When Balbus had finished, Cotta said with a smile: "You instruct me too late, Balbus, on what I am to defend. For while you were speaking, I was turning over in my own mind what I might say against you — not so much to refute you as to ask after the things I understood too little. And since each man must use his own judgment, it would be a hard thing to bring me to feel as you would have me feel."

Cum multae res in philosophia nequaquam satis adhuc explicatae sint, tum perdifficilis, Brute, quod tu minime ignoras, et perobscura quaestio est de natura deorum, quae et ad cognitionem animi pulcherrima est et ad moderandam religionem necessaria. De qua cum tam variae sint doctissimorum hominum tamque discrepantes sententiae, magno argumento esse debeat ea causa, principium philosophiae ad h * scientiam, prudenterque Academici a rebus incertis adsensionem cohibuisse. quid est enim temeritate turpius aut quid tam temerarium tamque indignum sapientis gravitate atque constantia quam aut falsum sentire aut quod non satis explorate perceptum sit et cognitum sine ulla dubitatione defendere?

At this Velleius said: "You have no idea how keenly I look forward to hearing you, Cotta. For our friend Balbus found your discourse against Epicurus delightful; so I in turn will offer myself to you as an attentive listener against the Stoics. For I trust you come, as you usually do, well prepared."

Velut in hac quaestione plerique, quod maxime veri simile est et quo omnes †sese duce natura venimus, deos esse dixerunt, dubitare se Protagoras, nullos esse omnino Diagoras Melius et Theodorus Cyrenaicus putaverunt. Qui vero deos esse dixerunt tanta sunt in varietate et dissensione, ut eorum infinitum sit enumerare sententias. nam et de figuris deorum et de locis atque sedibus et de actione vitae multa dicuntur, deque is summa philosophorum dissensione certatur; quod vero maxime rem causamque continet, utrum nihil agant nihil moliantur omni curatione et administratione rerum vacent, an contra ab iis et a principio omnia facta et constituta sint et ad infinitum tempus regantur atque moveantur, in primis quae magna dissensio est, eaque nisi diiudicatur in summo errore necesse est homines atque in maximarum rerum ignoratione versari.

Then Cotta said: "By Hercules, Velleius, I do — for my reckoning with Lucilius is not the same as it was with you." "How so, then?" said the other. "Because it seems to me that your Epicurus does not put up much of a fight over the immortal gods. He merely does not dare to deny that the gods exist, for fear of incurring some odium or charge; but when he asserts that the gods do nothing and care for nothing, and that they are furnished with human limbs but make no use of those limbs, he seems to be trifling — content to have said that there is a certain blessed and eternal nature.

Sunt enim philosophi et fuerunt qui omnino nullam habere censerent rerum humanarum procurationem deos. quorum si vera sententia est, quae potest esse pietas quae sanctitas quae religio? haec enim omnia pure atque caste tribuenda deorum numini ita sunt, si animadvertuntur ab is et si est aliquid a deis inmortalibus hominum generi tributum; sin autem dei neque possunt nos iuvare nec volunt nec omnino curant nec quid agamus animadvertunt nec est quod ab is ad hominum vitam permanare possit, quid est quod ullos deis inmortalibus cultus honores preces adhibeamus? in specie autem fictae simulationis sicut reliquae virtutes item pietas inesse non potest; cum qua simul sanctitatem et religionem tolli necesse est, quibus sublatis perturbatio vitae sequitur et magna confusio;

From Balbus, on the other hand, you noticed, I am sure, how many things were said, and how — even if less than true — they were nonetheless apt and consistent with one another. And so I intend, as I said, not so much to refute his discourse as to ask after the things I understood too little. So I leave it to you, Balbus: would you rather answer me as I question you on individual points, the things I have grasped too little, or hear my discourse entire?" Then Balbus said: "For my part, if you want anything explained to you, I would rather answer; but if you mean to question me not so much to understand as to refute, I will do whichever you please — either reply at once to each point you raise, or, when you have finished, to all of them together."

atque haut scio an pietate adversus deos sublata fides etiam et societas generis humani et una excellentissuma virtus iustitia tollatur. Sunt autem alii philosophi, et hi quidem magni atque nobiles, qui deorum mente atque ratione omnem mundum administrari et regi censeant, neque vero id solum, sed etiam ab isdem hominum vitae consuli et provideri; nam et fruges et reliqua quae terra pariat et tempestates ac temporum varietates caelique mutationes, quibus omnia quae terra gignat maturata pubescant, a dis inmortalibus tribui generi humano putant, multaque quae dicentur in his libris colligunt, quae talia sunt ut ea ipsa dei inmortales ad usum hominum fabricati paene videantur. Contra quos Carneades ita multa disseruit, ut excitaret homines non socordes ad veri investigandi cupiditatem.

Then Cotta said: "Excellent. So let us proceed as the discourse itself leads us. But before the matter at hand, a few words about myself. I am moved no slightly by your authority, Balbus, and by that part of your discourse which, in your peroration, urged me to remember that I am both a Cotta and a pontiff — which, I believe, came to this: that I should defend the beliefs we have received from our ancestors concerning the immortal gods, the rites, the ceremonies, the observances of religion. These I will indeed defend always, as I have always defended them, and no man’s discourse, learned or unlearned, will ever move me from the belief I received from my ancestors concerning the worship of the immortal gods. But when religion is the question, I follow Tiberius Coruncanius, Publius Scipio, Publius Scaevola, men who were chief pontiffs — not Zeno or Cleanthes or Chrysippus; and I have Gaius Laelius, an augur and at the same time a wise man, whom I would sooner hear speaking on religion, in that famous discourse of his, than any leader of the Stoics. And since the whole religion of the Roman people is divided into rites and auspices, with a third thing joined to them — whatever the interpreters of the Sibyl or the soothsayers have advised by way of prediction from portents and prodigies — I have always held that none of these observances is to be despised, and I have convinced myself that Romulus by establishing the auspices, and Numa by establishing the rites, laid the foundations of our state, which surely could never have grown so great without the fullest appeasement of the immortal gods.

res enim nulla est de qua tantopere non solum indocti sed etiam docti dissentiant; quorum opiniones cum tam variae sint tamque inter se dissidentes, alterum fieri profecto potest ut earum nulla, alterum certe non potest ut plus una vera sit. Qua quidem in causa et benivolos obiurgatores placare et invidos vituperatores confutare possumus, ut alteros reprehendisse paeniteat, alteri didicisse se gaudeant; nam qui admonent amice docendi sunt, qui inimice insectantur repellendi.

There you have, Balbus, what Cotta thinks, what a pontiff thinks. Now let me understand what you think; for from you, a philosopher, I am bound to receive a reasoned account of religion, whereas in our ancestors I must believe even when no account is rendered." Then Balbus said: "What account, then, do you want from me, Cotta?" And he replied: "Your division was fourfold: first, you proposed to show that the gods exist; next, of what kind they are; then, that the world is governed by them; and last, that they take thought for human affairs. This, if I remember rightly, was the partition." "Quite right," said Balbus; "but I am waiting to hear what you would ask."

Multum autem fluxisse video de libris nostris, quos compluris brevi tempore edidimus, variumque sermonem partim admirantium unde hoc philosophandi nobis subito studium extitisset, partim quid quaque de re certi haberemus scire cupientium; multis etiam sensi mirabile videri eam nobis potissimum probatam esse philosophiam, quae lucem eriperet et quasi noctem quandam rebus offunderet, desertaeque disciplinae et iam pridem relictae patrocinium necopinatum a nobis esse susceptum. Nos autem nec subito coepimus philosophari nec mediocrem a primo tempore aetatis in eo studio operam curamque consumpsimus, et cum minime videbamur tum maxime philosophabamur; quod et orationes declarant refertae philosophorum sententiis et doctissimorum hominum familiaritates, quibus semper domus nostra floruit, et principes illi Diodotus Philo Antiochus Posidonius, a quibus instituti sumus.

Then Cotta said: "Let us look at each point in turn. And as for the first — if it is first, the thing on which all but the wholly impious agree, and which cannot be burned out of my mind, namely that the gods exist — that very thing, of which I am convinced by the authority of my ancestors, why it should be so, you teach me nothing." "What is this?" said Balbus. "If you are convinced of it, why would you have me teach you?" Then Cotta said: "Because I approach this discussion as though I had never heard anything about the immortal gods, never given them a thought. Take me as a raw and untouched pupil, and teach me the things I ask."

et si omnia philosophiae praecepta referuntur ad vitam, arbitramur nos et publicis et privatis in rebus ea praestitisse quae ratio et doctrina praescripserit. Sin autem quis requirit quae causa nos inpulerit ut haec tam sero litteris mandaremus, nihil est quod expedire tam facile possimus. Nam cum otio langueremus et is esset rei publicae status ut eam unius consilio atque cura gubernari necesse esset, primum ipsius rei publicae causa philosophiam nostris hominibus explicandam putavi, magni existimans interesse ad decus et ad laudem civitatis res tam gravis tamque praeclaras Latinis etiam litteris contineri.

"Tell me, then," he said, "what you ask." "Why, this first: when you had said that on that side the matter is so plain it does not even need a discourse — that the gods exist being plain and agreed by all — why on that very point you said so much." "Because I have often noticed you too, Cotta," he said, "when you spoke in the Forum, loading the juror with as many arguments as you could, if only the case gave you the means. And philosophers do this same thing, and I have done it as I could. But what you ask is much as if you were to ask me why I look at you with two eyes and do not close the other, when I could attain the same end with one." Then Cotta said: "How apt that comparison is, you may judge for yourself.

eoque me minus instituti mei paenitet, quod facile sentio quam multorum non modo discendi sed etiam scribendi studia commoverim. complures enim Graecis institutionibus eruditi ea quae didicerant cum civibus suis communicare non poterant, quod illa quae a Graecis accepissent Latine dici posse diffiderent; quo in genere tantum profecisse videmur, ut a Graecis ne verborum quidem copia vinceremur.

For I am not in the habit, in lawsuits, of arguing for anything that is self-evident and agreed by all — argumentation only weakens what is clear — and even if I did so in the courts, I would not do the same in this finer kind of discourse. As for closing one eye, there would be no cause for that, since the gaze of both is the same, and since nature — which you would have to be wise — willed that we should have two channels bored from the mind to the eyes for light. But because you had no confidence that the thing was as plain as you would have it, for that reason you set out to show by many arguments that the gods exist. For me one thing was enough: that our ancestors had handed it down so. But you despise authorities and fight with reason;

Hortata etiam est ut me ad haec conferrem animi aegritudo fortunae magna et gravi commota iniuria; cuius si maiorem aliquam levationem reperire potuissem, non ad hanc potissimum confugissem. ea vero ipsa nulla ratione melius frui potui quam si me non modo ad legendos libros sed etiam ad totam philosophiam pertractandam dedissem. omnes autem eius partes atque omnia membra tum facillume noscuntur, cum totae quaestiones scribendo explicantur; est enim admirabilis quaedam continuatio seriesque rerum, ut alia ex alia nexa et omnes inter se aptae conligataeque videantur.

allow my reason, then, to contend with your reason. You bring forward all these arguments why there should be gods, and by your arguing you make doubtful a matter that in my view is not doubtful in the least; for I have committed to memory not only the number of your arguments but their order as well. The first was that, when we have looked up at the sky, we at once understand that there is some divine power by which all this is governed. From this came also that line: ’Behold this shining vault on high, which all

Qui autem requirunt quid quaque de re ipsi sentiamus, curiosius id faciunt quam necesse est; non enim tam auctoritatis in disputando quam rationis momenta quaerenda sunt. quin etiam obest plerumque iis qui discere volunt auctoritas eorum qui se docere profitentur; desinunt enim suum iudicium adhibere, id habent ratum quod ab eo quem probant iudicatum vident. nec vero probare soleo id quod de Pythagoreis accepimus, quos ferunt, si quid adfirmarent in disputando, cum ex iis quaereretur quare ita esset, respondere solitos ipse dixit; ipse autem erat Pythagoras: tantum opinio praeiudicata poterat, ut etiam sine ratione valeret auctoritas.

invoke as Jupiter’ — as if any of us called upon that Jupiter rather than the Jupiter of the Capitol, or as if this were plain and agreed by all, that those are gods which Velleius and many besides will not even grant to be living beings. A weighty argument too you thought it, that the belief in the immortal gods belongs to all men and grows greater every day: so it pleases you, then, that matters so great should be judged by the opinion of fools — and that with you above all, who say those very men are mad? ’But we see the gods present among us, as Postumius did at Lake Regillus, and Vatinius on the Salarian Way’ — and there is some tale, too, about the Locrians’ battle at the Sagra. Those, then, whom you called the Tyndaridae — that is, men born of a man — and whom Homer, who lived not long after their age, says were buried at Lacedaemon: do you suppose that these came to meet Vatinius on white horses, with no grooms, and announced the victory of the Roman people to Vatinius, a country fellow, rather than to Marcus Cato, who was then the leading man? And do you, in the same way, believe that the mark which appears today in the flint at Regillus is, as it were, the print of a hoof from Castor’s horse?

Qui autem admirantur nos hanc potissimum disciplinam secutos, his quattuor Academicis libris satis responsum videtur. Nec vero desertarum relictarumque rerum patrocinium suscepimus; non enim hominum interitu sententiae quoque occidunt, sed lucem auctoris fortasse desiderant. ut haec in philosophia ratio contra omnia disserendi nullamque rem aperte iudicandi profecta a Socrate repetita ab Arcesila confirmata a Carneade usque ad nostram viguit aetatem; quam nunc prope modum orbam esse in ipsa Graecia intellego. quod non Academiae vitio sed tarditate hominum arbitror contigisse. nam si singulas disciplinas percipere magnum est, quanto maius omnis; quod facere is necesse est quibus propositum est veri reperiendi causa et contra omnes philosophos et pro omnibus dicere.

Would you not rather believe what can be proved — that the souls of illustrious men, such as those Tyndaridae were, are divine and eternal — than that men once cremated could ride horses and fight in the line of battle? Or, if you say this could have happened, you ought to teach how, and not bring out old wives’ tales."

cuius rei tantae tamque difficilis facultatem consecutum esse me non profiteor, secutum esse prae me fero. Nec tamen fieri potest ut qui hac ratione philosophentur hi nihil habeant quod sequantur. dictum est omnino de hac re alio loco diligentius, sed quia nimis indociles quidam tardique sunt admonendi videntur saepius. non enim sumus i quibus nihil verum esse videatur, sed i qui omnibus veris falsa quaedam adiuncta esse dicamus tanta similitudine ut in is nulla insit certa iudicandi et adsentiendi nota. ex quo exsistit et illud, multa esse probabilia, quae quamquam non perciperentur, tamen, quia visum quendam haberent insignem et inlustrem, his sapientis vita regeretur.

Then Lucilius said: "Do they seem to you mere tales? Do you not see the temple to Castor and Pollux dedicated in the Forum by Aulus Postumius, and the decree of the Senate concerning Vatinius? As for the Sagra, there is even a common proverb among the Greeks, who, when they affirm something, call it ’surer than the things at the Sagra.’ Ought you not, then, to be moved by such authorities?" Then Cotta said: "It is with rumors that you fight me, Balbus, while I ask reasons of you.... What follows is what is to come;

Sed iam, ut omni me invidia liberem, ponam in medio sententias philosophorum de natura deorum. quo quidem loco convocandi omnes videntur, qui quae sit earum vera iudicent; tum demum mihi procax Academia videbitur, si aut consenserint omnes aut erit inventus aliquis qui quid verum sit invenerit. itaque mihi libet exclamare ut in Synephebis: pro deum, popularium omnium, omnium adulescentium clamo postulo obsecro oro ploro atque inploro fidem non levissuma de re, ut queritur ille in civitate fieri facinora capitalia: ab amico amante argentum accipere meretrix non vult, sed ut adsint cognoscant animadvertant, quid de religione pietate sanctitate caerimoniis fide iure iurando, quid de templis delubris sacrificiisque sollemnibus, quid de ipsis auspiciis, quibus nos praesumus, existimandum sit (haec enim omnia ad hanc de dis inmortalibus quaestionem referenda sunt):

for no one can escape what is to be. And often it is not even useful to know what will be; for it is a wretched thing to be tormented to no purpose, and not to have even the last consolation common to all, namely hope — especially since you yourselves say that all things come about by fate, and that what has been true forever from all eternity is fate. What good is it, then, or what does it bring toward taking precaution, to know that something will be, when it certainly will be? And again — where does that divination of yours come from? Who discovered the cleft in a liver, who marked the cry of the crow, who the lots? In these I believe, and I cannot despise the staff of Attus Navius whom you brought up; but how these things came to be understood by the philosophers, that I must learn — especially since those diviners of yours lie about a great many matters.

profecto eos ipsos, qui se aliquid certi habere arbitrantur, addubitare coget doctissimorum hominum de maxuma re tanta dissensio.

’But physicians too’ — for so you were saying — ’are often deceived.’ What likeness is there between medicine, whose method I see, and divination, whose source I do not understand? You hold besides that the gods were appeased by the self-devotions of the Decii. What was their injustice so great that they could not be appeased toward the Roman people unless such men had perished? That was a general’s stratagem — what the Greeks call stratēgēma — but the stratagem of generals who took thought for their country and did not spare their own lives; for they reckoned that the army would follow a general who, spurring his horse, hurled himself against the enemy, and so it fell out. As for the voice of Faunus, I myself have never heard it; if you say that you have heard it, I will believe you, though I have no idea at all what a Faunus is. So far, then, Balbus, at least so far as it rests with you, I do not understand that the gods exist — gods whom I for my part believe to exist, but the Stoics teach me nothing.

Quod cum saepe alias tum maxime animadverti cum apud C. Cottam familiarem meum accurate sane et diligenter de dis inmortalibus disputatumst. nam cum feriis Latinis ad eum ipsius rogatu arcessituque venissem, offendi eum sedentem in exedra et cum C. Velleio senatore disputantem, ad quem tum Epicurei primas ex nostris hominibus deferebant. aderat etiam Q. Lucilius Balbus, qui tantos progressus habebat in Stoicis, ut cum excellentibus in eo genere Graecis compararetur. Tum ut me Cotta vidit Peroportune inquit venis; oritur enim mihi magna de re altercatio cum Velleio, cui pro tuo studio non est alienum te interesse.

For Cleanthes, as you were saying, holds that the notions of the gods are formed in the minds of men in four ways. The first is the one I have spoken of enough, the one taken from the foreknowledge of things to come; the second, from the disturbances of the weather and the other motions; the third, from the convenience and abundance of the things we enjoy; the fourth, from the order of the stars and the constancy of the heavens. Of foreknowledge we have spoken. Of disturbances in sky, sea, and earth we cannot say, when these occur, that there are not many who fear them and suppose them to be brought about by the immortal gods;

Atqui mihi quoque videor inquam venisse, ut dicis, oportune. tres enim trium disciplinarum principes convenistis. M. enim Piso si adesset, nullius philosophiae, earum quidem quae in honore sunt, vacaret locus. Tum Cotta Si inquit liber Antiochi nostri, qui ab eo nuper ad hunc Balbum missus est, vera loquitur, nihil est quod Pisonem familiarem tuum desideres; Antiocho enim Stoici cum Peripateticis re concinere videntur verbis discrepare; quo de libro Balbe velim scire quid sentias. Egone inquit ille, miror Antiochum hominem in primis acutum non vidisse interesse plurimum inter Stoicos, qui honesta a commodis non nomine sed genere toto diiungerent, et Peripateticos, qui honesta commiscerent cum commodis, ut ea inter se magnitudine et quasi gradibus non genere differrent. haec enim est non verborum parva sed rerum permagna dissensio. verum hoc alias; nunc quod coepimus, si videtur.

But that is not the question — whether there are some people who think the gods exist; the question is whether the gods exist or not. For the remaining grounds that Cleanthes brings forward — one of them concerning the abundance of advantages we receive, another concerning the ordering of the seasons and the constancy of the heavens — these I shall take up when we come to dispute about the providence of the gods, on which a great deal was said by you, Balbus;

Mihi vero inquit Cotta videtur. sed ut hic qui intervenit me intuens ne ignoret quae res agatur, de natura agebamus deorum, quae cum mihi videretur perobscura, ut semper videri solet, Epicuri ex Velleio sciscitabar sententiam. quam ob rem inquit Vellei, nisi molestum est, repete quae coeperas. Repetam vero, quamquam non mihi sed tibi hic venit adiutor; ambo enim inquit adridens ab eodem Philone nihil scire didicistis. Tum ego: Quid didicerimus Cotta viderit, tu autem nolo existimes me adiutorem huic venisse sed auditorem, et quidem aecum, libero iudicio, nulla eius modi adstrictum necessitate, ut mihi velim nolim sit certa quaedam tuenda sententia.

and to that same place I shall also defer the point you said Chrysippus made — that since there is something in the natural world which cannot be brought about by man, there exists something better than man — together with the comparisons you drew between the beauty of a fine house and the beauty of the world, and the case you made for the harmony and concord of the whole world. Zeno’s brief and rather clever syllogisms, too, I shall defer to that part of the discussion I have just named; and at that same time all those things you stated as a natural philosopher — about the fiery force and about that heat from which you said all things are generated — shall be examined in their proper place; and everything you said the day before yesterday, when you wished to prove the gods exist, as to why the whole world and the sun and the moon and the stars should possess sensation and mind, all of this I shall reserve for the same occasion.

Tum Velleius fidenter sane, ut solent isti, nihil tam verens quam ne dubitare aliqua de re videretur, tamquam modo ex deorum concilio et ex Epicuri intermundiis descendisset, Audite inquit “non futtilis commenticiasque sententias, non opificem aedificatoremque mundi Platonis de Timaeo deum, nec anum fatidicam Stoicorum Pronoeam, quam Latine licet Providentiam dicere, neque vero mundum ipsum animo et sensibus praeditum rutundum ardentem volubilem deum, portenta et miracula non disserentium philosophorum sed somniantium.

But of you, again and again, I shall ask this one same thing: by what reasonings do you persuade yourself that the gods exist?” Then Balbus said: For my part I think I have brought forward my reasonings; but you refute them in such a way that, just when you seem about to question me and I have made myself ready to answer, you suddenly turn your discourse aside and give me no room to reply. And so matters of the greatest weight have passed by in silence — divination, fate — questions on which you indeed speak only in passing, but on which our school is accustomed to say a great deal, though they are kept distinct from the very question now in hand. So, if you please, do not proceed in a confused manner, so that in this disputation we may unravel the thing that is in question. Excellent, said Cotta.

Quibus enim oculis animi intueri potuit vester Plato fabricam illam tanti operis, qua construi a deo atque aedificari mundum facit; quae molitio quae ferramenta qui vectes quae machinae qui ministri tanti muneris fuerunt; quem ad modum autem oboedire et parere voluntati architecti aer ignis aqua terra potuerunt; unde vero ortae illae quinque formae, ex quibus reliqua formantur, apte cadentes ad animum afficiendum pariendosque sensus? longum est ad omnia, quae talia sunt ut optata magis quam inventa videantur;

“And so, since you divided the whole question into four parts, and we have spoken of the first, let us consider the second; which seemed to me to be of this kind — that, when you wished to show what sort of beings the gods are, you showed there are none at all. You said it was extremely difficult to draw the mind away from the habit of the eyes; yet, since nothing is more excellent than a god, you did not doubt that the world is a god, since there is nothing better than it in the natural world — if only we could conceive of it as a living being, or rather discern this with the mind, as we discern other things with the eyes.

sed illa palmaris, quod, qui non modo natum mundum introduxerit sed etiam manu paene factum, is eum dixerit fore sempiternum. hunc censes primis ut dicitur labris gustasse physiologiam id est naturae rationem, qui quicquam quod ortum sit putet aeternum esse posse? quae est enim coagmentatio non dissolubilis, aut quid est cuius principium aliquod sit nihil sit extremum? Pronoea vero si vestra est Lucili eadem, requiro quae paulo ante, ministros machinas omnem totius operis dissignationem atque apparatum; sin alia est, cur mortalem fecerit mundum, non, quem ad modum Platonicus deus, sempiternum.

But when you deny that anything is better than the world, what do you mean by better? If more beautiful, I agree; if better fitted to our advantages, that too I agree; but if you mean that nothing is wiser than the world, I do not in the least agree — not because it is difficult to call the mind away from the eyes, but because the more I call it away, the less I can grasp with the mind what you wish me to. “Nothing in the natural world is better than the world.” Not even on earth is anything better than our own city; do you therefore think that on that account reason, thought, and mind reside in the city? Or, since they do not, do you on that account judge that an ant must be set above this most beautiful city, on the ground that in a city there is no sensation, while in an ant there is not only sensation but mind, reason, and memory? You ought to see, Balbus, what is granted to you, and not yourself assume what you would like.

Ab utroque autem sciscitor cur mundi aedificatores repente exstiterint, innumerabilia saecla dormierint; non enim si mundus nullus erat saecla non erant (saecla nunc dico non ea quae dierum noctiumque numero annuis cursibus conficiuntur; nam fateor ea sine mundi conversione effici non potuisse; sed fuit quaedam ab infinito tempore aeternitas, quam nulla circumscriptio temporum metiebatur, spatio tamen qualis ea fuerit intellegi potest, quod ne in cogitationem quidem cadit ut fuerit

For that whole position was opened out by that old, brief, and — as it seemed to you — clever syllogism of Zeno’s. For Zeno argues thus: “That which uses reason is better than that which does not use reason; but nothing is better than the world;

tempus aliquod nullum cum tempus esset)—isto igitur tam inmenso spatio quaero Balbe cur Pronoea vestra cessaverit. laboremne fugiebat? at iste nec attingit deum nec erat ullus, cum omnes naturae numini divino, caelum ignes terrae maria, parerent. Quid autem erat quod concupisceret deus mundum signis et luminibus tamquam aedilis ornare? si ut deus ipse melius habitaret, antea videlicet tempore infinito in tenebris tamquam in gurgustio habitaverat. post autem: varietatene eum delectari putamus, qua caelum et terras exornatas videmus? quae ista potest esse oblectatio deo? quae si esset, non ea tam diu carere potuisset.

therefore the world uses reason.” If this is acceptable, you will soon make the world appear to read a book superbly; for following in Zeno’s footsteps you will be able to draw your conclusion in this fashion: “That which is lettered is better than that which is not lettered; but nothing is better than the world; therefore the world is lettered” — and in that manner the world is also eloquent, and indeed a mathematician, a musician, finally trained in every branch of learning, and at last a philosopher. You said often that nothing comes to be without a god, and that there is no power in nature able to fashion things unlike itself: shall I grant that the world is not only living and wise but also a lyre-player and a trumpeter, since men of those arts too are brought forth from it? Then that father of the Stoics offers nothing to make us think the world uses reason, nor even that it is a living being. The world, therefore, is not a god; and yet there is nothing better than it: for there is nothing more beautiful than it, nothing more wholesome to us, nothing more adorned to look upon or more constant in its motion. But if the world as a whole is not a god, neither are the stars, which you placed, beyond counting, in the number of the gods. Their even and eternal courses delighted you — and by Hercules, not without cause, for they move with an admirable and incredible constancy.

an haec, ut fere dicitis, hominum causa a deo constituta sunt? sapientiumne? propter paucos igitur tanta est rerum facta molitio. an stultorum? at primum causa non fuit cur de inprobis bene mereretur; deinde quid est adsecutus, cum omnes stulti sint sine dubio miserrimi, maxime quod stulti sunt (miserius enim stultitia quid possumus dicere), deinde quod ita multa sunt incommoda in vita, ut ea sapientes commodorum conpensatione leniant, stulti nec vitare venientia possint nec ferre praesentia. Qui vero mundum ipsum animantem sapientemque esse dixerunt, nullo modo viderunt animi natura intellegentis in quam figuram cadere posset. de quo dicam equidem paulo post, nunc autem hactenus:

But not all things, Balbus, that have fixed and constant courses are to be ascribed to a god rather than to nature. What do you suppose can be more constant than the Chalcidian Euripus in its repeated ebb and flow back and forth? Than the Sicilian strait? Than the seething of the Ocean in those regions, “where the ravening wave divides Europe from Libya”? Are not the sea-tides, whether of Spain or of Britain, with their advances and retreats at fixed times, able to come about without a god? Consider, I beg you: if we call divine all motion and all things that keep their order at fixed times, must we not say that tertian and quartan fevers too are divine — for what can be more constant than their recurrence and movement? But of all such things an account must be rendered;

admirabor eorum tarditatem qui animantem inmortalem et eundem beatum rutundum esse velint, quod ea forma neget ullam esse pulchriorem Plato: at mihi vel cylindri vel quadrati vel coni vel pyramidis videtur esse formosior. Quae vero vita tribuitur isti rutundo deo? nempe ut ea celeritate contorqueatur cui par nulla ne cogitari quidem possit; in qua non video ubinam mens constans et vita beata possit insistere. Quodque in nostro corpore si minima ex parte significetur molestum sit, cur hoc idem non habeatur molestum in deo? terra enim profecto, quoniam mundi pars est, pars est etiam dei; atqui terrae maxumas regiones inhabitabilis atque incultas videmus, quod pars earum adpulsu solis exarserit, pars obriguerit nive pruinaque longinquo solis abscessu; quae, si mundus est deus, quoniam mundi partes sunt, dei membra partim ardentia partim refrigerata ducenda sunt.

and when you cannot do this, you flee to a god as though to an altar. And Chrysippus seemed to you to speak shrewdly — a man without doubt versatile and shrewd (I call those versatile whose mind turns quickly, and those shrewd whose mind has grown hardened by use, as a hand grows hardened by work); so he says: “If there is something that man cannot bring about, then whatever brings it about is better than man; but man cannot bring about the things that are in the world; therefore whoever was able to do so surpasses man; but who could surpass man except a god? Therefore a god exists.” All of this turns upon the same error as that argument of Zeno’s.

Atque haec quidem vestra Lucili; qualia vero * est, ab ultimo repetam superiorum. Thales enim Milesius, qui primus de talibus rebus quaesivit, aquam dixit esse initium rerum, deum autem eam mentem quae ex aqua cuncta fingeret: si dei possunt esse sine sensu; et mentem cur aquae adiunxit, si ipsa mens constare potest vacans corpore? Anaximandri autem opinio est nativos esse deos longis intervallis orientis occidentisque, eosque innumerabilis esse mundos. sed nos deum nisi sempiternum intellegere qui possumus?

For what is better, what is more excellent, what is the difference between nature and reason — none of this is distinguished. And the same man, if the gods do not exist, denies that there is anything in all of nature better than man; yet for any human being to think that nothing is better than man he judges to be the height of arrogance. Let it be the mark of an arrogant man to think more of himself than of the world; but to understand that he himself has sensation and reason, while Orion and the Dog-Star do not — that is the mark not of an arrogant man but rather of a prudent one. And “If a house is beautiful,” he says, “let us understand it was built for its masters and not for mice; so, then, we ought to judge the world to be the house of the gods.” I would judge precisely so, if I thought it built, and not — as I shall show — shaped by nature.

Post Anaximenes aera deum statuit, eumque gigni esseque inmensum et infinitum et semper in motu: quasi aut aer sine ulla forma deus esse possit, cum praesertim deum non modo aliqua sed pulcherrima specie deceat esse, aut non omne quod ortum sit mortalitas consequatur. Inde Anaxagoras, qui accepit ab Anaximene disciplinam, primus omnium rerum discriptionem et modum mentis infinitae vi ac ratione dissignari et confici voluit. in quo non vidit neque motum sensu iunctum et in continentem infinito ullum esse posse, neque sensum omnino quo non ipsa natura pulsa sentiret. deinde si mentem istam quasi animal aliquod voluit esse, erit aliquid interius ex quo illud animal nominetur; quid autem interius mente: cingatur igitur corpore externo;

But, says he, Socrates in Xenophon asks where we should have caught up our soul if there were none in the world. And I ask where we caught up speech, where numbers, where song — unless indeed we suppose the sun talks with the moon when it has drawn nearer, or that the world sings in harmony, as Pythagoras believes. These things, Balbus, belong to nature — nature that walks not artfully, as Zeno says (and we shall presently see just what that claim amounts to), but that sets all things in motion and stirs them by its own movements and changes.

quod quoniam non placet, aperta simplexque mens nulla re adiuncta, quae sentire possit, fugere intellegentiae nostrae vim et notionem videtur. Crotoniates autem Alcmaeo, qui soli et lunae reliquisque sideribus animoque praeterea divinitatem dedit, non sensit sese mortalibus rebus inmortalitatem dare. Nam Pythagoras, qui censuit animum esse per naturam rerum omnem intentum et commeantem, ex quo nostri animi carperentur, non vidit distractione humanorum animorum discerpi et lacerari deum, et cum miseri animi essent, quod plerisque contingeret, tum dei partem esse miseram, quod fieri non potest.

And so that discourse of yours about the harmony and concord of nature pleased me — nature which you said breathes together, as if held continuous by a kind of kinship; but what I did not approve was your denial that this could come about unless nature were held together by one divine breath. In fact it coheres and endures by the powers of nature, not of the gods, and there is in it that kind of concord which the Greeks call sympatheian; but the more it arises of its own accord, the less it is to be thought to come about by divine reason.

cur autem quicquam ignoraret animus hominis, si esset deus? quo modo porro deus iste, si nihil esset nisi animus, aut infixus aut infusus esset in mundo? Tum Xenophanes, qui mente adiuncta omne praeterea, quod esset infinitum, deum voluit esse, de ipsa mente item reprehendetur ut ceteri, de infinitate autem vehementius, in qua nihil neque sentiens neque coniunctum potest esse. Nam Parmenides quidem commenticium quiddam: coronae similem efficit ( stefa/nhn appellat) continentem ardorum lucis orbem, qui cingit caelum, quem appellat deum; in quo neque figuram divinam neque sensum quisquam suspicari potest. multaque eiusdem monstra, quippe qui bellum qui discordiam qui cupiditatem ceteraque generis eiusdem ad deum revocet, quae vel morbo vel somno vel oblivione vel vetustate delentur; eademque de sideribus, quae reprehensa in alio iam in hoc omittantur.

And those arguments which Carneades used to bring forward — how do you dissolve them? If no body is immortal, no body is everlasting; but no body is immortal, not even an indivisible one, nor one that cannot be sundered and torn apart; and since every animate being has a nature capable of being acted upon, there is none of them that escapes the necessity of receiving something from outside — that is, as it were, of bearing and suffering it; and if every animate being is of this kind, none is immortal. So likewise, if every animate being can be cut and divided, none of them is indivisible, none eternal; but every animate being is constituted to receive and bear an external force; therefore every animate being must of necessity be mortal, dissoluble, and divisible.

Empedocles autem multa alia peccans in deorum opinione turpissume labitur. quattuor enim naturas, ex quibus omnia constare censet, divinas esse vult; quas et nasci et extingui perspicuum est et sensu omni carere. Nec vero Protagoras, qui sese negat omnino de deis habere quod liqueat, sint non sint qualesve sint, quicquam videtur de natura deorum suspicari. Quid Democritus, qui tum imagines eorumque circumitus in deorum numero refert, tum illam naturam quae imagines fundat ac mittat, tum sententiam intellegentiamque nostram, nonne in maximo errore versatur? cum idem omnino, quia nihil semper suo statu maneat, neget esse quicquam sempiternum, nonne deum omnino ita tollit, ut nullam opinionem eius reliquam faciat? Quid aer, quo Diogenes Apolloniates utitur deo, quem sensum habere potest aut quam formam dei?

For just as, if all wax were changeable, there would be nothing waxen that could not be changed, and likewise nothing silver, nothing bronze, if the nature of silver and bronze were changeable — so, in like manner, if all the things that exist, out of which all things are composed, are changeable, then there can be no body that is not changeable; but those things out of which all things are composed are changeable, as it seems to you; therefore every body is changeable. But if there were any immortal body, not every body would be changeable; and so it follows that every body is mortal. For every body is either water or air or fire or earth, or that which is compounded out of these, or out of some part of them.

Iam de Platonis inconstantia longum est dicere, qui in Timaeo patrem huius mundi nominari neget posse, in Legum autem libris quid sit omnino deus anquiri oportere non censeat. quod vero sine corpore ullo deum vult esse (ut Graeci dicunt a)sw/maton ), id quale esse possit intellegi non potest: careat enim sensu necesse est, careat etiam prudentia, careat voluptate; quae omnia una cum deorum notione conprehendimus. idem et in Timaeo dicit et in Legibus et mundum deum esse et caelum et astra et terram et animos et eos quos maiorum institutis accepimus. quae et per se sunt falsa perspicue et inter se vehementer repugnantia.

But there is none of these that does not perish; for everything earthen is divided, and moisture is so soft that it can easily be pressed and crushed together; fire indeed and air are most easily driven off by any blow, and are by nature most yielding and most readily dispersed. And besides, all these perish whenever they are turned into another nature, which happens when earth turns itself into water, and when from water air arises, and from air aether, and when these same elements in their turn travel back again. But if it is so, that those things perish out of which every animate being is composed, then no animate being is everlasting.

Atque etiam Xenophon paucioribus verbis eadem fere peccat; facit enim in his quae a Socrate dicta rettulit Socratem disputantem formam dei quaeri non oportere, eundemque et solem et animum deum dicere, et modo unum tum autem plures deos; quae sunt isdem in erratis fere quibus ea quae de Platone dicimus.

And even if we leave all this aside, still no animate being can be found that was never born at any time and will always exist in the future. For every animate being has sensation; it senses, therefore, things hot and cold, sweet and bitter, nor can it through any sense receive what is pleasant and not receive the contrary; if, then, it takes in the sensation of pleasure, it takes in that of pain as well; but whatever receives pain must of necessity also receive destruction; therefore every animate being must be admitted to be mortal. Besides, if there is anything that feels neither pleasure nor pain, that thing cannot be an animate being;

Atque etiam Antisthenes in eo libro qui physicus inscribitur popularis deos multos naturalem unum esse dicens tollit vim et naturam deorum. Nec multo secus Speusippus Platonem avunculum subsequens et vim quandam dicens, qua omnia regantur, eamque animalem, evellere ex animis conatur cognitionem deorum.

But if, on the other hand, because a thing is a living creature it must therefore have sensation, then because it has sensation it cannot be eternal; and every living creature has sensation; no living creature, therefore, is eternal. Besides, there can be no living creature in which there is not both a natural appetite and a natural aversion. Now the things that are sought are those that accord with nature, the things that are avoided are their opposites; and every living creature seeks certain things and flees from certain others, and what it flees from is contrary to its nature, and what is contrary to its nature has the power to destroy it. Every living creature, therefore, must of necessity perish.

Aristotelesque in tertio de philosophia libro multa turbat a magistro suo Platone dissentiens; modo enim menti tribuit omnem divinitatem, modo mundum ipsum deum dicit esse, modo alium quendam praeficit mundo eique eas partis tribuit ut replicatione quadam mundi motum regat atque tueatur, tum caeli ardorem deum dicit esse non intellegens caelum mundi esse partem, quem alio loco ipse designarit deum. quo modo autem caeli divinus ille sensus in celeritate tanta conservari potest? ubi deinde illi tot dii, si numeramus etiam caelum deum? cum autem sine corpore idem vult esse deum, omni illum sensu privat, etiam prudentia. quo porro modo mundus moveri carens corpore aut quo modo semper se movens esse quietus et beatus potest?

The grounds are innumerable from which it can be established and forced upon us that nothing which possesses sensation is exempt from perishing. For those very things that are felt — cold, heat, pleasure, pain, and the rest — destroy when they are intensified; and no living creature is without sensation; no living creature, therefore, is eternal. And indeed, the nature of a living thing is either simple — earthy, say, or fiery, or airy, or watery, what such a thing would be cannot even be conceived — or else compounded of several natures, of which each has its own place toward which it is borne by natural force, one to the lowest, another to the highest, another to the middle. These can cohere for a certain span of time, but in no way can they cohere forever; for each must of necessity be swept by nature into its own place. No living creature, therefore, is everlasting.

Nec vero eius condiscipulus Xenocrates in hoc genere prudentior est, cuius in libris qui sunt de natura deorum nulla species divina describitur; deos enim octo esse dicit, quinque eos qui in stellis vagis nominantur, unum qui ex omnibus sideribus quae infixa caelo sint ex dispersis quasi membris simplex sit putandus deus, septimum solem adiungit octavamque lunam; qui quo sensu beati esse possint intellegi non potest. Ex eadem Platonis schola Ponticus Heraclides puerilibus fabulis refersit libros, et tamen modo mundum tum mentem divinam esse putat, errantibus etiam stellis divinitatem tribuit sensuque deum privat et eius formam mutabilem esse vult, eodemque in libro rursus terram et caelum refert in deos.

But your school, Balbus, is in the habit of referring everything to the power of fire — following Heraclitus, I suppose, whom not everyone interprets in one and the same way; since what he meant he was unwilling to have understood, let us pass him over. You, however, put it thus: that all force is fire, and accordingly that living things too perish when their heat has failed, and that throughout the whole of nature the thing that lives and the thing that thrives is the thing that is warm. I, for my part, do not understand how bodies perish when their heat is extinguished but do not perish with the loss of moisture or breath — especially since they perish from excessive heat as well.

Nec vero Theophrasti inconstantia ferenda est; modo enim menti divinum tribuit principatum modo caelo, tum autem signis sideribusque caelestibus. Nec audiendus eius auditor Strato is qui physicus appellatur, qui omnem vim divinam in natura sitam esse censet, quae causas gignendi augendi minuendi habeat sed careat omni et sensu et figura.

On that score, then, the point about the warm is held in common; but let us nonetheless see where it comes out. You hold, I believe, that there is no living thing outside in nature and in the universe except fire: why fire any more than breath, of which the very mind of living things is composed, from which the word "living" is derived? But how do you take it as a thing all but conceded that the mind is nothing but fire? For it seems more probable that the mind is something of this kind: a tempering of fire with breath. "But if fire by itself is a living creature, with no other nature mingled in, then since it, when it is present in our bodies, makes us capable of sensation, it cannot itself be without sensation." Again the same things can be said: for whatever it is that possesses sensation must of necessity feel both pleasure and pain, and the thing to which pain comes also comes to destruction. So it turns out that you cannot make even fire eternal.

Zeno autem, ut iam ad vestros Balbe veniam, naturalem legem divinam esse censet, eamque vim obtinere recta imperantem prohibentemque contraria. quam legem quo modo efficiat animantem intellegere non possumus; deum autem animantem certe volumus esse. atque hic idem alio loco aethera deum dicit: si intellegi potest nihil sentiens deus, qui numquam nobis occurrit neque in precibus neque in optatis neque in votis. aliis autem libris rationem quandam per omnium naturam rerum pertinentem vi divina esse adfectam putat. idem astris hoc idem tribuit, tum annis mensibus annorumque mutationibus. cum vero Hesiodi Theogoniam id est originem deorum interpretatur, tollit omnino usitatas perceptasque cognitiones deorum; neque enim Iovem neque Iunonem neque Vestam neque quemquam qui ita appelletur in deorum habet numero, sed rebus inanimis atque mutis per quandam significationem haec docet tributa nomina.

Why, is it not the view of your very own school that all fire needs nourishment and can in no way endure unless it is fed, and that the sun, the moon, and the rest of the stars are fed by waters, some by fresh and some by the sea’s? And Cleanthes adduces this as the reason why the sun turns back and goes no farther than the summer circle and likewise the winter one: so that it should not stray too far from its food. What this whole notion amounts to we shall see shortly; for now let this be the conclusion: that what can perish is not eternal by nature; that fire will perish unless it is fed; that fire, therefore, is not by nature everlasting.

Cuius discipuli Aristonis non minus magno in errore sententiast, qui neque formam dei intellegi posse censeat neque in dis sensum esse dicat dubitetque omnino deus animans necne sit. Cleanthes autem, qui Zenonem audivit una cum eo quem proxime nominavi, tum ipsum mundum deum dicit esse, tum totius naturae menti atque animo tribuit hoc nomen, tum ultimum et altissimum atque undique circumfusum et extremum omnia cingentem atque conplexum ardorem, qui aether nominetur, certissimum deum iudicat; idemque quasi delirans in his libris quos scripsit contra voluptatem tum fingit formam quandam et speciem deorum, tum divinitatem omnem tribuit astris, tum nihil ratione censet esse divinius. ita fit ut deus ille, quem mente noscimus atque in animi notione tamquam in vestigio volumus reponere, nusquam prorsus appareat. At Persaeus eiusdem Zenonis auditor eos esse habitos deos a quibus aliqua magna utilitas ad vitae cultum esset inventa, ipsasque res utiles et salutares deorum esse vocabulis nuncupatas, ut ne hoc quidem diceret, illa inventa esse deorum, sed ipsa divina;

And what sort of god can we conceive who is endowed with no virtue? Why, shall we attribute prudence to a god — prudence, which consists in the knowledge of things good and bad and neither good nor bad? To one who has, and can have, no evil, what need is there of choosing between good and bad, what need of reason, what of intelligence — which we use to attain the obscure by means of the plain? But to a god nothing can be obscure. As for justice, which assigns to each his own, what has it to do with the gods? For it is the fellowship and community of men, as you yourselves say, that begot justice. And temperance consists in foregoing the pleasures of the body: if there is room in heaven for temperance, there is room for pleasures too. For how can a god be conceived as brave — in pain, or in toil, or in danger?

quo quid absurdius quam aut res sordidas atque deformis deorum honore adficere aut homines iam morte deletos reponere in deos, quorum omnis cultus esset futurus in luctu.

None of which touches a god. How, then, can we conceive a god who neither employs reason nor is endowed with any virtue? And indeed I cannot despise the ignorance of the common crowd and the unlearned when I consider what is said by the Stoics. For those are the beliefs of the ignorant: the Syrians venerate a fish, the Egyptians have consecrated nearly every kind of beast; and in Greece, again, they have many gods who were once men — Alabandus at Alabanda, Tenes at Tenedos, Leucothea, who was once Ino, and her son Palaemon throughout all Greece — and Hercules, Aesculapius, the sons of Tyndareus, our own Romulus, and a good many others besides, whom they suppose to have been received into heaven as new and enrolled citizens, so to speak.

Iam vero Chrysippus, qui Stoicorum somniorum vaferrumus habetur interpres, magnam turbam congregat ignotorum deorum, atque ita ignotorum ut eos ne coniectura quidem informare possimus, cum mens nostra quidvis videatur cogitatione posse depingere. ait enim vim divinam in ratione esse positam et in universae naturae animo atque mente, ipsumque mundum deum dicit esse et eius animi fusionem universam, tum eius ipsius principatum qui in mente et ratione versetur, communemque rerum naturam universam atque omnia continentem, tum fatalem †umbram et necessitatem rerum futurarum, ignem praeterea et eum quem ante dixi aethera, tum ea quae natura fluerent atque manarent, ut et aquam et terram et aera, solem lunam sidera universitatemque rerum qua omnia continerentur, atque etiam homines eos qui inmortalitatem essent consecuti.

So much, then, for the unlearned; what of you philosophers, who do better? I pass over those finer doctrines, for they are splendid: let the world itself, by all means, be a god. This, I take it, is what is meant by "that radiance on high, whom all men invoke as Jove." Why, then, do we add more gods? And how great is their multitude — to me, at any rate, they seem quite many; for you count the single stars as gods and call them either by the names of beasts, like the Goat, the Scorpion, the Bull, the Lion, or by the names of inanimate things, like the Argo, the Altar, the Crown.

idemque disputat aethera esse eum quem homines Iovem appellarent, quique aer per maria manaret eum esse Neptunum, terramque eam esse quae Ceres diceretur, similique ratione persequitur vocabula reliquorum deorum. idemque etiam legis perpetuae et aeternae vim, quae quasi dux vitae et magistra officiorum sit, Iovem dicit esse, eandemque fatalem necessitatem appellat sempiternam rerum futurarum veritatem; quorum nihil tale est ut in eo vis divina inesse videatur.

But even granting these, how on earth can the rest not merely be granted but understood at all? When we call grain Ceres and wine Liber, we are using a customary turn of speech; but do you suppose anyone so out of his mind as to believe that the thing he eats is a god? As for those whom you say have passed from being men to being gods, you will render an account of how that could have come about, or why it has ceased to come about, and I shall be glad to learn; for as the case now stands, I do not see how the man for whom "torches were brought to Mount Oeta," as Accius says, passed from that blaze "into the eternal house of his father." Yet Homer has him met among the dead by Ulysses, just like the others who had departed from life.

et haec quidem in primo libro de natura deorum; in secundo autem volt Orphei Musaei Hesiodi Homerique fabellas accommodare ad ea quae ipse primo libro de deis inmortalibus dixerit, ut etiam veterrimi poetae, qui haec ne suspicati quidem sint, Stoici fuisse videantur. Quem Diogenes Babylonius consequens in eo libro qui inscribitur de Minerva partum Iovis ortumque virginis ad physiologiam traducens deiungit a fabula.

Though indeed which Hercules above all we ought to worship I should very much like to know; for those who probe the deeper and more recondite writings hand down to us several. The most ancient was born of Jove — but of Jove the most ancient as well, for in the old writings of the Greeks we find several Joves too: of him, then, and of Lysithoe is that Hercules whom we are told contended with Apollo over the tripod. A second is handed down as Egyptian, born of the Nile, who they say composed the Phrygian letters. A third is from the Idaean Dactyls, to whom they bring funeral offerings. A fourth is the son of Jove and of Asteria, sister of Latona; he is worshipped above all at Tyre, and they hold Carthage to be his daughter. A fifth is in India, who is called Belus. A sixth is this one, born of Alcmena, whom Jupiter begot — but the third Jupiter, since, as I shall presently show, we have received several Joves as well.

Exposui fere non philosophorum iudicia sed delirantium somnia. Nec enim multo absurdiora sunt ea quae poetarum vocibus fusa ipsa suavitate nocuerunt, qui et ira inflammatos et libidine furentis induxerunt deos feceruntque ut eorum bella proelia pugnas vulnera videremus, odia praeterea discidia discordias, ortus interitus, querellas lamentationes, effusas in omni intemperantia libidines, adulteria vincula, cum humano genere concubitus mortalisque ex inmortali procreatos.

Now that the discourse has brought me to this point, I shall show that I have learned better things about worshipping the immortal gods by pontifical law and the custom of our ancestors — from these little sacrificial bowls that Numa left us, of which Laelius speaks in that golden little oration of his — than from the reasonings of the Stoics. For if I follow you, tell me what I am to answer the man who questions me thus: "If there are gods, are the Nymphs goddesses too? If the Nymphs, then the little Pans and the Satyrs as well; but these are not gods; the Nymphs, then, are not goddesses either. Yet their temples have been publicly vowed and dedicated. Then neither are the rest gods, whose temples have been dedicated. Go further: you count Jupiter and Neptune as gods; therefore Orcus, their brother, is also a god, and those who are said to flow in the underworld — Acheron, Cocytus, Pyriphlegethon — and then Charon and then Cerberus must be reckoned gods.

Cum poetarum autem errore coniungere licet portenta magorum Aegyptiorumque in eodem genere dementiam, tum etiam vulgi opiniones, quae in maxima inconstantia veritatis ignoratione versantur. Ea qui consideret quam inconsulte ac temere dicantur, venerari Epicurum et in eorum ipsorum numero de quibus haec quaestio est habere debeat. Solus enim vidit primum esse deos, quod in omnium animis eorum notionem inpressisset ipsa natura. quae est enim gens aut quod genus hominum quod non habeat sine doctrina anticipationem quandam deorum, quam appellat pro/lhmyin Epicurus id est anteceptam animo rei quandam informationem, sine qua nec intellegi quicquam nec quaeri nec disputari potest. quoius rationis vim atque utilitatem ex illo caelesti Epicuri de regula et iudicio volumine accepimus.

But that, surely, must be rejected; then Orcus is no god either; what, then, do you say about his brothers?" This was what Carneades used to say — not in order to do away with the gods, for what could be less becoming to a philosopher, but to convince the Stoics that they explain nothing about the gods. And so he pressed on: "For tell me," he said, "if these brothers are in the number of the gods, surely it cannot be denied of their father Saturn, whom the common people worship above all in the West? And if he is a god, it must be acknowledged that his father Caelus is a god too. And if that is so, then the parents of Caelus must also be held to be gods, Aether and Dies, and their brothers and sisters, who are named thus by the ancient genealogists: Love, Guile, Toil, Envy, Fate, Old Age, Death, Darkness, Misery, Lamentation, Favor, Fraud, Stubbornness, the Fates, the Hesperides, Dreams — all of whom they say were born of Erebus and Night. Either, then, these monstrosities must be approved, or those first gods must be done away with.

quod igitur fundamentum huius quaestionis est, id praeclare iactum videtis. cum enim non instituto aliquo aut more aut lege sit opinio constituta maneatque ad unum omnium firma consensio, intellegi necesse est esse deos, quoniam insitas eorum vel potius innatas cognitiones habemus; de quo autem omnium natura consentit, id verum esse necesse est; esse igitur deos confitendum est. Quod quoniam fere constat inter omnis non philosophos solum sed etiam indoctos, fatemur constare illud etiam, hanc nos habere sive anticipationem, ut ante dixi, sive praenotionem deorum (sunt enim rebus novis nova ponenda nomina, ut Epicurus ipse pro/lhyin appellavit,

Will you say that Apollo, Vulcan, Mercury, and the rest are gods, yet hesitate about Hercules, Aesculapius, Liber, Castor, Pollux? But these are worshipped just as much as the others — among some peoples, indeed, far more. These, then, must be held to be gods, though born of mortal mothers. What of Aristaeus, who is said to be the discoverer of the olive, son of Apollo; Theseus, son of Neptune; the rest whose fathers are gods — will they not be in the number of the gods? And what of those whose mothers are goddesses? More so, I think; for just as under civil law a man whose mother is free is free, so by the law of nature one who has a goddess for a mother must be a god. And so the islanders of Astypalaea worship Achilles most devoutly; and if he is a god, then Orpheus and Rhesus are gods too, born of a Muse for their mother — unless perhaps marriages of the sea are to be preferred to those of the land. If these are not gods because they are nowhere worshipped, how are the others gods?

quam antea nemo eo verbo nominarat)—hanc igitur habemus, ut deos beatos et inmortales putemus. quae enim nobis natura informationem ipsorum deorum dedit, eadem insculpsit in mentibus ut eos aeternos et beatos haberemus. Quod si ita est, vere exposita illa sententia est ab Epicuro, quod beatum aeternumque sit id nec habere ipsum negotii quicquam nec exhibere alteri, itaque neque ira neque gratia teneri, quod quae talia essent inbecilla essent omnia. Si nihil aliud quaereremus nisi ut deos pie coleremus et ut superstitione liberaremur, satis erat dictum; nam et praestans deorum natura hominum pietate coleretur, cum et aeterna esset et beatissima (habet enim venerationem iustam quicquid excellit), et metus omnis a vi atque ira deorum pulsus esset; intellegitur enim a beata inmortalique natura et iram et gratiam segregari; quibus remotis nullos a superis inpendere metus. sed ad hanc confirmandam opinionem anquirit animus et formam et vitam et actionem mentis atque agitationem in deo.

Consider, then, whether these honors are paid to the virtues of men and not to their immortality — which you too, Balbus, seemed to be saying. But how can you, if you think Latona a goddess, refuse to think Hecate one, who is the daughter of Asteria, Latona’s sister? Is she too, then, a goddess? For we have seen her altars and shrines in Greece. And if she is a goddess, why not the Eumenides? And if these are goddesses — whose sanctuary there is at Athens, and among us, as I interpret it, the grove of Furina — then the Furies are goddesses, watchers, I suppose, and avengers of crime and wickedness.

Ac de forma quidem partim natura nos admonet partim ratio docet. Nam a natura habemus omnes omnium gentium speciem nullam aliam nisi humanam deorum; quae enim forma alia occurrit umquam aut vigilanti cuiquam aut dormienti? Sed ne omnia revocentur ad primas notiones, ratio hoc idem ipsa declarat.

But if the gods are of such a kind that they take part in human affairs, then Natio too must be held a goddess, to whom we are accustomed to perform divine rites when we go round the shrines in the territory of Ardea; she is named Natio because she watches over the childbearing of matrons, from those being born. If she is a goddess, then all those gods you were enumerating are gods — Honor, Faith, Mind, Concord — and so too Hope, Moneta, and everything we can fashion for ourselves in thought. But if that is not plausible, then neither is the source from which these flowed. And what do you say to this: if those whom we worship and have received are gods, why do we not reckon Serapis and Isis in the same class? And if we do that, why should we reject the gods of the barbarians? Oxen, then, and horses, ibises, hawks, asps, crocodiles, fish, dogs, wolves, cats, and many beasts besides we shall put back into the number of the gods. But if we reject these, we shall also reject those from which they sprang.

nam cum praestantissumam naturam, vel quia beata est vel quia sempiterna, convenire videatur eandem esse pulcherrimam, quae conpositio membrorum, quae conformatio liniamentorum, quae figura, quae species humana potest esse pulchrior? Vos quidem Lucili soletis (nam Cotta meus modo hoc modo illud), cum artificium effingitis fabricamque divinam, quam sint omnia in hominis figura non modo ad usum verum etiam ad venustatem apta describere;

What next — shall Ino be reckoned a goddess, and be called Leucothea by the Greeks and Matuta by us, when she is the daughter of Cadmus, while Circe and Pasiphae and Aeetes, born of Perseis the daughter of Ocean and fathered by the Sun, shall not be held in the number of the gods? And yet Circe too is religiously worshipped by our colonists at Circeii. So you reckon her a goddess: what will you answer about Medea, who was born of two gods for grandfathers, the Sun and Ocean, with Aeetes for her father and Idyia for her mother? What about her brother Absyrtus — who in Pacuvius is Aegialeus, but the other name is the more usual in the writings of the ancients? If these are not gods, I fear for the standing of Ino; for all these flowed from the very same spring.

quod si omnium animantium formam vincit hominis figura, deus autem animans est, ea figura profecto est quae pulcherrimast omnium. quoniamque deos beatissimos esse constat, beatus autem esse sine virtute nemo potest nec virtus sine ratione constare nec ratio usquam inesse nisi in hominis figura, hominis esse specie deos confitendum est.

Will Amphiaraus and Trophonius, then, be gods? Our own tax-farmers, when lands in Boeotia that had been exempted by censorial law as belonging to the immortal gods came into question, denied that any beings were immortal who had once been men. But if these are gods, then surely Erechtheus is one too, whose shrine and whose priest I have myself seen at Athens. And if we make him a god, what doubt can we have about Codrus, or about all the others who fell fighting for their country’s freedom? But if that is not credible, then neither are the earlier premises from which these consequences flow to be accepted.

Nec tamen ea species corpus est sed quasi corpus, nec habet sanguinem sed quasi sanguinem. Haec quamquam et inventa sunt acutius et dicta subtilius ab Epicuro quam ut quivis ea possit agnoscere, tamen fretus intellegentia vestra dissero brevius quam causa desiderat. Epicurus autem, qui res occultas et penitus abditas non modo videat animo sed etiam sic tractet ut manu, docet eam esse vim et naturam deorum, ut primum non sensu sed mente cernatur, nec soliditate quadam nec ad numerum, ut ea quae ille propter firmitatem stere/mnia appellat, sed imaginibus similitudine et transitione perceptis, cum infinita simillumarum imaginum species ex innumerabilibus individuis existat et ad deos adfluat, cum maximis voluptatibus in eas imagines mentem intentam infixamque nostram intellegentiam capere quae sit et beata natura et aeterna.

And in most communities it can be seen that, for the sake of fostering virtue — so that every man of the best sort might face danger more willingly for the commonwealth’s sake — the memory of brave men was consecrated with the honor due to the immortal gods. It is for that very reason that Erechtheus at Athens and his daughters are counted among the gods; and likewise there is a shrine at Athens called the Leokorion. The people of Alabanda, indeed, worship Alabandus, the founder of their city, more devoutly than any of the renowned gods; and it was among them that Stratonicus made one of his many witty remarks, when a certain tiresome fellow kept insisting to him that Alabandus was a god and Hercules was not. "Very well, then," he said,

Summa vero vis infinitatis et magna ac diligenti contemplatione dignissima est. in qua intellegi necesse est eam esse naturam ut omnia omnibus paribus paria respondeant; hanc i)sonomi/an appellat Epicurus id est aequabilem tributionem. ex hac igitur illud efficitur, si mortalium tanta multitudo sit, esse inmortalium non minorem, et si quae interimant innumerabilia sint, etiam ea quae conservent infinita esse debere. Et quaerere a nobis Balbe soletis quae vita deorum sit quaeque ab is degatur aetas.

"let Alabandus be angry with me, and Hercules with you." But as for those gods you derived from the heavens and the stars, Balbus — you do not see how far the thing creeps. The sun is a god, you say, and the moon, the one of which the Greeks take to be Apollo and the other Diana. But if the moon is a goddess, then Lucifer too and the rest of the wandering stars will hold a place in the roll of the gods; and so, then, will the fixed stars. And why should the rainbow not be set down among the gods? For it is beautiful, and on account of that beauty — since its cause is wonderful — it is said to be the daughter of Thaumas. And if the rainbow has a divine nature, what will you do about the clouds? For the rainbow itself is produced, in a manner of speaking, out of clouds that have taken on color; and one cloud, indeed, is even said to have given birth to the Centaurs. And if you reckon clouds among the gods, then storms too will certainly have to be reckoned there, since they have been consecrated in the rites of the Roman people. So rains, downpours, gales, and whirlwinds are to be held gods; at any rate our own commanders, on putting out to sea, made a practice of sacrificing a victim to the waves.

ea videlicet qua nihil beatius nihil omnibus bonis affluentius cogitari potest. nihil enim agit, nullis occupationibus est inplicatus, nulla opera molitur, sua sapientia et virtute gaudet, habet exploratum fore se semper cum in maximis tum in aeternis voluptatibus.

Again, if Ceres takes her name from "bearing" — for so you were saying — then the earth itself is a goddess (and so it is held to be; for what else is Tellus?); but if the earth, then the sea as well, which you said was Neptune; and so the rivers too, and the springs. And accordingly Massa dedicated a shrine to the Spring from Corsica, and in the augurs’ prayer we find Tiberinus, Spino, Anemo, Nodinus, and the names of other neighboring rivers. So this will either creep on without limit, or we shall admit none of it; and that boundless logic of superstition will not be accepted; therefore none of this is to be accepted.

Hunc deum rite beatum dixerimus, vestrum vero laboriosissimum. sive enim ipse mundus deus est, quid potest esse minus quietum quam nullo puncto temporis intermisso versari circum axem caeli admirabili celeritate: nisi quietum autem nihil beatum est; sive in ipso mundo deus inest aliquis, qui regat qui gubernet qui cursus astrorum mutationes temporum rerum vicissitudines ordinesque conservet, terras et maria contemplans hominum commoda vitasque tueatur, ne ille est inplicatus molestis negotiis et operosis.

We must also, then, Balbus, speak against those who say that these gods, translated to heaven from the race of men, exist not in reality but only in opinion — the very gods whom we all venerate with reverence and devotion. To begin with, those who are called theologians count three Jupiters, of whom the first and second were born in Arcadia, the one fathered by Aether (by whom, they say, Proserpina too and Liber were born), the other fathered by Caelus, who is said to have begotten Minerva — said to be the originator and inventor of war — and the third a Cretan, the son of Saturn, whose tomb is shown on that island. The Dioscuri, too, are named in many ways among the Greeks: the first, three in number, who are called the Anactes at Athens, sons of the most ancient King Jupiter and Proserpina — Tritopatreus, Eubuleus, and Dionysus; the second, sons of the third Jupiter and Leda — Castor and Pollux; the third, called by some Alco, Melampus, and Eumolus, the sons of Atreus, who was born of Pelops.

nos autem beatam vitam in animi securitate et in omnium vacatione munerum ponimus. docuit enim nos idem qui cetera, natura effectum esse mundum, nihil opus fuisse fabrica, tamque eam rem esse facilem, quam vos effici negetis sine divina posse sollertia, ut innumerabiles natura mundos effectura sit efficiat effecerit. quod quia quem ad modum natura efficere sine aliqua mente possit non videtis, ut tragici poetae cum explicare argumenti exitum non potestis confugitis ad deum.

Then there are the Muses: the first four, born of the second Jupiter — Thelxinoe, Aoede, Arche, and Melete; the second, nine in number, begotten by the third Jupiter and Mnemosyne; the third, born of the third Jupiter and Antiopa, fathered by Pierus, whom the poets are accustomed to call the Pierides and Pieriae, with the same names and the same number as those just above. And whereas you say that the Sun is so called because he is alone, of him too the theologians bring forward how many Suns. One of them is the son of Jupiter and grandson of Aether; a second, son of Hyperion; a third, son of Vulcan the son of the Nile, whose city the Egyptians hold to be the one called Heliopolis; a fourth, the one whom in heroic times Acantho is said to have borne at Rhodes, father of Ialysus, Camirus, and Lindus, from whom the Rhodians are named; a fifth, who is said to have fathered Aeetes and Circe among the Colchians. There are likewise several Vulcans:

cuius operam profecto non desideraretis, si inmensam et interminatam in omnis partis magnitudinem regionum videretis, in quam se iniciens animus et intendens ita late longeque peregrinatur, ut nullam tamen oram ultimi videat in qua possit insistere. in hac igitur inmensitate latitudinum longitudinum altitudinum infinita vis innumerabilium volitat atomorum, quae interiecto inani cohaerescunt tamen inter se et aliae alias adprehendentes continuantur; ex quo efficiuntur eae rerum formae et figurae, quas vos effici posse sine follibus et incudibus non putatis. itaque inposuistis in cervicibus nostris sempiternum dominum, quem dies et noctes timeremus. quis enim non timeat omnia providentem et cogitantem et animadvertentem et omnia ad se pertinere putantem curiosum et plenum negotii deum?

the first born of Caelus, by whom and by Minerva was born that Apollo in whose guardianship the ancient historians wished Athens to stand; the second, born in the Nile, called Opas by the Egyptians, whom they hold to be the guardian of Egypt; the third, of the third Jupiter and Juno, who is said to have presided over the smithy in Lemnos; the fourth, born of Maemalius, who held the islands near Sicily that were called the Vulcanian.

Hinc vobis extitit primum illa fatalis necessitas, quam ei(marme/nhn dicitis, ut quicquid accidat id ex aeterna veritate causarumque continuatione fluxisse dicatis. quanti autem haec philosophia aestimandast, cui tamquam aniculis, et his quidem indoctis, fato fieri videantur omnia. sequitur mantikh\ vestra, quae Latine divinatio dicitur, qua tanta inbueremur superstitione si vos audire vellemus, ut haruspices augures harioli vates coniectores nobis essent colendi.

Mercury is one, born of Caelus his father and Dies his mother, whose nature is said to have been indecently aroused because he was excited at the sight of Proserpina; a second is the son of Valens and Phoronis, the one held to dwell beneath the earth, the same as Trophonius; a third, born of the third Jupiter and Maia, by whom and by Penelope they say Pan was born; a fourth, son of the Nile, whom the Egyptians count it a sin to name; a fifth, whom the people of Pheneus worship, who is said to have killed Argus, and for that reason to have fled to Egypt and to have handed laws and letters to the Egyptians: this one the Egyptians call Theyt, and by the same name the first month of the year is called among them.

His terroribus ab Epicuro soluti et in libertatem vindicati nec metuimus eos quos intellegimus nec sibi fingere ullam molestiam nec alteri quaerere, et pie sancteque colimus naturam excellentem atque praestantem. Sed elatus studio vereor ne longior fuerim. erat autem difficile rem tantam tamque praeclaram inchoatam relinquere; quamquam non tam dicendi ratio mihi habenda fuit quam audiendi.”

Of the Aesculapii the first is the son of Apollo, worshipped by the Arcadians, who is said to have invented the probe and to have been the first to bind up a wound; the second is the brother of the second Mercury, said to have been struck by lightning and buried at Cynosurae; the third, son of Arsippus and Arsinoe, who first discovered, as they say, the purging of the bowels and the extraction of teeth, whose tomb and grove is shown in Arcadia not far from the river Lusius. Of the Apollos the most ancient is the one I said a little earlier was born of Vulcan, the guardian of Athens; a second is the son of Corybas, born in Crete, who is said to have contended with Jupiter himself for that island; a third, born of the third Jupiter and Latona, who they say came to Delphi from the Hyperboreans; a fourth, in Arcadia, whom the Arcadians call Nomion because they say they received their laws from him.

Tum Cotta comiter ut solebat Atqui inquit “Vellei nisi tu aliquid dixisses, nihil sane ex me quidem audire potuisses. mihi enim non tam facile in mentem venire solet quare verum sit aliquid quam quare falsum; idque cum saepe tum cum te audirem paulo ante contigit. roges me qualem naturam deorum esse dicam: nihil fortasse respondeam; quaeras putemne talem esse qualis modo a te sit exposita: nihil dicam mihi videri minus. Sed ante quam adgrediar ad ea quae a te disputata sunt de te ipso dicam quid sentiam.

There are likewise several Dianas: the first, daughter of Jupiter and Proserpina, said to have given birth to the winged Cupid; a second, better known, whom we have received as born of the third Jupiter and Latona; the father of the third is recorded to be Upis, the mother Glauce — her the Greeks often call Upis by her father’s name. We have many Dionysi: the first born of Jupiter and Proserpina; the second of the Nile, said to have killed Nysa; the third fathered by Cabirus, whom they say ruled as king over Asia, in whose honor the Sabazian rites were instituted; the fourth of Jupiter and the Moon, in whose honor the Orphic mysteries are thought to be performed; the fifth born of Nysus and Thyone, by whom the triennial festivals are thought to have been established.

Saepe enim de L. Crasso illo familiari tuo videor audisse, cum te togatis omnibus sine dubio anteferret, paucos tecum Epicureos e Graecia compararet, sed, quod ab eo te mirifice diligi intellegebam, arbitrabar illum propter benivolentiam uberius id dicere. ego autem, etsi vereor laudare praesentem, iudico tamen de re obscura atque difficili a te dictum esse dilucide, neque sententiis solum copiose sed verbis etiam ornatius quam solent vestri.

The first Venus was born of Caelus and Dies, whose shrine I have seen at Elis; a second was begotten from the sea-foam, by whom and by Mercury we have received that the second Cupid was born; a third, born of Jupiter and Dione, who married Vulcan, but is said to have borne Anteros to Mars; a fourth, conceived in Syria and Cyprus, who is called Astarte, who is reported to have married Adonis. The first Minerva is the one we mentioned above as the mother of Apollo; a second, sprung from the Nile, whom the Egyptians of Sais worship; a third, the one we said above was begotten by Jupiter; a fourth, born of Jupiter and Coryphe the daughter of Oceanus, whom the Arcadians call Coria and hold to be the inventor of the four-horse chariot; a fifth, daughter of Pallas, who is said to have killed her father when he tried to violate her virginity, and to whom they fasten winged sandals.

Zenonem, quem Philo noster coryphaeum appellare Epicureorum solebat, cum Athenis essem audiebam frequenter, et quidem ipso auctore Philone, credo ut facilius iudicarem quam illa bene refellerentur, cum a principe Epicureorum accepissem quem ad modum dicerentur. non igitur ille ut plerique, sed isto modo ut tu, distincte graviter ornate. Sed quod in illo mihi usu saepe venit, idem modo cum te audirem accidebat, ut moleste ferrem tantum ingenium (bona venia me audies) in tam leves ne dicam in tam ineptas sententias incidisse.

The first Cupid is said to have been born of Mercury and the first Diana; the second of Mercury and the second Venus; the third, who is the same as Anteros, of Mars and the third Venus. These things, then, and others of the kind, have been gathered from the ancient lore of Greece. You see that they must be resisted, lest religious observances be thrown into confusion; but your school not only does not refute them — it even confirms them by interpreting what each one is supposed to signify. But let us now return to the point from which we digressed to come here. Do you really suppose, then, that any subtler reasoning is needed to refute all this?

Nec ego nunc ipse aliquid adferam melius. ut enim modo dixi, omnibus fere in rebus sed maxime in physicis quid non sit citius quam quid sit dixerim. roges me quid aut quale sit deus: auctore utar Simonide, de quo cum quaesivisset hoc idem tyrannus Hiero, deliberandi sibi unum diem postulavit; cum idem ex eo postridie quaereret, biduum petivit; cum saepius duplicaret numerum dierum admiransque Hiero requireret cur ita faceret, "quia quanto diutius considero" inquit "tanto mihi spes videtur obscurior". Sed Simoniden arbitror (non enim poeta solum suavis verum etiam ceteroqui doctus sapiensque traditur), quia multa venirent in mentem acuta atque subtilia, dubitantem quid eorum esset verissimum desperasse omnem veritatem.

For we see that mind, faith, hope, virtue, honor, victory, safety, concord, and the rest of this kind have the force of things, not of gods. For either they reside within ourselves — as mind, as hope, as faith, as virtue, as concord — or they are things to be wished for by us, as honor, as safety, as victory; and I see the usefulness of these things, I see too their consecrated images; but why there should be in them the power of gods I shall understand only when I have come to know it. In this class above all is Fortune to be counted, whom no one will separate from inconstancy and randomness — qualities surely not worthy of a god.

Epicurus vero tuus (nam cum illo malo disserere quam tecum) quid dicit quod non modo philosophia dignum esset sed mediocri prudentia? Quaeritur primum in ea quaestione quae est de natura deorum, sintne dei necne sint. "Difficile est negare." Credo si in contione quaeratur, sed in huius modi sermone et in consessu familiari facillimum. itaque ego ipse pontifex, qui caerimonias religionesque publicas sanctissime tuendas arbitror, is hoc quod primum est, esse deos, persuaderi mihi non opinione solum sed etiam ad veritatem plane velim. multa enim occurrunt quae conturbent, ut interdum nulli esse videantur.

But again, what delight do you take in that unraveling of fables and that teasing-out of names? Caelus castrated by his son, Saturn likewise bound by his son — these and other things of the kind you defend in such a way that those who invented them seem to have been not merely sane but actually wise. As for the teasing-out of names, the labor you spend on it is pitiable: "Saturn, because he saturates himself with years; Mavors, because he overturns great things; Minerva, because she diminishes, or because she threatens; Venus, because she comes to all things; Ceres, from bearing." How dangerous a habit! For with many names you will be stuck fast: what will you do with Veiovis, what with Vulcan? And yet, since you think Neptune is named from swimming, there will be no name whose derivation you cannot explain by means of a single letter; and in that, indeed, you seemed to me to be swimming harder than Neptune himself.

Sed vide quam tecum agam liberaliter: quae communia sunt vobis cum ceteris philosophis non attingam, ut hoc ipsum; placet enim omnibus fere mihique ipsi in primis deos esse. itaque non pugno; rationem tamen eam quae a te adfertur non satis firmam puto. Quod enim omnium gentium generumque hominibus ita videretur, id satis magnum argumentum esse dixisti cur esse deos confiteremur. quod cum leve per se tum etiam falsum est. Primum enim unde tibi notae sunt opiniones nationum? equidem arbitror multas esse gentes sic inmanitate efferatas, ut apud eas nulla suspicio deorum sit.

Zeno first took up a great and altogether needless task, and after him Cleanthes, then Chrysippus — that of giving an account of fabricated fables, of explaining the reasons why each thing was called by its particular name. And in doing this you assuredly confess one thing: that the matter stands far otherwise than men’s opinion has it; for those who are called gods are the natures of things, not the figures of gods. So great was this error that names of gods were assigned even to pernicious things, and what is more, sacred rites were established for them. For we see a temple of Fever on the Palatine, and one of Orbona at the shrine of the Lares, and an altar consecrated to Mala Fortuna on the Esquiline.

Quid Diagoras, Atheos qui dictus est, posteaque Theodorus nonne aperte deorum naturam sustulerunt? nam Abderites quidem Protagoras, cuius a te modo mentio facta est, sophistes temporibus illis vel maximus, cum in principio libri sic posuisset "de divis neque ut sint neque ut non sint habeo dicere", Atheniensium iussu urbe atque agro est exterminatus librique eius in contione combusti; ex quo equidem existimo tardioris ad hanc sententiam profitendam multos esse factos, quippe cum poenam ne dubitatio quidem effugere potuisset. Quid de sacrilegis, quid de impiis periurisque dicemus? Tubulus si Lucius umquam, si Lupus aut Carbo aut Neptuni filius, ut ait Lucilius, putasset esse deos, tam periurus aut tam inpurus fuisset?

Let every such error, then, be driven out of philosophy, so that when we discuss the immortal gods we may say what is worthy of immortal gods. On that subject I have my own view, but I do not have grounds for agreeing with you. You say that Neptune is a mind endowed with intelligence, pervading the sea, and you say the same of Ceres about the earth; but that intelligence — whether of the sea or of the earth — I am able not only not to grasp with my mind but not even to touch by conjecture. And so I must seek elsewhere, in order that I may learn both that the gods exist and what sort of beings they are — such as you would have them be * *.

Non est igitur tam explorata ista ratio ad id quod vultis confirmandum quam videtur. sed quia commune hoc est argumentum aliorum etiam philosophorum, omittam hoc tempore; ad vestra propria venire malo.

Let us look at what follows: first, whether the world is governed by the providence of the gods, and second, whether the gods take thought for human affairs. For these are the two points that remain to me out of your division; and on them, if it seems good to you, I think we ought to argue with more care.” “It seems very good to me indeed,” said Velleius; “for I both look for greater things to come and warmly assent to what has been said.” Then Balbus said, “I do not wish to interrupt you, Cotta, but we shall take another occasion; I shall certainly bring you to confess. But ” In the first place, then, it is not probable that the matter of things, from which all things have arisen, was produced by divine providence, but rather that it has, and has always had, a force and a nature of its own. As a builder, then, when he is about to put up some structure, does not himself make his material but uses what is ready to hand, and as the modeler likewise uses his wax, so for that divine providence the material had to be available — not the material it might itself make, but the material it would find prepared. And if matter was not made by a god, then neither were earth nor water nor air nor fire made by a god. “Men surpass all the beasts” — by no means will it go that way; there is a great struggle in the matter. For “that I should so entreat him with such honeyed flattery, were it not to my purpose”: does she not seem to reason quite well, and to be contriving for her own self a monstrous ruin?

Concedo esse deos; doce me igitur unde sint ubi sint quales sint corpore animo vita; haec enim scire desidero. Abuteris ad omnia atomorum regno et licentia; hinc quodcumque in solum venit, ut dicitur, effingis atque efficis. Quae primum nullae sunt. nihil est enim * * quod vacet corpore, corporibus autem omnis obsidetur locus; ita nullum inane, nihil esse individuum potest.

And by how cunning a calculation here: “Whoever wills what he wills, things so dispose themselves as he will ply his effort” — this from the man who is the sower of all evils. “He, with mind turned awry, has handed me today the very bolts by which I shall throw open all my wrath and deal him destruction — to me grief, to him mourning; to me exile, to him annihilation.” This faculty of reason, which you say has been granted to man alone by the gods’ kindness, the beasts plainly do not possess. Do you see, then, with how great a gift of the gods we have been endowed?

Haec ego nunc physicorum oracla fundo, vera an falsa nescio, sed veri simile tamen similiora quam vestra. ista enim flagitia Democriti sive etiam ante Leucippi, esse corpuscula quaedam levia alia aspera, rutunda alia, partim autem angulata et hamata, curvata quaedam et quasi adunca, ex iis effectum esse caelum atque terram nulla cogente natura sed concursu quodam fortuito—hanc tu opinionem C. Vellei usque ad hanc aetatem perduxisti, priusque te quis de omni vitae statu quam de ista auctoritate deiecerit; ante enim iudicasti Epicureum te esse oportere quam ista cognovisti: ita necesse fuit aut haec flagitia concipere animo aut susceptae philosophiae nomen amittere.

And the same Medea, in flight from her father and her fatherland, when her father drew near and was already preparing all but to seize her, slaughtered her brother in the meantime, hacked his limbs apart joint by joint, and scattered the body abroad through the fields — for this reason: that while her father gathered up the strewn limbs of his child, she herself might escape in the interval, that grief might slow him in pursuit, that she might secure her own safety by a kinsman’s murder. To this woman, as wickedness was not wanting, so neither was reason.

quid enim mereas, ut Epicureus esse desinas? "Nihil equidem" inquis "ut rationem vitae beatae veritatemque deseram". Ista igitur est veritas? nam de vita beata nihil repugno, quam tu ne in deo quidem esse censes nisi plane otio langueat. sed ubi est veritas? in mundis credo innumerabilibus omnibus minimis temporum punctis aliis nascentibus aliis cadentibus; an in individuis corpusculis tam praeclara opera nulla moderante natura nulla ratione fingentibus? Sed oblitus liberalitatis meae, qua tecum paulo ante uti coeperam, plura complector. Concedam igitur ex individuis constare omnia; quid ad rem?

What of the man preparing the deadly banquet for his brother — does he not turn the calculation this way and that in thought? “A greater pile is mine to raise, a greater evil to be mixed, that I may crush and grind down that man’s bitter heart.” Nor yet is that very man himself to be passed over, who was not content to have lured his brother’s wife into adultery — of whom Atreus speaks rightly and most truly: “What in the highest matter of state I judge the highest peril — that royal mothers be defiled, the line contaminated, the stock confounded.” But that very thing, with what cunning — the man who would seek a throne by adultery: “I add to this,” he says, “that the father of the gods of heaven sent me a portent and a prodigy, the very prop of my kingdom — a lamb among the flocks, conspicuous with golden fleece, which Thyestes once dared to steal away from the palace” — and in this affair he took his wife as his accomplice. Does he not seem to have used the utmost depravity, yet not without the utmost reason?

deorum enim natura quaeritur. sint sane ex atomis; non igitur aeterni. †quia enim ex atomis, id natum aliquandost; si natum, nulli dei ante quam nati; et si ortus est deorum, interitus sit necesse est, ut tu paulo ante de Platonis mundo disputabas. ubi igitur illud vestrum beatum et aeternum, quibus duobus verbis significatis deum? Quod cum efficere vultis, in dumeta conrepitis. ita enim dicebas, non corpus esse in deo sed quasi corpus, nec sanguinem sed tamquam sanguinem.

Nor is the stage alone crammed with these crimes; ordinary life is full of crimes nearly greater. Each man’s household feels it, the Forum feels it, the Senate-house, the Campus, our allies, the provinces — so that, just as a thing is rightly done by reason, so it is by reason that men sin; and the one is done both by few and rarely, the other both always and by very many. So it would have been better that no reason at all had been given us by the immortal gods than that it should be given with so great a ruin attending it. As with wine for the sick: because it rarely helps and very often harms, it is better not to administer it at all than to rush into open ruin in the hope of a doubtful recovery — so I rather think it might have been better for the human race that this quick stir of thought, this keenness, this ingenuity, which we call reason, since it is destructive to many and salutary to very few, had not been given at all than that it should be given so munificently and so lavishly.

Hoc persaepe facitis, ut, cum aliquid non veri simile dicatis et effugere reprehensionem velitis, adferatis aliquid quod omnino ne fieri quidem possit, ut satius fuerit illud ipsum de quo ambigebatur concedere quam tam inpudenter resistere. Velut Epicurus cum videret, si atomi ferrentur in locum inferiorem suopte pondere, nihil fore in nostra potestate, quod esset earum motus certus et necessarius, invenit quo modo necessitatem effugeret, quod videlicet Democritum fugerat: ait atomum, cum pondere et gravitate directo deorsus feratur, declinare paululum.

For this reason, if the divine mind and will took thought for men precisely because it bestowed reason on them, it took thought only for those whom it endowed with good reason — and these we see, if indeed there are any at all, to be very few. But it cannot be allowed that the immortal gods took thought for only a few; it follows, then, that they took thought for no one. To this point you are accustomed to make this reply: that the gods did not therefore fail to provide for us excellently merely because many would use their gift perversely; that many use their inheritances badly too, and are not on that account held to have had no benefit from their fathers. Who denies it — and what likeness is there in that comparison? For Deianira did not wish to harm Hercules when she gave him the tunic dyed with the Centaur’s blood, nor did the man who opened with his sword the abscess of Jason of Pherae — which the physicians had not been able to cure — wish to do him good. For many, even while wishing to do harm, have done good, and while wishing to do good have done harm. And so it does not follow from what is given that the will of the giver is made plain, nor, if the one who received it uses it well, that the one who gave it gave it in friendship. For what lust, what avarice, what crime is either undertaken without a plan having been formed, or carried through without the mind’s motion and reflection — that is, without reason?

hoc dicere turpius est quam illud quod vult non posse defendere. Idem facit contra dialecticos; a quibus cum traditum sit in omnibus diiunctionibus, in quibus "aut etiam aut non" poneretur, alterum utrum esse verum, pertimuit ne, si concessum esset huius modi aliquid "aut vivet cras aut non vivet Epicurus", alterutrum fieret necessarium: totum hoc "aut etiam aut non" negavit esse necessarium; quo quid dici potuit obtusius? Urguebat Arcesilas Zenonem, cum ipse falsa omnia diceret quae sensibus viderentur, Zenon autem non nulla visa esse falsa non omnia; timuit Epicurus ne, si unum visum esset falsum, nullum esset verum: omnes sensus veri nuntios dixit esse. Nihil horum nisi †valde; graviorem enim plagam accipiebat ut leviorem repelleret.

For every opinion is reason — good reason if the opinion is true, but bad reason if it is false. Yet from a god we have only reason, if indeed we have it; whether the reason is good or not good comes from ourselves. For reason was not given to man by the kindness of the gods in the way that an inheritance is left to him. For what else could the gods rather have given to men, if they had wished to harm them? And what would be the seeds of injustice, of intemperance, of cowardice, if reason did not underlie these vices? Medea just now and Atreus were called to mind by us — heroic characters who, having reckoned and weighed the account, plotted their unspeakable crimes.

Idem facit in natura deorum: dum individuorum corporum concretionem fugit ne interitus et dissipatio consequatur, negat esse corpus deorum sed tamquam corpus, nec sanguinem sed tamquam sanguinem. Mirabile videtur quod non rideat haruspex cum haruspicem viderit; hoc mirabilius quam ut vos inter vos risum tenere possitis? non est corpus sed quasi corpus: hoc intellegerem quale esset, si in cereis fingeretur aut fictilibus figuris; in deo quid sit quasi corpus aut quid sit quasi sanguis intellegere non possum. ne tu quidem Vellei, sed non vis fateri.

What of the trivialities of comedy — do they not always turn upon reasoning? Does that fellow in the Eunuchus not argue with subtlety enough: “What, then, shall I do? She shut me out, she calls me back; shall I return? No, not if she begged me.” And that other in the Synephebi does not hesitate, in the manner of the Academics and against the common opinion, to do battle with reason: he says it is “sweet, in the height of love and the depth of need, to have a father who is grasping, ungracious toward his children, hard — one who neither loves you nor takes pains for you”; and to this incredible thesis he supplies his little arguments:

Ista enim a vobis quasi dictata redduntur, quae Epicurus oscitans halucinatus est, cum quidem gloriaretur, ut videmus in scriptis, se magistrum habuisse nullum. quod et non praedicanti tamen facile equidem crederem, sicut mali aedificii domino glorianti se architectum non habuisse; nihil enim olet ex Academia, nihil ne ex Lycio, nihil ne e puerilibus quidem disciplinis. Xenocraten audire potuit (quem virum, dii inmortales), et sunt qui putent audisse; ipse non vult: credo, plus nemini. Pamphilum quendam Platonis auditorem ait a se Sami auditum (ibi enim adulescens habitabat cum patre et fratribus, quod in eam pater eius Neocles agripeta venerat, sed cum agellus eum non satis aleret ut opinor, ludi magister fuit);

“Either you cheat him of his revenue, or by a letter divert some debt, or through a little slave throw the timid old man into a fright; and in the end, the more sparing the father from whom you filch, the more gladly you squander it.” And the same fellow argues that an easygoing and generous father is an inconvenience to a son in love: “one whom I know no way to cheat, nor what to carry off from him, nor what trick or contrivance to set in motion against him — so utterly has my father’s obligingness baffled all my tricks, deceits, and sleights of hand.” Well then — those tricks, those contrivances, those deceits and sleights of hand: could they have existed without reason? O splendid gift of the gods, that Phormio should be able to say: “Fetch me the old man; all my plans are now drawn up and ready in my heart.” But let us leave the theater and come into the Forum.

sed hunc Platonicum mirifice contemnit Epicurus: ita metuit ne quid umquam didicisse videatur. In Nausiphane Democriteo tenetur; quem cum a se non neget auditum vexat tamen omnibus contumeliis. atqui si haec Democritea non audisset, quid audierat, quid est in physicis Epicuri non a Democrito? nam etsi quaedam commutavit, ut quod paulo ante de inclinatione atomorum dixi, tamen pleraque dicit eadem, atomos inane, imagines infinitatem locorum innumerabilitatemque mundorum, eorum ortus interitus, omnia fere quibus naturae ratio continetur. Nunc istuc quasi corpus et quasi sanguinem quid intellegis?

The praetor goes to take his seat. To try what case? The man who burned down the record office. What crime more hidden? Yet Quintus Sosius, a distinguished Roman knight from the Picene country, confessed that he had done it. The man who falsified the public registers? That too Lucius Alenus did, when he forged the handwriting of the six chief clerks; what was ever more ingenious than this man? Take note of other inquiries: into the gold of Tolosa, into the Jugurthine conspiracy; go back to earlier matters — the case of Tubulus over money taken for rendering a verdict; later matters — the inquiry into incest under the Peducaean bill; then these everyday affairs: daggers, poisonings, embezzlements, and inquiries into wills as well under a new law. From this comes that form of action: “I declare that a theft was committed by your aid and counsel”; from this come so many trials over bad faith — over guardianship, mandate, partnership, trusteeship — and the rest of the dealings in buying or selling, hiring or letting, that are done against good faith; from this comes the public trial of a private matter under the Laetorian law; from this the dragnet of all knaveries, the action concerning malicious fraud, which our friend Gaius Aquillius brought forward — the very fraud which the same Aquillius holds to be present whenever one thing is feigned and another done.

ego enim te scire ista melius quam me non fateor solum sed etiam facile patior; cum quidem semel dicta sunt, quid est quod Velleius intellegere possit Cotta non possit? itaque corpus quid sit sanguis quid sit intellego, quasi corpus et quasi sanguis quid sit nullo prorsus modo intellego. neque tu me celas ut Pythagoras solebat alienos, nec consulto dicis occulte tamquam Heraclitus, sed, quod inter nos liceat, ne tu quidem intellegis.

Do we then suppose that this vast sowing of evils was done by the immortal gods? For if the gods gave reason to men, they gave malice; for malice is the cunning and deceitful reasoning of doing harm. The same gods gave fraud too, and crime, and the rest, none of which can either be undertaken or accomplished without reason. Would, then — as that old woman wishes that the fir timbers, cut down by axes in the grove of Pelion, had never fallen to earth — would that the gods had not given men this craftiness, which very few use well, and even those few are often overborne by those who use it ill, while countless men use it wickedly: so that this divine gift of reason and counsel seems to have been imparted to men for fraud and not for goodness.

Illud video pugnare te, species ut quaedam sit deorum, quae nihil concreti habeat nihil solidi nihil expressi nihil eminentis, sitque pura levis perlucida. dicemus igitur idem quod in Venere Coa: corpus illud non est sed simile corporis, nec ille fusus et candore mixtus rubor sanguis est sed quaedam sanguinis similitudo; sic in Epicureo deo non rem sed similitudines esse rerum. Fac id quod ne intellegi quidem potest mihi esse persuasum; cedo mihi istorum adumbratorum deorum liniamenta atque formas.

But you press again and again that this is the fault of men, not of the gods. As if a physician should blame the gravity of the disease, or a pilot the violence of the storm; and even though these are mere mortal creatures, still they are ridiculous: “for who would have called you in,” someone might say, “if these things did not exist?” Against a god one may argue more freely: “You say the fault lies in men’s vices: you should have given men a reason that would have shut out vice and fault.” Where, then, was there room for error on the gods’ part? For we leave our inheritances in the hope of handing them on well, and in that we can be deceived; but how could a god be deceived? Was it as the Sun was, when he took up his son Phaethon into the chariot, or Neptune, when Theseus destroyed Hippolytus, having been granted by his father Neptune the power of three wishes?

Non deest hoc loco copia rationum, quibus docere velitis humanas esse formas deorum; primum quod ita sit informatum anticipatum- que mentibus nostris, ut homini, cum de deo cogitet, forma occurrat humana; deinde cum, quoniam rebus omnibus excellat natura divina, forma quoque esse pulcherrima debeat, nec esse humana ullam pulchriorem; tertiam rationem adfertis, quod nulla in alia figura domicilium mentis esse possit.

These are the poets’ tales; but we wish to be philosophers, authors of facts, not of fables. And yet even these poets’ gods themselves, had they known that those gifts would be ruinous to their sons, would be reckoned to have done wrong in conferring the benefit. And if it is true, as Aristo of Chios used to say, that philosophers do harm to their hearers who put a bad interpretation on things well said — for it is possible for profligates to come out of Aristippus’s school, and harsh men out of Zeno’s — then surely, if those who had heard were going to depart corrupted because they perversely interpreted the philosophers’ discourse, it would be better for the philosophers to keep silent than to harm those who had heard them;

primum igitur quidque considera quale sit; arripere enim mihi videmini quasi vestro iure rem nullo modo probabilem. Primum omnium quis tam caecus in contemplandis rebus umquam fuit, ut non videret species istas hominum conlatas in deos aut consilio quodam sapientium, quo facilius animos imperitorum ad deorum cultum a vitae pravitate converterent, aut superstitione, ut essent simulacra quae venerantes deos ipsos se adire crederent. auxerunt autem haec eadem poetae pictores opifices; erat enim non facile agentis aliquid et molientes deos in aliarum formarum imitatione servare. Accessit etiam ista opinio fortasse, quod homini homine pulchrius nihil videatur. Sed tu hoc physice non vides, quam blanda conciliatrix et quasi sui sit lena natura? an putas ullam esse terra marique beluam quae non sui generis belua maxime delectetur? quod ni ita esset, cur non gestiret taurus equae contrectatione, equus vaccae? an tu aquilam aut leonem aut delphinum ullam anteferre censes figuram suae? quid igitur mirum si hoc eodem modo homini natura praescripsit, ut nihil pulchrius quam hominem putaret? * * eam esse causam cur deos hominum similis putaremus: quid censes, si ratio esset in beluis, non suo quasque generi plurimum tributuras fuisse?

so, if men turn the reason given them by the immortal gods with good intent into fraud and malice, it would have been better that it had not been given to the human race than that it should be given. As, if a physician should know that the patient ordered to take wine would take it undiluted and perish at once, he would be greatly at fault, so that Providence of yours is to be blamed, which gave reason to those it knew would use it perversely and wickedly. Unless perhaps you say it did not know. Would that it were so; but you will not dare to, for I am well aware how highly you esteem its name.

At mehercule ego (dicam enim ut sentio) quamvis amem ipse me tamen non audeo dicere pulchriorem esse me quam ille fuerit taurus qui vexit Europam; non enim hoc loco de ingeniis aut de orationibus nostris sed de specie figuraque quaeritur. quod si fingere nobis et iungere formas velimus, qualis ille maritimus Triton pingitur, natantibus invehens beluis adiunctis humano corpori, nolis esse. Difficili in loco versor; est enim vis tanta naturae, ut homo nemo velit nisi hominis similis esse— et quidem formica formicae.

But here at any rate this topic can now be brought to a close. For if folly, by the consensus of all philosophers, is a greater evil than all the evils of fortune and of the body weighed in the opposite scale, and if no one attains wisdom, then we are all in the depths of evil — we for whom you say the immortal gods have provided so excellently. For just as it makes no difference whether no one is in good health or no one is able to be in good health, so I do not see what difference it makes whether no one is wise or no one is able to be wise. But we, indeed, have said too much about a thing perfectly plain; Telamo, however, dispatches the whole topic — why the gods neglect men — in a single line: “For if they cared, it would go well with the good, ill with the wicked; which now is not the case.” The gods ought indeed to have made all men good, if in truth they were taking thought for the human race;

Sed tamen cuius hominis? quotus enim quisque formonsus est: Athenis cum essem, e gregibus epheborum vix singuli reperiebantur —video quid adriseris, sed ita tamen se res habet. Deinde nobis, qui concedentibus philosophis antiquis adulescentulis delectamur, etiam vitia saepe iucunda sunt. naevos in articulo pueri delectat Alcaeum; at est corporis macula naevos; illi tamen hoc lumen videbatur. Q. Catulus, huius collegae et familiaris nostri pater, dilexit municipem tuum Roscium, in quem etiam illud est eius: constiteram exorientem Auroram forte salutans, cum subito a laeva Roscius exoritur. pace mihi liceat caelestes dicere vestra: mortalis visus pulchrior esse deo. huic deo pulchrior; at erat, sicuti hodie est, perversissimis oculis: quid refert, si hoc ipsum salsum illi et venustum videbatur?

or if that less, they ought at least certainly to have taken thought for the good. Why, then, did the Carthaginian crush the two Scipios in Spain, those bravest and best of men? Why did Maximus bury his son, who had held the consulship? Why did Hannibal slay Marcellus? Why did Cannae carry off Paulus? Why was the body of Regulus surrendered to the cruelty of the Carthaginians? Why did his own house’s walls not shelter Africanus? But these are old matters, and there are very many others; let us look at things nearer home. Why is my uncle, Publius Rutilius, a man of the purest innocence and at the same time the most learned, in exile? Why was my friend Drusus killed in his own house? Why was Quintus Scaevola, the very pattern of temperance and prudence, the pontifex maximus, butchered before the image of Vesta? Why, still earlier, were so many leading men of the state put to death by Cinna? Why could Gaius Marius, the most treacherous of all men, order Quintus Catulus, a man of the most surpassing dignity, to die?

Redeo ad deos. ecquos si non tam strabones at paetulos esse arbitramur, ecquos naevum habere, ecquos silos flaccos frontones capitones, quae sunt in nobis, an omnia emendata in illis? Detur id vobis; num etiam una est omnium facies? nam si plures, aliam esse alia pulchriorem necesse est, igitur aliquis non pulcherrimus deus; si una omnium facies est, florere in caelo Academiam necesse est: si enim nihil inter deum et deum differt, nulla est apud deos cognitio, nulla perceptio.

The day would fail me if I tried to count those good men to whom evil befell, and no less if I called to mind those scoundrels to whom things fell out best of all. For why did Marius, so happily consul a seventh time, die an old man in his own house? Why did Cinna, cruelest of all men, rule for so long? "But he paid the penalty." It would have been better to stop him and hold him back from killing so many of the greatest men than for him at last to pay for it himself. Quintus Varius, a thoroughly ruthless man, perished under the utmost torture and execution; if it was because he had made away with Drusus by the sword and Metellus by poison, then it would have been better for those two to be preserved than for Varius to pay the penalty of his crime. Dionysius the tyrant ruled a most wealthy and most prosperous city for thirty-eight years;

Quid si etiam Vellei falsum illud omnino est, nullam aliam nobis de deo cogitantibus speciem nisi hominis occurrere: tamenne ista tam absurda defendes? Nobis fortasse sic occurrit ut dicis; a parvis enim Iovem Iunonem Minervam Neptunum Vulcanum Apollinem reliquos deos ea facie novimus qua pictores fictoresque voluerunt, neque solum facie sed etiam ornatu aetate vestitu. at non Aegyptii nec Syri nec fere cuncta barbaria; firmiores enim videas apud eos opiniones esse de bestiis quibusdam quam apud nos de sanctissimis templis et simulacris deorum.

and before him, in the very flower of Greece, how many years did Pisistratus rule? "But Phalaris paid the penalty, and Apollodorus too." Yes — after many had first been tortured and put to death. And pirates too often pay the penalty, yet we cannot say that more captives were not cruelly killed than pirates. We are told that Anaxarchus, the follower of Democritus, was butchered by the tyrant of Cyprus, and that Zeno of Elea was killed under torture; and what shall I say of Socrates, over whose death I am accustomed to weep when I read Plato? Do you see, then, that if the gods do regard human affairs, in their judgment the distinction between good men and bad has been abolished?

etenim fana multa spoliata et simulacra deorum de locis sanctissimis ablata videmus a nostris, at vero ne fando quidem auditumst crocodilum aut ibin aut faelem violatum ab Aegyptio. quid igitur censes Apim illum sanctum Aegyptiorum bovem nonne deum videri Aegyptiis? tam hercle quam tibi illam vestram Sospitam. Quam tu numquam ne in somnis quidem vides nisi cum pelle caprina cum hasta cum scutulo cum calceolis repandis. at non est talis Argia nec Romana Iuno. ergo alia species Iunonis Argivis alia Lanuinis. et quidem alia nobis Capitolini alia Afris Hammonis Iovis.

Diogenes the Cynic used to say that Harpalus, who in those days was reckoned a fortunate pirate, was a standing witness against the gods, since he lived so long in such prosperity. Dionysius, of whom I spoke before, after he had plundered the shrine of Proserpina at Locri, was sailing to Syracuse; and as he held his course with a most favorable wind, he said with a laugh, "Do you see, friends, what a fine voyage the immortal gods grant to men who rob temples?" And, sharp man that he was, having grasped the matter clearly and fully, he held firmly to the same opinion. When he had brought his fleet to the Peloponnese and had come into the temple of Olympian Jupiter, he stripped from the god a golden cloak of great weight, with which the tyrant Gelo had adorned Jupiter from the spoils of the Carthaginians, and over this he even joked that a golden cloak was heavy in summer and cold in winter, and threw a woolen mantle over the god, saying that it suited every season of the year. The same man ordered the golden beard of Aesculapius at Epidaurus to be taken off, declaring that it was not fitting for the son to be bearded when in all the temples the father stood beardless.

Non pudet igitur physicum id est speculatorem venatoremque naturae ab animis consuetudine inbutis petere testimonium veritatis? isto enim modo dicere licebit Iovem semper barbatum, Apollinem semper inberbem, caesios oculos Minervae, caeruleos esse Neptuni. et quidem laudamus esse Athenis Volcanum eum quem fecit Alcamenes, in quo stante atque vestito leviter apparet claudicatio non deformis: claudum igitur habebimus deum, quoniam de Volcano sic accepimus. Age et his vocabulis esse deos facimus quibus a nobis nominantur?

Then he ordered the silver tables to be carried off from all the sanctuaries, and since, by the custom of old Greece, they bore the inscription "of the good gods," he said he wished to enjoy their goodness. The same man took down without hesitation the little golden Victories and the bowls and crowns held out in the outstretched hands of the images, saying that he was accepting these things, not carrying them off — for it was folly to refuse to take, from gods who held them out and offered them, the very goods we pray to receive from them. They say, too, that the things I have mentioned — taken from the temples — he brought out into the forum and sold by the auctioneer’s voice, and that, once the money had been exacted, he proclaimed that whatever anyone held from sacred property he should return, each item to its own temple, before a fixed day: thus to his impiety toward the gods he added injustice toward men. This man, then, neither did Olympian Jupiter strike with the thunderbolt, nor did Aesculapius destroy by some wretched lingering disease; he died in his own bed, was borne to the pyre of his tyranny, and the power that he himself had won by crime he handed on to his son, as though it were a just and lawful inheritance.

at primum quot hominum linguae tot nomina deorum; non enim ut tu Velleius quocumque veneris sic idem in Italia Volcanus idem in Africa idem in Hispania. deinde nominum non magnus numerus ne in pontificiis quidem nostris, deorum autem innumerabilis. an sine nominibus sunt? istud quidem ita vobis dicere necesse est; quid enim attinet, cum una facies sit, plura esse nomina? Quam bellum erat Vellei confiteri potius nescire quod nescires quam ista effutientem nauseare atque ipsum sibi displicere. An tu mei similem putas esse aut tui deum? profecto non putas. "Quid ergo, solem dicam aut lunam aut caelum deum? ergo etiam beatum: quibus fruentem voluptatibus? et sapientem: qui potest esse in eius modi trunco sapientia?

Against my will my argument moves on this ground, for it seems to lend authority to wrongdoing; and it would rightly seem so, were it not that conscience itself carries a heavy weight, in matters both of virtue and of vice, apart from any divine reckoning — and once that is removed, everything collapses. For just as no household and no commonwealth would appear to be ordered by any rational design and discipline if in it there were no rewards set out for right conduct and no punishments for wrongdoing, so there is surely no divine governance of the world over men, if in it there is no distinction between the good and the bad.

" haec vestra sunt. Si igitur nec humano *, quod docui, nec tali aliquo, quod tibi ita persuasum est, quid dubitas negare deos esse? non audes. sapienter id quidem, etsi hoc loco non populum metuis sed ipsos deos. novi ego Epicureos omnia sigilla venerantes. Quamquam video non nullis videri Epicurum, ne in offensionem Atheniensium caderet, verbis reliquisse deos re sustulisse. itaque in illis selectis eius brevibusque sententiis, quas appellatis kuri/as do/cas, haec ut opinor prima sententia est: "quod beatum et inmortale est id nec habet nec exhibet cuiquam negotium"; in hac ita exposita sententia sunt qui existiment, quod ille inscitia plane loquendi fecerit, fecisse consulto:

"But the gods neglect small things; they do not attend to the little fields of individual men or their slips of vine, and if blight or hail has harmed someone, that was no business for Jupiter to take notice of; not even kings in their kingdoms see to all the smallest matters" — for so you say. As if I had complained a moment ago about Publius Rutilius’s estate at Formiae, and not about the loss of his civic standing! And this, indeed, is how all mortals regard the matter: that external advantages — vineyards, crops, olive groves, abundance of grain and fruit, in short every comfort and prosperity of life — they have from the gods; but no one has ever credited his virtue to a god.

de homine minime vafro male existimant. dubium est enim utrum dicat aliquid esse beatum et inmortale an si quod sit id esse tale. non animadvertunt hic eum ambigue locutum esse, sed multis aliis locis et illum et Metrodorum tam aperte quam paulo ante te. Ille vero deos esse putat, nec quemquam vidi qui magis ea quae timenda esse negaret timeret, mortem dico et deos: quibus mediocres homines non ita valde moventur, his ille clamat omnium mortalium mentes esse perterritas; tot milia latrocinantur morte proposita, alii omnia quae possunt fana conpilant: credo aut illos mortis timor terret aut hos religionis. Sed quoniam non audes (iam enim cum ipso Epicuro loquar) negare esse deos, quid est quod te inpediat aut solem aut mundum aut mentem aliquam sempiternam in deorum numero ponere?

And rightly, no doubt; for it is on account of virtue that we are justly praised, and in virtue that we rightly glory — which could not be the case if we held it as a gift from a god and not from ourselves. But truly, when we have been raised by honors or in our family fortune, or have gained some other accidental good or fended off some evil, then we give thanks to the gods, and then think nothing has been added to our own credit. Has anyone ever thanked the gods for being a good man? No — but for being rich, for being honored, for being safe; and they call upon Jupiter Best and Greatest for those things, not because he makes us just, temperate, and wise, but because he keeps us safe, sound, wealthy, and well supplied;

"Numquam vidi" inquit "animam rationis consilique participem in ulla alia nisi humana figura". Quid solis numquidnam aut lunae aut quinque errantium siderum simile vidisti? sol duabus unius orbis ultimis partibus definiens motum cursus annuos conficit; huius hanc lustrationem eiusdem incensa radiis menstruo spatio luna complet; quinque autem stellae eundem orbem tenentes, aliae propius a terris aliae remotius, ab isdem principiis disparibus temporibus eadem spatia conficiunt. num quid tale Epicure vidisti?

nor did anyone ever vow a tithe to Hercules for having been made wise — though Pythagoras, when he had discovered something new in geometry, is said to have sacrificed an ox to the Muses; but that I do not believe, since he was unwilling even to sacrifice a victim to Apollo at Delos, lest he sprinkle the altar with blood. But to return to the point: this is the judgment of all mortals — that fortune is to be sought from a god, but wisdom to be taken from oneself. Grant that we may dedicate temples to Mind, to Virtue, and to Faith, yet we see that these things reside in ourselves; the capacity for hope, safety, help, and victory must be sought from the gods. The prosperity, then, and the good fortune of the wicked refute, as Diogenes used to say, all the power and might of the gods.

ne sit igitur sol ne luna ne stellae, quoniam nihil esse potest nisi quod attigimus aut vidimus. Quid deum ipsum numne vidisti? cur igitur credis esse? Omnia tollamus ergo quae aut historia nobis aut ratio nova adfert. ita fit ut mediterranei mare esse non credant. quae sunt tantae animi angustiae ut, si Seriphi natus esses nec umquam egressus ex insula, in qua lepusculos vulpeculasque saepe vidisses, non crederes leones et pantheras esse, cum tibi quales essent dicerentur, si vero de elephanto quis diceret, etiam rideri te putares.

"But sometimes good men come to a good end." We snatch up such cases, to be sure, and assign them to the immortal gods without any reason. But Diagoras — the one called the Atheist — when he had come to Samothrace, and a certain friend said to him, "You who think the gods neglect human affairs, do you not notice, from all these painted tablets, how many men have escaped the violence of the storm by their vows and reached harbor safely?" — "Just so," he replied, "for those who suffered shipwreck and perished at sea are nowhere painted." And the same man, when he was sailing and his fellow passengers, frightened and panic-stricken by a storm against them, said that this was happening to them not undeservedly, since they had taken him aboard their ship, pointed out to them many other ships laboring on the same course and asked whether they believed that Diagoras was sailing on those ships too. For the truth of the matter is this: that, as regards prosperous or adverse fortune, it makes no difference what sort of man you are or how you have lived.

Et tu quidem Vellei non vestro more sed dialecticorum, quae funditus gens vestra non novit, angustia argumenti sententiam conclusisti. Beatos esse deos sumpsisti: concedimus. beatum autem esse sine virtute neminem posse: id quoque damus, et libenter quidem. virtutem autem sine ratione constare non posse: conveniat id quoque necesse est. Adiungis nec rationem esse nisi in hominis figura. quem tibi hoc daturum putas? si enim ita esset, quid opus erat te gradatim istuc pervenire? sumpsisses tuo iure. quod autem est istuc gradatim? nam a beatis ad virtutem, a virtute ad rationem video te venisse gradibus; a ratione ad humanam figuram quo modo accedis? praecipitare istuc quidem est, non descendere.

"The gods do not attend to everything," he says, "any more than kings do." But where is the likeness? For if kings deliberately overlook things, the fault is great; whereas for a god there is not even the excuse of ignorance. And you defend him splendidly when you say that the power of the gods is such that, even if someone has escaped the penalty of his crime by death, those penalties are exacted from his children, his grandchildren, his descendants. What admirable fairness in the gods! Would any state endure a proposer of a law of this kind — that a son or grandson be condemned if a father or grandfather had transgressed? What end could be set to the slaughter of the house of Tantalus, or what satiety of punishment will ever be granted for the death of Myrtilus to be atoned by penalties? Whether the poets have corrupted the Stoics, or the Stoics have lent authority to the poets, I could not easily say;

Nec vero intellego cur maluerit Epicurus deos hominum similes dicere quam homines deorum. quaeres quid intersit; si enim hoc illi simile sit, esse illud huic. video, sed hoc dico, non ab hominibus formae figuram venisse ad deos; di enim semper fuerunt, nati numquam sunt, si quidem aeterni sunt futuri; at homines nati; ante igitur humana forma quam homines, eaque erant forma dii inmortales: non ergo illorum humana forma sed nostra divina dicenda est. Verum hoc quidem ut voletis; illud quaero, quae fuerit tanta fortuna (nihil enim ratione in rerum natura

for both alike tell of monstrous and scandalous things. For the man whom an iambic of Hipponax had wounded, or who had been injured by a verse of Archilochus, did not bear a pain sent down by a god but one conceived by himself; and when we observe the lust of Aegisthus or of Paris, we do not look for a god as its cause, since we all but hear the voice of guilt itself; nor do I judge that the recovery of many sick men was given by Aesculapius rather than by Hippocrates; nor shall I ever say that the discipline of the Lacedaemonians was given to Sparta by Apollo rather than by Lycurgus. Critolaus, I say, destroyed Corinth, and Hasdrubal Carthage; these two men gouged out those two eyes of the seacoast — not some angry god, who, you maintain, cannot be angry at all.

factum esse vultis)—sed tamen quis iste tantus casus, unde tam felix concursus atomorum, ut repente homines deorum forma nascerentur? Seminane deorum decidisse de caelo putamus in terras et sic homines patrum similes extitisse? vellem diceretis; deorum cognationem agnoscerem non invitus. nihil tale dicitis, sed casu esse factum ut essemus similes deorum. Et nunc argumenta quaerenda sunt quibus hoc refellatur. utinam tam facile vera invenire possim quam falsa convincere. Etenim enumerasti memoriter et copiose, ut mihi quidem admirari luberet in homine esse Romano tantam scientiam, usque a Thale Milesio de deorum natura philosophorum sententias.

But surely he could have come to their aid and preserved cities so great and so fine; for you yourselves are accustomed to say that there is nothing a god cannot accomplish, and that without any effort at all; for just as the limbs of men are moved by the mind itself and by the will, without any straining, so by the divine power of the gods all things can be fashioned, moved, and changed. And you do not say this in a superstitious, old-wives’ way, but on grounds of physics and consistent reasoning: that the matter of things, out of which and in which all things are, is wholly flexible and changeable, so that there is nothing that cannot be fashioned and transformed out of it, however suddenly; and that the fashioner and governess of this whole matter is divine providence; therefore, wherever it moves itself, it can bring about whatever it wills. And so either it does not know what it can do, or it neglects human affairs, or it cannot judge what is best.

omnesne tibi illi delirare visi sunt qui sine manibus et pedibus constare deum posse decreverint? Ne hoc quidem vos movet considerantis, quae sit utilitas quaeque oportunitas in homine membrorum, ut iudicetis membris humanis deos non egere? quid enim pedibus opus est sine ingressu, quid manibus si nihil conprehendendum est, quid reliqua discriptione omnium corporis partium, in qua nihil inane nihil sine causa nihil supervacuaneum est, itaque nulla ars imitari sollertiam naturae potest. habebit igitur linguam deus et non loquetur, dentes palatum fauces nullum ad usum, quaeque procreationis causa natura corpori adfinxit ea frustra habebit deus; nec externa magis quam interiora, cor pulmones iecur cetera— quae detracta utilitate quid habent venustatis (quando quidem haec esse in deo propter pulchritudinem voltis)?

"It does not care for individual men." No wonder: not even for states; not for those: not even for nations and peoples. And if it will despise these too, what wonder is it that the whole human race has been despised by it? But how can you, who say that the gods do not pursue all things, at the same time wish that dreams be distributed and divided among men by the immortal gods (this with you, since the doctrine about the truth of dreams is yours), and likewise say that vows ought to be undertaken? Individuals, surely, make vows; the divine mind, then, hears even individuals; you see, therefore, that it is not so occupied as you supposed. Suppose it is distracted — turning the heavens, watching over the earth, governing the seas: why does it allow so many gods to do nothing and stand idle? Why does it not set over human affairs some of the gods at leisure — those innumerable ones that you, Balbus, have unfolded? This is more or less what I had to say about the nature of the gods, not in order to abolish it, but so that you might understand how obscure it is and what difficult explanations it involves.’ When he had said this, Cotta made an end.

Istisne fidentes somniis non modo Epicurus et Metrodorus et Hermarchus contra Pythagoram Platonem Empedoclemque dixerunt, sed meretricula etiam Leontium contra Theophrastum scribere ausast —scito illa quidem sermone et Attico, sed tamen: tantum Epicuri hortus habuit licentiae. Et soletis queri; Zeno quidem etiam litigabat; quid dicam Albucium; nam Phaedro nihil elegantius nihil humanius, sed stomachabatur senex si quid asperius dixeram, cum Epicurus Aristotelem vexarit contumeliosissime, Phaedoni Socratico turpissime male dixerit, Metrodori sodalis sui fratrem Timocraten, quia nescio quid in philosophia dissentiret, totis voluminibus conciderit, in Democritum ipsum quem secutus est fuerit ingratus, Nausiphanem magistrum suum, a quo non nihil didicerat, tam male acceperit. Zeno quidem non eos solum qui tum erant, Apollodorum Sillim ceteros, figebat maledictis, sed Socraten ipsum parentem philosophiae Latino verbo utens scurram Atticum fuisse dicebat, Chrysippum numquam nisi Chrysippam vocabat.

But Lucilius said: "Too vehemently, Cotta, have you inveighed against that doctrine of the Stoics concerning the providence of the gods, which they established most reverently and most wisely. But since evening is coming on, you will grant us some day on which to argue against what you have said. For I have a contest with you on behalf of altars and hearths, on behalf of the temples and shrines of the gods and the walls of the city — those walls which you priests declare to be sacred, and you gird the city more carefully with religion than with its own ramparts; and to abandon them, so long as I can draw breath, I judge to be a sacrilege."

tu ipse paulo ante cum tamquam senatum philosophorum recitares, summos viros desipere delirare dementis esse dicebas. quorum si nemo verum vidit de natura deorum, verendum est ne nulla sit omnino. Nam ista quae vos dicitis sunt tota commenticia, vix digna lucubratione anicularum. non enim sentitis quam multa vobis suscipienda sint si inpetraritis ut concedamus eandem hominum esse et deorum figuram. omnis cultus et curatio corporis erit eadem adhibenda deo quae adhibetur homini, ingressus cursus accubitio inclinatio sessio conprehensio, ad extremum etiam sermo et oratio.

Then Cotta: ’For my part, I both wish to be refuted, Balbus, and I preferred to set out the things I argued rather than to pass judgment on them, and I know for certain that you can easily defeat me.’ "No doubt," said Velleius, "from a man who thinks that even dreams are sent to us by Jupiter — dreams which are nevertheless not so trifling as the Stoics’ discourse on the nature of the gods." When these things had been said, we parted in such a way that to Velleius the argument of Cotta seemed the truer, while to me that of Balbus seemed to lean nearer the resemblance of truth.

nam quod et maris deos et feminas esse dicitis, quid sequatur videtis. equidem mirari satis non possum unde ad istas opiniones vester ille princeps venerit. Sed clamare non desinitis retinendum hoc esse, deus ut beatus inmortalisque sit. quid autem obstat quo minus sit beatus si non sit bipes, aut ista sive beatitas sive beatitudo dicendast (utrumque omnino durum, sed usu mollienda nobis verba sunt)—verum ea quaecumque est cur aut in solem illum aut in hunc mundum aut in aliquam mentem aeternam figura membrisque corporis vacuam cadere non potest?

the works of the gods." So much for him. As for us, let us imagine darkness as great as that which, they say, once obscured the neighboring regions at the eruption of the fires of Aetna, so that for two days no man recognized his fellow, and when on the third day the sun shone out, they then seemed to themselves to have come back to life. But if this same thing should befall us — that out of eternal darkness we should suddenly look upon the light — what an appearance the sky would seem to have! Yet by the daily constancy of it and the habit of our eyes our minds grow used to it, and we neither wonder nor seek out the reasons for the things we always see — just as though it were the novelty, rather than the magnitude, of things that ought to rouse us to inquire into their causes.

nihil aliud dicis nisi "Numquam vidi solem aut mundum beatum". Quid mundum praeter hunc umquamne vidisti? negabis. cur igitur non sescenta milia esse mundorum sed innumerabilia ausus es dicere? "Ratio docuit." Ergo hoc te ratio non docebit, cum praestantissima natura quaeratur eaque beata et aeterna, quae sola divina naturast, ut inmortalitate vincamur ab ea natura sic animi praestantia vinci, atque ut animi item corporis? cur igitur, cum ceteris rebus inferiores simus, forma pares sumus; ad similitudinem enim deorum propius accedebat humana virtus quam figura.

For who would call this creature a man — who, when he has seen motions of the heavens so fixed, orders of the stars so settled, and all things so interconnected and fitted to one another, should deny that any reason is present in them and assert that those things come about by chance, things conducted with a forethought we cannot match by any forethought of our own? When we see something moved by a kind of mechanism — an orrery, say, or a water clock, or a great many other contrivances — we do not doubt that they are the work of reason; and yet, when we see the onrush of the heavens turning and revolving with marvelous speed, bringing about the changes of the seasons year by year with the utmost benefit and preservation of all things, do we doubt that these come about not only by reason, but by a reason surpassing and divine?

An quicquam tam puerile dici potest (ut eundem locum diutius urgeam) quam si ea genera beluarum, quae in rubro mari Indiave gignantur, nulla esse dicamus? atqui ne curiosissimi quidem homines exquirendo audire tam multa possunt quam sunt multa quae terra mari paludibus fluminibus existunt; quae negemus esse, quia numquam vidimus? Ipsa vero quam nihil ad rem pertinet, quae vos delectat maxime, similitudo. quid canis nonne similis lupo (atque, ut Ennius, "simia quam similis turpissuma bestia nobis"); at mores in utroque dispares. elephanto beluarum nulla prudentior;

For we may now set aside the subtlety of argument and contemplate, in a manner of speaking, with our very eyes the beauty of those things which we say divine providence has established. And first let the whole earth be brought into view, set in the central seat of the world, solid and globed and gathered into a sphere on every side by its own downward tendencies, clothed in flowers, grasses, trees, and crops — of all of which an incredible multitude is set off by an inexhaustible variety. Add to this the cold perpetual flow of springs, the translucent waters of rivers, the greenest mantling of their banks, the hollow depths of caverns, the roughness of crags, the heights of overhanging mountains, and the immensities of the plains; add too the hidden veins of gold and silver, and the boundless wealth of marble.

ad figuram quae vastior? de bestiis loquor; quid inter ipsos homines nonne et simillimis formis dispares mores et moribus paribus figura dissimilis? Etenim si semel Vellei suscipimus genus hoc argumenti, attende quo serpat. tu enim sumebas nisi in hominis figura rationem inesse non posse; sumet alius nisi in terrestri, nisi in eo qui natus sit, nisi in eo qui adoleverit, nisi in eo qui didicerit, nisi in eo qui ex animo constet et corpore caduco et infirmo, postremo nisi in homine atque mortali. quod si in omnibus his rebus obsistis, quid est quod te forma una conturbet? his enim omnibus quae proposui adiunctis in homine rationem esse et mentem videbas; quibus detractis deum tamen nosse te dicis, modo liniamenta maneant. hoc est non considerare sed quasi sortiri quid loquare.

And then the kinds of living creatures — how many and how varied, whether tame or wild — the gliding flight and the song of birds, the grazing of the herds, the life of the woodland creatures. What now shall I say of the race of men, who, appointed as it were to be the tillers of the earth, do not suffer it to run wild with the savagery of beasts or to lie waste under the roughness of brush, and by whose works the fields, the islands, and the shores shine bright, set off with dwellings and cities? If we could see all this with our eyes as we see it with our minds, no one, gazing upon the earth entire, would doubt the divine reason behind it.

Nisi forte ne hoc quidem adtendis, non modo in homine sed etiam in arbore quicquid supervacuaneum sit aut usum non habeat obstare. quam molestum est uno digito plus habere; quid ita? quia nec speciem nec usum alium quinque desiderant. tuus autem deus non digito uno redundat sed capite collo cervicibus lateribus alvo tergo poplitibus manibus pedibus feminibus cruribus. si ut inmortalis sit, quid haec ad vitam membra pertinent, quid ipsa facies? magis illa, cerebrum cor pulmones iecur: haec enim sunt domicilia vitae; oris quidem habitus ad vitae firmitatem nihil pertinet.

And how great, again, is the beauty of the sea, what the aspect of its whole expanse, what the multitude and variety of its islands, what the loveliness of its coasts and shores, how many and how unlike the kinds of creatures — some submerged, some floating and swimming, some clinging to the rocks in shells of their own growing. The sea itself, reaching out toward the land, so plays along its shores that the two natures seem fused into one.

Et eos vituperabas, qui ex operibus magnificis atque praeclaris, cum ipsum mundum, cum eius membra caelum terras maria, cumque horum insignia solem lunam stellasque vidissent, cumque temporum maturitates mutationes vicissitudinesque cognovissent, suspicati essent aliquam excellentem esse praestantemque naturam, quae haec effecisset moveret regeret gubernaret. qui etiam si aberrant a coniectura, video tamen quid sequantur: tu quod opus tandem magnum et egregium habes quod effectum divina mente videatur, ex quo esse deos suspicere? "Habebam" inquis "in animo insitam informationem quandam dei". Et barbati quidem Iovis, galeatae Minervae: num igitur esse talis putas?

Next, bordering on the sea, the air is divided between day and night; now, diffused and rarefied, it is borne aloft, now, condensed, it is packed into clouds and, gathering moisture, swells the earth with rains, and now, flowing this way and that, it makes the winds. The same air produces the yearly alternations of cold and heat; the same both sustains the flights of birds and, drawn in by breath, feeds and supports living things. There remains the last embrace, the highest above our dwellings, which encircles and confines all things — the same that is called the aether, the outermost rim and boundary of the world, in which, with the greatest wonder, the fiery shapes mark out their ordered courses.

Quanto melius haec vulgus imperitorum, qui non membra solum hominis deo tribuant sed usum etiam membrorum; dant enim arcum sagittas hastam clipeum fuscinam fulmen, et si actiones quae sint deorum non vident, nihil agentem tamen deum non queunt cogitare. ipsi qui inridentur Aegyptii nullam beluam nisi ob aliquam utilitatem quam ex ea caperent consecraverunt; velut ibes maximam vim serpentium conficiunt, cum sint aves excelsae cruribus rigidis corneo proceroque rostro; avertunt pestem ab Aegypto, cum volucris anguis ex vastitate Libyae vento Africo invectas interficiunt atque consumunt, ex quo fit ut illae nec morsu vivae noceant nec odore mortuae. possum de ichneumonum utilitate de crocodilorum de faelium dicere, sed nolo esse longus. ita concludam, tamen beluas a barbaris propter beneficium consecratas, vestrorum deorum non modo beneficium nullum extare, sed ne factum quidem omnino.

Among these the sun, by whose magnitude the earth is many times surpassed, revolves about that very earth, and rising and setting brings about day and night; and now drawing nearer, now again withdrawing, it makes each year two reversals, opposite to each other, from the farthest points — and in the interval between them it now contracts the earth, as though with a kind of sadness, and now in turn gladdens it, so that it seems to rejoice along with the sky.

"Nihil habet" inquit "negotii". Profecto Epicurus quasi pueri delicati nihil cessatione melius existimat. at ipsi tamen pueri etiam cum cessant exercitatione aliqua ludicra delectantur: deum sic feriatum volumus cessatione torpere, ut, si se commoverit, vereamur ne beatus esse non possit? haec oratio non modo deos spoliat motu et actione divina, sed etiam homines inertis efficit, si quidem agens aliquid ne deus quidem esse beatus potest.

The moon, which is, as the mathematicians demonstrate, larger than half the earth, ranges over the same tracts as the sun, but now meeting the sun, now departing from it, sends down to the lands the light it has received from the sun and itself undergoes various changes of light; and now, lying beneath and set against the sun, it darkens his rays and his light, now, falling itself into the shadow of the earth when it is directly opposite the sun, is suddenly eclipsed by the interposition and intervention of the earth between them. Over the same tracts those stars we call wandering are borne about the earth, and in the same way they rise and set, their motions now quickened, now slowed,

Verum sit sane, ut vultis, deus effigies hominis et imago: quod eius est domicilium quae sedes qui locus, quae deinde actio vitae, quibus rebus, id quod vultis, beatus est? utatur enim suis bonis oportet et fruatur qui beatus futurus est. nam locus quidem his etiam naturis, quae sine animis sunt, suus est cuique proprius, ut terra infimum teneat, hanc inundet aqua, superior aeri, aetheriis ignibus altissima ora reddatur; bestiarum autem terrenae sunt aliae, partim aquatiles, aliae quasi ancipites in utraque sede viventes, sunt quaedam etiam quae igne nasci putentur appareantque in ardentibus fornacibus saepe volitantes.

and often they stand still — than which spectacle nothing can be more wonderful, nothing more beautiful. There follows the vast multitude of the fixed stars, so distinctly grouped that men have found names for them out of their resemblance to familiar figures.” And here, looking at me, “I shall make use,” he said, “of the Aratean verses, which, since you turned them into Latin in your earliest youth, so delight me precisely because they are Latin that I keep many of them by heart. So then, as we see continually with our eyes: Without any change or alteration the rest of the heavenly bodies glide on with swift celestial motion, and together with the sky are borne along through the nights and days,

Quaero igitur vester deus primum ubi habitet, deinde quae causa eum loco moveat, si modo movetur aliquando, post, cum hoc proprium sit animantium ut aliquid adpetant quod sit naturae accommodatum, deus quid appetat, ad quam denique rem motu mentis ac rationis utatur, postremo quo modo beatus sit quo modo aeternus. quicquid enim horum attigeris ulcus est: ita male instituta ratio exitum reperire non potest.

in the contemplation of which the mind of one who longs to see the steadfastness of nature can never have its fill. And at the very farthest point, on the twofold pivot, is what is called the topmost height, the pole. About this turn the two Bears, that never set. Of these one is called among the Greeks the Dog’s Tail, Kynosoura, the other is said to be the Twister, Helike, whose brightest stars, indeed, we behold all night long — the ones our people are wont to call the Seven Plow-oxen;

Sic enim dicebas, speciem dei percipi cogitatione non sensu, nec esse in ea ullam soliditatem, neque eandem ad numerum permanere, eamque esse eius visionem ut similitudine et transitione cernatur neque deficiat umquam ex infinitis corporibus similium accessio, ex eoque fieri ut in haec intenta mens nostra beatam illam naturam et sempiternam putet. hoc, per ipsos deos de quibus loquimur, quale tandem est? nam si tantum modo ad cogitationem valent nec habent ullam soliditatem nec eminentiam, quid interest utrum de hippocentauro an de deo cogitemus; omnem enim talem conformationem animi ceteri philosophi motum inanem vocant, vos autem adventum in animos et introitum imaginum dicitis.

and with stars set off as evenly and alike, the little Dog’s Tail ranges round the same height of the sky. In her the Phoenicians trust as their guide upon the deep at night. But that earlier one shines forth more distinct with stars and is seen broad and foremost the moment night falls. This one, though small, yet to sailors is its use; for it turns in a brief circle on its inner course. And, that the look of those stars may be the more wonderful, between them, like a river with its rushing flood, the grim Dragon glides, coiling himself below and above, and shaping the winding folds that issue from his body.

ut igitur, Ti. Gracchum cum videor contionantem in Capitolio videre de M. Octavio deferentem sitellam, tum eum motum animi dico esse inanem, tu autem et Gracchi et Octavi imagines remanere, quae in Capitolium cum pervenerint tum ad animum meum referantur—hoc idem fieri in deo, cuius crebra facie pellantur animi, ex quo esse beati atque aeterni intellegantur.

Splendid as is the look of him entire, above all to be marked is the shape of his head and the blaze of his eyes: for him not one star alone shines forth, adorning his head, but his temples are marked with a twofold gleam, and from his fierce eyes two burning fires flame out, and his chin is bright with one radiant star; his head is bent aslant, and turned back upon his rounded neck, you would say he fixes his gaze upon the tail of the Greater Bear.

Fac imagines esse quibus pulsentur animi: species dumtaxat obicitur quaedam; num etiam cur ea beata sit cur aeterna? Quae autem istae imagines vestrae aut unde? a Democrito omnino haec licentia; sed et ille reprehensus a multis est, nec vos exitum reperitis, totaque res vacillat et claudicat. nam quid est quod minus probari possit, omnium in me incidere imagines, Homeri Archilochi Romuli Numae Pythagorae Platonis—nec ea forma qua illi fuerunt: quo modo illi ergo? et quorum imagines: Orpheum poetam docet Aristoteles numquam fuisse, et hoc Orphicum carmen Pythagorei ferunt cuiusdam fuisse Cerconis; at Orpheus, id est imago eius ut vos vultis, in animum meum saepe incurrit.

And the rest of the Dragon’s body indeed we behold all night long, but here his head dips and on a sudden hides itself, where rising and setting are blended into one. And, touching that head, there turns — like the image of one weary and grieving — the figure which the Greeks are wont to call the Kneeler, Engonasin, because it is borne along resting upon its knees. Here, set with surpassing brightness, is placed that Crown. And this one indeed is at its back; but next to its head is the Snake-holder, whom the Greeks proclaim by the famous name of the Serpent-bearer, Ophiouchos.

Quid quod eiusdem hominis in meum aliae aliae in tuum; quid quod earum rerum quae numquam omnino fuerunt neque esse potuerunt, ut Scyllae ut Chimaerae; quid quod hominum locorum urbium earum quas numquam vidimus; quid quod simul ac mihi collibitum est praesto est imago; quid quod etiam ad dormientem veniunt invocatae. tota res Vellei nugatoria est. Vos autem non modo oculis imagines sed etiam animis inculcatis: tanta est inpunitas garriendi. At quam licenter.

He with the double pressure of his palms holds fast the Serpent, and is himself held bound by its twisted body; for the Serpent girds the man’s middle beneath his breast. Yet he, straining, sets his feet down heavily and presses with them the eyes and breast of the Scorpion. The Seven Plow-oxen, moreover, are followed by the Bear-warder, commonly said to be the Oxherd, Bootes, because he drives the Bear before him as though yoked to the pole. Then what follows:

"Fluentium frequenter transitio fit visionum, ut e multis una videatur." Puderet me dicere non intellegere, si vos ipsi intellegeretis qui ista defenditis. quo modo enim probas continenter imagines ferri, aut si continenter, quo modo aeterne? "Innumerabilitas" inquit "suppeditat atomorum". Num eadem ergo ista faciet ut sint omnia sempiterna? Confugis ad aequilibritatem (sic enim i)sonomi/an si placet appellemus) et ais, quoniam sit natura mortalis, inmortalem etiam esse oportere. isto modo, quoniam homines mortales sunt, sint aliqui inmortales, et quoniam nascuntur in terra, nascantur in aqua. "Et quia sunt quae interimant, sint quae conservent." Sint sane, sed ea conservent quae sunt; deos istos esse non sentio.

For beneath the Oxherd’s breast there seems to be fixed a star flashing with rays, Arcturus by its famous name; and set beneath his feet is borne, holding the bright Ear of grain in her shining body, the Maiden. And so the constellations are laid out by measure, that in arrangements so vast a divine craftsmanship may appear. And you would have seen the Twin-born below the Bear’s head; beneath the middle lies the Crab, and by the feet is held the great Lion, shaking from his body a quivering flame. The Charioteer will be borne along, drawn beneath the left side of the Twins. Opposite, the fierce one of the Twister gazes at his head. But the Goat holds his left shoulder, bright. Then what follows: but this is a star endowed with a great and brilliant sign, while over against it the Kids cast their scant fire upon mortals. Beneath whose feet is the horn-bearing Bull, braced upon his sturdy body. His head is sprinkled with thronging stars;

Omnis tamen ista rerum effigies ex individuis quo modo corporibus oritur? quae etiam si essent, quae nulla sunt, pellere sepse et agitari inter se concursu fortasse possent, formare figurare colorare animare non possent. Nullo igitur modo inmortalem deum efficitis. Videamus nunc de beato. Sine virtute certe nullo modo; virtus autem actuosa; et deus vester nihil agens; expers virtutis igitur;

these stars the Greeks have been wont to call the Hyades, from raining (hyein being to rain), while our people, in their ignorance, call them the Piglets, as though they were named from sows rather than from the showers. The Lesser Bear, moreover, Cepheus follows close behind with hands outspread; for he himself is turned toward the back of the Dog’s-Tail Bear. Before him goes Cassiopeia, dim in the look of her stars. And next to her wheels, with shining body, Andromeda, fleeing the sad gaze of her parent. For her that Horse, shaking his mane with flashing brightness, touches the top of her head with his belly, and one star, joining them, holds the two figures in a shared light, longing to bind an everlasting knot out of the stars. Next clings the Ram with his curled-back horns; near him the Fishes, of which one glides on a little ahead and is touched more by the bristling breezes of the north wind.

ita ne beatus quidem. Quae ergo vita? "Suppeditatio" inquis "bonorum nullo malorum interventu". Quorum tandem bonorum? voluptatum credo, nempe ad corpus pertinentium; nullam enim novistis nisi profectam a corpore et redeuntem ad corpus animi voluptatem. non arbitror te velle similem esse Epicureorum reliquorum, quos pudeat quarundam Epicuri vocum, quibus ille testatur se ne intellegere quidem ullum bonum quod sit seiunctum a delicatis et obscenis voluptatibus; quas quidem non erubescens persequitur omnis nominatim.

At the feet of Andromeda is Perseus traced out, whom the blasts buffet from the topmost region of the north. Near his left knee you will see, with faint light, the Pleiades. Next the Lyre is seen, lightly laid and arched. Next is the winged Bird beneath the broad covering of the sky. And nearest to the Horse’s head is the right hand of the Water-pourer, and then, after him, the whole Water-pourer. Then, breathing chill cold from his mighty breast, half-beast in body, Capricorn upon his great orbit; whom, when the Titan has clothed him in unbroken light, wheeling about he drives his chariot at the winter season.

quem cibum igitur aut quas potiones aut quas vocum aut florum varietates aut quos tactus quos odores adhibebis ad deos, ut eos perfundas voluptatibus? ac poetae quidem nectar ambrosiam epulas conparant et aut Iuventatem aut Ganymedem pocula ministrantem, tu autem Epicure quid facies? neque enim unde habeat ista deus tuus video nec quo modo utatur. locupletior igitur hominum natura ad beate vivendum est quam deorum, quod pluribus generibus fruitur voluptatum.

And here is seen, showing itself, the Scorpion rising on high, drawing behind it with the force of its body the curving Bow. Near it the winged Bird wheels in flight, gleaming with its pinions. Hard by, the Eagle carries itself with its burning body. Then the Dolphin. And after it Orion, leaning with his slanting frame.

At has levioris ducis voluptates, quibus quasi titillatio (Epicuri enim hoc verbum est) adhibetur sensibus. quo usque ludis? nam etiam Philo noster ferre non poterat aspernari Epicureos mollis et delicatas voluptates. summa enim memoria pronuntiabat plurimas Epicuri sententias is ipsis verbis quibus erant scriptae. Metrodori vero, qui est Epicuri collega sapientiae, multa inpudentiora recitabat; accusat enim Timocratem fratrem suum Metrodorus, quod dubitet omnia quae ad beatam vitam pertineant ventre metiri, neque id semel dicit sed saepius. adnuere te video, nota enim tibi sunt; proferrem libros si negares. Neque nunc reprehendo quod ad voluptatem omnia referantur (alia est ea quaestio), sed doceo deos vestros esse voluptatis expertes, ita vestro iudicio ne beatos quidem. "At dolore vacant.

Following close upon him, that blazing Dog shines out with the light of its stars. After it the Hare comes next, never resting its course on a wearied body. And at the Dog’s tail the Argo glides, snaking along. The Ram covers her, and the Fishes with their scaly bodies, while she touches with her gleaming body the banks of the River — which you will see snaking far and streaming on; and you will behold the long Bonds set in the quarter of their tails that hold the Fishes back. Then, beside the Scorpion’s flashing sting, you will discern the Altar, which the breath of the south wind caresses with its blast. Near these the Centaur moves, hastening to join the parts of the Horse to the Claws. With his right hand outstretched, where the great four-footed beast is gripped, he reaches and grimly advances toward the bright Altar. Here from the regions below rears up the Hydra, whose body lies poured out far along, and in the middle of its coil the gleaming Bowl shines back. At the end the Crow, straining with its feathered body, strikes with its beak; and here, just beneath the Twins themselves, before the Dog, is that star which goes by the Greek name Procyon.

" Satin est id ad illam abundantem bonis vitam beatissimam? "Cogitat" inquiunt "adsidue beatum esse se; habet enim nihil aliud quod agitet in mente". Conprehende igitur animo et propone ante oculos deum nihil aliud in omni aeternitate nisi "mihi pulchre est" et "ego beatus sum" cogitantem. Nec tamen video quo modo non vereatur iste deus beatus ne intereat, cum sine ulla intermissione pulsetur agiteturque atomorum incursione sempiterna, cumque ex ipso imagines semper afluant. Ita nec beatus est vester deus nec aeternus.

Can this whole ordering of the constellations, this whole great adornment of the heavens, seem to any man of sound mind to have been brought about by bodies coursing this way and that by chance and at random? Or did some other nature, devoid of mind and reason, manage to produce these things, which not only required reason in order to come into being, but cannot even be understood for what they are without the highest reason? Nor is this alone to be marveled at; there is nothing greater than the fact that the world is so stable and coheres so closely that nothing better fitted for its endurance can so much as be conceived. For all its parts, on every side pressing toward the central place, strain equally. And bodies joined to one another remain so most firmly when they are bound together as if by some encompassing chain; and this is the work of that nature which, pervading the whole world, brings all things to completion through mind and reason, drawing them toward the center and turning the outermost parts inward.

"At etiam de sanctitate de pietate adversus deos libros scripsit Epicurus." At quo modo in his loquitur: ut Ti. Coruncanium aut P. Scaevolam pontifices maximos te audire dicas, non eum qui sustulerit omnem funditus religionem nec manibus ut Xerses sed rationibus deorum inmortalium templa et aras everterit. quid est enim cur deos ab hominibus colendos dicas, cum dei non modo homines non colant sed omnino nihil curent nihil agant?

And so, if the world is spherical, and if for that reason all its parts on every side are held together, balanced both in themselves and among themselves, the same must necessarily hold true of the earth: with all its parts inclining toward the center — and the center in a sphere is the lowest point — nothing breaks in to undermine so great a tension of gravity and weight. By the same principle the sea, though it lies above the earth, nevertheless, seeking the central place of the earth, gathers itself into a sphere uniformly on every side, and neither overflows nor pours away.

"At est eorum eximia quaedam praestansque natura, ut ea debeat ipsa per se ad se colendam elicere sapientem." An quicquam eximium potest esse in ea natura, quae sua voluptate laetans nihil nec actura sit umquam neque agat neque egerit? Quae porro pietas ei debetur a quo nihil acceperis, aut quid omnino cuius nullum meritum sit ei deberi potest? est enim pietas iustitia adversum deos; cum quibus quid potest nobis esse iuris, cum homini nulla cum deo sit communitas? Sanctitas autem est scientia colendorum deorum; qui quam ob rem colendi sint non intellego nullo nec accepto ab his nec sperato bono.

The air, which borders upon the sea, is borne aloft by its lightness, yet pours itself out in every direction; and so it is at once continuous and joined with the sea and naturally borne toward the heavens, tempered by whose thinness and warmth it furnishes living things with the breath of life and health. The topmost part of the heavens, which is called the ethereal, embraces the air, and at once retains its own fire — thin and condensed by no admixture — and is joined to the outer limit of the air. In the ether the stars revolve, which both hold themselves together, compacted by their own striving, and sustain their movements by their very form and figure; for they are round, and to forms of this kind, as I think I have said before, no harm can come.

Quid est autem quod deos veneremur propter admirationem eius naturae in qua egregium nihil videmus? Nam superstitione, quod gloriari soletis, facile est liberare, cum sustuleris omnem vim deorum. Nisi forte Diagoram aut Theodorum, qui omnino deos esse negabant, censes superstitiosos esse potuisse; ego ne Protagoram quidem, cui neutrum licuerit, nec esse deos nec non esse. horum enim sententiae omnium non modo superstitionem tollunt, in qua inest timor inanis deorum, sed etiam religionem, quae deorum cultu pio continetur.

The stars are by nature fiery; and so they are fed by the vapors of the earth, the sea, and the other waters — vapors raised by the sun from the warmed fields and from the waters. Nourished and renewed by these, the stars and the whole ether pour them out again and draw them back from the same source, so that almost nothing perishes, or only the very smallest amount, consumed by the fire of the stars and the flame of the ether. From this our school holds that what will come about is the very thing they said Panaetius doubted: that in the end the whole world will burst into fire, when, the moisture being consumed, neither can the earth be nourished nor can the air return, since the air’s source, once all the water is exhausted, cannot exist; and so nothing will be left but fire, by which in turn, as a living being and a god, the renewal of the world will take place and the same adornment will arise again.

Quid i qui dixerunt totam de dis inmortalibus opinionem fictam esse ab hominibus sapientibus rei publicae causa, ut quos ratio non posset eos ad officium religio duceret, nonne omnem religionem funditus sustulerunt? Quid Prodicus Cius, qui ea quae prodessent hominum vitae deorum in numero habita esse dixit, quam tandem religionem reliquit?

I do not wish to seem to you to dwell at length on the system of the stars, and above all on those said to wander; their harmony out of the most dissimilar motions is so great that, while the highest, Saturn’s, chills, the middle one, Mars’s, sets ablaze, and Jupiter’s, set between them, gives light and tempers; and below Mars two obey the sun, while the sun itself fills the whole world with its light, and from it the moon, illumined, brings on conceptions and births and the ripening of all that is born. This linking of things, this conjoining of nature consenting, as it were, to the world’s preservation — the man whom it does not move, I know for certain has never reflected on any of these matters.

Quid qui aut fortis aut claros aut potentis viros tradunt post mortem ad deos pervenisse, eosque esse ipsos quos nos colere precari venerarique soleamus, nonne expertes sunt religionum omnium? quae ratio maxime tractata ab Euhemero est, quem noster et interpretatus est et secutus praeter ceteros Ennius; ab Euhemero autem et mortes et sepulturae demonstrantur deorum; utrum igitur hic confirmasse videtur religionem an penitus totam sustulisse? Omitto Eleusinem sanctam illam et augustam, "ubi initiantur gentes orarum ultimae", praetereo Samothraciam eaque quae Lemni "nocturno aditu occulta coluntur silvestribus saepibus densa"; quibus explicatis ad rationemque revocatis rerum magis natura cognoscitur quam deorum.

Come, that we may pass from the things of the heavens to those of the earth — what is there among them in which the reasoning of an intelligent nature does not appear? To begin with, among the things that grow from the earth, the roots both give stability to the things they support and draw from the earth the sap by which the parts held together by the roots are nourished; and the trunks are clothed in bark or rind, so as to be the safer against cold and heat. And then the vines grasp their props with their tendrils, as though with hands, and so raise themselves up like living things; indeed, the cabbages are said to recoil from the stalks of the vine, if they are planted near them, as from things pestilent and harmful, and not to touch them in any part.

As for living creatures, how great is their variety, how great their capacity for this end — that each should persist within its own kind! Of these, some are covered with hides, some clothed with shaggy hair, some bristling with spines; some we see overlaid with feathers, others with scales, some armed with horns, some furnished with wings for escape. To living creatures, moreover, nature has supplied lavishly and abundantly the food that suited each. I could enumerate, for the seizing and processing of that food, what design there is in the shapes of living things, and how skillful and subtle the disposition of their parts, how admirable the construction of their limbs. For all the parts at least that are enclosed within are so formed and so placed that none of them is superfluous, none not necessary to the preservation of life.

Mihi quidem etiam Democritus vir magnus in primis, cuius fontibus Epicurus hortulos suos inrigavit, nutare videtur in natura deorum. tum enim censet imagines divinitate praeditas inesse in universitate rerum, tum principia mentis quae sunt in eodem universo deos esse dicit, tum animantes imagines quae vel prodesse nobis solent vel nocere, tum ingentes quasdam imagines tantasque ut universum mundum conplectantur extrinsecus. quae quidem omnia sunt patria Democriti quam Democrito digniora; quis enim istas imagines conprehendere animo potest, quis admirari, quis aut cultu aut religione dignas iudicare? Epicurus vero ex animis hominum extraxit radicitus religionem, cum dis inmortalibus et opem et gratiam sustulit. cum enim optimam et praestantissumam naturam dei dicat esse, negat idem esse in deo gratiam: tollit id quod maxime proprium est optimae praestantissimaeque naturae. quid enim melius aut quid praestantius bonitate et beneficentia; qua cum carere deum vultis, neminem deo nec deum nec hominem carum, neminem ab eo amari neminem diligi vultis: ita fit ut non modo homines a deis sed ipsi dei inter se ab aliis alii neglegantur. Quanto Stoici melius, qui a vobis reprehenduntur: censent autem sapientes sapientibus etiam ignotis esse amicos; nihil est enim virtute amabilius, quam qui adeptus erit ubicumque erit gentium a nobis diligetur.

The same nature has given to the beasts both sensation and appetite, so that by the one they might have the impulse to seize their natural foods, and by the other distinguish the pestilent from the wholesome. Some animals, again, approach their food by walking, others by crawling, others by flying, others by swimming; and they take their food partly with the open mouth and with the teeth themselves, partly seize it with the grip of their claws, partly with the hook of their beaks; some suck, some pluck, some gulp, some chew. Some, too, are of such lowness that they easily reach food on the ground with their mouths, while those that are taller — geese, swans, cranes, camels — are helped by the length of their necks;

Vos autem quid mali datis, cum in inbecillitate gratificationem et benivolentiam ponitis. ut enim omittam vim et naturam deorum, ne homines quidem censetis, nisi inbecilli essent, futuros beneficos et benignos fuisse? nulla est caritas naturalis inter bonos? carum ipsum verbum est amoris, ex quo amicitiae nomen est ductum; quam si ad fructum nostrum referemus, non ad illius commoda quem diligemus, non erit ista amicitia sed mercatura quaedam utilitatum suarum. prata et arva et pecudum greges diliguntur isto modo, quod fructus ex is capiuntur, hominum caritas et amicitia gratuita est; quanto igitur magis deorum, qui nulla re egentes et inter se diligunt et hominibus consulunt. Quod ni ita sit, quid veneramur quid precamur deos, cur sacris pontifices cur auspiciis augures praesunt, quid optamus a deis inmortalibus quid vovemus? "At etiam liber est Epicuri de sanctitate."

a hand, too, was given to the elephant, because on account of the size of its body it had difficult access to its food. As for the beasts whose food was such that they had to feed on the foods of other kinds, nature gave them either strength or speed. To some, even, a certain contrivance and skill was given — as among the little spiders, some weave a kind of net, so that they may dispatch whatever sticks in it, while others watch unawares and snatch whatever falls in and consume it. The pina, however — for that is its Greek name — opening up two great mussel-shells, enters as it were into a partnership with a little shrimp for the procuring of food; and so, when small fish have swum into its gaping shell, the pina, warned by the shrimp, snaps the shells shut with a bite: thus among the most dissimilar little creatures food is sought in common;

Ludimur ab homine non tam faceto quam ad scribendi licentiam libero. quae enim potest esse sanctitas si dii humana non curant, quae autem animans natura nihil curans? Verius est igitur nimirum illud quod familiaris omnium nostrum Posidonius disseruit in libro quinto de natura deorum, nullos esse deos Epicuro videri, quaeque is de deis inmortalibus dixerit invidiae detestandae gratia dixisse; neque enim tam desipiens fuisset ut homunculi similem deum fingeret, liniamentis dumtaxat extremis non habitu solido, membris hominis praeditum omnibus usu membrorum ne minimo quidem, exilem quendam atque perlucidum, nihil cuiquam tribuentem nihil gratificantem, omnino nihil curantem nihil agentem. quae natura primum nulla esse potest, idque videns Epicurus re tollit oratione relinquit deos;

and here it is to be marveled at whether they were brought together by some encounter with each other, or were associated by nature herself straight from their birth. There is, too, some occasion for wonder in the water-dwelling creatures that are born on land — for instance crocodiles and river tortoises and certain serpents which, born away from the water, as soon as they first can move, make for the water. Indeed, we often place ducks’ eggs under hens; and the chicks hatched from them are first nourished by these as by mothers, by whom they were brought forth and warmed, and then they leave them and flee from them as they follow, the moment they have been able to catch sight of water as their natural home: so great a guardianship of self-preservation has nature implanted in living things. I have also read it written that there is a certain bird called the spoonbill; it seeks its food by flying to those birds that plunge themselves into the sea, and when these have emerged and caught a fish, it presses their heads with its bite until they let go their catch, upon which it pounces itself. The same bird is recorded as being in the habit of filling itself with shellfish, and when it has cooked these with the heat of its stomach, of vomiting them up, and so selecting from them the parts that are good to eat.

deinde si maxime talis est deus ut nulla gratia nulla hominum caritate teneatur, valeat—quid enim dicam "propitius sit"; esse enim propitius potest nemini, quoniam ut dicitis omnis in inbecillitate est et gratia et caritas.”’

When Balbus had finished, Cotta said with a smile: "You instruct me too late, Balbus, on what I am to defend. For while you were speaking, I was turning over in my own mind what I might say against you — not so much to refute you as to ask after the things I understood too little. And since each man must use his own judgment, it would be a hard thing to bring me to feel as you would have me feel."

Quae cum Cotta dixisset, tum Velleius Ne ego inquit incautus, qui cum Academico et eodem rhetore congredi conatus sim. nam neque indisertum Academicum pertimuissem nec sine ista philosophia rhetorem quamvis eloquentem; neque enim flumine conturbor inanium verborum nec subtilitate sententiarum si orationis est siccitas. tu autem Cotta utraque re valuisti; corona tibi et iudices defuerunt. Sed ad ista alias, nunc Lucilium, si ipsi commodum est, audiamus.

At this Velleius said: "You have no idea how keenly I look forward to hearing you, Cotta. For our friend Balbus found your discourse against Epicurus delightful; so I in turn will offer myself to you as an attentive listener against the Stoics. For I trust you come, as you usually do, well prepared."

Tum Balbus: ’Eundem equidem mallem audire Cottam, dum qua eloquentia falsos deos sustulit eadem veros inducat. est enim et philosophi et pontificis et Cottae de dis inmortalibus habere non errantem et vagam ut Academici sed ut nostri stabilem certamque sententiam. nam contra Epicurum satis superque dictum est; sed aveo audire tu ipse Cotta quid sentias.’ An inquit oblitus es quid initio dixerim, facilius me, talibus praesertim de rebus, quid non sentirem quam quid sentirem posse dicere? quod si haberem aliquid quod liqueret, tamen te vicissim audire vellem, cum ipse tam multa dixissem.

Then Cotta said: "By Hercules, Velleius, I do — for my reckoning with Lucilius is not the same as it was with you." "How so, then?" said the other. "Because it seems to me that your Epicurus does not put up much of a fight over the immortal gods. He merely does not dare to deny that the gods exist, for fear of incurring some odium or charge; but when he asserts that the gods do nothing and care for nothing, and that they are furnished with human limbs but make no use of those limbs, he seems to be trifling — content to have said that there is a certain blessed and eternal nature.

Tum Balbus: Geram tibi morem et agam quam brevissume potero; etenim convictis Epicuri erroribus longa de mea disputatione detracta oratio est. Omnino dividunt nostri totam istam de dis inmortalibus quaestionem in partis quattuor. primum docent esse deos, deinde quales sint, tum mundum ab his administrari, postremo consulere eos rebus humanis. nos autem hoc sermone quae priora duo sunt sumamus; tertium et quartum, quia maiora sunt, puto esse in aliud tempus differenda. Minime vero inquit Cotta; nam et otiosi sumus et his de rebus agimus, quae sunt etiam negotiis anteponenda.

From Balbus, on the other hand, you noticed, I am sure, how many things were said, and how — even if less than true — they were nonetheless apt and consistent with one another. And so I intend, as I said, not so much to refute his discourse as to ask after the things I understood too little. So I leave it to you, Balbus: would you rather answer me as I question you on individual points, the things I have grasped too little, or hear my discourse entire?" Then Balbus said: "For my part, if you want anything explained to you, I would rather answer; but if you mean to question me not so much to understand as to refute, I will do whichever you please — either reply at once to each point you raise, or, when you have finished, to all of them together."

Tum Lucilius Ne egere quidem videtur inquit “oratione prima pars. Quid enim potest esse tam apertum tamque perspicuum, cum caelum suspeximus caelestiaque contemplati sumus, quam esse aliquod numen praestantissimae mentis quo haec regantur? quod ni ita esset, qui potuisset adsensu omnium dicere Ennius "aspice hoc sublime candens, quem invocant omnes Iovem"—illum vero et Iovem et dominatorem rerum et omnia motu regentem et, ut idem Ennius, "patrem divumque hominumque" et praesentem ac praepotentem deum? quod qui dubitet, haud sane intellego cur non idem sol sit an nullus sit dubitare possit;

Then Cotta said: "Excellent. So let us proceed as the discourse itself leads us. But before the matter at hand, a few words about myself. I am moved no slightly by your authority, Balbus, and by that part of your discourse which, in your peroration, urged me to remember that I am both a Cotta and a pontiff — which, I believe, came to this: that I should defend the beliefs we have received from our ancestors concerning the immortal gods, the rites, the ceremonies, the observances of religion. These I will indeed defend always, as I have always defended them, and no man’s discourse, learned or unlearned, will ever move me from the belief I received from my ancestors concerning the worship of the immortal gods. But when religion is the question, I follow Tiberius Coruncanius, Publius Scipio, Publius Scaevola, men who were chief pontiffs — not Zeno or Cleanthes or Chrysippus; and I have Gaius Laelius, an augur and at the same time a wise man, whom I would sooner hear speaking on religion, in that famous discourse of his, than any leader of the Stoics. And since the whole religion of the Roman people is divided into rites and auspices, with a third thing joined to them — whatever the interpreters of the Sibyl or the soothsayers have advised by way of prediction from portents and prodigies — I have always held that none of these observances is to be despised, and I have convinced myself that Romulus by establishing the auspices, and Numa by establishing the rites, laid the foundations of our state, which surely could never have grown so great without the fullest appeasement of the immortal gods.

qui enim est hoc illo evidentius? Quod nisi cognitum conprehensumque animis haberemus, non tam stabilis opinio permaneret nec confirmaretur diuturnitate temporis nec una cum saeclis aetatibusque hominum inveterare potuisset. etenim videmus ceteras opiniones fictas atque vanas diuturnitate extabuisse. quis enim hippocentaurum fuisse aut Chimaeram putat, quaeve anus tam excors inveniri potest quae illa quae quondam credebantur apud inferos portenta extimescat? opinionis enim commenta delet dies, naturae iudicia confirmat.

There you have, Balbus, what Cotta thinks, what a pontiff thinks. Now let me understand what you think; for from you, a philosopher, I am bound to receive a reasoned account of religion, whereas in our ancestors I must believe even when no account is rendered." Then Balbus said: "What account, then, do you want from me, Cotta?" And he replied: "Your division was fourfold: first, you proposed to show that the gods exist; next, of what kind they are; then, that the world is governed by them; and last, that they take thought for human affairs. This, if I remember rightly, was the partition." "Quite right," said Balbus; "but I am waiting to hear what you would ask."

Itaque et in nostro populo et in ceteris deorum cultus religionumque sanctitates existunt in dies maiores atque meliores; idque evenit non temere nec casu, sed quod et praesentes saepe di vim suam declarant, ut et apud Regillum bello Latinorum, cum A. Postumius dictator cum Octavio Mamillio Tusculano proelio dimicaret, in nostra acie Castor et Pollux ex equis pugnare visi sunt, et recentiore memoria idem Tyndaridae Persem victum nuntiaverunt. P. enim Vatinius avus huius adulescentis, cum e praefectura Reatina Romam venienti noctu duo iuvenes cum equis albis dixissent regem Persem illo die captum, cum senatui nuntiavisset, primo quasi temere de re publica locutus in carcerem coniectus est, post a Paulo litteris allatis cum idem dies constitisset, et agro a senatu et vacatione donatus est. atque etiam cum ad fluvium Sagram Crotoniatas Locri maximo proelio devicissent, eo ipso die auditam esse eam pugnam ludis Olympiae memoriae proditum est. saepe Faunorum voces exauditae, saepe visae formae deorum quemvis aut non hebetem aut impium deos praesentes esse confiteri coegerunt.

Then Cotta said: "Let us look at each point in turn. And as for the first — if it is first, the thing on which all but the wholly impious agree, and which cannot be burned out of my mind, namely that the gods exist — that very thing, of which I am convinced by the authority of my ancestors, why it should be so, you teach me nothing." "What is this?" said Balbus. "If you are convinced of it, why would you have me teach you?" Then Cotta said: "Because I approach this discussion as though I had never heard anything about the immortal gods, never given them a thought. Take me as a raw and untouched pupil, and teach me the things I ask."

Praedictiones vero et praesensiones rerum futurarum quid aliud declarant nisi hominibus ea quae sint ostendi monstrari portendi praedici, ex quo illa ostenta monstra portenta prodigia dicuntur. Quod si ea ficta credimus licentia fabularum, Mopsum Tiresiam Amphiaraum Calchantem Helenum (quos tamen augures ne ipsae quidem fabulae adscivissent, si res omnino repudiarent), ne domesticis quidem exemplis docti numen deorum conprobabimus? Nihil nos P. Clodi bello Punico primo temeritas movebit, qui etiam per iocum deos inridens, cum cavea liberati pulli non pascerentur, mergi eos in aquam iussit, ut biberent, quoniam esse nollent? qui risus classe devicta multas ipsi lacrimas, magnam populo Romano cladem attulit. quid collega eius L. Iunius eodem bello nonne tempestate classem amisit, cum auspiciis non paruisset? itaque Clodius a populo condemnatus est, Iunius necem sibi ipse conscivit.

"Tell me, then," he said, "what you ask." "Why, this first: when you had said that on that side the matter is so plain it does not even need a discourse — that the gods exist being plain and agreed by all — why on that very point you said so much." "Because I have often noticed you too, Cotta," he said, "when you spoke in the Forum, loading the juror with as many arguments as you could, if only the case gave you the means. And philosophers do this same thing, and I have done it as I could. But what you ask is much as if you were to ask me why I look at you with two eyes and do not close the other, when I could attain the same end with one." Then Cotta said: "How apt that comparison is, you may judge for yourself.

C. Flaminium Coelius religione neglecta cecidisse apud Transumenum scribit cum magno rei publicae vulnere. quorum exitio intellegi potest eorum imperiis rem publicam amplificatam qui religionibus paruissent. et si conferre volumus nostra cum externis, ceteris rebus aut pares aut etiam inferiores reperiemur, religione id est cultu deorum multo superiores.

For I am not in the habit, in lawsuits, of arguing for anything that is self-evident and agreed by all — argumentation only weakens what is clear — and even if I did so in the courts, I would not do the same in this finer kind of discourse. As for closing one eye, there would be no cause for that, since the gaze of both is the same, and since nature — which you would have to be wise — willed that we should have two channels bored from the mind to the eyes for light. But because you had no confidence that the thing was as plain as you would have it, for that reason you set out to show by many arguments that the gods exist. For me one thing was enough: that our ancestors had handed it down so. But you despise authorities and fight with reason;

An Atti Navi lituus ille, quo ad investigandum suem regiones vineae terminavit, contemnendus est? crederem, nisi eius augurio rex Hostilius maxima bella gessisset. Sed neglegentia nobilitatis augurii disciplina omissa veritas auspiciorum spreta est, species tantum retenta; itaque maximae rei publicae partes, in is bella quibus rei publicae salus continetur, nullis auspiciis administrantur, nulla peremnia servantur, nulla ex acuminibus, nulli viri vocantur ex quo in procinctu testamenta perierunt; tum enim bella gerere nostri duces incipiunt, cum auspicia posuerunt.

allow my reason, then, to contend with your reason. You bring forward all these arguments why there should be gods, and by your arguing you make doubtful a matter that in my view is not doubtful in the least; for I have committed to memory not only the number of your arguments but their order as well. The first was that, when we have looked up at the sky, we at once understand that there is some divine power by which all this is governed. From this came also that line: ’Behold this shining vault on high, which all

at vero apud maiores tanta religionis vis fuit, ut quidam imperatores etiam se ipsos dis inmortalibus capite velato verbis certis pro re publica devoverent. Multa ex Sibyllinis vaticinationibus, multa ex haruspicum responsis commemorare possum quibus ea confirmentur quae dubia nemini debent esse. Atqui et nostrorum augurum et Etruscorum haruspicum disciplinam P. Scipione C. Figulo consulibus res ipsa probavit. quos cum Ti. Gracchus consul iterum crearet, primus rogator, ut eos rettulit, ibidem est repente mortuus. Gracchus cum comitia nihilo minus peregisset remque illam in religionem populo venisse sentiret, ad senatum rettulit. senatus quos ad soleret referendum censuit. haruspices introducti responderunt non fuisse iustum comitiorum rogatorem. tum Gracchus, ut e patre audiebam, incensus ira:

invoke as Jupiter’ — as if any of us called upon that Jupiter rather than the Jupiter of the Capitol, or as if this were plain and agreed by all, that those are gods which Velleius and many besides will not even grant to be living beings. A weighty argument too you thought it, that the belief in the immortal gods belongs to all men and grows greater every day: so it pleases you, then, that matters so great should be judged by the opinion of fools — and that with you above all, who say those very men are mad? ’But we see the gods present among us, as Postumius did at Lake Regillus, and Vatinius on the Salarian Way’ — and there is some tale, too, about the Locrians’ battle at the Sagra. Those, then, whom you called the Tyndaridae — that is, men born of a man — and whom Homer, who lived not long after their age, says were buried at Lacedaemon: do you suppose that these came to meet Vatinius on white horses, with no grooms, and announced the victory of the Roman people to Vatinius, a country fellow, rather than to Marcus Cato, who was then the leading man? And do you, in the same way, believe that the mark which appears today in the flint at Regillus is, as it were, the print of a hoof from Castor’s horse?

"itane vero, ego non iustus, qui et consul rogavi et augur et auspicato? an vos Tusci ac barbari auspiciorum populi Romani ius tenetis et interpretes esse comitiorum potestis?" itaque tum illos exire iussit. post autem e provincia litteras ad collegium misit, se cum legeret libros recordatum esse vitio sibi tabernaculum captum fuisse hortos Scipionis, quod, cum pomerium postea intrasset habendi senatus causa, in redeundo cum idem pomerium transiret auspicari esset oblitus; itaque vitio creatos consules esse. augures rem ad senatum; senatus ut abdicarent consules; abdicaverunt. quae quaerimus exempla maiora: vir sapientissimus atque haud sciam an omnium praestantissimus peccatum suum, quod celari posset, confiteri maluit quam haerere in re publica religionem, consules summum imperium statim deponere quam id tenere punctum temporis contra religionem.

Would you not rather believe what can be proved — that the souls of illustrious men, such as those Tyndaridae were, are divine and eternal — than that men once cremated could ride horses and fight in the line of battle? Or, if you say this could have happened, you ought to teach how, and not bring out old wives’ tales."

magna augurum auctoritas; quid haruspicum ars nonne divina? Haec et innumerabilia ex eodem genere qui videat nonne cogatur confiteri deos esse? quorum enim interpretes sunt, eos ipsos esse certe necesse est; deorum autem interpretes sunt; deos igitur esse fateamur. At fortasse non omnia eveniunt quae praedicta sunt. ne aegri quidem quia non omnes convalescunt idcirco ars nulla medicina est. signa ostenduntur a dis rerum futurarum; in his si qui erraverunt, non deorum natura sed hominum coniectura peccavit. Itaque inter omnis omnium gentium summa constat; omnibus enim innatum est et in animo quasi insculptum esse deos. quales sint varium est, esse nemo negat.

Then Lucilius said: "Do they seem to you mere tales? Do you not see the temple to Castor and Pollux dedicated in the Forum by Aulus Postumius, and the decree of the Senate concerning Vatinius? As for the Sagra, there is even a common proverb among the Greeks, who, when they affirm something, call it ’surer than the things at the Sagra.’ Ought you not, then, to be moved by such authorities?" Then Cotta said: "It is with rumors that you fight me, Balbus, while I ask reasons of you.... What follows is what is to come;

Cleanthes quidem noster quattuor de causis dixit in animis hominum informatas deorum esse notiones. primam posuit eam de qua modo dixi, quae orta esset ex praesensione rerum futurarum; alteram quam ceperimus ex magnitudine commodorum, quae percipiuntur caeli temperatione fecunditate terrarum aliarumque commoditatum complurium copia;

for no one can escape what is to be. And often it is not even useful to know what will be; for it is a wretched thing to be tormented to no purpose, and not to have even the last consolation common to all, namely hope — especially since you yourselves say that all things come about by fate, and that what has been true forever from all eternity is fate. What good is it, then, or what does it bring toward taking precaution, to know that something will be, when it certainly will be? And again — where does that divination of yours come from? Who discovered the cleft in a liver, who marked the cry of the crow, who the lots? In these I believe, and I cannot despise the staff of Attus Navius whom you brought up; but how these things came to be understood by the philosophers, that I must learn — especially since those diviners of yours lie about a great many matters.

tertiam quae terreret animos fulminibus tempestatibus nimbis nivibus grandinibus vastitate pestilentia terrae motibus et saepe fremitibus lapideisque imbribus et guttis imbrium quasi cruentis, tum labibus aut repentinis terrarum hiatibus tum praeter naturam hominum pecudumque portentis, tum facibus visis caelestibus tum stellis is quas Graeci komh/tas nostri cincinnatas vocant, quae nuper bello Octaviano magnarum fuerunt calamitatum praenuntiae, tum sole geminato, quod ut e patre audivi Tuditano et Aquilio consulibus evenerat, quo quidem anno P. Africanus sol alter extinctus est, quibus exterriti homines vim quandam esse caelestem et divinam suspicati sunt;

’But physicians too’ — for so you were saying — ’are often deceived.’ What likeness is there between medicine, whose method I see, and divination, whose source I do not understand? You hold besides that the gods were appeased by the self-devotions of the Decii. What was their injustice so great that they could not be appeased toward the Roman people unless such men had perished? That was a general’s stratagem — what the Greeks call stratēgēma — but the stratagem of generals who took thought for their country and did not spare their own lives; for they reckoned that the army would follow a general who, spurring his horse, hurled himself against the enemy, and so it fell out. As for the voice of Faunus, I myself have never heard it; if you say that you have heard it, I will believe you, though I have no idea at all what a Faunus is. So far, then, Balbus, at least so far as it rests with you, I do not understand that the gods exist — gods whom I for my part believe to exist, but the Stoics teach me nothing.

quartam causam esse eamque vel maximam aequabilitatem motus constantissimamque conversionem caeli, solis lunae siderumque omnium distinctionem utilitatem pulchritudinem ordinem, quarum rerum aspectus ipse satis indicaret non esse ea fortuita: ut, si quis in domum aliquam aut in gymnasium aut in forum venerit, cum videat omnium rerum rationem modum disciplinam, non possit ea sine causa fieri iudicare, sed esse aliquem intellegat qui praesit et cui pareatur, multo magis in tantis motionibus tantisque vicissitudinibus, tam multarum rerum atque tantarum ordinibus, in quibus nihil umquam inmensa et infinita vetustas mentita sit, statuat necesse est ab aliqua mente tantos naturae motus gubernari.

For Cleanthes, as you were saying, holds that the notions of the gods are formed in the minds of men in four ways. The first is the one I have spoken of enough, the one taken from the foreknowledge of things to come; the second, from the disturbances of the weather and the other motions; the third, from the convenience and abundance of the things we enjoy; the fourth, from the order of the stars and the constancy of the heavens. Of foreknowledge we have spoken. Of disturbances in sky, sea, and earth we cannot say, when these occur, that there are not many who fear them and suppose them to be brought about by the immortal gods;

Chrysippus quidem, quamquam est acerrimo ingenio, tamen ea dicit ut ab ipsa natura didicisse, non ut ipse repperisse videatur. "Si enim" inquit "est aliquid in rerum natura quod hominis mens quod ratio quod vis quod potestas humana efficere non possit, est certe id quod illud efficit homine melius; atqui res caelestes omnesque eae quarum est ordo sempiternus ab homine confici non possunt; est igitur id quo illa conficiuntur homine melius. id autem quid potius dixeris quam deum? Etenim si di non sunt, quid esse potest in rerum natura homine melius; in eo enim solo est ratio, qua nihil potest esse praestantius; esse autem hominem qui nihil in omni mundo melius esse quam se putet desipientis adrogantiae est; ergo est aliquid melius. est igitur profecto deus.

But that is not the question — whether there are some people who think the gods exist; the question is whether the gods exist or not. For the remaining grounds that Cleanthes brings forward — one of them concerning the abundance of advantages we receive, another concerning the ordering of the seasons and the constancy of the heavens — these I shall take up when we come to dispute about the providence of the gods, on which a great deal was said by you, Balbus;

" An vero, si domum magnam pulchramque videris, non possis adduci ut, etiam si dominum non videas, muribus illam et mustelis aedificatam putes—: tantum ergo ornatum mundi, tantam varietatem pulchritudinemque rerum caelestium, tantam vim et magnitudinem maris atque terrarum si tuum ac non deorum inmortalium domicilium putes, nonne plane desipere videare? An ne hoc quidem intellegimus, omnia supera esse meliora, terram autem esse infimam, quam crassissimus circumfundat aer: ut ob eam ipsam causam, quod etiam quibusdam regionibus atque urbibus contingere videmus, hebetiora ut sint hominum ingenia propter caeli pleniorem naturam, hoc idem generi humano evenerit, quod in terra hoc est in crassissima regione mundi conlocati sint.

and to that same place I shall also defer the point you said Chrysippus made — that since there is something in the natural world which cannot be brought about by man, there exists something better than man — together with the comparisons you drew between the beauty of a fine house and the beauty of the world, and the case you made for the harmony and concord of the whole world. Zeno’s brief and rather clever syllogisms, too, I shall defer to that part of the discussion I have just named; and at that same time all those things you stated as a natural philosopher — about the fiery force and about that heat from which you said all things are generated — shall be examined in their proper place; and everything you said the day before yesterday, when you wished to prove the gods exist, as to why the whole world and the sun and the moon and the stars should possess sensation and mind, all of this I shall reserve for the same occasion.

Et tamen ex ipsa hominum sollertia esse aliquam mentem et eam quidem acriorem et divinam existimare debemus. unde enim hanc homo "arripuit", ut ait apud Xenophontem Socrates. quin et umorem et calorem, qui est fusus in corpore, et terrenam ipsam viscerum soliditatem, animum denique illum spirabilem si quis quaerat unde habeamus, apparet; quorum aliud a terra sumpsimus aliud ab umore aliud ab igni aliud ab aere eo quem spiritum dicimus. illud autem quod vincit haec omnia, rationem dico et, si placet pluribus verbis, mentem consilium cogitationem prudentiam, ubi invenimus unde sustulimus? An cetera mundus habebit omnia, hoc unum quod plurimi est non habebit? atqui certe nihil omnium rerum melius est mundo nihil praestabilius nihil pulchrius, nec solum nihil est sed ne cogitari quidem quicquam melius potest. et si ratione et sapientia nihil est melius, necesse est haec inesse in eo quod optimum esse concedimus.

But of you, again and again, I shall ask this one same thing: by what reasonings do you persuade yourself that the gods exist?” Then Balbus said: For my part I think I have brought forward my reasonings; but you refute them in such a way that, just when you seem about to question me and I have made myself ready to answer, you suddenly turn your discourse aside and give me no room to reply. And so matters of the greatest weight have passed by in silence — divination, fate — questions on which you indeed speak only in passing, but on which our school is accustomed to say a great deal, though they are kept distinct from the very question now in hand. So, if you please, do not proceed in a confused manner, so that in this disputation we may unravel the thing that is in question. Excellent, said Cotta.

Quid vero tanta rerum consentiens conspirans, continuata cognatio quem non coget ea quae dicuntur a me conprobare? possetne uno tempore florere, dein vicissim horrere terra, aut tot rebus ipsis se inmutantibus solis accessus discessusque solstitiis brumisque cognosci, aut aestus maritimi fretorumque angustiae ortu aut obitu lunae commoveri, aut una totius caeli conversione cursus astrorum dispares conservari? haec ita fieri omnibus inter se concinentibus mundi partibus profecto non possent, nisi ea uno divino et continuato spiritu continerentur.

“And so, since you divided the whole question into four parts, and we have spoken of the first, let us consider the second; which seemed to me to be of this kind — that, when you wished to show what sort of beings the gods are, you showed there are none at all. You said it was extremely difficult to draw the mind away from the habit of the eyes; yet, since nothing is more excellent than a god, you did not doubt that the world is a god, since there is nothing better than it in the natural world — if only we could conceive of it as a living being, or rather discern this with the mind, as we discern other things with the eyes.

Atque haec cum uberius disputantur et fusius, ut mihi est in animo facere, facilius effugiunt Academicorum calumniam; cum autem, ut Zeno solebat, brevius angustiusque concluduntur, tum apertiora sunt ad reprendendum. nam ut profluens amnis aut vix aut nullo modo, conclusa autem aqua facile conrumpitur, sic orationis flumine reprensoris convicia diluuntur, angustia autem conclusae rationis non facile se ipsa tutatur. Haec enim quae dilatantur a nobis Zeno sic premebat:

But when you deny that anything is better than the world, what do you mean by better? If more beautiful, I agree; if better fitted to our advantages, that too I agree; but if you mean that nothing is wiser than the world, I do not in the least agree — not because it is difficult to call the mind away from the eyes, but because the more I call it away, the less I can grasp with the mind what you wish me to. “Nothing in the natural world is better than the world.” Not even on earth is anything better than our own city; do you therefore think that on that account reason, thought, and mind reside in the city? Or, since they do not, do you on that account judge that an ant must be set above this most beautiful city, on the ground that in a city there is no sensation, while in an ant there is not only sensation but mind, reason, and memory? You ought to see, Balbus, what is granted to you, and not yourself assume what you would like.

"Quod ratione utitur id melius est quam id quod ratione non utitur; nihil autem mundo melius; ratione igitur mundus utitur". similiter effici potest sapientem esse mundum, similiter beatum, similiter aeternum; omnia enim haec meliora sunt quam ea quae sunt his carentia, nec mundo quicquam melius. ex quo efficietur esse mundum deum.

For that whole position was opened out by that old, brief, and — as it seemed to you — clever syllogism of Zeno’s. For Zeno argues thus: “That which uses reason is better than that which does not use reason; but nothing is better than the world;

Idemque hoc modo: "Nullius sensu carentis pars aliqua potest esse sentiens; mundi autem partes sentientes sunt; non igitur caret sensu mundus". Pergit idem et urguet angustius: "Nihil" inquit "quod animi quodque rationis est expers, id generare ex se potest animantem compotemque rationis; mundus autem generat animantis compotesque rationis; animans est igitur mundus composque rationis". Idemque similitudine, ut saepe solet, rationem conclusit hoc modo: "Si ex oliva modulate canentes tibiae nascerentur, num dubitares quin inesset in oliva tibicini quaedam scientia? quid si platani fidiculas ferrent numerose sonantes: idem scilicet censeres in platanis inesse musicam. cur igitur mundus non animans sapiensque iudicetur, cum ex se procreet animantis atque sapientis?"

therefore the world uses reason.” If this is acceptable, you will soon make the world appear to read a book superbly; for following in Zeno’s footsteps you will be able to draw your conclusion in this fashion: “That which is lettered is better than that which is not lettered; but nothing is better than the world; therefore the world is lettered” — and in that manner the world is also eloquent, and indeed a mathematician, a musician, finally trained in every branch of learning, and at last a philosopher. You said often that nothing comes to be without a god, and that there is no power in nature able to fashion things unlike itself: shall I grant that the world is not only living and wise but also a lyre-player and a trumpeter, since men of those arts too are brought forth from it? Then that father of the Stoics offers nothing to make us think the world uses reason, nor even that it is a living being. The world, therefore, is not a god; and yet there is nothing better than it: for there is nothing more beautiful than it, nothing more wholesome to us, nothing more adorned to look upon or more constant in its motion. But if the world as a whole is not a god, neither are the stars, which you placed, beyond counting, in the number of the gods. Their even and eternal courses delighted you — and by Hercules, not without cause, for they move with an admirable and incredible constancy.

Sed quoniam coepi secus agere atque initio dixeram (negaram enim hanc primam partem egere oratione, quod esset omnibus perspicuum deos esse), tamen id ipsum rationibus physicis id est naturalibus confirmari volo. Sic enim res se habet, ut omnia quae alantur et quae crescant contineant in se vim caloris, sine qua neque ali possent nec crescere. nam omne quod est calidum et igneum cietur et agitur motu suo; quod autem alitur et crescit motu quodam utitur certo et aequabili; qui quam diu remanet in nobis tam diu sensus et vita remanet, refrigerato autem et extincto calore occidimus ipsi et extinguimur.

But not all things, Balbus, that have fixed and constant courses are to be ascribed to a god rather than to nature. What do you suppose can be more constant than the Chalcidian Euripus in its repeated ebb and flow back and forth? Than the Sicilian strait? Than the seething of the Ocean in those regions, “where the ravening wave divides Europe from Libya”? Are not the sea-tides, whether of Spain or of Britain, with their advances and retreats at fixed times, able to come about without a god? Consider, I beg you: if we call divine all motion and all things that keep their order at fixed times, must we not say that tertian and quartan fevers too are divine — for what can be more constant than their recurrence and movement? But of all such things an account must be rendered;

Quod quidem Cleanthes his etiam argumentis docet, quanta vis insit caloris in omni corpore: negat enim esse ullum cibum tam gravem quin is nocte et die concoquatur; cuius etiam in reliquiis inest calor iis quas natura respuerit. iam vero venae et arteriae micare non desinunt quasi quodam igneo motu, animadversumque saepe est cum cor animantis alicuius evolsum ita mobiliter palpitaret ut imitaretur igneam celeritatem. Omne igitur quod vivit, sive animal sive terra editum, id vivit propter inclusum in eo calorem. ex quo intellegi debet eam caloris naturam vim habere in se vitalem per omnem mundum pertinentem.

and when you cannot do this, you flee to a god as though to an altar. And Chrysippus seemed to you to speak shrewdly — a man without doubt versatile and shrewd (I call those versatile whose mind turns quickly, and those shrewd whose mind has grown hardened by use, as a hand grows hardened by work); so he says: “If there is something that man cannot bring about, then whatever brings it about is better than man; but man cannot bring about the things that are in the world; therefore whoever was able to do so surpasses man; but who could surpass man except a god? Therefore a god exists.” All of this turns upon the same error as that argument of Zeno’s.

Atque id facilius cernemus toto genere hoc igneo quod tranat omnia subtilius explicato. Omnes igitur partes mundi (tangam autem maximas) calore fultae sustinentur. Quod primum in terrena natura perspici potest. nam et lapidum conflictu atque tritu elici ignem videmus et recenti fossione terram fumare calentem, atque etiam ex puteis iugibus aquam calidam trahi, et id maxime fieri temporibus hibernis, quod magna vis terrae cavernis contineatur caloris eaque hieme sit densior ob eamque causam calorem insitum in terris contineat artius.

For what is better, what is more excellent, what is the difference between nature and reason — none of this is distinguished. And the same man, if the gods do not exist, denies that there is anything in all of nature better than man; yet for any human being to think that nothing is better than man he judges to be the height of arrogance. Let it be the mark of an arrogant man to think more of himself than of the world; but to understand that he himself has sensation and reason, while Orion and the Dog-Star do not — that is the mark not of an arrogant man but rather of a prudent one. And “If a house is beautiful,” he says, “let us understand it was built for its masters and not for mice; so, then, we ought to judge the world to be the house of the gods.” I would judge precisely so, if I thought it built, and not — as I shall show — shaped by nature.

longa est oratio multaeque rationes, quibus doceri possit omnia quae terra concipiat semina quaeque ipsa ex se generata stirpibus infixa contineat ea temperatione caloris et oriri et augescere. Atque aquae etiam admixtum esse calorem primum ipse liquor aquae declarat et fusio, quae neque conglaciaret frigoribus neque nive pruinaque concresceret, nisi eadem se admixto calore liquefacta et dilapsa diffunderet; itaque et aquilonibus reliquisque frigoribus adiectis durescit umor, et idem vicissim mollitur tepefactus et tabescit calore. atque etiam maria agitata ventis ita tepescunt ut intellegi facile possit in tantis illis umoribus esse inclusum calorem; nec enim ille externus et adventicius habendus est tepor, sed ex intumis maris partibus agitatione excitatus, quod nostris quoque corporibus contingit cum motu atque exercitatione recalescunt. Ipse vero aer, qui natura est maxime frigidus, minime est expers caloris;

But, says he, Socrates in Xenophon asks where we should have caught up our soul if there were none in the world. And I ask where we caught up speech, where numbers, where song — unless indeed we suppose the sun talks with the moon when it has drawn nearer, or that the world sings in harmony, as Pythagoras believes. These things, Balbus, belong to nature — nature that walks not artfully, as Zeno says (and we shall presently see just what that claim amounts to), but that sets all things in motion and stirs them by its own movements and changes.

ille vero et multo quidem calore admixtus est: ipse enim oritur ex respiratione aquarum; earum enim quasi vapor quidam aer habendus est, is autem existit motu eius caloris qui aquis continetur, quam similitudinem cernere possumus in his aquis quae effervescunt subiectis ignibus. Iam vero reliqua quarta pars mundi: ea et ipsa tota natura fervida est et ceteris naturis omnibus salutarem inpertit et vitalem calorem.

And so that discourse of yours about the harmony and concord of nature pleased me — nature which you said breathes together, as if held continuous by a kind of kinship; but what I did not approve was your denial that this could come about unless nature were held together by one divine breath. In fact it coheres and endures by the powers of nature, not of the gods, and there is in it that kind of concord which the Greeks call sympatheian; but the more it arises of its own accord, the less it is to be thought to come about by divine reason.

Ex quo concluditur, cum omnes mundi partes sustineantur calore, mundum etiam ipsum simili parique natura in tanta diuturnitate servari, eoque magis quod intellegi debet calidum illud atque igneum ita in omni fusum esse natura, ut in eo insit procreandi vis et causa gignendi, a quo et animantia omnia et ea quorum stirpes terra continentur et nasci sit necesse et augescere.

And those arguments which Carneades used to bring forward — how do you dissolve them? If no body is immortal, no body is everlasting; but no body is immortal, not even an indivisible one, nor one that cannot be sundered and torn apart; and since every animate being has a nature capable of being acted upon, there is none of them that escapes the necessity of receiving something from outside — that is, as it were, of bearing and suffering it; and if every animate being is of this kind, none is immortal. So likewise, if every animate being can be cut and divided, none of them is indivisible, none eternal; but every animate being is constituted to receive and bear an external force; therefore every animate being must of necessity be mortal, dissoluble, and divisible.

Natura est igitur quae contineat mundum omnem eumque tueatur, et ea quidem non sine sensu atque ratione. Omnem enim naturam necesse est, quae non solitaria sit neque simplex sed cum alio iuncta atque conexa, habere aliquem in se principatum, ut in homine mentem, in belua quiddam simile mentis unde oriantur rerum adpetitus; in arborum autem et earum rerum quae gignuntur e terra radicibus inesse principatus putatur. principatum autem id dico quod Graeci h(gemoniko vocant, quo nihil in quoque genere nec potest nec debet esse praestantius. ita necesse est illud etiam in quo sit totius naturae principatus esse omnium optumum omniumque rerum potestate dominatuque dignissimum.

For just as, if all wax were changeable, there would be nothing waxen that could not be changed, and likewise nothing silver, nothing bronze, if the nature of silver and bronze were changeable — so, in like manner, if all the things that exist, out of which all things are composed, are changeable, then there can be no body that is not changeable; but those things out of which all things are composed are changeable, as it seems to you; therefore every body is changeable. But if there were any immortal body, not every body would be changeable; and so it follows that every body is mortal. For every body is either water or air or fire or earth, or that which is compounded out of these, or out of some part of them.

videmus autem in partibus mundi (nihil est enim in omni mundo quod non pars universi sit) inesse sensum atque rationem. in ea parte igitur, in qua mundi inest principatus, haec inesse necessest, et acriora quidem atque maiora. quocirca sapientem esse mundum necesse est, naturamque eam quae res omnes conplexa teneat perfectione rationis excellere, eoque deum esse mundum omnemque vim mundi natura divina contineri. Atque etiam mundi ille fervor purior perlucidior mobiliorque multo ob easque causas aptior ad sensus commovendos quam hic noster calor, quo haec quae nota nobis sunt retinentur et vigent.

But there is none of these that does not perish; for everything earthen is divided, and moisture is so soft that it can easily be pressed and crushed together; fire indeed and air are most easily driven off by any blow, and are by nature most yielding and most readily dispersed. And besides, all these perish whenever they are turned into another nature, which happens when earth turns itself into water, and when from water air arises, and from air aether, and when these same elements in their turn travel back again. But if it is so, that those things perish out of which every animate being is composed, then no animate being is everlasting.

absurdum igitur est dicere, cum homines bestiaeque hoc calore teneantur et propterea moveantur ac sentiant, mundum esse sine sensu, qui integro et libero et puro eodemque acerrimo et mobilissimo ardore teneatur, praesertim cum is ardor qui est mundi non agitatus ab alio neque externo pulsu sed per se ipse ac sua sponte moveatur; nam quid potest esse mundo valentius, quod pellat atque moveat calorem eum quo ille teneatur.

And even if we leave all this aside, still no animate being can be found that was never born at any time and will always exist in the future. For every animate being has sensation; it senses, therefore, things hot and cold, sweet and bitter, nor can it through any sense receive what is pleasant and not receive the contrary; if, then, it takes in the sensation of pleasure, it takes in that of pain as well; but whatever receives pain must of necessity also receive destruction; therefore every animate being must be admitted to be mortal. Besides, if there is anything that feels neither pleasure nor pain, that thing cannot be an animate being;

Audiamus enim Platonem quasi quendam deum philosophorum; cui duo placet esse motus, unum suum alterum externum, esse autem divinius quod ipsum ex se sua sponte moveatur quam quod pulsu agitetur alieno. hunc autem motum in solis animis esse ponit, ab isque principium motus esse ductum putat. quapropter quoniam ex mundi ardore motus omnis oritur, is autem ardor non alieno inpulsu sed sua sponte movetur, animus sit necesse est; ex quo efficitur animantem esse mundum. Atque ex hoc quoque intellegi poterit in eo inesse intellegentiam, quod certe est mundus melior quam ulla natura. ut enim nulla pars est corporis nostri quae non minoris sit quam nosmet ipsi sumus, sic mundum universum pluris esse necesse est quam partem aliquam universi. quod si ita est, sapiens sit mundus necesse est. nam ni ita esset, hominem qui esset mundi pars, quoniam rationis esset particeps, pluris esse quam mundum omnem oporteret.

But if, on the other hand, because a thing is a living creature it must therefore have sensation, then because it has sensation it cannot be eternal; and every living creature has sensation; no living creature, therefore, is eternal. Besides, there can be no living creature in which there is not both a natural appetite and a natural aversion. Now the things that are sought are those that accord with nature, the things that are avoided are their opposites; and every living creature seeks certain things and flees from certain others, and what it flees from is contrary to its nature, and what is contrary to its nature has the power to destroy it. Every living creature, therefore, must of necessity perish.

Atque etiam si a primis incohatisque naturis ad ultimas perfectasque volumus procedere, ad deorum naturam perveniamus necesse est. Prima enim animadvertimus a natura sustineri ea quae gignantur e terra, quibus natura nihil tribuit amplius quam ut ea alendo atque augendo tueretur.

The grounds are innumerable from which it can be established and forced upon us that nothing which possesses sensation is exempt from perishing. For those very things that are felt — cold, heat, pleasure, pain, and the rest — destroy when they are intensified; and no living creature is without sensation; no living creature, therefore, is eternal. And indeed, the nature of a living thing is either simple — earthy, say, or fiery, or airy, or watery, what such a thing would be cannot even be conceived — or else compounded of several natures, of which each has its own place toward which it is borne by natural force, one to the lowest, another to the highest, another to the middle. These can cohere for a certain span of time, but in no way can they cohere forever; for each must of necessity be swept by nature into its own place. No living creature, therefore, is everlasting.

bestiis autem sensum et motum dedit et cum quodam adpetitu accessum ad res salutares a pestiferis recessum. hoc homini amplius, quod addidit rationem, qua regerentur animi adpetitus, qui tum remitterentur tum continerentur. quartus autem est gradus et altissimus eorum qui natura boni sapientesque gignuntur, quibus a principio innascitur ratio recta constansque, quae supra hominem putanda est deoque tribuenda id est mundo, in quo necesse est perfectam illam atque absolutam inesse rationem.

But your school, Balbus, is in the habit of referring everything to the power of fire — following Heraclitus, I suppose, whom not everyone interprets in one and the same way; since what he meant he was unwilling to have understood, let us pass him over. You, however, put it thus: that all force is fire, and accordingly that living things too perish when their heat has failed, and that throughout the whole of nature the thing that lives and the thing that thrives is the thing that is warm. I, for my part, do not understand how bodies perish when their heat is extinguished but do not perish with the loss of moisture or breath — especially since they perish from excessive heat as well.

Neque enim dici potest in ulla rerum institutione non esse aliquid extremum atque perfectum. ut enim in vite ut in pecude, nisi quae vis obstitit, videmus naturam suo quodam itinere ad ultimum pervenire, atque ut pictura et fabrica ceteraeque artes habent quendam absoluti operis effectum, sic in omni natura ac multo etiam magis necesse est absolvi aliquid ac perfici. etenim ceteris naturis multa externa quo minus perficiantur possunt obsistere, universam autem naturam nulla res potest impedire propterea quod omnis naturas ipsa cohibet et continet. Quocirca necesse est esse quartum illum et altissimum gradum quo nulla vis possit accedere.

On that score, then, the point about the warm is held in common; but let us nonetheless see where it comes out. You hold, I believe, that there is no living thing outside in nature and in the universe except fire: why fire any more than breath, of which the very mind of living things is composed, from which the word "living" is derived? But how do you take it as a thing all but conceded that the mind is nothing but fire? For it seems more probable that the mind is something of this kind: a tempering of fire with breath. "But if fire by itself is a living creature, with no other nature mingled in, then since it, when it is present in our bodies, makes us capable of sensation, it cannot itself be without sensation." Again the same things can be said: for whatever it is that possesses sensation must of necessity feel both pleasure and pain, and the thing to which pain comes also comes to destruction. So it turns out that you cannot make even fire eternal.

is autem est gradus in quo rerum omnium natura ponitur; quae quoniam talis est ut et praesit omnibus et eam nulla res possit inpedire, necesse est intellegentem esse mundum et quidem etiam sapientem. Quid autem est inscitius quam eam naturam quae omnis res sit conplexa non optumam dici, aut, cum sit optuma, non primum animantem esse, deinde rationis et consilii compotem, postremo sapientem. qui enim potest aliter esse optima? neque enim si stirpium similis sit aut etiam bestiarum, optuma putanda sit potius quam deterruma. Nec vero, si rationis particeps sit nec sit tamen a principio sapiens, non sit deterior mundi potius quam humana condicio. homo enim sapiens fieri potest, mundus autem, si in aeterno praeteriti temporis spatio fuit insipiens, numquam profecto sapientiam consequetur; ita erit homine deterior. quod quoniam absurdum est, et sapiens a principio mundus et deus habendus est.

Why, is it not the view of your very own school that all fire needs nourishment and can in no way endure unless it is fed, and that the sun, the moon, and the rest of the stars are fed by waters, some by fresh and some by the sea’s? And Cleanthes adduces this as the reason why the sun turns back and goes no farther than the summer circle and likewise the winter one: so that it should not stray too far from its food. What this whole notion amounts to we shall see shortly; for now let this be the conclusion: that what can perish is not eternal by nature; that fire will perish unless it is fed; that fire, therefore, is not by nature everlasting.

Neque enim est quicquam aliud praeter mundum quoi nihil absit quodque undique aptum atque perfectum expletumque sit omnibus suis numeris et partibus. Scite enim Chrysippus, ut clipei causa involucrum vaginam autem gladii, sic praeter mundum cetera omnia aliorum causa esse generata, ut eas fruges atque fructus quos terra gignit animantium causa, animantes autem hominum, ut ecum vehendi causa arandi bovem venandi et custodiendi canem; ipse autem homo ortus est ad mundum contemplandum et imitandum—nullo modo perfectus sed est quaedam particula perfecti.

And what sort of god can we conceive who is endowed with no virtue? Why, shall we attribute prudence to a god — prudence, which consists in the knowledge of things good and bad and neither good nor bad? To one who has, and can have, no evil, what need is there of choosing between good and bad, what need of reason, what of intelligence — which we use to attain the obscure by means of the plain? But to a god nothing can be obscure. As for justice, which assigns to each his own, what has it to do with the gods? For it is the fellowship and community of men, as you yourselves say, that begot justice. And temperance consists in foregoing the pleasures of the body: if there is room in heaven for temperance, there is room for pleasures too. For how can a god be conceived as brave — in pain, or in toil, or in danger?

sed mundus quoniam omnia conplexus est neque est quicquam quod non insit in eo, perfectus undique est; qui igitur potest ei desse id quod est optimum? nihil autem est mente et ratione melius; ergo haec mundo deesse non possunt. Bene igitur idem Chrysippus, qui similitudines adiungens omnia in perfectis et maturis docet esse meliora, ut in equo quam in eculeo in cane quam in catulo in viro quam in puero; item quod in omni mundo optimum sit id in perfecto aliquo atque absoluto esse debere;

None of which touches a god. How, then, can we conceive a god who neither employs reason nor is endowed with any virtue? And indeed I cannot despise the ignorance of the common crowd and the unlearned when I consider what is said by the Stoics. For those are the beliefs of the ignorant: the Syrians venerate a fish, the Egyptians have consecrated nearly every kind of beast; and in Greece, again, they have many gods who were once men — Alabandus at Alabanda, Tenes at Tenedos, Leucothea, who was once Ino, and her son Palaemon throughout all Greece — and Hercules, Aesculapius, the sons of Tyndareus, our own Romulus, and a good many others besides, whom they suppose to have been received into heaven as new and enrolled citizens, so to speak.

est autem nihil mundo perfectius nihil virtute melius; igitur mundi est propria virtus. Nec vero hominis natura perfecta est, et efficitur tamen in homine virtus; quanto igitur in mundo facilius; est ergo in eo virtus. sapiens est igitur et propterea deus. Atque hac mundi divinitate perspecta tribuenda est sideribus eadem divinitas; quae ex mobilissima purissimaque aetheris parte gignuntur neque ulla praeterea sunt admixta natura totaque sunt calida atque perlucida, ut ea quoque rectissime et animantia esse et sentire atque intellegere dicantur.

So much, then, for the unlearned; what of you philosophers, who do better? I pass over those finer doctrines, for they are splendid: let the world itself, by all means, be a god. This, I take it, is what is meant by "that radiance on high, whom all men invoke as Jove." Why, then, do we add more gods? And how great is their multitude — to me, at any rate, they seem quite many; for you count the single stars as gods and call them either by the names of beasts, like the Goat, the Scorpion, the Bull, the Lion, or by the names of inanimate things, like the Argo, the Altar, the Crown.

Atque ea quidem tota esse ignea duorum sensuum testimonio confirmari Cleanthes putat, tactus et oculorum. nam solis calor et candor inlustrior est quam ullius ignis, quippe qui inmenso mundo tam longe lateque conluceat, et is eius tactus est, non ut tepefaciat solum sed etiam saepe comburat, quorum neutrum faceret nisi esset igneus. "ergo" inquit "cum sol igneus sit Oceanique alatur umoribus" (quia nullus ignis sine pastu aliquo possit permanere) "necesse est aut ei similis sit igni quem adhibemus ad usum atque victum, aut ei qui corporibus animantium continetur.

But even granting these, how on earth can the rest not merely be granted but understood at all? When we call grain Ceres and wine Liber, we are using a customary turn of speech; but do you suppose anyone so out of his mind as to believe that the thing he eats is a god? As for those whom you say have passed from being men to being gods, you will render an account of how that could have come about, or why it has ceased to come about, and I shall be glad to learn; for as the case now stands, I do not see how the man for whom "torches were brought to Mount Oeta," as Accius says, passed from that blaze "into the eternal house of his father." Yet Homer has him met among the dead by Ulysses, just like the others who had departed from life.

atqui hic noster ignis, quem usus vitae requirit, confector est et consumptor omnium idemque quocumque invasit cuncta disturbat ac dissipat; contra ille corporeus vitalis et salutaris omnia conservat alit auget sustinet sensuque adficit." negat ergo esse dubium horum ignium sol utri similis sit, cum is quoque efficiat ut omnia floreant et in suo quaeque genere pubescant. quare cum solis ignis similis eorum ignium sit qui sunt in corporibus animantium, solem quoque animantem esse oportet, et quidem reliqua astra quae oriantur in ardore caelesti qui aether vel caelum nominatur.

Though indeed which Hercules above all we ought to worship I should very much like to know; for those who probe the deeper and more recondite writings hand down to us several. The most ancient was born of Jove — but of Jove the most ancient as well, for in the old writings of the Greeks we find several Joves too: of him, then, and of Lysithoe is that Hercules whom we are told contended with Apollo over the tripod. A second is handed down as Egyptian, born of the Nile, who they say composed the Phrygian letters. A third is from the Idaean Dactyls, to whom they bring funeral offerings. A fourth is the son of Jove and of Asteria, sister of Latona; he is worshipped above all at Tyre, and they hold Carthage to be his daughter. A fifth is in India, who is called Belus. A sixth is this one, born of Alcmena, whom Jupiter begot — but the third Jupiter, since, as I shall presently show, we have received several Joves as well.

Cum igitur aliorum animantium ortus in terra sit aliorum in aqua in aere aliorum, absurdum esse Aristoteli videtur in ea parte quae sit ad gignenda animantia aptissima animal gigni nullum putare. sidera autem aetherium locum optinent; qui quoniam tenuissimus est et semper agitatur et viget, necesse est quod animal in eo gignatur id et sensu acerrumo et mobilitate celerrima esse. quare cum in aethere astra gignantur, consentaneum est in his sensum inesse et intellegentiam, ex quo efficitur in deorum numero astra esse ducenda. Etenim licet videre acutiora ingenia et ad intellegendum aptiora eorum qui terras incolant eas in quibus aer sit purus ac tenuis quam illorum qui utantur crasso caelo atque concreto.

Now that the discourse has brought me to this point, I shall show that I have learned better things about worshipping the immortal gods by pontifical law and the custom of our ancestors — from these little sacrificial bowls that Numa left us, of which Laelius speaks in that golden little oration of his — than from the reasonings of the Stoics. For if I follow you, tell me what I am to answer the man who questions me thus: "If there are gods, are the Nymphs goddesses too? If the Nymphs, then the little Pans and the Satyrs as well; but these are not gods; the Nymphs, then, are not goddesses either. Yet their temples have been publicly vowed and dedicated. Then neither are the rest gods, whose temples have been dedicated. Go further: you count Jupiter and Neptune as gods; therefore Orcus, their brother, is also a god, and those who are said to flow in the underworld — Acheron, Cocytus, Pyriphlegethon — and then Charon and then Cerberus must be reckoned gods.

quin etiam cibo quo utare interesse aliquid ad mentis aciem putant. probabile est igitur praestantem intellegentiam in sideribus esse, quae et aetheriam partem mundi incolant et marinis terrenisque umoribus longo intervallo extenuatis alantur. Sensum autem astrorum atque intellegentiam maxume declarat ordo eorum atque constantia (nihil est enim quod ratione et numero moveri possit sine consilio), in quo nihil est temerarium nihil varium nihil fortuitum. ordo autem siderum et in omni aeternitate constantia neque naturam significat (est enim plena rationis) neque fortunam, quae amica varietati constantiam respuit. sequitur ergo ut ipsa sua sponte suo sensu ac divinitate moveantur.

But that, surely, must be rejected; then Orcus is no god either; what, then, do you say about his brothers?" This was what Carneades used to say — not in order to do away with the gods, for what could be less becoming to a philosopher, but to convince the Stoics that they explain nothing about the gods. And so he pressed on: "For tell me," he said, "if these brothers are in the number of the gods, surely it cannot be denied of their father Saturn, whom the common people worship above all in the West? And if he is a god, it must be acknowledged that his father Caelus is a god too. And if that is so, then the parents of Caelus must also be held to be gods, Aether and Dies, and their brothers and sisters, who are named thus by the ancient genealogists: Love, Guile, Toil, Envy, Fate, Old Age, Death, Darkness, Misery, Lamentation, Favor, Fraud, Stubbornness, the Fates, the Hesperides, Dreams — all of whom they say were born of Erebus and Night. Either, then, these monstrosities must be approved, or those first gods must be done away with.

Nec vero Aristoteles non laudandus in eo quod omnia quae moventur aut natura moveri censuit aut vi aut voluntate; moveri autem solem et lunam et sidera omnia; quae autem natura moverentur, haec aut pondere deorsum aut levitate in sublime ferri, quorum neutrum astris contingeret propterea quod eorum motus in orbem circumque ferretur; nec vero dici potest vi quadam maiore fieri ut contra naturam astra moveantur (quae enim potest maior esse?); restat igitur ut motus astrorum sit voluntarius. Quae qui videat non indocte solum verum etiam impie faciat si deos esse neget. nec sane multum interest utrum id neget an eos omni procuratione atque actione privet; mihi enim qui nihil agit esse omnino non videtur. esse igitur deos ita perspicuum est, ut id qui neget vix eum sanae mentis existimem.

Will you say that Apollo, Vulcan, Mercury, and the rest are gods, yet hesitate about Hercules, Aesculapius, Liber, Castor, Pollux? But these are worshipped just as much as the others — among some peoples, indeed, far more. These, then, must be held to be gods, though born of mortal mothers. What of Aristaeus, who is said to be the discoverer of the olive, son of Apollo; Theseus, son of Neptune; the rest whose fathers are gods — will they not be in the number of the gods? And what of those whose mothers are goddesses? More so, I think; for just as under civil law a man whose mother is free is free, so by the law of nature one who has a goddess for a mother must be a god. And so the islanders of Astypalaea worship Achilles most devoutly; and if he is a god, then Orpheus and Rhesus are gods too, born of a Muse for their mother — unless perhaps marriages of the sea are to be preferred to those of the land. If these are not gods because they are nowhere worshipped, how are the others gods?

Restat ut qualis eorum natura sit consideremus; in quo nihil est difficilius quam a consuetudine oculorum aciem mentis abducere ea difficultas induxit et vulgo imperitos et similes philosophos imperitorum, ut nisi figuris hominum constitutis nihil possent de dis inmortalibus cogitare; cuius opinionis levitas confutata a Cotta non desiderat orationem meam. Sed cum talem esse deum certa notione animi praesentiamus, primum ut sit animans, deinde ut in omni natura nihil eo sit praestantius, ad hanc praesensionem notionemque nostram nihil video quod potius accommodem quam ut primum hunc ipsum mundum, quo nihil excellentius fieri potest, animantem esse et deum iudicem.

Consider, then, whether these honors are paid to the virtues of men and not to their immortality — which you too, Balbus, seemed to be saying. But how can you, if you think Latona a goddess, refuse to think Hecate one, who is the daughter of Asteria, Latona’s sister? Is she too, then, a goddess? For we have seen her altars and shrines in Greece. And if she is a goddess, why not the Eumenides? And if these are goddesses — whose sanctuary there is at Athens, and among us, as I interpret it, the grove of Furina — then the Furies are goddesses, watchers, I suppose, and avengers of crime and wickedness.

Hic quam volet Epicurus iocetur, homo non aptissimus ad iocandum minimeque resipiens patriam, et dicat se non posse intellegere qualis sit volubilis et rutundus deus, tamen ex hoc, quod etiam ipse probat, numquam me movebit. Placet enim illi esse deos, quia necesse sit praestantem esse aliquam naturam qua nihil sit melius. mundo autem certe nihil est melius; nec dubium quin quod animans sit habeatque sensum et rationem et mentem id sit melius quam id quod is careat.

But if the gods are of such a kind that they take part in human affairs, then Natio too must be held a goddess, to whom we are accustomed to perform divine rites when we go round the shrines in the territory of Ardea; she is named Natio because she watches over the childbearing of matrons, from those being born. If she is a goddess, then all those gods you were enumerating are gods — Honor, Faith, Mind, Concord — and so too Hope, Moneta, and everything we can fashion for ourselves in thought. But if that is not plausible, then neither is the source from which these flowed. And what do you say to this: if those whom we worship and have received are gods, why do we not reckon Serapis and Isis in the same class? And if we do that, why should we reject the gods of the barbarians? Oxen, then, and horses, ibises, hawks, asps, crocodiles, fish, dogs, wolves, cats, and many beasts besides we shall put back into the number of the gods. But if we reject these, we shall also reject those from which they sprang.

ita efficitur animantem, sensus mentis rationis mundum esse compotem; qua ratione deum esse mundum concluditur. Sed haec paulo post facilius cognoscentur ex is rebus ipsis quas mundus efficit. interea Vellei noli quaeso prae te ferre vos plane expertes esse doctrinae. conum tibi ais et cylindrum et pyramidem pulchriorem quam sphaeram videri. novum etiam oculorum iudicium habetis. sed sint ista pulchriora dumtaxat aspectu—quod mihi tamen ipsum non videtur; quid enim pulchrius ea figura quae sola omnis alias figuras complexa continet, quaeque nihil asperitatis habere nihil offensionis potest, nihil incisum angulis nihil anfractibus, nihil eminens nihil lacunosum; cumque duae formae praestantissimae sint, ex solidis globus (sic enim sfai=ran interpretari placet), ex planis autem circulus aut orbis, qui ku/klos Graece dicitur, his duabus formis contingit solis ut omnes earum partes sint inter se simillumae a medioque tantum absit extremum,

What next — shall Ino be reckoned a goddess, and be called Leucothea by the Greeks and Matuta by us, when she is the daughter of Cadmus, while Circe and Pasiphae and Aeetes, born of Perseis the daughter of Ocean and fathered by the Sun, shall not be held in the number of the gods? And yet Circe too is religiously worshipped by our colonists at Circeii. So you reckon her a goddess: what will you answer about Medea, who was born of two gods for grandfathers, the Sun and Ocean, with Aeetes for her father and Idyia for her mother? What about her brother Absyrtus — who in Pacuvius is Aegialeus, but the other name is the more usual in the writings of the ancients? If these are not gods, I fear for the standing of Ino; for all these flowed from the very same spring.

quo nihil fieri potest aptius—sed si haec non videtis, quia numquam eruditum illum pulverem attigistis, ne hoc quidem physici intellegere potuistis, hanc aequabilitatem motus constantiamque ordinum in alia figura non potuisse servari? Itaque nihil potest indoctius quam quod a vobis adfirmari solet. nec enim hunc ipsum mundum pro certo rutundum esse dicitis, nam posse fieri ut sit alia figura, innumerabilesque mundos alios aliarum esse formarum.

Will Amphiaraus and Trophonius, then, be gods? Our own tax-farmers, when lands in Boeotia that had been exempted by censorial law as belonging to the immortal gods came into question, denied that any beings were immortal who had once been men. But if these are gods, then surely Erechtheus is one too, whose shrine and whose priest I have myself seen at Athens. And if we make him a god, what doubt can we have about Codrus, or about all the others who fell fighting for their country’s freedom? But if that is not credible, then neither are the earlier premises from which these consequences flow to be accepted.

quae si bis bina quot essent didicisset Epicurus certe non diceret; sed dum palato quid sit optimum iudicat, "caeli palatum", ut ait Ennius, non suspexit. Nam cum duo sint genera siderum, quorum alterum spatiis inmutabilibus ab ortu ad occasum commeans nullum umquam cursus sui vestigium inflectat, alterum autem continuas conversiones duas isdem spatiis cursibusque conficiat, ex utraque re et mundi volubilitas, quae nisi in globosa forma esse non posset, et stellarum rutundi ambitus cognoscuntur. Primusque sol, qui astrorum tenet principatum, ita movetur ut, cum terras larga luce compleverit, easdem modo his modo illis ex partibus opacet; ipsa enim umbra terrae soli officiens noctem efficit. nocturnorum autem spatiorum eadem est aequabilitas quae diurnorum. eiusdemque solis tum accessus modici tum recessus et frigoris et caloris modum temperant. circumitus enim solis orbium quinque et sexaginta et trecentorum quarta fere diei parte addita conversionem conficiunt annuam; inflectens autem sol cursum tum ad septem triones tum ad meridiem aestates et hiemes efficit et ea duo tempora quorum alterum hiemi senescenti adiunctum est alterum aestati: ita ex quattuor temporum mutationibus omnium quae terra marique gignuntur initia causaeque ducuntur.

And in most communities it can be seen that, for the sake of fostering virtue — so that every man of the best sort might face danger more willingly for the commonwealth’s sake — the memory of brave men was consecrated with the honor due to the immortal gods. It is for that very reason that Erechtheus at Athens and his daughters are counted among the gods; and likewise there is a shrine at Athens called the Leokorion. The people of Alabanda, indeed, worship Alabandus, the founder of their city, more devoutly than any of the renowned gods; and it was among them that Stratonicus made one of his many witty remarks, when a certain tiresome fellow kept insisting to him that Alabandus was a god and Hercules was not. "Very well, then," he said,

Iam solis annuos cursus spatiis menstruis luna consequitur, cuius tenuissimum lumen facit proximus accessus ad solem, digressus autem longissimus quisque plenissimum. neque solum eius species ac forma mutatur tum crescendo tum defectibus in initia recurrendo, sed etiam regio; quae cum est aquilonia aut australis, in lunae quoque cursu est et brumae quaedam et solstitii similitudo, multaque ab ea manant et fluunt quibus et animantes alantur augescantque et pubescant maturitatemque adsequantur quae oriuntur e terra.

"let Alabandus be angry with me, and Hercules with you." But as for those gods you derived from the heavens and the stars, Balbus — you do not see how far the thing creeps. The sun is a god, you say, and the moon, the one of which the Greeks take to be Apollo and the other Diana. But if the moon is a goddess, then Lucifer too and the rest of the wandering stars will hold a place in the roll of the gods; and so, then, will the fixed stars. And why should the rainbow not be set down among the gods? For it is beautiful, and on account of that beauty — since its cause is wonderful — it is said to be the daughter of Thaumas. And if the rainbow has a divine nature, what will you do about the clouds? For the rainbow itself is produced, in a manner of speaking, out of clouds that have taken on color; and one cloud, indeed, is even said to have given birth to the Centaurs. And if you reckon clouds among the gods, then storms too will certainly have to be reckoned there, since they have been consecrated in the rites of the Roman people. So rains, downpours, gales, and whirlwinds are to be held gods; at any rate our own commanders, on putting out to sea, made a practice of sacrificing a victim to the waves.

Maxume vero sunt admirabiles motus earum quinque stellarum quae falso vocantur errantes; nihil enim errat quod in omni aeternitate conservat progressus et regressus reliquosque motus constantis et ratos. quod eo est admirabilius in is stellis quas dicimus, quia tum occultantur tum rursus aperiuntur, tum adeunt tum recedunt, tum antecedunt tum autem subsecuntur, tum celerius moventur tum tardius, tum omnino ne moventur quidem sed ad quoddam tempus insistunt. quarum ex disparibus motionibus magnum annum mathematici nominaverunt, qui tum efficitur cum solis et lunae et quinque errantium ad eandem inter se comparationem confectis omnium spatiis est facta conversio;

Again, if Ceres takes her name from "bearing" — for so you were saying — then the earth itself is a goddess (and so it is held to be; for what else is Tellus?); but if the earth, then the sea as well, which you said was Neptune; and so the rivers too, and the springs. And accordingly Massa dedicated a shrine to the Spring from Corsica, and in the augurs’ prayer we find Tiberinus, Spino, Anemo, Nodinus, and the names of other neighboring rivers. So this will either creep on without limit, or we shall admit none of it; and that boundless logic of superstition will not be accepted; therefore none of this is to be accepted.

quae quam longa sit magna quaestio est, esse vero certam et definitam necesse est. Nam ea quae Saturni stella dicitur *fai/nwn que a Graecis nominatur, quae a terra abest plurimum, xxx fere annis cursum suum conficit, in quo cursu multa mirabiliter efficiens tum antecedendo tum retardando, tum vespertinis temporibus delitiscendo tum matutinis rursum se aperiendo nihil inmutat sempiternis saeclorum aetatibus quin eadem isdem temporibus efficiat. Infra autem hanc propius a terra Iovis stella fertur, quae *fae/qwn dicitur, eaque eundem duodecim signorum orbem annis duodecim conficit easdemque quas Saturni stella efficit in cursu varietates.

We must also, then, Balbus, speak against those who say that these gods, translated to heaven from the race of men, exist not in reality but only in opinion — the very gods whom we all venerate with reverence and devotion. To begin with, those who are called theologians count three Jupiters, of whom the first and second were born in Arcadia, the one fathered by Aether (by whom, they say, Proserpina too and Liber were born), the other fathered by Caelus, who is said to have begotten Minerva — said to be the originator and inventor of war — and the third a Cretan, the son of Saturn, whose tomb is shown on that island. The Dioscuri, too, are named in many ways among the Greeks: the first, three in number, who are called the Anactes at Athens, sons of the most ancient King Jupiter and Proserpina — Tritopatreus, Eubuleus, and Dionysus; the second, sons of the third Jupiter and Leda — Castor and Pollux; the third, called by some Alco, Melampus, and Eumolus, the sons of Atreus, who was born of Pelops.

Huic autem proximum inferiorem orbem tenet *puro/eis, quae stella Martis appellatur, eaque quattuor et viginti mensibus sex ut opinor diebus minus eundem lustrat orbem quem duae superiores. Infra hanc autem stella Mercuri est (ea *sti/lbwn appellatur a Graecis), quae anno fere vertenti signiferum lustrat orbem neque a sole longius umquam unius signi intervallo discedit tum antevertens tum subsequens. Infima est quinque errantium terraeque proxuma stella Veneris, quae *fwsfo/ros Graece Lucifer Latine dicitur cum antegreditur solem, cum subsequitur autem *(/esperos; ea cursum anno conficit et latitudinem lustrans signiferi orbis et longitudinem, quod idem faciunt stellae superiores, neque umquam ab sole duorum signorum intervallo longius discedit tum antecedens tum subsequens.

Then there are the Muses: the first four, born of the second Jupiter — Thelxinoe, Aoede, Arche, and Melete; the second, nine in number, begotten by the third Jupiter and Mnemosyne; the third, born of the third Jupiter and Antiopa, fathered by Pierus, whom the poets are accustomed to call the Pierides and Pieriae, with the same names and the same number as those just above. And whereas you say that the Sun is so called because he is alone, of him too the theologians bring forward how many Suns. One of them is the son of Jupiter and grandson of Aether; a second, son of Hyperion; a third, son of Vulcan the son of the Nile, whose city the Egyptians hold to be the one called Heliopolis; a fourth, the one whom in heroic times Acantho is said to have borne at Rhodes, father of Ialysus, Camirus, and Lindus, from whom the Rhodians are named; a fifth, who is said to have fathered Aeetes and Circe among the Colchians. There are likewise several Vulcans:

Hanc igitur in stellis constantiam, hanc tantam tam variis cursibus in omni aeternitate convenientiam temporum non possum intellegere sine mente ratione consilio. quae cum in sideribus inesse videamus, non possumus ea ipsa non in deorum numero reponere. Nec vero eae stellae quae inerrantes vocantur non significant eandem mentem atque prudentiam. quarum est cotidiana conveniens constansque conversio, nec habent aetherios cursus neque caelo inhaerentes, ut plerique dicunt physicae rationis ignari; non est enim aetheris ea natura ut vi sua stellas conplexa contorqueat, nam tenuis ac perlucens et aequabili calore suffusus aether non satis aptus ad stellas continendas videtur;

the first born of Caelus, by whom and by Minerva was born that Apollo in whose guardianship the ancient historians wished Athens to stand; the second, born in the Nile, called Opas by the Egyptians, whom they hold to be the guardian of Egypt; the third, of the third Jupiter and Juno, who is said to have presided over the smithy in Lemnos; the fourth, born of Maemalius, who held the islands near Sicily that were called the Vulcanian.

habent igitur suam sphaeram stellae inerrantes ab aetheria coniunctione secretam et liberam. earum autem perennes cursus atque perpetui cum admirabili incredibilique constantia declarant in his vim et mentem esse divinam, ut haec ipsa qui non sentiat deorum vim habere is nihil omnino sensurus esse videatur.

Mercury is one, born of Caelus his father and Dies his mother, whose nature is said to have been indecently aroused because he was excited at the sight of Proserpina; a second is the son of Valens and Phoronis, the one held to dwell beneath the earth, the same as Trophonius; a third, born of the third Jupiter and Maia, by whom and by Penelope they say Pan was born; a fourth, son of the Nile, whom the Egyptians count it a sin to name; a fifth, whom the people of Pheneus worship, who is said to have killed Argus, and for that reason to have fled to Egypt and to have handed laws and letters to the Egyptians: this one the Egyptians call Theyt, and by the same name the first month of the year is called among them.

Nulla igitur in caelo nec fortuna nec temeritas nec erratio nec vanitas inest contraque omnis ordo veritas ratio constantia, quaeque his vacant ementita et falsa plenaque erroris, ea circum terras infra lunam, quae omnium ultima est, in terrisque versantur. caelestem ergo admirabilem ordinem incredibilemque constantiam, ex qua conservatio et salus omnium omnis oritur, qui vacare mente putat is ipse mentis expers habendus est.

Of the Aesculapii the first is the son of Apollo, worshipped by the Arcadians, who is said to have invented the probe and to have been the first to bind up a wound; the second is the brother of the second Mercury, said to have been struck by lightning and buried at Cynosurae; the third, son of Arsippus and Arsinoe, who first discovered, as they say, the purging of the bowels and the extraction of teeth, whose tomb and grove is shown in Arcadia not far from the river Lusius. Of the Apollos the most ancient is the one I said a little earlier was born of Vulcan, the guardian of Athens; a second is the son of Corybas, born in Crete, who is said to have contended with Jupiter himself for that island; a third, born of the third Jupiter and Latona, who they say came to Delphi from the Hyperboreans; a fourth, in Arcadia, whom the Arcadians call Nomion because they say they received their laws from him.

Haut ergo ut opinor erravero, si a principe investigandae veritatis huius disputationis principium duxero. Zeno igitur naturam ita definit ut eam dicat ignem esse artificiosum ad gignendum progredientem via. censet enim artis maxume proprium esse creare et gignere, quodque in operibus nostrarum artium manus efficiat id multo artificiosius naturam efficere, id est ut dixi ignem artificiosum magistrum artium reliquarum. Atque hac quidem ratione omnis natura artificiosa est, quod habet quasi viam quandam et sectam quam sequatur.

There are likewise several Dianas: the first, daughter of Jupiter and Proserpina, said to have given birth to the winged Cupid; a second, better known, whom we have received as born of the third Jupiter and Latona; the father of the third is recorded to be Upis, the mother Glauce — her the Greeks often call Upis by her father’s name. We have many Dionysi: the first born of Jupiter and Proserpina; the second of the Nile, said to have killed Nysa; the third fathered by Cabirus, whom they say ruled as king over Asia, in whose honor the Sabazian rites were instituted; the fourth of Jupiter and the Moon, in whose honor the Orphic mysteries are thought to be performed; the fifth born of Nysus and Thyone, by whom the triennial festivals are thought to have been established.

ipsius vero mundi, qui omnia conplexu suo coercet et continet, natura non artificiosa solum sed plane artifex ab eodem Zenone dicitur, consultrix et provida utilitatum oportunitatumque omnium. atque ut ceterae naturae suis seminibus quaeque gignuntur augescunt continentur, sic natura mundi omnis motus habet voluntarios, conatusque et adpetitiones, quas o(rma Graeci vocant, et is consentaneas actiones sic adhibet ut nosmet ipsi qui animis movemur et sensibus. Talis igitur mens mundi cum sit ob eamque causam vel prudentia vel providentia appellari recte possit (Graece enim pro/noia dicitur), haec potissimum providet et in is maxime est occupata, primum ut mundus quam aptissimus sit ad permanendum, deinde ut nulla re egeat, maxume autem ut in eo eximia pulchritudo sit atque omnis ornatus.

The first Venus was born of Caelus and Dies, whose shrine I have seen at Elis; a second was begotten from the sea-foam, by whom and by Mercury we have received that the second Cupid was born; a third, born of Jupiter and Dione, who married Vulcan, but is said to have borne Anteros to Mars; a fourth, conceived in Syria and Cyprus, who is called Astarte, who is reported to have married Adonis. The first Minerva is the one we mentioned above as the mother of Apollo; a second, sprung from the Nile, whom the Egyptians of Sais worship; a third, the one we said above was begotten by Jupiter; a fourth, born of Jupiter and Coryphe the daughter of Oceanus, whom the Arcadians call Coria and hold to be the inventor of the four-horse chariot; a fifth, daughter of Pallas, who is said to have killed her father when he tried to violate her virginity, and to whom they fasten winged sandals.

Dictum est de universo mundo, dictum etiam est de sideribus, ut iam prope modum appareat multitudo nec cessantium deorum nec ea quae agant molientium cum labore operoso ac molesto. non enim venis et nervis et ossibus continentur nec his escis aut potionibus vescuntur, ut aut nimis acres aut nimis concretos umores colligant, nec is corporibus sunt ut casus aut ictus extimescant aut morbos metuant ex defetigatione membrorum, quae verens Epicurus monogrammos deos et nihil agentes commentus est.

The first Cupid is said to have been born of Mercury and the first Diana; the second of Mercury and the second Venus; the third, who is the same as Anteros, of Mars and the third Venus. These things, then, and others of the kind, have been gathered from the ancient lore of Greece. You see that they must be resisted, lest religious observances be thrown into confusion; but your school not only does not refute them — it even confirms them by interpreting what each one is supposed to signify. But let us now return to the point from which we digressed to come here. Do you really suppose, then, that any subtler reasoning is needed to refute all this?

illi autem pulcherruma forma praediti purissimaque in regione caeli collocati ita feruntur moderanturque cursus, ut ad omnia conservanda et tuenda consensisse videantur. Multae autem aliae naturae deorum ex magnis beneficiis eorum non sine causa et a Graeciae sapientissimis et a maioribus nostris constitutae nominataeque sunt. quicquid enim magnam utilitatem generi adferret humano, id non sine divina bonitate erga homines fieri arbitrabantur. itaque tum illud quod erat a deo natum nomine ipsius dei nuncupabant, ut cum fruges Cererem appellamus vinum autem Liberum, ex quo illud Te-

For we see that mind, faith, hope, virtue, honor, victory, safety, concord, and the rest of this kind have the force of things, not of gods. For either they reside within ourselves — as mind, as hope, as faith, as virtue, as concord — or they are things to be wished for by us, as honor, as safety, as victory; and I see the usefulness of these things, I see too their consecrated images; but why there should be in them the power of gods I shall understand only when I have come to know it. In this class above all is Fortune to be counted, whom no one will separate from inconstancy and randomness — qualities surely not worthy of a god.

renti "sine Cerere et Libero friget Venus", tum autem res ipsa, in qua vis inest maior aliqua, sic appellatur ut ea ipsa vis nominetur deus, ut Fides ut Mens, quas in Capitolio dedicatas videmus proxume a M. Aemilio Scauro, ante autem ab A. Atilio Calatino erat Fides consecrata. vides Virtutis templum vides Honoris a M. Marcello renovatum, quod multis ante annis erat bello Ligustico a Q. Maxumo dedicatum. quid Opis quid Salutis quid Concordiae Libertatis Victoriae; quarum omnium rerum quia vis erat tanta ut sine deo regi non posset, ipsa res deorum nomen optinuit. quo ex genere Cupidinis et Voluptatis et Lubentinae Veneris vocabula consecrata sunt, vitiosarum rerum neque naturalium—quamquam Velleius aliter existimat, sed tamen ea ipsa vitia naturam vehementius saepe pulsant.

But again, what delight do you take in that unraveling of fables and that teasing-out of names? Caelus castrated by his son, Saturn likewise bound by his son — these and other things of the kind you defend in such a way that those who invented them seem to have been not merely sane but actually wise. As for the teasing-out of names, the labor you spend on it is pitiable: "Saturn, because he saturates himself with years; Mavors, because he overturns great things; Minerva, because she diminishes, or because she threatens; Venus, because she comes to all things; Ceres, from bearing." How dangerous a habit! For with many names you will be stuck fast: what will you do with Veiovis, what with Vulcan? And yet, since you think Neptune is named from swimming, there will be no name whose derivation you cannot explain by means of a single letter; and in that, indeed, you seemed to me to be swimming harder than Neptune himself.

Utilitatum igitur magnitudine constituti sunt ei di qui utilitates quasque gignebant, atque is quidem nominibus quae paulo ante dicta sunt quae vis sit in quoque declaratur deo. Suscepit autem vita hominum consuetudoque communis ut beneficiis excellentis viros in caelum fama ac voluntate tollerent. hinc Hercules hinc Castor et Pollux hinc Aesculapius hinc Liber etiam (hunc dico Liberum Semela natum, non eum quem nostri maiores auguste sancteque Liberum cum Cerere et Libera consecraverunt, quod quale sit ex mysteriis intellegi potest; sed quod ex nobis natos liberos appellamus, idcirco Cerere nati nominati sunt Liber et Libera, quod in Libera servant, in Libero non item)—hinc etiam Romulum, quem quidam eundem esse Quirinum putant. quorum cum remanerent animi atque aeternitate fruerentur, rite di sunt habiti, cum et optimi essent et aeterni.

Zeno first took up a great and altogether needless task, and after him Cleanthes, then Chrysippus — that of giving an account of fabricated fables, of explaining the reasons why each thing was called by its particular name. And in doing this you assuredly confess one thing: that the matter stands far otherwise than men’s opinion has it; for those who are called gods are the natures of things, not the figures of gods. So great was this error that names of gods were assigned even to pernicious things, and what is more, sacred rites were established for them. For we see a temple of Fever on the Palatine, and one of Orbona at the shrine of the Lares, and an altar consecrated to Mala Fortuna on the Esquiline.

Alia quoque ex ratione et quidem physica magna fluxit multitudo deorum, qui induti specie humana fabulas poetis suppeditaverunt, hominum autem vitam superstitione omni referserunt. atque hic locus a Zenone tractatus post a Cleanthe et Chrysippo pluribus verbis explicatus est. Nam vetus haec opinio Graeciam opplevit, esse exsectum Caelum a filio Saturno, vinctum autem Saturnum ipsum a filio Iove:

Let every such error, then, be driven out of philosophy, so that when we discuss the immortal gods we may say what is worthy of immortal gods. On that subject I have my own view, but I do not have grounds for agreeing with you. You say that Neptune is a mind endowed with intelligence, pervading the sea, and you say the same of Ceres about the earth; but that intelligence — whether of the sea or of the earth — I am able not only not to grasp with my mind but not even to touch by conjecture. And so I must seek elsewhere, in order that I may learn both that the gods exist and what sort of beings they are — such as you would have them be * *.

physica ratio non inelegans inclusa est in impias fabulas. caelestem enim altissimam aetheriamque naturam id est igneam, quae per sese omnia gigneret, vacare voluerunt ea parte corporis quae coniunctione alterius egeret ad procreandum. Saturnum autem eum esse voluerunt qui cursum et conversionem spatiorum ac temporum contineret. qui deus Graece id ipsum nomen habet: *kro/nos enim dicitur, qui est idem xro/nos id est spatium temporis. Saturnus autem est appellatus quod saturaretur annis; ex se enim natos comesse fingitur solitus, quia consumit aetas temporum spatia annisque praeteritis insaturabiliter expletur. vinctus autem a Iove, ne inmoderatos cursus haberet, atque ut eum siderum vinclis alligaret. sed ipse Iuppiter, id est iuvans pater, quem conversis casibus appellamus a iuvando Iovem, a poetis "pater divomque hominumque" dicitur, a maioribus autem nostris optumus maxumus, et quidem ante optimus id est beneficentissimus quam maximus, quia maius est certeque gratius prodesse omnibus quam opes mag-

Let us look at what follows: first, whether the world is governed by the providence of the gods, and second, whether the gods take thought for human affairs. For these are the two points that remain to me out of your division; and on them, if it seems good to you, I think we ought to argue with more care.” “It seems very good to me indeed,” said Velleius; “for I both look for greater things to come and warmly assent to what has been said.” Then Balbus said, “I do not wish to interrupt you, Cotta, but we shall take another occasion; I shall certainly bring you to confess. But ” In the first place, then, it is not probable that the matter of things, from which all things have arisen, was produced by divine providence, but rather that it has, and has always had, a force and a nature of its own. As a builder, then, when he is about to put up some structure, does not himself make his material but uses what is ready to hand, and as the modeler likewise uses his wax, so for that divine providence the material had to be available — not the material it might itself make, but the material it would find prepared. And if matter was not made by a god, then neither were earth nor water nor air nor fire made by a god. “Men surpass all the beasts” — by no means will it go that way; there is a great struggle in the matter. For “that I should so entreat him with such honeyed flattery, were it not to my purpose”: does she not seem to reason quite well, and to be contriving for her own self a monstrous ruin?

nas habere—hunc igitur Ennius, ut supra dixi, nuncupat ita dicens "aspice hoc sublime candens, quem invocant omnes Iovem" planius quam alio loco idem "cui quod in me est exsecrabor hoc quod lucet quicquid est"; hunc etiam augures nostri cum dicunt "Iove fulgente tonante": dicunt enim "caelo fulgente et tonante". Euripides autem ut multa praeclare sic hoc breviter: vides sublime fusum immoderatum aethera, qui terram tenero circumiectu amplectitur: hunc summum habeto divum, hunc perhibeto Iovem.

And by how cunning a calculation here: “Whoever wills what he wills, things so dispose themselves as he will ply his effort” — this from the man who is the sower of all evils. “He, with mind turned awry, has handed me today the very bolts by which I shall throw open all my wrath and deal him destruction — to me grief, to him mourning; to me exile, to him annihilation.” This faculty of reason, which you say has been granted to man alone by the gods’ kindness, the beasts plainly do not possess. Do you see, then, with how great a gift of the gods we have been endowed?

Aer autem, ut Stoici disputant, interiectus inter mare et caelum Iunonis nomine consecratur, quae est soror et coniux Iovis, quod ei et similitudo est aetheris et cum eo summa coniunctio. effeminarunt autem eum Iunonique tribuerunt, quod nihil est eo mollius. sed Iunonem a iuvando credo nominatam. Aqua restabat et terra, ut essent ex fabulis tria regna divisa. datum est igitur Neptuno alterum, Iovis ut volumus fratri, maritimum omne regnum, nomenque productum ut Portunus a porta sic Neptunus a nando, paulum primis litteris immutatis. Terrena autem vis omnis atque natura Diti patri dedicata est, qui dives ut apud Graecos *plou/- twn, quia et recidunt omnia in terras et oriuntur e terris. †Cui Proserpinam (quod Graecorum nomen est, ea enim est quae *persefo/nh Graece nominatur)—quam frugum semen esse volunt absconditamque quaeri a matre fingunt.

And the same Medea, in flight from her father and her fatherland, when her father drew near and was already preparing all but to seize her, slaughtered her brother in the meantime, hacked his limbs apart joint by joint, and scattered the body abroad through the fields — for this reason: that while her father gathered up the strewn limbs of his child, she herself might escape in the interval, that grief might slow him in pursuit, that she might secure her own safety by a kinsman’s murder. To this woman, as wickedness was not wanting, so neither was reason.

Mater autem est a gerendis frugibus Ceres tamquam geres, casuque prima littera itidem immutata ut a Graecis; nam ab illis quoque *dhmh/thr quasi gh= mh/thr nominata est. Iam qui magna verteret Mavors, Minerva autem quae vel minueret vel minaretur. Cumque in omnibus rebus vim haberent maxumam prima et extrema, principem in sacrificando Ianum esse voluerunt, quod ab eundo nomen est ductum, ex quo transitiones perviae iani foresque in liminibus profanarum aedium ianuae nominantur. Nam Vestae nomen a Graecis (ea est enim quae ab illis *(esti/a dicitur); vis autem eius ad aras et focos pertinet, itaque in ea dea, quod est rerum custos intumarum, omnis et precatio et sacrificatio extrema est.

What of the man preparing the deadly banquet for his brother — does he not turn the calculation this way and that in thought? “A greater pile is mine to raise, a greater evil to be mixed, that I may crush and grind down that man’s bitter heart.” Nor yet is that very man himself to be passed over, who was not content to have lured his brother’s wife into adultery — of whom Atreus speaks rightly and most truly: “What in the highest matter of state I judge the highest peril — that royal mothers be defiled, the line contaminated, the stock confounded.” But that very thing, with what cunning — the man who would seek a throne by adultery: “I add to this,” he says, “that the father of the gods of heaven sent me a portent and a prodigy, the very prop of my kingdom — a lamb among the flocks, conspicuous with golden fleece, which Thyestes once dared to steal away from the palace” — and in this affair he took his wife as his accomplice. Does he not seem to have used the utmost depravity, yet not without the utmost reason?

Nec longe absunt ab hac vi di Penates, sive a penu ducto nomine (est enim omne quo vescuntur homines penus) sive ab eo quod penitus insident; ex quo etiam penetrales a poetis vocantur. Iam Apollinis nomen est Graecum. quem solem esse volunt, Dianam autem et lunam eandem esse putant, cum sol dictus sit vel quia solus ex omnibus sideribus est tantus vel quia cum est exortus obscuratis omnibus solus apparet, luna a lucendo nominata sit; eadem est enim Lucina, itaque ut apud Graecos Dianam eamque Luciferam sic apud nostros Iunonem Lucinam in pariendo invocant. quae eadem Diana Omnivaga dicitur non a venando sed quod in septem numeratur tamquam vagantibus;

Nor is the stage alone crammed with these crimes; ordinary life is full of crimes nearly greater. Each man’s household feels it, the Forum feels it, the Senate-house, the Campus, our allies, the provinces — so that, just as a thing is rightly done by reason, so it is by reason that men sin; and the one is done both by few and rarely, the other both always and by very many. So it would have been better that no reason at all had been given us by the immortal gods than that it should be given with so great a ruin attending it. As with wine for the sick: because it rarely helps and very often harms, it is better not to administer it at all than to rush into open ruin in the hope of a doubtful recovery — so I rather think it might have been better for the human race that this quick stir of thought, this keenness, this ingenuity, which we call reason, since it is destructive to many and salutary to very few, had not been given at all than that it should be given so munificently and so lavishly.

Diana dicta quia noctu quasi diem efficeret. adhibetur autem ad partus, quod i maturescunt aut septem non numquam aut ut plerumque novem lunae cursibus, qui quia mensa spatia conficiunt menses nominantur; concinneque ut multa Timaeus, qui cum in historia dixisset qua nocte natus Alexander esset eadem Dianae Ephesiae templum deflagravisse, adiunxit minime id esse mirandum, quod Diana quom in partu Olympiadis adesse voluisset afuisset domo. Quae autem dea ad res omnes veniret Venerem nostri nominaverunt, atque ex ea potius venustas quam Venus ex venustate.

For this reason, if the divine mind and will took thought for men precisely because it bestowed reason on them, it took thought only for those whom it endowed with good reason — and these we see, if indeed there are any at all, to be very few. But it cannot be allowed that the immortal gods took thought for only a few; it follows, then, that they took thought for no one. To this point you are accustomed to make this reply: that the gods did not therefore fail to provide for us excellently merely because many would use their gift perversely; that many use their inheritances badly too, and are not on that account held to have had no benefit from their fathers. Who denies it — and what likeness is there in that comparison? For Deianira did not wish to harm Hercules when she gave him the tunic dyed with the Centaur’s blood, nor did the man who opened with his sword the abscess of Jason of Pherae — which the physicians had not been able to cure — wish to do him good. For many, even while wishing to do harm, have done good, and while wishing to do good have done harm. And so it does not follow from what is given that the will of the giver is made plain, nor, if the one who received it uses it well, that the one who gave it gave it in friendship. For what lust, what avarice, what crime is either undertaken without a plan having been formed, or carried through without the mind’s motion and reflection — that is, without reason?

Videtisne igitur ut a physicis rebus bene atque utiliter inventis tracta ratio sit ad commenticios et fictos deos. Quae res genuit falsas opiniones erroresque turbulentos et superstitiones paene aniles. et formae enim nobis deorum et aetates et vestitus ornatusque noti sunt, genera praeterea coniugia cognationes, omniaque traducta ad similitudinem inbecillitatis humanae. nam et perturbatis animis inducuntur: accepimus enim deorum cupiditates aegritudines iracundias; nec vero, ut fabulae ferunt, bellis proeliisque caruerunt, nec solum ut apud Homerum cum duo exercitus contrarios alii dei ex alia parte defenderent, sed etiam ut cum Titanis ut cum Gigantibus sua propria bella gesserunt. haec et dicuntur et creduntur stultissime et plena sunt futtilitatis summaeque levitatis.

For every opinion is reason — good reason if the opinion is true, but bad reason if it is false. Yet from a god we have only reason, if indeed we have it; whether the reason is good or not good comes from ourselves. For reason was not given to man by the kindness of the gods in the way that an inheritance is left to him. For what else could the gods rather have given to men, if they had wished to harm them? And what would be the seeds of injustice, of intemperance, of cowardice, if reason did not underlie these vices? Medea just now and Atreus were called to mind by us — heroic characters who, having reckoned and weighed the account, plotted their unspeakable crimes.

Sed tamen is fabulis spretis ac repudiatis deus pertinens per naturam cuiusque rei, per terras Ceres per maria Neptunus alii per alia, poterunt intellegi qui qualesque sint quoque eos nomine consuetudo nuncupaverit. Quos deos et venerari et colere debemus. cultus autem deorum est optumus idemque castissimus atque sanctissimus plenissimusque pietatis, ut eos semper pura integra incorrupta et mente et voce veneremur. non enim philosophi solum verum etiam maiores nostri superstitionem a religione separaverunt.

What of the trivialities of comedy — do they not always turn upon reasoning? Does that fellow in the Eunuchus not argue with subtlety enough: “What, then, shall I do? She shut me out, she calls me back; shall I return? No, not if she begged me.” And that other in the Synephebi does not hesitate, in the manner of the Academics and against the common opinion, to do battle with reason: he says it is “sweet, in the height of love and the depth of need, to have a father who is grasping, ungracious toward his children, hard — one who neither loves you nor takes pains for you”; and to this incredible thesis he supplies his little arguments:

nam qui totos dies precabantur et immolabant, ut sibi sui liberi superstites essent, superstitiosi sunt appellati, quod nomen patuit postea latius; qui autem omnia quae ad cultum deorum pertinerent diligenter retractarent et tamquam relegerent, i sunt dicti religiosi ex relegendo, tamquam elegantes ex eligendo, tamquam ex diligendo diligentes, ex intellegendo intellegentes; his enim in verbis omnibus inest vis legendi eadem quae in religioso. ita factum est in superstitioso et religioso alterum vitii nomen alterum laudis. Ac mihi videor satis et esse deos et quales essent ostendisse.

“Either you cheat him of his revenue, or by a letter divert some debt, or through a little slave throw the timid old man into a fright; and in the end, the more sparing the father from whom you filch, the more gladly you squander it.” And the same fellow argues that an easygoing and generous father is an inconvenience to a son in love: “one whom I know no way to cheat, nor what to carry off from him, nor what trick or contrivance to set in motion against him — so utterly has my father’s obligingness baffled all my tricks, deceits, and sleights of hand.” Well then — those tricks, those contrivances, those deceits and sleights of hand: could they have existed without reason? O splendid gift of the gods, that Phormio should be able to say: “Fetch me the old man; all my plans are now drawn up and ready in my heart.” But let us leave the theater and come into the Forum.

Proximum est ut doceam deorum providentia mundum administrari. magnus sane locus est et a vestris Cotta vexatus, ac nimirum vobiscum omne certamen est. Nam vobis Vellei minus notum est quem ad modum quidque dicatur; vestra enim solum legitis vestra amatis, ceteros causa incognita condemnatis. velut a te ipso hesterno die dictumst anum fatidicam Pronoean a Stoicis induci id est Providentiam. quod eo errore dixisti, quia existumas ab is providentiam fingi quasi quandam deam singularem, quae mundum omnem gubernet et regat.

The praetor goes to take his seat. To try what case? The man who burned down the record office. What crime more hidden? Yet Quintus Sosius, a distinguished Roman knight from the Picene country, confessed that he had done it. The man who falsified the public registers? That too Lucius Alenus did, when he forged the handwriting of the six chief clerks; what was ever more ingenious than this man? Take note of other inquiries: into the gold of Tolosa, into the Jugurthine conspiracy; go back to earlier matters — the case of Tubulus over money taken for rendering a verdict; later matters — the inquiry into incest under the Peducaean bill; then these everyday affairs: daggers, poisonings, embezzlements, and inquiries into wills as well under a new law. From this comes that form of action: “I declare that a theft was committed by your aid and counsel”; from this come so many trials over bad faith — over guardianship, mandate, partnership, trusteeship — and the rest of the dealings in buying or selling, hiring or letting, that are done against good faith; from this comes the public trial of a private matter under the Laetorian law; from this the dragnet of all knaveries, the action concerning malicious fraud, which our friend Gaius Aquillius brought forward — the very fraud which the same Aquillius holds to be present whenever one thing is feigned and another done.

sed id praecise dicitur: ut, si quis dicat Atheniensium rem publicam consilio regi, desit illud "Arii pagi", sic, cum dicimus providentia mundum administrari, deesse arbitrato "deorum", plene autem et perfecte sic dici existumato, providentia deorum mundum administrari. Ita salem istum, quo caret vestra natio, in inridendis nobis nolitote consumere, et mercule si me audiatis ne experiamini quidem; non decet non datum est non potestis. nec vero hoc in te unum convenit moribus domesticis ac nostrorum hominum urbanitate limatum, sed cum in reliquos vestros tum in eum maxime qui ista peperit, hominem sine arte sine litteris, insultantem in omnes, sine acumine ullo sine auctoritate sine lepore.

Do we then suppose that this vast sowing of evils was done by the immortal gods? For if the gods gave reason to men, they gave malice; for malice is the cunning and deceitful reasoning of doing harm. The same gods gave fraud too, and crime, and the rest, none of which can either be undertaken or accomplished without reason. Would, then — as that old woman wishes that the fir timbers, cut down by axes in the grove of Pelion, had never fallen to earth — would that the gods had not given men this craftiness, which very few use well, and even those few are often overborne by those who use it ill, while countless men use it wickedly: so that this divine gift of reason and counsel seems to have been imparted to men for fraud and not for goodness.

Dico igitur providentia deorum mundum et omnes mundi partes et initio constitutas esse et omni tempore administrari. Eamque disputationem tris in partes nostri fere dividunt. quarum prima pars est quae ducitur ab ea ratione quae docet esse deos; quo concesso confitendum est eorum consilio mundum administrari. secunda est autem quae docet omnes res subiectas esse naturae sentienti ab eaque omnia pulcherrume geri; quo constituto sequitur ab animantibus principiis eam esse generatam. tertius est locus qui ducitur ex admiratione rerum caelestium atque terrestrium.

But you press again and again that this is the fault of men, not of the gods. As if a physician should blame the gravity of the disease, or a pilot the violence of the storm; and even though these are mere mortal creatures, still they are ridiculous: “for who would have called you in,” someone might say, “if these things did not exist?” Against a god one may argue more freely: “You say the fault lies in men’s vices: you should have given men a reason that would have shut out vice and fault.” Where, then, was there room for error on the gods’ part? For we leave our inheritances in the hope of handing them on well, and in that we can be deceived; but how could a god be deceived? Was it as the Sun was, when he took up his son Phaethon into the chariot, or Neptune, when Theseus destroyed Hippolytus, having been granted by his father Neptune the power of three wishes?

Primum igitur aut negandum est esse deos, quod et Democritus simulacra et Epicurus imagines inducens quodam pacto negat, aut qui deos esse concedant is fatendum est eos aliquid agere idque praeclarum; nihil est autem praeclarius mundi administratione; deorum igitur consilio administratur. Quod si aliter est, aliquid profecto sit necesse est melius et maiore vi praeditum quam deus, quale id cumque est, sive inanima natura sive necessitas vi magna incitata haec pulcherrima opera efficiens quae videmus;

These are the poets’ tales; but we wish to be philosophers, authors of facts, not of fables. And yet even these poets’ gods themselves, had they known that those gifts would be ruinous to their sons, would be reckoned to have done wrong in conferring the benefit. And if it is true, as Aristo of Chios used to say, that philosophers do harm to their hearers who put a bad interpretation on things well said — for it is possible for profligates to come out of Aristippus’s school, and harsh men out of Zeno’s — then surely, if those who had heard were going to depart corrupted because they perversely interpreted the philosophers’ discourse, it would be better for the philosophers to keep silent than to harm those who had heard them;

non est igitur natura deorum praepotens neque excellens, si quidem ea subiecta est ei vel necessitati vel naturae, qua caelum maria terrae regantur. nihil est autem praestantius deo; ab eo igitur mundum necesse est regi; nulli igitur est naturae oboediens aut subiectus deus; omnem ergo regit ipse naturam. Etenim si concedimus intellegentes esse deos, concedimus etiam providentes et rerum quidem maxumarum. ergo utrum ignorant quae res maxumae sint quoque eae modo tractandae et tuendae, an vim non habent qua tantas res sustineant et gerant? at et ignoratio rerum aliena naturae deorum est, et sustinendi muneris propter inbecillitatem difficultas minime cadit in maiestatem deorum. ex quo efficitur id quod volumus, deorum providentia mundum administrari.

so, if men turn the reason given them by the immortal gods with good intent into fraud and malice, it would have been better that it had not been given to the human race than that it should be given. As, if a physician should know that the patient ordered to take wine would take it undiluted and perish at once, he would be greatly at fault, so that Providence of yours is to be blamed, which gave reason to those it knew would use it perversely and wickedly. Unless perhaps you say it did not know. Would that it were so; but you will not dare to, for I am well aware how highly you esteem its name.

Atqui necesse est cum sint di (si modo sunt, ut profecto sunt) animantis esse, nec solum animantes sed etiam rationis compotes inter seque quasi civili conciliatione et societate coniunctos, unum mundum ut communem rem publicam atque urbem aliquam regentis.

But here at any rate this topic can now be brought to a close. For if folly, by the consensus of all philosophers, is a greater evil than all the evils of fortune and of the body weighed in the opposite scale, and if no one attains wisdom, then we are all in the depths of evil — we for whom you say the immortal gods have provided so excellently. For just as it makes no difference whether no one is in good health or no one is able to be in good health, so I do not see what difference it makes whether no one is wise or no one is able to be wise. But we, indeed, have said too much about a thing perfectly plain; Telamo, however, dispatches the whole topic — why the gods neglect men — in a single line: “For if they cared, it would go well with the good, ill with the wicked; which now is not the case.” The gods ought indeed to have made all men good, if in truth they were taking thought for the human race;

sequitur ut eadem sit in is quae humano in genere ratio, eadem veritas utrobique sit eademque lex, quae est recti praeceptio pravique depulsio. ex quo intellegitur prudentiam quoque et mentem a deis ad homines pervenisse (ob eamque causam maiorum institutis Mens Fides Virtus Concordia consecratae et publice dedicatae sunt; quae qui convenit penes deos esse negare, cum eorum augusta et sancta simulacra veneremur: quod si inest in hominum genere mens fides virtus concordia, unde haec in terram nisi ab superis defluere potuerunt?), cumque sint in nobis consilium ratio prudentia, necesse est deos haec ipsa habere maiora, nec habere solum sed etiam his uti in maxumis et optumis rebus.

or if that less, they ought at least certainly to have taken thought for the good. Why, then, did the Carthaginian crush the two Scipios in Spain, those bravest and best of men? Why did Maximus bury his son, who had held the consulship? Why did Hannibal slay Marcellus? Why did Cannae carry off Paulus? Why was the body of Regulus surrendered to the cruelty of the Carthaginians? Why did his own house’s walls not shelter Africanus? But these are old matters, and there are very many others; let us look at things nearer home. Why is my uncle, Publius Rutilius, a man of the purest innocence and at the same time the most learned, in exile? Why was my friend Drusus killed in his own house? Why was Quintus Scaevola, the very pattern of temperance and prudence, the pontifex maximus, butchered before the image of Vesta? Why, still earlier, were so many leading men of the state put to death by Cinna? Why could Gaius Marius, the most treacherous of all men, order Quintus Catulus, a man of the most surpassing dignity, to die?

nihil autem nec maius nec melius mundo; necesse est ergo eum deorum consilio et providentia administrari. Postremo cum satis docuerimus hos esse deos, quorum insignem vim et inlustrem faciem videremus, solem dico et lunam et vagas stellas et inerrantes et caelum et mundum ipsum et earum rerum vim quae inessent in omni mundo cum magno usu et commoditate generis humani, efficitur omnia regi divina mente atque prudentia. Ac de prima quidem parte satis dictum est.

The day would fail me if I tried to count those good men to whom evil befell, and no less if I called to mind those scoundrels to whom things fell out best of all. For why did Marius, so happily consul a seventh time, die an old man in his own house? Why did Cinna, cruelest of all men, rule for so long? "But he paid the penalty." It would have been better to stop him and hold him back from killing so many of the greatest men than for him at last to pay for it himself. Quintus Varius, a thoroughly ruthless man, perished under the utmost torture and execution; if it was because he had made away with Drusus by the sword and Metellus by poison, then it would have been better for those two to be preserved than for Varius to pay the penalty of his crime. Dionysius the tyrant ruled a most wealthy and most prosperous city for thirty-eight years;

Sequitur ut doceam omnia subiecta esse naturae, eaque ab ea pulcherrime geri. Sed quid sit ipsa natura explicandum est ante breviter, quo facilius id quod docere volumus intellegi possit. namque alii naturam esse censent vim quandam sine ratione cientem motus in corporibus necessarios, alii autem vim participem rationis atque ordinis tamquam via progredientem declarantemque quid cuiusque rei causa efficiat quid sequatur, cuius sollertiam nulla ars nulla manus nemo opifex consequi possit imitando; seminis enim vim esse tantam, ut id, quamquam sit perexiguum, tamen, si inciderit in concipientem conprendentemque naturam nanctumque sit materiam qua ali augerique possit, ita fingat et efficiat in suo quidque genere, partim ut tantum modo per stirpes alantur suas, partim ut moveri etiam et sentire et appetere possint et ex sese similia sui gignere.

and before him, in the very flower of Greece, how many years did Pisistratus rule? "But Phalaris paid the penalty, and Apollodorus too." Yes — after many had first been tortured and put to death. And pirates too often pay the penalty, yet we cannot say that more captives were not cruelly killed than pirates. We are told that Anaxarchus, the follower of Democritus, was butchered by the tyrant of Cyprus, and that Zeno of Elea was killed under torture; and what shall I say of Socrates, over whose death I am accustomed to weep when I read Plato? Do you see, then, that if the gods do regard human affairs, in their judgment the distinction between good men and bad has been abolished?

Sunt autem qui omnia naturae nomine appellent, ut Epicurus qui ita dividit, omnium quae sint naturam esse corpora et inane quaeque is accidant. Sed nos cum dicimus natura constare administrarique mundum, non ita dicimus ut glaebam aut fragmentum lapidis aut aliquid eius modi nulla cohaerendi natura, sed ut arborem ut animal, in quibus nulla temeritas sed ordo apparet et artis quaedam similitudo.

Diogenes the Cynic used to say that Harpalus, who in those days was reckoned a fortunate pirate, was a standing witness against the gods, since he lived so long in such prosperity. Dionysius, of whom I spoke before, after he had plundered the shrine of Proserpina at Locri, was sailing to Syracuse; and as he held his course with a most favorable wind, he said with a laugh, "Do you see, friends, what a fine voyage the immortal gods grant to men who rob temples?" And, sharp man that he was, having grasped the matter clearly and fully, he held firmly to the same opinion. When he had brought his fleet to the Peloponnese and had come into the temple of Olympian Jupiter, he stripped from the god a golden cloak of great weight, with which the tyrant Gelo had adorned Jupiter from the spoils of the Carthaginians, and over this he even joked that a golden cloak was heavy in summer and cold in winter, and threw a woolen mantle over the god, saying that it suited every season of the year. The same man ordered the golden beard of Aesculapius at Epidaurus to be taken off, declaring that it was not fitting for the son to be bearded when in all the temples the father stood beardless.

Quod si ea quae a terra stirpibus continentur arte naturae vivunt et vigent, profecto ipsa terra eadem vi continetur arte naturae, quippe quae gravidata seminibus omnia pariat et fundat ex sese, stirpes amplexa alat et augeat ipsaque alatur vicissim a superis externisque naturis; eiusdemque exspirationibus et aer alitur et aether et omnia supera. Ita si terra natura tenetur et viget, eadem ratio in reliquo mundo est; stirpes enim terrae inhaerent, animantes autem adspiratione aeris sustinentur; ipseque aer nobiscum videt nobiscum audit nobiscum sonat, nihil enim eorum sine eo fieri potest; quin etiam movetur nobiscum, quacumque enim imus qua movemur videtur quasi locum dare et cedere.

Then he ordered the silver tables to be carried off from all the sanctuaries, and since, by the custom of old Greece, they bore the inscription "of the good gods," he said he wished to enjoy their goodness. The same man took down without hesitation the little golden Victories and the bowls and crowns held out in the outstretched hands of the images, saying that he was accepting these things, not carrying them off — for it was folly to refuse to take, from gods who held them out and offered them, the very goods we pray to receive from them. They say, too, that the things I have mentioned — taken from the temples — he brought out into the forum and sold by the auctioneer’s voice, and that, once the money had been exacted, he proclaimed that whatever anyone held from sacred property he should return, each item to its own temple, before a fixed day: thus to his impiety toward the gods he added injustice toward men. This man, then, neither did Olympian Jupiter strike with the thunderbolt, nor did Aesculapius destroy by some wretched lingering disease; he died in his own bed, was borne to the pyre of his tyranny, and the power that he himself had won by crime he handed on to his son, as though it were a just and lawful inheritance.

quaeque in medium locum mundi, qui est infimus, et quae a medio in superum quaeque conversione rutunda circum medium feruntur, ea continentem mundi efficiunt unamque naturam. Et cum quattuor genera sint corporum, vicissitudine eorum mundi continuata natura est. nam ex terra aqua ex aqua oritur aer ex aere aether, deinde retrorsum vicissim ex aethere aer inde aqua ex aqua terra infima. sic naturis is ex quibus omnia constant sursus deorsus ultro citro commeantibus mundi partium coniunctio continetur.

Against my will my argument moves on this ground, for it seems to lend authority to wrongdoing; and it would rightly seem so, were it not that conscience itself carries a heavy weight, in matters both of virtue and of vice, apart from any divine reckoning — and once that is removed, everything collapses. For just as no household and no commonwealth would appear to be ordered by any rational design and discipline if in it there were no rewards set out for right conduct and no punishments for wrongdoing, so there is surely no divine governance of the world over men, if in it there is no distinction between the good and the bad.

Quae aut sempiterna sit necessest hoc eodem ornatu quem videmus, aut certe perdiuturna, permanens ad longinquum et inmensum paene tempus. quorum utrumvis ut sit, sequitur natura mundum administrari. Quae enim classium navigatio aut quae instructio exercitus aut, rursus ut ea quae natura efficit conferamus, quae procreatio vitis aut arboris, quae porro animantis figura conformatioque membrorum tantam naturae sollertiam significat quantam ipse mundus? aut igitur nihil est quod sentiente natura regatur, aut mundum regi confitendum est.

"But the gods neglect small things; they do not attend to the little fields of individual men or their slips of vine, and if blight or hail has harmed someone, that was no business for Jupiter to take notice of; not even kings in their kingdoms see to all the smallest matters" — for so you say. As if I had complained a moment ago about Publius Rutilius’s estate at Formiae, and not about the loss of his civic standing! And this, indeed, is how all mortals regard the matter: that external advantages — vineyards, crops, olive groves, abundance of grain and fruit, in short every comfort and prosperity of life — they have from the gods; but no one has ever credited his virtue to a god.

Etenim qui reliquas naturas omnes earumque semina contineat, qui potest ipse non natura administrari; ut, si qui dentes et pubertatem natura dicat existere, ipsum autem hominem cui ea existant non constare natura, non intellegat ea quae ecferant aliquid ex sese perfectiores habere naturas quam ea quae ex his efferantur. omnium autem rerum quae natura administrantur seminator et sator et parens ut ita dicam atque educator et altor est mundus omniaque sicut membra et partes suas nutricatur et continet. quod si mundi partes natura administrantur, necesse est mundum ipsum natura administrari. Cuius quidem administratio nihil habet in se quod reprehendi possit; ex his enim naturis quae erant quod effici optimum potuit effectum est.

And rightly, no doubt; for it is on account of virtue that we are justly praised, and in virtue that we rightly glory — which could not be the case if we held it as a gift from a god and not from ourselves. But truly, when we have been raised by honors or in our family fortune, or have gained some other accidental good or fended off some evil, then we give thanks to the gods, and then think nothing has been added to our own credit. Has anyone ever thanked the gods for being a good man? No — but for being rich, for being honored, for being safe; and they call upon Jupiter Best and Greatest for those things, not because he makes us just, temperate, and wise, but because he keeps us safe, sound, wealthy, and well supplied;

doceat ergo aliquis potuisse melius; sed nemo umquam docebit, et si quis corrigere aliquid volet aut deterius faciet aut id quod fieri non potuerit desiderabit. Quod si omnes mundi partes ita constitutae sunt ut neque ad usum meliores potuerint esse neque ad speciem pulchriores, videamus utrum ea fortuitane sint an eo statu quo cohaerere nullo modo potuerint nisi sensu moderante divinaque providentia. Si igitur meliora sunt ea quae natura quam illa quae arte perfecta sunt nec ars efficit quicquam sine ratione, ne natura quidem rationis expers est habenda. Qui igitur convenit, signum aut tabulam pictam cum aspexeris, scire adhibitam esse artem, cumque procul cursum navigii videris, non dubitare quin id ratione atque arte moveatur, aut cum solarium vel descriptum vel ex aqua contemplere, intellegere declarari horas arte non casu, mundum autem, qui et has ipsas artes et earum artifices et cuncta conplectatur, consilii et rationis esse expertem putare.

nor did anyone ever vow a tithe to Hercules for having been made wise — though Pythagoras, when he had discovered something new in geometry, is said to have sacrificed an ox to the Muses; but that I do not believe, since he was unwilling even to sacrifice a victim to Apollo at Delos, lest he sprinkle the altar with blood. But to return to the point: this is the judgment of all mortals — that fortune is to be sought from a god, but wisdom to be taken from oneself. Grant that we may dedicate temples to Mind, to Virtue, and to Faith, yet we see that these things reside in ourselves; the capacity for hope, safety, help, and victory must be sought from the gods. The prosperity, then, and the good fortune of the wicked refute, as Diogenes used to say, all the power and might of the gods.

quod si in Scythiam aut in Brittanniam sphaeram aliquis tulerit hanc quam nuper familiaris noster effecit Posidonius, cuius singulae conversiones idem efficiunt in sole et in luna et in quinque stellis errantibus quod efficitur in caelo singulis diebus et noctibus, quis in illa barbaria dubitet quin ea sphaera sit perfecta ratione; hi autem dubitant de mundo, ex quo et oriuntur et fiunt omnia, casune ipse sit effectus aut necessitate aliqua an ratione ac mente divina, et Archimedem arbitrantur plus valuisse in imitandis sphaerae conversionibus quam naturam in efficiendis; praesertim cum multis partibus sint illa perfecta quam haec simulata sollertius.

"But sometimes good men come to a good end." We snatch up such cases, to be sure, and assign them to the immortal gods without any reason. But Diagoras — the one called the Atheist — when he had come to Samothrace, and a certain friend said to him, "You who think the gods neglect human affairs, do you not notice, from all these painted tablets, how many men have escaped the violence of the storm by their vows and reached harbor safely?" — "Just so," he replied, "for those who suffered shipwreck and perished at sea are nowhere painted." And the same man, when he was sailing and his fellow passengers, frightened and panic-stricken by a storm against them, said that this was happening to them not undeservedly, since they had taken him aboard their ship, pointed out to them many other ships laboring on the same course and asked whether they believed that Diagoras was sailing on those ships too. For the truth of the matter is this: that, as regards prosperous or adverse fortune, it makes no difference what sort of man you are or how you have lived.

utque ille apud Accium pastor, qui navem numquam ante vidisset, ut procul divinum et novum vehiculum Argonautarum e monte conspexit, primo admirans et perterritus hoc modo loquitur: tanta moles labitur fremibunda ex alto ingenti sonitu et spiritu: prae se undas volvit, vertices vi suscitat, ruit prolapsa, pelagus respergit reflat; ita dum interruptum credas nimbum volvier, dum quod sublime ventis expulsum rapi saxum aut procellis, vel globosos turbines existere ictos undis concursantibus— nisi quas terrestres pontus strages conciet aut forte Triton fuscina evertens specus subter radices penitus undanti in freto molem ex profundo saxeam ad caelum eruit: dubitat primo quae sit ea natura quam cernit ignotam; idemque iuvenibus visis auditoque nautico cantu: "sicut †inciti atque alacres rostris perfremunt delphini" —item alia multa— Silvani melo consimilem ad aures cantum et auditum refert —

"The gods do not attend to everything," he says, "any more than kings do." But where is the likeness? For if kings deliberately overlook things, the fault is great; whereas for a god there is not even the excuse of ignorance. And you defend him splendidly when you say that the power of the gods is such that, even if someone has escaped the penalty of his crime by death, those penalties are exacted from his children, his grandchildren, his descendants. What admirable fairness in the gods! Would any state endure a proposer of a law of this kind — that a son or grandson be condemned if a father or grandfather had transgressed? What end could be set to the slaughter of the house of Tantalus, or what satiety of punishment will ever be granted for the death of Myrtilus to be atoned by penalties? Whether the poets have corrupted the Stoics, or the Stoics have lent authority to the poets, I could not easily say;

ergo ut hic primo aspectu inanimum quiddam sensuque vacuum se putat cernere, post autem signis certioribus quale sit id de quo dubitaverat incipit suspicari, sic philosophi debuerunt, si forte eos primus aspectus mundi conturbaverat, postea cum vidissent motus eius finitos et aequabiles omniaque ratis ordinibus moderata inmutabilique constantia, intellegere inesse aliquem non solum habitatorem in hac caelesti ac divina domo sed etiam rectorem et moderatorem et tamquam architectum tanti operis tantique muneris. Nunc autem mihi videntur ne suspicari quidem quanta sit admirabilitas caelestium rerum atque terrestrium.

for both alike tell of monstrous and scandalous things. For the man whom an iambic of Hipponax had wounded, or who had been injured by a verse of Archilochus, did not bear a pain sent down by a god but one conceived by himself; and when we observe the lust of Aegisthus or of Paris, we do not look for a god as its cause, since we all but hear the voice of guilt itself; nor do I judge that the recovery of many sick men was given by Aesculapius rather than by Hippocrates; nor shall I ever say that the discipline of the Lacedaemonians was given to Sparta by Apollo rather than by Lycurgus. Critolaus, I say, destroyed Corinth, and Hasdrubal Carthage; these two men gouged out those two eyes of the seacoast — not some angry god, who, you maintain, cannot be angry at all.

Principio enim terra sita in media parte mundi circumfusa undique est hac animali spirabilique natura cui nomen est aer—Graecum illud quidem sed perceptum iam tamen usu a nostris; tritum est enim pro Latino. hunc rursus amplectitur inmensus aether, qui constat ex altissimis ignibus (mutuemur hoc quoque verbum, dicaturque tam aether Latine quam dicitur aer, etsi interpretatur Pacuvius: "hoc, quod memoro, nostri caelum Grai perhibent aethera"—quasi vero non Graius hoc dicat. "at Latine loquitur." si quidem nos non quasi Graece loquentem audiamus; docet idem alio loco:

But surely he could have come to their aid and preserved cities so great and so fine; for you yourselves are accustomed to say that there is nothing a god cannot accomplish, and that without any effort at all; for just as the limbs of men are moved by the mind itself and by the will, without any straining, so by the divine power of the gods all things can be fashioned, moved, and changed. And you do not say this in a superstitious, old-wives’ way, but on grounds of physics and consistent reasoning: that the matter of things, out of which and in which all things are, is wholly flexible and changeable, so that there is nothing that cannot be fashioned and transformed out of it, however suddenly; and that the fashioner and governess of this whole matter is divine providence; therefore, wherever it moves itself, it can bring about whatever it wills. And so either it does not know what it can do, or it neglects human affairs, or it cannot judge what is best.

"Graiugena: de isto aperit ipsa oratio")—sed ad maiora redeamus. ex aethere igitur innumerabiles flammae siderum existunt, quorum est princeps sol omnia clarissima luce conlustrans, multis partibus maior atque amplior quam terra universa, deinde reliqua sidera magnitudinibus inmensis. atque hi tanti ignes tamque multi non modo nihil nocent terris rebusque terrestribus, sed ita prosunt ut si mota loco sint conflagrare terras necesse sit a tantis ardoribus moderatione et temperatione sublata.

"It does not care for individual men." No wonder: not even for states; not for those: not even for nations and peoples. And if it will despise these too, what wonder is it that the whole human race has been despised by it? But how can you, who say that the gods do not pursue all things, at the same time wish that dreams be distributed and divided among men by the immortal gods (this with you, since the doctrine about the truth of dreams is yours), and likewise say that vows ought to be undertaken? Individuals, surely, make vows; the divine mind, then, hears even individuals; you see, therefore, that it is not so occupied as you supposed. Suppose it is distracted — turning the heavens, watching over the earth, governing the seas: why does it allow so many gods to do nothing and stand idle? Why does it not set over human affairs some of the gods at leisure — those innumerable ones that you, Balbus, have unfolded? This is more or less what I had to say about the nature of the gods, not in order to abolish it, but so that you might understand how obscure it is and what difficult explanations it involves.’ When he had said this, Cotta made an end.

Hic ego non mirer esse quemquam qui sibi persuadeat corpora quaedam solida atque individua vi et gravitate ferri mundumque effici ornatissimum et pulcherrimum ex eorum corporum concursione fortuita? hoc qui existimat fieri potuisse, non intellego cur non idem putet, si innumerabiles unius et viginti formae litterarum vel aureae vel qualeslibet aliquo coiciantur, posse ex is in terram excussis annales Enni ut deinceps legi possint effici; quod nescio an ne in uno quidem versu possit tantum valere fortuna.

But Lucilius said: "Too vehemently, Cotta, have you inveighed against that doctrine of the Stoics concerning the providence of the gods, which they established most reverently and most wisely. But since evening is coming on, you will grant us some day on which to argue against what you have said. For I have a contest with you on behalf of altars and hearths, on behalf of the temples and shrines of the gods and the walls of the city — those walls which you priests declare to be sacred, and you gird the city more carefully with religion than with its own ramparts; and to abandon them, so long as I can draw breath, I judge to be a sacrilege."

isti autem quem ad modum adseverant ex corpusculis non colore non qualitate aliqua (quam poio/thta Graeci vocant) non sensu praeditis sed concurrentibus temere atque casu mundum esse perfectum, vel innumerabiles potius in omni puncto temporis alios nasci alios interire: quod si mundum efficere potest concursus atomorum, cur porticum cur templum cur domum cur urbem non potest, quae sunt minus operosa; et multa quidem faciliora. certe ita temere de mundo effuttiunt, ut mihi quidem numquam hunc admirabilem caeli ornatum (qui locus est proxumus) suspexisse videantur.

Then Cotta: ’For my part, I both wish to be refuted, Balbus, and I preferred to set out the things I argued rather than to pass judgment on them, and I know for certain that you can easily defeat me.’ "No doubt," said Velleius, "from a man who thinks that even dreams are sent to us by Jupiter — dreams which are nevertheless not so trifling as the Stoics’ discourse on the nature of the gods." When these things had been said, we parted in such a way that to Velleius the argument of Cotta seemed the truer, while to me that of Balbus seemed to lean nearer the resemblance of truth.

Praeclare ergo Aristoteles "Si essent" inquit "qui sub terra semper habitavissent bonis et inlustribus domiciliis, quae essent ornata signis atque picturis instructaque rebus his omnibus quibus abundant i qui beati putantur, nec tamen exissent umquam supra terram, accepissent autem fama et auditione esse quoddam numen et vim deorum, deinde aliquo tempore patefactis terrae faucibus ex illis abditis sedibus evadere in haec loca quae nos incolimus atque exire potuissent: cum repente terram et maria caelumque vidissent, nubium magnitudinem ventorumque vim cognovissent aspexissentque solem eiusque cum magnitudinem pulchritudinemque tum etiam efficientiam cognovissent, quod is diem efficeret toto caelo luce diffusa, cum autem terras nox opacasset tum caelum totum cernerent astris distinctum et ornatum lunaeque luminum varietatem tum crescentis tum senescentis, eorumque omnium ortus et occasus atque in omni aeternitate ratos inmutabilesque cursus—quae cum viderent, profecto et esse deos et haec tanta opera

the works of the gods." So much for him. As for us, let us imagine darkness as great as that which, they say, once obscured the neighboring regions at the eruption of the fires of Aetna, so that for two days no man recognized his fellow, and when on the third day the sun shone out, they then seemed to themselves to have come back to life. But if this same thing should befall us — that out of eternal darkness we should suddenly look upon the light — what an appearance the sky would seem to have! Yet by the daily constancy of it and the habit of our eyes our minds grow used to it, and we neither wonder nor seek out the reasons for the things we always see — just as though it were the novelty, rather than the magnitude, of things that ought to rouse us to inquire into their causes.

deorum esse arbitrarentur". atque haec quidem ille; nos autem tenebras cogitemus tantas quantae quondam eruptione Aetnaeorum ignium finitimas regiones obscuravisse dicuntur, ut per biduum nemo hominem homo agnosceret, cum autem tertio die sol inluxisset tum ut revixisse sibi viderentur: quod si hoc idem ex aeternis tenebris contingeret ut subito lucem aspiceremus, quaenam species caeli videretur? sed adsiduitate cotidiana et consuetudine oculorum adsuescunt animi, neque admirantur neque requirunt rationes earum rerum quas semper vident, proinde quasi novitas nos magis quam magnitudo rerum debeat ad exquirendas causas excitare.

For who would call this creature a man — who, when he has seen motions of the heavens so fixed, orders of the stars so settled, and all things so interconnected and fitted to one another, should deny that any reason is present in them and assert that those things come about by chance, things conducted with a forethought we cannot match by any forethought of our own? When we see something moved by a kind of mechanism — an orrery, say, or a water clock, or a great many other contrivances — we do not doubt that they are the work of reason; and yet, when we see the onrush of the heavens turning and revolving with marvelous speed, bringing about the changes of the seasons year by year with the utmost benefit and preservation of all things, do we doubt that these come about not only by reason, but by a reason surpassing and divine?

Quis enim hunc hominem dixerit, qui, cum tam certos caeli motus tam ratos astrorum ordines tamque inter se omnia conexa et apta viderit, neget in his ullam inesse rationem eaque casu fieri dicat, quae quanto consilio gerantur nullo consilio adsequi possumus. an, cum machinatione quadam moveri aliquid videmus, ut sphaeram ut horas ut alia permulta, non dubitamus quin illa opera sint rationis, cum autem impetum caeli cum admirabili celeritate moveri vertique videamus constantissime conficientem vicissitudines anniversarias cum summa salute et conservatione rerum omnium, dubitamus quin ea non solum ratione fiant sed etiam excellenti divinaque ratione?

For we may now set aside the subtlety of argument and contemplate, in a manner of speaking, with our very eyes the beauty of those things which we say divine providence has established. And first let the whole earth be brought into view, set in the central seat of the world, solid and globed and gathered into a sphere on every side by its own downward tendencies, clothed in flowers, grasses, trees, and crops — of all of which an incredible multitude is set off by an inexhaustible variety. Add to this the cold perpetual flow of springs, the translucent waters of rivers, the greenest mantling of their banks, the hollow depths of caverns, the roughness of crags, the heights of overhanging mountains, and the immensities of the plains; add too the hidden veins of gold and silver, and the boundless wealth of marble.

Licet enim iam remota subtilitate disputandi oculis quodam modo contemplari pulchritudinem rerum earum quas divina providentia dicimus constitutas. Ac principio terra universa cernatur, locata in media sede mundi, solida et globosa et undique ipsa in sese nutibus suis conglobata, vestita floribus herbis arboribus frugibus, quorum omnium incredibilis multitudo insatiabili varietate distinguitur. adde huc fontum gelidas perennitates, liquores perlucidos amnium, riparum vestitus viridissimos, speluncarum concavas altitudines, saxorum asperitates, inpendentium montium altitudines inmensitatesque camporum; adde etiam reconditas auri argentique venas infinitamque vim marmoris.

And then the kinds of living creatures — how many and how varied, whether tame or wild — the gliding flight and the song of birds, the grazing of the herds, the life of the woodland creatures. What now shall I say of the race of men, who, appointed as it were to be the tillers of the earth, do not suffer it to run wild with the savagery of beasts or to lie waste under the roughness of brush, and by whose works the fields, the islands, and the shores shine bright, set off with dwellings and cities? If we could see all this with our eyes as we see it with our minds, no one, gazing upon the earth entire, would doubt the divine reason behind it.

quae vero et quam varia genera bestiarum vel cicurum vel ferarum, qui volucrium lapsus atque cantus, qui pecudum pastus, quae vita silvestrium. quid iam de hominum genere dicam, qui quasi cultores terrae constituti non patiuntur eam nec inmanitate beluarum efferari nec stirpium asperitate vastari, quorumque operibus agri insulae litoraque collucent distincta tectis et urbibus. quae si ut animis sic oculis videre possemus, nemo cunctam intuens terram de divina ratione dubitaret.

And how great, again, is the beauty of the sea, what the aspect of its whole expanse, what the multitude and variety of its islands, what the loveliness of its coasts and shores, how many and how unlike the kinds of creatures — some submerged, some floating and swimming, some clinging to the rocks in shells of their own growing. The sea itself, reaching out toward the land, so plays along its shores that the two natures seem fused into one.

At vero quanta maris est pulchritudo, quae species universi, quae multitudo et varietas insularum, quae amoenitates orarum ac litorum, quot genera quamque disparia partim submersarum partim fluitantium et innantium beluarum partim ad saxa nativis testis inhaerentium. ipsum autem mare sic terram appetens litoribus eludit, ut una ex duabus naturis conflata videatur.

Next, bordering on the sea, the air is divided between day and night; now, diffused and rarefied, it is borne aloft, now, condensed, it is packed into clouds and, gathering moisture, swells the earth with rains, and now, flowing this way and that, it makes the winds. The same air produces the yearly alternations of cold and heat; the same both sustains the flights of birds and, drawn in by breath, feeds and supports living things. There remains the last embrace, the highest above our dwellings, which encircles and confines all things — the same that is called the aether, the outermost rim and boundary of the world, in which, with the greatest wonder, the fiery shapes mark out their ordered courses.

Exin mari finitumus aer die et nocte distinguitur, isque tum fusus et extenuatus sublime fertur, tum autem concretus in nubes cogitur umoremque colligens terram auget imbribus, tum effluens huc et illuc ventos efficit. idem annuas frigorum et calorum facit varietates, idemque et volatus alitum sustinet et spiritu ductus alit et sustentat animantes. Restat ultimus et a domiciliis nostris altissimus omnia cingens et coercens caeli complexus, qui idem aether vocatur, extrema ora et determinatio mundi, in quo cum admirabilitate maxima igneae formae cursus ordinatos definiunt.

Among these the sun, by whose magnitude the earth is many times surpassed, revolves about that very earth, and rising and setting brings about day and night; and now drawing nearer, now again withdrawing, it makes each year two reversals, opposite to each other, from the farthest points — and in the interval between them it now contracts the earth, as though with a kind of sadness, and now in turn gladdens it, so that it seems to rejoice along with the sky.

E quibus sol, cuius magnitudine multis partibus terra superatur, circum eam ipsam volvitur, isque oriens et occidens diem noctemque conficit et modo accedens tum autem recedens binas in singulis annis reversiones ab extremo contrarias facit, quarum in intervallo tum quasi tristitia quadam contrahit terram tum vicissim laetificat ut cum caelo hilarata videatur.

The moon, which is, as the mathematicians demonstrate, larger than half the earth, ranges over the same tracts as the sun, but now meeting the sun, now departing from it, sends down to the lands the light it has received from the sun and itself undergoes various changes of light; and now, lying beneath and set against the sun, it darkens his rays and his light, now, falling itself into the shadow of the earth when it is directly opposite the sun, is suddenly eclipsed by the interposition and intervention of the earth between them. Over the same tracts those stars we call wandering are borne about the earth, and in the same way they rise and set, their motions now quickened, now slowed,

Luna autem, quae est, ut ostendunt mathematici, maior quam dimidia pars terrae, isdem spatiis vagatur quibus sol, sed tum congrediens cum sole tum degrediens et eam lucem quam a sole accepit mittit in terras et varias ipsa lucis mutationes habet, atque etiam tum subiecta atque opposita soli radios eius et lumen obscurat, tum ipsa incidens in umbram terrae, cum est e regione solis, interpositu interiectuque terrae repente deficit. Isdemque spatiis eae stellae quas vagas dicimus circum terram feruntur eodemque modo oriuntur et occidunt, quarum motus tum incitantur tum retardantur,

and often they stand still — than which spectacle nothing can be more wonderful, nothing more beautiful. There follows the vast multitude of the fixed stars, so distinctly grouped that men have found names for them out of their resemblance to familiar figures.” And here, looking at me, “I shall make use,” he said, “of the Aratean verses, which, since you turned them into Latin in your earliest youth, so delight me precisely because they are Latin that I keep many of them by heart. So then, as we see continually with our eyes: Without any change or alteration the rest of the heavenly bodies glide on with swift celestial motion, and together with the sky are borne along through the nights and days,

saepe etiam insistunt, quo spectaculo nihil potest admirabilius esse nihil pulchrius. Sequitur stellarum inerrantium maxima multitudo, quarum ita descripta distinctio est, ut ex notarum figurarum similitudine nomina invenerint.” Atque hoc loco me intuens Utar inquit “carminibus Arateis, quae a te admodum adulescentulo conversa ita me delectant quia Latina sunt, ut multa ex is memoria teneam. Ergo, ut oculis adsidue videmus, sine ulla mutatione aut varietate cetera labuntur celeri caelestia motu cum caeloque simul noctesque diesque feruntur,

in the contemplation of which the mind of one who longs to see the steadfastness of nature can never have its fill. And at the very farthest point, on the twofold pivot, is what is called the topmost height, the pole. About this turn the two Bears, that never set. Of these one is called among the Greeks the Dog’s Tail, Kynosoura, the other is said to be the Twister, Helike, whose brightest stars, indeed, we behold all night long — the ones our people are wont to call the Seven Plow-oxen;

quorum contemplatione nullius expleri potest animus naturae constantiam videre cupientis. extremusque adeo duplici de cardine vertex dicitur esse polus." Hunc circum Arctoe duae feruntur numquam occidentes. ex is altera apud Graios Cynosura vocatur, altera dicitur esse Helice, cuius quidem clarissimas stellas totis noctibus cernimus, quas nostri Septem soliti vocitare Triones;

and with stars set off as evenly and alike, the little Dog’s Tail ranges round the same height of the sky. In her the Phoenicians trust as their guide upon the deep at night. But that earlier one shines forth more distinct with stars and is seen broad and foremost the moment night falls. This one, though small, yet to sailors is its use; for it turns in a brief circle on its inner course. And, that the look of those stars may be the more wonderful, between them, like a river with its rushing flood, the grim Dragon glides, coiling himself below and above, and shaping the winding folds that issue from his body.

paribusque stellis similiter distinctis eundem caeli verticem lustrat parva Cynosura. hac fidunt duce nocturna Phoenices in alto. sed prior illa magis stellis distincta refulget et late prima confestim a nocte videtur. haec vero parva est, sed nautis usus in hac est; nam cursu interiore brevi convertitur orbe. Et quo sit earum stellarum admirabilior aspectus, has inter veluti rapido cum gurgite flumen torvus Draco serpit supter supraque revolvens sese conficiensque sinus e corpore flexos.

Splendid as is the look of him entire, above all to be marked is the shape of his head and the blaze of his eyes: for him not one star alone shines forth, adorning his head, but his temples are marked with a twofold gleam, and from his fierce eyes two burning fires flame out, and his chin is bright with one radiant star; his head is bent aslant, and turned back upon his rounded neck, you would say he fixes his gaze upon the tail of the Greater Bear.

eius cum totius est praeclara species tum in primis aspicienda est figura capitis atque ardor oculorum: huic non una modo caput ornans stella relucet, verum tempora sunt duplici fulgore notata e trucibusque oculis duo fervida lumina flagrant atque uno mentum radianti sidere lucet; opstipum caput, a t tereti cervice reflexum optutum in cauda maioris figere dicas.

And the rest of the Dragon’s body indeed we behold all night long, but here his head dips and on a sudden hides itself, where rising and setting are blended into one. And, touching that head, there turns — like the image of one weary and grieving — the figure which the Greeks are wont to call the Kneeler, Engonasin, because it is borne along resting upon its knees. Here, set with surpassing brightness, is placed that Crown. And this one indeed is at its back; but next to its head is the Snake-holder, whom the Greeks proclaim by the famous name of the Serpent-bearer, Ophiouchos.

et relicum quidem corpus Draconis totis noctibus cernimus, hoc caput hic paulum sese subitoque recondit, ortus ubi atque obitus parti admiscetur in una. Id autem caput attingens defessa velut maerentis imago vertitur, quam quidem Graeci Engonasin vocitant, genibus quia nixa feratur. hic illa eximio posita est fulgore Corona. Atque haec quidem a tergo, propter caput autem Anguitenens, quem claro perhibent Ophiuchum nomine Graii.

He with the double pressure of his palms holds fast the Serpent, and is himself held bound by its twisted body; for the Serpent girds the man’s middle beneath his breast. Yet he, straining, sets his feet down heavily and presses with them the eyes and breast of the Scorpion. The Seven Plow-oxen, moreover, are followed by the Bear-warder, commonly said to be the Oxherd, Bootes, because he drives the Bear before him as though yoked to the pole. Then what follows:

hic pressu duplici palmarum continet Anguem, atque eius ipse manet religatus corpore torto; namque virum medium Serpens sub pectora cingit. ille tamen nitens graviter vestigia ponit atque oculos urget pedibus pectusque Nepai. Septentriones autem sequitur Arctophylax, vulgo qui dicitur esse Bootes, quod quasi temone adiunctam prae se quatit Arctum. Dein quae sequuntur:

For beneath the Oxherd’s breast there seems to be fixed a star flashing with rays, Arcturus by its famous name; and set beneath his feet is borne, holding the bright Ear of grain in her shining body, the Maiden. And so the constellations are laid out by measure, that in arrangements so vast a divine craftsmanship may appear. And you would have seen the Twin-born below the Bear’s head; beneath the middle lies the Crab, and by the feet is held the great Lion, shaking from his body a quivering flame. The Charioteer will be borne along, drawn beneath the left side of the Twins. Opposite, the fierce one of the Twister gazes at his head. But the Goat holds his left shoulder, bright. Then what follows: but this is a star endowed with a great and brilliant sign, while over against it the Kids cast their scant fire upon mortals. Beneath whose feet is the horn-bearing Bull, braced upon his sturdy body. His head is sprinkled with thronging stars;

"huic" enim Booti subter praecordia fixa videtur stella micans radiis, Arcturus nomine claro; cuius pedibus subiecta fertur Spicum inlustre tenens splendenti corpore Virgo. Atque ita demetata signa sunt, ut in tantis descriptionibus divina sollertia appareat: et Natos Geminos invisses sub caput Arcti; subiectus mediaest Cancer, pedibusque tenetur magnus Leo tremulam quatiens e corpore flammam. Auriga sub laeva Geminorum obductus parte feretur. adversum caput huic Helicae truculenta tuetur. at Capra laeum umerum clara obtinet. Tum quae secuntur: verum haec est magno atque inlustri praedita signo, contra Haedi exiguum iaciunt mortalibus ignem. Cuius sub pedibus corniger est valido conixus corpore Taurus. eius caput stellis conspersum est frequentibus;

these stars the Greeks have been wont to call the Hyades, from raining (hyein being to rain), while our people, in their ignorance, call them the Piglets, as though they were named from sows rather than from the showers. The Lesser Bear, moreover, Cepheus follows close behind with hands outspread; for he himself is turned toward the back of the Dog’s-Tail Bear. Before him goes Cassiopeia, dim in the look of her stars. And next to her wheels, with shining body, Andromeda, fleeing the sad gaze of her parent. For her that Horse, shaking his mane with flashing brightness, touches the top of her head with his belly, and one star, joining them, holds the two figures in a shared light, longing to bind an everlasting knot out of the stars. Next clings the Ram with his curled-back horns; near him the Fishes, of which one glides on a little ahead and is touched more by the bristling breezes of the north wind.

has Graeci stellas Hyadas vocitare suerunt a pluendo ( u(/ein enim est pluere), nostri imperite Suculas, quasi a subus essent non ab imbribus nominatae. Minorem autem Septentrionem Cepheus passis palmis post terga subsequitur; namque ipsum ad tergum Cynosurae vertitur Arcti. Hunc antecedit obscura specie stellarum Cassiepia. Hanc autem inlustri versatur corpore propter Andromeda aufugiens aspectu maesta parentis. Huic Equos ille iubam quatiens fulgore micanti summum contingit caput alvo, stellaque iungens una tenet duplices communi lumine formas aeternum ex astris cupiens conectere nodum. exin contortis Aries cum cornibus haeret. quem propter Pisces, quorum alter paulum praelabitur ante et magis horriferis aquilonis tangitur auris.

At the feet of Andromeda is Perseus traced out, whom the blasts buffet from the topmost region of the north. Near his left knee you will see, with faint light, the Pleiades. Next the Lyre is seen, lightly laid and arched. Next is the winged Bird beneath the broad covering of the sky. And nearest to the Horse’s head is the right hand of the Water-pourer, and then, after him, the whole Water-pourer. Then, breathing chill cold from his mighty breast, half-beast in body, Capricorn upon his great orbit; whom, when the Titan has clothed him in unbroken light, wheeling about he drives his chariot at the winter season.

Ad pedes Andromedae Perseus describitur, quem summa a regione aquilonis flamina pulsant. cuius propter laeum genum Vergilias tenui cum luce videbis. inde Fides leviter posita et convexa videtur. inde est ales Avis lato sub tegmine caeli. Capiti autem Equi proxima est Aquari dextra totusque deinceps Aquarius. Tum gelidum valido de pectore frigus anhelans corpore semifero magno Capricornus in orbe; quem cum perpetuo vestivit lumine Titan, brumali flectens contorquet tempore currum.

And here is seen, showing itself, the Scorpion rising on high, drawing behind it with the force of its body the curving Bow. Near it the winged Bird wheels in flight, gleaming with its pinions. Hard by, the Eagle carries itself with its burning body. Then the Dolphin. And after it Orion, leaning with his slanting frame.

Hic autem aspicitur sese ostendens emergit Scorpios alte posteriore trahens flexum vi corporis Arcum. quem propter nitens pinnis convolvitur Ales. at propter se Aquila ardenti cum corpore portat. Deinde Delphinus. exinde Orion obliquo corpore nitens.

Following close upon him, that blazing Dog shines out with the light of its stars. After it the Hare comes next, never resting its course on a wearied body. And at the Dog’s tail the Argo glides, snaking along. The Ram covers her, and the Fishes with their scaly bodies, while she touches with her gleaming body the banks of the River — which you will see snaking far and streaming on; and you will behold the long Bonds set in the quarter of their tails that hold the Fishes back. Then, beside the Scorpion’s flashing sting, you will discern the Altar, which the breath of the south wind caresses with its blast. Near these the Centaur moves, hastening to join the parts of the Horse to the Claws. With his right hand outstretched, where the great four-footed beast is gripped, he reaches and grimly advances toward the bright Altar. Here from the regions below rears up the Hydra, whose body lies poured out far along, and in the middle of its coil the gleaming Bowl shines back. At the end the Crow, straining with its feathered body, strikes with its beak; and here, just beneath the Twins themselves, before the Dog, is that star which goes by the Greek name Procyon.

quem subsequens fervidus ille Canis stellarum luce refulget. post Lepus subsequitur curriculum numquam defesso corpore sedans at Canis ad caudam serpens prolabitur Argo. hanc Aries tegit et squamoso corpore Pisces Fluminis inlustri tangentem corpore ripas. quem longe "serpentem" et manantem aspicies proceraque Vincla videbis, quae retinent Pisces caudarum a parte locata Inde Nepae cernes propter fulgentis acumen Aram, quam flatu permulcet spiritus austri. Propter quae Centaurus cedit Equi partis properans subiungere Chelis. hic dextram porgens, quadrupes qua vasta tenetur, tendit et inlustrem truculentus cedit ad Aram. Hic sese infernis e partibus erigit Hydra, cuius longe corpus est fusum, in medioque sinu fulgens Cretera relucet. extremam nitens plumato corpore Corvus rostro tundit, et hic Geminis est ille sub ipsis Ante Canem, Procyon Graio qui nomine fertur.

Can this whole ordering of the constellations, this whole great adornment of the heavens, seem to any man of sound mind to have been brought about by bodies coursing this way and that by chance and at random? Or did some other nature, devoid of mind and reason, manage to produce these things, which not only required reason in order to come into being, but cannot even be understood for what they are without the highest reason? Nor is this alone to be marveled at; there is nothing greater than the fact that the world is so stable and coheres so closely that nothing better fitted for its endurance can so much as be conceived. For all its parts, on every side pressing toward the central place, strain equally. And bodies joined to one another remain so most firmly when they are bound together as if by some encompassing chain; and this is the work of that nature which, pervading the whole world, brings all things to completion through mind and reason, drawing them toward the center and turning the outermost parts inward.

Haec omnis descriptio siderum atque hic tantus caeli ornatus ex corporibus huc et illuc casu et temere cursantibus potuisse effici cuiquam sano videri potest, aut vero alia quae natura mentis et rationis expers haec efficere potuit quae non modo ut fierent ratione eguerunt sed intellegi qualia sint sine summa ratione non possunt? Nec vero haec solum admirabilia, sed nihil maius quam quod ita stabilis est mundus atque ita cohaeret, ad permanendum ut nihil ne excogitari quidem possit aptius. omnes enim partes eius undique medium locum capessentes nituntur aequaliter. maxime autem corpora inter se iuncta permanent cum quasi quodam vinculo circumdato colligantur; quod facit ea natura quae per omnem mundum omnia mente et ratione conficiens funditur et ad medium rapit et convertit extrema.

And so, if the world is spherical, and if for that reason all its parts on every side are held together, balanced both in themselves and among themselves, the same must necessarily hold true of the earth: with all its parts inclining toward the center — and the center in a sphere is the lowest point — nothing breaks in to undermine so great a tension of gravity and weight. By the same principle the sea, though it lies above the earth, nevertheless, seeking the central place of the earth, gathers itself into a sphere uniformly on every side, and neither overflows nor pours away.

Quocirca si mundus globosus est ob eamque causam omnes eius partes undique aequabiles ipsae per se atque inter se continentur, contingere idem terrae necesse est, ut omnibus eius partibus in medium vergentibus (id autem medium infimum in sphaera est) nihil interrumpat quo labefactari possit tanta contentio gravitatis et ponderum. Eademque ratione mare, cum supra terram sit, medium tamen terrae locum expetens conglobatur undique aequabiliter, neque redundat umquam neque effunditur.

The air, which borders upon the sea, is borne aloft by its lightness, yet pours itself out in every direction; and so it is at once continuous and joined with the sea and naturally borne toward the heavens, tempered by whose thinness and warmth it furnishes living things with the breath of life and health. The topmost part of the heavens, which is called the ethereal, embraces the air, and at once retains its own fire — thin and condensed by no admixture — and is joined to the outer limit of the air. In the ether the stars revolve, which both hold themselves together, compacted by their own striving, and sustain their movements by their very form and figure; for they are round, and to forms of this kind, as I think I have said before, no harm can come.

Huic autem continens aer fertur ille quidem levitate sublimi, sed tamen in omnes partes se ipse fundit; itaque et mari continuatus et iunctus est et natura fertur ad caelum, cuius tenuitate et calore temperatus vitalem et salutarem spiritum praebet animantibus. Quem complexa summa pars caeli, quae aetheria dicitur, et suum retinet ardorem tenuem et nulla admixtione concretum et cum aeris extremitate coniungitur. In aethere autem astra volvuntur, quae se et nisu suo conglobata continent et forma ipsa figuraque sua momenta sustentant; sunt enim rutunda, quibus formis, ut ante dixisse videor, minime noceri potest.

The stars are by nature fiery; and so they are fed by the vapors of the earth, the sea, and the other waters — vapors raised by the sun from the warmed fields and from the waters. Nourished and renewed by these, the stars and the whole ether pour them out again and draw them back from the same source, so that almost nothing perishes, or only the very smallest amount, consumed by the fire of the stars and the flame of the ether. From this our school holds that what will come about is the very thing they said Panaetius doubted: that in the end the whole world will burst into fire, when, the moisture being consumed, neither can the earth be nourished nor can the air return, since the air’s source, once all the water is exhausted, cannot exist; and so nothing will be left but fire, by which in turn, as a living being and a god, the renewal of the world will take place and the same adornment will arise again.

Sunt autem stellae natura flammeae; quocirca terrae maris aquarum que reliquarum vaporibus aluntur is qui a sole ex agris tepefactis et ex aquis excitantur; quibus altae renovataeque stellae atque omnis aether effundunt eadem et rursum trahunt indidem, nihil ut fere intereat aut admodum paululum, quod astrorum ignis et aetheris flamma consumat. ex quo eventurum nostri putant id de quo Panaetium addubitare dicebant, ut ad extremum omnis mundus ignesceret, cum umore consumpto neque terra ali posset nec remearet aer, cuius ortus aqua omni exhausta esse non posset: ita relinqui nihil praeter ignem, a quo rursum animante ac deo renovatio mundi fieret atque idem ornatus oreretur.

I do not wish to seem to you to dwell at length on the system of the stars, and above all on those said to wander; their harmony out of the most dissimilar motions is so great that, while the highest, Saturn’s, chills, the middle one, Mars’s, sets ablaze, and Jupiter’s, set between them, gives light and tempers; and below Mars two obey the sun, while the sun itself fills the whole world with its light, and from it the moon, illumined, brings on conceptions and births and the ripening of all that is born. This linking of things, this conjoining of nature consenting, as it were, to the world’s preservation — the man whom it does not move, I know for certain has never reflected on any of these matters.

Nolo in stellarum ratione multus vobis videri, maximeque earum quae errare dicuntur; quarum tantus est concentus ex dissimillimis motibus, ut, cum summa Saturni refrigeret, media Martis incendat, is interiecta Iovis inlustret et temperet, infraque Martem duae soli oboediant, ipse sol mundum omnem sua luce compleat, ab eoque luna inluminata graviditates et partus adferat maturitatesque gignendi. Quae copulatio rerum et quasi consentiens ad mundi incolumitatem coagmentatio naturae quem non movet, hunc horum nihil umquam reputavisse certo scio.

Come, that we may pass from the things of the heavens to those of the earth — what is there among them in which the reasoning of an intelligent nature does not appear? To begin with, among the things that grow from the earth, the roots both give stability to the things they support and draw from the earth the sap by which the parts held together by the roots are nourished; and the trunks are clothed in bark or rind, so as to be the safer against cold and heat. And then the vines grasp their props with their tendrils, as though with hands, and so raise themselves up like living things; indeed, the cabbages are said to recoil from the stalks of the vine, if they are planted near them, as from things pestilent and harmful, and not to touch them in any part.

Age ut a caelestibus rebus ad terrestres veniamus, quid est in his in quo non naturae ratio intellegentis appareat. Principio eorum quae gignuntur e terra stirpes et stabilitatem dant is quae sustinentur, et e terra sucum trahunt quo alantur ea quae radicibus continentur; obducunturque libro aut cortice trunci, quo sint a frigoribus et caloribus tutiores. iam vero vites sic claviculis adminicula tamquam manibus adprehendunt atque ita se erigunt ut animantes; quin etiam a caulibus brassicae, si propter sati sint, ut a pestiferis et nocentibus refugere dicuntur nec eos ulla ex parte contingere.

As for living creatures, how great is their variety, how great their capacity for this end — that each should persist within its own kind! Of these, some are covered with hides, some clothed with shaggy hair, some bristling with spines; some we see overlaid with feathers, others with scales, some armed with horns, some furnished with wings for escape. To living creatures, moreover, nature has supplied lavishly and abundantly the food that suited each. I could enumerate, for the seizing and processing of that food, what design there is in the shapes of living things, and how skillful and subtle the disposition of their parts, how admirable the construction of their limbs. For all the parts at least that are enclosed within are so formed and so placed that none of them is superfluous, none not necessary to the preservation of life.

Animantium vero quanta varietas est, quanta ad eam rem vis ut in suo quaeque genere permaneat. Quarum aliae coriis tectae sunt aliae villis vestitae aliae spinis hirsutae; pluma alias alias squama videmus obductas, alias esse cornibus armatas, alias habere effugia pinnarum. Pastum autem animantibus large et copiose natura eum qui cuique aptus erat comparavit. Enumerare possum ad eum pastum capessendum conficiendumque quae sit in figuris animantium et quam sollers subtilisque descriptio partium quamque admirabilis fabrica membrorum. omnia enim, quae quidem intus inclusa sunt, ita nata atque ita locata sunt, ut nihil eorum supervacuaneum sit, nihil ad vitam retinendam non necessarium.

The same nature has given to the beasts both sensation and appetite, so that by the one they might have the impulse to seize their natural foods, and by the other distinguish the pestilent from the wholesome. Some animals, again, approach their food by walking, others by crawling, others by flying, others by swimming; and they take their food partly with the open mouth and with the teeth themselves, partly seize it with the grip of their claws, partly with the hook of their beaks; some suck, some pluck, some gulp, some chew. Some, too, are of such lowness that they easily reach food on the ground with their mouths, while those that are taller — geese, swans, cranes, camels — are helped by the length of their necks;

Dedit autem eadem natura beluis et sensum et appetitum, ut altero conatum haberent ad naturales pastus capessendos, altero secernerent pestifera a salutaribus. Iam vero alia animalia gradiendo alia serpendo ad pastum accedunt, alia volando alia nando, cibumque partim oris hiatu et dentibus ipsis capessunt, partim unguium tenacitate arripiunt partim aduncitate rostrorum, alia sugunt alia carpunt alia vorant alia mandunt. atque etiam aliorum east humilitas ut cibum terrestrem rostris facile contingant, quae autem altiora sunt, ut anseres ut cygni ut grues ut camelli, adiuvantur proceritate collorum;

a hand, too, was given to the elephant, because on account of the size of its body it had difficult access to its food. As for the beasts whose food was such that they had to feed on the foods of other kinds, nature gave them either strength or speed. To some, even, a certain contrivance and skill was given — as among the little spiders, some weave a kind of net, so that they may dispatch whatever sticks in it, while others watch unawares and snatch whatever falls in and consume it. The pina, however — for that is its Greek name — opening up two great mussel-shells, enters as it were into a partnership with a little shrimp for the procuring of food; and so, when small fish have swum into its gaping shell, the pina, warned by the shrimp, snaps the shells shut with a bite: thus among the most dissimilar little creatures food is sought in common;

manus etiam data elephantost, quia propter magnitudinem corporis difficiles aditus habebat ad pastum. at quibus bestiis erat is cibus ut †aliis generis escis vescerentur, aut vires natura dedit aut celeritatem. data est quibusdam etiam machinatio quaedam atque sollertia, ut in araneolis aliae quasi rete texunt, ut si quid inhaeserit conficiant, aliae autem ut * * ex inopinato observant et si quid incidit arripiunt idque consumunt. pina vero (sic enim Graece dicitur) duabus grandibus patula conchis cum parva squilla quasi societatem coit comparandi cibi; itaque cum pisciculi parvi in concham hiantem innataverunt, tum admonita a squilla pina morsu comprimit conchas: sic dissimillimis bestiolis communiter cibus quaeritur;

and here it is to be marveled at whether they were brought together by some encounter with each other, or were associated by nature herself straight from their birth. There is, too, some occasion for wonder in the water-dwelling creatures that are born on land — for instance crocodiles and river tortoises and certain serpents which, born away from the water, as soon as they first can move, make for the water. Indeed, we often place ducks’ eggs under hens; and the chicks hatched from them are first nourished by these as by mothers, by whom they were brought forth and warmed, and then they leave them and flee from them as they follow, the moment they have been able to catch sight of water as their natural home: so great a guardianship of self-preservation has nature implanted in living things. I have also read it written that there is a certain bird called the spoonbill; it seeks its food by flying to those birds that plunge themselves into the sea, and when these have emerged and caught a fish, it presses their heads with its bite until they let go their catch, upon which it pounces itself. The same bird is recorded as being in the habit of filling itself with shellfish, and when it has cooked these with the heat of its stomach, of vomiting them up, and so selecting from them the parts that are good to eat.

in quo admirandum est, congressune aliquo inter se an iam inde ab ortu natura ipsa congregatae sint. Est etiam admiratio non nulla in bestiis aquatilibus is quae gignuntur in terra; veluti crocodili fluviatilesque testudines quaedamque serpentes ortae extra aquam simul ac primum niti possunt aquam persequuntur. quin etiam anitum ova gallinis saepe supponimus; e quibus pulli orti primo aluntur ab his ut a matribus, a quibus exclusi fotique sunt, deinde eas relinquunt et effugiunt sequentes, cum primum aquam quasi naturalem domum videre potuerunt: tantam ingenuit animantibus conservandi sui natura custodiam. Legi etiam scriptum, esse avem quandam quae platalea nominaretur; eam sibi cibum quaerere advolantem ad eas avis quae se in mari mergerent, quae cum emersissent piscemque cepissent usque eo premere earum capita mordicus, dum illae captum amitterent, in quod ipsa invaderet. eademque haec avis scribitur conchis se solere complere, eas cum stomachi calore concoxerit evomere, atque ita eligere ex his quae sunt esculenta.

Sea-frogs, again, are said to be in the habit of burying themselves in the sand and stirring near the water, and when fish approach them as if to feed, they are dispatched by the frogs and consumed. The kite has a kind of war with the crow, as it were natural to it; and so each, wherever it comes upon them, breaks the other’s eggs. But this — observed by Aristotle, by whom most things were observed — who can fail to marvel at? When cranes, seeking warmer regions, cross the seas, they form the shape of a triangle; with its uppermost angle the air opposing them is thrust aside, and then little by little, on either side, as though by oars, the birds’ course is lightened by their wings; and the base of the triangle which the cranes make is helped, as though from a stern, by the winds; and they rest their necks and heads on the backs of those flying ahead; and because the leader himself cannot do this, since he has nothing to lean upon, he flies back so that he too may rest, and into his place succeeds one of those that have rested, and this exchange is kept up throughout the whole flight.

Ranae autem marinae dicuntur obruere sese harena solere et moveri prope aquam, ad quas quasi ad escam pisces cum accesserint confici a ranis atque consumi. Miluo est quoddam bellum quasi naturale cum corvo; ergo alter alterius ubicumque nanctus est ova frangit. Illud vero (ab Aristotele animadversum, a quo pleraque) quis potest non mirari: grues cum loca calidiora petentes maria transmittant trianguli efficere formam; eius autem summo angulo aer ab is adversus pellitur, deinde sensim ab utroque latere tamquam remis ita pinnis cursus avium levatur; basis autem trianguli, quam efficiunt grues, ea tamquam a puppi ventis adiuvatur; eaeque in tergo praevolantium colla et capita reponunt; quod quia ipse dux facere non potest, quia non habet ubi nitatur, revolat ut ipse quoque quiescat, in eius locum succedit ex his quae adquierunt, eaque vicissitudo in omni cursu conservatur.

I could bring forward many things of this kind, but you see the type itself. And then there are these still more familiar facts: how greatly the beasts guard themselves, how they look about them while feeding, how they hide away in their lairs. And these are marvelous: that the very remedies discovered only recently — that is, a few centuries ago — by the genius of physicians, the dogs treat themselves with by vomiting, and the Egyptian ibises by purging the bowels. It has been heard that panthers, which in barbarian lands are caught with poisoned meat, have a certain remedy which, when they have used it, they do not die; and that the wild goats in Crete, when they have been pierced with poisoned arrows, seek out a herb called dittany, and that when they have tasted it the arrows are said to fall out of their bodies;

Multa eius modi proferre possum, sed genus ipsum videtis. Iam vero illa etiam notiora, quanto se opere custodiant bestiae, ut in pastu circumspectent, ut in cubilibus delitiscant. Atque illa mirabilia, quod —ea quae nuper id est paucis ante saeclis medicorum ingeniis reperta sunt—vomitione canes, purgando autem alvo se ibes Aegyptiae curant. auditum est pantheras, quae in barbaria venenata carne caperentur, remedium quoddam habere, quo cum essent usae non morerentur, capras autem in Creta feras, cum essent confixae venenatis sagittis, herbam quaerere quae dictamnus vocaretur, quam cum gustavissent sagittas excidere dicunt e corpore;

and that hinds, a little before bearing their young, thoroughly purge themselves with a certain little herb called hartwort. And then we observe how each defends itself with its own weapons against violence and danger: bulls with their horns, boars with their tusks, lions by running, some protect themselves by flight, others by hiding, the cuttlefish by discharging ink, the torpedo-fish by numbing, and many also drive off their pursuers by the intolerable foulness of their stench. And so that the adornment of the world might be perpetual, great care was taken by the providence of the gods that there should always exist both the kinds of beasts and of trees and of all the things held together from the earth by roots — all of which indeed have within themselves such a force of seed that from one many are generated. And this seed is enclosed in the inmost part of those berries which are shed from each plant, and by these same seeds men feed in abundance and the lands are filled by the renewal of plants of the same kind.

cervaeque paulo ante partum perpurgant se quadam herbula quae seselis dicitur. Iam illa cernimus, ut contra vim et metum suis se armis quaeque defendat: cornibus tauri, apri dentibus, cursu leones, aliae fuga se aliae occultatione tutantur, atramenti effusione saepiae torpore torpedines, multae etiam insectantes odoris intolerabili foeditate depellunt. Ut vero perpetuus mundi esset ornatus, magna adhibita cura est a providentia deorum, ut semper essent et bestiarum genera et arborum omniumque rerum quae a terra stirpibus continerentur; quae quidem omnia eam vim seminis habent in se ut ex uno plura generentur. Idque semen inclusum est in intuma parte earum bacarum quae ex quaque stirpe funduntur, isdemque seminibus et homines adfatim vescuntur et terrae eiusdem generis stirpium renovatione conplentur.

Why should I speak of how great a design appears in the beasts for the perpetual preservation of their kind? For first, some are male and some female, which nature has contrived for the sake of perpetuity; then the parts of the body are most aptly fitted both for begetting and for conceiving, and in male and female alike there are marvelous urges for the coupling of bodies; and when the seed has lodged in its place, it draws to itself nearly all the nourishment and, walled in by it, forms the animal; and when this has slipped from the womb and dropped free, in those living things that are nourished by milk nearly all the mothers’ nourishment begins to turn to milk, and the newborn, with no teacher but nature for guide, seek out the teats and are sated by their abundance. And that we may understand that none of these things is by chance and that all of them are the works of a provident and skillful nature, those creatures that bring forth manifold offspring — such as sows and dogs — are given a multitude of teats, the very teats that those beasts have few of which bring forth few.

Quid loquar quanta ratio in bestiis ad perpetuam conservationem earum generis appareat? nam primum aliae mares aliae feminae sunt, quod perpetuitatis causa machinata natura est, deinde partes corporis et ad procreandum et ad concipiendum aptissimae, et in mari et in femina commiscendorum corporum mirae libidines, cum autem in locis semen insedit rapit omnem fere cibum ad sese eoque saeptum fingit animal; quod cum ex utero elapsum excidit, in is animantibus quae lacte aluntur omnis fere cibus matrum lactescere incipit, eaque quae paulo ante nata sunt sine magistro duce natura mammas adpetunt earumque ubertate saturantur. atque ut intellegamus nihil horum esse fortuitum et haec omnia esse opera providae sollertisque naturae, quae multiplices fetus procreant, ut sues ut canes, is mammarum data est multitudo, quas easdem paucas habent eae bestiae quae pauca gignunt.

What shall I say of how great a love beasts have in rearing and guarding the young they have brought forth, right up to the point at which the young can defend themselves? Fish, it is true, abandon their eggs once they have laid them, since water both buoys those eggs up easily and brings the brood to maturity; turtles and crocodiles, they say, after delivering their young on land, bury the eggs and then depart, so that the young are born and reared entirely by themselves. Hens, on the other hand, and the rest of the birds both seek out a quiet place for laying and build themselves nests and roosts, and line them as softly as they can, so that the eggs may be kept as safely as possible; and once they have hatched the chicks from these, they protect them in such a way as both to cherish them with their feathers, lest they be harmed by cold, and to shield them with their bodies if there is heat from the sun. But when the chicks are able to use their little wings, then the mothers attend their flights, and are released from any further care.

Quid dicam quantus amor bestiarum sit in educandis custodiendisque is quae procreaverunt, usque ad eum finem dum possint se ipsa defendere. etsi pisces, ut aiunt, ova cum genuerunt relinquunt, facile enim illa aqua et sustinentur et fetum fundunt; testudines autem et crocodilos dicunt, cum in terra partum ediderint, obruere ova, deinde discedere: ita et nascuntur et educantur ipsa per sese. iam gallinae avesque reliquae et quietum requirunt ad pariendum locum et cubilia sibi nidosque construunt eosque quam possunt mollissume substernunt, ut quam facillume ova serventur; e quibus pullos cum excuderunt ita tuentur ut et pinnis foveant ne frigore laedantur et si est calor a sole se opponant; cum autem pulli pinnulis uti possunt, tum volatus eorum matres prosequuntur, reliqua cura liberantur.

There is also added, toward the preservation and well-being of certain living creatures and of those things which the earth brings forth, the resourcefulness and diligence of human beings. For there are many kinds of livestock and many plants that cannot survive without human management. Great opportunities, too, for the cultivation and abundance of human life are found in one region or another. The Nile irrigates Egypt, and when it has held the whole country submerged and flooded all summer long, it then withdraws and leaves the fields, softened and silted over, ready for sowing. The Euphrates makes Mesopotamia fertile, into which it each year brings, as it were, fresh fields. And the Indus indeed, which is the greatest of all rivers, not only gladdens and mellows the fields with its water but even sows them; for it is said to carry down with it a great quantity of seeds resembling grain.

Accedit etiam ad non nullorum animantium et earum rerum quas terra gignit conservationem et salutem hominum etiam sollertia et diligentia. nam multae et pecudes et stirpes sunt quae sine procuratione hominum salvae esse non possunt. Magnae etiam oportunitates ad cultum hominum atque abundantiam aliae aliis in locis reperiuntur. Aegyptum Nilus inrigat, et cum tota aestate obrutam oppletamque tenuit tum recedit mollitosque et oblimatos agros ad serendum relinquit. Mesopotamiam fertilem efficit Euphrates, in quam quotannis quasi novos agros invehit. Indus vero, qui est omnium fluminum maximus, non aqua solum agros laetificat et mitigat, sed eos etiam conserit; magnam enim vim seminum secum frumenti similium dicitur deportare.

And I could bring forward many other things in other regions worth recording, many fertile fields rich in one crop or another. But how great is that bounty of nature, which brings forth so many things to eat, so various and so delightful, and these not at one season of the year, so that we are always delighted by both their novelty and their plenty. And how seasonable, how salutary the Etesian winds are which she has given, not only to the race of men but also to that of the herds, and indeed to all things that spring from the earth: by their breath excessive heat is tempered, and by them too the swift and steady courses of ships at sea are guided. Many things must be passed over, and yet many are spoken of.

multaque alia in aliis locis commemorabilia proferre possum, multos fertiles agros alios aliorum fructuum. Sed illa quanta benignitas naturae, quod tam multa ad vescendum tam varie tam iucunda gignit, neque ea uno tempore anni, ut semper et novitate delectemur et copia. Quam tempestivos autem dedit quam salutares non modo hominum sed etiam pecudum generi, is denique omnibus quae oriuntur e terra, ventos etesias; quorum flatu nimii temperantur calores, ab isdem etiam maritimi cursus celeres et certi diriguntur. Multa praetereunda sunt et tamen multa dicuntur.

For the advantages of rivers cannot be enumerated, nor the tides of the sea ebbing and flowing, the mountains clothed and forested, the salt-pans set farthest back from the seacoast, the lands brimming with healing medicines, and finally the countless arts necessary for sustenance and for life. Again, the alternation of day and night preserves living creatures by allotting one time for action and another for rest. Thus on every side, by every line of reasoning, the conclusion is drawn that by a divine mind and design all things in this world are administered, in a manner deserving of wonder, toward the safety and preservation of all.

enumerari enim non possunt fluminum oportunitates, aestus maritimi †multum accedentes et recedentes, montes vestiti atque silvestres, salinae ab ora maritima remotissimae, medicamentorum salutarium plenissumae terrae, artes denique innumerabiles ad victum et ad vitam necessariae. Iam diei noctisque vicissitudo conservat animantes tribuens aliud agendi tempus aliud quiescendi. Sic undique omni ratione concluditur mente consilioque divino omnia in hoc mundo ad salutem omnium conservationemque admirabiliter administrari.

But should anyone ask for whose sake so vast a work was contrived—was it for the sake of trees and plants, which, though without sensation, are nevertheless sustained by nature? But that is absurd. Was it for the sake of beasts? It is no more probable that the gods labored so greatly for the sake of creatures dumb and without understanding. For whose sake, then, would one say the world was made? Surely for the sake of those living beings that use reason; these are gods and men, than whom assuredly nothing is better, for reason is what surpasses all things. Thus it becomes credible that the world, and all things that are in that world, were made for the sake of gods and men. And it will be more readily understood that provision has been made by the immortal gods for men, if the whole fabrication of man is examined, and the entire figure and perfection of human nature.

Sin quaeret quispiam cuiusnam causa tantarum rerum molitio facta sit—arborumne et herbarum, quae quamquam sine sensu sunt tamen a natura sustinentur: at id quidem absurdum est; an bestiarum: nihilo probabilius deos mutarum et nihil intellegentium causa tantum laborasse. quorum igitur causa quis dixerit effectum esse mundum? eorum scilicet animantium quae ratione utuntur; hi sunt di et homines; quibus profecto nihil est melius, ratio est enim quae praestet omnibus ita fit credibile deorum et hominum causa factum esse mundum quaeque in eo mundo sint omnia. Faciliusque intellegetur a dis inmortalibus hominibus esse provisum, si erit tota hominis fabricatio perspecta omnisque humanae naturae figura atque perfectio.

For since the life of living creatures is sustained by three things—food, drink, and breath—the mouth is best suited for taking in all of these: with the nostrils joined to it, it is augmented by breath, while by the teeth set in array within the mouth the food is chewed and by them broken down and softened. The front teeth, being sharp, divide the food with their bite, while the inner ones, which are called the molars, grind it up; and this grinding seems to be assisted by the tongue as well.

Nam cum tribus rebus animantium vita teneatur, cibo potione spiritu, ad haec omnia percipienda os est aptissimum quod adiunctis naribus spiritu augetur, dentibus autem in ore constructis mandatur atque ab is extenuatur et mollitur cibus. eorum adversi acuti morsu dividunt escas, intimi autem conficiunt qui genuini vocantur; quae confectio etiam a lingua adiuvari videtur.

Next to the tongue, clinging at its roots, the gullet receives what comes; into it first slip down the things taken in by the mouth. Touching the tonsils on either side, it is bounded by the farthest and innermost part of the palate, and when, by the working and movements of the tongue, it has received the food driven and as it were thrust down, it forces it downward. Those parts of it which lie below the thing being swallowed dilate, while those which lie above contract.

linguam autem ad radices eius haerens excipit stomachus, quo primum inlabuntur ea quae accepta sunt ore. is utraque ex parte tosillas attingens palato extremo atque intimo terminatur atque is agitatione et motibus linguae cum depulsum et quasi detrusum cibum accepit depellit. ipsius autem partes eae quae sunt infra quam id quod devoratur dilatantur, quae autem supra contrahuntur.

But since the windpipe (for so it is called by the physicians) has its opening joined to the roots of the tongue, a little above the point where the gullet is attached to the tongue, and since it extends all the way to the lungs and receives the air drawn in by breathing, and breathes that same air out again from the lungs and returns it, it is covered by a kind of lid, so to speak, which was given for this purpose: so that, if some bit of food should chance to fall into it, the breath might not be obstructed. But since the belly, set beneath the gullet, is the receptacle of food and drink, while the lungs and the heart draw in breath from without, in the belly many things have been wrought in a manner deserving of wonder, things composed for the most part of sinews; and it is many-folded and winding, and it encloses and holds whatever it has received, whether dry or moist, so that this may be altered and digested, and now it is drawn tight, now relaxed, and it compresses and blends together everything it has received, so that easily—both by the heat, which it has in abundance, and by the grinding of the food, and besides by the breath—all things, cooked and broken down, may be distributed to the rest of the body. In the lungs, on the other hand, there is a certain porousness and a softness resembling that of sponges, most apt for drawing in the breath, which now contract as they exhale, now dilate as the breath flows in, so that the breath of life may be drawn frequently, by which living creatures are above all nourished.

Sed cum aspera arteria (sic enim a medicis appellatur) ostium habeat adiunctum linguae radicibus paulo supra quam ad linguam stomachus adnectitur, eaque ad pulmones usque pertineat excipiatque animam eam quae ductast spiritu eandemque a pulmonibus respiret et reddat, tegitur quodam quasi operculo, quod ob eam causam datum est, ne si quid in eam cibi forte incidisset spiritus impediretur. Sed cum alvi natura subiecta stomacho cibi et potionis sit receptaculum, pulmones autem et cor extrinsecus spiritum ducant, in alvo multa sunt mirabiliter effecta, quae constant fere e nervis; est autem multiplex et tortuosa arcetque et continet sive illud aridum est sive umidum quod recepit, ut id mutari et concoqui possit, eaque tum adstringitur tum relaxatur, atque omne quod accepit cogit et confundit, ut facile et calore, quem multum habet, et terendo cibo et praeterea spiritu omnia cocta atque confecta in reliquum corpus dividantur. in pulmonibus autem inest raritas quaedam et adsimilis spongiis mollitudo ad hauriendum spiritum aptissima, qui tum se contrahunt adspirantes tum †inre spiritu dilatantur, ut frequenter ducatur cibus animalis, quo maxime aluntur animantes.

From the intestines, however, the juice by which we are nourished, separated in the belly from the rest of the food, seeps through to the liver by certain channels drawn and directed from the middle intestine all the way to the gates of the liver (for so they are called), channels which reach to the liver and adhere to it; and from there other passages run on, through which the food, gliding down from the liver, makes its descent. When the bile has been separated from that food, and likewise the humors which are discharged from the kidneys, the rest turns itself into blood and flows together to those same gates of the liver, to which all its channels reach; and through these the food, having glided on, is in this very place poured into the vein which is called the hollow vein, and through it, now broken down and cooked, it slides on to the heart; and from the heart it is distributed into the whole body through veins exceedingly many, reaching into all the parts of the body.

Ex intestinis autem †alvo secretus a reliquo cibo sucus is quo alimur permanat ad iecur per quasdam a medio intestino usque ad portas iecoris (sic enim appellantur) ductas et directas vias, quae pertinent ad iecur eique adhaerent; atque inde aliae * * pertinentes sunt, per quas cadit cibus a iecore dilapsus. ab eo cibo cum est secreta bilis eique umores qui e renibus profunduntur, reliqua se in sanguinem vertunt ad easdemque portas iecoris confluunt ad quas omnes eius viae pertinent; per quas lapsus cibus in hoc ipso loco in eam venam quae cava appellatur confunditur perque eam ad cor confectus iam coctusque perlabitur; a corde autem in totum corpus distribuitur per venas admodum multas in omnes partes corporis pertinentes.

How the residue of the food is driven out, now by the intestines drawing themselves tight, now by their relaxing, is by no means difficult to tell, yet it must be passed over, lest the discourse contain anything disagreeable. Let this rather be set forth—the incredible workmanship of nature: for the air which is drawn into the lungs by breathing first grows warm from the breath itself, then by contact with the lungs, and from it one part is given back in exhalation, while another part is taken up by a certain part of the heart which they call the heart’s ventricle, to which another like it is joined, into which the blood flows from the liver through that hollow vein. And in this way, from these parts, both the blood is diffused through the veins into the whole body and the breath through the arteries; and both kinds, frequent and many, interwoven throughout the whole body, attest to a certain incredible force of skillful and divine workmanship.

Quem ad modum autem reliquiae cibi depellantur tum astringentibus se intestinis tum relaxantibus, haud sane difficile dictu est, sed tamen praetereundum est, ne quid habeat iniucunditatis oratio. Illa potius explicetur incredibilis fabrica naturae: nam quae spiritu in pulmones anima ducitur, ea calescit primum ipso ab spiritu, deinde contagione pulmonum, ex eaque pars redditur respirando, pars concipitur cordis parte quadam quam ventriculum cordis appellant, cui similis alter adiunctus est, in quem sanguis a iecore per venam illam cavam influit. eoque modo ex is partibus et sanguis per venas in omne corpus diffunditur et spiritus per arterias; utraeque autem crebrae multaeque toto corpore intextae vim quandam incredibilem artificiosi operis divinique testantur.

What shall I say of the bones, which, set beneath the body, have wondrous joinings, fitted both for stability and apt for bounding the limbs and for movement and for every action of the body? To this add the sinews, by which the limbs are held together, and their interlacing, which extends through the whole body, and which, like the veins and arteries, are drawn and set out from the heart and led into the whole body.

Quid dicam de ossibus; quae subiecta corpori mirabiles commissuras habent et ad stabilitatem aptas et ad artus finiendos adcommodatas et ad motum et ad omnem corporis actionem. Huc adde nervos, a quibus artus continentur, eorumque inplicationem corpore toto pertinentem, qui sicut venae et arteriae a corde tractae et profectae in corpus omne ducuntur.

To this providence of nature, so diligent and so resourceful, many things can be added, from which it may be understood how great and how surpassing are the gifts bestowed on men by the gods. First, the gods raised men up from the ground and set them tall and erect, so that, gazing at the sky, they might be able to grasp the knowledge of the gods. For men spring from the earth not as its dwellers and inhabitants, but as it were the spectators of things on high and in the heavens, the contemplation of which belongs to no other kind of living creature. The senses, moreover, the interpreters and messengers of things, have been both made and placed in the head, as in a citadel, wonderfully suited to their necessary uses. For the eyes, like watchmen, occupy the highest position, from which, surveying very many things, they may discharge their office;

Ad hanc providentiam naturae tam diligentem tamque sollertem adiungi multa possunt, e quibus intellegatur quantae res hominibus a dis quamque eximiae tributae sint. Qui primum eos humo excitatos celsos et erectos constituit, ut deorum cognitionem caelum intuentes capere possent. sunt enim ex terra homines non ut incolae atque habitatores sed quasi spectatores superarum rerum atque caelestium, quarum spectaculum ad nullum aliud genus animantium pertinet. Sensus autem interpretes ac nuntii rerum in capite tamquam in arce mirifice ad usus necessarios et facti et conlocati sunt. nam oculi tamquam speculatores altissimum locum optinent, ex quo plurima conspicientes fungantur suo munere;

and the ears, since they must perceive sound, which by nature is borne upward, have rightly been placed in the high parts of the body; likewise the nostrils—because every odor rises to the upper regions—are rightly set aloft, and because their judgment of food and drink is of great moment, not without reason have they kept close to the neighborhood of the mouth. And taste, which had to perceive the kinds of the things we eat, dwells in that part of the mouth where nature has opened a passage for food and drink. Touch, however, is spread uniformly over the whole body, so that we can feel all blows and all excessive impingements of cold and heat. And just as in buildings architects turn away from the eyes and noses of the masters those outflowing things that would necessarily have something foul about them, so nature has banished such things far from the senses.

et aures, cum sonum percipere debeant qui natura in sublime fertur, recte in altis corporum partibus collocatae sunt; itemque nares et, quod omnis odor ad supera fertur, recte sursum sunt et, quod cibi et potionis iudicium magnum earum est, non sine causa vicinitatem oris secutae sunt. iam gustatus, qui sentire eorum quibus vescimur genera deberet, habitat in ea parte oris qua esculentis et posculentis iter natura patefecit. tactus autem toto corpore aequabiliter fusus est, ut omnes ictus omnesque nimios et frigoris et caloris adpulsus sentire possimus. atque ut in aedificiis architecti avertunt ab oculis naribusque dominorum ea quae profluentia necessario taetri essent aliquid habitura, sic natura res similis procul amandavit a sensibus.

What craftsman, indeed, other than nature—than which nothing can be more cunning—could have pursued such resourcefulness in the senses? First, she clothed and fenced the eyes with the finest of membranes, which she first made transparent so that one might see through them, yet firm so that they might be held in. But she made the eyes slippery and mobile, so that they might both turn aside if something should harm them and easily direct their gaze wherever they wished; and the very point of vision by which we see, which is called the pupil, is so small that it easily avoids the things that might do it harm; and the eyelids, which are the coverings of the eyes, softest to the touch lest they injure the point of vision, have been most aptly made both for closing the pupils, lest anything fall in, and for opening them, and she has provided that this can be done again and again with the utmost speed.

Quis vero opifex praeter naturam, qua nihil potest esse callidius, tantam sollertiam persequi potuisset in sensibus? Quae primum oculos membranis tenuissimis vestivit et saepsit; quas primum perlucidas fecit ut per eas cerni posset, firmas autem ut continerentur. sed lubricos oculos fecit et mobiles, ut et declinarent si quid noceret et aspectum quo vellent facile converterent; aciesque ipsa qua cernimus, quae pupula vocatur, ita parva est ut ea quae nocere possint facile vitet; palpebraeque, quae sunt tegmenta oculorum, mollissimae tactu ne laederent aciem, aptissime factae et ad claudendas pupulas ne quid incideret et ad aperiendas, idque providit ut identidem fieri posset cum maxima celeritate.

And the eyelids are fortified, as with a palisade of hairs, by which, when the eyes are open, anything that might fall in is repelled, and, when in sleep they close together—since we did not then need the eyes for seeing—they might rest as though wrapped up. They lie hidden, besides, to good purpose, and are fenced about on every side by lofty parts. For first the upper portions, overhung by the brows, repel the sweat that flows down from the head and forehead; then the cheeks, set beneath on the lower side and slightly projecting, guard them; and the nose is so placed that it seems to stand as a wall set between the eyes.

munitaeque sunt palpebrae tamquam vallo pilorum, quibus et apertis oculis si quid incideret repelleretur et somno coniventibus, cum oculis ad cernendum non egeremus, ut qui tamquam involuti quiescerent. latent praeterea utiliter et excelsis undique partibus saepiuntur. primum enim superiora superciliis obducta sudorem a capite et fronte defluentem repellunt; genae deinde ab inferiore parte tutantur subiectae leviterque eminentes; nasusque ita locatus est ut quasi murus oculis interiectus esse videatur.

The hearing, however, always lies open, for we have need of its sense even while asleep, and when a sound is received by it we are roused even out of sleep. It has a winding path, lest anything be able to enter if it lay open straight and direct; provision has been made, too, that if some tiny creature should try to break in, it would stick fast in the wax of the ears as though in birdlime. And on the outside project what are called the ears, made both for the sake of covering and protecting the sense, and so that incoming sounds might not slip away and stray before the sense had been struck by them. But their passages of entry are hard and, as it were, horny, and beset with many turnings, because by these natural features sound, when carried in, is amplified; this is why a sound resounds in the lyre from its tortoise-shell or its horn, and why from winding and enclosed places sounds are returned more amply.

Auditus autem semper patet, eius enim sensu etiam dormientes egemus, a quo cum sonus est acceptus etiam e somno excitamur. flexuosum iter habet, ne quid intrare possit si simplex et directum pateret; provisum etiam ut si qua minima bestiola conaretur inrumpere in sordibus aurium tamquam in visco inhaeresceret. extra autem eminent quae appellantur aures, et tegendi causa factae tutandique sensus, et ne adiectae voces laberentur atque errarent prius quam sensus ab his pulsus esset. sed duros et quasi corneolos habent introitus multisque cum flexibus, quod his naturis relatus amplificatur sonus; quocirca et in fidibus testudine resonatur aut cornu, et ex tortuosis locis et inclusis referuntur ampliores.

The nostrils too, which must stand open for their indispensable uses, have their entrances rather narrowed, so that nothing harmful can force its way into them; and they always hold a moisture not without value for repelling dust and much else besides. The sense of taste is splendidly fenced in, for it is enclosed within the mouth, conveniently placed both for its use and for the safekeeping of our health. And all the senses of human beings far surpass the senses of the beasts. To begin with the eyes: in those arts whose judgment belongs to the eyes — in shapes painted, modeled, and engraved, and in the very motion and gesture of bodies — they discern much with the finer subtlety; the eyes judge too the loveliness and order of colors and figures and, so to speak, their decorum; and they judge things still greater, for they recognize virtues and vices as well — they recognize the angry man and the kindly, the joyful and the grieving, the brave and the cowardly, the bold and the fearful.

Similiter nares, quae semper propter necessarias utilitates patent, contractiores habent introitus, ne quid in eas quod noceat possit pervadere; umoremque semper habent ad pulverem multaque alia depellenda non inutilem. Gustatus praeclare saeptus est; ore enim continetur et ad usum apte et ad incolumitatis custodiam. Omnesque sensus hominum multo antecellunt sensibus bestiarum. Primum enim oculi in his artibus, quarum iudicium est oculorum, in pictis fictis caelatisque formis, in corporum etiam motione atque gestu multa cernunt subtilius, colorum etiam et figurarum †tum venustatem atque ordinem et ut ita dicam decentiam oculi iudicant, atque etiam alia maiora: nam et virtutes et vitia cognoscunt, iratum propitium, laetantem dolentem, fortem ignavum, audacem timidumque cognoscunt.

The judgment of the ears, likewise, is a thing wonderful and full of craft, by which is judged, in the singing of the voice and of pipes and strings, the variety of sounds, their intervals, their distinctness, and the very many kinds of voice — ringing and muffled, smooth and rough, low and high, supple and hard — qualities judged by the ears of human beings alone. The judgments of the nostrils too, and of taste, and of touch, are great. To capture and fully enjoy these senses, more arts have been discovered than I could wish; for it is plain enough to what lengths the compounding of perfumes, the seasoning of foods, and the allurements of the body have advanced.

Auriumque item est admirabile quoddam artificiosumque iudicium, quo iudicatur et in vocis et in tibiarum nervorumque cantibus varietas sonorum intervalla distinctio, et vocis genera permulta, canorum fuscum, leve asperum, grave acutum, flexibile durum, quae hominum solum auribus iudicantur. Nariumque item et gustandi et †parte tangendi magna iudicia sunt. ad quos sensus capiendos et perfruendos plures etiam quam vellem artes repertae sunt; perspicuum est enim quo conpositiones unguentorum, quo ciborum conditiones, quo corporum lenocinia processerint.

And now, as for the soul itself and the mind of man, his reason, his judgment, his prudence — whoever does not perceive that these were brought to perfection by divine care seems to me himself to be destitute of those very things. While I argue this point I could wish your eloquence, Cotta, were given to me. For how you would set forth those matters: first, how great an intelligence is in us, and then how, above all, there is a connecting and a comprehending of consequences — from which, plainly, we judge what follows from each set of premises, and conclude it by reason, and define each thing singly and embrace it within precise bounds; from which we understand what power knowledge has and of what kind it is — a thing than which not even in a god is there anything more excellent. And how great are those faculties which you of the Academy weaken and abolish — that by the senses and by the mind we perceive and grasp the things that lie outside us;

Iam vero animum ipsum mentemque hominis rationem consilium prudentiam qui non divina cura perfecta esse perspicit, is his ipsis rebus mihi videtur carere. De quo dum disputarem tuam mihi dari vellem Cotta eloquentiam. quo enim tu illa modo diceres, quanta primum intellegentia deinde consequentium rerum cum primis coniunctio et conprehensio esset in nobis; ex quo videlicet iudicamus quid ex quibusque rebus efficiatur, idque ratione concludimus, singulasque res definimus circumscripteque conplectimur; ex quo scientia intellegitur quam vim habeat qualis que sit, qua ne in deo quidem est res ulla praestantior. quanta vero illa sunt, quae vos Academici infirmatis et tollitis, quod et sensibus et animo ea quae extra sunt percipimus atque conprendimus;

for it is from these, set side by side and compared with one another, that we also fashion the arts, the ones necessary partly for the use of life and partly for its delight. And now, that mistress of all things, as you are accustomed to call it — the power of speech — how splendid it is and how divine! It is this, first, that enables us both to learn what we do not know and to teach others what we do know; it is by this that we exhort, by this that we persuade, by this that we console the afflicted, by this that we lead the terrified back from their fear, by this that we restrain the overexuberant, by this that we quench desires and angers; it is this that has bound us together in the fellowship of law, of statutes, of cities; it is this that has set us apart from a savage and brutish life.

ex quibus conlatis inter se et conparatis artes quoque efficimus partim ad usum vitae partim ad oblectationem necessarias. Iam vero domina rerum, ut vos soletis dicere, eloquendi vis quam est praeclara quamque divina. quae primum efficit ut et ea quae ignoramus discere et ea quae scimus alios docere possimus; deinde hac cohortamur hac persuademus, hac consolamur afflictos hac deducimus perterritos a timore, hac gestientes conprimimus hac cupiditates iracundiasque restinguimus, haec nos iuris legum urbium societate devinxit, haec a vita inmani et fera segregavit.

As for the use of speech, it is incredible — unless you attend to it carefully — how great a work nature has contrived. For first the windpipe runs from the lungs all the way to the inmost mouth, and through it the voice, taking its origin from the mind, is received and poured forth. Then the tongue is set within the mouth, bounded by the teeth; it shapes and gives limit to the voice when it is poured out without measure, and it produces the distinct and well-defined sounds of speech as it strikes both the teeth and the other parts of the mouth. And so our people are accustomed to call the tongue something like a plectrum, the teeth its strings, the nostrils the horns that resonate to the strings in singing.

Ad usum autem orationis incredibile est, nisi diligenter attenderis, quanta opera machinata natura sit. primum enim a pulmonibus arteria usque ad os intimum pertinet, per quam vox principium a mente ducens percipitur et funditur. deinde in ore sita lingua est finita dentibus; ea vocem inmoderate profusam fingit et terminat atque sonos vocis distinctos et pressos efficit, cum et dentes et alias partes pellit oris; itaque plectri similem linguam nostri solent dicere, chordarum dentes, nares cornibus is quae ad nervos resonant in cantibus.

And how apt the hands are, and what handmaids of so many arts, that nature gave to man! For the bending of the fingers is easy, and easy their stretching out, on account of their soft joints and articulations, and they labor in no movement. And so, by the application of the fingers, the hand is fitted for painting, for modeling, for carving, for drawing sounds from strings and pipes. And these are the works of delight, those others of necessity — I mean the tilling of fields and the raising of roofs, the coverings of the body whether woven or sewn, and all the fashioning of bronze and iron. From this it is understood that, by applying the workmen’s hands to what was discovered by the mind and perceived by the senses, we have obtained everything — so that we could be sheltered, clothed, and safe, and could have cities, walls, dwellings, and shrines.

Quam vero aptas quamque multarum artium ministras manus natura homini dedit. Digitorum enim contractio facilis facilisque porrectio propter molles commissuras et artus nullo in motu laborat. itaque ad pingendum fingendum, ad scalpendum, ad nervorum eliciendos sonos ad tibiarum apta manus est admotione digitorum. Atque haec oblectationis, illa necessitatis, cultus dico agrorum extructionesque tectorum, tegumenta corporum vel texta vel suta omnemque fabricam aeris et ferri; ex quo intellegitur ad inventa animo percepta sensibus adhibitis opificum manibus omnia nos consecutos, ut tecti ut vestiti ut salvi esse possemus, urbes muros domicilia delubra haberemus.

And now, by the works of men, that is, by their hands, variety and abundance of food too is procured. For the fields bring forth many things, sought by the hand, to be either consumed at once or stored away and entrusted to keeping; and besides this we feed on beasts of the land, of the water, and of the air, partly by catching them, partly by rearing them. We also contrive, by our taming of them, the carrying-services of four-footed animals, whose swiftness and strength lend strength and swiftness to ourselves. We lay burdens upon certain beasts, we set yokes upon them; we turn to our own advantage the keenest senses of elephants and the sharp scent of dogs; we draw iron out from the caverns of the earth, a thing necessary for the tilling of fields; we find the deeply hidden veins of bronze, silver, and gold, both serviceable for use and lovely for adornment. And by the cutting of trees, and from every material both cultivated and wild, we make use partly — with fire applied — to warm the body and to soften our food, partly for building, so that, fenced in by roofs, we may repel cold and heat.

Iam vero operibus hominum id est manibus cibi etiam varietas invenitur et copia. nam et agri multa efferunt manu quaesita, quae vel statim consumantur vel mandentur condita vetustati, et praeterea vescimur bestiis et terrenis et aquatilibus et volantibus partim capiendo partim alendo. Efficimus etiam domitu nostro quadripedum vectiones, quorum celeritas atque vis nobis ipsis adfert vim et celeritatem. nos onera quibusdam bestiis nos iuga inponimus; nos elephantorum acutissumis sensibus nos sagacitate canum ad utilitatem nostram abutimur; nos e terrae cavernis ferrum elicimus rem ad colendos agros necessariam, nos aeris argenti auri venas penitus abditas invenimus et ad usum aptas et ad ornatum decoras. Arborum autem confectione omnique materia et culta et silvestri partim ad calficiendum corpus igni adhibito et ad mitigandum cibum utimur, partim ad aedificandum, ut tectis saepti frigora caloresque pellamus;

And timber brings great uses for the making of ships, by whose voyages all the supplies needed for life are furnished from every quarter; and of those forces which nature has begotten most violent — the sea and the winds — we alone possess the mastery, through our knowledge of seafaring, and we enjoy and make use of very many things from the sea. Likewise the whole dominion over the goods of the land lies in man: we enjoy the plains, we enjoy the mountains; ours are the rivers, ours the lakes; we sow the crops, we plant the trees; we give fertility to the soil by the leading-in of waters; we dam the rivers, we straighten them, we turn them aside; and with our own hands, in short, we strive to bring about within the world of nature a kind of second nature.

magnos vero usus adfert ad navigia facienda, quorum cursibus suppeditantur omnes undique ad vitam copiae; quasque res violentissimas natura genuit earum moderationem nos soli habemus, maris atque ventorum, propter nauticarum rerum scientiam, plurimisque maritimis rebus fruimur atque utimur. Terrenorum item commodorum omnis est in homine dominatus: nos campis nos montibus fruimur, nostri sunt amnes nostri lacus, nos fruges serimus nos arbores; nos aquarum inductionibus terris fecunditatem damus, nos flumina arcemus derigimus avertimus; nostris denique manibus in rerum natura quasi alteram naturam efficere conamur.

And what of human reason — has it not penetrated even into the heavens? We alone among living creatures have come to know the risings, the settings, and the courses of the stars; by the race of men the day, the month, the year have been bounded; the eclipses of the sun and moon have been recognized and foretold for all time to come — how great they will be, and when. Contemplating these things, the mind arrives at a knowledge of the gods, from which springs piety, to which justice is joined and the remaining virtues; and from these arises a happy life, the equal and the likeness of the gods, yielding to the celestial beings in no other respect than immortality — which has nothing to do with living well. Now that these matters are set out, I think I have shown sufficiently how far the nature of man surpasses all living things. From which it ought to be understood that neither the shape and arrangement of the limbs nor the power of the intellect and mind could have been wrought by chance.

Quid vero hominum ratio non in caelum usque penetravit? soli enim ex animantibus nos astrorum ortus obitus cursusque cognovimus, ab hominum genere finitus est dies mensis annus, defectiones solis et lunae cognitae praedictaeque in omne posterum tempus, quae quantae quando futurae sint. Quae contuens animus accedit ad cognitionem deorum, e qua oritur pietas, cui coniuncta iustitia est reliquaeque virtutes, e quibus vita beata existit par et similis deorum, nulla alia re nisi immortalitate, quae nihil ad bene vivendum pertinet, cedens caelestibus. Quibus rebus expositis satis docuisse videor hominis natura quanto omnis anteiret animantes. ex quo debet intellegi nec figuram situmque membrorum nec ingenii mentisque vim talem effici potuisse fortuna.

It remains for me to show, and at last to bring my speech to its close, that everything in this world which men make use of was made and made ready for the sake of men. In the first place, the world itself was made for the sake of gods and men, and whatever is in it was prepared and devised for the enjoyment of men. For the world is, as it were, the common house of gods and men, or the city of both; for they alone, using reason, live by right and by law. As, then, Athens and Sparta must be reckoned to have been founded for the sake of the Athenians and the Spartans, and everything in those cities is rightly said to belong to those peoples, so whatever is in the whole world must be reckoned to belong to the gods and to men.

Restat ut doceam atque aliquando perorem, omnia quae sint in hoc mundo, quibus utantur homines, hominum causa facta esse et parata. Principio ipse mundus deorum hominumque causa factus est, quaeque in eo sunt ea parata ad fructum hominum et inventa sunt. Est enim mundus quasi communis deorum atque hominum domus aut urbs utrorumque; soli enim ratione utentes iure ac lege vivunt. ut igitur Athenas et Lacedaemonem Atheniensium Lacedaemoniorumque causa putandum est conditas esse, omniaque quae sint in his urbibus eorum populorum recte esse dicuntur, sic quaecumque sunt in omni mundo deorum atque hominum putanda sunt.

And now the circuits of the sun and moon and of the other heavenly bodies, although they belong also to the coherence of the world, nevertheless also afford a spectacle to men; for there is no sight more insatiable, none more beautiful, none more excelling in reason and craftsmanship; for, by measuring out their courses, we have come to know the ripenings of the seasons and their variations and changes. And if these things are known to men alone, it must be judged that they were made for the sake of men.

Iam vero circumitus solis et lunae reliquorumque siderum, quamquam etiam ad mundi cohaerentiam pertinent, tamen et spectaculum hominibus praebent; nulla est enim insatiabilior species, nulla pulchrior et ad rationem sollertiamque praestantior; eorum enim cursus dimetati maturitates temporum et varietates mutationesque cognovimus. quae si hominibus solis nota sunt, hominum facta esse causa iudicandum est.

And the earth, teeming with crops and with every kind of pulse, which she pours out with the greatest bounty — does she seem to give them birth for the sake of the beasts, or of men? What shall I say of the vines and the olive groves, whose richest and most abundant fruits have nothing whatever to do with the beasts? For the cattle have no knowledge of sowing, or of cultivating, or of reaping and gathering the fruits in due season, or of storing and laying them up; the use and care of all these things belong to men.

Terra vero feta frugibus et vario leguminum genere, quae cum maxuma largitate fundit, ea ferarumne an hominum causa gignere videtur? quid de vitibus olivetisque dicam, quarum uberrumi laetissumique fructus nihil omnino ad bestias pertinent; neque enim serendi neque colendi nec tempestive demetendi percipiendique fructus neque condendi ac reponendi ulla pecudum scientia est, earumque omnium rerum hominum est et usus et cura.

As, then, the lyre and the pipes must be said to have been made for the sake of those who could use them, so the things I have spoken of must be granted to have been prepared for those alone who use them; nor, if certain beasts steal or snatch some of them, shall we say that they were brought into being for the sake of those beasts as well. For men do not store up grain for the sake of mice or ants, but for the sake of their wives and children and households; and so the beasts enjoy it by stealth, as I said, while the masters enjoy it openly and freely.

ut fides igitur et tibias eorum causa factas dicendum est qui illis uti possent, sic ea quae dixi is solis confitendum est esse parata qui utuntur, nec, si quae bestiae furantur aliquid ex is aut rapiunt, illarum quoque causa ea nata esse dicemus. neque enim homines murum aut formicarum causa frumentum condunt sed coniugum et liberorum et familiarum suarum; itaque bestiae furtim ut dixi fruuntur, domini palam et libere;

It must therefore be admitted that these stores of things were provided for the sake of men. Unless perhaps so great an abundance and variety of fruits, and the pleasantness not only of tasting them but of smelling and seeing them as well, leaves room for any doubt that nature has bestowed them on men alone. And so far is it from the truth that these things were prepared for the sake of the beasts as well, that we see the very beasts themselves were begotten for the sake of men. For what else do sheep provide, except that men may be clothed when their wool has been worked and woven? Indeed they could neither have been nourished nor sustained nor have yielded any produce of themselves without the cultivation and care of men. And as for the dog — its loyalty so faithful in keeping watch, its fawning affection so loving toward its masters, its hatred so great toward strangers, the incredible keenness of its nose for tracking, its great eagerness in the hunt — what does all this signify but that they were begotten for the conveniences of men?

hominum igitur causa eas rerum copias comparatas fatendum est. nisi forte tanta ubertas varietas que pomorum eorumque iucundus non gustatus solum sed odoratus etiam et aspectus dubitationem adfert quin hominibus solis ea natura donaverit. Tantumque abest ut haec bestiarum etiam causa parata sint, ut ipsas bestias hominum gratia generatas esse videamus. quid enim oves aliud adferunt nisi ut earum villis confectis atque contextis homines vestiantur; quae quidem neque ali neque sustentari neque ullum fructum edere ex se sine cultu hominum et curatione potuissent. canum vero tam fida custodia tamque amans dominorum adulatio tantumque odium in externos et tam incredibilis ad investigandum sagacitas narium tanta alacritas in venando quid significat aliud nisi se ad hominum commoditates esse generatos.

What shall I say of oxen? Their very backs declare that they were not shaped for receiving a burden, while their necks were born for the yoke, and the strength and breadth of their shoulders for dragging the plow. By these, when the earth was being broken up by the splitting of the clods — in that golden age, as the poets put it — no violence was ever done; but then the iron race sprang up, and was the first that dared to forge the deadly sword and to taste the bullock, joined to it and tamed by its hand: so great was the usefulness reckoned to be reaped from oxen, that it was held a crime to feed upon their flesh. It would be a long task to run through the uses of mules and asses, which were certainly provided for the use of men.

quid de bubus loquar; quorum ipsa terga declarant non esse se ad onus accipiendum figurata, cervices autem natae ad iugum, tum vires umerorum et latitudines ad aratra †extrahenda. quibus cum terrae subigerentur fissione glebarum ab illo aureo genere, ut poetae loquuntur, vis nulla umquam adferebatur: ferrea tum vero proles exorta repentest ausaque funestum primast fabricarier ensem et gustare manu iunctum domitumque iuvencum: tanta putabatur utilitas percipi e bubus, ut eorum visceribus vesci scelus haberetur. longum est mulorum persequi utilitates et asinorum, quae certe ad hominum usum paratae sunt.

And the pig — what has it, beyond being food? To it, indeed, Chrysippus says that the very soul was given in place of salt, to keep its flesh from rotting; and of this animal, since it was fit for the eating of men, nature has begotten nothing more prolific. What shall I say of the multitude and the delightfulness of fish, what of birds? From these so great a pleasure is reaped that at times our Stoic Providence seems to have been an Epicurean; and they could not even be caught except by the reason and craftsmanship of men — although certain birds, both the birds of flight and the birds of song, as our augurs call them, we believe were born for the sake of taking auguries.

sus vero quid habet praeter escam; cui quidem ne putesceret animam ipsam pro sale datam dicit esse Chrysippus; qua pecude, quod erat ad vescendum hominibus apta, nihil genuit natura fecundius. quid multitudinem suavitatemque piscium dicam, quid avium; ex quibus tanta percipitur voluptas, ut interdum Pronoea nostra Epicurea fuisse videatur, atque eae ne caperentur quidem nisi hominum ratione atque sollertia; quamquam avis quasdam, et alites et oscines, ut nostri augures appellant, rerum augurandarum causa esse natas putamus.

Then too we take huge and savage beasts by hunting, both to feed on them and to train ourselves in the chase after the likeness of military discipline, and to put the tamed and well-schooled ones to use, as we do elephants; and we draw from their bodies many remedies for diseases and wounds, just as we do from certain roots and herbs, whose usefulness we have learned by the practice and trial of long ages. You may survey the whole earth and all the seas with your mind as with your eyes: you will see now the fruitful and measureless expanses of the plains and the dense mantling of the mountains, the pastures of the herds, and then the voyages over the sea accomplished with incredible speed.

iam vero immanes et feras beluas nanciscimur venando, ut et vescamur is et exerceamur in venando ad similitudinem bellicae disciplinae et utamur domitis et condocefactis, ut elephantis, multaque ex earum corporibus remedia morbis et vulneribus eligamus, sicut ex quibusdam stirpibus et herbis, quarum utilitates longinqui temporis usu et periclitatione percepimus. Totam licet animis tamquam oculis lustrare terram mariaque omnia: cernes iam spatia frugifera atque inmensa camporum vestitusque densissimos montium, pecudum pastus, tum incredibili cursus maritimos celeritate.

And not above the earth only, but even in its innermost darkness there lies hidden the usefulness of very many things, which, having come into being for the use of men, are discovered by men alone. There is a point, however, which each of you will perhaps seize upon to censure — Cotta because Carneades took such pleasure in inveighing against the Stoics, Velleius because Epicurus laughs at nothing so much as the foretelling of things to come — yet this very point seems to me to confirm beyond anything else that human affairs are looked after by the providence of the gods. For there is, surely, such a thing as divination, which shows itself in many places, in many matters, at many times, in private concerns and above all in public ones:

Nec vero supra terram sed etiam in intumis eius tenebris plurimarum rerum latet utilitas, quae ad usum hominum orta ab hominibus solis invenitur. Illud vero, quod uterque vestrum arripiet fortasse ad reprendendum, Cotta quia Carneades lubenter in Stoicos invehebatur, Velleius quia nihil tam inridet Epicurus quam praedictionem rerum futurarum, mihi videtur vel maxume confirmare deorum prudentia consuli rebus humanis. est enim profecto divinatio, quae multis locis rebus temporibus apparet cum in privatis tum maxume publicis:

the haruspices discern much, the augurs foresee much, much is declared by oracles, much by prophecies, much by dreams, much by portents; and through the knowledge of these, many results have often been secured in accordance with men’s wishes and to their advantage, and many dangers have been averted as well. This power, then — whether you call it a power or an art or a natural endowment — has surely been granted to man, and to no other creature, by the immortal gods, for the knowledge of things to come. And if these proofs taken singly do not perhaps move you, taken all together, linked and joined to one another, they ought certainly to have moved you.

multa cernunt haruspices multa augures provident, multa oraclis declarantur multa vaticinationibus multa somniis multa portentis; quibus cognitis multae saepe res ex hominum sententia atque utilitate partae, multa etiam pericula depulsa sunt. haec igitur sive vis sive ars sive natura ad scientiam rerum futurarum homini profecto est nec ali cuiquam a dis inmortalibus data. Quae si singula vos forte non movent, universa certe tamen inter se conexa atque coniuncta movere debebant.

And it is not the whole race of men only, but individuals as well, for whom the immortal gods are wont to provide and take thought. For one may draw in the whole community of the human race and reduce it step by step to a smaller number, and at last to single men. For if we judge that the gods take thought for all men, wherever they are, on whatever shore or quarter of the earth, even those separated from the continuous landmass of this earth which we inhabit — and this for the reasons we have given before — then they take thought also for these men who, together with us, dwell in these lands of ours from the rising to the setting of the sun.

Nec vero universo generi hominum solum sed etiam singulis a dis inmortalibus consuli et provideri solet. Licet enim contrahere universitatem generis humani eamque gradatim ad pauciores postremo deducere ad singulos. nam si omnibus hominibus, qui ubique sunt quacumque in ora ac parte terrarum ab huiusce terrae quam nos incolimus continuatione distantium, deos consulere censemus ob has causas quas ante diximus, his quoque hominibus consulunt qui has nobiscum terras ab oriente ad occidentem colunt.

But if they take thought for those who dwell upon what is, as it were, a great island, which we call the circle of the earth, then they also take thought for those who hold the parts of that island, Europe, Asia, and Africa. And so they cherish the parts of these regions as well, such as Rome, Athens, Sparta, and Rhodes; and within those cities they cherish individuals apart from the whole — as, in the war with Pyrrhus, Curius, Fabricius, and Coruncanius; in the first Punic War, Calatinus, Duellius, Metellus, and Lutatius; in the second, Maximus, Marcellus, and Africanus; after these, Paulus, Gracchus, and Cato; and within our fathers’ memory, Scipio and Laelius. Many other men of singular worth our own state and Greece besides have produced, and we must believe that none of them was such as he was without the help of a god.

sin autem consulunt qui quasi magnam quandam insulam incolunt quam nos orbem terrae vocamus, etiam illis consulunt qui partes eius insulae tenent, Europam Asiam Africam. ergo et earum partes diligunt, ut Romam Athenas Spartam Rhodum, et earum urbium separatim ab universis singulos diligunt, ut Pyrrhi bello Curium Fabricium Coruncanium, primo Punico Calatinum Duellium Metellum Lutatium, secundo Maxumum Marcellum Africanum, post hos Paulum Gracchum Catonem, patrumve memoria Scipionem Laelium; multosque praeterea et nostra civitas et Graecia tulit singulares viros, quorum neminem nisi iuvante deo talem fuisse credendum est.

It was this consideration that drove the poets, and above all Homer, to attach particular gods, as companions in their crises and perils, to the foremost of the heroes — to Ulysses, Diomedes, Agamemnon, and Achilles. Besides this, the visible presence of the gods themselves, of the kind I have mentioned above, makes plain that thought is taken by them both for states and for individual men — a fact understood also through the signs of things to come, which are foreshown sometimes to men asleep, sometimes to men awake. And we are warned, besides, by many prodigies, by many tokens in the entrails of victims, and by many other things which long practice has so marked down that it has produced the art of divination.

quae ratio poetas maxumeque Homerum inpulit ut principibus heroum Ulixi Diomedi Agamemnoni Achilli certos deos discriminum et periculorum comites adiungeret. praeterea ipsorum deorum saepe praesentiae, quales supra commemoravi, declarant ab is et in civitatibus et singulis hominibus consuli quod quidem intellegitur etiam significationibus rerum futurarum, quae tum dormientibus tum vigilantibus portenduntur; multa praeterea ostentis, multa in extis admonemur multisque rebus aliis, quas diuturnus usus ita notavit ut artem divinationis efficeret.

No man, then, was ever great without some breath of the divine. Yet this is not to be refuted in such a way that, if a storm has harmed someone’s crops or vineyards, or if chance has stripped away some one of life’s comforts, we should judge the man to whom any of these things happened to be either hateful to a god or neglected by a god. The gods attend to great things; the small they overlook. But for great men all things are always prosperous — that is, if enough has been said by our school and by the foremost of philosophers, Socrates, about the abundance and the riches of virtue.

nemo igitur vir magnus sine aliquo adflatu divino umquam fuit. Nec vero ita refellendum est ut, si segetibus aut vinetis cuiuspiam tempestas nocuerit, aut si quid e vitae commodis casus abstulerit, eum cui quid horum acciderit aut invisum deo aut neglectum a deo iudicemus. magna di curant, parva neglegunt. magnis autem viris prosperae semper omnes res, si quidem satis a nostris et a principe philosophiae Socrate dictum est de ubertatibus virtutis et copiis.

These, roughly, were the things that came to my mind which I thought ought to be said about the nature of the gods. As for you, Cotta — if you would take my advice, you would plead this same cause, and would consider that you are both a leading citizen and a pontiff, and, since you are free to argue on either side, you would rather take this one, and would bring to it that faculty of discourse which the Academy has enlarged for you out of what you received from your training in rhetoric. For it is a wicked and impious habit to argue against the gods, whether it is done in earnest or only in pretense.”

Haec mihi fere in mentem veniebant quae dicenda putarem de natura deorum. tu autem Cotta si me audias eandem causam agas teque et principem civem et pontificem esse cogites et, quoniam in utramque partem vobis licet disputare, hanc potius sumas eamque facultatem disserendi, quam tibi a rhetoricis exercitationibus acceptam amplificavit Academia, potius huc conferas. mala enim et impia consuetudo est contra deos disputandi, sive ex animo id fit sive simulate.”

When Balbus had finished, Cotta said with a smile: "You instruct me too late, Balbus, on what I am to defend. For while you were speaking, I was turning over in my own mind what I might say against you — not so much to refute you as to ask after the things I understood too little. And since each man must use his own judgment, it would be a hard thing to bring me to feel as you would have me feel."

Quae cum Balbus dixisset, tum adridens Cotta Sero inquit mihi Balbe praecipis quid defendam. ego enim te disputante quid contra dicerem mecum ipse meditabar, neque tam refellendi tui causa quam ea quae minus intellegebam requirendi. cum autem suo cuique iudicio sit utendum, difficile factu est me id sentire quod tu velis.

At this Velleius said: "You have no idea how keenly I look forward to hearing you, Cotta. For our friend Balbus found your discourse against Epicurus delightful; so I in turn will offer myself to you as an attentive listener against the Stoics. For I trust you come, as you usually do, well prepared."

Hic Velleius Nescis inquit quanta cum expectatione Cotta sim te auditurus. iucundus enim Balbo nostro sermo tuus contra Epicurum fuit; praebebo igitur ego me tibi vicissim attentum contra Stoicos auditorem. spero enim te ut soles bene paratum venire.

Then Cotta said: "By Hercules, Velleius, I do — for my reckoning with Lucilius is not the same as it was with you." "How so, then?" said the other. "Because it seems to me that your Epicurus does not put up much of a fight over the immortal gods. He merely does not dare to deny that the gods exist, for fear of incurring some odium or charge; but when he asserts that the gods do nothing and care for nothing, and that they are furnished with human limbs but make no use of those limbs, he seems to be trifling — content to have said that there is a certain blessed and eternal nature.

Tum Cotta Sic mehercule inquit Vellei; neque enim mihi par ratio cum Lucilio est ac tecum fuit. Qui tandem inquit ille. “Quia mihi videtur Epicurus vester de dis immortalibus non magnopere pugnare: tantum modo negare deos esse non audet, ne quid invidiae subeat aut criminis; cum vero deos nihil agere nihil curare confirmat membrisque humanis esse praeditos sed eorum membrorum usum nullum habere, ludere videtur satisque putare si dixerit esse quandam beatam naturam et aeternam.

From Balbus, on the other hand, you noticed, I am sure, how many things were said, and how — even if less than true — they were nonetheless apt and consistent with one another. And so I intend, as I said, not so much to refute his discourse as to ask after the things I understood too little. So I leave it to you, Balbus: would you rather answer me as I question you on individual points, the things I have grasped too little, or hear my discourse entire?" Then Balbus said: "For my part, if you want anything explained to you, I would rather answer; but if you mean to question me not so much to understand as to refute, I will do whichever you please — either reply at once to each point you raise, or, when you have finished, to all of them together."

A Balbo autem animadvertisti credo quam multa dicta sint quamque etiam si minus vera tamen apta inter se et cohaerentia. itaque cogito ut dixi non tam refellere eius orationem quam ea quae minus intellexi requirere. quare Balbe tibi permitto, responderene mihi malis de singulis rebus quaerenti ex te ea quae parum accepi an universam audire orationem meam.” Tum Balbus: Ego vero, si quid explanari tibi voles, respondere malo, sin me interrogare non tam intellegendi causa quam refellendi, utrum voles faciam, vel ad singula quae requires statim respondebo vel cum peroraris ad omnia.

Then Cotta said: "Excellent. So let us proceed as the discourse itself leads us. But before the matter at hand, a few words about myself. I am moved no slightly by your authority, Balbus, and by that part of your discourse which, in your peroration, urged me to remember that I am both a Cotta and a pontiff — which, I believe, came to this: that I should defend the beliefs we have received from our ancestors concerning the immortal gods, the rites, the ceremonies, the observances of religion. These I will indeed defend always, as I have always defended them, and no man’s discourse, learned or unlearned, will ever move me from the belief I received from my ancestors concerning the worship of the immortal gods. But when religion is the question, I follow Tiberius Coruncanius, Publius Scipio, Publius Scaevola, men who were chief pontiffs — not Zeno or Cleanthes or Chrysippus; and I have Gaius Laelius, an augur and at the same time a wise man, whom I would sooner hear speaking on religion, in that famous discourse of his, than any leader of the Stoics. And since the whole religion of the Roman people is divided into rites and auspices, with a third thing joined to them — whatever the interpreters of the Sibyl or the soothsayers have advised by way of prediction from portents and prodigies — I have always held that none of these observances is to be despised, and I have convinced myself that Romulus by establishing the auspices, and Numa by establishing the rites, laid the foundations of our state, which surely could never have grown so great without the fullest appeasement of the immortal gods.

Tum Cotta Optime inquit; ’quam ob rem sic agamus ut nos ipsa ducit oratio. Sed ante quam de re, pauca de me. non enim mediocriter moveor auctoritate tua Balbe orationeque ea quae me in perorando cohortabatur ut meminissem me et Cottam esse et pontificem; quod eo credo valebat, ut opiniones, quas a maioribus accepimus de dis immortalibus, sacra caerimonias religionesque defenderem. ego vero eas defendam semper semperque defendi, nec me ex ea opinione, quam a maioribus accepi de cultu deorum inmortalium, ullius umquam oratio aut docti aut indocti movebit. sed cum de religione agitur, Ti. Coruncanium P. Scipionem P. Scaevolam pontifices maximos, non Zenonem aut Cleanthen aut Chrysippum sequor, habeoque C. Laelium augurem eundemque sapientem quem potius audiam dicentem de religione in illa oratione nobili quam quemquam principem Stoicorum. cumque omnis populi Romani religio in sacra et in auspicia divisa sit, tertium adiunctum sit si quid praedictionis causa ex portentis et monstris Sibyllae interpretes haruspicesve monuerunt, harum ego religionum nullam umquam contemnendam putavi mihique ita persuasi, Romulum auspiciis Numam sacris constitutis fundamenta iecisse nostrae civitatis, quae numquam profecto sine summa placatione deorum inmortalium tanta esse potuisset.

There you have, Balbus, what Cotta thinks, what a pontiff thinks. Now let me understand what you think; for from you, a philosopher, I am bound to receive a reasoned account of religion, whereas in our ancestors I must believe even when no account is rendered." Then Balbus said: "What account, then, do you want from me, Cotta?" And he replied: "Your division was fourfold: first, you proposed to show that the gods exist; next, of what kind they are; then, that the world is governed by them; and last, that they take thought for human affairs. This, if I remember rightly, was the partition." "Quite right," said Balbus; "but I am waiting to hear what you would ask."

Habes Balbe quid Cotta quid pontifex sentiat; fac nunc ego intellegam tu quid sentias; a te enim philosopho rationem accipere debeo religionis, maioribus autem nostris etiam nulla ratione reddita credere.’ Tum Balbus Quam igitur a me rationem inquit Cotta desideras? Et ille Quadripertita inquit fuit divisio tua, primum ut velles docere deos esse, deinde quales essent, tum ab is mundum regi, postremo consulere eos rebus humanis. haec, si recte memini, partitio fuit. Rectissume inquit Balbus; sed expecto quid requiras.

Then Cotta said: "Let us look at each point in turn. And as for the first — if it is first, the thing on which all but the wholly impious agree, and which cannot be burned out of my mind, namely that the gods exist — that very thing, of which I am convinced by the authority of my ancestors, why it should be so, you teach me nothing." "What is this?" said Balbus. "If you are convinced of it, why would you have me teach you?" Then Cotta said: "Because I approach this discussion as though I had never heard anything about the immortal gods, never given them a thought. Take me as a raw and untouched pupil, and teach me the things I ask."

Tum Cotta Primum quidque videamus inquit et si id est primum, quod inter omnis nisi admodum impios convenit, mihi quidem ex animo exuri non potest, esse deos, id tamen ipsum, quod mihi persuasum est auctoritate maiorum, cur ita sit nihil tu me doces. Quid est inquit Balbus, si tibi persuasum est, cur a me velis discere? Tum Cotta Quia sic adgredior inquit ad hanc disputationem, quasi nihil umquam audierim de dis immortalibus nihil cogitaverim; rudem me et integrum discipulum accipe et ea quae requiro doce.

"Tell me, then," he said, "what you ask." "Why, this first: when you had said that on that side the matter is so plain it does not even need a discourse — that the gods exist being plain and agreed by all — why on that very point you said so much." "Because I have often noticed you too, Cotta," he said, "when you spoke in the Forum, loading the juror with as many arguments as you could, if only the case gave you the means. And philosophers do this same thing, and I have done it as I could. But what you ask is much as if you were to ask me why I look at you with two eyes and do not close the other, when I could attain the same end with one." Then Cotta said: "How apt that comparison is, you may judge for yourself.

Dic igitur inquit quid requiras. Egone, primum illud, cur, quom perspicuum in istam partem ne egere quidem oratione dixisses, quod esset perspicuum et inter omnis constaret deos esse, de eo ipso tam multa dixeris. Quia te quoque inquit animadverti Cotta saepe cum in foro diceres quam plurimis posses argumentis onerare iudicem, si modo eam facultatem tibi daret causa. atque hoc idem et philosophi faciunt et ego ut potui feci. tu autem quod quaeris similiter facis ac si me roges cur te duobus contuear oculis et non altero coniveam, cum idem uno adsequi possim. Tum Cotta Quam simile istud sit inquit “tu videris.

For I am not in the habit, in lawsuits, of arguing for anything that is self-evident and agreed by all — argumentation only weakens what is clear — and even if I did so in the courts, I would not do the same in this finer kind of discourse. As for closing one eye, there would be no cause for that, since the gaze of both is the same, and since nature — which you would have to be wise — willed that we should have two channels bored from the mind to the eyes for light. But because you had no confidence that the thing was as plain as you would have it, for that reason you set out to show by many arguments that the gods exist. For me one thing was enough: that our ancestors had handed it down so. But you despise authorities and fight with reason;

nam ego neque in causis, si quid est evidens de quo inter omnis conveniat, argumentari soleo (perspicuitas enim argumentatione elevatur) nec si id facerem in causis forensibus idem facerem in hac suptilitate sermonis. cur coniveres autem altero oculo causa non esset, cum idem obtutus esset amborum et cum rerum natura, quam tu sapientem esse vis, duo lumina ab animo ad oculos perforata nos habere voluisset. sed quia non confidebas tam esse id perspicuum quam tu velis, propterea multis argumentis deos esse docere voluisti. mihi enim unum sat erat, ita nobis maioris nostros tradidisse. sed tu auctoritates contemnis, ratione pugnas;

allow my reason, then, to contend with your reason. You bring forward all these arguments why there should be gods, and by your arguing you make doubtful a matter that in my view is not doubtful in the least; for I have committed to memory not only the number of your arguments but their order as well. The first was that, when we have looked up at the sky, we at once understand that there is some divine power by which all this is governed. From this came also that line: ’Behold this shining vault on high, which all

patere igitur rationem meam cum tua ratione contendere. Adfers haec omnia argumenta cur dii sint, remque mea sententia minime dubiam argumentando dubiam facis; mandavi enim memoriae non numerum solum sed etiam ordinem argumentorum tuorum. Primum fuit, cum caelum suspexissemus statim nos intellegere esse aliquod numen quo haec regantur. ex hoc illud etiam "aspice hoc sublime candens, quem invocant

invoke as Jupiter’ — as if any of us called upon that Jupiter rather than the Jupiter of the Capitol, or as if this were plain and agreed by all, that those are gods which Velleius and many besides will not even grant to be living beings. A weighty argument too you thought it, that the belief in the immortal gods belongs to all men and grows greater every day: so it pleases you, then, that matters so great should be judged by the opinion of fools — and that with you above all, who say those very men are mad? ’But we see the gods present among us, as Postumius did at Lake Regillus, and Vatinius on the Salarian Way’ — and there is some tale, too, about the Locrians’ battle at the Sagra. Those, then, whom you called the Tyndaridae — that is, men born of a man — and whom Homer, who lived not long after their age, says were buried at Lacedaemon: do you suppose that these came to meet Vatinius on white horses, with no grooms, and announced the victory of the Roman people to Vatinius, a country fellow, rather than to Marcus Cato, who was then the leading man? And do you, in the same way, believe that the mark which appears today in the flint at Regillus is, as it were, the print of a hoof from Castor’s horse?

omnes Iovem": quasi vero quisquam nostrum istum potius quam Capitolinum Iovem appellet, aut hoc perspicuum sit constetque inter omnes, eos esse deos quos tibi Velleius multique praeterea ne animantis quidem esse concedant. Grave etiam argumentum tibi videbatur, quod opinio de dis inmortalibus et omnium esset et cottidie cresceret: placet igitur tantas res opinione stultorum iudicari, vobis praesertim qui illos insanos esse dicatis? "At enim praesentis videmus deos, ut apud Regillum Postumius, in Salaria Vatinius"—nescio quid etiam de Locrorum apud Sagram proelio. quos igitur tu Tyndaridas appellabas id est homines homine natos, et quos Homerus, qui recens ab illorum aetate fuit, sepultos esse dicit Lacedaemone, eos tu cum cantheriis albis nullis calonibus obviam Vatinio venisse existimas et victoriam populi Romani Vatinio potius homini rustico quam M. Catoni qui tum erat princeps nuntiavisse? ergo et illud in silice quod hodie apparet apud Regillum tamquam vestigium ungulae Castoris equi credis esse?

Would you not rather believe what can be proved — that the souls of illustrious men, such as those Tyndaridae were, are divine and eternal — than that men once cremated could ride horses and fight in the line of battle? Or, if you say this could have happened, you ought to teach how, and not bring out old wives’ tales."

nonne mavis illud credere, quod probari potest, animos praeclarorum hominum, quales isti Tyndaridae fuerunt, divinos esse et aeternos, quam eos qui semel cremati essent equitare et in acie pugnare potuisse; aut si hoc fieri potuisse dicis, doceas oportet quo modo, nec fabellas aniles proferas.”

Then Lucilius said: "Do they seem to you mere tales? Do you not see the temple to Castor and Pollux dedicated in the Forum by Aulus Postumius, and the decree of the Senate concerning Vatinius? As for the Sagra, there is even a common proverb among the Greeks, who, when they affirm something, call it ’surer than the things at the Sagra.’ Ought you not, then, to be moved by such authorities?" Then Cotta said: "It is with rumors that you fight me, Balbus, while I ask reasons of you.... What follows is what is to come;

Tum Lucilius An tibi inquit fabellae videntur? nonne ab A. Postumio aedem Castori et Polluci in foro dedicatam, nonne senatus consultum de Vatinio vides? nam de Sagra Graecorum etiam est volgare proverbium, qui quae adfirmant certiora esse dicunt quam illa quae apud Sagram. his igitur auctoribus nonne debes moveri? Tum Cotta Rumoribus inquit “mecum pugnas Balbe, ego autem a te rationes requiro * * * * * secuntur quae futura sunt;

for no one can escape what is to be. And often it is not even useful to know what will be; for it is a wretched thing to be tormented to no purpose, and not to have even the last consolation common to all, namely hope — especially since you yourselves say that all things come about by fate, and that what has been true forever from all eternity is fate. What good is it, then, or what does it bring toward taking precaution, to know that something will be, when it certainly will be? And again — where does that divination of yours come from? Who discovered the cleft in a liver, who marked the cry of the crow, who the lots? In these I believe, and I cannot despise the staff of Attus Navius whom you brought up; but how these things came to be understood by the philosophers, that I must learn — especially since those diviners of yours lie about a great many matters.

effugere enim nemo id potest quod futurum est. saepe autem ne utile quidem est scire quid futurum sit; miserum est enim nihil proficientem angi nec habere ne spei quidem extremum et tamen commune solacium; praesertim cum vos idem fato fieri dicatis omnia, quod autem semper ex omni aeternitate verum fuerit id esse fatum: quid igitur iuvat aut quid adfert ad cavendum scire aliquid futurum, cum id certe futurum sit? Unde porro ista divinatio, quis invenit fissum iecoris, quis cornicis cantum notavit quis sortis? quibus ego credo, nec possum Atti Navi quem commemorabas lituum contemnere, sed qui ista intellecta sint a philosophis debeo discere, praesertim cum plurimis de rebus divini isti mentiantur.

’But physicians too’ — for so you were saying — ’are often deceived.’ What likeness is there between medicine, whose method I see, and divination, whose source I do not understand? You hold besides that the gods were appeased by the self-devotions of the Decii. What was their injustice so great that they could not be appeased toward the Roman people unless such men had perished? That was a general’s stratagem — what the Greeks call stratēgēma — but the stratagem of generals who took thought for their country and did not spare their own lives; for they reckoned that the army would follow a general who, spurring his horse, hurled himself against the enemy, and so it fell out. As for the voice of Faunus, I myself have never heard it; if you say that you have heard it, I will believe you, though I have no idea at all what a Faunus is. So far, then, Balbus, at least so far as it rests with you, I do not understand that the gods exist — gods whom I for my part believe to exist, but the Stoics teach me nothing.

"At medici quoque" (ita enim dicebas) "saepe falluntur". Quid simile medicina, cuius ego rationem video, et divinatio, quae unde oriatur non intellego? Tu autem etiam Deciorum devotionibus placatos deos esse censes. quae fuit eorum tanta iniquitas, ut placari populo Romano non possent nisi viri tales occidissent? consilium illud imperatorium fuit, quod Graeci strath/ghma appellant, sed eorum imperatorum qui patriae consulerent vitae non parcerent; rebantur enim fore ut exercitus imperatorem equo incitato se in hostem inmittentem persequeretur, id quod evenit. Nam Fauni vocem equidem numquam audivi; tibi, si audivisse te dicis, credam, etsi Faunus omnino quid sit nescio. Non igitur adhuc, quantum quidem in te est Balbe, intellego deos esse; quos equidem credo esse, sed nil docent Stoici.

For Cleanthes, as you were saying, holds that the notions of the gods are formed in the minds of men in four ways. The first is the one I have spoken of enough, the one taken from the foreknowledge of things to come; the second, from the disturbances of the weather and the other motions; the third, from the convenience and abundance of the things we enjoy; the fourth, from the order of the stars and the constancy of the heavens. Of foreknowledge we have spoken. Of disturbances in sky, sea, and earth we cannot say, when these occur, that there are not many who fear them and suppose them to be brought about by the immortal gods;

Nam Cleanthes ut dicebas quattuor modis informatas in animis hominum putat deorum esse notiones. unus is modus est de quo satis dixi, qui est susceptus ex praesensione rerum futurarum; alter ex perturbationibus tempestatum et reliquis motibus; tertius ex commoditate rerum quas percipimus et copia; quartus ex astrorum ordine caelique constantia. De praesensione diximus. De perturbationibus caelestibus et maritimis et terrenis non possumus dicere cum ea fiant non esse multos qui illa metuant et a dis inmortalibus fieri existument;

But that is not the question — whether there are some people who think the gods exist; the question is whether the gods exist or not. For the remaining grounds that Cleanthes brings forward — one of them concerning the abundance of advantages we receive, another concerning the ordering of the seasons and the constancy of the heavens — these I shall take up when we come to dispute about the providence of the gods, on which a great deal was said by you, Balbus;

sed non id quaeritur, sintne aliqui qui deos esse putent: di utrum sint necne sint quaeritur. Nam reliquae causae quas Cleanthes adfert, quarum una est de commodorum quae capimus copia, altera de temporum ordine caelique constantia, tum tractabuntur a nobis, cum disputabimus de providentia deorum, de qua plurima a te Balbe dicta sunt;

and to that same place I shall also defer the point you said Chrysippus made — that since there is something in the natural world which cannot be brought about by man, there exists something better than man — together with the comparisons you drew between the beauty of a fine house and the beauty of the world, and the case you made for the harmony and concord of the whole world. Zeno’s brief and rather clever syllogisms, too, I shall defer to that part of the discussion I have just named; and at that same time all those things you stated as a natural philosopher — about the fiery force and about that heat from which you said all things are generated — shall be examined in their proper place; and everything you said the day before yesterday, when you wished to prove the gods exist, as to why the whole world and the sun and the moon and the stars should possess sensation and mind, all of this I shall reserve for the same occasion.

eodemque illa etiam differemus, quod Chrysippum dicere aiebas, quoniam esset aliquid in rerum natura quod ab homine effici non posset, esse aliquid homine melius, quaeque in domo pulchra cum pulchritudine mundi comparabas, et cum totius mundi convenientiam consensumque adferebas; Zenonisque brevis et acutulas conclusiones in eam partem sermonis quam modo dixi differemus; eodemque tempore illa omnia quae a te physice dicta sunt de vi ignea deque eo calore ex quo omnia generari dicebas loco suo quaerentur; omniaque quae a te nudius tertius dicta sunt, cum docere velles deos esse, quare et mundus universus et sol et luna et stellae sensum ac mentem haberent, in idem tempus reservabo.

But of you, again and again, I shall ask this one same thing: by what reasonings do you persuade yourself that the gods exist?” Then Balbus said: For my part I think I have brought forward my reasonings; but you refute them in such a way that, just when you seem about to question me and I have made myself ready to answer, you suddenly turn your discourse aside and give me no room to reply. And so matters of the greatest weight have passed by in silence — divination, fate — questions on which you indeed speak only in passing, but on which our school is accustomed to say a great deal, though they are kept distinct from the very question now in hand. So, if you please, do not proceed in a confused manner, so that in this disputation we may unravel the thing that is in question. Excellent, said Cotta.

A te autem idem illud etiam atque etiam quaeram, quibus rationibus tibi persuadeas deos esse.” Tum Balbus: Equidem attulisse rationes mihi videor, sed eas tu ita refellis, ut, cum me interrogaturus esse videare et ego me ad respondendum compararim, repente avertas orationem nec des respondendi locum. itaque maximae res tacitae praeterierunt, de divinatione de fato, quibus de quaestionibus tu quidem strictim nostri autem multa solent dicere, sed ab hac ea quaestione quae nunc in manibus est separantur; quare si videtur noli agere confuse, ut hoc explicemus, hac disputatione quod quaeritur. Optime inquit Cotta.

“And so, since you divided the whole question into four parts, and we have spoken of the first, let us consider the second; which seemed to me to be of this kind — that, when you wished to show what sort of beings the gods are, you showed there are none at all. You said it was extremely difficult to draw the mind away from the habit of the eyes; yet, since nothing is more excellent than a god, you did not doubt that the world is a god, since there is nothing better than it in the natural world — if only we could conceive of it as a living being, or rather discern this with the mind, as we discern other things with the eyes.

’Itaque quoniam quattuor in partes totam quaestionem divisisti de primaque diximus, consideremus secundam; quae mihi talis videtur fuisse, ut, cum ostendere velles quales di essent, ostenderes nullos esse. A consuetudine oculorum animum abducere difficillimum dicebas, sed, cum deo nihil praestantius esset, non dubitabas quin mundus esset deus, quo nihil in rerum natura melius esset: modo possemus eum animantem cogitare vel potius ut cetera oculis sic animo hoc cernere.

But when you deny that anything is better than the world, what do you mean by better? If more beautiful, I agree; if better fitted to our advantages, that too I agree; but if you mean that nothing is wiser than the world, I do not in the least agree — not because it is difficult to call the mind away from the eyes, but because the more I call it away, the less I can grasp with the mind what you wish me to. “Nothing in the natural world is better than the world.” Not even on earth is anything better than our own city; do you therefore think that on that account reason, thought, and mind reside in the city? Or, since they do not, do you on that account judge that an ant must be set above this most beautiful city, on the ground that in a city there is no sensation, while in an ant there is not only sensation but mind, reason, and memory? You ought to see, Balbus, what is granted to you, and not yourself assume what you would like.

Sed cum mundo negas quicquam esse melius, quid dicis melius? si pulchrius, adsentior; si aptius ad utilitates nostras, id quoque adsentior; sin autem id dicis, nihil esse mundo sapientius, nullo modo prorsus adsentior, non quod difficile sit mentem ab oculis sevocare, sed quo magis sevoco eo minus id quod tu vis possum mente comprendere. "Nihil est mundo melius in rerum natura." Ne in terris quidem urbe nostra; num igitur idcirco in urbe esse rationem cogitationem mentem putas, aut, quoniam non sit, num idcirco existimas formicam anteponendam esse huic pulcherrumae urbi, quod in urbe sensus sit nullus, in formica non modo sensus sed etiam mens ratio memoria? videre oportet Balbe quid tibi concedatur, non te ipsum quod velis sumere.

For that whole position was opened out by that old, brief, and — as it seemed to you — clever syllogism of Zeno’s. For Zeno argues thus: “That which uses reason is better than that which does not use reason; but nothing is better than the world;

Istum enim locum totum illa vetus Zenonis brevis et ut tibi videbatur acuta conclusio dilatavit *. Zeno enim ita concludit: "Quod ratione utitur id melius est quam id quod ratione non utitur; nihil autem mundo melius;

therefore the world uses reason.” If this is acceptable, you will soon make the world appear to read a book superbly; for following in Zeno’s footsteps you will be able to draw your conclusion in this fashion: “That which is lettered is better than that which is not lettered; but nothing is better than the world; therefore the world is lettered” — and in that manner the world is also eloquent, and indeed a mathematician, a musician, finally trained in every branch of learning, and at last a philosopher. You said often that nothing comes to be without a god, and that there is no power in nature able to fashion things unlike itself: shall I grant that the world is not only living and wise but also a lyre-player and a trumpeter, since men of those arts too are brought forth from it? Then that father of the Stoics offers nothing to make us think the world uses reason, nor even that it is a living being. The world, therefore, is not a god; and yet there is nothing better than it: for there is nothing more beautiful than it, nothing more wholesome to us, nothing more adorned to look upon or more constant in its motion. But if the world as a whole is not a god, neither are the stars, which you placed, beyond counting, in the number of the gods. Their even and eternal courses delighted you — and by Hercules, not without cause, for they move with an admirable and incredible constancy.

ratione igitur mundus utitur". Hoc si placet, iam efficies ut mundus optime librum legere videatur; Zenonis enim vestigiis hoc modo rationem poteris concludere: "quod litteratum est id est melius quam quod non est litteratum; nihil autem mundo melius; litteratus igitur est mundus"—isto modo etiam disertus et quidem mathematicus musicus, omni denique doctrina eruditus, postremo philosophus. Saepe dixisti nihil fieri sine deo, nec ullam vim esse naturae ut sui dissimilia posset effingere: concedam non modo animantem et sapientem esse mundum sed fidicinem etiam et tubicinem, quoniam earum quoque artium homines ex eo procreantur? Nihil igitur adfert pater iste Stoicorum quare mundum ratione uti putemus, ne cur animantem quidem esse. non est igitur mundus deus; et tamen nihil est eo melius: nihil est enim eo pulchrius nihil salutarius nobis, nihil ornatius aspectu motuque constantius. Quod si mundus universus non est deus, ne stellae quidem, quas tu innumerabilis in deorum numero reponebas. quarum te cursus aequabiles aeternique delectabant, nec mehercule iniuria, sunt enim admirabili incredibilique constantia.

But not all things, Balbus, that have fixed and constant courses are to be ascribed to a god rather than to nature. What do you suppose can be more constant than the Chalcidian Euripus in its repeated ebb and flow back and forth? Than the Sicilian strait? Than the seething of the Ocean in those regions, “where the ravening wave divides Europe from Libya”? Are not the sea-tides, whether of Spain or of Britain, with their advances and retreats at fixed times, able to come about without a god? Consider, I beg you: if we call divine all motion and all things that keep their order at fixed times, must we not say that tertian and quartan fevers too are divine — for what can be more constant than their recurrence and movement? But of all such things an account must be rendered;

sed non omnia Balbe quae cursus certos et constantis habent ea deo potius tribuenda sunt quam naturae. quid Chalcidico Euripo in motu identidem reciprocando putas fieri posse constantius, quid freto Siciliensi, quid Oceani fervore illis in locis, "Europam Libyamque rapax ubi dividit unda"? quid aestus maritimi vel Hispanienses vel Brittannici eorumque certis temporibus vel accessus vel recessus sine deo fieri nonne possunt? vide quaeso, si omnis motus omniaque quae certis temporibus ordinem suum conservant divina dicimus, ne tertianas quoque febres et quartanas divinas esse dicendum sit, quarum reversione et motu quid potest esse constantius. sed omnium talium rerum ratio reddenda est;

and when you cannot do this, you flee to a god as though to an altar. And Chrysippus seemed to you to speak shrewdly — a man without doubt versatile and shrewd (I call those versatile whose mind turns quickly, and those shrewd whose mind has grown hardened by use, as a hand grows hardened by work); so he says: “If there is something that man cannot bring about, then whatever brings it about is better than man; but man cannot bring about the things that are in the world; therefore whoever was able to do so surpasses man; but who could surpass man except a god? Therefore a god exists.” All of this turns upon the same error as that argument of Zeno’s.

quod vos cum facere non potestis, tamquam in aram confugitis ad deum. Et Chrysippus tibi acute dicere videbatur, homo sine dubio versutus et callidus (versutos eos appello quorum celeriter mens versatur, callidos autem quorum tamquam manus opere sic animus usu concalluit); is igitur "Si aliquid est" inquit "quod homo efficere non possit, qui id efficit melior est homine; homo autem haec quae in mundo sunt efficere non potest; qui potuit igitur is praestat homini; homini autem praestare quis possit nisi deus; est igitur deus". Haec omnia in eodem quo illa Zenonis errore versantur.

For what is better, what is more excellent, what is the difference between nature and reason — none of this is distinguished. And the same man, if the gods do not exist, denies that there is anything in all of nature better than man; yet for any human being to think that nothing is better than man he judges to be the height of arrogance. Let it be the mark of an arrogant man to think more of himself than of the world; but to understand that he himself has sensation and reason, while Orion and the Dog-Star do not — that is the mark not of an arrogant man but rather of a prudent one. And “If a house is beautiful,” he says, “let us understand it was built for its masters and not for mice; so, then, we ought to judge the world to be the house of the gods.” I would judge precisely so, if I thought it built, and not — as I shall show — shaped by nature.

quid enim sit melius quid praestabilius, quid inter naturam et rationem intersit, non distinguitur. Idemque, si dei non sint, negat esse in omni natura quicquam homine melius; id autem putare quemquam hominem, nihil homine esse melius, summae adrogantiae censet esse. Sit sane adrogantis pluris se putare quam mundum; at illud non modo non adrogantis sed potius prudentis, intellegere se habere sensum et rationem, haec eadem Orionem et Caniculam non habere. Et "Si domus pulchra sit, intellegamus eam dominis" inquit "aedificatam esse non muribus; sic igitur mundum deorum domum existimare debemus". Ita prorsus existimarem, si illum aedificatum, non quem ad modum docebo a natura conformatum putarem.

But, says he, Socrates in Xenophon asks where we should have caught up our soul if there were none in the world. And I ask where we caught up speech, where numbers, where song — unless indeed we suppose the sun talks with the moon when it has drawn nearer, or that the world sings in harmony, as Pythagoras believes. These things, Balbus, belong to nature — nature that walks not artfully, as Zeno says (and we shall presently see just what that claim amounts to), but that sets all things in motion and stirs them by its own movements and changes.

At enim quaerit apud Xenophontem Socrates unde animum arripuerimus si nullus fuerit in mundo. Et ego quaero unde orationem unde numeros unde cantus; nisi vero loqui solem cum luna putamus cum propius accesserit, aut ad harmoniam canere mundum ut Pythagoras existimat. Naturae ista sunt Balbe, naturae non artificiose ambulantis ut ait Zeno, quod quidem quale sit iam videbimus, sed omnia cientis et agitantis motibus et mutationibus suis.

And so that discourse of yours about the harmony and concord of nature pleased me — nature which you said breathes together, as if held continuous by a kind of kinship; but what I did not approve was your denial that this could come about unless nature were held together by one divine breath. In fact it coheres and endures by the powers of nature, not of the gods, and there is in it that kind of concord which the Greeks call sympatheian; but the more it arises of its own accord, the less it is to be thought to come about by divine reason.

Itaque illa mihi placebat oratio de convenientia consensuque naturae, quam quasi cognatione continuatam conspirare dicebas, illud non probabam, quod negabas id accidere potuisse nisi ea uno divino spiritu contineretur. illa vero cohaeret et permanet naturae viribus non deorum, estque in ea iste quasi consensus, quam sunpa/qeian Graeci vocant; sed ea quo sua sponte maior est eo minus divina ratione fieri existimanda est.

And those arguments which Carneades used to bring forward — how do you dissolve them? If no body is immortal, no body is everlasting; but no body is immortal, not even an indivisible one, nor one that cannot be sundered and torn apart; and since every animate being has a nature capable of being acted upon, there is none of them that escapes the necessity of receiving something from outside — that is, as it were, of bearing and suffering it; and if every animate being is of this kind, none is immortal. So likewise, if every animate being can be cut and divided, none of them is indivisible, none eternal; but every animate being is constituted to receive and bear an external force; therefore every animate being must of necessity be mortal, dissoluble, and divisible.

Illa autem, quae Carneades adferebat, quem ad modum dissolvitis: si nullum corpus inmortale sit, nullum esse corpus sempiternum: corpus autem inmortale nullum esse, ne individuum quidem nec quod dirimi distrahive non possit; cumque omne animal patibilem naturam habeat, nullum est eorum quod effugiat accipiendi aliquid extrinsecus id est quasi ferendi et patiendi necessitatem, et si omne animal tale est inmortale nullum est. Ergo itidem, si omne animal secari ac dividi potest, nullum est eorum individuum nullum aeternum; atqui omne animal ad accipiendam vim externam et ferundam paratum est; mortale igitur omne animal et dissolubile et dividuum sit necesse est.

For just as, if all wax were changeable, there would be nothing waxen that could not be changed, and likewise nothing silver, nothing bronze, if the nature of silver and bronze were changeable — so, in like manner, if all the things that exist, out of which all things are composed, are changeable, then there can be no body that is not changeable; but those things out of which all things are composed are changeable, as it seems to you; therefore every body is changeable. But if there were any immortal body, not every body would be changeable; and so it follows that every body is mortal. For every body is either water or air or fire or earth, or that which is compounded out of these, or out of some part of them.

Ut enim, si omnis cera commutabilis esset, nihil esset cereum quod commutari non posset, item nihil argenteum nihil aeneum, si commutabilis esset, natura argenti et aeris—similiter igitur, si omnia quae sunt * * e quibus cuncta constant mutabilia sunt, nullum corpus esse potest non mutabile; mutabilia autem sunt illa ex quibus omnia constant, ut vobis videtur; omne igitur corpus mutabile est. at si esset corpus aliquod immortale, non esset omne mutabile; ita efficitur ut omne corpus mortale sit. Etenim omne corpus aut aqua aut aer aut ignis aut terra est aut id quod est concretum ex is aut ex aliqua parte eorum.

But there is none of these that does not perish; for everything earthen is divided, and moisture is so soft that it can easily be pressed and crushed together; fire indeed and air are most easily driven off by any blow, and are by nature most yielding and most readily dispersed. And besides, all these perish whenever they are turned into another nature, which happens when earth turns itself into water, and when from water air arises, and from air aether, and when these same elements in their turn travel back again. But if it is so, that those things perish out of which every animate being is composed, then no animate being is everlasting.

horum autem nihil est quin intereat; nam et terrenum omne dividitur, et umor ita mollis est ut facile premi conlidique possit; ignis vero et aer omni pulsu facillime pellitur naturaque cedens est maxime et dissupabilis. praetereaque omnia haec tum intereunt cum in naturam aliam convertuntur, quod fit cum terra in aquam se vertit et cum ex aqua oritur aer ex aere aether, cumque eadem vicissim retro commeant. quod si ita est, ut ea intereant e quibus constet omne animal, nullum est animal sempiternum.

And even if we leave all this aside, still no animate being can be found that was never born at any time and will always exist in the future. For every animate being has sensation; it senses, therefore, things hot and cold, sweet and bitter, nor can it through any sense receive what is pleasant and not receive the contrary; if, then, it takes in the sensation of pleasure, it takes in that of pain as well; but whatever receives pain must of necessity also receive destruction; therefore every animate being must be admitted to be mortal. Besides, if there is anything that feels neither pleasure nor pain, that thing cannot be an animate being;

Et ut haec omittamus, tamen animal nullum inveniri potest quod neque natum umquam sit et semper sit futurum. omne enim animal sensus habet; sentit igitur et calida et frigida et dulcia et amara nec potest ullo sensu iucunda accipere non accipere contraria; si igitur voluptatis sensum capit, doloris etiam capit; quod autem dolorem accipit id accipiat etiam interitum necesse est; omne igitur animal confitendum est esse mortale. Praeterea, si quid est quod nec voluptatem sentiat nec dolorem, id animal esse non potest;

But if, on the other hand, because a thing is a living creature it must therefore have sensation, then because it has sensation it cannot be eternal; and every living creature has sensation; no living creature, therefore, is eternal. Besides, there can be no living creature in which there is not both a natural appetite and a natural aversion. Now the things that are sought are those that accord with nature, the things that are avoided are their opposites; and every living creature seeks certain things and flees from certain others, and what it flees from is contrary to its nature, and what is contrary to its nature has the power to destroy it. Every living creature, therefore, must of necessity perish.

sin autem quod animal est, id illa necesse est sentiat, et quod ea sentiat non potest esse aeternum; et omne animal sentit; nullum igitur animal aeternum est. Praeterea nullum potest esse animal in quo non et adpetitio sit et declinatio naturalis. adpetuntur autem quae secundum naturam sunt, declinantur contraria; et omne animal adpetit quaedam et fugit a quibusdam, quod autem refugit id contra naturam est, et quod est contra naturam id habet vim interemendi. omne ergo animal intereat necesse est.

The grounds are innumerable from which it can be established and forced upon us that nothing which possesses sensation is exempt from perishing. For those very things that are felt — cold, heat, pleasure, pain, and the rest — destroy when they are intensified; and no living creature is without sensation; no living creature, therefore, is eternal. And indeed, the nature of a living thing is either simple — earthy, say, or fiery, or airy, or watery, what such a thing would be cannot even be conceived — or else compounded of several natures, of which each has its own place toward which it is borne by natural force, one to the lowest, another to the highest, another to the middle. These can cohere for a certain span of time, but in no way can they cohere forever; for each must of necessity be swept by nature into its own place. No living creature, therefore, is everlasting.

Innumerabilia sunt ex quibus effici cogique possit nihil esse quod sensum habeat quin id intereat; etenim ea ipsa quae sentiuntur, ut frigus ut calor ut voluptas ut dolor ut cetera, cum amplificata sunt interimunt; nec ullum animal est sine sensu; nullum igitur animal aeternum est. Etenim aut simplex est natura animantis, ut vel terrena sit vel ignea vel animalis vel umida, quod quale sit ne intellegi quidem potest, aut concretum ex pluribus naturis, quarum suum quaeque locum habeat quo naturae vi feratur, alia infimum alia summum alia medium. haec ad quoddam tempus cohaerere possunt, semper autem nullo modo possunt; necesse est enim in suum quaeque locum natura rapiatur. nullum igitur animal est sempiternum.

But your school, Balbus, is in the habit of referring everything to the power of fire — following Heraclitus, I suppose, whom not everyone interprets in one and the same way; since what he meant he was unwilling to have understood, let us pass him over. You, however, put it thus: that all force is fire, and accordingly that living things too perish when their heat has failed, and that throughout the whole of nature the thing that lives and the thing that thrives is the thing that is warm. I, for my part, do not understand how bodies perish when their heat is extinguished but do not perish with the loss of moisture or breath — especially since they perish from excessive heat as well.

Sed omnia vestri Balbe solent ad igneam vim referre Heraclitum ut opinor sequentes, quem ipsum non omnes interpretantur uno modo, †quoniam quid diceret quod intellegi noluit† omittamus; vos autem ita dicitis, omnem vim esse ignem, itaque et animantis cum calor defecerit tum interire, et in omni natura rerum id vivere id vigere quod caleat. Ego autem non intellego quo modo calore extincto corpora intereant, non intereant umore aut spiritu amisso, praesertim cum intereant etiam nimio calore.

On that score, then, the point about the warm is held in common; but let us nonetheless see where it comes out. You hold, I believe, that there is no living thing outside in nature and in the universe except fire: why fire any more than breath, of which the very mind of living things is composed, from which the word "living" is derived? But how do you take it as a thing all but conceded that the mind is nothing but fire? For it seems more probable that the mind is something of this kind: a tempering of fire with breath. "But if fire by itself is a living creature, with no other nature mingled in, then since it, when it is present in our bodies, makes us capable of sensation, it cannot itself be without sensation." Again the same things can be said: for whatever it is that possesses sensation must of necessity feel both pleasure and pain, and the thing to which pain comes also comes to destruction. So it turns out that you cannot make even fire eternal.

quam ob rem id quidem commune est de calido; verum tamen videamus exitum. ita voltis opinor, nihil esse animal extrinsecus in natura atque mundo praeter ignem: qui magis quam praeter animam, unde animantium quoque constet animus, ex quo animal dicitur? quo modo autem hoc quasi concedatur sumitis, nihil esse animum nisi ignem; probabilius enim videtur tale quiddam esse animum, ut sit ex igni atque anima temperatum. "Quod si ignis ex sese ipse animal est nulla se alia admiscente natura, quoniam is, cum inest in corporibus nostris, efficit ut sentiamus, non potest ipse esse sine sensu." Rursus eadem dici possunt: quidquid est enim quod sensum habeat, id necesse est sentiat et voluptatem et dolorem, ad quem autem dolor veniat ad eundem etiam interitum venire. ita fit ut ne ignem quidem efficere possitis aeternum.

Why, is it not the view of your very own school that all fire needs nourishment and can in no way endure unless it is fed, and that the sun, the moon, and the rest of the stars are fed by waters, some by fresh and some by the sea’s? And Cleanthes adduces this as the reason why the sun turns back and goes no farther than the summer circle and likewise the winter one: so that it should not stray too far from its food. What this whole notion amounts to we shall see shortly; for now let this be the conclusion: that what can perish is not eternal by nature; that fire will perish unless it is fed; that fire, therefore, is not by nature everlasting.

Quid enim, non eisdem vobis placet omnem ignem pastus indigere nec permanere ullo modo posse nisi alatur, ali autem solem lunam reliqua astra aquis, alia dulcibus alia marinis; eamque causam Cleanthes adfert cur se sol referat nec longius progrediatur solstitiali orbi itemque brumali, ne longius discedat a cibo. Hoc totum quale sit mox; nunc autem concludatur illud: quod interire possit id aeternum non esse natura; ignem autem interiturum esse nisi alatur; non esse igitur natura ignem sempiternum.

And what sort of god can we conceive who is endowed with no virtue? Why, shall we attribute prudence to a god — prudence, which consists in the knowledge of things good and bad and neither good nor bad? To one who has, and can have, no evil, what need is there of choosing between good and bad, what need of reason, what of intelligence — which we use to attain the obscure by means of the plain? But to a god nothing can be obscure. As for justice, which assigns to each his own, what has it to do with the gods? For it is the fellowship and community of men, as you yourselves say, that begot justice. And temperance consists in foregoing the pleasures of the body: if there is room in heaven for temperance, there is room for pleasures too. For how can a god be conceived as brave — in pain, or in toil, or in danger?

Qualem autem deum intellegere nos possumus nulla virtute praeditum? Quid enim, prudentiamne deo tribuemus, quae constat ex scientia rerum bonarum et malarum et nec bonarum nec malarum? cui mali nihil est nec esse potest, quid huic opus est dilectu bonorum et malorum, quid autem ratione quid intellegentia: quibus utimur ad eam rem ut apertis obscura adsequamur; at opscurum deo nihil potest esse. Nam iustitia, quae suum cuique distribuit, quid pertinet ad deos; hominum enim societas et communitas, ut vos dicitis, iustitiam procreavit. Temperantia autem constat ex praetermittendis voluptatibus corporis: cui si locus in caelo est, est etiam voluptatibus. Nam fortis deus intellegi qui potest, in dolore an in labore an in periculo:

None of which touches a god. How, then, can we conceive a god who neither employs reason nor is endowed with any virtue? And indeed I cannot despise the ignorance of the common crowd and the unlearned when I consider what is said by the Stoics. For those are the beliefs of the ignorant: the Syrians venerate a fish, the Egyptians have consecrated nearly every kind of beast; and in Greece, again, they have many gods who were once men — Alabandus at Alabanda, Tenes at Tenedos, Leucothea, who was once Ino, and her son Palaemon throughout all Greece — and Hercules, Aesculapius, the sons of Tyndareus, our own Romulus, and a good many others besides, whom they suppose to have been received into heaven as new and enrolled citizens, so to speak.

quorum deum nihil attingit. Nec ratione igitur utentem nec virtute ulla praeditum deum intellegere qui possumus? Nec vero volgi atque imperitorum inscitiam despicere possum, cum ea considero quae dicuntur a Stoicis. sunt enim illa imperitorum: piscem Syri venerantur, omne fere genus bestiarum Aegyptii consecraverunt; iam vero in Graecia multos habent ex hominibus deos, Alabandum Alabandis, Tenedi Tenen, Leucotheam quae fuit Ino et eius Palaemonem filium cuncta Graecia— Herculem Aesculapium Tyndaridas Romulum nostrum aliosque compluris, quos quasi novos et adscripticios cives in caelum receptos putant.

So much, then, for the unlearned; what of you philosophers, who do better? I pass over those finer doctrines, for they are splendid: let the world itself, by all means, be a god. This, I take it, is what is meant by "that radiance on high, whom all men invoke as Jove." Why, then, do we add more gods? And how great is their multitude — to me, at any rate, they seem quite many; for you count the single stars as gods and call them either by the names of beasts, like the Goat, the Scorpion, the Bull, the Lion, or by the names of inanimate things, like the Argo, the Altar, the Crown.

Haec igitur indocti; quid vos philosophi, qui meliora? Omitto illa, sunt enim praeclara: sit sane deus ipse mundus. hoc credo illud esse "sublime candens, quem invocant omnes Iovem". Quare igitur pluris adiungimus deos? quanta autem est eorum multitudo: mihi quidem sane multi videntur; singulas enim stellas numeras deos eosque aut beluarum nomine appellas, ut Capram ut Nepam ut Taurum ut Leonem, aut rerum inanimarum, ut Argo ut Aram ut Coronam.

But even granting these, how on earth can the rest not merely be granted but understood at all? When we call grain Ceres and wine Liber, we are using a customary turn of speech; but do you suppose anyone so out of his mind as to believe that the thing he eats is a god? As for those whom you say have passed from being men to being gods, you will render an account of how that could have come about, or why it has ceased to come about, and I shall be glad to learn; for as the case now stands, I do not see how the man for whom "torches were brought to Mount Oeta," as Accius says, passed from that blaze "into the eternal house of his father." Yet Homer has him met among the dead by Ulysses, just like the others who had departed from life.

Sed ut haec concedantur, reliqua qui tandem non modo concedi sed omnino intellegi possunt? Cum fruges Cererem vinum Liberum dicimus, genere nos quidem sermonis utimur usitato, sed ecquem tam amentem esse putas qui illud quo vescatur deum credat esse? Nam quos ab hominibus pervenisse dicis ad deos, tu reddes rationem quem ad modum id fieri potuerit aut cur fieri desierit, et ego discam libenter; quo modo nunc quidem est, non video quo pacto ille, cui "in monte Oetaeo inlatae lampades" fuerint ut ait Accius, "in domum aeternam patris" ex illo ardore pervenerit; quem tamen Homerus apud inferos conveniri facit ab Ulixe sicut ceteros qui excesserant vita.

Though indeed which Hercules above all we ought to worship I should very much like to know; for those who probe the deeper and more recondite writings hand down to us several. The most ancient was born of Jove — but of Jove the most ancient as well, for in the old writings of the Greeks we find several Joves too: of him, then, and of Lysithoe is that Hercules whom we are told contended with Apollo over the tripod. A second is handed down as Egyptian, born of the Nile, who they say composed the Phrygian letters. A third is from the Idaean Dactyls, to whom they bring funeral offerings. A fourth is the son of Jove and of Asteria, sister of Latona; he is worshipped above all at Tyre, and they hold Carthage to be his daughter. A fifth is in India, who is called Belus. A sixth is this one, born of Alcmena, whom Jupiter begot — but the third Jupiter, since, as I shall presently show, we have received several Joves as well.

Quamquam quem potissimum Herculem colamus scire sane velim; pluris enim tradunt nobis i qui interiores scrutantur et reconditas litteras, antiquissimum Iove natum—sed item Iove antiquissimo, nam Ioves quoque pluris in priscis Graecorum litteris invenimus: ex eo igitur et Lysithoe est is Hercules quem concertavisse cum Apolline de tripode accepimus. alter traditur Nilo natus Aegyptius, quem aiunt Phrygias litteras conscripsisse. tertius est ex Idaeis Digitis, cui inferias adferunt †cui. quartus Iovis est et Asteriae Latonae sororis, qui Tyri maxime colitur, cuius Carthaginem filiam ferunt, quintus in India qui Belus dicitur, sextus hic ex Alcmena quem Iuppiter genuit, sed tertius Iuppiter, quoniam ut iam docebo pluris Ioves etiam accepimus.

Now that the discourse has brought me to this point, I shall show that I have learned better things about worshipping the immortal gods by pontifical law and the custom of our ancestors — from these little sacrificial bowls that Numa left us, of which Laelius speaks in that golden little oration of his — than from the reasonings of the Stoics. For if I follow you, tell me what I am to answer the man who questions me thus: "If there are gods, are the Nymphs goddesses too? If the Nymphs, then the little Pans and the Satyrs as well; but these are not gods; the Nymphs, then, are not goddesses either. Yet their temples have been publicly vowed and dedicated. Then neither are the rest gods, whose temples have been dedicated. Go further: you count Jupiter and Neptune as gods; therefore Orcus, their brother, is also a god, and those who are said to flow in the underworld — Acheron, Cocytus, Pyriphlegethon — and then Charon and then Cerberus must be reckoned gods.

Quando enim me in hunc locum deduxit oratio, docebo meliora me didicisse de colendis diis inmortalibus iure pontificio et more maiorum capedunculis his, quas Numa nobis reliquit, de quibus in illa aureola oratiuncula dicit Laelius, quam rationibus Stoicorum. Si enim vos sequar, dic quid ei respondeam qui me sic roget: "Si di sunt * *, suntne etiam Nymphae deae? si Nymphae, Panisci etiam et Satyri; hi autem non sunt; ne Nymphae deae quidem igitur. at earum templa sunt publice vota et dedicata. ne ceteri quidem ergo di, quorum templa sunt dedicata. Age porro: Iovem et Neptunum deum numeras; ergo etiam Orcus frater eorum deus, et illi qui fluere apud inferos dicuntur, Acheron Cocytus Pyriphlegethon, tum Charon tum Cerberus di putandi.

But that, surely, must be rejected; then Orcus is no god either; what, then, do you say about his brothers?" This was what Carneades used to say — not in order to do away with the gods, for what could be less becoming to a philosopher, but to convince the Stoics that they explain nothing about the gods. And so he pressed on: "For tell me," he said, "if these brothers are in the number of the gods, surely it cannot be denied of their father Saturn, whom the common people worship above all in the West? And if he is a god, it must be acknowledged that his father Caelus is a god too. And if that is so, then the parents of Caelus must also be held to be gods, Aether and Dies, and their brothers and sisters, who are named thus by the ancient genealogists: Love, Guile, Toil, Envy, Fate, Old Age, Death, Darkness, Misery, Lamentation, Favor, Fraud, Stubbornness, the Fates, the Hesperides, Dreams — all of whom they say were born of Erebus and Night. Either, then, these monstrosities must be approved, or those first gods must be done away with.

at id quidem repudiandum; ne Orcus quidem igitur; quid dicitis ergo de fratribus?" Haec Carneades aiebat, non ut deos tolleret (quid enim philosopho minus conveniens), sed ut Stoicos nihil de dis explicare convinceret; itaque insequebatur: "Quid enim" aiebat, "si hi fratres sunt in numero deorum, num de patre eorum Saturno negari potest, quem volgo maxime colunt ad occidentem? qui si est deus, patrem quoque eius Caelum esse deum confitendum est. quod si ita est, Caeli quoque parentes dii habendi sunt Aether et Dies eorumque fratres et sorores, qui a genealogis antiquis sic nominantur, Amor Dolus †modus Labor Invidentia Fatum Senectus Mors Tenebrae Miseria Querella Gratia Fraus Pertinacia Parcae Hesperides Somnia; quos omnis Erebo et Nocte natos ferunt. aut igitur haec monstra probanda sunt aut prima illa tollenda.

Will you say that Apollo, Vulcan, Mercury, and the rest are gods, yet hesitate about Hercules, Aesculapius, Liber, Castor, Pollux? But these are worshipped just as much as the others — among some peoples, indeed, far more. These, then, must be held to be gods, though born of mortal mothers. What of Aristaeus, who is said to be the discoverer of the olive, son of Apollo; Theseus, son of Neptune; the rest whose fathers are gods — will they not be in the number of the gods? And what of those whose mothers are goddesses? More so, I think; for just as under civil law a man whose mother is free is free, so by the law of nature one who has a goddess for a mother must be a god. And so the islanders of Astypalaea worship Achilles most devoutly; and if he is a god, then Orpheus and Rhesus are gods too, born of a Muse for their mother — unless perhaps marriages of the sea are to be preferred to those of the land. If these are not gods because they are nowhere worshipped, how are the others gods?

" Quid Apollinem Volcanum Mercurium ceteros deos esse dices, de Hercule Aesculapio Libero Castore Polluce dubitabis? at hi quidem coluntur aeque atque illi, apud quosdam etiam multo magis. ergo hi dei sunt habendi mortalibus nati matribus. Quid Aristaeus qui olivae dicitur inventor Apollinis filius, Theseus qui Neptuni, reliqui quorum patres di, non erunt in deorum numero? quid quorum matres? opinor etiam magis; ut enim in iure civili qui est matre libera liber est, item iure naturae qui dea matre est deus sit necesse est. itaque Achillem Astypalenses insulani sanctissume colunt; qui si deus est, et Orpheus et Rhesus di sunt Musa matre nati; nisi forte maritumae nuptiae terrenis anteponuntur. si hi di non sunt, quia nusquam coluntur, quo modo illi sunt?

Consider, then, whether these honors are paid to the virtues of men and not to their immortality — which you too, Balbus, seemed to be saying. But how can you, if you think Latona a goddess, refuse to think Hecate one, who is the daughter of Asteria, Latona’s sister? Is she too, then, a goddess? For we have seen her altars and shrines in Greece. And if she is a goddess, why not the Eumenides? And if these are goddesses — whose sanctuary there is at Athens, and among us, as I interpret it, the grove of Furina — then the Furies are goddesses, watchers, I suppose, and avengers of crime and wickedness.

vide igitur ne virtutibus hominum isti honores habeantur non immortalitatibus; quod tu quoque Balbe visus es dicere. Quo modo autem potes, si Latonam deam putas, Hecatam non putare, quae matre Asteria est sorore Latonae? an haec quoque dea est; vidimus enim eius aras delubraque in Graecia. sin haec dea est, cur non Eumenides? quae si deae sunt, quarum et Athenis fanumst et apud nos ut ego interpretor lucus Furinae, Furiae deae sunt, speculatrices credo et vindices facinorum et sceleris.

But if the gods are of such a kind that they take part in human affairs, then Natio too must be held a goddess, to whom we are accustomed to perform divine rites when we go round the shrines in the territory of Ardea; she is named Natio because she watches over the childbearing of matrons, from those being born. If she is a goddess, then all those gods you were enumerating are gods — Honor, Faith, Mind, Concord — and so too Hope, Moneta, and everything we can fashion for ourselves in thought. But if that is not plausible, then neither is the source from which these flowed. And what do you say to this: if those whom we worship and have received are gods, why do we not reckon Serapis and Isis in the same class? And if we do that, why should we reject the gods of the barbarians? Oxen, then, and horses, ibises, hawks, asps, crocodiles, fish, dogs, wolves, cats, and many beasts besides we shall put back into the number of the gods. But if we reject these, we shall also reject those from which they sprang.

Quod si tales dei sunt ut rebus humanis intersint, Natio quoque dea putanda est, cui cum fana circumimus in agro Ardeati rem divinam facere solemus; quae quia partus matronarum tueatur a nascentibus Natio nominata est. ea si dea est, di omnes illi qui commemorabantur a te, Honos Fides Mens Concordia, ergo etiam Spes Moneta omniaque quae cogitatione nobismet ipsis possumus fingere. quod si veri simile non est, ne illud quidem est haec unde fluxerunt. Quid autem dicis, si di sunt illi quos colimus et accepimus, cur non eodem in genere Serapim Isimque numeremus? quod si facimus, cur barbarorum deos repudiemus? boves igitur et equos, ibis accipitres, aspidas crocodilos pisces, canes lupos faelis, multas praeterea beluas in deorum numerum reponemus. quae si reiciamus, illa quoque unde haec nata sunt reiciemus.

What next — shall Ino be reckoned a goddess, and be called Leucothea by the Greeks and Matuta by us, when she is the daughter of Cadmus, while Circe and Pasiphae and Aeetes, born of Perseis the daughter of Ocean and fathered by the Sun, shall not be held in the number of the gods? And yet Circe too is religiously worshipped by our colonists at Circeii. So you reckon her a goddess: what will you answer about Medea, who was born of two gods for grandfathers, the Sun and Ocean, with Aeetes for her father and Idyia for her mother? What about her brother Absyrtus — who in Pacuvius is Aegialeus, but the other name is the more usual in the writings of the ancients? If these are not gods, I fear for the standing of Ino; for all these flowed from the very same spring.

Quid deinde, Ino dea ducetur et *leukoqe/a a Graecis a nobis Matuta dicetur, cum sit Cadmi filia, Circe autem et Pasiphae et Aeeta e Perseide Oceani filia natae patre Sole in deorum numero non habebuntur? quamquam Circen quoque coloni nostri Cercienses religiose colunt. ergo hanc deam ducis: quid Medeae respondebis, quae duobus dis avis Sole et Oceano Aeeta patre matre Idyia procreata est, quid huius Absyrtio fratri (qui est apud Pacuvium Aegialeus, sed illud nomen veterum litteris usitatius)? qui si di non sunt, vereor quid agat Ino; haec enim omnia ex eodem fonte fluxerunt.

Will Amphiaraus and Trophonius, then, be gods? Our own tax-farmers, when lands in Boeotia that had been exempted by censorial law as belonging to the immortal gods came into question, denied that any beings were immortal who had once been men. But if these are gods, then surely Erechtheus is one too, whose shrine and whose priest I have myself seen at Athens. And if we make him a god, what doubt can we have about Codrus, or about all the others who fell fighting for their country’s freedom? But if that is not credible, then neither are the earlier premises from which these consequences flow to be accepted.

An Amphiaraus erit deus et Trophonius? nostri quidem publicani, cum essent agri in Boeotia deorum inmortalium excepti lege censoria, negabant immortalis esse ullos qui aliquando homines fuissent. sed si sunt i di, est certe Erectheus, cuius Athenis et delubrum vidimus et sacerdotem. quem si deum facimus, quid aut de Codro dubitare possumus aut de ceteris qui pugnantes pro patriae libertate ceciderunt? quod si probabile non est, ne illa quidem superiora unde haec manant probanda sunt.

And in most communities it can be seen that, for the sake of fostering virtue — so that every man of the best sort might face danger more willingly for the commonwealth’s sake — the memory of brave men was consecrated with the honor due to the immortal gods. It is for that very reason that Erechtheus at Athens and his daughters are counted among the gods; and likewise there is a shrine at Athens called the Leokorion. The people of Alabanda, indeed, worship Alabandus, the founder of their city, more devoutly than any of the renowned gods; and it was among them that Stratonicus made one of his many witty remarks, when a certain tiresome fellow kept insisting to him that Alabandus was a god and Hercules was not. "Very well, then," he said,

Atque in plerisque civitatibus intellegi potest augendae virtutis gratia, quo libentius rei publicae causa periculum adiret optimus quisque, virorum fortium memoriam honore deorum immortalium consecratam. ob eam enim ipsam causam Erectheus Athenis filiaeque eius in numero deorum sunt, itemque Leonaticum est delubrum Athenis quod *lewko/rion nominatur. Alabandenses quidem sanctius Alabandum colunt, a quo est urbs illa condita, quam quemquam nobilium deorum; apud quos non inurbane Stratonicus ut multa, cum quidam ei molestus Alabandum deum esse confirmaret Herculem negaret, "ergo"

"let Alabandus be angry with me, and Hercules with you." But as for those gods you derived from the heavens and the stars, Balbus — you do not see how far the thing creeps. The sun is a god, you say, and the moon, the one of which the Greeks take to be Apollo and the other Diana. But if the moon is a goddess, then Lucifer too and the rest of the wandering stars will hold a place in the roll of the gods; and so, then, will the fixed stars. And why should the rainbow not be set down among the gods? For it is beautiful, and on account of that beauty — since its cause is wonderful — it is said to be the daughter of Thaumas. And if the rainbow has a divine nature, what will you do about the clouds? For the rainbow itself is produced, in a manner of speaking, out of clouds that have taken on color; and one cloud, indeed, is even said to have given birth to the Centaurs. And if you reckon clouds among the gods, then storms too will certainly have to be reckoned there, since they have been consecrated in the rites of the Roman people. So rains, downpours, gales, and whirlwinds are to be held gods; at any rate our own commanders, on putting out to sea, made a practice of sacrificing a victim to the waves.

inquit "mihi Alabandus tibi Hercules sit iratus". Illa autem Balbe, quae tu a caelo astrisque ducebas, quam longe serpant non vides: solem deum esse lunamque, quorum alterum Apollinem Graeci alteram Dianam putant. quod si luna dea est, ergo etiam Lucifer ceteraeque errantes numerum deorum optinebunt; igitur etiam inerrantes. cur autem arqui species non in deorum numero reponatur; est enim pulcher (et ob eam speciem, quia causam habeat admirabilem, Thaumante dicitur esse nata). cuius si divina natura est, quid facies nubibus; arcus enim ipse e nubibus efficitur quodam modo coloratis; quarum una etiam Centauros peperisse dicitur. quod si nubes rettuleris in deos, referendae certe erunt tempestates, quae populi Romani ritibus consecratae sunt. ergo imbres nimbi procellae turbines dei putandi; nostri quidem duces mare ingredientes inmolare hostiam fluctibus consuerunt.

Again, if Ceres takes her name from "bearing" — for so you were saying — then the earth itself is a goddess (and so it is held to be; for what else is Tellus?); but if the earth, then the sea as well, which you said was Neptune; and so the rivers too, and the springs. And accordingly Massa dedicated a shrine to the Spring from Corsica, and in the augurs’ prayer we find Tiberinus, Spino, Anemo, Nodinus, and the names of other neighboring rivers. So this will either creep on without limit, or we shall admit none of it; and that boundless logic of superstition will not be accepted; therefore none of this is to be accepted.

Iam si est Ceres a gerendo (ita enim dicebas), terra ipsa dea est (et ita habetur; quae est enim alia Tellus); sin terra, mare etiam, quem Neptunum esse dicebas; ergo et flumina et fontes. itaque et Fontis delubrum Masso ex Corsica dedicavit, et in augurum precatione Tiberinum Spinonem Anemonem Nodinum alia propinquorum fluminum nomina videmus. Ergo hoc aut in inmensum serpet, aut nihil horum recipiemus; nec illa infinita ratio superstitionis probabitur; nihil ergo horum probandum est.

We must also, then, Balbus, speak against those who say that these gods, translated to heaven from the race of men, exist not in reality but only in opinion — the very gods whom we all venerate with reverence and devotion. To begin with, those who are called theologians count three Jupiters, of whom the first and second were born in Arcadia, the one fathered by Aether (by whom, they say, Proserpina too and Liber were born), the other fathered by Caelus, who is said to have begotten Minerva — said to be the originator and inventor of war — and the third a Cretan, the son of Saturn, whose tomb is shown on that island. The Dioscuri, too, are named in many ways among the Greeks: the first, three in number, who are called the Anactes at Athens, sons of the most ancient King Jupiter and Proserpina — Tritopatreus, Eubuleus, and Dionysus; the second, sons of the third Jupiter and Leda — Castor and Pollux; the third, called by some Alco, Melampus, and Eumolus, the sons of Atreus, who was born of Pelops.

Dicamus igitur Balbe oportet contra illos etiam, qui hos deos ex hominum genere in caelum translatos non re sed opinione esse dicunt, quos auguste omnes sancteque veneramur. Principio Ioves tres numerant i qui theologi nominantur, ex quibus primum et secundum natos in Arcadia, alterum patre Aethere, ex quo etiam Proserpinam natam ferunt et Liberum, alterum patre Caelo, qui genuisse Minervam dicitur, quam principem et inventricem belli ferunt, tertium Cretensem Saturni filium, cuius in illa insula sepulcrum ostenditur. Dioscoroe etiam apud Graios multis modis nominantur: primi tres, qui appellantur Anactes Athenis, ex rege Iove antiquissimo et Proserpina nati Tritopatreus Eubuleus Dionysus, secundi Iove tertio nati et Leda Castor et Pollux; tertii dicuntur a non nullis Alco et Melampus †euiolus, Atrei filii, qui Pelope natus fuit.

Then there are the Muses: the first four, born of the second Jupiter — Thelxinoe, Aoede, Arche, and Melete; the second, nine in number, begotten by the third Jupiter and Mnemosyne; the third, born of the third Jupiter and Antiopa, fathered by Pierus, whom the poets are accustomed to call the Pierides and Pieriae, with the same names and the same number as those just above. And whereas you say that the Sun is so called because he is alone, of him too the theologians bring forward how many Suns. One of them is the son of Jupiter and grandson of Aether; a second, son of Hyperion; a third, son of Vulcan the son of the Nile, whose city the Egyptians hold to be the one called Heliopolis; a fourth, the one whom in heroic times Acantho is said to have borne at Rhodes, father of Ialysus, Camirus, and Lindus, from whom the Rhodians are named; a fifth, who is said to have fathered Aeetes and Circe among the Colchians. There are likewise several Vulcans:

Iam Musae primae quattuor natae Iove altero †nata et Thelxinoe† Aoede Arche Melete, secundae Iove tertio et Mnemosyne procreatae novem, tertiae Iove tertio Piero natae et Antiopa, quas Pieridas et Pierias solent poetae appellare, isdem nominibus et eodem numero quo proxumae superiores. Cumque tu solem quia solus esset appellatum esse dicas, Soles ipsi quam multi a theologis proferuntur. unus eorum Iove natus nepos Aetheris, alter Hyperione, tertius Volcano Nili filio, cuius urbem Aegyptii volunt esse eam quae Heliopolis appellatur, quartus is quem heroicis temporibus Acantho Rhodi peperisse dicitur, pater Ialysi Camiri Lindi, unde Rhodii, quintus qui Colchis fertur Aeetam et Circam procreavisse. Volcani item complures:

the first born of Caelus, by whom and by Minerva was born that Apollo in whose guardianship the ancient historians wished Athens to stand; the second, born in the Nile, called Opas by the Egyptians, whom they hold to be the guardian of Egypt; the third, of the third Jupiter and Juno, who is said to have presided over the smithy in Lemnos; the fourth, born of Maemalius, who held the islands near Sicily that were called the Vulcanian.

primus Caelo natus, ex quo et Minerva Apollinem eum cuius in tutela Athenas antiqui historici esse voluerunt, secundus in Nilo natus Opas ut Aegyptii appellant, quem custodem esse Aegypti volunt, tertius ex tertio Iove et Iunone, qui Lemni fabricae traditur praefuisse, quartus Maemalio natus, qui tenuit insulas propter Siciliam quae Volcaniae nominabantur.

Mercury is one, born of Caelus his father and Dies his mother, whose nature is said to have been indecently aroused because he was excited at the sight of Proserpina; a second is the son of Valens and Phoronis, the one held to dwell beneath the earth, the same as Trophonius; a third, born of the third Jupiter and Maia, by whom and by Penelope they say Pan was born; a fourth, son of the Nile, whom the Egyptians count it a sin to name; a fifth, whom the people of Pheneus worship, who is said to have killed Argus, and for that reason to have fled to Egypt and to have handed laws and letters to the Egyptians: this one the Egyptians call Theyt, and by the same name the first month of the year is called among them.

Mercurius unus Caelo patre Die matre natus, cuius obscenius excitata natura traditur quod aspectu Proserpinae commotus sit, alter Valentis et Phoronidis filius is qui sub terris habetur idem Trophonius, tertius Iove tertio natus et Maia, ex quo et Penelopa Pana natum ferunt, quartus Nilo patre, quem Aegyptii nefas habent nominare, quintus quem colunt Pheneatae, qui Argum dicitur interemisse ob eamque causam Aegyptum profugisse atque Aegyptiis leges et litteras tradidisse: hunc Aegyptii Theyt appellant, eodemque nomine anni primus mensis apud eos vocatur.

Of the Aesculapii the first is the son of Apollo, worshipped by the Arcadians, who is said to have invented the probe and to have been the first to bind up a wound; the second is the brother of the second Mercury, said to have been struck by lightning and buried at Cynosurae; the third, son of Arsippus and Arsinoe, who first discovered, as they say, the purging of the bowels and the extraction of teeth, whose tomb and grove is shown in Arcadia not far from the river Lusius. Of the Apollos the most ancient is the one I said a little earlier was born of Vulcan, the guardian of Athens; a second is the son of Corybas, born in Crete, who is said to have contended with Jupiter himself for that island; a third, born of the third Jupiter and Latona, who they say came to Delphi from the Hyperboreans; a fourth, in Arcadia, whom the Arcadians call Nomion because they say they received their laws from him.

Aesculapiorum primus Apollinis, quem Arcades colunt, qui specillum invenisse primusque volnus dicitur obligavisse, secundus secundi Mercuri frater: is fulmine percussus dicitur humatus esse Cynosuris; tertius Arsippi et Arsinoae, qui primus purgationem alvi dentisque evolsionem ut ferunt invenit, cuius in Arcadia non longe a Lusio flumine sepulcrum et lucus ostenditur. Apollinum antiquissimus is quem paulo antea e Volcano natum esse dixi custodem Athenarum, alter Corybantis filius natus in Creta, cuius de illa insula cum Iove ipso certamen fuisse traditur, tertius Iove tertio natus et Latona, quem ex Hyperboreis Delphos ferunt advenisse, quartus in Arcadia, quem Arcades Nomionem appellant quod ab eo se leges ferunt accepisse.

There are likewise several Dianas: the first, daughter of Jupiter and Proserpina, said to have given birth to the winged Cupid; a second, better known, whom we have received as born of the third Jupiter and Latona; the father of the third is recorded to be Upis, the mother Glauce — her the Greeks often call Upis by her father’s name. We have many Dionysi: the first born of Jupiter and Proserpina; the second of the Nile, said to have killed Nysa; the third fathered by Cabirus, whom they say ruled as king over Asia, in whose honor the Sabazian rites were instituted; the fourth of Jupiter and the Moon, in whose honor the Orphic mysteries are thought to be performed; the fifth born of Nysus and Thyone, by whom the triennial festivals are thought to have been established.

Dianae item plures, prima Iovis et Proserpinae, quae pinnatum Cupidinem genuisse dicitur, secunda notior quam Iove tertio et Latona natam accepimus; tertiae pater Upis traditur Glauce mater: eam saepe Graeci Upim paterno nomine appellant. Dionysos multos habemus, primum Iove et Proserpina natum, secundum Nilo, qui Nysam dicitur interemisse, tertium Cabiro patre, eumque regem Asiae praefuisse dicunt, cui Sabazia sunt instituta, quartum Iove et Luna, cui sacra Orphica putantur confici, quintum Nyso natum et Thyone, a quo trieterides constitutae putantur.

The first Venus was born of Caelus and Dies, whose shrine I have seen at Elis; a second was begotten from the sea-foam, by whom and by Mercury we have received that the second Cupid was born; a third, born of Jupiter and Dione, who married Vulcan, but is said to have borne Anteros to Mars; a fourth, conceived in Syria and Cyprus, who is called Astarte, who is reported to have married Adonis. The first Minerva is the one we mentioned above as the mother of Apollo; a second, sprung from the Nile, whom the Egyptians of Sais worship; a third, the one we said above was begotten by Jupiter; a fourth, born of Jupiter and Coryphe the daughter of Oceanus, whom the Arcadians call Coria and hold to be the inventor of the four-horse chariot; a fifth, daughter of Pallas, who is said to have killed her father when he tried to violate her virginity, and to whom they fasten winged sandals.

Venus prima Caelo et Die nata, cuius Eli delubrum vidimus, altera spuma procreata, ex qua et Mercurio Cupidinem secundum natum accepimus, tertia Iove nata et Diona, quae nupsit Volcano, sed ex ea et Marte natus Anteros dicitur, quarta Syria Cyproque concepta, quae Astarte vocatur, quam Adonidi nupsisse proditum est. Minerva prima quam Apollinis matrem supra diximus, secunda orta Nilo, quam Aegyptii Saietae colunt, tertia illa quam a Iove generatam supra diximus, quarta Iove nata et Coryphe Oceani filia, quam Arcades *kori/an nominant et quadrigarum inventricem ferunt, quinta Pallantis, quae patrem dicitur interemisse virginitatem suam violare conantem, cui pinnarum talaria adfigunt.

The first Cupid is said to have been born of Mercury and the first Diana; the second of Mercury and the second Venus; the third, who is the same as Anteros, of Mars and the third Venus. These things, then, and others of the kind, have been gathered from the ancient lore of Greece. You see that they must be resisted, lest religious observances be thrown into confusion; but your school not only does not refute them — it even confirms them by interpreting what each one is supposed to signify. But let us now return to the point from which we digressed to come here. Do you really suppose, then, that any subtler reasoning is needed to refute all this?

Cupido primus Mercurio et Diana prima natus dicitur, secundus Mercurio et Venere secunda, tertius qui idem est Anteros Marte et Venere tertia. Atque haec quidem et alia eius modi ex vetere Graeciae fama collecta sunt. quibus intellegis resistendum esse, ne perturbentur religiones; vestri autem non modo haec non refellunt verum etiam confirmant interpretando quorsum quidque pertineat. Sed eo iam unde huc digressi sumus revertamur. Num censes igitur subtiliore ratione opus esse ad haec refellenda?

For we see that mind, faith, hope, virtue, honor, victory, safety, concord, and the rest of this kind have the force of things, not of gods. For either they reside within ourselves — as mind, as hope, as faith, as virtue, as concord — or they are things to be wished for by us, as honor, as safety, as victory; and I see the usefulness of these things, I see too their consecrated images; but why there should be in them the power of gods I shall understand only when I have come to know it. In this class above all is Fortune to be counted, whom no one will separate from inconstancy and randomness — qualities surely not worthy of a god.

Nam mentem fidem spem virtutem honorem victoriam salutem concordiam ceteraque huius modi rerum vim habere videmus non deorum. aut enim in nobismet insunt ipsis, ut mens ut spes ut fides ut virtus ut concordia, aut optandae nobis sunt, ut honos ut salus ut victoria; quarum rerum utilitatem video, video etiam consecrata simulacra; quare autem in is vis deorum insit tum intellegam cum cognovero. quo in genere vel maxime est fortuna numeranda, quam nemo ab inconstantia et temeritate seiunget, quae digna certe non sunt deo.

But again, what delight do you take in that unraveling of fables and that teasing-out of names? Caelus castrated by his son, Saturn likewise bound by his son — these and other things of the kind you defend in such a way that those who invented them seem to have been not merely sane but actually wise. As for the teasing-out of names, the labor you spend on it is pitiable: "Saturn, because he saturates himself with years; Mavors, because he overturns great things; Minerva, because she diminishes, or because she threatens; Venus, because she comes to all things; Ceres, from bearing." How dangerous a habit! For with many names you will be stuck fast: what will you do with Veiovis, what with Vulcan? And yet, since you think Neptune is named from swimming, there will be no name whose derivation you cannot explain by means of a single letter; and in that, indeed, you seemed to me to be swimming harder than Neptune himself.

Iam vero quid vos illa delectat explicatio fabularum et enodatio nominum? exsectum a filio Caelum, vinctum itidem a filio Saturnum, haec et alia generis eiusdem ita defenditis, ut i qui ista finxerunt non modo non insani sed etiam fuisse sapientes videantur. in enodandis autem nominibus quod miserandum sit laboratis: "Saturnus quia se saturat annis, Mavors quia magna vertit, Minerva quia minuit aut quia minatur, Venus quia venit ad omnia, Ceres a gerendo". quam periculosa consuetudo. in multis enim nominibus haerebitis: quid Veiovi facies quid Volcano? quamquam, quoniam Neptunum a nando appellatum putas, nullum erit nomen quod non possis una littera explicare unde ductum sit; in quo quidem magis tu mihi natare visus es quam ipse Neptunus.

Zeno first took up a great and altogether needless task, and after him Cleanthes, then Chrysippus — that of giving an account of fabricated fables, of explaining the reasons why each thing was called by its particular name. And in doing this you assuredly confess one thing: that the matter stands far otherwise than men’s opinion has it; for those who are called gods are the natures of things, not the figures of gods. So great was this error that names of gods were assigned even to pernicious things, and what is more, sacred rites were established for them. For we see a temple of Fever on the Palatine, and one of Orbona at the shrine of the Lares, and an altar consecrated to Mala Fortuna on the Esquiline.

Magnam molestiam suscepit et minime necessariam primus Zeno post Cleanthes deinde Chrysippus, commenticiarum fabularum reddere rationem, vocabulorum cur quidque ita appellatum sit causas explicare. quod cum facitis illud profecto confitemini, longe aliter se rem habere atque hominum opinio sit; eos enim qui di appellantur rerum naturas esse non figuras deorum. Qui tantus error fuit, ut perniciosis etiam rebus non nomen deorum tribueretur sed etiam sacra constituerentur. Febris enim fanum in Palatio et Orbonae ad aedem Larum et aram Malae Fortunae Exquiliis consecratam videmus.

Let every such error, then, be driven out of philosophy, so that when we discuss the immortal gods we may say what is worthy of immortal gods. On that subject I have my own view, but I do not have grounds for agreeing with you. You say that Neptune is a mind endowed with intelligence, pervading the sea, and you say the same of Ceres about the earth; but that intelligence — whether of the sea or of the earth — I am able not only not to grasp with my mind but not even to touch by conjecture. And so I must seek elsewhere, in order that I may learn both that the gods exist and what sort of beings they are — such as you would have them be * *.

Omnis igitur talis a philosophia pellatur error, ut, cum de dis inmortalibus disputemus, dicamus digna dis inmortalibus. de quibus habeo ipse quid sentiam, non habeo autem quid tibi adsentiar. Neptunum esse dicis animum cum intellegentia per mare pertinentem, idem de Cerere; istam autem intellegentiam aut maris aut terrae non modo comprehendere animo sed ne suspicione quidem possum attingere. itaque aliunde mihi quaerendum est et ut esse deos et quales sint dii discere possim, qualis tu eos esse vis * *.

Let us look at what follows: first, whether the world is governed by the providence of the gods, and second, whether the gods take thought for human affairs. For these are the two points that remain to me out of your division; and on them, if it seems good to you, I think we ought to argue with more care.” “It seems very good to me indeed,” said Velleius; “for I both look for greater things to come and warmly assent to what has been said.” Then Balbus said, “I do not wish to interrupt you, Cotta, but we shall take another occasion; I shall certainly bring you to confess. But ” In the first place, then, it is not probable that the matter of things, from which all things have arisen, was produced by divine providence, but rather that it has, and has always had, a force and a nature of its own. As a builder, then, when he is about to put up some structure, does not himself make his material but uses what is ready to hand, and as the modeler likewise uses his wax, so for that divine providence the material had to be available — not the material it might itself make, but the material it would find prepared. And if matter was not made by a god, then neither were earth nor water nor air nor fire made by a god. “Men surpass all the beasts” — by no means will it go that way; there is a great struggle in the matter. For “that I should so entreat him with such honeyed flattery, were it not to my purpose”: does she not seem to reason quite well, and to be contriving for her own self a monstrous ruin?

* videamus ea quae secuntur, primum deorum ne prudentia mundus regatur, deinde consulantne di rebus humanis. haec enim mihi ex tua partitione restant duo; de quibus si vobis videtur accuratius disserendum puto.’ Mihi vero inquit Velleius valde videtur; nam et maiora exspecto et is quae dicta sunt vehementer adsentior. Tum Balbus Interpellare te inquit Cotta nolo, sed sumemus tempus aliud; efficiam profecto ut fateare. sed * * * * * Primum igitur non est probabile eam materiam rerum unde omnia orta sunt esse divina providentia effectam, sed et habere et habuisse vim et naturam suam. ut igitur faber cum quid aedificaturus est non ipse facit materiam sed utitur ea quae sit parata, fictorque item cera, sic isti providentiae divinae materiam praesto esse oportuit non quam ipse faceret sed quam haberet paratam. quod si materia non est a deo facta, ne terra quidem et aqua et aer et ignis a deo factus est. * * * homines omnibus bestiis antecedunt nequaquam istuc istac ibit; magna inest certatio. nam ut ego illi supplicarem tanta blandiloquentia, ni ob rem: parumne ratiocinari videtur et sibi ipsa nefariam pestem machinari?

And by how cunning a calculation here: “Whoever wills what he wills, things so dispose themselves as he will ply his effort” — this from the man who is the sower of all evils. “He, with mind turned awry, has handed me today the very bolts by which I shall throw open all my wrath and deal him destruction — to me grief, to him mourning; to me exile, to him annihilation.” This faculty of reason, which you say has been granted to man alone by the gods’ kindness, the beasts plainly do not possess. Do you see, then, with how great a gift of the gods we have been endowed?

illud vero quam callida ratione: qui volt quod volt, ita dat se res ut operam dabit, qui est versus omnium seminator malorum. ille traversa mente mihi hodie tradidit repagula, quibus ego iram omnem recludam atque illi perniciem dabo, mihi maerores illi luctum, exitium illi exilium mihi. hanc videlicet rationem, quam vos divino beneficio homini solum tributam dicitis, bestiae non habent; videsne igitur quanto munere deorum simus adfecti?

And the same Medea, in flight from her father and her fatherland, when her father drew near and was already preparing all but to seize her, slaughtered her brother in the meantime, hacked his limbs apart joint by joint, and scattered the body abroad through the fields — for this reason: that while her father gathered up the strewn limbs of his child, she herself might escape in the interval, that grief might slow him in pursuit, that she might secure her own safety by a kinsman’s murder. To this woman, as wickedness was not wanting, so neither was reason.

Atque eadem Medea patrem patriamque fugiens, postquam pater adpropinquat iamque paene ut conprehendatur parat, puerum interea obtruncat membraque articulatim dividit perque agros passim dispergit corpus: id ea gratia ut, dum nati dissipatos artus captaret parens, ipsa interea effugeret, illum ut maeror tardaret sequi, sibi salutem ut familiari pareret parricidio. huic ut scelus sic ne ratio quidem defuit.

What of the man preparing the deadly banquet for his brother — does he not turn the calculation this way and that in thought? “A greater pile is mine to raise, a greater evil to be mixed, that I may crush and grind down that man’s bitter heart.” Nor yet is that very man himself to be passed over, who was not content to have lured his brother’s wife into adultery — of whom Atreus speaks rightly and most truly: “What in the highest matter of state I judge the highest peril — that royal mothers be defiled, the line contaminated, the stock confounded.” But that very thing, with what cunning — the man who would seek a throne by adultery: “I add to this,” he says, “that the father of the gods of heaven sent me a portent and a prodigy, the very prop of my kingdom — a lamb among the flocks, conspicuous with golden fleece, which Thyestes once dared to steal away from the palace” — and in this affair he took his wife as his accomplice. Does he not seem to have used the utmost depravity, yet not without the utmost reason?

Quid ille funestas epulas fratri conparans nonne versat huc et illuc cogitatione rationem: maior mihi moles, maius miscendumst malum, qui illius acerbum cor contundam et conprimam. Nec tamen ille ipse est praetereundus, qui non sat habuit coniugem inlexe in stuprum, de quo recte et verissume loquitur Atreus: quod re in summa summum esse arbitror periclum, matres coinquinari regias, contaminari stirpem, admisceri genus. at id ipsum quam callide, qui regnum adulterio quaereret: addo" inquit "huc, quod mihi portento caelestum pater prodigium misit, regni stabilimen mei, agnum inter pecudes aurea clarum coma quondam Thyestem clepere ausum esse e regia, a qua in re adiutricem coniugem cepit sibi. videturne summa inprobitate usus non sine summa esse ratione?

Nor is the stage alone crammed with these crimes; ordinary life is full of crimes nearly greater. Each man’s household feels it, the Forum feels it, the Senate-house, the Campus, our allies, the provinces — so that, just as a thing is rightly done by reason, so it is by reason that men sin; and the one is done both by few and rarely, the other both always and by very many. So it would have been better that no reason at all had been given us by the immortal gods than that it should be given with so great a ruin attending it. As with wine for the sick: because it rarely helps and very often harms, it is better not to administer it at all than to rush into open ruin in the hope of a doubtful recovery — so I rather think it might have been better for the human race that this quick stir of thought, this keenness, this ingenuity, which we call reason, since it is destructive to many and salutary to very few, had not been given at all than that it should be given so munificently and so lavishly.

Nec vero scaena solum referta est his sceleribus sed multo vita communis paene maioribus. sentit domus unius cuiusque sentit forum, sentit curia campus socii provinciae, ut quem ad modum ratione recte fiat sic ratione peccetur, alterumque et a paucis et raro, alterum et semper et a plurimis, ut satius fuerit nullam omnino nobis a dis immortalibus datam esse rationem quam tanta cum pernicie datam. ut vinum aegrotis, quia prodest raro nocet saepissime, melius est non adhibere omnino quam spe dubiae salutis in apertam perniciem incurrere, sic haud scio an melius fuerit humano generi motum istum celerem cogitationis acumen sollertiam, quam rationem vocamus, quoniam pestifera sit multis admodum paucis salutaris, non dari omnino quam tam munifice et tam large dari.

For this reason, if the divine mind and will took thought for men precisely because it bestowed reason on them, it took thought only for those whom it endowed with good reason — and these we see, if indeed there are any at all, to be very few. But it cannot be allowed that the immortal gods took thought for only a few; it follows, then, that they took thought for no one. To this point you are accustomed to make this reply: that the gods did not therefore fail to provide for us excellently merely because many would use their gift perversely; that many use their inheritances badly too, and are not on that account held to have had no benefit from their fathers. Who denies it — and what likeness is there in that comparison? For Deianira did not wish to harm Hercules when she gave him the tunic dyed with the Centaur’s blood, nor did the man who opened with his sword the abscess of Jason of Pherae — which the physicians had not been able to cure — wish to do him good. For many, even while wishing to do harm, have done good, and while wishing to do good have done harm. And so it does not follow from what is given that the will of the giver is made plain, nor, if the one who received it uses it well, that the one who gave it gave it in friendship. For what lust, what avarice, what crime is either undertaken without a plan having been formed, or carried through without the mind’s motion and reflection — that is, without reason?

Quam ob rem si mens voluntasque divina idcirco consuluit hominibus quod is est largita rationem, is solis consuluit quos bona ratione donavit, quos videmus si modo ulli sint esse perpaucos. non placet autem paucis a diis inmortalibus esse consultum; sequitur ergo ut nemini consultum sit. Huic loco sic soletis occurrere: non idcirco non optume nobis a dis esse provisum, quod multi eorum beneficio perverse uterentur; etiam patrimoniis multos male uti, nec ob eam causam eos beneficium a patribus nullum habere. Quisquam istuc negat, aut quae est in collatione ista similitudo? nec enim Herculi nocere Deianira voluit cum ei tunicam sanguine Centauri tinctam dedit, nec prodesse Pheraeo Iasoni is qui gladio vomicam eius aperuit, quam sanare medici non potuerant. multi enim et cum obesse vellent profuerunt et cum prodesse offuerunt; ita non fit ex eo quod datur ut voluntas eius qui dederit appareat, nec si is qui accepit bene utitur idcirco is qui dedit amice dedit. Quae enim libido quae avaritia quod facinus aut suscipitur nisi consilio capto aut sine animi motu et cogitatione di est ratione perficitur;

For every opinion is reason — good reason if the opinion is true, but bad reason if it is false. Yet from a god we have only reason, if indeed we have it; whether the reason is good or not good comes from ourselves. For reason was not given to man by the kindness of the gods in the way that an inheritance is left to him. For what else could the gods rather have given to men, if they had wished to harm them? And what would be the seeds of injustice, of intemperance, of cowardice, if reason did not underlie these vices? Medea just now and Atreus were called to mind by us — heroic characters who, having reckoned and weighed the account, plotted their unspeakable crimes.

nam omnis opinio ratio est, et quidem bona ratio si vera, mala autem si falsa est opinio. sed a deo tantum rationem habemus, si modo habemus, bonam autem rationem aut non bonam a nobis. Non enim ut patrimonium relinquitur sic ratio est homini beneficio deorum data; quid enim potius hominibus dii dedissent si is nocere voluissent, iniustitiae autem intemperantiae timiditatis quae semina essent si is vitiis ratio non subesset? Medea modo et Atreus commemorabatur a nobis, heroicae personae inita subductaque ratione nefaria scelera meditantes.

What of the trivialities of comedy — do they not always turn upon reasoning? Does that fellow in the Eunuchus not argue with subtlety enough: “What, then, shall I do? She shut me out, she calls me back; shall I return? No, not if she begged me.” And that other in the Synephebi does not hesitate, in the manner of the Academics and against the common opinion, to do battle with reason: he says it is “sweet, in the height of love and the depth of need, to have a father who is grasping, ungracious toward his children, hard — one who neither loves you nor takes pains for you”; and to this incredible thesis he supplies his little arguments:

quid levitates comicae parumne semper in ratione versantur? parumne subtiliter disputat ille in Eunucho: quid igitur faciam? exclusit, revocat; redeam? non si me obsecret. ille vero in Synephebis Academicorum more contra communem opinionem non dubitat pugnare ratione, qui "in amore summo summaque inopia suave" esse dicit parentem habere avarum inlepidum in liberos difficilem, qui te nec amet nec studeat tui, atque huic incredibili sententiae ratiunculas suggerit:

“Either you cheat him of his revenue, or by a letter divert some debt, or through a little slave throw the timid old man into a fright; and in the end, the more sparing the father from whom you filch, the more gladly you squander it.” And the same fellow argues that an easygoing and generous father is an inconvenience to a son in love: “one whom I know no way to cheat, nor what to carry off from him, nor what trick or contrivance to set in motion against him — so utterly has my father’s obligingness baffled all my tricks, deceits, and sleights of hand.” Well then — those tricks, those contrivances, those deceits and sleights of hand: could they have existed without reason? O splendid gift of the gods, that Phormio should be able to say: “Fetch me the old man; all my plans are now drawn up and ready in my heart.” But let us leave the theater and come into the Forum.

aut tu illum fructu fallas aut per litteras avertas aliquod nomen aut per servolum percutias pavidum; postremo a parco patre quod sumas, quanto dissipes libentius; idemque facilem et liberalem patrem incommodum esse amanti filio disputat: quem neque quo pacto fallam nec quid inde auferam nec quem dolum ad eum aut machinam commoliar scio quicquam: ita omnes meos dolos fallacias praestrigias praestrinxit commoditas patris. quid ergo isti doli, quid machinae, quid fallaciae praestrigiaeque num sine ratione esse potuerunt? o praeclarum munus deorum; ut Phormio possit dicere: cedo senem; iam instructa sunt mihi in corde consilia omnia. Sed exeamus e theatro, veniamus in forum.

The praetor goes to take his seat. To try what case? The man who burned down the record office. What crime more hidden? Yet Quintus Sosius, a distinguished Roman knight from the Picene country, confessed that he had done it. The man who falsified the public registers? That too Lucius Alenus did, when he forged the handwriting of the six chief clerks; what was ever more ingenious than this man? Take note of other inquiries: into the gold of Tolosa, into the Jugurthine conspiracy; go back to earlier matters — the case of Tubulus over money taken for rendering a verdict; later matters — the inquiry into incest under the Peducaean bill; then these everyday affairs: daggers, poisonings, embezzlements, and inquiries into wills as well under a new law. From this comes that form of action: “I declare that a theft was committed by your aid and counsel”; from this come so many trials over bad faith — over guardianship, mandate, partnership, trusteeship — and the rest of the dealings in buying or selling, hiring or letting, that are done against good faith; from this comes the public trial of a private matter under the Laetorian law; from this the dragnet of all knaveries, the action concerning malicious fraud, which our friend Gaius Aquillius brought forward — the very fraud which the same Aquillius holds to be present whenever one thing is feigned and another done.

sessum it praetor. quid ut iudicetur? qui tabularium incenderit. quod facinus occultius: at se Q. Sosius splendidus eques Romanus ex agro Piceno fecisse confessus est. qui transscripserit tabulas publicas: id quoque L. Alenus fecit, cum chirographum sex primorum imitatus est; quid hoc homine sollertius? cognosce alias quaestiones, auri Tolossani coniurationis Iugurthinae; repete superiora: Tubuli de pecunia capta ob rem iudicandam; posteriora: de incestu rogatione Peducaea; tum haec cotidiana: sicae venena peculatus, testamentorum etiam lege nova quaestiones. inde illa actio "ope consilioque tuo furtum aio factum esse", inde tot iudicia de fide mala, tutelae mandati pro socio fiduciae, reliqua quae ex empto aut vendito aut conducto aut locato contra fidem fiunt, inde iudicium publicum rei privatae lege Laetoria, inde everriculum malitiarum omnium iudicium de dolo malo, quod C. Aquillius familiaris noster protulit, quem dolum idem Aquillius tum teneri putat cum aliud sit simulatum aliud actum.

Do we then suppose that this vast sowing of evils was done by the immortal gods? For if the gods gave reason to men, they gave malice; for malice is the cunning and deceitful reasoning of doing harm. The same gods gave fraud too, and crime, and the rest, none of which can either be undertaken or accomplished without reason. Would, then — as that old woman wishes that the fir timbers, cut down by axes in the grove of Pelion, had never fallen to earth — would that the gods had not given men this craftiness, which very few use well, and even those few are often overborne by those who use it ill, while countless men use it wickedly: so that this divine gift of reason and counsel seems to have been imparted to men for fraud and not for goodness.

Hanc igitur tantam a dis inmortalibus arbitramur malorum sementim esse factam? si enim rationem hominibus di dederunt, malitiam dederunt; est enim malitia versuta et fallax ratio nocendi; idem etiam di fraudem dederunt facinus ceteraque quorum nihil nec suscipi sine ratione nec effici potest. Utinam igitur, ut illa anus optat ne in nemore Pelio securibus caesae accidissent abiegnae ad terram trabes sic istam calliditatem hominibus di ne dedissent, qua perpauci bene utuntur, qui tamen ipsi saepe a male utentibus opprimuntur, innumerabiles autem improbe utuntur, ut donum hoc divinum rationis et consilii ad fraudem hominibus non ad bonitatem impertitum esse videatur.

But you press again and again that this is the fault of men, not of the gods. As if a physician should blame the gravity of the disease, or a pilot the violence of the storm; and even though these are mere mortal creatures, still they are ridiculous: “for who would have called you in,” someone might say, “if these things did not exist?” Against a god one may argue more freely: “You say the fault lies in men’s vices: you should have given men a reason that would have shut out vice and fault.” Where, then, was there room for error on the gods’ part? For we leave our inheritances in the hope of handing them on well, and in that we can be deceived; but how could a god be deceived? Was it as the Sun was, when he took up his son Phaethon into the chariot, or Neptune, when Theseus destroyed Hippolytus, having been granted by his father Neptune the power of three wishes?

Sed urgetis identidem hominum esse istam culpam non deorum. Ut si medicus gravitatem morbi, gubernator vim tempestatis accuset; etsi hi quidem homunculi, sed tamen ridiculi: "quis enim te adhibuisset" dixerit quispiam "si ista non essent". contra deum licet disputare liberius: "in hominum vitiis ais esse culpam: eam dedisses hominibus rationem quae vitia culpamque excluderet". Ubi igitur locus fuit errori deorum? nam patrimonia spe bene tradendi relinquimus, qua possumus falli; deus falli qui potuit? an ut Sol in currum quom Phaethontem filium sustulit, aut Neptunus cum Theseus Hippolytum perdidit, cum ter optandi a Neptuno patre habuisset potestatem:

These are the poets’ tales; but we wish to be philosophers, authors of facts, not of fables. And yet even these poets’ gods themselves, had they known that those gifts would be ruinous to their sons, would be reckoned to have done wrong in conferring the benefit. And if it is true, as Aristo of Chios used to say, that philosophers do harm to their hearers who put a bad interpretation on things well said — for it is possible for profligates to come out of Aristippus’s school, and harsh men out of Zeno’s — then surely, if those who had heard were going to depart corrupted because they perversely interpreted the philosophers’ discourse, it would be better for the philosophers to keep silent than to harm those who had heard them;

poetarum ista sunt, nos autem philosophi esse volumus, rerum auctores non fabularum. atque hi tamen ipsi di poetici, si scissent perniciosa fore illa filiis, peccasse in beneficio putarentur. Et si verum est quod Aristo Chius dicere solebat, nocere audientibus philosophos is qui bene dicta male interpretarentur (posse enim asotos ex Aristippi, acerbos e Zenonis schola exire)—prorsus, si qui audierunt vitiosi essent discessuri, quod perverse philosophorum disputationem interpretarentur, tacere praestaret philosophis quam iis qui se audissent nocere;

so, if men turn the reason given them by the immortal gods with good intent into fraud and malice, it would have been better that it had not been given to the human race than that it should be given. As, if a physician should know that the patient ordered to take wine would take it undiluted and perish at once, he would be greatly at fault, so that Providence of yours is to be blamed, which gave reason to those it knew would use it perversely and wickedly. Unless perhaps you say it did not know. Would that it were so; but you will not dare to, for I am well aware how highly you esteem its name.

sic, si homines rationem bono consilio a dis immortalibus datam in fraudem malitiamque convertunt, non dari illam quam dari humano generi melius fuit. Ut si medicus sciat eum aegrotum, qui iussus sit vinum sumere, meracius sumpturum statimque periturum, magna sit in culpa, sic vestra ista Providentia reprendenda, quae rationem dederit is quos scierit ea perverse et inprobe ussuros. Nisi forte dicitis eam nescisse. Utinam quidem; sed non audebitis, non enim ignoro quanti eius nomen putetis.

But here at any rate this topic can now be brought to a close. For if folly, by the consensus of all philosophers, is a greater evil than all the evils of fortune and of the body weighed in the opposite scale, and if no one attains wisdom, then we are all in the depths of evil — we for whom you say the immortal gods have provided so excellently. For just as it makes no difference whether no one is in good health or no one is able to be in good health, so I do not see what difference it makes whether no one is wise or no one is able to be wise. But we, indeed, have said too much about a thing perfectly plain; Telamo, however, dispatches the whole topic — why the gods neglect men — in a single line: “For if they cared, it would go well with the good, ill with the wicked; which now is not the case.” The gods ought indeed to have made all men good, if in truth they were taking thought for the human race;

Sed hic quidem locus concludi iam potest. nam si stultitia consensu omnium philosophorum maius est malum quam si omnia mala et fortunae et corporis ex altera parte ponantur, sapientiam autem nemo adsequitur, in summis malis omnes sumus, quibus vos optume consultum a dis inmortalibus dicitis. nam ut nihil interest utrum nemo valeat an nemo possit valere, sic non intellego quid intersit utrum nemo sit sapiens an nemo esse possit. Ac nos quidem nimis multa de re apertissuma; Telamo autem uno versu totum locum conficit cur di homines neglegant: nam si curent, bene bonis sit, male malis; quod nunc abest. debebant illi quidem omnis bonos efficere, si quidem hominum generi consulebant;

or if that less, they ought at least certainly to have taken thought for the good. Why, then, did the Carthaginian crush the two Scipios in Spain, those bravest and best of men? Why did Maximus bury his son, who had held the consulship? Why did Hannibal slay Marcellus? Why did Cannae carry off Paulus? Why was the body of Regulus surrendered to the cruelty of the Carthaginians? Why did his own house’s walls not shelter Africanus? But these are old matters, and there are very many others; let us look at things nearer home. Why is my uncle, Publius Rutilius, a man of the purest innocence and at the same time the most learned, in exile? Why was my friend Drusus killed in his own house? Why was Quintus Scaevola, the very pattern of temperance and prudence, the pontifex maximus, butchered before the image of Vesta? Why, still earlier, were so many leading men of the state put to death by Cinna? Why could Gaius Marius, the most treacherous of all men, order Quintus Catulus, a man of the most surpassing dignity, to die?

sin id minus, bonis quidem certe consulere debebant. Cur igitur duo Scipiones fortissimos et optimos viros in Hispania Poenus oppressit, cur Maximus extulit filium consularem, cur Marcellum Annibal interemit, cur Paulum Cannae sustulerunt, cur Poenorum crudelitati Reguli corpus est praebitum, cur Africanum domestici parietes non texerunt? Sed haec vetera et alia permulta; propiora videamus. cur avunculus meus vir innocentissumus idemque doctissumus P. Rutilius in exilio est, cur sodalis meus interfectus domi suae Drusus, cur temperantiae prudentiaeque specimen ante simulacrum Vestae pontifex maximus est Q. Scaevola trucidatus, cur ante etiam tot civitatis principes a Cinna interempti, cur omnium perfidiosissimus C. Marius Q. Catulum praestantissuma dignitate virum mori potuit iubere?

The day would fail me if I tried to count those good men to whom evil befell, and no less if I called to mind those scoundrels to whom things fell out best of all. For why did Marius, so happily consul a seventh time, die an old man in his own house? Why did Cinna, cruelest of all men, rule for so long? "But he paid the penalty." It would have been better to stop him and hold him back from killing so many of the greatest men than for him at last to pay for it himself. Quintus Varius, a thoroughly ruthless man, perished under the utmost torture and execution; if it was because he had made away with Drusus by the sword and Metellus by poison, then it would have been better for those two to be preserved than for Varius to pay the penalty of his crime. Dionysius the tyrant ruled a most wealthy and most prosperous city for thirty-eight years;

Dies deficiat si velim numerare quibus bonis male evenerit, nec minus si commemorem quibus improbis optime. Cur enim Marius tam feliciter septimum consul domi suae senex est mortuus, cur omnium crudelissimus tam diu Cinna regnavit? "At dedit poenas." Prohiberi melius fuit impedirique ne tot summos viros interficeret quam ipsum aliquando poenas dare. Summo cruciatu supplicioque Q. Varius homo importunissumus periit; si quia Drusum ferro Metellum veneno sustulerat, illos conservari melius fuit quam poenas sceleris Varium pendere. Duodequadraginta Dionysius tyrannus annos fuit opulentissumae et beatissumae civitatis;

and before him, in the very flower of Greece, how many years did Pisistratus rule? "But Phalaris paid the penalty, and Apollodorus too." Yes — after many had first been tortured and put to death. And pirates too often pay the penalty, yet we cannot say that more captives were not cruelly killed than pirates. We are told that Anaxarchus, the follower of Democritus, was butchered by the tyrant of Cyprus, and that Zeno of Elea was killed under torture; and what shall I say of Socrates, over whose death I am accustomed to weep when I read Plato? Do you see, then, that if the gods do regard human affairs, in their judgment the distinction between good men and bad has been abolished?

quam multos ante hunc in ipso Graeciae flore Pisistratus. "At Phalaris, at Apollodorus poenas sustulit." Multis quidem ante cruciatis et necatis. Et praedones multi saepe poenas dant, nec tamen possumus dicere non pluris captivos acerbe quam praedones necatos. Anaxarchum Democriteum a Cyprio tyranno excarnificatum accepimus, Zenonem Eleatem in tormentis necatum; quid dicam de Socrate, cuius morti inlacrimare soleo Platonem legens? Videsne igitur deorum iudicio, si vident res humanas, discrimen esse sublatum?

Diogenes the Cynic used to say that Harpalus, who in those days was reckoned a fortunate pirate, was a standing witness against the gods, since he lived so long in such prosperity. Dionysius, of whom I spoke before, after he had plundered the shrine of Proserpina at Locri, was sailing to Syracuse; and as he held his course with a most favorable wind, he said with a laugh, "Do you see, friends, what a fine voyage the immortal gods grant to men who rob temples?" And, sharp man that he was, having grasped the matter clearly and fully, he held firmly to the same opinion. When he had brought his fleet to the Peloponnese and had come into the temple of Olympian Jupiter, he stripped from the god a golden cloak of great weight, with which the tyrant Gelo had adorned Jupiter from the spoils of the Carthaginians, and over this he even joked that a golden cloak was heavy in summer and cold in winter, and threw a woolen mantle over the god, saying that it suited every season of the year. The same man ordered the golden beard of Aesculapius at Epidaurus to be taken off, declaring that it was not fitting for the son to be bearded when in all the temples the father stood beardless.

Diogenes quidem Cynicus dicere solebat Harpalum, qui temporibus illis praedo felix habebatur, contra deos testimonium dicere, quod in illa fortuna tam diu viveret. Dionysius, de quo ante dixi, cum fanum Proserpinae Locris expilavisset, navigabat Syracusas; isque cum secundissumo vento cursum teneret, ridens "videtisne" inquit "amici quam bona a dis inmortalibus navigatio sacrilegis detur". atque homo acutus cum bene planeque percepisset, in eadem sententia perseverabat. qui quom ad Peloponnesum classem appulisset et in fanum venisset Iovis Olympii, aureum ei detraxit amiculum grandi pondere, quo Iovem ornarat e manubiis Carthaginiensium tyrannus Gelo, atque in eo etiam cavillatus est aestate grave esse aureum amiculum hieme frigidum, eique laneum pallium iniecit, cum id esse ad omne anni tempus diceret. idemque Aesculapi Epidauri barbam auream demi iussit; neque enim convenire barbatum esse filium, cum in omnibus fanis pater imberbis esset.

Then he ordered the silver tables to be carried off from all the sanctuaries, and since, by the custom of old Greece, they bore the inscription "of the good gods," he said he wished to enjoy their goodness. The same man took down without hesitation the little golden Victories and the bowls and crowns held out in the outstretched hands of the images, saying that he was accepting these things, not carrying them off — for it was folly to refuse to take, from gods who held them out and offered them, the very goods we pray to receive from them. They say, too, that the things I have mentioned — taken from the temples — he brought out into the forum and sold by the auctioneer’s voice, and that, once the money had been exacted, he proclaimed that whatever anyone held from sacred property he should return, each item to its own temple, before a fixed day: thus to his impiety toward the gods he added injustice toward men. This man, then, neither did Olympian Jupiter strike with the thunderbolt, nor did Aesculapius destroy by some wretched lingering disease; he died in his own bed, was borne to the pyre of his tyranny, and the power that he himself had won by crime he handed on to his son, as though it were a just and lawful inheritance.

iam mensas argenteas de omnibus delubris iussit auferri, in quibus quod more veteris Graeciae inscriptum esset "bonorum deorum", uti se eorum bonitate velle dicebat. idem Victoriolas aureas et pateras coronasque, quae simulacrorum porrectis manibus sustinebantur, sine dubitatione tollebat eaque se accipere non auferre dicebat; esse enim stultitiam a quibus bona precaremur ab is porrigentibus et dantibus nolle sumere. eundemque ferunt haec quae dixi sublata de fanis in forum protulisse et per praeconem vendidisse exactaque pecunia edixisse ut quod quisque a sacris haberet id ante diem certam in suum quicque fanum referret: ita ad impietatem in deos in homines adiunxit iniuriam. Hunc igitur nec Olympius Iuppiter fulmine percussit nec Aesculapius misero diuturnoque morbo tabescentem interemit, atque in suo lectulo mortuus in †tyrannidis rogum inlatus est, eamque potestatem, quam ipse per scelus erat nanctus, quasi iustam et legitimam hereditatis loco filio tradidit.

Against my will my argument moves on this ground, for it seems to lend authority to wrongdoing; and it would rightly seem so, were it not that conscience itself carries a heavy weight, in matters both of virtue and of vice, apart from any divine reckoning — and once that is removed, everything collapses. For just as no household and no commonwealth would appear to be ordered by any rational design and discipline if in it there were no rewards set out for right conduct and no punishments for wrongdoing, so there is surely no divine governance of the world over men, if in it there is no distinction between the good and the bad.

Invita in hoc loco versatur oratio, videtur enim auctoritatem adferre peccandi; recte videretur, nisi et virtutis et vitiorum sine ulla divina ratione grave ipsius conscientiae pondus esset, qua sublata iacent omnia. ut enim nec domus nec res publica ratione quadam et disciplina dissignata videatur, si in ea nec recte factis praemia extent ulla nec supplicia peccatis, sic mundi divina in homines moderatio profecto nulla est, si in ea discrimen nullum est bonorum et malorum.

"But the gods neglect small things; they do not attend to the little fields of individual men or their slips of vine, and if blight or hail has harmed someone, that was no business for Jupiter to take notice of; not even kings in their kingdoms see to all the smallest matters" — for so you say. As if I had complained a moment ago about Publius Rutilius’s estate at Formiae, and not about the loss of his civic standing! And this, indeed, is how all mortals regard the matter: that external advantages — vineyards, crops, olive groves, abundance of grain and fruit, in short every comfort and prosperity of life — they have from the gods; but no one has ever credited his virtue to a god.

"At enim minora di neglegunt, neque agellos singulorum nec viticulas persequuntur, nec, si uredo aut grando cuipiam nocuit, id Iovi animadvertendum fuit; ne in regnis quidem reges omnia minima curant": sic enim dicitis. Quasi ego paulo ante de fundo Formiano P. Rutili sim questus non de amissa salute. Atque hoc quidem omnes mortales sic habent, externas commoditates, vineta segetes oliveta, ubertatem frugum et fructuum, omnem denique commoditatem prosperitatemque vitae a dis se habere; virtutem autem nemo umquam acceptam deo rettulit.

And rightly, no doubt; for it is on account of virtue that we are justly praised, and in virtue that we rightly glory — which could not be the case if we held it as a gift from a god and not from ourselves. But truly, when we have been raised by honors or in our family fortune, or have gained some other accidental good or fended off some evil, then we give thanks to the gods, and then think nothing has been added to our own credit. Has anyone ever thanked the gods for being a good man? No — but for being rich, for being honored, for being safe; and they call upon Jupiter Best and Greatest for those things, not because he makes us just, temperate, and wise, but because he keeps us safe, sound, wealthy, and well supplied;

nimirum recte; propter virtutem enim iure laudamur et in virtute recte gloriamur; quod non contingeret, si id donum a deo non a nobis haberemus. at vero aut honoribus aucti aut re familiari, aut si aliud quippiam nacti sumus fortuiti boni aut depulimus mali, tum dis gratias agimus, tum nihil nostrae laudi adsumptum arbitramur. num quis quod bonus vir esset gratias dis egit umquam? at quod dives quod honoratus quod incolumis, Iovemque optimum et maximum ob eas res appellant, non quod nos iustos temperantes sapientes efficiat, sed quod salvos incolumis opulentos copiosos;

nor did anyone ever vow a tithe to Hercules for having been made wise — though Pythagoras, when he had discovered something new in geometry, is said to have sacrificed an ox to the Muses; but that I do not believe, since he was unwilling even to sacrifice a victim to Apollo at Delos, lest he sprinkle the altar with blood. But to return to the point: this is the judgment of all mortals — that fortune is to be sought from a god, but wisdom to be taken from oneself. Grant that we may dedicate temples to Mind, to Virtue, and to Faith, yet we see that these things reside in ourselves; the capacity for hope, safety, help, and victory must be sought from the gods. The prosperity, then, and the good fortune of the wicked refute, as Diogenes used to say, all the power and might of the gods.

neque Herculi quisquam decumam vovit umquam, si sapiens factus esset—quamquam Pythagoras, cum in geometria quiddam novi invenisset, Musis bovem immolavisse dicitur; sed id quidem non credo, quoniam ille ne Apollini quidem Deli hostiam immolare voluit, ne aram sanguine aspergeret. ad rem autem ut redeam, iudicium hoc omnium mortalium est, fortunam a deo petendam, a se ipso sumendam esse sapientiam. quamvis licet Menti delubra et Virtuti et Fidei consecremus, tamen haec in nobis ipsis sita videmus; spei salutis opis victoriae facultas a dis expetenda est. Inproborum igitur prosperitates secundaeque res redarguunt, ut Diogenes dicebat, vim omnem deorum ac potestatem.

"But sometimes good men come to a good end." We snatch up such cases, to be sure, and assign them to the immortal gods without any reason. But Diagoras — the one called the Atheist — when he had come to Samothrace, and a certain friend said to him, "You who think the gods neglect human affairs, do you not notice, from all these painted tablets, how many men have escaped the violence of the storm by their vows and reached harbor safely?" — "Just so," he replied, "for those who suffered shipwreck and perished at sea are nowhere painted." And the same man, when he was sailing and his fellow passengers, frightened and panic-stricken by a storm against them, said that this was happening to them not undeservedly, since they had taken him aboard their ship, pointed out to them many other ships laboring on the same course and asked whether they believed that Diagoras was sailing on those ships too. For the truth of the matter is this: that, as regards prosperous or adverse fortune, it makes no difference what sort of man you are or how you have lived.

"At non numquam bonos exitus habent boni." Eos quidem arripimus adtribuimusque sine ulla ratione dis inmortalibus. at Diagoras cum Samothracam venisset Atheus ille qui dicitur, atque ei quidam amicus "tu, qui deos putas humana neglegere, nonne animadvertis ex tot tabulis pictis, quam multi votis vim tempestatis effugerint in portumque salvi pervenerint", "ita fit" inquit, "illi enim nusquam picti sunt qui naufragia fecerunt in marique perierunt". idemque, cum ei naviganti vectores adversa tempestate timidi et perterriti dicerent non iniuria sibi illud accidere qui illum in eandem navem recepissent, ostendit eis in eodem cursu multas alias laborantis quaesivitque num etiam in is navibus Diagoram vehi crederent. Sic enim res se habet, ut ad prosperam adversamve fortunam qualis sis aut quem ad modum vixeris nihil intersit.

"The gods do not attend to everything," he says, "any more than kings do." But where is the likeness? For if kings deliberately overlook things, the fault is great; whereas for a god there is not even the excuse of ignorance. And you defend him splendidly when you say that the power of the gods is such that, even if someone has escaped the penalty of his crime by death, those penalties are exacted from his children, his grandchildren, his descendants. What admirable fairness in the gods! Would any state endure a proposer of a law of this kind — that a son or grandson be condemned if a father or grandfather had transgressed? What end could be set to the slaughter of the house of Tantalus, or what satiety of punishment will ever be granted for the death of Myrtilus to be atoned by penalties? Whether the poets have corrupted the Stoics, or the Stoics have lent authority to the poets, I could not easily say;

"Non animadvertunt" inquit "omnia di, ne reges quidem". Quid est simile; reges enim si scientes praetermittunt, magna culpa est; at deo ne excusatio quidem est inscientiae. Quem vos praeclare defenditis, cum dicitis eam vim deorum esse, ut etiam si quis morte poenas sceleris effugerit expetantur eae poenae a liberis a nepotibus a posteris. O miram aequitatem deorum: ferretne civitas ulla latorem istius modi legis, ut condemnaretur filius aut nepos, si pater aut avus deliquisset? quinam Tantalidarum internecioni modus paretur, aut quaenam umquam ob mortem Myrtili poenis luendis dabitur satias supplici? Utrum poetae Stoicos depravarint an Stoici poetis dederint auctoritatem non facile dixerim;

for both alike tell of monstrous and scandalous things. For the man whom an iambic of Hipponax had wounded, or who had been injured by a verse of Archilochus, did not bear a pain sent down by a god but one conceived by himself; and when we observe the lust of Aegisthus or of Paris, we do not look for a god as its cause, since we all but hear the voice of guilt itself; nor do I judge that the recovery of many sick men was given by Aesculapius rather than by Hippocrates; nor shall I ever say that the discipline of the Lacedaemonians was given to Sparta by Apollo rather than by Lycurgus. Critolaus, I say, destroyed Corinth, and Hasdrubal Carthage; these two men gouged out those two eyes of the seacoast — not some angry god, who, you maintain, cannot be angry at all.

portenta enim ab utrisque et flagitia dicuntur. neque enim quem Hipponactis iambus laeserat aut qui erat Archilochi versu volneratus a deo immissum dolorem non conceptum a se ipso continebat, nec cum Aegisthi libidinem aut cum Paridis videmus a deo causam requirimus, cum culpae paene vocem audiamus, nec ego multorum aegrorum salutem non ab Hippocrate potius quam ab Aesculapio datam iudico, nec Lacedaemoniorum disciplinam dicam umquam ab Apolline potius Spartae quam a Lycurgo datam. Critolaus inquam evertit Corinthum, Carthaginem Asdrubal; hi duo illos oculos orae maritumae effoderunt, non iratus aliqui, quem omnino irasci posse negatis, deus.

But surely he could have come to their aid and preserved cities so great and so fine; for you yourselves are accustomed to say that there is nothing a god cannot accomplish, and that without any effort at all; for just as the limbs of men are moved by the mind itself and by the will, without any straining, so by the divine power of the gods all things can be fashioned, moved, and changed. And you do not say this in a superstitious, old-wives’ way, but on grounds of physics and consistent reasoning: that the matter of things, out of which and in which all things are, is wholly flexible and changeable, so that there is nothing that cannot be fashioned and transformed out of it, however suddenly; and that the fashioner and governess of this whole matter is divine providence; therefore, wherever it moves itself, it can bring about whatever it wills. And so either it does not know what it can do, or it neglects human affairs, or it cannot judge what is best.

At subvenire certe potuit et conservare urbis tantas atque talis; vos enim ipsi dicere soletis nihil esse quod deus efficere non possit, et quidem sine labore ullo; ut enim hominum membra nulla contentione mente ipsa ac voluntate moveantur, sic numine deorum omnia fingi moveri mutarique posse. neque id dicitis superstitiose atque aniliter sed physica constantique ratione; materiam enim rerum, ex qua et in qua omnia sint, totam esse flexibilem et commutabilem, ut nihil sit quod non ex ea quamvis subito fingi convertique possit, eius autem universae fictricem et moderatricem divinam esse providentiam; haec igitur quocumque se moveat, efficere posse quicquid velit. Itaque aut nescit quid possit, aut neglegit res humanas, aut quid sit optimum non potest iudicare.

"It does not care for individual men." No wonder: not even for states; not for those: not even for nations and peoples. And if it will despise these too, what wonder is it that the whole human race has been despised by it? But how can you, who say that the gods do not pursue all things, at the same time wish that dreams be distributed and divided among men by the immortal gods (this with you, since the doctrine about the truth of dreams is yours), and likewise say that vows ought to be undertaken? Individuals, surely, make vows; the divine mind, then, hears even individuals; you see, therefore, that it is not so occupied as you supposed. Suppose it is distracted — turning the heavens, watching over the earth, governing the seas: why does it allow so many gods to do nothing and stand idle? Why does it not set over human affairs some of the gods at leisure — those innumerable ones that you, Balbus, have unfolded? This is more or less what I had to say about the nature of the gods, not in order to abolish it, but so that you might understand how obscure it is and what difficult explanations it involves.’ When he had said this, Cotta made an end.

"Non curat singulos homines." Non mirum: ne civitates quidem; non eas: ne nationes quidem et gentis. quod si has etiam contemnet, quid mirum est omne ab ea genus humanum esse contemptum? Sed quo modo idem dicitis non omnia deos persequi, idem voltis a diis inmortalibus hominibus dispertiri ac dividi somnia (idcirco haec tecum, quia vestra est de somniorum veritate sententia), atque idem etiam vota suscipi dicitis oportere? Nempe singuli vovent, audit igitur mens divina etiam de singulis; videtis ergo non esse eam tam occupatam quam putabatis. Fac esse distentam, caelum versantem terram tuentem maria moderantem: cur tam multos deos nihil agere et cessare patitur, cur non rebus humanis aliquos otiosos deos praeficit, qui a te Balbe innumerabiles explicati sunt? Haec fere dicere habui de natura deorum, non ut eam tollerem sed ut intellegeretis quam esset obscura et quam difficiles explicatus haberet.’ Quae cum dixisset, Cotta finem.

But Lucilius said: "Too vehemently, Cotta, have you inveighed against that doctrine of the Stoics concerning the providence of the gods, which they established most reverently and most wisely. But since evening is coming on, you will grant us some day on which to argue against what you have said. For I have a contest with you on behalf of altars and hearths, on behalf of the temples and shrines of the gods and the walls of the city — those walls which you priests declare to be sacred, and you gird the city more carefully with religion than with its own ramparts; and to abandon them, so long as I can draw breath, I judge to be a sacrilege."

Lucilius autem Vehementius inquit Cotta tu quidem invectus es in eam Stoicorum rationem quae de providentia deorum ab illis sanctissume et prudentissume constituta est. sed quoniam advesperascit, dabis nobis diem aliquem ut contra ista dicamus. est enim mihi tecum pro aris et focis certamen et pro deorum templis atque delubris proque urbis muris, quos vos pontifices sanctos esse dicitis diligentiusque urbem religione quam ipsis moenibus cingitis; quae deseri a me, dum quidem spirare potero, nefas iudico.

Then Cotta: ’For my part, I both wish to be refuted, Balbus, and I preferred to set out the things I argued rather than to pass judgment on them, and I know for certain that you can easily defeat me.’ "No doubt," said Velleius, "from a man who thinks that even dreams are sent to us by Jupiter — dreams which are nevertheless not so trifling as the Stoics’ discourse on the nature of the gods." When these things had been said, we parted in such a way that to Velleius the argument of Cotta seemed the truer, while to me that of Balbus seemed to lean nearer the resemblance of truth.

Tum Cotta: ’Ego vero et opto redargui me Balbe, et ea quae disputavi disserere malui quam iudicare, et facile me a te vinci posse certo scio.’ Quippe inquit Velleius qui etiam somnia putet ad nos mitti ab Iove, quae ipsa tamen tam levia non sunt quam est Stoicorum de natura deorum oratio. Haec cum essent dicta, ita discessimus, ut Velleio Cottae disputatio verior, mihi Balbi ad veritatis similitudinem videretur esse propensior.

C icero by Claude

On the Nature of the Gods

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