For Lucius Cornelius Balbus
Pro L. Cornelio Balbo
Headnote
For L. Cornelius Balbus, delivered at Rome in the summer of 56 BC. Balbus, born at Gades (Cadiz) in Hispania Ulterior, had served Pompey in the Sertorian war and been granted Roman citizenship by Pompey under the lex Gellia-Cornelia of 72 BC, which authorized the imperator to grant the franchise on the advice of his consilium. He had become a close intimate of Caesar (a quaestor on Caesar’s staff in Spain in 61 BC, and prefect of engineers in his praetorship and consulship), and at the time of this trial had been one of the lubricators of the Luca conference of April 56 BC. The prosecution was brought under the lex Papia of 65 BC (which had established a quaestio on usurped citizenship); the prosecutor’s case — the only charge — was that Balbus was born at Gades, a federate state, and that the Gaditan treaty either forbade or did not allow the transfer of citizenship.
The defence was the post-Luca front in court form: M. Crassus opening, Pompey speaking second (“yesterday’s speech,” §2–4, the long praise of which is the speech’s opening figure), Cicero closing. The legal architecture (Cicero’s brief at §17) is to leave to Crassus and Pompey the detailed legal exposition and to give the closing in the form of a defence not so much of Balbus as of Pompey’s act — and through Pompey of the whole generals’-citizenship-grant tradition that runs from Marius and Sulla through to Caesar and the Caesarian governors of his own command.
The argument falls into three movements. §5–17 sets out the core dilemma: the only charge is the act of Pompey himself, and either Pompey acted in ignorance (impossible: he is the man of incredible authority and breadth of experience whose footprints can be heard, as Cicero says at §13, in every shore and harbour of the empire) or he acted knowingly (in which case who would dare to say he had violated treaty?). §18–37 is the properly legal section: the prosecutor has misunderstood the technical word fundus (a federate or Latin people becomes fundus when it confirms a Roman law within its own jurisdiction — a function of the people’s right, not of the federate-vs-free distinction); the right of changing citizenship is a two-way street that runs from us to them and from them to us; the lex Gellia-Cornelia’s “si quid sacrosanctum est” exception cannot bind because no sacrosanct condition was ever Roman-vote-confirmed in the Gaditan treaty; the closing fine reading at §35–37 of the Gaditan treaty’s maiestatem populi Romani comiter conservanto clause (comiter means kindly, not communiter — and the very phrase shows that the Gaditans are the inferior party).
§38–55 catalogues the historical practice. C. Marius is the foundational example (§46–49: M. Annius Appius the Iguvian, two whole cohorts of Camertes, the famous defence of his own grants by Marius in person under the Licinian-Mucian quaestio). The roll-call at §50–51 covers Pompey’s father at Ravenna, P. Crassus the Heraclean, Sulla the Massiliot, Q. Metellus Pius the Saguntine, M. Crassus the federate from Aveia, and finally Pompey’s own grants (the Gaditan Hasdrubal, the Mamertines, the Uticans, the Saguntine Fabii). Section 51 is the famous quotation from Ennius’s Annales: “the man who shall strike the enemy will be Carthaginian to me, whoever he is.” §52–55 give the jurors’ (the Mamertine-Cassius case under the Papian law), the people’s (the Latin-treaty precedent), and the Senate’s (the Greek priestess Calliphana of Velia) parallels.
The peroration §56–65 is the political speech behind the legal one. §56–58: Balbus has no enemies; he is being attacked because his friends are powerful. §59–62: Pompey calls those enemies to fight him directly, not through the company and the following. §61 is the most explicit surviving statement of Cicero’s post-Luca accommodation: “some things we wished, contended for, made trial of; they were not won”; the fifteen-day supplicatio for Caesar in 57 BC, the army- pay vote, the ten legates, the de-Provinciis-vote against succession — these are signal of the change of mind the times required. §63–65 closes on Caesar himself: do not let Balbus’s intimacy with the absent commander be his ruin; the empire’s frontiers are now at the bounds of his deeds. The verdict (we know from no surviving source) was certainly an acquittal: Balbus rose afterwards to the consulship of 40 BC, the first man not of Roman or Latin birth to hold it.
If the authority of patrons counts in trials, the case of L. Cornelius has been defended by men of the highest standing; if the experience, by men of the greatest skill; if the talents, by the most eloquent; if the zeal, by his closest friends, joined to L. Cornelius both by his services and by the greatest familiarity. What then is my part? Of authority such as you have wished me to have, of moderate experience, of talent in no way matching my will. For to the rest by whom he has been defended, I see he owes most; how much he owes me, I shall set out in another place. At the start of my speech I lay this down: that to all who have been friends to my safety and standing, if I cannot do enough by repaying the favour, by proclaiming and acknowledging it I will at least do enough.
si auctoritates patronorum in iudiciis valent, ab amplissimis viris L. Corneli causa defensa est; si usus, a peritissimis; si ingenia, ab eloquentissimis; si studia, ab amicissimis et cum beneficiis cum L. Cornelio tum maxima familiaritate coniunctis. quae sunt igitur meae partes? auctoritatis tantae quantam vos in me esse voluistis, usus mediocris, ingeni minime voluntati paris. nam ceteris a quibus est defensus hunc debere plurimum video; ego quantum ei debeam, alio loco; principio orationis hoc pono, me omnibus qui amici fuerint saluti et dignitati meae, si minus referenda gratia satis facere potuerim, praedicanda et habenda certe satis esse facturum.
What yesterday was Cn. Pompey’s gravity in speaking, gentlemen of the jury, what facility, what fullness, was being shown not by the silent thought of your minds but by visible admiration. For I have never heard anything which seemed to me more subtly said about right; nothing more wide-ranging in memory of precedents; nothing more skilled about treaties; nothing of more illustrious authority about wars; nothing weightier about the commonwealth; nothing more modest about himself; nothing more elegant about the case and the charge:
quae fuerit hesterno die Cn. Pompei gravitas in dicendo, iudices, quae facultas, quae copia, non opinione tacita vestrorum animorum, sed perspicua admiratione declarari videbatur. nihil enim umquam audivi quod mihi de iure subtilius dici videretur, nihil memoria maiore de exemplis, nihil peritius de foederibus, nihil inlustriore auctoritate de bellis, nihil de re publica gravius, nihil de ipso modestius, nihil de causa et crimine ornatius:
so that to me at last that seems to be true which some men, given to letters and the studies of learning, were thought to say as a kind of incredible thing: that to him who had thoroughly comprehended in his soul all the virtues, everything he did proceeds rightly. For what greater fullness, variety, fluency could there have been in L. Crassus, a man born for some unique faculty of speaking, had he pleaded this case, than there was in him who could give to this study only as much time as he himself, from boyhood up to this age, has rested from continuous wars and victories?
ut mihi iam verum videatur illud esse quod non nulli litteris ac studiis doctrinae dediti quasi quiddam incredibile dicere putabantur, ei qui omnis animo virtutes penitus comprehendisset omnia quae faceret recte procedere. quae enim in L. Crasso potuit, homine nato ad dicendi singularem quandam facultatem, si hanc causam ageret, maior esse ubertas, varietas, copia quam fuit in eo qui tantum potuit impertire huic studio temporis quantum ipse a pueritia usque ad hanc aetatem a continuis bellis et victoriis conquievit?
For which the more difficult is this concluding place of my speech. For I am succeeding a speech which has not glided past your ears, but settled deep within the minds of all, so that you may take more pleasure from the recollection of that speech than from mine, or from anyone’s. But I must oblige not only Cornelius — to whose will in his perils I cannot in any way fail — but also Cn. Pompey, who wished me to be both the proclaimer and the advocate of his act, his judgement, his kindness, just as before you, gentlemen, recently in another case I was.
quo mihi difficilior est hic extremus perorandi locus. etenim ei succedo orationi quae non praetervecta sit auris vestras, sed in animis omnium penitus insederit, ut plus voluptatis ex recordatione illius orationis quam non modo ex mea, sed ex cuiusquam oratione capere possitis. sed mos est gerundus non modo Cornelio, cuius ego voluntati in eius periculis nullo modo deesse possum, sed etiam Cn. Pompeio, qui sui facti, sui iudici, sui benefici voluit me esse, ut apud eosdem vos, iudices, nuper in alia causa fuerim, et praedicatorem et actorem.
And to me indeed this seems worthy of the commonwealth, owed to the outstanding glory of this excellent man, proper to your own duty, sufficient to the case: that what Cn. Pompey is established to have done, all should grant him to have been at liberty to do. For nothing is truer than what he himself said yesterday — that L. Cornelius is fighting for all his fortunes in such a way that he is called into the charge of no single offence. For he is not said to have stolen citizenship, to have falsified his birth, to have hidden in some shameless lie, to have crept onto the census-roll: one thing only is brought against him — that he was born at Gades, which no one denies. The rest the prosecutor admits: that this man in Spain was in the most fierce war with Q. Metellus, with C. Memmius, both in the fleet and in the army; that, when Pompey came to Spain and began to have Memmius as quaestor, he never left Memmius’s side; that he was besieged at Carthage; took part in those most fierce and great battles, of the Sucro and the Turia; was with Pompey to the very end of the war.
ac mihi quidem hoc dignum re publica videtur, hoc deberi huius excellentis viri praestantissimae gloriae, hoc proprium esse vestri offici, hoc satis esse causae ut, quod fecisse Cn. Pompeium constet, id omnes ei licuisse concedant. nam verius nihil est quam quod hesterno die dixit ipse, ita L. Cornelium de fortunis omnibus dimicare ut nullius in delicti crimen vocaretur. non enim furatus esse civitatem, non genus suum ementitus, non in aliquo impudenti mendacio delituisse, non inrepsisse in censum dicitur: unum obicitur, natum esse Gadibus, quod negat nemo. cetera accusator fatetur, hunc in Hispania durissimo bello cum Q. Metello, cum C. Memmio et in classe et in exercitu fuisse; ut Pompeius in Hispaniam venerit Memmiumque habere quaestorem coeperit, numquam a Memmio discessisse, Carthagine esse obsessum, acerrimis illis proeliis et maximis, Sucronensi et Turiensi, interfuisse, cum Pompeio ad extremum belli tempus fuisse.
These things are Cornelius’s own: piety toward our commonwealth, labour, perseverance, fighting, courage worthy of the highest commander, and the hope of rewards for his perils. Yet the rewards themselves are not in the act of him who received them, but of him who gave. He was therefore granted citizenship by Cn. Pompey for these reasons. The prosecutor does not deny this, but reproaches it: so that in Cornelius’s case, the case is approved, but a penalty is sought; in Pompey’s, the case is wounded, the penalty is none save of reputation. Thus the fortunes of a most innocent man, the act of an outstanding commander, they wish to be condemned. So Cornelius’s life, Pompey’s act, is brought to trial. For you grant that this man was born of the most honourable rank in that city in which he was born; and that from his earliest youth, leaving all his own affairs, in our wars he has been engaged with our commanders; that he has had no part in any toil, any siege, any battle. All these things, full of praise, are Cornelius’s own; and in them there is no charge.
haec sunt propria Corneli, pietas in rem publicam nostram, labor, adsiduitas, dimicatio, virtus digna summo imperatore, spes pro periculis praemiorum; praemia quidem ipsa non sunt in eius facto qui adeptus est, sed in eius qui dedit. Donatus igitur est ob eas causas a Cn. Pompeio civitate. id accusator non negat, sed reprehendit, ut in Cornelio causa ipsius probetur, poena quaeratur, in Pompeio causa laedatur, poena sit nulla nisi famae: sic innocentissimi hominis fortunas, praestantissimi imperatoris factum condemnari volunt. ergo in iudicium caput Corneli, factum Pompei vocatur. hunc enim in ea civitate in qua sit natus honestissimo loco natum esse concedis, et ab ineunte aetate relictis rebus suis omnibus in nostris bellis nostris cum imperatoribus esse versatum, nullius laboris, nullius obsessionis, nullius proeli expertem fuisse. haec sunt omnia cum plena laudis tum propria Corneli, nec in iis rebus crimen est ullum.
Where, then, is the charge? — That Pompey granted him citizenship. His charge? Hardly, unless honour is to be reckoned disgrace. Whose then? In truth no one’s; in the prosecutor’s procedure, only of the man who granted it. Who, even if, led by favour, he had given the reward to a man less fit; even if, indeed, to a good man but not so deserving; even if, in short, anything were said to have been done not against what was lawful but against what was fitting — yet every reproach of that sort would have to be rejected by you, gentlemen.
ubi igitur est crimen? quod eum Pompeius civitate donavit. huius crimen? minime, nisi honos ignominia putanda est. cuius igitur? re vera nullius, actione accusatoris eius unius qui donavit; qui si adductus gratia minus idoneum hominem praemio adfecisset, quin etiam si virum bonum sed non ita meritum, si denique aliquid non contra ac liceret factum diceretur, sed contra atque oporteret, tamen esset omnis eius modi reprehensio a vobis, iudices, repudianda.
Now what is said? What does the prosecutor allege? That Pompey did what it was not lawful for him to do; which is graver than if he should say it was done not as it ought to have been. For there is something which ought not to be done, even if it is lawful; whatever is not lawful, surely ought not. Should I now hesitate, gentlemen, to plead this way: that it is not right to doubt that, what Cn. Pompey is established to have done, we should confess to have been not only lawful but actually fitting?
nunc vero quid dicitur? quid ait accusator? fecisse Pompeium quod ei facere non licuerit; quod gravius est quam si id factum ab eo diceret quod non oportuisset. est enim aliquid quod non oporteat, etiam si licet; quicquid vero non licet, certe non oportet. hic ego nunc cuncter sic agere, iudices, non esse fas dubitari quin, quod Cn. Pompeium fecisse constet, id non solum licuisse sed etiam decuisse fateamur?
For what is wanting in this man — which, were it present, we should think rightly attributed and granted to him? Experience? — whose latest boyhood was the beginning of wars and the greatest commands; whose age-mates have for the most part less often seen camp than he has triumphed; who has so many triumphs as there are coasts and parts of the world, so many victories of war as there are kinds of war in nature. Or talent? — nay, the very accidents and outcomes of things have been not the leaders but the companions of his counsels: in this one man, fortune so contended with virtue that, by the judgement of all, more was attributed to the man than to the goddess. Or modesty, integrity, religion in him — when has diligence ever been wanting? Whom did our provinces, what free peoples, what kings, what farthest nations, see more chaste, more moderate, more holy — nay, even hope or wish for in their own dreams?
quid enim abest huic homini quod, si adesset, iure haec ei tribui et concedi putaremus? Vsusne rerum? qui pueritiae tempus extremum principium habuit bellorum atque imperiorum maximorum, cuius plerique aequales minus saepe castra viderunt quam hic triumphavit, qui tot habet triumphos quot orae sunt partesque terrarum, tot victorias bellicas quot sunt in rerum natura genera bellorum. an ingenium? quin etiam ipsi casus eventusque rerum non duces, sed comites eius consiliorum fuerunt: in quo uno ita summa fortuna cum summa virtute certavit ut omnium iudicio plus homini quam deae tribueretur. an pudor, an integritas, an religio in eo, an diligentia umquam requisita est? quem provinciae nostrae, quem liberi populi, quem reges, quem ultimae gentes castiorem, moderatiorem, sanctiorem non modo viderunt, sed aut sperando umquam aut optando cogitaverunt?
What shall I say of his authority? Which is as great as in such great virtues and praises it ought to be. To this man the Senate and the Roman people gave the rewards of the highest standing without his asking, and even commands when he refused them. Of his act, gentlemen, that the question be raised in this way — whether it was lawful for him to do what he did, or whether (I will not say it was not lawful, but) it was wickedness (for he is said to have acted contrary to the treaty, that is, contrary to the religion and faith of the Roman people) — is this not shameful to the commonwealth, is it not to you?
quid dicam de auctoritate? quae tanta est quanta in his tantis virtutibus ac laudibus esse debet. cui senatus populusque Romanus amplissimae dignitatis praemia dedit non postulanti, imperia vero etiam recusanti, huius de facto, iudices, ita quaeri ut id agatur, licueritne ei facere quod fecit, an vero non dicam non licuerit, sed nefas fuerit— contra foedus enim, id est contra populi Romani religionem et fidem fecisse dicitur—non turpe rei publicae, nonne vobis?
I have heard this from my father as a boy, when Q. Metellus the son of Lucius was pleading his case on extortion — that man, that man whose country’s safety was sweeter than its sight, who chose rather to depart from the city than from his opinion — so when he was pleading his cause, when his own ledgers were carried about for the inspection of the figures, there was not one of those gravest of men, the Roman knights serving as jurors, who did not turn his eyes away and avert himself entirely, lest perhaps it seem that anyone was doubting whether what that man had entered in his account books was true or false: shall we re-examine the decree of Cn. Pompey, gentlemen, given out under the advice of his council; shall we compare it with the laws, with the treaties, weigh everything with the bitterest diligence?
audivi hoc de parente meo puer, cum Q. Metellus Luci filius causam de pecuniis repetundis diceret, ille, ille vir, cui patriae salus dulcior quam conspectus fuit, qui de civitate decedere quam de sententia maluit—hoc igitur causam dicente, cum ipsius tabulae circumferrentur inspiciendi nominis causa, fuisse iudicem ex illis equitibus Romanis gravissimis viris neminem quin removeret oculos et se totum averteret, ne forte, quod ille in tabulas publicas rettulisset, dubitasse quisquam verumne an falsum esset videretur: nos Cn. Pompei decretum, iudices, de consili sententia pronuntiatum recognoscemus, cum legibus conferemus, cum foederibus, omnia acerbissima diligentia perpendemus?
At Athens, they say, when a certain man who had lived holily and gravely had given testimony before them on a public matter, and, as is the Greek custom, came toward the altars to take the oath, all the jurors with one voice cried out that he should not swear. Then those Greeks, men distinguished, did not wish faith to be tied down by religion rather than by truth: shall we doubt what Cn. Pompey was, even in observing the religion of laws and treaties?
Athenis aiunt, cum quidam apud eos qui sancte graviterque vixisset testimonium publice dixisset et, ut mos Graecorum est, iurandi causa ad aras accederet, una voce omnis iudices ne is iuraret reclamasse. tum Graeci homines spectati viri noluerunt religione videri potius quam veritate fidem esse constrictam: nos etiam in ipsa religione et legum et foederum conservanda qualis fuerit Cn. Pompeius dubitabimus?
Do you wish him to have acted against the treaty in ignorance, or knowingly? If knowingly — O the name of our empire! O the outstanding dignity of the Roman people! O Cn. Pompey’s praise so widely and far diffused, that the home of his glory is bounded by the limits of the common empire! O nations, cities, peoples, kings, tetrarchs, tyrants — witnesses of Cn. Pompey’s not only courage in war but religion in peace! you, finally, mute regions, I implore, and the soils of the farthest lands; you, seas, harbours, islands, shores! For what is the coast, the seat, the place in which there are not the imprinted footsteps of his courage and humanity, of his spirit and his counsel? Will any man dare to say that he, gifted with an incredible and unheard-of gravity, courage, constancy, has knowingly neglected, violated, broken treaties?
utrum enim inscientem vultis contra foedera fecisse an scientem? si scientem,—O nomen nostri imperi! O populi Romani excellens dignitas! O Cn. Pompei sic late longeque diffusa laus ut eius gloriae domicilium communis imperi finibus terminetur! O nationes, urbes, populi, reges, tetrarchae, tyranni,—testes Cn. Pompei non solum virtutis in bello sed etiam religionis in pace! vos denique, mutae regiones, imploro, et sola terrarum ultimarum; vos, maria, portus, insulae, litora! quae est enim ora, quae sedes, qui locus in quo non exstent huius cum fortitudinis tum vero humanitatis, cum animi tum consili impressa vestigia? hunc quisquam, incredibili quadam atque inaudita gravitate virtute constantia praeditum, foedera scientem neglexisse violasse rupisse dicere audebit?
The prosecutor obliges me with a gesture: he indicates that Pompey acted unknowingly — as if it were lighter, when one is engaged in such great public affairs and presides over the greatest matters, to do something which one knows is not lawful, than not to know at all what is lawful! For did the man who had waged in Spain a most fierce and great war not know by what right Gades stood, or, when he knew the right of that people, did he not grasp the interpretation of the treaty? Will anyone dare to say that Cn. Pompey was ignorant of what mediocre men, men of no military experience, no soldierly study, what the very copyists profess to know?
gratificatur mihi gestu accusator: inscientem Cn. Pompeium fecisse significat,—quasi vero levius sit, cum in tanta re publica versere et maximis negotiis praesis, facere aliquid quod scias non licere, quam omnino non scire quid liceat! etenim utrum qui in Hispania bellum acerrimum et maximum gesserat quo iure Gaditana civitas esse nesciebat, an, cum ius illius populi nosset, interpretationem foederis non tenebat? id igitur quisquam Cn. Pompeium ignorasse dicere audebit quod mediocres homines, quod nullo usu, nullo studio praediti militari, quod librarioli denique scire se profiteantur?
I, on the contrary, hold, gentlemen, that, since in every kind and variety of arts — even of those that are not easily learned without the highest leisure — Cn. Pompey excels, his knowledge is unique and outstanding in the matter of treaties, of pacts, of the conditions of peoples, kings, foreign nations, and finally in the whole law of war and peace; unless perhaps those things which books teach us in shade and leisure could not be taught Cn. Pompey, when he rested by letters, nor in the doing of business by the regions themselves. And, as I judge, gentlemen, the case has been pleaded. I shall say more now from the faults of the times rather than from the kind of trial: for it is a kind of stain and slip of the age to envy virtue, to wish to break the very flower of dignity. For if Pompey had lived five hundred years ago,
equidem contra existimo, iudices, cum in omni genere ac varietate artium, etiam illarum quae sine summo otio non facile discuntur, Cn. Pompeius excellat, singularem quandam laudem et praestabilem eius esse scientiam in foederibus, pactionibus, condicionibus populorum, regum, exterarum nationum, in universo denique belli iure atque pacis; nisi forte ea quae nos libri docent in umbra atque otio, ea Cn. Pompeium neque cum requiesceret litterae, neque cum rem gereret regiones ipsae docere potuerunt. atque, ut ego sentio, iudices, causa dicta est. temporum magis ego nunc vitiis quam genere iudici plura dicam; est enim haec saeculi quaedam macula atque labes, virtuti invidere, velle ipsum florem dignitatis infringere. etenim si Pompeius abhinc annos quingentos fuisset,
that man, from whom the Senate as a young man and a Roman knight had often sought aid for the common safety, whose deeds had ranged through all peoples with the most distinguished victory by land and sea, whose three triumphs were witnesses that the whole circuit of the earth was held by our empire, whom the Roman people had honoured with signal and unique distinctions — if now among us what he had done were said to have been done contrary to the treaty, who would listen? No one indeed; for since death would have extinguished envy, his deeds would have rested on the glory of an everlasting name. Will the man whose virtue, when heard of, would give no place for doubt — when seen and looked through — be hurt by the voice of detractors?
is vir a quo senatus adulescentulo atque equite Romano saepe communi saluti auxilium expetisset, cuius res gestae omnis gentis cum clarissima victoria terra marique peragrassent, cuius tres triumphi testes essent totum orbem terrarum nostro imperio teneri, quem populus Romanus honoribus in signibus singularibusque decorasset,—si nunc apud nos id quod is fecisset contra foedus factum diceretur, quis audiret? nemo profecto; mors enim cum exstinxisset invidiam, res eius gestae sempiterni nominis gloria niterentur. cuius igitur audita virtus dubitationi locum non daret, huius visa atque perspecta obtrectatorum voce laedetur?
I shall therefore set Pompey aside in the rest of my speech; but you, gentlemen, hold him in your minds and memory. About the law, the treaty, the precedents, the perpetual custom of our state, I shall renew what has been said. For nothing new, nothing untouched, has been left for me to say either by M. Crassus, who has set out the whole case before you most diligently both for skill and for faith; or by Cn. Pompey, whose speech abounded with every ornament. But since, despite my refusal, both wished this last labour, as it were of finishing-off, to be applied by me to the work, I ask of you to think that I have undertaken this labour and duty out of zeal of duty rather than of speaking.
omittam igitur Pompeium iam oratione mea reliqua, sed vos, iudices, animis ac memoria tenetote. de lege, de foedere, de exemplis, de perpetua consuetudine civitatis nostrae renovabo ea quae dicta sunt; nihil enim mihi novi, nihil integri neque M. Crassus, qui totam causam et pro facultate et pro fide sua diligentissime vobis explicavit, neque Cn. Pompeius, cuius oratio omnibus ornamentis abundavit, ad dicendum reliquit. sed quoniam me recusante placuit ambobus adhiberi hunc a me quasi perpoliendi quendam operis extremum laborem, peto a vobis ut me offici potius quam dicendi studio hanc suscepisse operam ac munus putetis.
And before I approach the right and the case of Cornelius, something on the common condition of all of us seems to be briefly recalled, for the deflection of malice. If, gentlemen, in whatever rank of ours each was born, or in whatever fortune one was placed at the start of his being born, he must hold this state of life till old age; and if all whom either fortune has lifted or their own labour and industry has made distinguished are to be visited with punishment — not heavier upon L. Cornelius than upon many good and brave men would the law of life and the condition seem to be set. But if many men’s virtue, talent, and humanity from the lowest rank of birth and step of fortune has gained not only friendships and the means of household but the highest praise, honours, glory, dignity — I do not see why envy should rather violate L. Cornelius’s virtue than your fairness aid his modesty.
ac prius quam adgrediar ad ius causamque Corneli, quiddam de communi condicione omnium nostrum deprecandae malivolentiae causa breviter commemorandum videtur. si quo quisque loco nostrum est, iudices, natus, aut si, in qua fortuna est nascendi initio constitutus, hunc vitae statum usque ad senectutem obtinere debet, et si omnes quos aut fortuna extulit aut ipsorum inlustravit labor et industria poena sunt adficiendi, non gravior L. Cornelio quam multis viris bonis atque fortibus constitui lex vitae et condicio videretur: sin autem multorum virtus, ingenium, humanitas ex infimo genere et fortunae gradu non modo amicitias et rei familiaris copias consecuta est, sed summam laudem, honores, gloriam, dignitatem, non intellego cur potius invidia violatura virtutem L. Corneli quam aequitas vestra pudorem eius adiutura videatur.
Therefore what is most to be asked of you I do not ask, gentlemen — lest I seem to doubt your wisdom and humanity. But it must be asked: that you do not hate talent, are not enemies to industry, do not think humanity is to be crushed and virtue punished. This I do ask: that, if you see the case itself firm and stable in itself, you choose that the man’s own ornaments be a help to the case rather than a hindrance. The case of Cornelius arises out of that law which L. Gellius and Cn. Cornelius proposed by the will of the Senate; by which law we see it has been duly ordained that those should be Roman citizens whom Cn. Pompey has, on the advice of his council, individually granted citizenship. That L. Cornelius was so granted, Pompey present says; the public registers indicate. The prosecutor admits this, but denies that anyone from a federate people could come into this citizenship unless that people had been made fundus.
itaque quod maxime petendum est a vobis idcirco non peto, iudices, ne de vestra sapientia atque de vestra humanitate dubitare videar: est autem petendum ne oderitis ingenium, ne inimici sitis industriae, ne humanitatem opprimendam, ne virtutem puniendam putetis. illud peto, ut, si causam ipsam per se firmam esse et stabilem videritis, hominis ipsius ornamenta adiumento causae potius quam impedimento esse malitis. nascitur, iudices, causa Corneli ex ea lege quam L. Gellius Cn. Cornelius ex senatus sententia tulerunt; qua lege videmus rite esse sanctum ut cives Romani sint ii quos Cn. Pompeius de consili sententia singillatim civitate donaverit. Donatum esse L. Cornelium praesens Pompeius dicit, indicant publicae tabulae. accusator fatetur, sed negat ex foederato populo quemquam potuisse, nisi is populus fundus factus esset, in hanc civitatem venire.
O outstanding interpreter of right, sponsor of antiquity, corrector and emender of our state — who attaches this penalty to treaties: that he makes federates excluded from all our rewards and benefits! For what could be said more inexperiencedly than that federate peoples must be made fundi? For that is no more proper to federates than to all free peoples. But this whole matter, gentlemen, has always been founded on this rationale and view: that, when the Roman people had ordered something, if their allies, or the Latins, accepted it, and if the same law which we held had settled itself, as in a fundus, in some other people, then by the same law that people would be held — not so that anything would be diminished from our right, but so that those peoples would either use that right which had been established by us, or some advantage or benefit.
O praeclarum interpretem iuris, auctorem antiquitatis, correctorem atque emendatorem nostrae civitatis, qui hanc poenam foederibus adscribat, ut omnium praemiorum beneficiorumque nostrorum expertis faciat foederatos! quid enim potuit dici imperitius quam foederatos populos fieri fundos oportere? nam id non magis est proprium foederatorum quam omnium liberorum. sed totum hoc, iudices, in ea fuit positum semper ratione atque sententia ut, cum iussisset populus Romanus aliquid, si id adscivissent socii populi ac Latini, et si ea lex, quam nos haberemus, eadem in populo aliquo tamquam in fundo resedisset, ut tum lege eadem is populus teneretur, non ut de nostro iure aliquid deminueretur, sed ut illi populi aut iure eo quod a nobis esset constitutum aut aliquo commodo aut beneficio uterentur.
Among our forefathers C. Furius proposed a law on wills, Q. Voconius on women’s inheritances; innumerable other laws on civil right have been passed; which the Latins, as they wished, accepted. The Julian law itself, by which citizenship was given to the allies and the Latins, granted no citizenship to those peoples who had not been made fundi. On which there was great contention among the Heracleans and Neapolitans, since a great part in those communities preferred the freedom of their treaty to citizenship. In the end, this is the force both of that right and of the word: that peoples be made fundi by our kindness, not by their own right.
tulit apud maiores nostros legem C. Furius de testamentis, tulit Q. Voconius de mulierum hereditatibus; innumerabiles aliae leges de civili iure sunt latae; quas Latini voluerunt, adsciverunt; ipsa denique Iulia, qua lege civitas est sociis et Latinis data, qui fundi populi facti non essent civitatem non haberent. in quo magna contentio Heracliensium et Neapolitanorum fuit, cum magna pars in iis civitatibus foederis sui libertatem civitati anteferret. postremo haec vis est istius et iuris et verbi, ut fundi populi beneficio nostro, non suo iure fiant.
When the Roman people has ordered something, if it is of such a kind that it seems to certain peoples, whether federate or free, must be permitted that they should themselves decide — not concerning our affairs but concerning their own — what right they wish to use, then it seems we must ask whether they are made fundi or not; but concerning our commonwealth, our empire, our wars, our victory, our safety, they did not want peoples to become fundi. And yet if it shall not be lawful for our commanders, for the Senate, for the Roman people, by setting up rewards, to draw out from the cities of allies and friends each bravest and best man to undertaking dangers for our safety, we shall have to do without the greatest help and frequently the greatest defence in dangerous and rough times.
cum aliquid populus Romanus iussit, id si est eius modi ut quibusdam populis, sive foederatis sive liberis, permittendum esse videatur ut statuant ipsi non de nostris sed de suis rebus, quo iure uti velint, tum utrum fundi facti sint an non quaerendum esse videatur; de nostra vero re publica, de nostro imperio, de nostris bellis, de victoria, de salute fundos populos fieri noluerunt. atqui si imperatoribus nostris, si senatui, si populo Romano non licebit propositis praemiis elicere ex civitatibus sociorum atque amicorum fortissimum atque optimum quemque ad subeunda pro salute nostra pericula, summa utilitate ac maximo saepe praesidio periculosis atque asperis temporibus carendum nobis erit.
But, by the immortal gods! what kind of alliance, friendship, treaty is this, that either our state should lack the Massiliot defender in its perils, lack the Gaditan, lack the Saguntine; or, if any from these peoples should arise to help our generals with toil and provisions at his own peril, who has often fought hand to hand with our enemy in the line, who has often thrown himself in the way of the enemy’s weapons, of capital combat, of death — on no terms should he be able to be rewarded with this state’s prizes?
sed, per deos immortalis, quae est ista societas, quae amicitia, quod foedus, ut aut nostra civitas careat in suis periculis Massiliensi propugnatore, careat Gaditano, careat Saguntino, aut, si quis ex his populis sit exortus qui nostros duces auxilio laboris, commeatus periculo suo iuverit, qui cum hoste nostro comminus in acie saepe pugnarit, qui se saepe telis hostium, qui dimicationi capitis, qui morti obiecerit, nulla condicione huius civitatis praemiis adfici possit?
For on the Roman people it weighs heavily not to be able to use as allies men endowed with outstanding courage who wish to share their dangers with ours; on the allies themselves, and on those federates of whom we are speaking, it is unjust and insulting that those most loyal and most closely connected allies should be excluded from rewards and honours which lie open to stipendiaries, lie open to enemies, lie often open to slaves. For we see many stipendiaries from Africa, Sicily, Sardinia, the rest of the provinces granted citizenship; and we know that men who fled from being enemies to our generals and were of great use to our commonwealth have been granted citizenship; slaves, finally, whose right, fortune, condition is the lowest, who have well deserved of the commonwealth, we see very often publicly granted freedom — that is, citizenship.
etenim in populum Romanum grave est non posse uti sociis excellenti virtute praeditis, qui velint cum periculis nostris sua communicare; in socios vero ipsos, et in eos de quibus agimus foederatos, iniuriosum et contumeliosum est iis praemiis et iis honoribus exclusos esse fidelissimos et coniunctissimos socios quae pateant stipendiariis, pateant hostibus, pateant saepe servis. nam stipendiarios ex Africa, Sicilia, Sardinia, ceteris provinciis multos civitate donatos videmus, et, qui hostes ad nostros imperatores perfugissent et magno usui rei publicae nostrae fuissent, scimus civitate esse donatos; servos denique, quorum ius, fortuna, condicio infima est, bene de re publica meritos persaepe libertate, id est civitate, publice donari videmus.
Do you, then, patron of treaties and federates, set up this condition for the Gaditans, your fellow citizens: that what is allowed to those whom we have subdued in arms with their great help, and reduced to our sway — if the Roman people will permit, that they may be granted citizenship by the Senate, even by our generals — this is not allowed to the Gaditans themselves? Who if they had ordained by their own decrees and laws that no one of their citizens should enter the camps of the Roman generals, that no one should expose himself to capital danger or to the hazard of life on behalf of our empire — so that we, when we wished, might use the help of the Gaditans, but no individual man of distinguished spirit and courage should fight under our command at his own peril — we should bear this gravely, and rightly: that the helps of the Roman people are diminished, the spirits of the bravest men weakened, that we are deprived by the eagerness of foreign men and their ancestral courage.
hanc tu igitur, patrone foederum ac foederatorum, condicionem statuis Gaditanis, tuis civibus, ut, quod iis quos magnis adiutoribus tuis usi civibus armis subegimus atque in dicionem nostram redegimus liceat, si populus Romanus permiserit, ut ab senatu, etiam per imperatores nostros civitate donentur, id ne liceat ipsis? qui si suis decretis legibusve sanxissent ne quis suorum civium castra imperatorum populi Romani iniret, ne quis se pro nostro imperio in periculum capitis atque in vitae discrimen inferret, Gaditanorum auxiliis, cum vellemus, uti nobis ut liceret, privatus vero ne quis vir et animo et virtute praecellens pro nostro imperio periculo suo dimicaret, graviter id iure ferremus, minui auxilia populi Romani, debilitari animos fortissimorum virorum, alienigenarum nos hominum studiis atque paterna virtute privari.
And it is no different, gentlemen, whether the federates establish these terms — that none from those communities be allowed to come to the dangers of our wars — or that what we have given to their citizens for their courage cannot be ratified. For we should no more use those helpers, the rewards of courage taken away, than if it were altogether forbidden to them to be in our wars. For when, on behalf of his own country, few since the human race has been have been found who without prizes set up have thrown their life upon the weapons of enemies, do you think anyone will be found who will set himself against danger on behalf of an alien commonwealth, not only with no reward set up, but even with reward forbidden?
atqui nihil interest, iudices, utrum haec foederati iura constituant, ut ne cui liceat ex iis civitatibus ad nostrorum bellorum pericula accedere, an, quae nos eorum civibus virtutis causa tribuerimus, ea rata esse non possint; nihil enim magis uteremur iis adiutoribus, sublatis virtutis praemiis, quam si omnino iis versari in nostris bellis non liceret. etenim cum pro sua patria pauci post genus hominum natum reperti sint qui nullis praemiis propositis vitam suam hostium telis obiecerint, pro aliena re publica quemquam fore putatis qui se opponat periculis non modo nullo proposito praemio, sed etiam interdicto?
But while it was very inexperienced what was said about peoples being fundi (which is common to free peoples, not proper to federates — from which it must be understood either that no one out of allies can become a citizen, or that he can do so even out of federates), then this our master of changing of citizenship is ignorant of every right which is set, gentlemen, not only in public laws but even in the will of private persons. For by our right neither can anyone change his citizenship unwillingly, nor, if he wishes, can he not change it — provided he be received by that state of which he wishes to be a citizen. So if the Gaditans by name accept some Roman citizen as a Gaditan citizen, our citizen has full power to change his citizenship; nor is he hindered by the treaty from being a Gaditan citizen instead of a Roman.
sed cum est illud imperitissime dictum de populis fundis, quod commune liberorum est populorum, non proprium foederatorum,—ex quo intellegi necesse est aut neminem ex sociis civem fieri posse aut etiam posse ex foederatis,— tum vero ius omne noster iste magister mutandae civitatis ignorat, quod est, iudices, non solum in legibus publicis positum, sed etiam in privatorum voluntate. iure enim nostro neque mutare civitatem quisquam invitus potest, neque si velit mutare non potest, modo adsciscatur ab ea civitate cuius esse se civitatis velit: ut, si Gaditani sciverint nominatim de aliquo cive Romano ut sit is civis Gaditanus, magna potestas sit nostro civi mutandae civitatis, nec foedere impediatur quo minus ex civi Romano civis Gaditanus possit esse.
Of two states none of us can be a citizen by civil law: he who has dedicated himself to another state can not be of this. Nor only by dedication — as in the case of the misfortune we have seen befall the most distinguished men, Q. Maximus, C. Laenas, Q. Philippus at Nuceria; C. Cato at Tarraco; Q. Caepio, P. Rutilius at Smyrna — whereby they became citizens of those communities, since they could not lose this one before they had turned this single soil by the change of citizenship; but also by postliminium can the change of citizenship be made. For not without reason, on Cn. Publicius Menander — a freedman whom our forefathers’ envoys, setting out for Greece, wished to take with them as interpreter — a measure was put before the people: that this Publicius, if he should return home and from there come back to Rome, would not on that account be the less a citizen. Many in earlier memory also of their own will, uncondemned and untouched, having left these things, betook themselves into other states.
duarum civitatum civis noster esse iure civili nemo potest: non esse huius civitatis qui se alii civitati dicarit potest. neque solum dicatione, quod in calamitate clarissimis viris Q. Maximo, C. Laenati, Q. Philippo Nuceriae, C. Catoni Tarracone, Q. Caepioni, P. Rutilio Zmyrnae vidimus accidisse, ut earum civitatum fierent cives, cum hanc ante amittere non potuissent quam hoc solum civitatis mutatione vertissent, sed etiam postliminio potest civitatis fieri mutatio. neque enim sine causa de Cn. Publicio Menandro, libertino homine, quem apud maiores legati nostri in Graeciam proficiscentes interpretem secum habere voluerunt, ad populum latum est ut is Publicius, si domum revenisset et inde Romam redisset, ne minus civis esset. multi etiam superiore memoria cives Romani sua voluntate, indemnati et incolumes, his rebus relictis alias se in civitates contulerunt.
If then it is lawful for a Roman citizen to be a Gaditan, whether by exile, or postliminium, or by rejection of this citizenship — to come now to the treaty, which is nothing to the case (for we are deciding the right of citizenship, not of treaties) — what is the reason a Gaditan citizen should not be allowed to come into this state? I myself feel far otherwise. For while from all states there is a way into ours, and to our citizens lies open the way to the rest of the states, yet the more any state is joined to us by alliance, friendship, sponsion, pact, treaty, the more it seems to me to be bound by the common sharing of benefits and rewards of citizenship. And all the other states would not hesitate to receive our men into their citizenship, if we had the same right as the rest; but we cannot be of this state and of any other besides; the rest are allowed it.
quod si civi Romano licet esse Gaditanum sive exsilio sive postliminio sive reiectione huius civitatis,—ut iam ad foedus veniam, quod ad causam nihil pertinet: de civitatis enim iure, non de foederibus disceptamus,—quid est quam ob rem civi Gaditano in hanc civitatem venire non liceat? equidem longe secus sentio. nam cum ex omnibus civitatibus via sit in nostram, cumque nostris civibus pateat ad ceteras iter civitates, tum vero, ut quaeque nobiscum maxime societate amicitia sponsione pactione foedere est coniuncta, ita mihi maxime communione beneficiorum praemiorum civitatis contineri videtur. atqui ceterae civitates omnes non dubitarent nostros homines recipere in suas civitates, si idem nos iuris haberemus quod ceteri; sed nos non possumus et huius esse civitatis et cuiusvis praeterea, ceteris concessum est.
Thus in the Greek states we see Athenians, Rhodians, Lacedaemonians, the rest from everywhere being inscribed, and the same men being of many states. By that error led, I myself have seen some inexperienced men, our citizens, at Athens, in the number of jurors and Areopagites, of a fixed tribe, of a fixed number, when they did not know that, if they had won that citizenship, they had lost this — unless they had recovered it by postliminium. But none ever experienced in our custom and right, who wished to retain this citizenship, dedicated himself to another. But this whole topic of my disputation and speech, gentlemen, applies to the common right of changing citizenship: it has nothing peculiar to religion and treaties. For I defend the universal point: that there is no people from any region of the earth, neither so divided from the Roman people by some hatred and rupture, nor so joined in faith and goodwill, from which we are forbidden to receive or to grant citizenship.
itaque in Graecis civitatibus videmus Atheniensis, Rhodios, Lacedaemonios, ceteros undique adscribi multarumque esse eosdem homines civitatum. quo errore ductos vidi egomet non nullos imperitos homines, nostros civis, Athenis in numero iudicum atque Areopagitarum, certa tribu, certo numero, cum ignorarent, si illam civitatem essent adepti, hanc se perdidisse nisi postliminio reciperassent. peritus vero nostri moris ac iuris nemo umquam, qui hanc civitatem retinere vellet, in aliam se civitatem dicavit. sed hic totus locus disputationis atque orationis meae, iudices, pertinet ad commune ius mutandarum civitatum: nihil habet quod sit proprium religionis ac foederum. defendo enim rem universam, nullam esse gentem ex omni regione terrarum, neque tam dissidentem a populo Romano odio quodam atque discidio, neque tam fide benivolentiaque coniunctam, ex qua nobis interdictum sit ne quem adsciscere civem aut civitate donare possimus.
O distinguished and divinely founded laws, from the very beginning of the Roman name by our forefathers established: that no one of us can be of more than one state (for the difference of states must hold a variety of right); that no one is unwillingly changed in citizenship, nor remains in citizenship unwillingly! For these are the firmest foundations of our liberty: that each is master both of holding and of giving up his own right. But this without doubt most of all founded our empire and increased the name of the Roman people: that that founder of this city, Romulus, by his treaty with the Sabines, taught that this state should be increased even by receiving enemies; on whose authority and example the largesse and sharing of citizenship was never broken off by our forefathers. So both from Latium many — as Tusculans, Lanuvians — and from the rest of kinds whole peoples were received into citizenship, as of the Sabines, Volscians, Hernicians; from which states neither would they have been forced to change citizenship if they had not wished to, nor, if any had attained our citizenship by the kindness of the Roman people, would their treaty have seemed violated.
O iura praeclara atque divinitus iam inde a principio Romani nominis a maioribus nostris comparata, ne quis nostrum plus quam unius civitatis esse possit,—dissimilitudo enim civitatum varietatem iuris habeat necesse est,—ne quis invitus civitate mutetur neve in civitate maneat invitus! haec sunt enim fundamenta firmissima nostrae libertatis, sui quemque iuris et retinendi et dimittendi esse dominum. illud vero sine ulla dubitatione maxime nostrum fundavit imperium et populi Romani nomen auxit, quod princeps ille creator huius urbis, Romulus, foedere Sabino docuit etiam hostibus recipiendis augeri hanc civitatem oportere; cuius auctoritate et exemplo numquam est intermissa a maioribus nostris largitio et communicatio civitatis. itaque et ex Latio multi, ut Tusculani, ut Lanuvini, et ex ceteris generibus gentes universae in civitatem sunt receptae, ut Sabinorum, Volscorum, Hernicorum; quibus ex civitatibus nec coacti essent civitate mutari, si qui noluissent, nec, si qui essent civitatem nostram beneficio populi Romani consecuti, violatum foedus eorum videretur.
For some treaties exist — as of the Cenomani, Insubres, Helvetii, Iapydes, and some likewise of the Gallic barbarians — in whose treaties it has been excepted that no one of them should be received as our citizen. But if exception makes it not lawful, then where it is not excepted, there it must be lawful. Where then is it in the Gaditan treaty that the Roman people should receive no Gaditan as a citizen? Nowhere. And if anywhere it were, the Gellian and Cornelian law, which had given Pompey definite power of granting citizenship, would have removed it. “The treaty,” he says, “has been excepted, if anything is sacrosanct.” I forgive you, if you neither know the laws of the Carthaginians (for you had left your own state) nor could you inspect our laws — for they themselves drove you back from their cognizance by a public trial.
etenim quaedam foedera exstant, ut Cenomanorum, Insubrium, Helvetiorum, Iapydum, non nullorum item ex Gallia barbarorum, quorum in foederibus exceptum est ne quis eorum a nobis civis recipiatur. quod si exceptio facit ne liceat, ubi non sit exceptum, ibi necesse est licere. Vbi est igitur in foedere Gaditano, ne quem populus Romanus Gaditanum recipiat civitate? nusquam. ac sicubi esset, lex id Gellia et Cornelia, quae definite potestatem Pompeio civitatem donandi dederat, sustulisset. exceptum, inquit, est foedus, Si qvid sacrosanctvm est. ignosco tibi, si neque Poenorum iura calles (reliqueras enim civitatem tuam) neque nostras potuisti leges inspicere; ipsae enim te a cognitione sua iudicio publico reppulerunt.
What was there in that bill which was carried about Pompey by the consuls Gellius and Lentulus, in which anything sacrosanct seemed to be excepted? For first, sacrosanct nothing can be unless what the people or plebs has sanctioned; next, sanctions are made sacred either by the kind itself or by the imprecation and consecration of the law, or by the penalty, when the head of him who has done contrary is consecrated. What then can you say of the Gaditan treaty of this kind? Whether by consecration of head or by imprecation of the law do you confirm it sacrosanct? Nothing at all has ever been brought to the people about that treaty, nothing to the plebs; I say no law and no consecrated penalty exists. Of those things, then, in respect of which, even if it had been put forward that we should receive no citizen, yet that would be ratified which the people had afterwards ordered — nor would anything seem to be excepted by those words “if anything is sacrosanct” — you, since the Roman people has ordered nothing about them, dare to say that anything has been sacrosanct?
quid fuit in rogatione ea quae de Pompeio a Gellio et a Lentulo consulibus lata est, in quo aliquid sacrosanctum exceptum videretur? primum enim sacrosanctum esse nihil potest nisi quod populus plebesve sanxit; deinde sanctiones sacrandae sunt aut genere ipso aut obtestatione et consecratione legis aut poenae, cum caput eius qui contra fecerit consecratur. quid habes igitur dicere de Gaditano foedere eius modi? utrum capitis consecratione an obtestatione legis sacrosanctum esse confirmas? nihil omnino umquam de isto foedere ad populum, nihil ad plebem latum esse neque legem neque poenam consecratam esse dico. de quibus igitur etiam si latum esset ne quem civem reciperemus, tamen id esset quod postea populus iussisset ratum, nec quicquam illis verbis Si qvid sacrosanctvm est exceptum videretur, de iis, cum populus Romanus nihil umquam iusserit, quicquam audes dicere sacrosanctum fuisse?
Nor does my speech, gentlemen, tend to weaken the Gaditan treaty; for it is not for me to speak against the right of a most well-deserving state, against the opinion of antiquity, against the authority of the Senate. For in those hard times of our commonwealth, when the most powerful by land and sea Carthage, leaning on the two Spains, threatened this empire, and when our two thunderbolts of empire suddenly perished extinct in Spain, Cn. and P. Scipio, L. Marcius, a centurion of the first rank, is said to have made a treaty with the Gaditans. Which, since it was held more by the faith of that people, by our justice, finally by antiquity itself, than by any public bond of religious sanction — the wise men and skilled in public law, the Gaditans, in the consulship of M. Lepidus and Q. Catulus, sought from the Senate concerning the treaty. Then was made or renewed the treaty with the Gaditans; about which treaty the Roman people did not vote, which without its order can in no way be religiously bound.
nec vero oratio mea ad infirmandum foedus Gaditanorum, iudices, pertinet; neque enim est meum contra ius optime meritae civitatis, contra opinionem vetustatis, contra auctoritatem senatus dicere. Duris enim quondam temporibus rei publicae nostrae, cum praepotens terra marique Carthago nixa duabus Hispaniis huic imperio immineret, et cum duo fulmina nostri imperi subito in Hispania, Cn. et P. Scipiones, exstincti occidissent, L. Marcius, primi pili centurio, cum Gaditanis foedus fecisse dicitur. quod cum magis fide illius populi, iustitia nostra, vetustate denique ipsa quam aliquo publico vinculo religionis teneretur, sapientes homines et publici iuris periti, Gaditani, M. Lepido Q. Catulo consulibus a senatu de foedere postulaverunt. tum est cum Gaditanis foedus vel renovatum vel ictum; de quo foedere populus Romanus sententiam non tulit, qui iniussu suo nullo pacto potest religione obligari.
So the Gaditan state, what it could attain by its services to our commonwealth, what by the testimonies of our generals, what by antiquity, what by the authority of Q. Catulus, the highest of men, what by the judgement of the Senate, what by the treaty, it has attained; what could be sanctioned by public religion, that is wanting — for the people nowhere bound itself. Nor for that is the case of the Gaditans the worse; for it is propped up by the gravest and most numerous things. But for that disputation here there is certainly no place; for sacrosanct nothing can be unless what has been sanctioned through people or plebs. But if this treaty, which the Roman people, on the authority of the Senate, by the recommendation and judgement of antiquity, by its will and opinions, approves, the same had approved by votes, what reason was there why a Gaditan should not be allowed by the very treaty to be received into our state? For there is nothing else in the treaty but that there should be “a holy and eternal peace.” What is that to the citizenship? There is also added what is not in all treaties: “Let them comiter preserve the majesty of the Roman people.” That has this force: that he is the inferior in the treaty.
ita Gaditana civitas, quod beneficiis suis erga rem publicam nostram consequi potuit, quod imperatorum testimoniis, quod vetustate, quod Q. Catuli, summi viri, auctoritate, quod iudicio senatus, quod foedere, consecuta est; quod publica religione sanciri potuit, id abest; populus enim se nusquam obligavit. neque ideo est Gaditanorum causa deterior; gravissimis enim et plurimis rebus est fulta. sed isti disputationi hic certe nihil est loci; sacrosanctum enim nihil potest esse nisi quod per populum plebemve sanctum est. quod si hoc foedus, quod populus Romanus auctore senatu, commendatione et iudicio vetustatis, voluntate et sententiis suis comprobat, idem suffragiis comprobasset, quid erat cur ex ipso foedere Gaditanum in civitatem nostram recipi non liceret? nihil est enim aliud in foedere nisi ut pia et aeterna pax sit. quid id ad civitatem? adiunctum illud etiam est, quod non est in omnibus foederibus: Maiestatem popvli Romani comiter conservanto. id habet hanc vim, ut sit ille in foedere inferior.
First, this kind of word “conservanto” (“let them preserve”), which we are wont to use rather in laws than in treaties, is of one giving orders, not asking. Next, since the majesty of one people is bidden to be preserved, while of the other there is silence, certainly that people is set in the higher condition and case whose majesty is defended by the sanction of the treaty. In which the prosecutor’s interpretation was unworthy of an answer; he was saying that “comiter” meant “communiter” — as if he were interpreting some ancient or unaccustomed word! Men are called “comes” who are kindly, easy, and pleasant; one who points out the road to a wanderer “comiter” does so kindly, not grudgingly. “Communiter” certainly does not fit.
primum verbi genus hoc conservanto, quo magis in legibus quam in foederibus uti solemus, imperantis est, non precantis. deinde cum alterius populi maiestas conservari iubetur, de altero siletur, certe ille populus in superiore condicione causaque ponitur cuius maiestas foederis sanctione defenditur. in quo erat accusatoris interpretatio indigna responsione, qui ita dicebat, comiter esse communiter, quasi vero priscum aliquod aut insolitum verbum interpretaretur. Comes benigni, faciles, suaves homines esse dicuntur; qui erranti comiter monstrat viam, benigne, non gravate; communiter quidem certe non convenit.
And at the same time it is absurd that it should be enjoined by treaty that they “communally” preserve the majesty of the Roman people, that is, that the Roman people wish its own majesty to be safe. And if it were so — as it cannot be — yet about our majesty, nothing would be enjoined about theirs. Can our majesty therefore be kindly preserved by the Gaditans, if we cannot draw out the Gaditans by rewards to keep it? Can there be any majesty at last, if we are hindered from delivering through the Roman people the power to our generals of giving rewards on account of services and courage?
et simul absurda res est caveri foedere ut maiestatem populi Romani communiter conservent, id est ut populus Romanus suam maiestatem esse salvam velit. quod si iam ita esset, ut esse non potest, tamen de nostra maiestate, nihil de illorum caveretur. potestne igitur nostra maiestas a Gaditanis benigne conservari, si ad eam retinendam Gaditanos praemiis elicere non possumus? potest esse ulla denique maiestas, si impedimur quo minus per populum Romanum beneficiorum virtutis causa tribuendorum potestatem imperatoribus nostris deferamus?
But why do I argue what would seem to me capable of being truly said if the Gaditans were speaking against me? For if they were demanding L. Cornelius back, I would answer that the Roman people had ordered the law on giving citizenship; that it was not customary for peoples to be made fundi for this kind of law; that Cn. Pompey, on the advice of his council, had given citizenship to this man; that the Gaditans had no order from our people about it; and so that nothing was sacrosanct that seemed excepted by the law; if it had been so, yet in the treaty nothing was provided for except peace; and that there was added too that they ought to preserve our majesty, which would surely be diminished if either it were not allowed us to use the help of those people in war, or we had no power of giving rewards.
sed quid ego disputo quae mihi tum, si Gaditani contra me dicerent, vere posse dici viderentur? illis enim repetentibus L. Cornelium responderem legem populum Romanum iussisse de civitate tribuenda; huic generi legum fundos populos fieri non solere; Cn. Pompeium de consili sententia civitatem huic dedisse, nullum populi nostri iussum Gaditanos habere; itaque nihil esse sacrosanctum quod lege exceptum videretur; si esset, tamen in foedere nihil esse cautum praeter pacem; additum esse etiam illud, ut maiestatem illi nostram conservare deberent, quae certe minueretur si aut adiutoribus illorum civibus uti in bellis nobis non liceret aut praemi tribuendi potestatem nullam haberemus.
Now indeed, why should I speak against the Gaditans, when what I am defending is approved by their will, their authority, by their very embassy? Who from the beginning of their race, by zeal for our commonwealth, turned their minds away from every leaning and feeling of Phoenicians toward our empire and name; who, when the greatest wars were being made on us, shut out the enemy from their walls, pursued them with fleets, drove them off with their bodies, resources, forces; who both have always considered that ancient form of the Marcian treaty more sacred than any citadel, and by this treaty under Catulus and the Senate’s authority have judged themselves most closely joined with us; whose walls, shrines, fields our forefathers wished to be the bounds of our empire and of the name of the Roman people, just as Hercules wished those his were of his journeys and labours.
nunc vero quid ego contra Gaditanos loquar, cum id quod defendo voluntate eorum, auctoritate, legatione ipsa comprobetur? qui a principio sui generis aut studio rei publicae †ii ab omni studio sensuque Poenorum mentis suas ad nostrum imperium nomenque flexerunt; qui, cum maxima bella nobis inferrentur, moenibus hostem excluserunt, classibus insecuti sunt, corporibus opibus copiis depulerunt; qui et veterem illam speciem foederis Marciani semper omni sanctiorem arce duxerunt, et hoc foedere Catuli senatusque auctoritate se nobiscum coniunctissimos esse arbitrati sunt; quorum moenia, delubra, agros ut Hercules itinerum ac laborum suorum, sic maiores nostri imperi ac nominis populi Romani terminos esse voluerunt.
Witness our dead generals — whose immortal memory and glory live: the Scipios, the Bruti, the Horatii, the Cassii, the Metelli; and witness this Cn. Pompey present, whom while he was waging a fierce and great war far from their walls they helped with provisions and money; and witness the Roman people itself at this time, whom in the dearness of grain, as they had often done before, they relieved by supplying corn — that they wish this to be their right: that to themselves and to their children, if any shall be of outstanding courage, there be a place in our camps, in the headquarters of our generals, and finally amid our standards and in the line of battle; that there be by these steps an ascent even to citizenship.
testantur et mortuos nostros imperatores, quorum vivit immortalis memoria et gloria, Scipiones, Brutos, Horatios, Cassios, Metellos, et hunc praesentem Cn. Pompeium, quem procul ab illorum moenibus acre et magnum bellum gerentem commeatu pecuniaque iuverunt, et hoc tempore ipsum populum Romanum, quem in caritate annonae, ut saepe ante fecerant, frumento suppeditato levarunt, se hoc ius esse velle, ut sibi et liberis, si qui eximia virtute fuerit, sit in nostris castris, sit in imperatorum praetoriis, sit denique inter signa atque in acie locus, sit his gradibus ascensus etiam ad civitatem.
If therefore Africans, Sardinians, Spaniards, fined in lands and tribute, are allowed by their courage to obtain citizenship, but to the Gaditans, joined to us by services, antiquity, faith, perils, treaty, this is not allowed — they will judge that no treaty has been struck with us but the most unfair of laws imposed by us. And that this speech is not feigned by me, gentlemen, but that I am saying what the Gaditans have themselves judged, the matter itself declares. Hospitality many years before this time the Gaditans publicly made with L. Cornelius, I declare. I will produce the tessera; I summon up envoys; you see eulogists sent to this trial, the highest and most noble men, and intercessors against this danger; finally, before this matter was so much as heard at Gades, that danger would arise here for him from yonder, the Gaditans had passed the gravest decrees of their senate against that citizen of theirs.
quod si Afris, si Sardis, si Hispanis agris stipendioque multatis virtute adipisci licet civitatem, Gaditanis autem officiis vetustate fide periculis foedere coniunctis hoc idem non licebit, non foedus sibi nobiscum ictum sed iniquissimas leges impositas a nobis esse arbitrabuntur. atque hanc, iudices, non a me fingi orationem, sed me dicere quae Gaditani iudicarint res ipsa declarat. hospitium multis annis ante hoc tempus cum L. Cornelio Gaditanos fecisse publice dico. Proferam tesseram; legatos excito; laudatores ad hoc iudicium, summos homines ac nobilissimos, deprecatores huius periculi missos videtis; re denique multo ante Gadibus inaudita, fore ut huic ab illo periculum crearetur gravissima autem in istum civem suum Gaditani senatus consulta fecerunt.
Could the Gaditan people be made more fundus (since you so heartily delight in this word) — if it becomes fundus when it confirms our resolutions and orders by its own opinion — than when they made hospitality with him, both confessing him to have changed citizenship and judging him most worthy of the honour of this state? Could it interpose more certain evidence of its will than when it marked the prosecutor of this man with fines and penalty? Could it judge more decidedly on the matter than when it sent its most distinguished citizens to your judgement as witnesses of this right, eulogists of his life, intercessors against his danger?
potuit magis fundus populus Gaditanus fieri, quoniam hoc magno opere delectare verbo, si tum fit fundus cum scita ac iussa nostra sua sententia comprobat, quam cum hospitium fecit, ut et civitate illum mutatum esse fateretur et huius civitatis honore dignissimum iudicaret? potuit certius interponere iudicium voluntatis suae quam cum etiam accusatorem huius multa et poena notavit? potuit magis de re iudicare quam cum ad vestrum iudicium civis amplissimos legavit testis huius iuris, vitae laudatores, periculi deprecatores?
For who is so demented as not to feel that this right is to be retained by the Gaditans, lest in perpetuity the way be hedged off to them to this most splendid prize of citizenship; and that they should rejoice greatly that this L. Cornelius’s goodwill toward them remains at Gades, that his favour and means of recommendation are at hand in this state? For who is there of us to whom that state has not been recommended by his zeal, care, diligence? I leave aside how greatly C. Caesar, when he was praetor in Spain, ornamented that people — settled controversies, established their laws by their permission, removed a kind of inveterate barbarism from the Gaditan customs and discipline, conferred on that state at this man’s request the highest zeal and benefits. Many things I pass over which they obtain daily by his labour and zeal, either at all or at any rate more easily. So the chief men of the state are present, and defend him, by love as their own citizen, by testimony as ours, by duty as the most holy guest from a most noble citizen, by zeal as the most diligent defender of their interests.
etenim quis est tam demens quin sentiat ius hoc Gaditanis esse retinendum, ne saeptum sit iis iter in perpetuum ad hoc amplissimum praemium civitatis, et magno opere iis esse laetandum huius L. Corneli benivolentiam erga suos remanere Gadibus, gratiam et facultatem commendandi in hac civitate versari? quis est enim nostrum cui non illa civitas sit huius studio, cura, diligentia commendatior? omitto quantis ornamentis populum istum C. Caesar, cum esset in Hispania praetor, adfecerit, controversias sedarit, iura ipsorum permissu statuerit, inveteratam quandam barbariam ex Gaditanorum moribus disciplinaque delerit, summa in eam civitatem huius rogatu studia et beneficia contulerit. multa praetereo quae cotidie labore huius et studio aut omnino aut certe facilius consequantur. itaque et adsunt principes civitatis et defendunt amore ut suum civem, testimonio ut nostrum, officio ut ex nobilissimo civi sanctissimum hospitem, studio ut diligentissimum defensorem commodorum suorum.
And lest the Gaditans themselves should think — although they suffer no harm if their citizens be allowed to come into our state on account of courage — yet that on this very score their treaty is inferior to that of others, I will console both these present, the best of men, and that most loyal and friendly state, and at the same time I will remind you, gentlemen, who are not unaware: that on the right by which this trial has been set up there has never been any doubt at all.
ac ne ipsi Gaditani arbitrentur, quamquam nullo incommodo adficiantur, si liceat eorum civis virtutis causa in nostram civitatem venire, tamen hoc ipso inferius esse suum foedus quam ceterorum, consolabor et hos praesentis, viros optimos, et illam fidelissimam atque amicissimam nobis civitatem, simul et vos non ignorantis, iudices, admonebo, quo de iure hoc iudicium constitutum sit, de eo numquam omnino esse dubitatum.
Whom therefore do we judge the wisest interpreters of treaties, the most skilled in the law of war, the most diligent in inquiring into the conditions of states and into causes? Surely those who have themselves now waged commands and wars. For if Q. Scaevola, that augur, when consulted on the law of property-pledges — a man most expert in law — sometimes referred his consultors to Furius and Cascellius, the property-dealers; if we used to consult M. Tugio about our Tusculan water rather than C. Aquilius, because constant practice given to one matter often surpasses both wit and craft — who can doubt that on treaties and on the whole law of peace and war we should set our generals before all the most expert in law?
quos igitur prudentissimos interpretes foederum, quos peritissimos bellici iuris, quos diligentissimos in exquirendis condicionibus civitatum atque causis esse arbitramur? eos profecto qui iam imperia ac bella gesserunt. etenim si Q. Scaevola ille augur, cum de iure praediatorio consuleretur, homo iuris peritissimus, consultores suos non numquam ad Furium et Cascellium praediatores reiciebat, si nos de aqua nostra Tusculana M. Tugionem potius quam C. Aquilium consulebamus, quod adsiduus usus uni rei deditus et ingenium et artem saepe vincit, quis dubitet de foederibus et de toto iure pacis et belli omnibus iuris peritissimis imperatores nostros anteferre?
Can we, then, prove to you the author of the example and act which is reproached by you — C. Marius? Do you seek anyone graver, more constant, more outstanding in courage, prudence, scrupulousness? He, then, granted citizenship to M. Annius Appius of Iguvium, a most brave man endowed with the highest courage; the same granted citizenship to two whole cohorts of Camertes, although he knew the Camertine treaty to be the holiest and fairest of all treaties. Can therefore L. Cornelius, gentlemen, be condemned without C. Marius’s act being condemned?
possumusne igitur tibi probare auctorem exempli atque facti illius quod a te reprenditur, C. Marium? quaeris aliquem graviorem, constantiorem, praestantiorem virtute, prudentia, religione? is igitur Iguvinatem M. Annium Appium, fortissimum virum summa virtute praeditum, civitate donavit: idem cohortis duas universas Camertium civitate donavit, cum Camertinum foedus omnium foederum sanctissimum atque aequissimum sciret esse. potest igitur, iudices, L. Cornelius condemnari, ut non C. Mari factum condemnetur?
Let that man therefore stand forth a little while in your thought, since in fact he cannot, that you may behold him with your minds, since with your eyes you cannot. Let him say that he was not inexperienced of the treaty, not raw of precedents, not unaware of war; that he was the disciple and soldier of P. Africanus; that he was instructed by his service, by his diplomatic missions in war; that, if he had touched as great wars as those he waged and finished, if he had served under as many consuls as the times he himself was consul, he could have learned and known thoroughly all the rights of war; that he had no doubt that he was hindered by no treaty from managing the commonwealth well; that by him from the most closely connected and friendly state every bravest man had been chosen out; that neither the Iguvians’ nor the Camertes’ treaty had been excepted, that rewards of courage might be granted to their citizens by the Roman people.
exsistat ergo ille vir parumper cogitatione vestra, quoniam re non potest, ut conspiciatis eum mentibus, quoniam oculis non potestis; dicat se non imperitum foederis, non rudem exemplorum, non ignarum belli fuisse; se P. Africani discipulum ac militem, se stipendiis, se legationibus bellicis eruditum, se, si tanta bella attigisset quanta gessit et confecit, si tot consulibus meruisset quotiens ipse consul fuit, omnia iura belli perdiscere ac nosse potuisse; sibi non fuisse dubium quin nullo foedere a re publica bene gerenda impediretur; a se ex coniunctissima atque amicissima civitate fortissimum quemque esse delectum; neque Iguvinatium neque Camertium foedere esse exceptum, quo minus eorum civibus a populo Romano praemia virtutis tribuerentur.
Therefore, when a few years after this gift of citizenship the most fierce inquiry on citizenship had come about under the Licinian and Mucian law, was any of those who had been granted citizenship from federate states called into trial? For T. Matrinius the Spoletine, one of those whom C. Marius had granted citizenship, pleaded his case from a most firm and distinguished Latin colony. When the eloquent man L. Antistius prosecuted him, he did not say that the Spoletine people had not been made fundus (for he saw that peoples are wont to be made fundi on their own right, not on ours), but that, since under the Apuleian law the colonies had not been led out — under which law Saturninus had carried for C. Marius the power of making three Roman citizens for each colony — this benefit, the substance being taken away, ought not in itself to stand.
itaque cum paucis annis post hanc civitatis donationem acerrima de civitate quaestio Licinia et Mucia lege venisset, num quis eorum, qui de foederatis civitatibus esset civitate donatus, in iudicium est vocatus? nam Spoletinus T. Matrinius, unus ex iis quos C. Marius civitate donasset, dixit causam ex colonia Latina in primis firma et inlustri. quem cum disertus homo L. Antistius accusaret, non dixit fundum Spoletinum populum non esse factum,—videbat enim populos de suo iure, non de nostro fundos fieri solere,—sed cum lege Apuleia coloniae non essent deductae, qua lege Saturninus C. Mario tulerat ut in singulas colonias ternos civis Romanos facere posset, negabat hoc beneficium re ipsa sublata valere debere.
That prosecution has nothing of likeness to this; but yet so great was the authority in C. Marius that not by L. Crassus his kinsman, a man of incredible eloquence, but in a few words he himself defended that case by his own gravity and won. For who would there be, gentlemen, who would wish to take from our generals in war, in the line, in the army, the choice of courage; from our allies, from our federates, in defending our commonwealth, the hope of rewards? But if the face of C. Marius, his voice, that imperatorial fire of his eyes, his recent triumphs, his living gaze were of weight, let his authority be of weight, let his deeds, let his memory, let the eternal name of that bravest and most distinguished man. Let this be the difference between citizens of favour and brave citizens: that those alive enjoy their resources, the authority of these men, even dead — if any defender of this empire can die — live immortal.
nihil habet similitudinis ista accusatio; sed tamen tanta auctoritas in C. Mario fuit ut non per L. Crassum, adfinem suum, hominem incredibili eloquentia, sed paucis ipse verbis causam illam gravitate sua defenderit et probarit. quis enim esset, iudices, qui imperatoribus nostris in bello, in acie, in exercitu dilectum virtutis, qui sociis, qui foederatis in defendenda re publica nostra spem praemiorum eripi vellet? quod si vultus C. Mari, si vox, si ille imperatorius ardor oculorum, si recentes triumphi, si praesens valuit aspectus, valeat auctoritas, valeant res gestae, valeat memoria, valeat fortissimi et clarissimi viri nomen aeternum. sit hoc discrimen inter gratiosos civis atque fortis, ut illi vivi fruantur opibus suis, horum etiam mortuorum, si quisquam huius imperi defensor mori potest, vivat auctoritas immortalis.
What of Cn. Pompey the father, after his greatest exploits in the Italic war: did he not grant citizenship to P. Caesius, a Roman knight, a good man, who lives, from the federate people of Ravenna? What? Two whole cohorts of Camertes did C. Marius? What? The Heraclean Alexas P. Crassus, that most distinguished man, from that state with which a treaty almost unique was struck in Pyrrhus’s times under the consul C. Fabricius? What? The Massiliot Aristo did L. Sulla? What? — since we are dealing with the Gaditans — the same man nine Gaditan slaves? What? The most holy and self-restrained man, Q. Metellus Pius, the Saguntine Q. Fabius? What? This man here who stands by, by whom these things which I am now running through have all been most subtly polished, M. Crassus, did he not grant citizenship to a federate from Aveia, a man of outstanding gravity and prudence, indeed perhaps too sparing in granting citizenship?
quid? Cn. Pompeius pater rebus Italico bello maximis gestis P. Caesium, equitem Romanum, virum bonum, qui vivit, Ravennatem foederato ex populo nonne civitate donavit? quid? cohortis duas universas Camertium C. Marius? quid? Heracliensem Alexam P. Crassus, vir amplissimus, ex ea civitate quacum prope singulare foedus Pyrrhi temporibus C. Fabricio consule ictum putatur? quid? Massiliensem Aristonem L. Sulla? quid? quoniam de Gaditanis agimus, idem serv os novem Gaditanos? quid? vir sanctissimus et summa religione ac modestia, Q. Metellus Pius, Q. Fabium Saguntinum? quid? hic qui adest, a quo haec quae ego nunc percurro subtilissime sunt omnia perpolita, M. Crassus, non Aveniensem foederatum civitate donavit, homo cum gravitate et prudentia praestans, tum vel nimium parcus in largienda civitate?
Here you try to weaken Cn. Pompey’s kindness — or rather his judgement and act — who did what he had heard C. Marius do, what he had seen P. Crassus, L. Sulla, Q. Metellus, M. Crassus do, finally what his own father had done, his domestic precedent? Nor indeed in Cornelius alone did he do this; for he granted citizenship to the Gaditan Hasdrubal from that African war, to the Mamertines Ovii, to certain Uticans, to the Saguntine Fabii. For while those who defend our commonwealth by their own labour and danger are worthy of other rewards, surely they are most worthy that they be granted that citizenship for which they have undergone perils and weapons. And would that those who anywhere are defenders of this empire could come into this state, and against the besiegers of the commonwealth be banished from citizenship! For not by chance was that highest poet of ours wishing Hannibal’s exhortation to be his rather than every general’s: “The man who shall strike the enemy, will be,” he says, “Carthaginian to me, whoever he is.” Of what citizenship a man is, they hold today as a slight matter, and have always held; and therefore from everywhere they have enrolled brave citizens, and the courage of obscure men they have very often preferred to the inertness of the noble.
hic tu Cn. Pompei beneficium vel potius iudicium et factum infirmare conaris, qui fecit quod C. Marium fecisse audierat, fecit quod P. Crassum, quod L. Sullam, quod Q. Metellum, quod M. Crassum, quod denique domesticum auctorem patrem suum facere viderat? neque vero id in uno Cornelio fecit; nam et Gaditanum Hasdrubalem ex bello illo Africano et Mamertinos Ovios et quosdam Vticensis et Saguntinos Fabios civitate donavit. etenim cum ceteris praemiis digni sunt qui suo labore et periculo nostram rem publicam defendunt, tum certe dignissimi sunt qui civitate ea donentur pro qua pericula ac tela subierunt. atque utinam qui ubique sunt propugnatores huius imperi possent in hanc civitatem venire, et contra oppugnatores rei publicae de civitate exterminari! neque enim ille summus poeta noster Hannibalis illam magis cohortationem quam communem imperatoriam voluit esse: hostem qui feriet, erit, inquit, mihi Carthaginiensis, quisquis erit. cuius civitatis sit, id habent hodie leve et semper habuerunt, itaque et civis undique fortis viros adsciverunt et hominum ignobilium virtutem persaepe nobilitatis inertiae praetulerunt.
You have the highest generals’ and the wisest men’s, the most distinguished men’s, interpretation of right and of treaties: I will give also that of the jurors who presided over this very inquiry; I will give that of the whole Roman people; I will give the most holy and wisest judgement also of the Senate. When the jurors openly carried before them and openly spoke what they would judge under the Papian law about M. Cassius, the Mamertines demanding him, the Mamertines, after they had publicly undertaken the case, withdrew. Many men received into citizenship from free and federate peoples have been freed: never was anyone accused on citizenship on the ground that the people had not been made fundus, or that the right of changing citizenship was hindered by treaty.
habetis imperatorum summorum et sapientissimorum hominum, clarissimorum virorum, interpretationem iuris ac foederum: dabo etiam iudicum qui huic quaestioni praefuerunt, dabo universi populi Romani, dabo sanctissimum et sapientissimum iudicium etiam senatus. iudices cum prae se ferrent palamque loquerentur quid essent lege Papia de M. Cassio Mamertinis repetentibus iudicaturi, Mamertini publice suscepta causa destiterunt. multi in civitatem recepti ex liberis foederatisque populis liberati sunt: nemo umquam est de civitate accusatus, quod aut populus fundus factus non esset, aut quod foedere civitatis mutandae ius impediretur.
I will dare to assert this also: never has anyone been condemned who was established to have been granted citizenship by our general. Hear now the judgement of the Roman people, often interposed and approved by the very fact and use in the greatest causes. That the treaty was struck with all the Latins under the consuls Sp. Cassius and Postumus Cominius, who is unaware? Which indeed we remember was lately inscribed and written out on the bronze column behind the rostra. How then did L. Cossinius of Tibur, the father of this Roman knight, an excellent and most distinguished man, become a Roman citizen on the conviction of T. Caelius? How, from the same state, did T. Coponius, a citizen likewise of the highest virtue and dignity (you know his grandsons T. and C. Coponius), become a Roman citizen on the conviction of C. Maso?
audebo etiam hoc contendere, numquam esse condemnatum quem constaret ab imperatore nostro civitate donatum. cognoscite nunc populi Romani iudicium multis rebus interpositum atque in maximis causis re ipsa atque usu comprobatum. Cum Latinis omnibus foedus esse ictum Sp. Cassio Postumo Cominio consulibus quis ignorat? quod quidem nuper in columna ahenea meminimus post rostra incisum et perscriptum fuisse. quo modo igitur L. Cossinius Tiburs, pater huius equitis Romani, optimi atque ornatissimi viri, damnato T. Caelio, quo modo ex eadem civitate T. Coponius, civis item summa virtute et dignitate,—nepotes T. et C. Coponios nostis,—damnato C. Masone civis Romanus est factus?
Or could the way to citizenship be opened by tongue and wit, and could it not by hand and courage? Or was it allowed to take spoils of us from the federates, but not from enemies? Or what they could win by speaking, could they not win by fighting? Or did our forefathers wish greater rewards for the prosecutor than for the warrior? But if under the most bitter Servilian law the leading men and most grave and wise citizens allowed this way to citizenship to be opened, by order of the people, to the Latins (that is, to the federates) — and that right was not reproached under the Licinian and Mucian law, especially since the very kind of accusation, the name itself, and a reward of such sort that no one could attain it except from a senator’s calamity, could be too pleasing neither to a senator nor to any good man — could there be doubt that, in the kind of trials in which the rewards of jurors stood ratified, the judgements of generals also were valid? Do we then think the Latin peoples were made fundi either to the Servilian law or to the rest by which to Latin men a reward of citizenship was set out from some matter?
an lingua et ingenio patefieri aditus ad civitatem potuit, manu et virtute non potuit? anne de nobis trahere spolia foederatis licebat, de hostibus non licebat? an quod adipisci poterant dicendo, id eis pugnando adsequi non licebat? an accusatori maiores nostri maiora praemia quam bellatori esse voluerunt? quod si acerbissima lege Servilia principes viri ac gravissimi et sapientissimi cives hanc Latinis, id est foederatis, viam ad civitatem populi iussu patere passi sunt, neque ius est hoc reprehensum Licinia et Mucia lege, cum praesertim genus ipsum accusationis et nomen et eius modi praemium quod nemo adsequi posset nisi ex senatoris calamitate neque senatori neque bono cuiquam nimis iucundum esse posset, dubitandum fuit quin, quo in genere iudicum praemia rata essent, in eodem iudicia imperatorum valerent? num fundos igitur factos populos Latinos arbitramur aut Serviliae legi aut ceteris quibus Latinis hominibus erat propositum aliqua ex re praemium civitatis?
Hear now the judgement of the Senate, which has always been approved by the judgement of the people. Our forefathers wished, gentlemen, that the rites of Ceres be performed with the highest religion and ceremony; which, since they had been adopted from Greece, were always managed by Greek priestesses and altogether named in Greek. But when from Greece they chose her who would show and perform that Greek rite, yet they wished that the rites for citizens should be performed by a citizen — that she should pray to the immortal gods with foreign and external knowledge, but with a domestic and civic mind. These priestesses I see for the most part have been either Neapolitans or Velians, of federate states without doubt. I leave aside ancient cases; most recently I say, before citizenship was given to the Velians, by the Senate’s opinion, C. Valerius Flaccus, the urban praetor, brought a measure to the people by name about Calliphana of Velia, that she should be a Roman citizen. Do we then think the Velians were made fundi, or that priestess not made a Roman citizen, or the treaty violated by both Senate and Roman people?
cognoscite nunc iudicium senatus, quod semper iudicio est populi comprobatum. sacra Cereris, iudices, summa maiores nostri religione confici caerimoniaque voluerunt; quae cum essent adsumpta de Graecia, et per Graecas curata sunt semper sacerdotes et Graeca omnino nominata. sed cum illam quae Graecum illud sacrum monstraret et faceret ex Graecia deligerent, tamen sacra pro civibus civem facere voluerunt, ut deos immortalis scientia peregrina et externa, mente domestica et civili precaretur. has sacerdotes video fere aut Neapolitanas aut Veliensis fuisse, foederatarum sine dubio civitatum. Mitto vetera; proxime dico ante civitatem Veliensibus datam de senatus sententia C. Valerium Flaccum, praetorem urbanum, nominatim ad populum de Calliphana Veliense, ut ea civis Romana esset, tulisse. num igitur aut fundos factos Veliensis, aut sacerdotem illam civem Romanam factam non esse, aut foedus et a senatu et a populo Romano violatum arbitramur?
I understand, gentlemen, that in a case clear and least doubtful much more has been said, and by more men of the greatest skill, than the matter required. But this was done not so that we might prove a thing so plain to you by speaking, but so that we might break the spirits of all the malevolent, the unfair, and the envious. Whom, that the prosecutor might inflame, that some words of men grieving over others’ goods should reach even your ears and overflow into the trial itself, you saw with the highest art was scattered in every part of his speech: now Cornelius’s money, which is neither odious and, however much there is, is of such kind that it seems to have been preserved rather than snatched up; now luxury, which was marked by no charge of any vice but by common abuse; now the Tusculan estate, which he remembered had belonged to Q. Metellus and L. Crassus — but he did not hold that Crassus had bought it from a freedman, Sotericus Marcius, and it had come to Metellus from the goods of Vennonius Vindex. He did not know either that there is no family of estates: that they are wont to come by purchase often to outsiders, often to the lowest, not by laws as it were as guardianships.
intellego, iudices, in causa aperta minimeque dubia multo et plura et a pluribus peritissimis esse dicta quam res postularet. sed id factum est, non ut vobis rem tam perspicuam dicendo probaremus, verum ut omnium malivolorum iniquorum invidiosorum animos frangeremus; quos ut accusator incenderet, ut aliqui sermones hominum alienis bonis maerentium etiam ad vestras auris permanarent et in iudicio ipso redundarent, idcirco illa in omni parte orationis summa arte adspergi videbatis; tum pecuniam L. Corneli, quae neque invidiosa est et, quantacumque est, eius modi est ut conservata magis quam correpta esse videatur; tum luxuriam, quae non crimine aliquo libidinis, sed communi maledicto notabatur; tum Tusculanum, quod Q. Metelli fuisse meminerat et L. Crassi, Crassum emisse de libertino homine, Soterico Marcio, ad Metellum pervenisse de Vennoni Vindici bonis non tenebat. simul illud nesciebat, praediorum nullam esse gentem, emptionibus ea solere saepe ad alienos homines, saepe ad infimos, non legibus tamquam tutelas pervenire.
It has been objected too that he came into the Clustumine tribe; which he obtained as the reward of the law on canvassing — a less odious reward than those who through the rewards of the laws win the praetorian opinion and the praetexta. And the adoption by Theophanes has been raised, through which Cornelius has obtained nothing but the inheritances of his own kinsmen. Yet it is not very difficult to soften the spirits of those who themselves envy Cornelius. After the manner of men they envy; in dinner-parties they gnaw at him; in conversations they nip; not with that hostile but with this evil tooth they bite.
obiectum est etiam quod in tribum Clustuminam pervenerit; quod hic adsecutus est legis de ambitu praemio minus invidioso quam qui legum praemiis praetoriam sententiam et praetextam togam consequuntur. et adoptatio Theophani agitata est, per quam Cornelius nihil est praeterquam propinquorum suorum hereditates adsecutus. quamquam istorum animos, qui ipsi Cornelio invident, non est difficillimum mitigare. more hominum invident, in conviviis rodunt, in circulis vellicant: non illo inimico, sed hoc malo dente carpunt.
Those who are either enemies to the friends of L. Cornelius or envy them are much more strongly to be feared by him. For of him himself, who has ever been found an enemy, or who could justly have been? What good man has he not cultivated, to whose fortune and dignity has he not yielded? Engaged in the inmost intimacy of the most powerful man, in our greatest evils and discords, he never offended anyone of the other policy and party, neither in deed, in word, nor finally in countenance. It was either my fate or that of the commonwealth that on me alone all that inclination of the common times should fall. Cornelius not only did not exult in our ruins and your mournful dress, but with every duty — tears, work, consolation — relieved all of mine in my absence.
qui amicis L. Corneli aut inimici sunt aut invident, ii sunt huic multo vehementius pertimescendi. nam huic quidem ipsi quis est umquam inventus inimicus aut quis iure esse potuit? quem bonum non coluit, cuius fortunae dignitatique non concessit? versatus in intima familiaritate hominis potentissimi, in maximis nostris malis atque discordiis neminem umquam alterius rationis ac partis non re, non verbo, non vultu denique offendit. fuit hoc sive meum sive rei publicae fatum, ut in me unum omnis illa inclinatio communium temporum incumberet. non modo non exsultavit in ruinis nostris vestrisque sordibus Cornelius, sed omni officio,—lacrimis, opera, consolatione,—omnis me absente meos sublevavit.
On their testimony and prayers I render this deserved gift to him and, as I said at the start, just and owed gratitude. And I hope, gentlemen, that, as you love and hold dear those who were the chiefs in preserving my safety or dignity, so what has been done by him — according to the means of the man, according to his place — is grateful to you and approved. Therefore he is pressed not by his own enemies (for he has none), but by the enemies of his friends, who are both many and powerful: whom indeed yesterday Cn. Pompey was bidding, in a copious and grave speech, to contend with him, if they wished, but was calling them away from this unequal struggle and unjust contest with this man.
quorum ego testimonio ac precibus munus hoc meritum huic et, ut a principio dixi, iustam et debitam gratiam refero, speroque, iudices, ut eos qui principes fuerunt conservandae salutis aut dignitatis meae diligitis et caros habetis, sic, quae ab hoc pro facultate hominis, pro loco facta sunt, et grata esse vobis et probata. non igitur a suis, quos nullos habet, sed a suorum, qui et multi et potentes sunt, urgetur inimicis; quos quidem hesterno die Cn. Pompeius copiosa oratione et gravi secum, si vellent, contendere iubebat, ab hoc impari certamine atque iniusta contentione avocabat.
And it will be a fair law and useful both to us, gentlemen, and to all who are bound up by intimacy with us: that we ourselves carry on our enmities among ourselves, but spare the friends of our enemies. And if my authority had enough weight with them in this matter — when especially they see me now well taught by the variety of affairs and by very practice — I would call them away even from those greater discords. For to contend about the commonwealth, when you defend what you feel to be best, I have always thought belongs to brave men and to great men, and I have never been wanting to that labour, duty, gift. But contention is wise just so long as it either profits something, or, if it does not profit, does not harm the state.
et erit aequa lex et nobis, iudices, atque omnibus qui nostris familiaritatibus implicantur vehementer utilis, ut nostras inimicitias ipsi inter nos geramus, amicis nostrorum inimicorum temperemus. ac si mea auctoritas satis apud illos in hac re ponderis haberet, cum me praesertim rerum varietate atque usu ipso iam perdoctum viderent, etiam ab illis eos maioribus discordiis avocarem. etenim contendere de re publica, cum id defendas quod esse optimum sentias, et fortium virorum et magnorum hominum semper putavi, neque huic umquam labori officio muneri defui. sed contentio tam diu sapiens est quam diu aut proficit aliquid, aut, si non proficit, non obest civitati.
Some things we wished, contended for, made trial of: they were not won. Some have taken on grief; we, mourning and sorrow. Why do we choose rather to tear up what we cannot change than to defend it? The Senate honoured C. Caesar both with the most ample form of supplication and with a new number of days; the same, in the straits of the treasury, paid the victorious army its stipend, decreed ten legates to the commander, and did not vote that he should be succeeded under the lex Sempronia. Of these opinions I was both leader and author, nor did I think I should rather assent to my old dissent than fit the present times of the commonwealth and concord. To others it does not seem the same: they are perhaps firmer in opinion. I rebuke no one, but I do not assent to all; and I do not think it inconsistent to steer my opinion as a vessel and a course out of the commonwealth’s tempest.
voluimus quaedam, contendimus, experti sumus: obtenta non sunt. dolorem alii, nos luctum maeroremque suscepimus. cur ea quae mutare non possumus convellere malumus quam tueri? C. Caesarem senatus et genere supplicationum amplissimo ornavit et numero dierum novo: idem in angustiis aerari victorem exercitum stipendio adfecit, imperatori decem legatos decrevit, lege Sempronia succedendum non censuit. harum ego sententiarum et princeps et auctor fui, neque me dissensioni meae pristinae putavi potius adsentiri quam praesentibus rei publicae temporibus et concordiae convenire. non idem aliis videtur: sunt fortasse in sententia firmiores. reprendo neminem, sed adsentior non omnibus; neque esse inconstantis puto sententiam tamquam aliquod navigium atque cursum ex rei publicae tempestate moderari.
But if there are some men whose hatred is endless once it has been taken up — and I see there are some — let them clash with the leaders themselves, not with the company and following. For some perhaps will think that obstinacy, others courage; this they will all think unfairness joined with some cruelty. But if we cannot by any reason placate the minds of certain men, gentlemen, your spirits at any rate we trust have been placated not by our speech but by your humanity.
sed si qui sunt quibus infinitum sit odium in quos semel susceptum sit, quos video esse non nullos, cum ducibus ipsis, non cum comitatu adsectatoribusque confligant. illam enim fortasse pertinaciam non nulli, virtutem alii putabunt, hanc vero iniquitatem omnes cum aliqua crudelitate coniunctam. sed si certorum hominum mentis nulla ratione, iudices, placare possumus, vestros quidem animos certe confidimus non oratione nostra, sed humanitate vestra esse placatos.
For why should not Caesar’s intimacy be of weight for this man rather toward the highest praise than toward the slightest fraud? Caesar got to know him as a young man; he pleased a most prudent man; in the great supply of friends he was set on a level with the closest. In his praetorship, in his consulship, he made him prefect of engineers. He approved the man’s counsel, embraced his faith, loved his offices and observance. He has been a partner of many of his labours sometime; he is perhaps now a sharer of some of his rewards. Which things, if they shall have hurt him with you, I do not see what good will profit anyone before such men.
quid enim est cur non potius ad summam laudem huic quam ad minimam fraudem Caesaris familiaritas valere debeat? cognovit adulescens; placuit homini prudentissimo; in summa amicorum copia cum familiarissimis eius est adaequatus. in praetura, in consulatu praefectum fabrum detulit; consilium hominis probavit, fidem est complexus, officia observantiamque dilexit. fuit hic multorum illi laborum socius aliquando: est fortasse nunc non nullorum particeps commodorum. quae quidem si huic obfuerint apud vos, non intellego quod bonum cuiquam sit apud talis viros profuturum.
But since C. Caesar is most far away, and is now in those places which by their region define the world, by his deeds the empire of the Roman people — do not, I beg by the immortal gods, gentlemen, wish a bitter message to be borne to him: that he should hear that his prefect of engineers, that the man dearest to him, has been crushed by your verdicts, not for any fault of his own, but on account of his intimacy. Pity him, who is not arguing about a sin of his own but about the act of this highest and most distinguished man, not about some charge but, at his own peril, about the public law. Which law if Cn. Pompey was ignorant of, if M. Crassus, if Q. Metellus, if Cn. Pompey the father, if L. Sulla, if P. Crassus, if C. Marius, if the Senate, if the Roman people, if those who have judged on a like matter, if the federate peoples, if the allies, if those ancient Latins — see that it not be more useful and more honourable for you to err with such leaders than to be schooled by this master. But if you see that you must establish from a sure, from a clear, from a useful, from an approved, from an adjudicated right, do not commit to feel anything new in a matter so long established.
sed quoniam C. Caesar abest longissime, atque in iis est nunc locis quae regione orbem terrarum, rebus illius gestis imperium populi Romani definiunt, nolite, per deos immortalis, iudices, hunc illi acerbum nuntium velle perferri, ut suum praefectum fabrum, ut hominem sibi carissimum, non ob ipsius aliquod delictum, sed ob suam familiaritatem vestris oppressum sententiis audiat. miseremini eius qui non de suo peccato sed de huius summi et clarissimi viri facto, non de aliquo crimine sed periculo suo de publico iure disceptat. quod ius si Cn. Pompeius ignoravit, si M. Crassus, si Q. Metellus, si Cn. Pompeius pater, si L. Sulla, si P. Crassus, si C. Marius, si senatus, si populus Romanus, si qui de re simili iudicarunt, si foederati populi, si socii, si illi antiqui Latini, videte ne utilius vobis et honestius sit illis ducibus errare quam hoc magistro erudiri. sed si de certo, de perspicuo, de utili, de probato, de iudicato vobis iure esse constituendum videtis, nolite committere ut in re tam inveterata quicquam novi sentiatis.
At the same time, gentlemen, set all these things before your eyes: first, that all those most distinguished men who have granted federates citizenship are even after their death defendants here; next, the Senate which judged it, the people which ordered it, the jurors who approved. Then consider this also: that Cornelius is so living and has so lived that, although the inquiries are on all faults, he is called into trial not for the punishment of his own vices but for the reward of his courage. Add to this, that you should establish by this trial whether you would prefer for the future that the friendships of distinguished men should be a calamity or an ornament for men. Last, hold this fixed in your hearts, gentlemen: that in this case you are about to judge not on L. Cornelius’s misdeed but on Cn. Pompey’s kindness.
simul et illa, iudices, omnia ante oculos vestros proponite: primum esse omnis etiam post mortem reos clarissimos illos viros qui foederatos civitate donarunt; deinde senatum qui hoc iudicavit, populum qui iussit, iudices qui adprobarunt. tum etiam illud cogitate, sic vivere ac vixisse Cornelium ut, cum omnium peccatorum quaestiones sint, non de vitiorum suorum poena, sed de virtutis praemio in iudicium vocetur. accedat etiam illud, ut statuatis hoc iudicio utrum posthac amicitias clarorum virorum calamitati hominibus an ornamento esse malitis. postremo illud, iudices, fixum in animis vestris tenetote, vos in hac causa non de maleficio L. Corneli, sed de beneficio Cn. Pompei iudicaturos.