Letter · 19 September 51 BC · in Cilicia

Ad Familiares 15.1

Ad Familiares 15.1

Headnote

Cicero, proconsul of Cilicia, to the consuls, praetors, tribunes of the plebs, and senate of Rome. The dispatch was written in the field on or about the 19th of September 51 BC, on the borders of Lycaonia and Cappadocia as Cicero’s army marched toward the Taurus (the manuscript dateline: Scr. in Cilicia xiii K. Oct. a. 703). It is one of the very few surviving specimens of Cicero’s official prose as a Roman magistrate addressing the Senate by letter — the litterae publice missae of a serving proconsul. The register is distinct from everything else in the correspondence: the formulaic health-greeting S. v. v. h. e. e. q. v. (“if you are in good health it is well; I myself am in good health”) opens the letter; the periods are longer and more architected; the personal voice is disciplined into the impersonal posture of the magistrate reporting.

The news is grave. Pacorus, son of Orodes the Parthian king, has crossed the Euphrates with a great Parthian cavalry force and a large mixed levy and has pitched camp at Tyba; Syria is in alarm; the Parthian campaign that the consular M. Crassus had opened with his disaster at Carrhae two years earlier is now coming out the other way, against a Roman East that has not been re-equipped. Cicero has the news from three independent sources — King Antiochus of Commagene’s envoys, Tarcondimotus the trans-Tauran prince, and Iamblichus the Arab phylarch — and reports each in turn. He has marched his army toward the Taurus rather than withdrawing, both to put down the Cilician tribes still in arms and to show the enemy in Syria that the Roman force is advancing. The body of the dispatch (sections 4–5) is a structured appeal: the provinces must be reinforced, the local levy is useless, the allies are either too feeble or too alienated by the abuses of Roman rule (propter acerbitatem atque iniurias imperi nostri) to be relied on; M. Bibulus, the proconsul of Syria with shared responsibility for the war, refused a levy in Asia when he had the authority for one, which Cicero offers as a judgement on the quality of provincial recruits. Section 6 closes on the kings of the East — Deiotarus loyal, Cappadocia empty, the rest neither in resources nor in will sufficient — and on a closing line that will become famous in Roman Stoic memory: utinam saluti nostrae consulere possimus! dignitati certe consulemus. The plain shape of the Latin is preserved: he hopes for survival, he is certain of honour. Bibulus, in the event, would not reach Syria for another month.

If you are in good health, it is well; I myself am in good health. Though it was being reported to me past doubting that the Parthians had crossed the Euphrates with nearly all their forces, nonetheless, because I judged that fuller information about these matters could be sent to you by M. Bibulus the proconsul, I had determined that there was no necessity for me to write officially about events reported from another man’s province. Afterwards, however, when from the surest witnesses — envoys, messengers, letters — I had been more fully informed, I thought I ought to write to you what had been brought to me: whether because the matter was so great, or because we had not yet heard that Bibulus had reached Syria, or because the conduct of this war is almost shared between Bibulus and myself.
S. v. v. h. e. e. q. v. etsi non dubie mihi nuntiabatur Parthos transisse Euphratem cum omnibus fere suis copiis, tamen, quod arbitrabar a M. Bibulo procos. certiora de his rebus ad vos scribi posse, statuebam mihi non necesse esse publice scribere ea quae de alterius provincia nuntiarentur. postea vero quam certissimis auctoribus, legatis, nuntiis, 10 litteris, sum certior factus, vel quod tanta res erat vel quod nondum audieramus Bibulum in Syriam venisse vel quia administratio huius belli mihi cum Bibulo paene est communis, quae ad me delata essent scribenda ad vos putavi.
The envoys of King Antiochus of Commagene were the first to bring me word that great forces of the Parthians had begun to cross the Euphrates. When this report came in, since there were some who thought that less credit should be given to the king, I determined that I should wait until something more definite was brought. On the 19th of September, when I was leading the army into Cilicia, on the borders of Lycaonia and Cappadocia, a letter was delivered to me from Tarcondimotus, who is reckoned the most loyal of our allies beyond the Taurus and a particular friend of the Roman people, to the effect that Pacorus, son of Orodes the king of the Parthians, with a very great body of Parthian cavalry, and a great force besides drawn from many tribes, had crossed the Euphrates and pitched camp at Tyba, and that a great alarm had been raised in the province of Syria. On the same day a letter was delivered to me on the same matters from Iamblichus, the phylarch of the Arabs, who is held to be well-disposed and a friend to our state.
Regis Antiochi Commageni legati primi mihi nuntiarunt is Parthorum magnas copias Euphratem transire coepisse. quo nuptio adlato, cum essent non nulli qui ei regi minorem fidem habendam putarent, statui exspectandum esse si quid certius adferretur. A. d. xiii K. Oct., cum exercitum in Ciliciam ducerem, in finibus Lycaoniae et Cappadociae mihi litterae redditae sunt a Tarcondimoto, qui fidelissimus socius trans Taurum amicissimusque p. R. existimatur, Pacorum Orodi regis Parthorum filium cum permagno equitatu Parthico transisse Euphratem et castra posuisse Tybae, magnumque tumultum esse in provincia Syria excitatum. eodem die ab Iamblicho, phylarcho Arabum, quem homines opinantur bene sentire amicumque esse rei p. nostrae, litterae de isdem rebus mihi redditae sunt.
When these reports were brought, although I knew that the allies were weakly disposed and held in suspense by the expectation of revolution, I hoped nonetheless that those to whom I had now drawn near, and who had seen plainly our mildness and our integrity, had been made more friendly to the Roman people, and that Cilicia would prove the steadier if it were made a partner in our fairness. Both for that reason, and so that those of the Cilician people who were under arms might be put down, and that the enemy, who was in Syria, might know that the army of the Roman people, far from giving ground at the news, was actually approaching nearer, I gave orders to lead the army to the Taurus.
his rebus adlatis, etsi intellegebam socios infirme animatos esse et novarum rerum exspectatione suspensos, sperabam tamen eos, ad quos iam accesseram quique nostram mansuetudinem integritatemque perspexerant, amiciores p. R. esse factos, Ciliciam autem firmiorem fore, si aequitatis nostrae particeps facta esset. et ob eam causam et ut opprimerentur ii qui ex Cilicum gente in armis essent, et ut hostis is qui esset in Syria sciret exercitum p. R. non modo non cedere iis nuntiis adlatis sed etiam propius accedere, exercitum ad Taurum institui ducere.
But if my authority carries any weight with you — particularly in matters which you have heard about, but which I almost see in person — I urge and warn you in the strongest terms that, later than was fitting, but at some point at last, you take thought for these provinces. With what equipment we have been sent, and with what defences fortified, to face the prospect of so great a war, you are not unaware. This task, not from being blinded by stupidity but from being deterred by a sense of shame, I did not refuse; for I have never thought any danger so great that I would rather slip away from it than obey your authority.
sed si quid apud vos auctoritas mea ponderis habet, in iis praesertim rebus, quas vos audistis, ego paene cerno, magno opere vos et hortor et moneo ut his provinciis serius vos quidem quam decuit, sed aliquando tamen consulatis. nos quem ad modum instructos et quibus praesidiis munitos ad tanti belli opinionem miseritis non estis ignari. quod ego negotium non stultitia occaecatus sed verecundia deterritus non recusavi; neque enim umquam ullum periculum tantum putavi quod subterfugere mallem ’ quam vestrae auctoritati obtemperare.
At this point the matter stands as follows: unless you send into these provinces in good time an army as great as you are accustomed to send to the greatest of wars, the gravest danger is that all these provinces, which carry the revenues of the Roman people, must be lost. As for placing any hope in a levy raised here in the province, there is no ground: they are not many, and those there are scatter at the sight of danger; and what kind of soldiers these are has been judged by that most resolute of men, M. Bibulus, in Asia, who, when you had given him the authority, refused to hold a levy. As for the allies’ auxiliaries, they are, on account of the harshness and the injustices of our rule, either so feeble that they can be of no great help to us, or so estranged from us that nothing is to be expected of them and nothing is to be entrusted to them.
hoc autem tempore res sese sic habet ut, nisi exercitum tantum, quantum ad maximum bellum mittere soletis, mature in has provincias miseritis, summum periculum sit ne amittendae sint omnes hae provinciae, quibus vectigalia p. R. continentur. quam ob rem autem in hoc provinciali dilectu spem habeatis aliquam causa nulla est. neque multi sunt et diffugiunt qui sunt metu oblato; et quod genus hoc militum sit iudicavit vir fortissimus M. Bibulus in Asia, qui, cum vos ei permisissetis, dilectum habere noluerit. nam sociorum auxilia propter acerbitatem atque iniurias imperi nostri aut ita imbecilla sunt ut non multum nos iuvare possint, aut ita alienata a nobis ut neque exspectandum ab iis neque committendum iis quicquam esse videatur.
The goodwill of King Deiotarus, and his forces, such as they are, I count as ours. Cappadocia is empty; the rest of the kings and princelings are neither in resources sufficiently firm nor in goodwill. In this thinness of soldiery courage, at any rate, will not fail me; counsel, I hope, will not either. What may befall, no one can say. May we be able to look to our preservation! To our standing we shall certainly look.
Regis Deiotari et voluntatem et copias, quantaecumque sunt, nostras esse duco; Cappadocia est inanis, reliqui reges tyrannique neque opibus satis firmi nec voluntate sunt. mihi in hac paucitate ’ militum animus certe non deerit, spero ne consilium quidem; quid casurum sit incertum est. utinam saluti nostrae consulere possimus! dignitati certe consulemus.

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Ad Familiares 15.1

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