Quintus my brother, as I set out to recall to mind and to consign to this third book the conversation which Crassus held after Antonius’s discussion, a sharp recollection has renewed my old grief and trouble of soul. For that talent worthy of immortality, that humanity, that virtue of L. Crassus was extinguished by his sudden death scarcely ten days after the day which is contained in this and the previous book.

Cogitanti mihi saepe numero et memoria vetera repetenti perbeati fuisse, Quinte frater, illi videri solent, qui in optima re publica, cum et honoribus et rerum gestarum gloria florerent, eum vitae cursum tenere potuerunt, ut vel in negotio sine periculo vel in otio cum dignitate esse possent; ac fuit cum mihi quoque initium requiescendi atque animum ad utriusque nostrum praeclara studia referendi fore iustum et prope ab omnibus concessum arbitrarer, si infinitus forensium rerum labor et ambitionis occupatio decursu honorum, etiam aetatis flexu constitisset.

For when he had returned to Rome on the last day of the stage games, deeply moved by that speech which was reported to have been made in the assembly by Philippus — who, it was agreed, had said: “I must look for some other counsel; with that senate I cannot conduct the commonwealth” — early on the Ides of September both he himself and a crowded senate came at Drusus’s summons into the curia. There Drusus, after he had complained much about Philippus, brought the matter before the senate concerning that very thing — that the consul had inveighed so weightily in the assembly against that order.

Quam spem cogitationum et consiliorum meorum cum graves communium temporum tum varii nostri casus fefellerunt; nam qui locus quietis et tranquillitatis plenissimus fore videbatur, in eo maximae moles molestiarum et turbulentissimae tempestates exstiterunt; neque vero nobis cupientibus atque exoptantibus fructus oti datus est ad eas artis, quibus a pueris dediti fuimus, celebrandas inter nosque recolendas.

Here, as I have often seen agreed among the wisest men, although it had nearly always happened to Crassus, when he had spoken anything more carefully, that he was thought never to have spoken better, yet by the consensus of all it was so judged at that time: that the rest had always been surpassed by Crassus, but on that day even he himself was surpassed by himself. For he lamented the chance and bereavement of the senate, whose patrimony of dignity was being torn away by the consul (who ought to be like a good parent or faithful guardian), as if by some criminal robber. Nor was it to be wondered at, if, when by his own counsels he had ruined the commonwealth, he should reject from the commonwealth the senate’s counsel.

Nam prima aetate incidimus in ipsam perturbationem disciplinae veteris, et consulatu devenimus in medium rerum omnium certamen atque discrimen, et hoc tempus omne post consulatum obiecimus eis fluctibus, qui per nos a communi peste depulsi in nosmet ipsos redundarent. Sed tamen in his vel asperitatibus rerum vel angustiis temporis obsequar studiis nostris et quantum mihi vel fraus inimicorum vel causae amicorum vel res publica tribuet oti, ad scribendum potissimum conferam; tibi vero, frater, neque hortanti deero neque roganti, nam neque auctoritate quisquam apud me plus valere te potest neque voluntate.

When he had brought, as it were, certain firebrands of words to the man — vehement and eloquent and chief of all in resisting, Philippus — Philippus did not bear it, and burned with grave anger, and, having seized pledges, set about coercing Crassus. In which very place many things are reported to have been said by Crassus divinely, when he denied that man could be his consul, to whom he himself was no senator. “Or do you, when you have reckoned the whole authority of our entire order as a pledge and have cut it down before the eyes of the Roman people, suppose me to be terrified by these pledges? Not those things must you cut down, if you wish to coerce L. Crassus: this tongue must be cut out by you, by which, even if torn out, my liberty by the very breath shall confound your lust.”

Ac mihi repetenda est veteris cuiusdam memoriae non sane satis explicata recordatio, sed, ut arbitror, apta ad id, quod requiris, ut cognoscas quae viri omnium eloquentissimi clarissimique senserint de omni ratione dicendi.

Many things are said by him on that day, with the highest contention of soul and body, weightily and abundantly, and it was indeed his outstanding statement, his “swan-song” — which we, awaiting more from him, used to come, as it were, to his house and tomb after his death, that we might see at least the very place in which he had lastly stood. The pain of his side at once attacked him in saying; sweat broke out, then a chill came on. So, having returned home with a fever, on the seventh day after, he died of pleurisy.

Vis enim, ut mihi saepe dixisti, quoniam, quae pueris aut adulescentulis nobis ex commentariolis nostris incohata ac rudia exciderunt, vix sunt hac aetate digna et hoc usu, quem ex causis, quas diximus, tot tantisque consecuti sumus, aliquid eisdem de rebus politius a nobis perfectiusque proferri; solesque non numquam hac de re a me in disputationibus nostris dissentire, quod ego eruditissimorum hominum artibus eloquentiam contineri statuam, tu autem illam ab elegantia doctrinae segregandam putes et in quodam ingeni atque exercitationis genere ponendam. Ac mihi quidem saepe numero in summos homines ac summis ingeniis praeditos intuenti quaerendum esse visum est quid esset cur plures in omnibus rebus quam in dicendo admirabiles exstitissent; nam quocumque te animo et cogitatione converteris, permultos excellentis in quoque genere videbis non mediocrium artium, sed prope maximarum.

O the deceitful hope of men, and the delusive fortune, and our vain studies, which, in mid-course, are often broken and dashed and shipwrecked before they could see the harbour! For while Crassus’s life had been busy with the labours of canvassing, of duties, of cases, while he was outweighing all by his usefulness — towards the end, even by his authority — that age had then come which both gave him not labour and gave him commendation. As long as some, even of his close friends, did not approve those wonderful deeds of his — that he had withdrawn himself from the courts and ceased to be the leader of cases. Yet to himself, however much he relaxed of forensic labour, the auctorship of public affairs would have been increased. And for me, neither the highest dignity of his consular kind, nor his most diligent and devoted friendship to me, would have given so much pleasure as that great work of his, in the senate, on the day before his death.

Quis enim est qui, si clarorum hominum scientiam rerum gestarum vel utilitate vel magnitudine metiri velit, non anteponat oratori imperatorem?

For of his death there are many memorials and many griefs left to me. Mine indeed: for I have lost a man — distinguished, the friendliest of all to me, with whom I lived most intimately, the foremost of all in dignity, in my judgment, and the most distinguished in eloquence; whose work in cases had been most pleasant to me. Of all our citizens too. For he was, as it seemed to all wise men, the brightest light of our state, who could have raised it both by his counsel and by his speech, ablaze in either, when bent upon the help of his brother and to the safety of the commonwealth.

Quis autem dubitet quin belli duces ex hac una civitate praestantissimos paene innumerabilis, in dicendo autem excellentis vix paucos proferre possimus?

For when by Drusus’s law the senatorial courts had been overthrown, and again the order of senators with the order of equestrians had been brought into contention, there was nothing of his speech in that case more vehement, more weighty, more eloquent than that, than to which I was a frequent hearer in his other cases. Yet, broken in body, with strength shattered, his soul was not bent at all, and he lifted himself up by speaking; and, the rest having departed almost from terror, he poured into the senate, as it were a will, the testimony of his counsel and judgment about the commonwealth — that for him, who was now perishing, it was easy to die.

Iam vero consilio ac sapientia qui regere ac gubernare rem publicam possint, multi nostra, plures patrum memoria atque etiam maiorum exstiterunt, cum boni perdiu nulli, vix autem singulis aetatibus singuli tolerabiles oratores invenirentur. Ac ne qui forte cum aliis studiis, quae reconditis in artibus atque in quadam varietate litterarum versentur, magis hanc dicendi rationem, quam cum imperatoris laude aut cum boni senatoris prudentia comparandam putet, convertat animum ad ea ipsa artium genera circumspiciatque, qui in eis floruerint quamque multi sint; sic facillime, quanta oratorum sit et semper fuerit paucitas, iudicabit.

I lament that great citizen, and (since I cannot go further) that I have lost so great an ornament of speech and of public counsel. Just so, surely as the most wretched among many other things, I bewail the death of L. Crassus before all. For when did I see him, but with that lessening of pain we feel for friends with whom even our closeness has been lessened? But, by Hercules, when I see his image, when I read his speeches — although the very things he said grow old in my soul — yet a certain solemn shape, even in the writing, is set before me of L. Crassus.

Neque enim te fugit omnium laudatarum artium procreatricem quandam et quasi parentem eam, quam filosofi/an Graeci vocant, ab hominibus doctissimis iudicari; in qua difficile est enumerare quot viri quanta scientia quantaque in suis studiis varietate et copia fuerint, qui non una aliqua in re separatim elaborarint, sed omnia, quaecumque possent, vel scientiae pervestigatione vel disserendi ratione comprehenderint.

What, then, can be greater than this — that we should bear, for our orators of these times, that they should be most distinguished and most outstanding (for so they are), and yet a longing, a memory, a desire is yet excited in us, of those who have already gone before? Wherefore, do you not yet judge it to be true, what I am wont to say to you in our daily conversations: that, even now, after the death of L. Crassus, I see no orator, when I have heard him, who can satisfy my hearing — let alone my judgment.

Quis ignorat, ei, qui mathematici vocantur, quanta in obscuritate rerum et quam recondita in arte et multiplici subtilique versentur? Quo tamen in genere ita multi perfecti homines exstiterunt, ut nemo fere studuisse ei scientiae vehementius videatur, quin quod voluerit consecutus sit. Quis musicis, quis huic studio litterarum, quod profitentur ei, qui grammatici vocantur, penitus se dedit, quin omnem illarum artium paene infinitam vim et materiem scientia et cognitione comprehenderit?

He did not see the horrible and pitiful chances of those very ones who, then young men, had given themselves to Crassus. Of whom Gaius Cotta, whom he had left flourishing, a few days after Crassus’s death, was driven by hatred from the tribunate, and not many months from that time was cast out of the state. Sulpicius, who had been in the same flame of hatred, made it his business in his tribunate to strip those whom, as a private man, he had lived with most closely, of all dignity. Whose life, indeed, blooming towards the highest glory of eloquence, was snatched by the sword, and the punishment of his recklessness was set, not without great evil to the commonwealth.

Vere mihi hoc videor esse dicturus, ex omnibus eis, qui in harum artium liberalissimis studiis sint doctrinisque versati, minimam copiam poetarum et oratorum egregiorum exstitisse: atque in hoc ipso numero, in quo perraro exoritur aliquis excellens, si diligenter et ex nostrorum et ex Graecorum copia comparare voles, multo tamen pauciores oratores quam poetae boni reperientur.

I think you, Crassus, both by the flower of your life and by the opportuneness of your death, were both adorned and extinguished by divine counsel. For you would either have had to undergo, according to your manly soul and constancy, the cruelty of the citizens’ steel; or, if any fortune had freed you from the atrocity of death, that same would have forced you to be a spectator of the funerals of your country. Nor would only the dominance of the wicked have been a grief to you, but also the victory of the good — because of the slaughter of citizens mixed with it.

Quod hoc etiam mirabilius debet videri, quia ceterarum artium studia fere reconditis atque abditis e fontibus hauriuntur, dicendi autem omnis ratio in medio posita communi quodam in usu atque in hominum ore et sermone versatur, ut in ceteris id maxime excellat, quod longissime sit ab imperitorum intellegentia sensuque disiunctum, in dicendo autem vitium vel maximum sit a vulgari genere orationis atque a consuetudine communis sensus abhorrere.

For me, indeed, my brother Quintus, when I think of both the chances of those of whom I spoke before, and what we ourselves have borne and felt for our incredible and singular love for the commonwealth, your opinion often seems to me true and wise — you who, on account of so many, so great, and so headlong falls of the most distinguished and the best of men, have always called me back from all contention and conflict of soul.

Ac ne illud quidem vere dici potest aut pluris ceteris inservire aut maiore delectatione aut spe uberiore aut praemiis ad perdiscendum amplioribus commoveri. Atque ut omittam Graeciam, quae semper eloquentiae princeps esse voluit, atque illas omnium doctrinarum inventrices Athenas, in quibus summa dicendi vis et inventa est et perfecta, in hac ipsa civitate profecto nulla umquam vehementius quam eloquentiae studia viguerunt.

But since these things now cannot be undone for us, and our highest labours are softened by the great glory of compensation, let us press on to those consolations which can be both pleasant for our settled troubles, and salutary for those still pricking us; and let us hand to memory the rest, and well-nigh last, conversation of L. Crassus; and to him, if not equal to his talent, yet according to our zeal, let us pay back the merited and owed thanks.

Nam postea quam imperio omnium gentium constituto diuturnitas pacis otium confirmavit, nemo fere laudis cupidus adulescens non sibi ad dicendum studio omni enitendum putavit; ac primo quidem totius rationis ignari, qui neque exercitationis ullam vim neque aliquod praeceptum artis esse arbitrarentur, tantum, quantum ingenio et cogitatione poterant, consequebantur; post autem auditis oratoribus Graecis cognitisque eorum litteris adhibitisque doctoribus incredibili quodam nostri homines di s cendi studio flagraverunt.

For there is none of us who, when he reads Plato’s wonderfully written books, in which Socrates is expressed in nearly all of them, although those things are written divinely, does not yet suspect something greater of him about whom they are written. Which we likewise ask — not from you, who give us all the highest things, but from the rest who shall take this into their hands — that they suspect something greater of L. Crassus than what shall be expressed by us.

Excitabat eos magnitudo, varietas multitudoque in omni genere causarum, ut ad eam doctrinam, quam suo quisque studio consecutus esset, adiungeretur usus frequens, qui omnium magistrorum praecepta superaret; erant autem huic studio maxima, quae nunc quoque sunt, exposita praemia vel ad gratiam vel ad opes vel ad dignitatem; ingenia vero, ut multis rebus possumus iudicare, nostrorum hominum multum ceteris hominibus omnium gentium praestiterunt.

For we who were not present at the conversation, and to whom Gaius Cotta had handed down only the topics and thoughts of this disputation, in what kind of speech we had recognised each orator, this very thing in their conversation we have tried to sketch out. But if anyone — led by common opinion — shall think Antonius leaner or Crassus fuller than they are introduced by us, he will be one of those who either has not heard them or cannot judge. For each was, as I set forth before, both outstanding to all in zeal, talent, and learning, and perfect in his own kind, so that this ornament of speech was neither lacking in Antonius nor overflowing in Crassus.

Quibus de causis quis non iure miretur ex omni memoria aetatum, temporum, civitatum tam exiguum oratorum numerum inveniri? Sed enim maius est hoc quiddam quam homines opinantur, et pluribus ex artibus studiisque conlectum. Quid enim quis aliud in maxima discentium multitudine, summa magistrorum copia, praestantissimis hominum ingeniis, infinita causarum varietate, amplissimis eloquentiae propositis praemiis esse causae putet, nisi rei quandam incredibilem magnitudinem ac difficultatem?

When, therefore, they had departed before noon and had rested a little, this Cotta said he had especially noticed: that all that midday time Crassus had spent in the keenest and most attentive thought; and he himself, who well knew his face when he had to speak, and the gaze of his eyes when in thought, and had often seen them in the greatest cases — then, of set purpose, while the others were resting, came into the alcove in which Crassus had reclined on a couch. When he felt that Crassus was fixed in thought, he at once withdrew, and in that silence about two hours were spent. Then, when all had come to Crassus, the day now bending to the afternoon, “What, Crassus,” said Iulius, “do we go to sit? Although we have come not to demand it of you, but to remind you.”

Est enim et scientia comprehendenda rerum plurimarum, sine qua verborum volubilitas inanis atque inridenda est, et ipsa oratio conformanda non solum electione, sed etiam constructione verborum, et omnes animorum motus, quos hominum generi rerum natura tribuit, penitus pernoscendi, quod omnis vis ratioque dicendi in eorum, qui audiunt, mentibus aut sedandis aut excitandis expromenda est; accedat eodem oportet lepos quidam facetiaeque et eruditio libero digna celeritasque et brevitas et respondendi et lacessendi subtili venustate atque urbanitate coniuncta; tenenda praeterea est omnis antiquitas exemplorumque vis, neque legum ac iuris civilis scientia neglegenda est.

Then Crassus: “Do you think me so impudent that I should suppose I can owe you this duty especially any longer?” “Where then will the place be?” he said. “Does the middle of the wood please? For it is the most shady and cool of places.” “Indeed,” said Crassus, “in that place there is a seat not unsuited to this our conversation.” When this had pleased the rest also, they came into the wood, and there, with great expectation of hearing, they sit down.

Nam quid ego de actione ipsa plura dicam? quae motu corporis, quae gestu, quae vultu, quae vocis conformatione ac varietate moderanda est; quae sola per se ipsa quanta sit, histrionum levis ars et scaena declarat; in qua cum omnes in oris et vocis et motus moderatione laborent, quis ignorat quam pauci sint fuerintque, quos animo aequo spectare possimus? Quid dicam de thesauro rerum omnium, memoria? Quae nisi custos inventis cogitatisque rebus et verbis adhibeatur, intellegimus omnia, etiam si praeclarissima fuerint in oratore, peritura.

Then Crassus: “Both your authority and friendship,” he said, “and Antonius’s easiness, have snatched from me, in my best case, the liberty of refusing. Although in the dividing of our disputation, when he took for himself those things which the orator ought to say, but left to me to set forth how those things ought to be ornated, he divided what cannot be separated. For since all speech consists of matter and words, neither can the words have a seat if you should subtract the matter, nor can the matter have light if you remove the words.

Quam ob rem mirari desinamus, quae causa sit eloquentium paucitatis, cum ex eis rebus universis eloquentia constet, in quibus singulis elaborare permagnum est, hortemurque potius liberos nostros ceterosque, quorum gloria nobis et dignitas cara est, ut animo rei magnitudinem complectantur neque eis aut praeceptis aut magistris aut exercitationibus, quibus utuntur omnes, sed aliis quibusdam se id quod expetunt, consequi posse confidant.

And to me, the ancients seem, having grasped something greater in their souls, to have seen far more than the edge of our talents can look upon — they who said all these things which are above and beneath are one, and bound up by one force and by one consensus of nature. For there is no kind of things which, torn from the rest, could either of itself stand, or, if the rest should be without it, could keep its own force and eternity.

Ac mea quidem sententia nemo poterit esse omni laude cumulatus orator, nisi erit omnium rerum magnarum atque artium scientiam consecutus: etenim ex rerum cognitione efflorescat et redundet oportet oratio. Quae, nisi res est ab oratore percepta et cognita, inanem quandam habet elocutionem et paene puerilem.

But if this seems too great a rationale to be grasped by men’s sense or thought, there is also that true voice of Plato, surely not unheard by you, Catulus: that all the doctrine of these freeborn and human arts is contained by some one chain of fellowship. For when the force of that reasoning is seen by which the causes of things and their outcomes are known, a wonderful concord, as it were, of all branches of knowledge and a harmony is found.

Neque vero ego hoc tantum oneris imponam nostris praesertim oratoribus in hac tanta occupatione urbis ac vitae, nihil ut eis putem licere nescire, quamquam vis oratoris professioque ipsa bene dicendi hoc suscipere ac polliceri videtur, ut omni de re, quaecumque sit proposita, ornate ab eo copioseque dicatur.

But if this also seems higher than that we, lying flat on the ground, can look up to it, yet that surely which we have embraced, which we profess, which we have undertaken, we ought to know and hold. For there is one eloquence — what both I said yesterday, and Antonius signified in several places of his morning speech — into whatever shores or regions of disputation it is brought.

Sed quia non dubito quin hoc plerisque immensum infinitumque videatur, et quod Graecos homines non solum ingenio et doctrina, sed etiam otio studioque abundantis partitionem iam quandam artium fecisse video neque in universo genere singulos elaborasse, sed seposuisse a ceteris dictionibus eam partem dicendi, quae in forensibus disceptationibus iudiciorum aut deliberationum versaretur, et id unum genus oratori reliquisse; non complectar in his libris amplius, quam quod huic generi re quaesita et multum disputata summorum hominum prope consensu est tributum;

For whether it speaks about the nature of heaven or of earth, of divine or of human force; whether from a lower place or from an equal or from a higher; whether to drive men or to teach or to deter or to rouse or to turn back or to inflame or to soothe; whether to few or to many, whether among foreigners or with one’s own or with oneself — speech is led off by streams, not by springs, and wherever it goes, by the same equipment and ornament it is accompanied.

repetamque non ab incunabulis nostrae veteris puerilisque doctrinae quendam ordinem praeceptorum, sed ea, quae quondam accepi in nostrorum hominum eloquentissimorum et omni dignitate principum disputatione esse versata; non quo illa contemnam, quae Graeci dicendi artifices et doctores reliquerunt, sed cum illa pateant in promptuque sint omnibus, neque ea interpretatione mea aut ornatius explicari aut planius exprimi possint, dabis hanc veniam, mi frater, ut opinor, ut eorum, quibus summa dicendi laus a nostris hominibus concessa est, auctoritatem Graecis anteponam.

But since we are now overwhelmed by the opinions not only of the common people, but also of men lightly learned, who, what they cannot embrace whole, these they more easily handle torn apart and as it were rent in pieces — and who, as body from soul, so words from thoughts they separate (without the perishing of which neither can come about) — I shall not undertake more in my speech than is laid on me. I shall only signify briefly that no ornament of words can be found, save when the thoughts have been distinguished and expressed, nor is there any thought illustrious without the light of words.

Cum igitur vehementius inveheretur in causam principum consul Philippus Drusique tribunatus pro senatus auctoritate susceptus infringi iam debilitarique videretur, dici mihi memini ludorum Romanorum diebus L. Crassum quasi conligendi sui causa se in Tusculanum contulisse; venisse eodem, socer eius qui fuerat, Q. Mucius dicebatur et M. Antonius, homo et consiliorum in re publica socius et summa cum Crasso familiaritate coniunctus.

But before I try to touch those things by which I think speech is to be ornated and lit up, I shall briefly set out what I think about the universal kind of speaking. There is no nature, as it seems to me, which does not have within its own kind several things unlike one another, which are yet judged worthy of similar praise. For we perceive by the ears many things which, although they delight us by sounds, are yet so various that what you have just heard seems most pleasant. And by the eyes are gathered well-nigh countless pleasures, which so seize us that they delight one sense in unlike kinds. The other senses too disparate pleasures delight, so that the judgment of the most outstanding sweetness is hard.

Exierant autem cum ipso Crasso adulescentes et Drusi maxime familiares et in quibus magnam tum spem maiores natu dignitatis suae conlocarent, C. Cotta, qui tum tribunatum plebis petebat, et P. Sulpicius, qui deinceps eum magistratum petiturus putabatur.

And the same which is in the natures of things can be transferred also to the arts. There is one art of modelling, in which Myro, Polyclitus, Lysippus were outstanding, all unlike one another, but yet in such a way that you would wish no one of them to be unlike himself. There is one art and rationale of painting, and yet most unlike one another are Zeuxis, Aglaophon, Apelles; nor is any of these one to whom anything in his own art seems wanting. And if this is wonderful in those, as it were, mute arts, and yet true, how much more wonderful in speech and in the tongue? Which, although it moves in the same thoughts and words, has the highest dissimilarities — not so that some should be blamed, but so that those who are agreed to be praised may yet in unlike kinds be praised.

Hi primo die de temporibus deque universa re publica, quam ob causam venerant, multum inter se usque ad extremum tempus diei conlocuti sunt; quo quidem sermone multa divinitus a tribus illis consularibus Cotta deplorata et commemorata narrabat, ut nihil incidisset postea civitati mali, quod non impendere illi tanto ante vidissent.

And this is first to be seen in the poets, with whom is the closest kinship to orators: how unlike one another are Ennius, Pacuvius, and Accius; how unlike, among the Greeks, Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides — although nearly equal praise is assigned to all in unlike kinds of writing.

Eo autem omni sermone confecto, tantam in Crasso humanitatem fuisse, ut, cum lauti accubuissent, tolleretur omnis illa superioris tristitia sermonis eaque esset in homine iucunditas et tantus in loquendo lepos, ut dies inter eos curiae fuisse videretur, convivium Tusculani;

Look now upon those men, and gaze upon them — concerning whose faculty we are inquiring what is the difference of their pursuits and natures. Sweetness Isocrates, subtlety Lysias, keenness Hyperides, resounding Aeschines, force Demosthenes had. Which of them was not outstanding? Yet who is like anyone but himself? Weight Africanus had, gentleness Laelius, harshness Galba, a flowing and singing thing Carbo. Which of these was not chief in those times? And yet each was chief in his own kind.

postero autem die, cum illi maiores natu satis quiessent et in ambulationem ventum esset, dicebat tum Scaevolam duobus spatiis tribusve factis dixisse ’cur non imitamur, Crasse, Socratem illum, qui est in Phaedro Platonis? Nam me haec tua platanus admonuit, quae non minus ad opacandum hunc locum patulis est diffusa ramis, quam illa, cuius umbram secutus est Socrates, quae mihi videtur non tam ipsa acula, quae describitur, quam Platonis oratione crevisse, et quod ille durissimis pedibus fecit, ut se abiceret in herba atque ita illa, quae philosophi divinitus ferunt esse dicta, loqueretur, id meis pedibus certe concedi est aequius.’

But why should I seek out old examples, when I may use present and living ones? What pleasanter has ever fallen on our ears than the speech of this Catulus? — which is so pure, that he seems to speak Latin almost alone; and so weighty, that, in singular dignity, all human kindness and charm is yet present. In short, listening to him I am wont so to judge: that whatever you should add or change or take away, the speech would be more faulty and the worse.

Tum Crassum ’immo vero commodius etiam’; pulvinosque poposcisse et omnis in eis sedibus, quae erant sub platano, consedisse dicebat. Ibi, ut ex pristino sermone relaxarentur animi omnium, solebat Cotta narrare Crassum sermonem quendam de studio dicendi intulisse.

Has not our Caesar here brought a kind of new principle of speech and introduced an almost singular kind of speaking? Who, except him, has ever handled tragic matters almost in comic vein, gloomy ones lightly, severe ones cheerfully, forensic ones with almost stage grace, and so that neither was the jest excluded by the greatness of the matters, nor was the gravity diminished by the wit?

Qui cum ita esset exorsus: non sibi cohortandum Sulpicium et Cottam, sed magis utrumque conlaudandum videri, quod tantam iam essent facultatem adepti, ut non aequalibus suis solum anteponerentur, sed cum maioribus natu compararentur; ’neque vero mihi quicquam’ inquit ’praestabilius videtur, quam posse dicendo tenere hominum coetus mentis, adlicere voluntates, impellere quo velit, unde autem velit deducere: haec una res in omni libero populo maximeque in pacatis tranquillisque civitatibus praecipue semper floruit semperque dominata est.

Behold, present here, two nearly contemporaries, Sulpicius and Cotta. What so unlike between them? What so outstanding in his own kind? The one polished and subtle, setting forth the matter with proper and apt words; he sticks always in the case, and when he has most keenly seen what should be proved to the judge, omitting other arguments, on this he fixes his mind and speech. But Sulpicius, with the bravest impulse of soul, with the fullest and greatest voice, with the highest contention of body and dignity of motion, has also such weight and abundance of words that alone of all he seems to be by nature most equipped for speaking.

Quid enim est aut tam admirabile, quam ex infinita multitudine hominum exsistere unum, qui id, quod omnibus natura sit datum, vel solus vel cum perpaucis facere possit? aut tam iucundum cognitu atque auditu, quam sapientibus sententiis gravibusque verbis ornata oratio et polita? aut tam potens tamque magnificum, quam populi motus, iudicum religiones, senatus gravitatem unius oratione converti? Quid tam porro regium, tam liberale, tam munificum, quam opem ferre supplicibus, excitare adflictos, dare salutem, liberare periculis, retinere homines in civitate?

I come back now to ourselves, since we have always been so compared that, as it were, we have been called by the conversations of men into some judgment of contention. What so unlike as I in speaking and Antonius? — when he is such an orator that nothing can be more outstanding than he, while I, although I am dissatisfied with myself, am yet most especially joined with him in comparison. Do you see what kind of orator Antonius is? Strong, vehement, moved in pleading, fortified and hedged on every side of the case, keen, sharp, kernel-cleared, dwelling on each thing in its place, honourably yielding, keenly pursuing, terrifying, supplicating, with the highest variety of speech, with no satiety to our ears.

Quid autem tam necessarium, quam tenere semper arma, quibus vel tectus ipse esse possis vel provocare integer vel te ulcisci lacessitus? Age vero, ne semper forum, subsellia, rostra curiamque meditere, quid esse potest in otio aut iucundius aut magis proprium humanitatis, quam sermo facetus ac nulla in re rudis? Hoc enim uno praestamus vel maxime feris, quod conloquimur inter nos et quod exprimere dicendo sensa possumus.

As for ourselves, whoever we are in speaking — since we seem to you to be in some account — we surely differ much from his kind. What kind that is, it is not for me to say, because each man is least known to himself, and most hardly each can judge of himself. But still the unlikeness can be understood from the moderate measure of my own motion, and from this — that the footsteps in which I have first set out, in those I am wont mostly to peroration, and that somewhat greater labour and care vexes me in choosing words than thoughts, fearing lest, if my speech is a little obsolete, it should not seem to have been worthy of expectation and silence.

Quam ob rem quis hoc non iure miretur summeque in eo elaborandum esse arbitretur, ut, quo uno homines maxime bestiis praestent, in hoc hominibus ipsis antecellat? Ut vero iam ad illa summa veniamus, quae vis alia potuit aut dispersos homines unum in locum congregare aut a fera agrestique vita ad hunc humanum cultum civilemque deducere aut iam constitutis civitatibus leges iudicia iura describere?

Now if among us who are present there are such great unlikenesses, such fixed proper qualities of each, and in that variety it is rather the better faculty than the kind that distinguishes the better from the worse, and everything is praised which is perfect in its own kind — what do you suppose, if we should wish to embrace all who anywhere are or have been orators, will not the result be that, as many as the orators, almost so many kinds of speaking are found? From which discussion of mine perhaps that may occur — that, if there are well-nigh countless, as it were, forms and figures of speaking, unlike in appearance, praiseworthy in kind, things which differ among themselves cannot be shaped by the same precepts and one institution.

Ac ne plura, quae sunt paene innumerabilia, consecter, comprehendam brevi: sic enim statuo, perfecti oratoris moderatione et sapientia non solum ipsius dignitatem, sed et privatorum plurimorum et universae rei publicae salutem maxime contineri. Quam ob rem pergite, ut facitis, adulescentes, atque in id studium, in quo estis, incumbite, ut et vobis honori et amicis utilitati et rei publicae emolumento esse possitis.’

Which is not so. And this is most diligently to be looked at by those who train and instruct anyone: whither each man’s nature seems most to bear him. For we see that from the same school, as it were, of the foremost masters and teachers in each one’s kind, have come pupils unlike one another, and yet praiseworthy, when the teacher’s training was adapted to each one’s nature.

Tum Scaevola comiter, ut solebat, ’cetera’ inquit ’adsentior Crasso, ne aut de C. Laeli soceri mei aut de huius generi aut arte aut gloria detraham; sed illa duo, Crasse, vereor ut tibi possim concedere: unum, quod ab oratoribus civitates et initio constitutas et saepe conservatas esse dixisti, alterum, quod remoto foro, contione, iudiciis, senatu statuisti oratorem in omni genere sermonis et humanitatis esse perfectum.

Of which especially marked is that example — to leave the rest of arts aside — which Isocrates, the singular teacher, used to say: that he was wont to use spurs on Ephorus, but, on the other hand, the bridle on Theopompus. For the one, leaping with audacity of words, he restrained; the other, hesitating and as it were bashful, he urged on. Nor did he make them like one another, but only added to one and shaved from the other, so that he shaped in each what each one’s nature would bear.

Quis enim tibi hoc concesserit aut initio genus hominum in montibus ac silvis dissipatum non prudentium consiliis compulsum potius quam disertorum oratione delenitum se oppidis moenibusque saepsisse? aut vero reliquas utilitates aut in constituendis aut in conservandis civitatibus non a sapientibus et fortibus viris, sed a disertis ornateque dicentibus esse constitutas?

These things had to be foretold by me, that, if not all the things proposed by me are stuck to the zeal of all of you and to that kind which each of you approves in speaking, you might feel that that kind is being expressed by me which most is approved by myself. Therefore those things must both be done by the orator which Antonius set out, and be said in some way. What better way of speaking, then — for of delivery I shall see later — than that we speak Latin, plainly, ornately, aptly and congruently to whatever is being treated?

An vero tibi Romulus ille aut pastores et convenas congregasse aut Sabinorum conubia coniunxisse aut finitimorum vim repressisse eloquentia videtur, non consilio et sapientia singulari? Quid? in Numa Pompilio, quid? in Servio Tullio, quid? in ceteris regibus, quorum multa sunt eximia ad constituendam rem publicam, num eloquentiae vestigium apparet? Quid? exactis regibus, tametsi ipsam exactionem mente, non lingua perfectam L. Bruti esse cernimus, sed deinceps omnia nonne plena consiliorum, inania verborum videmus?

As to the first two of these I have spoken of, I do not think the rationale of pure and clear speech is expected from me. For we do not try to teach speaking him who does not know to talk; nor to hope that he who cannot speak Latin will speak ornately; nor that he who does not say what we may understand can say something we shall admire. Let us therefore leave aside these things which have an easy understanding and a necessary use. For the one is handed down by letters and a boy’s instruction; the other is brought to bear so that what each one says may be understood — which we see is so necessary that yet there can be nothing less.

Ego vero si velim et nostrae civitatis exemplis uti et aliarum, plura proferre possim detrimenta publicis rebus quam adiumenta, per homines eloquentissimos importata; sed ut reliqua praetermittam, omnium mihi videor, exceptis, Crasse, vobis duobus, eloquentissimos audisse Ti. et C. Sempronios, quorum pater, homo prudens et gravis, haudquaquam eloquens, et saepe alias et maxime censor saluti rei publicae fuit: atque is non accurata quadam orationis copia, sed nutu atque verbo libertinos in urbanas tribus transtulit, quod nisi fecisset, rem publicam, quam nunc vix tenemus, iam diu nullam haberemus. At vero eius filii diserti et omnibus vel naturae vel doctrinae praesidiis ad dicendum parati, cum civitatem vel paterno consilio vel avitis armis florentissimam accepissent, ista praeclara gubernatrice, ut ais, civitatum eloquentia rem publicam dissipaverunt.

But all elegance of speaking, although it is polished by the science of letters, is yet increased by reading the orators and poets. For those ancients, who could not yet adorn what they said, all spoke nearly splendidly. Those who shall have grown accustomed to their conversation cannot, even if they wish, speak otherwise than in Latin. Yet we shall not have to use those words which our usage no longer uses, save sometimes for the sake of ornament sparingly, as I shall show; but the man who has been zealously and much turned over in old writings will be able so to use accustomed words as to use the choicest.

Quid? leges veteres moresque maiorum; quid? auspicia, quibus ego et tu, Crasse, cum magna rei publicae salute praesumus; quid? religiones et caerimoniae; quid? haec iura civilia, quae iam pridem in nostra familia sine ulla eloquentiae laude versantur, num aut inventa sunt aut cognita aut omnino ab oratorum genere tractata?

And in order to speak Latin, not only must we look that we should bring forth those words which no one would justly reproach, and so preserve them in their cases and times and gender and number that nothing be confused or out of agreement or backward — but the very tongue and breath and sound of voice itself is to be regulated.

Equidem et Ser. Galbam memoria teneo divinum hominem in dicendo et M. Aemilium Porcinam et C. ipsum Carbonem, quem tu adulescentulus perculisti, ignarum legum, haesitantem in maiorum institutis, rudem in iure civili; et haec aetas vestra praeter te, Crasse qui tuo magis studio quam proprio munere aliquo disertorum ius a nobis civile didicisti, quod interdum pudeat, iuris ignara est.

I do not wish letters to be expressed too pedantically, nor to be obscured too negligently; I do not wish words to come out meagrely lifeless, nor swelled and as it were heavily panted. For of voice I do not yet say those things which belong to delivery, but this — what seems to me as it were joined with conversation. For there are certain faults which there is no one but desires to flee: a soft voice or womanly, or as it were unmeasured, off-tune, absurd.

Quod vero in extrema oratione quasi tuo iure sumpsisti, oratorem in omnis sermonis disputatione copiosissime versari posse, id, nisi hic in tuo regno essemus, non tulissem multisque praeessem, qui aut interdicto tecum contenderent aut te ex iure manum consertum vocarent, quod in alienas possessiones tam temere inruisses.

There is, however, a fault which some pursue of set purpose: a rustic and rural voice delights some, that the more, if it sound thus, their conversation may seem to retain antiquity. As your friend, Catulus, L. Cotta, seems to me to delight in the heaviness of his tongue and the rural sound of his voice; and he thinks what he says will seem ancient if it is plainly rustic. But your sound and that subtlety of yours delights me — I leave aside that of words, although it is the chief thing — but that, reasoning brings, letters teach, the habit of reading and of speaking confirms. I mean this sweetness which comes out of the mouth: which, just as among the Greeks the speech of the Athenians, so in Latin speech is most proper to this city.

Agerent enim tecum lege primum Pythagorei omnes atque Democritii ceterique in iure sua physici vindicarent ornati homines in dicendo et graves, quibuscum tibi iusto sacramento contendere non liceret; urgerent praeterea philosophorum greges iam ab illo fonte et capite Socrate nihil te de bonis rebus in vita, nihil de malis, nihil de animi permotionibus, nihil de hominum moribus, nihil de ratione vitae didicisse, nihil omnino quaesisse, nihil scire convincerent; et cum universi in te impetum fecissent, tum singulae familiae litem tibi intenderent; instaret Academia, quae, quicquid dixisses, id te ipsum negare cogeret;

At Athens long ago the learning of the Athenians themselves perished; only the home of pursuits remains in that city, in which the citizens are at leisure, and foreigners enjoy them, captured in some way by the name of the city and its authority. Yet any unlearned Athenian will easily surpass the most learned Asiatic men — not in words, but in the sound of voice, and not so much by speaking well as sweetly. Our men devote themselves less to letters than the Latins; yet of those city-bred you know — among whom is the least of letters — there is no one who would not easily overcome the most lettered of all togaed men, Quintus Valerius of Sora, by the gentleness of his voice and the very pressure and sound of his mouth.

Stoici vero nostri disputationum suarum atque interrogationum laqueis te inretitum tenerent; Peripatetici autem etiam haec ipsa, quae propria oratorum putas esse adiumenta atque ornamenta dicendi, a se peti vincerent oportere, ac non solum meliora, sed etiam multo plura Aristotelem Theophrastumque de istis rebus, quam omnis dicendi magistros scripsisse ostenderent.

Therefore, since there is some certain voice proper to the Roman race and city, in which nothing may offend, nothing displease, nothing be marked, nothing sound or smell foreign — let us follow that, and learn to flee not only rustic harshness but also foreign novelty.

Missos facio mathematicos, grammaticos, musicos, quorum artibus vestra ista dicendi vis ne minima quidem societate coniungitur. Quam ob rem ista tanta tamque multa profitenda, Crasse, non censeo; satis id est magnum, quod potes praestare, ut in iudiciis ea causa, quamcumque tu dicis, melior et probabilior esse videatur, ut in contionibus et in sententiis dicendis ad persuadendum tua plurimum valeat oratio, denique ut prudentibus diserte, stultis etiam vere videare dicere. Hoc amplius si quid poteris, non id mihi videbitur orator, sed Crassus sua quadam propria, non communi oratorum facultate posse.’

For when I hear my mother-in-law Laelia — for women more easily preserve uncorrupted antiquity, who, having had no part in the conversation of many, always hold those things which they first learned — but I so hear her that I seem to be hearing Plautus or Naevius. So upright and simple is the very sound of her voice, that she seems to bring nothing of ostentation or imitation. From which I judge that her father so spoke, so her ancestors — not roughly as that man I spoke of, not vastly, not rustically, not gappingly, but pressed and evenly and gently.

Tum ille ’non sum’ inquit ’nescius, Scaevola, ista inter Graecos dici et disceptari solere; audivi enim summos homines, cum quaestor ex Macedonia venissem Athenas, florente Academia, ut temporibus illis ferebatur, cum eam Charmadas et Clitomachus et Aeschines obtinebant; erat etiam Metrodorus, qui cum illis una ipsum illum Carneadem diligentius audierat, hominem omnium in dicendo, ut ferebant, acerrimum et copiosissimum; vigebatque auditor Panaeti illius tui Mnesarchus et Peripatetici Critolai Diodorus;

Therefore our Cotta — whose broadness, Sulpicius, you sometimes imitate, dropping the letter i and saying e most fully — seems to me to imitate not the ancient orators but the harvesters.” Here, when Sulpicius himself had laughed, “So I shall deal with you,” said Crassus. “Since you wished me to speak, you shall hear something of your faults.” “Would that we might!” he said. “For that very thing we wish; and if you do it, many faults, I think, we shall lay aside today.”

multi erant praeterea clari in philosophia et nobiles, a quibus omnibus una paene voce repelli oratorem a gubernaculis civitatum, excludi ab omni doctrina rerumque maiorum scientia ac tantum in iudicia et contiunculas tamquam in aliquod pistrinum detrudi et compingi videbam;

“But not without my own danger,” said Crassus, “can I rebuke you, Sulpicius, since Antonius said you seemed to him most like himself.” Then he: “You yourself indeed warned us that we should imitate those things which were greatest in each. From which I fear lest I be nothing of yours but the imitator of the foot-stamp and a few words and some movement, perhaps.” “Therefore those things which you have from me,” said Crassus, “I do not rebuke, lest I deride myself — and they are far more and greater than you say. Those, however, which are plainly yours, or expressed by imitation from someone, of these I shall warn you, if some place shall remind me.

sed ego neque illis adsentiebar neque harum disputationum inventori et principi longe omnium in dicendo gravissimo et eloquentissimo, Platoni, cuius tum Athenis cum Charmada diligentius legi Gorgiam; quo in libro in hoc maxime admirabar Platonem, quod mihi in oratoribus inridendis ipse esse orator summus videbatur. Verbi enim controversia iam diu torquet Graeculos homines contentionis cupidiores quam veritatis.

Let us pass over then the precepts of speaking Latin, which boyish learning hands down, and which subtler knowledge and the rationale of letters nourishes, or the habit of daily and household conversation; books confirm them, and the reading of the ancient orators and poets. Nor let us linger longer on that other point — to argue by what means we may attain that what we say be understood:

Nam si quis hunc statuit esse oratorem, qui tantummodo in iure aut in iudiciis possit aut apud populum aut in senatu copiose loqui, tamen huic ipsi multa tribuat et concedat necesse est; neque enim sine multa pertractatione omnium rerum publicarum neque sine legum, morum, iuris scientia neque natura hominum incognita ac moribus in his ipsis rebus satis callide versari et perite potest; qui autem haec cognoverit, sine quibus ne illa quidem minima in causis quisquam recte tueri potest, quid huic abesse poterit de maximarum rerum scientia? Sin oratoris nihil vis esse nisi composite, ornate, copiose loqui, quaero, id ipsum qui possit adsequi sine ea scientia, quam ei non conceditis? Dicendi enim virtus, nisi ei, qui dicet, ea, quae dicet, percepta sunt, exstare non potest.

by speaking, of course, in Latin, with words usual and pointing properly to those things we wish to be signified and made plain; without ambiguous word or speech, without too long a continuity of words, without too far drawing out things which by way of likeness are transferred from other matters; without thoughts torn apart, without backward times, without confused persons, without disturbed order. In short: the whole matter is so easy that it often seems to me very strange when it is more difficult to understand what the patron wishes to say than if he himself, who calls in the patron, were to speak about his own affair.

Quam ob rem, si ornate locutus est, sicut et fertur et mihi videtur, physicus ille Democritus, materies illa fuit physici, de qua dixit, ornatus vero ipse verborum oratoris putandus est; et, si Plato de rebus ab civilibus controversiis remotissimis divinitus est locutus, quod ego concedo; si item Aristoteles, si Theophrastus, si Carneades in rebus eis, de quibus disputaverunt, eloquentes et in dicendo suaves atque ornati fuerunt, sint eae res, de quibus disputant, in aliis quibusdam studiis, oratio quidem ipsa propria est huius unius rationis, de qua loquimur et quaerimus.

For those who bring cases to us, mostly themselves teach us so that you do not desire it to be said more plainly. But the same matters, as soon as Fufius or your contemporary Pomponius begins to plead, I do not equally understand what they say, unless I attend most carefully. So confused is the speech, so disturbed, that nothing is first, nothing second; and there is so great an unaccustomedness and a throng of words that the speech, which ought to bring light to matters, brings obscurity and shadows; and they seem in some way themselves to drown out themselves in speaking.

Etenim videmus eisdem de rebus ieiune quosdam et exiliter, ut eum, quem acutissimum ferunt, Chrysippum, disputavisse neque ob eam rem philosophiae non satis fecisse, quod non habuerit hanc dicendi ex arte aliena facultatem. Quid ergo interest aut qui discernes eorum, quos nominavi, in dicendo ubertatem et copiam ab eorum exilitate, qui hac dicendi varietate et elegantia non utuntur? Unum erit profecto, quod ei, qui bene dicunt, adferunt proprium, compositam orationem et ornatam et artificio quodam et expolitione distinctam; haec autem oratio, si res non subest ab oratore percepta et cognita, aut nulla sit necesse est aut omnium inrisione ludatur.

But, if it pleases — since I hope these things at any rate seem troublesome and putrid to you, the elder ones — let us pass to the rest, somewhat more burdensome.” “But you see,” said Antonius, “how unwillingly we are doing other things and how unwillingly we are listening to you, who could be drawn — for I conjecture from myself — leaving everything else to follow you. So polished is your speech on rough matters, so full on meagre, so new on most common.”

Quid est enim tam furiosum, quam verborum vel optimorum atque ornatissimorum sonitus inanis, nulla subiecta sententia nec scientia? Quicquid erit igitur quacumque ex arte, quocumque de genere, orator id, si tamquam clientis causam didicerit, dicet melius et ornatius quam ipse ille eius rei inventor atque artifex.

“For those two parts were easy, Antonius,” he said, “which I have just run through or rather almost passed over: of speaking Latin and of speaking plainly. The rest are great, complex, various, weighty, in which all wonder of talent, all praise of eloquence is contained. For no one ever wondered at an orator because he spoke Latin; if it is otherwise, they laugh, and they do not think him an orator only, but even a man. No one has lifted up with words him who had so spoken that those who were present understood what he said, but they have despised him who could less do that.

Nam si quis erit qui hoc dicat, esse quasdam oratorum proprias sententias atque causas et certarum rerum forensibus cancellis circumscriptam scientiam, fatebor equidem in his magis adsidue versari hanc nostram dictionem, sed tamen in his ipsis rebus permulta sunt, quae ipsi magistri, qui rhetorici vocantur, nec tradunt nec tenent.

In whom, then, do men shudder? Whom do they gaze upon stupefied as he speaks? At whom do they cry out? Whom do they think a god, so to say, among men? Those who speak distinctly, who set out clearly, who copiously, who illustriously both with matters and words, and in the very speech as it were make some rhythm and verse — that is, what I mean by ornately. Those same who so moderate themselves as the dignity of matters, of persons, demands — those are to be praised in that kind of praise which I call apt and congruent.

Quis enim nescit maximam vim exsistere oratoris in hominum mentibus vel ad iram aut ad odium aut ad dolorem incitandis vel ab hisce eisdem permotionibus ad lenitatem misericordiamque revocandis? Quae nisi qui naturas hominum vimque omnem humanitatis causasque eas, quibus mentes aut incitantur aut reflectuntur, penitus perspexerit, dicendo quod volet perficere non poterit. Atque totus hic locus philosophorum proprius videtur, neque orator me auctore umquam repugnabit;

Antonius said he had not yet seen those who so spoke, and said this name of eloquence was to be assigned to them alone. Therefore deride and despise — on my counsel — all those who think they have embraced all the orator’s force in the precepts of those rhetoricians as they are now called, and have not yet been able to understand what character they hold or what they profess. For everything in the life of men — since the orator moves in it and that is his subject-matter — must be sought, heard, read, argued, handled, stirred up.

sed, cum illis cognitionem rerum concesserit, quod in ea solum illi voluerint elaborare, tractationem orationis, quae sine illa scientia est nulla, sibi adsumet; hoc enim est proprium oratoris, quod saepe iam dixi, oratio gravis et ornata et hominum sensibus ac mentibus accommodata.

For eloquence is one of the highest virtues; although all virtues are equal and on a par, yet there is in appearance one more comely and brighter than another, as is this faculty, which, having grasped the knowledge of things, so sets out the perceptions and counsels of mind by words that it can drive those who hear, wherever it shall lean. As its force is the greater, the more must it be joined to uprightness and the highest prudence; if to those without these virtues we should hand the abundance of speaking, we shall not have made them orators but shall have given certain weapons to madmen.

Quibus de rebus Aristotelem et Theophrastum scripsisse fateor; sed vide ne hoc, Scaevola, totum sit a me: nam ego, quae sunt oratori cum illis communia, non mutuor ab illis, isti quae de his rebus disputant, oratorum esse concedunt, itaque ceteros libros artis suae nomine, hos rhetoricos et inscribunt et appellant.

This rationale of thinking and pronouncing and the force of speaking, the ancient Greeks called wisdom; from this came the Lycurgi, the Pittaci, the Solons; and from this likeness our Coruncanii, Fabricii, Catones, Scipiones, perhaps not so learned, but with similar impulse and disposition of mind. Others with the same prudence, but with a different counsel about the pursuits of life, sought rest and leisure: as Pythagoras, Democritus, Anaxagoras, transferred themselves wholly from governing states to the knowledge of things; which life, on account of its tranquility and the sweetness of the science itself (than which nothing is more pleasant to men), has delighted more men than has been useful to commonwealths.

Etenim cum illi in dicendo inciderint loci, quod persaepe evenit, ut de dis immortalibus, de pietate, de concordia, de amicitia, de communi civium, de hominum, de gentium iure, de aequitate, de temperantia, de magnitudine animi, de omni virtutis genere sit dicendum, clamabunt, credo, omnia gymnasia atque omnes philosophorum scholae sua esse haec omnia propria, nihil omnino ad oratorem pertinere;

So when men of the most outstanding talents had given themselves to that pursuit, out of that highest faculty of free and empty time the most learned men, abounding in too much leisure and richest talents, took on themselves to handle and seek and investigate far more things than was necessary. For that old learning seems the same — both the teacher of doing rightly and of speaking well. Nor were the teachers separate, but the same were teachers of living and of speaking — as that Phoenix in Homer, who says he was given by Achilles’ father Peleus as companion to the young man for war, that he might make him an orator of words and an actor of deeds.

quibus ego, ut de his rebus in angulis consumendi oti causa disserant, cum concessero, illud tamen oratori tribuam et dabo, ut eadem, de quibus illi tenui quodam exsanguique sermone disputant, hic cum omni iucunditate et gravitate explicet. Haec ego cum ipsis philosophis tum Athenis disserebam; cogebat enim me M. Marcellus hic noster, qui nunc aedilis curulis est et profecto, nisi ludos nunc faceret, huic nostro sermoni interesset; ac iam tum erat adulescentulus his studiis mirifice deditus.

But as men accustomed to constant and daily labour, when on account of weather they are kept from work, betake themselves to ball or knucklebones or dice, or even invent for themselves some new game in their leisure — so those, kept from public business as it were from work, by the times or by their own will idle, betook themselves wholly, some to poets, some to geometers, some to musicians; some, too, like the dialecticians, brought forth for themselves a new study and game; and in those arts which were discovered, that the minds of boys might be shaped to humanity and virtue, they used up all their time and ages.

Iam vero de legibus constituendis, de bello, de pace, de sociis, de vectigalibus, de iure civium generatim in ordines aetatesque discriptorum dicant vel Graeci, si volunt, Lycurgum aut Solonem—quamquam illos quidem censemus in numero eloquentium reponendos—scisse melius quam Hyperidem aut Demosthenem, perfectos iam homines in dicendo et perpolitos, vel nostri decem viros, qui xii tabulas perscripserunt, quos necesse est fuisse prudentis, anteponant in hoc genere et Ser. Galbae et socero tuo C. Laelio, quos constat dicendi gloria praestitisse.

But because there were some — and many — who flourished in public life by reason of the twin wisdom of doing and speaking which cannot be separated, like Themistocles, Pericles, Theramenes, or who, less themselves engaged in public affairs, were yet teachers of this same wisdom, like Gorgias, Thrasymachus, Isocrates — there were found those who, themselves abounding in learning and talents, but recoiling from civic affairs and public business by some judgment of mind, harassed and despised this practice of speaking;

Numquam enim negabo esse quasdam partis proprias eorum, qui in his cognoscendis atque tractandis studium suum omne posuerunt, sed oratorem plenum atque perfectum esse eum, qui de omnibus rebus possit copiose varieque dicere. Etenim saepe in eis causis, quas omnes proprias esse oratorum confitentur, est aliquid, quod non ex usu forensi, quem solum oratoribus conceditis, sed ex obscuriore aliqua scientia sit promendum atque sumendum.

of whom Socrates was the leader, who, by the testimony of all the learned and by the judgment of the whole of Greece, was easily first of all in prudence and keenness and grace and subtlety, and indeed in eloquence, variety, abundance, into whichever side he had given himself. From those who handled, did, taught these things which we are now seeking — when they were called by one name (because all knowledge of the best things and exercise in them was named philosophy) — Socrates snatched away this common name, and separated by his own disputations the science of feeling wisely and speaking ornately, although they cohered in fact. His talent and various conversations Plato handed to immortality by his writings, since Socrates himself had left no letter.

Quaero enim num possit aut contra imperatorem aut pro imperatore dici sine rei militaris usu aut saepe etiam sine regionum terrestrium aut maritimarum scientia; num apud populum de legibus iubendis aut vetandis, num in senatu de omni rei publicae genere dici sine summa rerum civilium cognitione et prudentia; num admoveri possit oratio ad sensus animorum atque motus vel inflammandos vel etiam exstinguendos, quod unum in oratore dominatur, sine diligentissima pervestigatione earum omnium rationum, quae de naturis humani generis ac moribus a philosophis explicantur.

Hence arose that division as it were of tongue and heart — absurd surely and unprofitable and to be reproved — that some teach us to be wise, others to speak. For when several had risen mostly from Socrates, because each had grasped one thing from his various and diverse and on every side spread disputations, families were sown among one another quarrelling, much severed and unlike — when yet all the philosophers wished to be called and judged themselves to be Socratics.

Atque haud scio an minus vobis hoc sim probaturus; equidem non dubitabo, quod sentio, dicere: physica ista ipsa et mathematica et quae paulo ante ceterarum artium propria posuisti, scientiae sunt eorum, qui illa profitentur, inlustrari autem oratione si quis istas ipsas artis velit, ad oratoris ei confugiendum est facultatem.

And first from Plato himself Aristotle and Xenocrates, of whom one held the name of the Peripatetics, the other of the Academy. Then from Antisthenes, who in Socrates’ conversation had most loved patience and hardness, the Cynics first, then the Stoics. Then from Aristippus, whom those rather voluptuous disputations had pleased, flowed the Cyrenaic philosophy, which he and his successors defended simply; while these, who now measure all by pleasure, while they do this more bashfully, neither satisfy dignity (which they do not despise) nor protect pleasure (which they wish to embrace). There were also other kinds of philosophers — who almost all said they were Socratics — Eretrians, Herillians, Megarians, Pyrrhonians; but these have long ago been broken and extinguished by the force and arguments of these.

Neque enim si Philonem illum architectum, qui Atheniensibus armamentarium fecit, constat perdiserte populo rationem operis sui reddidisse, existimandum est architecti potius artificio disertum quam oratoris fuisse; nec, si huic M. Antonio pro Hermodoro fuisset de navalium opere dicendum, non, cum ab illo causam didicisset, ipse ornate de alieno artificio copioseque dixisset; neque vero Asclepiades, is quo nos medico amicoque usi sumus tum eloquentia vincebat ceteros medicos, in eo ipso, quod ornate dicebat, medicinae facultate utebatur, non eloquentiae.

Of those that remain, that philosophy which has undertaken the patronage of pleasure, even if it seems to anyone true, is yet far from that man whom we are seeking, and whom we wish to be the author of public counsel and the leader of governing the state, and chief of opinion and eloquence in the senate, before the people, in public causes. Yet no injury will be done by us to that philosophy. It will not be repelled from where it shall wish to enter, but will rest in its little gardens — where it wishes, where, even reclining softly and daintily, it calls us off from the Rostra, from the courts, from the curia. Wisely perhaps, especially in this commonwealth.

Atque illud est probabilius, neque tamen verum, quod Socrates dicere solebat, omnis in eo, quod scirent, satis esse eloquentis; illud verius, neque quemquam in eo disertum esse posse, quod nesciat, neque, si optime sciat ignarusque sit faciundae ac poliendae orationis, diserte id ipsum, de quo sciat, posse dicere.

But I am not now asking what philosophy is most true, but what is most joined to the orator. So let us send those men off without any insult; for they are good men, and (since they think themselves so) blessed. Let us only warn them that, even if it is most true, they should hold it silent like a mystery — that they say it is not the wise man’s part to be in public life. For if they shall persuade us and every best man of this, they cannot themselves be — what they most desire — at leisure.

Quam ob rem, si quis universam et propriam oratoris vim definire complectique vult, is orator erit mea sententia hoc tam gravi dignus nomine, qui, quaecumque res inciderit, quae sit dictione explicanda, prudenter et composite et ornate et memoriter dicet cum quadam actionis etiam dignitate.

The Stoics, however — whom I least disapprove — I yet send away, nor do I fear them angry, since they do not at all know how to be angry. To them I owe this thanks: that they alone of all said eloquence is virtue and wisdom. But there is doubtless in them what greatly recoils from the orator we are equipping. Either because they say all who are not wise are slaves, robbers, enemies, mad — and yet that no one is wise. But it is most absurd to commit an assembly or senate or any gathering of men to him to whom no one of those who are present seems to be sane, no one a citizen, no one a free man.

Sin cuipiam nimis infinitum videtur, quod ita posui "quacumque de re," licet hinc quantum cuique videbitur circumcidat atque amputet, tamen illud tenebo, si, quae ceteris in artibus atque studiis sita sunt, orator ignoret tantumque ea teneat, quae sint in disceptationibus atque usu forensi, tamen his de rebus ipsis si sit ei dicendum, cum cognoverit ab eis, qui tenent, quae sint in quaque re, multo oratorem melius quam ipsos illos, quorum eae sint artes, esse dicturum.

It is added that they have a kind of speech perhaps subtle and surely keen, but, for an orator, meagre, unaccustomed, recoiling from the ears of the common folk, obscure, empty, dry, and yet of such a kind that to use it before the multitude is in no way possible. For other things seem good and bad to the Stoics and to the rest of the citizens — or rather, the nations — different is the force of honour, of disgrace, of reward, of punishment; truly or falsely, nothing for the present matters; but if we should follow them, we shall never be able to bring any matter to a head by speaking.

Ita si de re militari dicendum huic erit Sulpicio, quaeret a C. Mario adfini nostro et, cum acceperit, ita pronuntiabit, ut ipsi C. Mario paene hic melius quam ipse illa scire videatur; sin de iure civili, tecum communicabit, te hominem prudentissimum et peritissimum in eis ipsis rebus, quas abs te didicerit, dicendi arte superabit.

The Peripatetics and the Academics remain. Although the name of the Academics is one, the opinions are two. For Speusippus, Plato’s sister’s son, and Xenocrates who heard Plato, and Polemo and Crantor who heard Xenocrates, did not greatly disagree from Aristotle, who together with them had heard Plato; in the abundance and variety of speaking they were perhaps not equal. Arcesilas first, who had heard Polemo, snatched up especially this from Plato’s various books and Socratic conversations: that nothing certain can be perceived either by the senses or by the soul. He, having used a certain extraordinary charm of speaking, is said to have spurned all judgment of soul and sense; and he first established (although it had been chiefly Socratic) not to show what he himself thought, but to argue against what each had said he thought.

Sin quae res inciderit, in qua de natura, de vitiis hominum, de cupiditatibus, de modo, de continentia, de dolore, de morte dicendum sit, forsitan, si ei sit visum,—etsi haec quidem nosse debet orator—, cum Sex. Pompeio, erudito homine in philosophia, communicarit; hoc profecto efficiet ut, quamcumque rem a quoquo cognoverit, de ea multo dicat ornatius quam ille ipse, unde cognorit.

Hence flowed this more recent Academy, in which Carneades stood out by a kind of divine swiftness of talent and abundance of speaking. Although I have known many of his hearers at Athens, I can yet name most certain authorities: my father-in-law Scaevola, who as a young man heard him at Rome; and my friend Q. Metellus, son of Lucius, that most distinguished man, who said that Carneades had been heard by him as a young man at Athens, in his old age, for many days.

Sed si me audiet, quoniam philosophia in tris partis est tributa, in naturae obscuritatem, in disserendi subtilitatem, in vitam atque mores, duo illa relinquamus atque largiamur inertiae nostrae; tertium vero, quod semper oratoris fuit, nisi tenebimus, nihil oratori, in quo magnus esse possit, relinquemus.

These — as the rivers from the Apennine, so from the common ridge of wisdom — were made the partings of doctrines: so that the philosophers as it were flow down into the upper sea, the Ionian, a Greek and harboured one, while the orators are slipped into this lower, Tuscan and barbarian one, full of rocks and dangers, in which even Ulysses himself wandered.

Qua re hic locus de vita et moribus totus est oratori perdiscendus; cetera si non didicerit, tamen poterit, si quando opus erit, ornare dicendo, si modo ad eum erunt delata et ei tradita. Etenim si constat inter doctos, hominem ignarum astrologiae ornatissimis atque optimis versibus Aratum de caelo stellisque dixisse; si de rebus rusticis hominem ab agro remotissimum Nicandrum Colophonium poetica quadam facultate, non rustica, scripsisse praeclare, quid est cur non orator de rebus eis eloquentissime dicat, quas ad certam causam tempusque cognorit?

Therefore, if we are content with this eloquence and this orator, who knows either that he must deny what is charged against him, or, if he cannot, then to show that what the accused did was either rightly done, or by another’s fault, or by injustice, or by law, or not against law, or imprudently, or necessarily, or that the matter must not be claimed under the name by which it is charged, or that the case is not being managed as it ought and was lawful — and if you think it enough to learn what those writers of the art teach, which yet Antonius has set out far more ornately and copiously than they say it — but if you are content with these, and with what you wished to be said by me, you compel the orator out of an enormous and unbounded field into a really narrow ring.

Est enim finitimus oratori poeta, numeris astrictior paulo, verborum autem licentia liberior, multis vero ornandi generibus socius ac paene par; in hoc quidem certe prope idem, nullis ut terminis circumscribat aut definiat ius suum, quo minus ei liceat eadem illa facultate et copia vagari qua velit.

But if you wish to follow that ancient Pericles, or this man, more familiar to us because of the multitude of his writings, Demosthenes; and if you have fallen in love with that brilliant and exceptional sight of the perfect orator, and his beauty — either this Carneadean or that Aristotelian force is to be grasped by you.

Nam quod illud, Scaevola, negasti te fuisse laturum, nisi in meo regno esses, quod in omni genere sermonis, in omni parte humanitatis dixerim oratorem perfectum esse debere: numquam me hercule hoc dicerem, si eum, quem fingo, me ipsum esse arbitrarer.

For, as I said before, those ancients up to Socrates joined the knowledge and science of all things which pertain to the morals of men, to life, to virtue, to the commonwealth, with the rationale of speaking. Afterwards, when (as I have set out) the eloquent had been parted from the learned by Socrates, and thereafter the philosophers, like all the Socratics, despised eloquence, and the orators wisdom, neither touched anything of the other’s part, save what these borrowed from those, or those from these — from which they would have drawn promiscuously, if they had wished to remain in their pristine community.

Sed, ut solebat C. Lucilius saepe dicere, homo tibi subiratus, mihi propter eam ipsam causam minus quam volebat familiaris, sed tamen et doctus et perurbanus, sic sentio neminem esse in oratorum numero habendum, qui non sit omnibus eis artibus, quae sunt libero dignae, perpolitus; quibus ipsis si in dicendo non utimur, tamen apparet atque exstat, utrum simus earum rudes an didicerimus: ut qui pila ludunt, non utuntur in ipsa lusione artificio proprio palaestrae, sed indicat ipse motus, didicerintne palaestram an nesciant, et qui aliquid fingunt, etsi tum pictura nihil utuntur, tamen, utrum sciant pingere an nesciant, non obscurum est;

But as the ancient pontiffs, on account of the multitude of sacrifices, wished there to be three men as banqueters, when they themselves had been instituted by Numa to perform also that banquet sacrifice of the games — so the Socratics severed from themselves the pleaders of cases, and from the common name of philosophy, when the ancients had wished there to be a wonderful fellowship of speaking and understanding.

sic in orationibus hisce ipsis iudiciorum, contionum, senatus, etiam si proprie ceterae non adhibeantur artes, tamen facile declaratur, utrum is, qui dicat, tantum modo in hoc declamatorio sit opere iactatus an ad dicendum omnibus ingenuis artibus instructus accesserit.’

Since these things are so, I shall a little plead for myself, and I shall ask you that what I shall say you should think to be said, not about myself, but about the orator. For I am one who, though taught with the highest zeal of my father in boyhood, and brought to the Forum so much talent (as I myself feel — not so much as perhaps I seem to you), cannot say that I have learned these things which I am now embracing as I shall say they ought to be learned. For of all I came most early to public causes, and at twenty-one called into court a most noble and most eloquent man. The Forum was my school; my master was practice and the laws and institutions of the Roman people and the custom of the ancestors.

Tum ridens Scaevola ’non luctabor tecum,’ inquit ’Crasse, amplius; id enim ipsum, quod contra me locutus es, artificio quodam es consecutus, ut et mihi, quae ego vellem non esse oratoris, concederes et ea ipsa nescio quo modo rursus detorqueres atque oratori propria traderes.

I tasted only a little of those arts of which I am speaking, when I was quaestor in Asia, having got the rhetorician of about my own age from the Academy, that Metrodorus of whose memory Antonius spoke; and on my way back from there, at Athens — where I should have lingered longer, had I not been angry with the Athenians, who would not put on the mysteries again, to which I had come two days too late. So this — that I embrace so great a knowledge and force of learning — is not for me but rather against me. For I am arguing not what I can do, but what the orator can; and all those who set out the rhetorical arts most ridiculously: for they write of the kinds of suits, of openings, of narrations.

Quae, cum ego praetor Rhodum venissem et cum summo illo doctore istius disciplinae Apollonio ea, quae a Panaetio acceperam, contulissem, inrisit ille quidem, ut solebat, philosophiam atque contempsit multaque non tam graviter dixit quam facete; tua autem fuit oratio eius modi, non ut ullam artem doctrinamve contemneres, sed ut omnis comites ac ministratrices oratoris esse diceres.

But the force of eloquence is so great that it grasps the origin, force, and changes of all things, all virtues, duties, all nature, which contains the morals of men, the souls, the life; the same describes morals, laws, rights, governs the commonwealth, and ornately and copiously speaks of everything, to whatever matter it pertains.

Quas ego si quis sit unus complexus omnis, idemque si ad eas facultatem istam ornatissimae orationis adiunxerit, non possum dicere eum non egregium quendam hominem atque admirandum fore; sed is, si quis esset aut si etiam umquam fuisset aut vero si esse posset, tu esses unus profecto, qui et meo iudicio et omnium vix ullam ceteris oratoribus—pace horum dixerim— laudem reliquisti.

In this kind we move as much as we can, as much as we are strong by talent, by moderate learning, by use; nor do we yield much in disputation to those who have set up their tent of life in philosophy alone.

Verum si tibi ipsi nihil deest, quod in forensibus rebus civilibusque versatur, quin scias, neque eam tamen scientiam, quam adiungis oratori, complexus es, videamus ne plus ei tribuamus quam res et veritas ipsa concedat.’

For what can my friend Gaius Velleius bring why pleasure should be the highest good, that I could not more copiously either defend, if I wished, or refute, from those topics which Antonius set out, by this practice of speaking — in which Velleius is unschooled, and each of us has been versed? What is there, that either Sextus Pompeius or the two Balbi, or my friend who lived with Panaetius, M. Vigellius the Stoic, could say of the virtue of men in such an argument, in which I should have to yield to them, or any of you?

Hic Crassus ’memento’ inquit ’me non de mea, sed de oratoris facultate dixisse; quid enim nos aut didicimus aut scire potuimus, qui ante ad agendum quam ad cognoscendum venimus; quos in foro, quos in ambitione, quos in re publica, quos in amicorum negotiis res ipsa ante confecit quam possemus aliquid de rebus tantis suspicari?

For philosophy is not like the rest of the arts. For what can he do in geometry who has not learned? What in music? He must either be silent or not even be reckoned sane. But these things which are in philosophy are dug out by talents to elicit what in each thing is like the truth, and they are polished by exercised speech. Our common orator here, if he is less learned, but yet exercised in speaking, by this very common exercise will beat off those of ours, nor will he allow himself to be despised and contemned by them.

Quod si tibi tantum in nobis videtur esse, quibus etiam si ingenium, ut tu putas, non maxime defuit, doctrina certe et otium et hercule etiam studium illud discendi acerrimum defuit, quid censes, si ad alicuius ingenium vel maius illa, quae ego non attigi, accesserint, qualem illum et quantum oratorem futurum?’

But if anyone shall ever come forth who can in the Aristotelian manner speak on every subject on either side, and in every case set out two contrary speeches by his precepts; or who in this manner of Arcesilas and Carneades shall argue against everything that is laid down — and shall add to that rationale this rhetorical use and habit and exercise of speaking, he will be the true, the perfect, the only orator. For neither without the forensic sinews can the orator be sufficiently vehement and weighty, nor without variety of learning sufficiently polished and wise.

Tum Antonius ’probas mihi’ inquit ’ista, Crasse, quae dicis, nec dubito quin multo locupletior in dicendo futurus sit, si quis omnium rerum atque artium rationem naturamque

Therefore let us suffer that ancient Corax to hatch his own chicks in the nest, that they may fly out as hateful and troublesome shouters; and let us allow that I-know-not-who Pamphilus to portray, in fillets, so great a matter as if it were certain childish playthings. Let us ourselves, by this so brief disputation of yesterday’s and today’s day, set out the orator’s whole duty — provided that thing be so great that it seems to be embraced in all the philosophers’ books which none of those orators of yours has ever touched.”

comprehenderit; sed primum id difficile est factu, praesertim in hac nostra vita nostrisque occupationibus; deinde illud etiam verendum est ne abstrahamur ab hac exercitatione et consuetudine dicendi populari et forensi. Aliud enim mihi quoddam orationis genus esse videtur eorum hominum, de quibus paulo ante dixisti, quamvis illi ornate et graviter aut de natura rerum aut de humanis rebus loquantur: nitidum quoddam genus est verborum et laetum, et palaestrae magis et olei, quam huius civilis turbae ac fori.

Then Catulus: “In no way, by Hercules,” he said, “Crassus, is it to be wondered at that there is in you so great a force of speaking, or sweetness, or copiousness. Of you indeed I before judged that you spoke by nature in such a way that you seemed to me not only the highest orator but also the wisest man. Now I understand that you have always reckoned even more important those things which look towards wisdom, and that out of these has flowed this copiousness of speaking. Yet, when I recall all the steps of your age, and consider your life and pursuits, I do not see at what time you learned those things, nor do I understand you to have been greatly given to those pursuits, men, books. And yet I cannot decide whether more I should wonder that you, in your such occupations, could have learned those things which you persuade me are the greatest helps; or, if you could not, that you can speak in this way.”

Namque egomet, qui sero ac leviter Graecas litteras attigissem, tamen cum pro consule in Ciliciam proficiscens venissem Athenas, compluris tum ibi dies sum propter navigandi difficultatem commoratus; sed, cum cotidie mecum haberem homines doctissimos, eos fere ipsos, qui abs te modo sunt nominati, cum hoc nescio quo modo apud eos increbruisset, me in causis maioribus sicuti te solere versari, pro se quisque ut poterat de officio et de ratione oratoris disputabat.

Here Crassus: “This,” he said, “Catulus, I would have you persuade yourself first: that I do not, when I argue about the orator, do much otherwise than I should do, if I had to speak about an actor. For I should deny that he could satisfy in gesture, unless he had learned the wrestling-school, unless he had learned to dance. Nor when I said this would it be necessary that I be an actor, but perhaps not a foolish judge of another’s art.

Horum alii, sicuti iste ipse Mnesarchus, hos, quos nos oratores vocaremus, nihil esse dicebat nisi quosdam operarios lingua celeri et exercitata; oratorem autem, nisi qui sapiens esset, esse neminem, atque ipsam eloquentiam, quod ex bene dicendi scientia constaret, unam quandam esse virtutem, et qui unam virtutem haberet, omnis habere easque esse inter se aequalis et paris; ita, qui esset eloquens, eum virtutes omnis habere atque esse sapientem. Sed haec erat spinosa quaedam et exilis oratio longeque a nostris sensibus abhorrebat.

Similarly now I am speaking of the orator at your urging — of the highest, of course; for always, whatever art or faculty is asked about, the question is wont to be of the absolute and perfect. Therefore, if you wish me to be even an orator, even tolerably good, even good — I shall not resist; for why should I now be silly? I know I am so reckoned. But if it is so, I am surely not the highest. For there is no thing among men either harder or greater, or which requires more helps of learning.

Charmadas vero multo uberius eisdem de rebus loquebatur, non quo aperiret sententiam suam; hic enim mos erat patrius Academiae adversari semper omnibus in disputando; sed cum maxime tamen hoc significabat, eos, qui rhetores nominarentur et qui dicendi praecepta traderent, nihil plane tenere neque posse quemquam facultatem adsequi dicendi, nisi qui philosophorum inventa didicisset.

And yet, since we must argue about the orator, I must speak about the highest orator. For the force and nature of the matter cannot be understood, of what kind and how great it is, unless the perfect is set before the eyes. As for me, Catulus, I confess that I do not now live in those books and with those men, nor indeed (which you rightly remember) ever had any time set apart for learning, nor have given to learning so much time as my boyish age and forensic holidays have allowed me.

Disputabant contra diserti homines Athenienses et in re publica causisque versati, in quis erat etiam is, qui nuper Romae fuit, Menedemus, hospes meus; qui cum diceret esse quandam prudentiam, quae versaretur in perspiciendis rationibus constituendarum et regendarum rerum publicarum, excitabatur homo promptus atque omni abundans doctrina et quadam incredibili varietate rerum atque copia: omnis enim partis illius ipsius prudentiae petendas esse a philosophia docebat neque ea, quae statuerentur in re publica de dis immortalibus, de disciplina iuventutis, de iustitia, de patientia, de temperantia, de modo rerum omnium, ceteraque, sine quibus civitates aut esse aut bene moratae esse non possent, usquam in eorum inveniri libellis;

And, if you ask, Catulus, what I think of that learning of yours: I think there is need of so much time not to a talented man, who has the Forum, the curia, cases, the commonwealth before him, as those have taken on themselves to whom learning has lasted to the end of life. For all arts are handled differently by those who transfer them to use, differently by those who, delighted with the handling of the arts themselves, are about to do nothing else in life. The Samnite gladiator-master here is now in extreme old age and is exercising daily, for he cares for nothing else; but Q. Velocius as a boy had learned a little, but, because he was apt for it and had wholly mastered it, was, as is said in Lucilius, “Although a good Samnite himself in the school and with the wooden swords, severe enough to anyone”; but he gave more pains to the Forum, to friends, to private affairs. Valerius sang every day, for he was an actor: what else could he do?

quod si tantam vim rerum maximarum arte sua rhetorici illi doctores complecterentur, quaerebat, cur de prooemiis et de epilogis et de huius modi nugis—sic enim appellabat—referti essent eorum libri, de civitatibus instituendis, de scribendis legibus, de aequitate, de iustitia, de fide, de frangendis cupiditatibus, de conformandis hominum moribus littera nulla in eorum libris inveniretur.

But our friend Numerius Furius sings when it is convenient, for he is a head of household, a Roman knight; as a boy he learned what was to be learned. The same rationale is in these greatest arts. Day and night we used to see Q. Tubero, a man of the highest virtue and prudence, when he was giving pains to philosophy. But his uncle Africanus you would scarcely understand to be doing this, although he was doing it. These things are easily learned if you both take so much as is needed, and have one who can teach faithfully, and yourself know how to learn;

Ipsa vero praecepta sic inludere solebat, ut ostenderet non modo eos expertis esse illius prudentiae, quam sibi asciscerent, sed ne hanc quidem ipsam dicendi rationem ac viam nosse: caput enim esse arbitrabatur oratoris, ut et ipse eis, apud quos ageret, talis, qualem se esse optaret, videretur; id fieri vitae dignitate, de qua nihil rhetorici isti doctores in praeceptis suis reliquissent; et uti ei qui audirent sic adficerentur animis, ut eos adfici vellet orator; quod item fieri nullo modo posse, nisi cognosset is, qui diceret, quot modis hominum mentes et quibus et quo genere orationis in quamque partem moverentur; haec autem esse penitus in media philosophia retrusa atque abdita, quae isti rhetores ne primoribus quidem labris attigissent.

but if you wish to do nothing else in your whole life, the very handling and inquiry produces something out of itself daily, that you may track it down with idle delight. So it happens that the stirring of subjects is unbounded, the knowledge easy, if practice confirms the learning, moderate effort is given, memory and zeal remain. But it is always pleasant to learn — as if I should wish to play knucklebones excellently, or be held by zeal for the ball — even, perhaps, if I cannot attain it. But others, because they do brilliantly, are more vehemently than the case requires delighted, as Titius with the ball, Brulla with the knucklebones.

Ea Menedemus exemplis magis quam argumentis conabatur refellere; memoriter enim multa ex orationibus Demostheni praeclare scripta pronuntians docebat illum in animis vel iudicum vel populi in omnem partem dicendo permovendis non fuisse ignarum, quibus ea rebus consequeretur, quae negaret ille sine philosophia quemquam nosse posse.

Therefore there is no reason why anyone should fear the magnitude of the arts because old men learn them. For either old men have approached them, or are detained in those studies right up to old age, or are most slow. The matter, in my view, is thus: that, unless what each could learn quickly, he could never altogether master.”

Huic respondebat non se negare Demosthenem summam prudentiam summamque vim habuisse dicendi, sed sive ille hoc ingenio potuisset sive, id quod constaret, Platonis studiosus audiendi fuisset, non quid ille potuisset, sed quid isti docerent esse quaerendum.

“Now, now,” said Catulus, “Crassus, I understand what you say. And by Hercules I agree. I see well enough that for you, a man most keen at mastering, there has been time enough for learning those things you say.” “Do you persist,” said Crassus, “in thinking that what I say I am saying about myself, not about the matter? But now, if it pleases, let us return to our institutes.” “It does please me,” said Catulus.

Saepe etiam in eam partem ferebatur oratione, ut omnino disputaret nullam artem esse dicendi; idque cum argumentis docuerat, quod ita nati essemus, ut et blandiri eis subtiliter, a quibus esset petendum, et adversarios minaciter terrere possemus et rem gestam exponere et id, quod intenderemus, confirmare et, quod contra diceretur, refellere, ad extremum deprecari aliquid et conqueri, quibus in rebus omnis oratorum versaretur facultas; et quod consuetudo exercitatioque intellegendi prudentiam acueret atque eloquendi celeritatem incitaret;

Then Crassus: “Whither, then, does this so long and so deeply drawn-out discourse look? These two parts which remain to me, of illustrating the speech and of crowning the whole eloquence — of which one demands ornate speaking, the other apt — have this force: that the speech be as pleasing as possible, that it flow into the senses of those who hear as much as possible, and that it be furnished with as many things as possible.

tum etiam exemplorum copia nitebatur. Nam primum quasi dedita opera neminem scriptorem artis ne mediocriter quidem disertum fuisse dicebat, cum repeteret usque a Corace nescio quo et Tisia, quos artis illius inventores et principes fuisse constaret; eloquentissimos autem homines, qui ista nec didicissent nec omnino scire curassent, innumerabilis quosdam nominabat; in quibus etiam, sive ille inridens sive quod ita putaret atque ita audisset, me in illo numero, qui illa non didicissem et tamen, ut ipse dicebat, possem aliquid in dicendo, proferebat; quorum ego alterum illi facile adsentiebar, nihil me didicisse, in altero autem me inludi ab eo aut etiam ipsum errare arbitrabar.

But this forensic equipment, litigious, keen, drawn from the opinions of the common people, is small and quite mendicant. That itself, again, which those hand down who profess themselves teachers of speaking, is not much greater than that vulgar and forensic stock. We need furnishing and exquisite matters gathered, sought, and brought together from every side — as it is for you to do, Caesar, next year; as I laboured in my aedileship, because I did not think I could satisfy this people with everyday and homespun matters.

Artem vero negabat esse ullam, nisi quae cognitis penitusque perspectis et in unum exitum spectantibus et numquam fallentibus rebus contineretur; haec autem omnia, quae tractarentur ab oratoribus, dubia esse et incerta; quoniam et dicerentur ab eis, qui omnia ea non plane tenerent, et audirentur ab eis, quibus non scientia esset tradenda, sed exigui temporis aut falsa aut certe obscura opinio.

The rationale of choosing and arranging and concluding words, or even — without rationale — practice itself, is easy. Of matters there is a great wood. Since the Greeks no longer hold this, and on that account our youth nearly unlearns by learning, even Latins (so it pleases the gods) in this two-year stretch have arisen as teachers of speaking. Whom I, as censor, removed by my edict — not because, as some, I am told, said, I should not wish the talents of the youth to be sharpened, but on the contrary, I should not wish their talents to be dulled, their shamelessness strengthened.

Quid multa? Sic mihi tum persuadere videbatur neque artificium ullum esse dicendi neque quemquam posse, nisi qui illa, quae a doctissimis hominibus in philosophia dicerentur, cognosset, aut callide aut copiose dicere; in quibus Charmadas solebat ingenium tuum, Crasse, vehementer admirari: me sibi perfacilem in audiendo, te perpugnacem in disputando esse visum.

For I saw that, among the Greeks, of whatever kind they were, there was, beyond this exercise of the tongue, some kind of doctrine and science worthy of culture; but these new masters I understood could teach nothing save daring; which, even when joined with good things, is by itself greatly to be fled. Since this alone was being handed down, and since it was a school of impudence, I thought it was the censor’s part to look out lest it should creep further.

Itaque ego hac eadem opinione adductus scripsi etiam illud quodam in libello, qui me imprudente et invito excidit et pervenit in manus hominum, disertos cognosse me non nullos, eloquentem adhuc neminem, quod eum statuebam disertum, qui posset satis acute atque dilucide apud mediocris homines ex communi quadam opinione hominum dicere, eloquentem vero, qui mirabilius et magnificentius augere posset atque ornare quae vellet, omnisque omnium rerum, quae ad dicendum pertinerent, fontis animo ac memoria contineret. Id si est difficile nobis, quod ante, quam ad discendum ingressi sumus, obruimur ambitione et foro, sit tamen in re positum atque natura:

Although I do not so lay down and decree these things as if I were despairing that those things on which we have argued can be handed down and polished in Latin. For both our tongue and the nature of things suffers that the ancient and outstanding prudence of the Greeks be transferred to our use and custom. But there is need of learned men, of whom thus far in our country there have been none in this kind. But if any shall ever stand forth, they will be set even before the Greeks.

ego enim, quantum auguror coniectura quantaque ingenia in nostris hominibus esse video, non despero fore aliquem aliquando, qui et studio acriore quam nos sumus atque fuimus et otio ac facultate discendi maiore ac maturiore et labore atque industria superiore, cum se ad audiendum legendum scribendumque dederit, exsistat talis orator, qualem quaerimus, qui iure non solum disertus, sed etiam eloquens dici possit; qui tamen mea sententia aut hic est iam Crassus aut, si quis pari fuerit ingenio pluraque quam hic et audierit et lectitarit et scripserit, paulum huic aliquid poterit addere.’

Speech then is adorned first by kind and as it were by a certain colour and sap of its own. For that it be weighty, that it be pleasing, that it be learned, that it be liberal, that it be admirable, that it be polished, that it have feeling, that it have grief as much as is needed — that does not lie in single joints. These things are seen in the whole body. Then, that it be sprinkled, as it were, with flowers of words and thoughts — that ought not to be diffused evenly through the whole speech, but so distinguished that there should be, as in ornament, certain marks set out and lights.

Hoc loco Sulpicius ’insperanti’ inquit ’mihi et Cottae, sed valde optanti utrique nostrum cecidit, ut in istum sermonem, Crasse, delaberemini; nobis enim huc venientibus satis iucundum fore videbatur, si, cum vos de rebus aliis loqueremini, tamen nos aliquid ex sermone vestro memoria dignum excipere possemus; ut vero penitus in eam ipsam totius huius vel studi vel artifici vel facultatis disputationem paene intimam veniretis, vix optandum nobis videbatur.

A kind of speaking, then, must be chosen which most holds those who hear, and which not only delights but delights without satiety. For I do not think it is now expected from me to warn that you should beware lest your speech be meagre, lest unkempt, lest vulgar, lest obsolete. Something else greater both your talents and your ages exhort me to.

Ego enim, qui ab ineunte aetate incensus essem studio utriusque vestrum, Crassi vero etiam amore, cum ab eo nusquam discederem, verbum ex eo numquam elicere potui de vi ac ratione dicendi, cum et per me ipsum egissem et per Drusum saepe temptassem; quo in genere tu, Antoni,—vere loquar—numquam mihi percontanti aut quaerenti aliquid defuisti et persaepe me, quae soleres in dicendo observare, docuisti.

For it is hard to say what cause there is why those things which most strike our senses with pleasure and most keenly stir us at first sight, we are most quickly turned away from in a kind of disgust and satiety. How much more flowery in beauty and variety of colours are most paintings new than old? Which yet, even if they have at first sight caught us, do not delight us long; whereas we are held by those very rude and obsolete features in old paintings. How much softer and more dainty in song are the inflexions and the false little notes than the fixed and severe? At which not only the austere, but, if they happen too often, the multitude itself cries out.

Nunc, quoniam uterque vestrum patefecit earum ipsarum rerum aditum, quas quaerimus, et quoniam princeps Crassus eius sermonis ordiendi fuit, date nobis hanc veniam, ut ea, quae sentitis de omni genere dicendi, subtiliter persequamini; quod quidem si erit a vobis impetratum, magnam habebo, Crasse, huic palaestrae et Tusculano tuo gratiam et longe Academiae illi ac Lycio tuum hoc suburbanum gymnasium anteponam.’

It is to be seen in the rest of the senses: that we are less long delighted by perfumes seasoned with the highest and keenest sweetness than by these moderate ones; and what seems to smell of earth is more praised than what seems to smell of saffron. In touch itself there is a measure both of softness and of smoothness. Even taste, which is the most pleasure-loving of all the senses, and which is moved by sweetness above the other senses, how quickly does it scorn and reject what is very sweet! Who can drink or eat what is sweet for long? — when in each kind those things which lightly move the sense with pleasure most easily flee satiety.

Tum ille ’immo vero,’ inquit ’Sulpici, rogemus Antonium, qui et potest facere, quod requiris, et consuevit, ut te audio dicere: nam me quidem fateor semper a genere hoc toto sermonis refugisse et tibi cupienti atque instanti saepissime negasse, ut tute paulo ante dixisti; quod ego non superbia neque inhumanitate faciebam neque quod tuo studio rectissimo atque optimo non obsequi vellem, praesertim cum te unum ex omnibus ad dicendum maxime natum aptumque cognossem, sed me hercule istius disputationis insolentia atque earum rerum, quae quasi in arte traduntur, inscitia.’

So in all things disgust is the neighbour of the greatest pleasures. Wherefore we should the less wonder at this in speech, in which we can judge from poets or from orators that whatever poetry or speech be neat, distinguished, ornate, festive, without intermission, without reproach, without variety, even painted with bright colours, cannot be lasting in delight. And we are the more quickly offended by the orator’s or the poet’s curls and rouge, because the senses by nature, not by mind, are sated in too much pleasure. In writings and in sayings the painted faults are known not only by the ears but, even more, by the judgment of the soul.

Tum Cotta ’quoniam id, quod difficillimum nobis videbatur, ut omnino de his rebus, Crasse, loquerere, adsecuti sumus, de reliquo iam nostra culpa fuerit, si te, nisi omnia, quae percontati erimus, explicaris, dimiserimus.’

Therefore though to us “well and brilliantly” be often said, “prettily and gaily” I will not have too often said. Although that very exclamation, “It cannot be better,” I would have frequent. But yet let that admiration and highest praise in speaking have some shadow and recess, that what is illumined may seem more to stand out and shine.

’De eis, credo, rebus,’ inquit Crassus ’ut in cretionibus scribi solet: qvibvs sciam poteroqve.’ Tum ille ’nam quod tu non poteris aut nescies, quis nostrum tam impudens est qui se scire aut posse postulet?’ ’Iam vero ista condicione, dum mihi liceat negare posse quod non potero et fateri nescire quod nesciam, licet’ inquit Crassus ’vestro arbitratu percontemini.’

Roscius never plays this verse with the gesture he can: “For the wise man seeks honour as the reward of virtue, not booty.” But he throws it off entirely, that in the next: “But what do I see? Hedged with steel, he holds the sacred seats” — he may push, may look, may admire, may stupefy. What of that other: “What guard shall I seek?” — how gently, how slackly, how unanimatedly! For there presses next: “O father, O country, O house of Priam!” — at which a delivery so great could not be moved, if it had been used up by the previous motion and exhausted. Nor did the actors see this before the poets themselves, and finally those too who composed the music; from each of which something is lowered, then increased, thinned, swelled, varied, distinguished.

’Atqui’ inquit Sulpicius ’hoc ex te, de quo modo Antonius exposuit, quid sentias, quaerimus, existimesne artem aliquam esse dicendi?’ ’Quid? mihi vos nunc’ inquit Crassus ’tamquam alicui Graeculo otioso et loquaci et fortasse docto atque erudito quaestiunculam, de qua meo arbitratu loquar, ponitis? Quando enim me ista curasse aut cogitasse arbitramini et non semper inrisisse potius eorum hominum impudentiam, qui cum in schola adsedissent, ex magna hominum frequentia dicere iuberent, si quis quid quaereret?

So let our orator be ornate and pleasing — nor indeed can he be otherwise — but in such a way that he has a sweetness austere and solid, not sweet and over-cooked. For the precepts that are given for ornament are of such a kind that anyone, even the most faulty orator, can set them out. Therefore, as I said before, first the wood of matters and thoughts must be gathered, of which Antonius spoke. These must be shaped by the very thread and kind of speech, illustrated by words, varied by thoughts.

Quod primum ferunt Leontinum fecisse Gorgiam, qui permagnum quiddam suscipere ac profiteri videbatur, cum se ad omnia, de quibus quisque audire vellet, esse paratum denuntiaret; postea vero vulgo hoc facere coeperunt hodieque faciunt, ut nulla sit res neque tanta neque tam improvisa neque tam nova, de qua se non omnia, quae dici possint, profiteantur esse dicturos.

The highest praise of eloquence is to amplify a matter by ornament, which avails not only for raising something and lifting it up higher by speech, but also for thinning and casting it down. This is required in all those topics which Antonius said are applied for producing the credit of speech, either when we explain anything, or when we conciliate minds, or when we rouse them.

Quod si te, Cotta, arbitrarer aut te, Sulpici, de eis rebus audire velle, adduxissem huc Graecum aliquem, qui nos istius modi disputationibus delectaret; quod ne nunc quidem difficile factu est: est enim apud M. Pisonem adulescentem iam huic studio deditum, summo homo ingenio nostrique cupidissimus, Peripateticus Staseas, homo nobis sane familiaris et, ut inter homines peritos constare video, in illo suo genere omnium princeps.’

But in this last thing I have spoken of, amplification can do the most, and that is the one praise of the orator, and especially proper. Even greater is that exercise which Antonius placed in the closing speech and at first rejected — of praising and blaming. For nothing is more apt for exaggerating and amplifying speech than to be able to do each of these in the fullest way.

’Quem tu mihi’ inquit Mucius ’Staseam, quem Peripateticum narras? Gerendus est tibi mos adulescentibus, Crasse, qui non Graeci alicuius cotidianam loquacitatem sine usu neque ex scholis cantilenam requirunt, sed ex homine omnium sapientissimo atque eloquentissimo atque ex eo, qui non in libellis, sed in maximis causis et in hoc domicilio imperi et gloriae sit consilio linguaque princeps, cuius vestigia persequi cupiunt, eius sententiam sciscitantur.

There follow also those topics which, although they ought to be proper to cases and clinging in their sinews, yet, because they are wont to be handled about the universal matter, were called by the ancients common — of which some have a kind of keen accusation or complaint of vices and faults with amplification, against which nothing is wont to be said and nothing can be: as against an embezzler, against a traitor, against a parricide. These should be used when the charges have been confirmed; otherwise they are dry and empty;

Equidem te cum in dicendo semper putavi deum, tum vero tibi numquam eloquentiae maiorem tribui laudem quam humanitatis; qua nunc te uti vel maxime decet neque defugere eam disputationem, ad quam te duo excellentes ingeniis adulescentes cupiunt accedere.’

others have entreaty or pity; others, indeed, two-sided disputations, in which copiously on both sides the universal kind may be argued. This exercise, now thought to be proper to those two philosophies of which I spoke before, was among the ancients of those from whom the whole rationale and abundance of speaking on forensic matters was sought. For of virtue, of duty, of right and good, of dignity, utility, honour, disgrace, reward, punishment, and like matters, we ought to have both force and art for speaking on each side.

’Ego vero’ inquit ’istis obsequi studeo neque gravabor breviter meo more, quid quaque de re sentiam, dicere. Ac primum illud—quoniam auctoritatem tuam neglegere, Scaevola, fas mihi non esse puto—respondeo, mihi dicendi aut nullam artem aut pertenuem videri, sed omnem esse contentionem inter homines doctos in verbi controversia positam.

But since we have been driven from our possession and left in a small and litigious little farm, and we, advocates of others, could not hold and protect our own, from those who have broken into our patrimony — what is most unworthy — let us borrow what we need.

Nam si ars ita definitur, ut paulo ante exposuit Antonius, ex rebus penitus perspectis planeque cognitis atque ab opinionis arbitrio seiunctis scientiaque comprehensis, non mihi videtur ars oratoris esse ulla; sunt enim varia et ad vulgarem popularemque sensum accommodata omnia genera huius forensis nostrae dictionis.

Those, then, who now indeed take their name from a small portion of the city and place — and are called Peripatetic or Academic philosophers — but in old time, by reason of their outstanding knowledge of the greatest things, were called by the Greeks “political” philosophers, by the name of the universal commonwealth — say that all civic speech moves in one of two kinds of these: either of a definite controversy in fixed times and parties (in this way: “Should our captives be received back from the Carthaginians by returning theirs?”); or, of one who asks generally about the universal kind: “What altogether ought to be decreed and felt about a captive?” The earlier of these two kinds they call cause or controversy; and they define it by three: suit, deliberation, or laudation. The other, however, is called an unbounded question and as it were a consultation put forward.

Sin autem ea, quae observata sunt in usu ac tractatione dicendi, haec ab hominibus callidis ac peritis animadversa ac notata, verbis definita, generibus inlustrata, partibus distributa sunt—id quod video potuisse fieri—, non intellego, quam ob rem non, si minus illa subtili definitione, at hac vulgari opinione ars esse videatur. Sed sive est ars sive artis quaedam similitudo, non est ea quidem neglegenda; verum intellegendum est alia quaedam ad consequendam eloquentiam esse maiora.’

And they so far speak, and use this division too in setting things up. But in such a way that they recover their lost possession not by right or by judgment, but, finally, by force; and that, not by civil law, but by breaking off a twig of the property, they seem to take possession by usage. For that other kind, which is defined by times, places, parties, they hold; and that itself only by a fringe — for now with Philo, who I hear is most flourishing in the Academy, the inquiry into and exercise of these very cases is being celebrated. The other only they name in the first handing-down of the art and say it is the orator’s. But neither do they set out the force or the nature of it, nor its parts, nor its kinds; so that it had been better passed by altogether than to have been touched and abandoned. For now they are understood to be silent through poverty; then they would have seemed silent through judgment.

Tum Antonius vehementer se adsentiri Crasso dixit, quod neque ita amplecteretur artem, ut ei solerent, qui omnem vim dicendi in arte ponerent, neque rursus eam totam, sicut plerique philosophi facerent, repudiaret. ’Sed existimo’ inquit ’gratum te his, Crasse, facturum, si ista exposueris quae putas ad dicendum plus quam ipsam artem posse prodesse.’

Every matter, therefore, has the same nature of being doubted, on which question and dispute can be made — whether it be argued in unbounded consultations, or in those cases which move in the state and forensic dispute. Nor is there any which is not referred to either the force and rationale of knowing or of doing.

’Dicam equidem, quoniam institui, petamque a vobis,’ inquit ’ne has meas ineptias efferatis; quamquam moderabor ipse, ne ut quidam magister atque artifex, sed quasi unus ex togatorum numero atque ex forensi usu homo mediocris neque omnino rudis videar non ipse a me aliquid promisisse, sed fortuito in sermonem vestrum incidisse.

For either the very knowledge and science of a thing is sought, as “Is virtue to be desired for its own dignity, or for some fruit?” Or the counsel of doing is asked, as “Should the wise man take part in the commonwealth?”

Equidem cum peterem magistratum, solebam in prensando dimittere a me Scaevolam, cum ita ei dicerem, me velle esse ineptum, id erat, petere blandius, quod, nisi inepte fieret, bene non posset fieri;—hunc autem esse unum hominem ex omnibus, quo praesente ego ineptum esse me minime vellem—quem quidem nunc mearum ineptiarum testem et spectatorem fortuna constituit: nam quid est ineptius quam de dicendo dicere, cum ipsum dicere numquam sit non ineptum, nisi cum est necessarium?’

There are three modes of knowing: conjecture, definition, and (so to say) consequence. For what is in a thing is asked by conjecture, as “Is there wisdom in the human race?” What force each thing has, definition sets out, as if it be asked, “What is wisdom?” Consequence is handled when it is asked what follows from each thing, as “Is it sometimes the part of a good man to lie?”

’Perge vero,’ inquit ’Crasse,’ Mucius; ’istam enim culpam, quam vereris, ego praestabo.’ ’Sic igitur’ inquit ’sentio,’ Crassus ’naturam primum atque ingenium ad dicendum vim adferre maximam; neque vero istis, de quibus paulo ante dixit Antonius, scriptoribus artis rationem dicendi et viam, sed naturam defuisse; nam et animi atque ingeni celeres quidam motus esse debent, qui et ad excogitandum acuti et ad explicandum ornandumque sint uberes et ad memoriam firmi atque diuturni;

They come back again to conjecture and divide it into four kinds. For either it is asked what something is, in this way: “Is right by nature among men, or in opinions?” Or what is the origin of each thing, as “What is the beginning of laws or of commonwealths?” Or the cause and reason, as if it should be asked, “Why do most learned men disagree on the greatest matters?” Or about a change, as if it should be argued, “Whether virtue can perish in a man, or be turned to vice.”

et si quis est qui haec putet arte accipi posse,—quod falsum est; praeclare enim res se habeat, si haec accendi aut commoveri arte possint; inseri quidem et donari ab arte non possunt; omnia sunt enim illa dona naturae—quid de illis dicam, quae certe cum ipso homine nascuntur, linguae solutio, vocis sonus, latera, vires, conformatio quaedam et figura totius oris et corporis?

The disputes of definition are either when it is asked what is impressed, as it were, in the common mind, as if it should be argued: “Is that the right which is useful to the greatest part?” Or when it is asked what is each thing’s own, as: “Is to speak ornately the orator’s own, or can someone besides do it?” Or when the matter is distributed into parts, as if it should be asked, “How many kinds are there of things to be sought? Are there three: of the body, of the soul, of external things?” Or when the form and as it were the natural mark of each thing is described, as if there be sought the kinds of the avaricious, the seditious, the boastful.

Neque enim haec ita dico, ut ars aliquos limare non possit —neque enim ignoro, et quae bona sint, fieri meliora posse doctrina, et, quae non optima, aliquo modo acui tamen et corrigi posse—, sed sunt quidam aut ita lingua haesitantes aut ita voce absoni aut ita vultu motuque corporis vasti atque agrestes, ut, etiam si ingeniis atque arte valeant, tamen in oratorum numerum venire non possint; sunt autem quidam ita in eisdem rebus habiles, ita naturae muneribus ornati, ut non nati, sed ab aliquo deo ficti esse videantur.

Two first kinds of questions of consequence are laid down. For either the dispute is simple, as if it be argued whether glory is to be sought; or from comparison, “Is praise or wealth more to be sought?” Of the simple, there are three modes: about things to be sought or fled, as “Are honours to be sought, or poverty to be fled?”; about the just or unjust, as “Is it just to revenge wrongs even against kinsfolk?”; about the honourable or base, as: “Is it honourable to die for glory?”

Magnum quoddam est onus atque munus suscipere atque profiteri se esse, omnibus silentibus, unum maximis de rebus magno in conventu hominum audiendum; adest enim fere nemo, quin acutius atque acrius vitia in dicente quam recta videat; ita quicquid est, in quo offenditur, id etiam illa, quae laudanda sunt, obruit.

Of comparison there are two modes. One when it is asked whether something is the same or has some difference: as to fear and to revere, as a king and a tyrant, as a flatterer and a friend. The other when it is asked what is preferable to what, as: “Are wise men led by the praise of each best man, or by popular praise?” These disputes which are referred to knowledge are about thus described by the most learned men.

Neque haec in eam sententiam disputo, ut homines adulescentis, si quid naturale forte non habeant, omnino a dicendi studio deterream: quis enim non videt C. Coelio, aequali meo, magno honori fuisse, homini novo, illam ipsam, quamcumque adsequi potuerat, in dicendo mediocritatem? Quis vestrum aequalem, Q. Varium, vastum hominem atque foedum, non intellegit illa ipsa facultate, quamcumque habuit, magnam esse in civitate gratiam consecutum?

Those, however, which are referred to action, either move in the dispute of duty (in which kind it is asked what is right and to be done, under which topic the whole wood of virtues and vices is set); or are handled in some movement of soul to be either produced or calmed or removed. To this kind are subjected exhortations, rebukes, consolations, pity, and every impulsion to every motion of soul, and, if the case so bear, mitigation.

Sed quia de oratore quaerimus, fingendus est nobis oratione nostra detractis omnibus vitiis orator atque omni laude cumulatus. Neque enim, si multitudo litium, si varietas causarum, si haec turba et barbaria forensis dat locum vel vitiosissimis oratoribus, idcirco nos hoc, quod quaerimus, omittemus. Itaque in eis artibus, in quibus non utilitas quaeritur necessaria, sed animi libera quaedam oblectatio, quam diligenter et quam prope fastidiose iudicamus! Nullae enim lites neque controversiae sunt, quae cogant homines sicut in foro non bonos oratores, item in theatro actores malos perpeti.

These kinds and modes of all disputes being set out, it is nothing to the purpose if in any matter our partition has differed from Antonius’s division: the same members are in each one’s discussion, but parted and assigned a little differently by me and by him. Now I shall move on to the rest, and call myself back to my own task and weight. For from those topics which Antonius set out, all arguments are to be taken for each kind of question. But to one kind one topic will be more apt than another. About which it is unnecessary to say anything, not so much because it is long as because it is plain.

Est igitur oratori diligenter providendum, non uti eis satis faciat, quibus necesse est, sed ut eis admirabilis esse videatur, quibus libere liceat iudicare; ac, si quaeritis, plane quid sentiam enuntiabo apud homines familiarissimos, quod adhuc semper tacui et tacendum putavi: mihi etiam qui optime dicunt quique id facillime atque ornatissime facere possunt, tamen, nisi timide ad dicendum accedunt et in ordienda oratione perturbantur, paene impudentes videntur,—tametsi id accidere non potest;

The most ornate, then, are those speeches which range most widely and bring and turn themselves from a private and singular controversy to setting out the force of the universal kind, so that those who hear, with the nature, kind, and universal matter known, may decide about the single parties, charges, and suits.

ut enim quisque optime dicit, ita maxime dicendi difficultatem variosque eventus orationis exspectationemque hominum pertimescit;—qui vero nihil potest dignum re, dignum nomine oratoris, dignum hominum auribus efficere atque edere, is mihi, etiam si commovetur in dicendo, tamen impudens videtur; non enim pudendo, sed non faciendo id, quod non decet, impudentiae nomen effugere debemus;

Antonius has exhorted you, young men, to this practice of exercise, and thought that you should be drawn from minute and narrow contests to the whole force and variety of arguing. Therefore this duty is not of a few little books, as those think who have written about the rationale of speaking; nor of the Tusculan villa or this morning walk or our after-noon sitting. For not only must our tongue be sharpened and forged, but the breast must be loaded and filled with the sweetness, abundance, and variety of the greatest and most numerous matters.

quem vero non pudet,—id quod in plerisque video—hunc ego non reprehensione solum, sed etiam poena dignum puto. Equidem et in vobis animum advertere soleo et in me ipso saepissime experior, ut et exalbescam in principiis dicendi et tota mente atque artubus omnibus contremiscam; adulescentulus vero sic initio accusationis exanimatus sum, ut hoc summum beneficium Q. Maximo debuerim, quod continuo consilium dimiserit, simul ac me fractum ac debilitatum metu viderit.’

For ours — if indeed we are orators, if in the disputes of citizens, if in dangers, if in public deliberations we are to be applied as authors and chiefs — ours, I say, is all that possession of prudence and learning, into which men, abounding in leisure while we are busy, have leapt as upon something fallen and empty; and either, mocking the orator (as Socrates does in the Gorgias), they bandy words; or they teach in a few books some of the orator’s art and entitle them rhetorical, as if those things were not the rhetoricians’ own which are said by them on justice, on duty, on instituting and governing states, on every rationale of living, and indeed of nature.

Hic omnes adsensi significare inter sese et conloqui coeperunt; fuit enim mirificus quidam in Crasso pudor, qui tamen non modo non obesset eius orationi, sed etiam probitatis commendatione prodesset. Tum Antonius ’saepe, ut dicis,’ inquit ’animadverti, Crasse, et te et ceteros summos oratores, quamquam tibi par mea sententia nemo umquam fuit, in dicendi exordio permoveri;

Which since we cannot now from elsewhere — they must be taken by us from those very men by whom we have been despoiled. Provided we transfer those things to this civil science to which they pertain and at which they look; and provided, as I said before, we do not waste our whole life in learning these matters. But when we have seen the springs (which, unless one quickly come to know, he will never come to know at all), then, as often as need shall be, from them we shall draw as much as the matter shall require.

cuius quidem rei cum causam quaererem, quidnam esset cur, ut in quoque oratore plurimum esset, ita maxime is pertimesceret, has causas inveniebam duas: unam, quod intellegerent ei, quos usus ac natura docuisset, non numquam summis oratoribus non satis ex sententia eventum dicendi procedere; ita non iniuria, quotienscumque dicerent, id, quod aliquando posset

For there is not so keen an edge in the natures and talents of men that anyone could see such great matters unless they have been pointed out; nor yet is there so great obscurity in matters that a man of keen talent cannot deeply discern them, if only he has looked. In this so vast, so unbounded a field, when the orator may freely range, and wherever he has stood, stand on his own ground, all the equipment and ornament of speaking easily abounds.

accidere, ne illo ipso tempore accideret, timere; altera est haec, de qua queri saepe soleo; quod ceterarum homines artium spectati et probati, si quando aliquid minus bene fecerunt quam solent, aut noluisse aut valetudine impediti non potuisse consequi id, quod scirent, putantur: "noluit" inquiunt "hodie agere Roscius," aut "crudior fuit"; oratoris peccatum, si quod est animadversum, stultitiae peccatum videtur;

For the abundance of matters begets the abundance of words; and if there is honour in the very things spoken about, there arises out of the matter a kind of natural splendour in words. Let only him who shall speak or write be liberally trained by his early education and learning, and burn with zeal and be helped by nature, and be exercised in unbounded disputations of universal kinds, and have chosen the most ornate writers and orators for knowing and imitating — he will surely not need those teachers to know how to construct and illumine words. So easily, in the abundance of matters, does nature itself, if only it has been exercised, slip without a guide to the ornaments of speech.”

stultitia autem excusationem non habet, quia nemo videtur, aut quia crudus fuerit aut quod ita maluerit, stultus fuisse; quo etiam gravius iudicium in dicendo subimus: quotiens enim dicimus, totiens de nobis iudicatur, et, qui semel in gestu peccavit, non continuo existimatur nescire gestum, cuius autem in dicendo quid reprehensum est, aut aeterna in eo aut certe diuturna valet opinio tarditatis.

Here Catulus: “Immortal gods,” he said, “Crassus, what variety of matters, what force, what abundance you have grasped, and out of what straits have you dared to lead the orator and to set him in the kingdom of his ancestors! For we have heard that those ancient teachers and authors of speaking thought no kind of disputation alien from themselves, and were always engaged in every rationale of speech.

Illud vero, quod a te dictum est, esse permulta, quae orator a natura nisi haberet, non multum a magistro adiuvaretur, valde tibi adsentior inque eo vel maxime probavi summum illum doctorem, Alabandensem Apollonium, qui cum mercede doceret, tamen non patiebatur eos, quos iudicabat non posse oratores evadere, operam apud sese perdere, dimittebatque et ad quam quemque artem putabat esse aptum, ad eam impellere atque hortari solebat.

Of whom Hippias of Elis, when he had come to Olympia at that great five-yearly celebration of the games, boasted, almost with all Greece listening, that there was nothing in any art of all things that he himself did not know — and that not only did he hold those arts which contain the liberal and free-born doctrines, geometry, music, the knowledge of letters and poets, and what is said of the natures of things, of the morals of men, of commonwealths — but also that he had made by his own hand the ring he had on, the cloak he was clothed with, the slippers he had put on.

Satis est enim in ceteris artificiis percipiendis tantum modo similem esse hominis et id, quod tradatur vel etiam inculcetur, si qui forte sit tardior, posse percipere animo et memoria custodire; non quaeritur mobilitas linguae, non celeritas verborum, non denique ea, quae nobis non possumus fingere, facies, vultus, sonus:

Of course this man went too far. But from him is easy conjecture how much those orators sought for themselves of the most distinguished arts — when they did not even shrink from baser ones. What shall I say of Prodicus of Ceos, Thrasymachus of Chalcedon, Protagoras of Abdera? Of whom each one, as much as in those times was possible, both argued and wrote about the nature of things.

in oratore autem acumen dialecticorum, sententiae philosophorum, verba prope poetarum, memoria iuris consultorum, vox tragoedorum, gestus paene summorum actorum est requirendus; quam ob rem nihil in hominum genere rarius perfecto oratore inveniri potest; quae enim, singularum rerum artifices singula si mediocriter adepti sunt, probantur, ea nisi omnia sunt in oratore summa, probari non possunt.’

That very Gorgias of Leontini, with whom as patron, as Plato wished, the orator yielded to the philosopher — who either was never overcome by Socrates and that conversation of Plato is not true, or, if he was overcome, then surely Socrates was more eloquent and skilled and (as you call him) more copious and a better orator. But this man, in that very book of Plato, professes that he will speak most copiously of every matter, whatever may be called into dispute and question. He first of all dared, in the assembly, to demand on what each wished to hear; to whom such honour was given by Greece, that for him alone of all there was set up at Delphi a statue not gilded but golden.

Tum Crassus ’atqui vide’ inquit ’in artificio perquam tenui et levi quanto plus adhibeatur diligentiae, quam in hac re, quam constat esse maximam: saepe enim soleo audire Roscium, cum ita dicat, se adhuc reperire discipulum, quem quidem probaret, potuisse neminem, non quo non essent quidam probabiles, sed quia, si aliquid modo esset viti, id ferre ipse non posset; nihil est enim tam insigne nec tam ad diuturnitatem memoriae stabile quam id, in quo aliquid offenderis.

But these whom I have named, and very many besides, the highest teachers of speaking, were at one time. From whom it can be understood that the matter is, as you say, Crassus: that the name of orator among the ancients in Greece flourished with somewhat greater abundance and glory.

Itaque ut ad hanc similitudinem huius histrionis oratoriam laudem dirigamus, videtisne quam nihil ab eo nisi perfecte, nihil nisi cum summa venustate fiat, nisi ita, ut deceat et uti omnis moveat atque delectet? Itaque hoc iam diu est consecutus, ut, in quo quisque artificio excelleret, is in suo genere Roscius diceretur. Hanc ego absolutionem perfectionemque in oratore desiderans, a qua ipse longe absum, facio impudenter; mihi enim volo ignosci, ceteris ipse non ignosco; nam qui non potest, qui vitiose facit, quem denique non decet, hunc, ut Apollonius iubebat, ad id, quod facere possit, detrudendum puto.’

Wherefore I doubt the more whether more praise should be assigned to you or more blame to the Greeks: that you, born in another tongue and other customs, in a most busy state, distracted either by the affairs of nearly all private men or by the management of the world and the steerage of the highest empire, have grasped so great a force and knowledge of matters, and have joined all of it with the science and exercise of him who avails by counsel and speech in the state — while they, born in letters and burning with these studies, but flowing in leisure, not only have acquired nothing, but have not even kept what was left and handed down and their own.”

’Num tu igitur’ inquit Sulpicius ’me aut hunc Cottam ius civile aut rem militarem iubes discere? Nam quis ad ista summa atque in omni genere perfecta potest pervenire?’ Tum ille ’ego vero,’ inquit ’quod in vobis egregiam quandam ac praeclaram indolem ad dicendum esse cognovi, idcirco haec exposui omnia; nec magis ad eos deterrendos, qui non possent, quam ad vos, qui possetis, exacuendos accommodavi orationem meam; et quamquam in utroque vestrum summum esse ingenium studiumque perspexi, tamen haec, quae sunt in specie posita, de quibus plura fortasse dixi, quam solent Graeci dicere, in te, Sulpici, divina sunt;

Then Crassus: “Not in this matter alone, Catulus,” he said, “but in many others too, the magnitudes of the arts have been diminished by the distribution and separation of parts. Or do you suppose that, when that famous Hippocrates of Cos lived, there were then other doctors who healed diseases, others who healed wounds, others who healed eyes? Surely with Euclid or Archimedes, surely with Damon or Aristoxenus in music, surely with Aristophanes or Callimachus in letters, those things were not so torn apart that no one embraced the universal kind, and that one set apart for himself one part, another another, in which to labour?

ego enim neminem nec motu corporis neque ipso habitu atque forma aptiorem nec voce pleniorem aut suaviorem mihi videor audisse; quae quibus a natura minora data sunt, tamen illud adsequi possunt, ut eis, quae habent, modice et scienter utantur et ut ne dedeceat. Id enim est maxime vitandum et de hoc uno minime est facile praecipere non mihi modo, qui sicut unus paterfamilias his de rebus loquor, sed etiam ipsi illi Roscio, quem saepe audio dicere caput esse artis decere, quod tamen unum id esse, quod tradi arte non possit.

For my part, I have often heard this from my father and my father-in-law: that our men also, who wished to excel in glory of wisdom, were wont to embrace everything which our state then knew. They remembered Sextus Aelius; M.’ Manilius indeed we ourselves have seen walking across the Forum — which was a sign that he who did this offered to all his fellow-citizens the abundance of his counsel. To these, both as they walked and as they sat at home in their high seat, men used to come — not only that they might consult them about the civil law, but also about giving a daughter in marriage, about buying a farm, about cultivating a field, about every duty or business.

Sed, si placet, sermonem alio transferamus et nostro more aliquando, non rhetorico, loquamur.’ ’Minime vero,’ inquit Cotta; ’nunc enim te iam exoremus necesse est, quoniam retines nos in hoc studio nec ad aliam dimittis artem, ut nobis explices, quicquid est istud, quod tu in dicendo potes;—neque enim sumus nimis avidi; ista tua mediocri eloquentia contenti sumus—idque ex te quaerimus, (ut ne plus nos adsequamur, quam quantulum tu in dicendo adsecutus es), quoniam, quae a natura expetenda sunt, ea dicis non nimis deesse nobis, quid praeterea esse adsumendum putes?’

This was the wisdom of that old P. Crassus, of Tiberius Coruncanius, of my son-in-law’s great-grandfather Scipio (a most prudent man) — all of whom were Pontifex Maximus, that things divine and human might be referred to them. The same gave their counsel and faith in the senate, before the people, in the cases of friends, at home and on military service.

Tum Crassus adridens ’quid censes,’ inquit ’Cotta, nisi studium et ardorem quendam amoris? sine quo cum in vita nihil quisquam egregium, tum certe hoc, quod tu expetis, nemo umquam adsequetur. Neque vero vos ad eam rem video esse cohortandos, quos, cum mihi quoque sitis molesti, nimis etiam flagrare intellego cupiditate.

For what was lacking to M. Cato besides this most polished doctrine from across the sea? Did he, because he had learned the civil law, not plead cases? Or, because he could plead, did he neglect the science of law? In each kind he both laboured and excelled. Did he, because of the favour gathered from private men’s affairs, become slower in undertaking public affairs? No one was braver before the people, no one a better senator; the same easily the best general; in short, nothing in this state in those times could be known or learned that he did not both investigate and know — and even write.

Sed profecto studia nihil prosunt perveniendi aliquo, nisi illud, quod eo, quo intendas, ferat deducatque, cognoris. Qua re quoniam mihi levius quoddam onus imponitis neque ex me de oratoris arte, sed de hac mea, quantulacumque est, facultate quaeritis, exponam vobis non quandam aut perreconditam aut valde difficilem aut magnificam aut gravem rationem consuetudinis meae, qua quondam solitus sum uti, cum mihi in isto studio versari adulescenti licebat.’

Now, on the contrary, most come naked and unarmed to the gaining of offices and to the conduct of public affairs, equipped with no knowledge of things, with no science. But if anyone excels above the rest, he flaunts himself if he brings one thing — either martial virtue or some military experience (which now indeed have grown obsolete); or the science of law, but not even of all of it (for the pontifical law, which is joined to it, no one learns); or eloquence, which they think is set in shouting and in the rush of words. The fellowship and kinship of all the good arts, indeed of the very virtues, they do not know.

Tum Sulpicius ’o diem, Cotta, nobis’ inquit ’optatum! Quod enim neque precibus umquam nec insidiando nec speculando adsequi potui, ut, quid Crassus ageret meditandi aut dicendi causa, non modo videre mihi, sed ex eius scriptore et lectore Diphilo suspicari liceret, id spero nos esse adeptos omniaque iam ex ipso, quae diu cupimus, cognituros.’

But to bring the speech back to the Greeks, whom in this kind of conversation we cannot do without (for as examples of virtue must be sought from ours, so of doctrine from them) — there are said to have been seven, at one time, who were both held and called wise. All these except Thales of Miletus presided over their states. Who is reported more learned in those same times than Pisistratus, or whose eloquence more equipped with letters? — who is said first to have so arranged Homer’s books, before confused, as we now have them. He, indeed, was not useful to his fellow-citizens, but yet so flourished in eloquence that he excelled in letters and learning.

Tum Crassus ’atqui arbitror, Sulpici, cum audieris, non tam te haec admiraturum, quae dixero, quam existimaturum tum, cum ea audire cupiebas, causam cur cuperes non fuisse; nihil enim dicam reconditum, nihil exspectatione vestra dignum, nihil aut inauditum vobis aut cuiquam novum. Nam principio, id quod est homine ingenuo liberaliterque educato dignum, non negabo me ista omnium communia et contrita praecepta didicisse: primum oratoris officium esse dicere ad persuadendum accommodate;

What of Pericles? About whose force of speaking we have heard this: that, when he spoke against the will of the Athenians somewhat sternly for the safety of his country, yet that very thing which he said against the popular men seemed popular to all and pleasant. On whose lips the old comic poets — even when they spoke ill of him (which was then permitted at Athens) — said that charm dwelt; and so great a force was in him that, in the minds of those who had heard him, he left as it were certain stings. But him no declaimer had taught to bark by the water-clock, but, as we have heard, that famous Anaxagoras of Clazomenae, the highest man in the science of the greatest matters. So this man, outstanding in learning, counsel, eloquence, presided over Athens for forty years, both in city and in war affairs.

deinde esse omnem orationem aut de infinitae rei quaestione sine designatione personarum et temporum aut de re certis in personis ac temporibus locata;

What of Critias? what of Alcibiades? Not, indeed, good men for their states, but surely learned and eloquent — were they not trained in Socratic disputations? Who polished Dion of Syracuse with all doctrines? Was it not Plato? And the same man drove him on, equipped him, armed him, not only as master of his tongue, but of his soul and virtue, to free his country. With other arts, then, did Plato train this Dion, with others did Isocrates train that most distinguished man Timotheus, son of Conon the most outstanding general — himself the highest general and a most learned man? Or with others did that famous Pythagorean Lysis train the Theban Epaminondas, who I do not know whether he was the single highest man of all Greece? Or Xenophon Agesilaus? Or Philolaus Archytas of Tarentum? Or Pythagoras himself that whole old Greece of Italy, which once was called Magna?

in utraque autem re quicquid in controversiam veniat, in eo quaeri solere aut factumne sit aut, si est factum, quale sit aut etiam quo nomine vocetur aut, quod non nulli addunt, rectene factum esse videatur;

I do not think so; for I see thus: that there was a single doctrine of all things which were worthy of a learned man, and of him who would excel in the commonwealth. Those who had received it, if they had been equally strong in talent for delivery and had given themselves also to speaking with no recoil of nature, excelled in eloquence.

exsistere autem controversias etiam ex scripti interpretatione, in quo aut ambigue quid sit scriptum aut contrarie aut ita, ut a sententia scriptura dissentiat; his autem omnibus partibus subiecta quaedam esse argumenta propria.

So Aristotle himself, when he saw Isocrates flourishing through the noble birth of his pupils — because he had transferred his disputations from forensic and civic causes to an empty elegance of speech — suddenly changed nearly the whole form of his discipline, and quoted, with a slight change, that verse of Philoctetes. For he says it is base to him to be silent when barbarians; but Aristotle, when Isocrates speaks. So he ornated and lit up that whole doctrine, and joined the knowledge of matters with the practice of speech. Nor did this escape the wisest king Philip, who summoned this man as teacher for his son Alexander, that from him he might receive both the precepts of doing and of speaking.

Sed causarum, quae sint a communi quaestione seiunctae, partim in iudiciis versari, partim in deliberationibus; esse etiam genus tertium, quod in laudandis aut vituperandis hominibus poneretur; certosque esse locos, quibus in iudiciis uteremur, in quibus aequitas quaereretur; alios in deliberationibus, quae omnes ad utilitatem dirigerentur eorum quibus consilium daremus; alios item in laudationibus, in quibus ad personarum dignitatem omnia referrentur;

Now whoever wishes — let him call by my leave a philosopher who hands down to us the abundance of matters and speech — by the name of orator. Or whether he prefer to call this orator (whom I say has wisdom joined to eloquence) a philosopher, I shall not hinder; provided this stand: that neither the speechlessness of him who knows the matter but cannot set it out by speaking, nor the ignorance of him to whom the matter is not at hand though words are not wanting, is to be praised. Of which, if one had to be wished, I should rather choose unspoken prudence than chattering folly. But if we ask what one excels of all, the palm must be given to the learned orator;

cumque esset omnis oratoris vis ac facultas in quinque partis distributa, ut deberet reperire primum quid diceret, deinde inventa non solum ordine, sed etiam momento quodam atque iudicio dispensare atque componere; tum ea denique vestire atque ornare oratione; post memoria saepire; ad extremum agere cum dignitate ac venustate.

whom if they suffer to be the same as the philosopher, the controversy is removed. But if they part them, those will be the lower in this — that in the perfect orator there is all that science of theirs, while in the philosophers’ knowledge eloquence does not necessarily lie; which, although they despise it, must yet seem to bring some heap to their arts.” When Crassus had said this, he was silent for a little, and there was silence from the rest.

Etiam illa cognoram et acceperam, ante quam de re diceremus, initio conciliandos eorum esse animos, qui audirent; deinde rem demonstrandam; postea controversiam constituendam; tum id, quod nos intenderemus, confirmandum; post, quae contra dicerentur, refellenda; extrema autem oratione ea, quae pro nobis essent, amplificanda et augenda, quaeque essent pro adversariis, infirmanda atque frangenda.

Then Cotta: “For my part, Crassus,” he said, “I cannot complain that you seem to me to have argued something else, which you had not undertaken; for you have brought somewhat more than was assigned to you and laid down by us. But surely those parts of yours were that you should speak about illustrating the speech, and you yourself had now begun, and had described all the praise of speech in four parts. When you had spoken about the first two enough, indeed (but, as you yourself said, swiftly and briefly), you had made two for yourself remaining: how we might first speak ornately, then aptly.

Audieram etiam quae de orationis ipsius ornamentis traderentur, in qua praecipitur primum, ut pure et Latine loquamur, deinde ut plane et dilucide, tum ut ornate, post ad rerum dignitatem apte et quasi decore; singularumque rerum praecepta cognoram.

When you had entered on this, suddenly a kind of tide of your talent snatched you far from the land and carried you out into the deep, almost out of the sight of all. For you, having grasped the whole knowledge of things, did not indeed hand it down to us; for time was not so much. But what you have profited with these, I do not know. Me indeed you have driven wholly into the Academy. In which I should wish that to be true which you often laid down: that it is not necessary to use up one’s life, and that he can discern all those things who has only looked at them. But even if it is sometimes denser, or if I am slower, I shall surely never rest nor be wearied before I have grasped those two-headed paths and methods of arguing on either side and against everything.”

Quin etiam, quae maxime propria essent naturae, tamen his ipsis artem adhiberi videram; nam de actione et de memoria quaedam brevia, sed magna cum exercitatione praecepta gustaram. In his enim fere rebus omnis istorum artificum doctrina versatur, quam ego si nihil dicam adiuvare, mentiar; habet enim quaedam quasi ad commonendum oratorem, quo quidque referat et quo intuens ab eo, quodcumque sibi proposuerit, minus aberret.

Then Caesar: “One thing,” he said, “most has stirred me from your speech, Crassus: that you said that he who could not learn anything quickly could ever entirely master it. So that it is not difficult for me to make trial, and either at once to grasp those things which you have lifted with words to the heavens, or, if I cannot, not to lose time, since I can yet be content with these of ours.”

Verum ego hanc vim intellego esse in praeceptis omnibus, non ut ea secuti oratores eloquentiae laudem sint adepti, sed, quae sua sponte homines eloquentes facerent, ea quosdam observasse atque collegisse; sic esse non eloquentiam ex artificio, sed artificium ex eloquentia natum; quod tamen, ut ante dixi, non eicio; est enim, etiam si minus necessarium ad bene dicendum, tamen ad cognoscendum non inliberale;

Here Sulpicius: “For my part,” said he, “Crassus, I am wanting neither for that Aristotle nor Carneades nor any of the philosophers. Either think me to be despairing of mastering those things, or — what I do — to despise them. To me this common knowledge of forensic and common matters is great enough for that eloquence at which I aim. From which itself, however, I do not know very many things; which then at last, when some case to be pleaded by me requires it, I ask. Therefore, unless you happen to be wearied and if we are not heavy to you, come back to those things which pertain to the praise and splendour of speech itself; which I wished to hear from you, not so as to despair of attaining eloquence, but so as to learn something more.”

et exercitatio quaedam suscipienda vobis est; quamquam vos quidem iam pridem estis in cursu: sed eis, qui ingrediuntur in stadium, quique ea, quae agenda sunt in foro tamquam in acie, possunt etiam nunc exercitatione quasi ludicra praediscere ac meditari.’

Then Crassus: “You ask common matters,” he said, “and not unknown to you, Sulpicius. For who has not taught about that kind, has not trained, has not even left writings? But I shall humour you, and I shall set out for you briefly only those things which are known to me. I shall yet judge that we must come back to those who are the authors and inventors of these surely small matters.

’Hanc ipsam’ inquit Sulpicius ’nosse volumus; ac tamen ista, quae abs te breviter de arte decursa sunt, audire cupimus, quamquam sunt nobis quoque non inaudita; verum illa mox; nunc de ipsa exercitatione quid sentias quaerimus.’

All speech, then, is composed of words, of which we must first see the rationale singly, then jointly. For there is one ornament of speech which lies in single words; another which consists of words joined continuously. Therefore we use words either of those which are proper and as it were the fixed names of things, born almost together with the things themselves; or of those which are transferred and as it were placed in another’s place; or of those which we make new and shape ourselves.

’Equidem probo ista,’ Crassus inquit ’quae vos facere soletis, ut, causa aliqua posita consimili causarum earum, quae in forum deferuntur, dicatis quam maxime ad veritatem accommodate; sed plerique in hoc vocem modo, neque eam scienter, et viris exercent suas et linguae celeritatem incitant verborumque frequentia delectantur; in quo fallit eos, quod audierunt, dicendo homines, ut dicant, efficere solere;

In proper words, then, the orator’s praise is to flee what is cast off and obsolete and to use what is choice and bright, in which something full and resounding seems to be. But in this kind of proper words a certain choice must be had, and that must be weighed by some judgment of the ears; in which the habit of speaking well also avails most.

vere enim etiam illud dicitur, perverse dicere homines perverse dicendo facillime consequi. Quam ob rem in istis ipsis exercitationibus, etsi utile est etiam subito saepe dicere, tamen illud utilius, sumpto spatio ad cogitandum paratius atque accuratius dicere. Caput autem est, quod, ut vere dicam, minime facimus (est enim magni laboris, quem plerique fugimus), quam plurimum scribere. Stilus optimus et praestantissimus dicendi effector ac magister; neque iniuria; nam si subitam et fortuitam orationem commentatio et cogitatio facile vincit, hanc ipsam profecto adsidua ac diligens scriptura superabit.

So that which the unskilled commonly say of orators — “This man uses good words,” or “Some other does not” — is not weighed by any art, but is judged by some natural sense, as it were. In which it is not great praise to avoid fault, although it is great. But this is, as it were, a single ground and foundation: the use and abundance of good words.

Omnes enim, sive artis sunt loci sive ingeni cuiusdam ac prudentiae, qui modo insunt in ea re, de qua scribimus, anquirentibus nobis omnique acie ingeni contemplantibus ostendunt se et occurrunt; omnesque sententiae verbaque omnia, quae sunt cuiusque generis maxime inlustria, sub acumen stili subeant et succedant necesse est; tum ipsa conlocatio conformatioque verborum perficitur in scribendo, non poetico, sed quodam oratorio numero et modo.

But what the orator himself builds, and where he applies art — that, it seems to me, must be sought and set out by us. There are three things, then, in single words which the orator should bring for illustrating and adorning speech: either an unaccustomed word, or a new-coined, or a transferred.

Haec sunt, quae clamores et admirationes in bonis oratoribus efficiunt; neque ea quisquam, nisi diu multumque scriptitarit, etiam si vehementissime se in his subitis dictionibus exercuerit, consequetur; et qui a scribendi consuetudine ad dicendum venit, hanc adfert facultatem, ut, etiam subito si dicat, tamen illa, quae dicantur, similia scriptorum esse videantur; atque etiam, si quando in dicendo scriptum attulerit aliquid, cum ab eo discesserit, reliqua similis oratio consequetur;

Unaccustomed are mostly old and through their antiquity long since dropped from the use of daily speech, which are freer for the licence of poets than ours; but rarely some poetic word has dignity also in speech. Nor would I shrink from saying, with Caelius, “In what season the Punic came into Italy”; nor “offspring” or “stock” or “to declare aloud” or “to call by name”; or, as you, Catulus, are wont, “I did not deem” or “opined”; or many others, by which, when set in place, the speech is wont often to seem grander and more ancient.

ut concitato navigio, cum remiges inhibuerunt, retinet tamen ipsa navis motum et cursum suum intermisso impetu pulsuque remorum, sic in oratione perpetua, cum scripta deficiunt, parem tamen obtinet oratio reliqua cursum scriptorum similitudine et vi concitata.

Coined words are those which are produced and made by the speaker himself, either by joining words, as: “Then a panic crushes from my breast all my wisdom,” or “Surely you do not wish his crooked-tongued malices” — for both versutiloquas and expectorat are words made from joining, not born; but often even without joining words are coined, like “that abandoned old age (senium)”, “the gods of begetting (di genitales)”, “to bend down (incurvescere) with abundance of berries.”

In cotidianis autem commentationibus equidem mihi adulescentulus proponere solebam illam exercitationem maxime, qua C. Carbonem nostrum illum inimicum solitum esse uti sciebam, ut aut versibus propositis quam maxime gravibus aut oratione aliqua lecta ad eum finem, quem memoria possem comprehendere, eam rem ipsam, quam legissem, verbis aliis quam maxime possem lectis, pronuntiarem; sed post animadverti hoc esse in hoc viti, quod ea verba, quae maxime cuiusque rei propria quaeque essent ornatissima atque optima, occupasset aut Ennius, si ad eius versus me exercerem, aut Gracchus, si eius orationem mihi forte proposuissem: ita, si eisdem verbis uterer, nihil prodesse; si aliis, etiam obesse, cum minus idoneis uti consuescerem.

The third mode of transferring a word is widely open. Necessity, forced by want and straits, gave it birth; afterwards pleasantness and delight made it celebrated. For as clothing, found first to ward off cold, was afterwards begun to be applied also to the body’s adornment and dignity, so the transfer of a word was set up for the sake of poverty, made frequent for delight. For “the vine sets gems,” “there is luxury in the grasses,” “glad crops,” even peasants say. For what can scarcely be made plain by the proper word — when said by transfer, the likeness of the thing we have set in another’s word illustrates that which we wish to be understood.

Postea mihi placuit, eoque sum usus adulescens, ut summorum oratorum Graecas orationes explicarem, quibus lectis hoc adsequebar, ut, cum ea, quae legeram Graece, Latine redderem, non solum optimis verbis uterer et tamen usitatis, sed etiam exprimerem quaedam verba imitando, quae nova nostris essent, dum modo essent idonea.

These transfers are as it were borrowings, when you take from another what you do not have. Those are a little bolder, which do not show poverty, but bring some splendour to speech. Of which I would not lay down for you either the reasoning of inventing or the kinds.

Iam vocis et spiritus et totius corporis et ipsius linguae motus et exercitationes non tam artis indigent quam laboris; quibus in rebus habenda est ratio diligenter, quos imitemur, quorum similes velimus esse. Intuendi nobis sunt non solum oratores, sed etiam actores, ne mala consuetudine ad aliquam deformitatem pravitatemque veniamus.

Of likeness it is the brevity drawn into a single word — which word, set in another’s place as in its own, if it is recognised, delights; if it has nothing similar, is rejected. But those things ought to be transferred which either make the matter brighter, as all those: “The sea bristles, the shadows are doubled, and the blackness of night and storm cloud darkens; flame quivers among the clouds, the heaven trembles with thunder, hail mixed with copious rain falls suddenly headlong, on every side all the winds break out, savage whirlwinds rise, the deep boils with seething.” All this, that it might be brighter, was said by words transferred through likeness;

Exercenda est etiam memoria ediscendis ad verbum quam plurimis et nostris scriptis et alienis; atque in ea exercitatione non sane mihi displicet adhibere, si consueris, etiam istam locorum simulacrorumque rationem, quae in arte traditur. Educenda deinde dictio est ex hac domestica exercitatione et umbratili medium in agmen, in pulverem, in clamorem, in castra atque in aciem forensem; subeundus visus hominum et periclitandae vires ingeni, et illa commentatio inclusa in veritatis lucem proferenda est.

or by which the whole thing of some deed or counsel is more signified, as he who, of one hiding it on purpose lest what was being done could be understood, by two transferred words, by likeness itself, signifies: “Since he wraps himself round in words, fences himself with guile.” Sometimes brevity also is got by transfer, as that “If the weapon flew from his hand”: the imprudence of a weapon let go could not be set out more briefly by proper words than has been signified by one transferred.

Legendi etiam poetae, cognoscendae historiae, omnium bonarum artium doctores atque scriptores eligendi et pervolutandi et exercitationis causa laudandi, interpretandi, corrigendi, vituperandi refellendi; disputandumque de omni re in contrarias partis et, quicquid erit in quaque re, quod probabile videri possit, eliciendum atque dicendum;

In this kind it often seems to me wonderful what the cause is, that all are more pleased by transferred and foreign words than by proper and their own. For if a thing has not its name and proper word — as the foot in a ship, as nexum which is done by the scale, as in a wife divorce — necessity forces us to take from elsewhere what we do not have. But in the greatest abundance of one’s own words men are yet much more delighted by foreign ones, if they are transferred with reason.

perdiscendum ius civile, cognoscendae leges, percipienda omnis antiquitas, senatoria consuetudo, disciplina rei publicae, iura sociorum, foedera, pactiones, causa imperi cognoscenda est; libandus est etiam ex omni genere urbanitatis facetiarum quidam lepos, quo tamquam sale perspergatur omnis oratio. Effudi vobis omnia quae sentiebam, quae fortasse, quemcumque patremfamilias adripuissetis ex aliquo circulo, eadem vobis percontantibus respondisset.’

I think this happens, either because it is some sign of talent to leap over what lies before our feet and take other things sought from afar; or because he who hears is led by his thought elsewhere and yet does not stray, which is the greatest delight; or because in single words a thing and a whole likeness is brought about; or because every transfer, which has been taken with reason, is brought to the senses themselves, especially of the eyes — which is the keenest sense.

Haec cum Crassus dixisset, silentium est consecutum; sed quamquam satis eis, qui aderant, ad id, quod erat propositum, dictum videbatur, tamen sentiebant celerius esse multo quam ipsi vellent ab eo peroratum. Tum Scaevola ’quid est, Cotta?’ inquit ’quid tacetis? Nihilne vobis in mentem venit, quod praeterea ab Crasso requiratis?’

For both “the smell of urbanity” and “the softness of humanity” and “the murmur of the sea” and “the sweetness of speech” are drawn from the other senses; but those of the eyes are far keener, which place almost before the gaze of the soul what we cannot perceive and see. For there is nothing in the nature of things whose word and name we cannot use of other things. Whence a likeness can be drawn — and it can be drawn from all things — thence one word, transferred, containing the likeness, will bring light to speech.

’Id me hercule’ inquit ’ipsum attendo: tantus enim cursus verborum fuit et sic evolavit oratio, ut eius vim et incitationem aspexerim, vestigia ingressumque vix viderim, et tamquam in aliquam locupletem ac refertam domum venerim, non explicata veste neque proposito argento neque tabulis et signis propalam conlocatis, sed his omnibus multis magnificisque rebus constructis ac reconditis; sic modo in oratione Crassi divitias atque ornamenta eius ingeni per quaedam involucra atque integumenta perspexi, sed ea contemplari cum cuperem, vix aspiciendi potestas fuit; itaque nec hoc possum dicere, me omnino ignorare, quid possideat, neque plane nosse atque vidisse.’

In this kind unlikeness must first be fled. “Vast vaults of heaven”: however much Ennius brought a sphere onto the stage, as is said, yet in a sphere the likeness of a vault cannot be. “Live, Ulysses; while you may; with your eyes the last beam of light snatch up” — he did not say “seek” or “take” (for that would have the delay of one hoping to live longer), but “snatch”: this word is fitted to that

’Quin tu igitur facis idem,’ inquit Scaevola ’quod faceres, si in aliquam domum plenam ornamentorum villamve venisses? Si ea seposita, ut dicis, essent, tu, qui valde spectandi cupidus esses, non dubitares rogare dominum, ut proferri iuberet, praesertim si esset familiaris: similiter nunc petes a Crasso, ut illam copiam ornamentorum suorum, quam constructam uno in loco quasi per transennam praetereuntes strictim aspeximus, in lucem proferat et suo quidque in loco conlocet.’

which he had said before, “while you may.” Then it must be looked at lest the likeness be drawn from afar. “Syrtis” of patrimony — I should rather say “rock”; “Charybdis” of goods — rather “whirlpool.” For the eyes of the mind are more easily borne to those things which are seen than to those which are heard. And since this is the very highest praise in transferring words — that what is transferred should strike the sense — all baseness must be fled in those things to which the likeness will draw the minds of those who hear.

’Ego vero’ inquit Cotta ’a te peto, Scaevola:—me enim et hunc Sulpicium impedit pudor ab homine omnium gravissimo, qui genus huius modi disputationis semper contempserit, haec, quae isti forsitan puerorum elementa videantur, exquirere:—sed tu hanc nobis veniam, Scaevola, da, et perfice, ut Crassus haec, quae coartavit et peranguste refersit in oratione sua, dilatet nobis atque explicet.’

I would not have said that by Africanus’s death the commonwealth was “castrated”; I would not have Glaucia called “the dung of the curia.” Even though the likeness be there, in each is a deformed thinking of likeness. I would not have it either greater than the matter requires (“a tempest of revelry”), or less (“a revelry of a tempest”). I would not have the word that is transferred narrower than that proper one and its own would have been: “What is it, pray? What do you nod me away from approach?” It would be better, “you forbid, prohibit, frighten away” — since he had said: “Get back here, lest my touch or shadow harm the good.”

’Ego me hercule’ inquit Mucius ’antea vestra magis hoc causa volebam, quam mea; neque enim tanto opere hanc a Crasso disputationem desiderabam, quanto opere eius in causis oratione delector; nunc vero, Crasse, mea quoque te iam causa rogo, ut, quoniam tantum habemus oti, quantum iam diu nobis non contigit, ne graveris exaedificare id opus, quod instituisti: formam enim totius negoti opinione meliorem maioremque video, quam vehementer probo.’

If you fear that the transfer may seem somewhat too harsh, it must often be softened by a word set before. As if, when M. Cato had died, anyone should say the senate had been left “orphaned,” that would be a little harsh; but “so to say, orphaned” is somewhat milder. For a transfer ought to be modest, so that it may seem brought to a foreign place, not to have broken in; and to have come on sufferance, not by force.

’Enimvero’ inquit Crassus ’mirari satis non queo etiam te haec, Scaevola, desiderare, quae neque ego ita teneo, uti ei, qui docent, neque sunt eius generis, ut, si optime tenerem, digna essent ista sapientia ac tuis auribus.’ ’Ain tu?’ inquit ille: ’si de istis communibus et pervagatis vix huic aetati audiendum putas, etiamne illa neglegere possumus, quae tu oratori cognoscenda esse dixisti, de naturis hominum, de moribus, de rationibus eis, quibus hominum mentes et incitarentur et reprimerentur, de historia, de antiquitate, de administratione rei publicae, denique de nostro ipso iure civili? Hanc enim ego omnem scientiam et copiam rerum in tua prudentia sciebam inesse; in oratoris vero instrumento tam lautam supellectilem numquam videram.’

But there is no more flowery way in single words, nor any which brings more light to speech. For that which flows from this kind is not in one word transferred, but is connected from several joined, so that one thing is said, another to be understood: “Nor shall I let myself again on the one rock, as once the Achaean fleet, dash myself.” And: “You err, you err. For when you leap and trust yourself, the strong reins of the laws will rein you in, and the yoke of empire will press you down.”

’Potes igitur,’ inquit Crassus ’ut alia omittam innumerabilia et immensa et ad ipsum tuum ius civile veniam, oratores putare eos, quos multas horas exspectavit, cum in campum properaret, et ridens et stomachans P. Scaevola, cum Hypsaeus maxima voce, plurimis verbis a M. Crasso praetore contenderet, ut ei, quem defendebat, causa cadere liceret, Cn. autem Octavius, homo consularis, non minus longa oratione recusaret, ne adversarius causa caderet ac ne is, pro quo ipse diceret, turpi tutelae iudicio atque omni molestia stultitia adversarii liberaretur?’

A like matter being taken, the words proper to it are then transferred to another matter, as I said. This is a great ornament of speech, in which obscurity must be fled. For these things, when carried too far in this kind, become what are called enigmas. The way is not in a word but in a speech, that is, in the continuity of words. Nor again does that turning and changing have a kind of fashioning in a word but in speech: “Africa trembles with terrible tumult, the rough land.” For the Africans is taken Africa: nor was the word made (as “the rock-breaking sea”), nor transferred (as “the sea is softened”), but for ornament’s sake one proper word is changed for another. “Cease, Rome, your enemies — and the great plains are witnesses.” This way is grave in adornment of speech and often to be taken; of this kind: that Mars of war is common, to call Ceres for crops, Liber for wine, Neptune for the sea, the curia for the senate, the Campus for the assemblies, the toga for peace, arms and weapons for war.

’Ego vero istos,’ inquit—’memini enim mihi narrare Mucium—non modo oratoris nomine sed ne foro quidem dignos vix putarim.’ ’Atqui non defuit illis patronis’ inquit Crassus ’eloquentia neque dicendi ratio aut copia, sed iuris civilis scientia: quod alter plus lege agendo petebat, quam quantum lex in xii tabulis permiserat, quod cum impetrasset, causa caderet; alter iniquum putabat plus secum agi, quam quod erat in actione; neque intellegebat, si ita esset actum, litem adversarium perditurum.

Likewise in the same kind, both virtues and vices are named for those very persons in whom they reside: “Luxury, when it broke into the house”; “Avarice penetrated where”; or “Faith availed, justice carried it through.” You see this whole kind: when, by an inflected and changed word, the same matter is uttered more ornately. To which are neighbouring those less ornate but yet not to be unknown — when we wish something to be understood: either the whole from a part (as for buildings when we say walls or roofs); or a part from the whole (as when we say one squadron for the cavalry of the Roman people); or several from one: “But the Roman, even though the matter is well done, in his heart trembles”; or when from many one is understood: “We are the Romans, who before were Rudini” (Rudine, Ennius’s home). Or in whatever way — not as it is said, in this kind is it understood, but as it is felt.

Quid? in his paucis diebus nonne nobis in tribunali Q. Pompei praetoris urbani familiaris nostri sedentibus homo ex numero disertorum postulabat, ut illi, unde peteretur, vetus atque usitata exceptio daretur cvivs pecvniae dies fvisset? quod petitoris causa comparatum esse non intellegebat, ut, si ille infitiator probasset iudici ante petitam esse pecuniam, quam esset coepta deberi, petitor rursus cum peteret, ne exceptione excluderetur, qvod ea res in ivdicivm ante venisset.

We often also misuse a word, not so elegantly as in transferring, but, even if more freely, sometimes not impudently — as when we say “grand speech” for “long,” “minute soul” for “small.” Now do you see those things to be not of a word but of a speech, which are connected from several transfers, as I have set out? But these — which I have said are either changed or to be otherwise understood than they are said — are transferred in a certain way.

Quid ergo hoc fieri turpius aut dici potest, quam eum, qui hanc personam susceperit, ut amicorum controversias causasque tueatur, laborantibus succurrat, aegris medeatur, adflictos excitet, hunc in minimis tenuissimisque rebus ita labi, ut aliis miserandus, aliis inridendus esse videatur?

So it happens that all the virtue and praise of single words arises from three things: if there be either an old word — which yet usage can bear; or a coined one, either by joining or by novelty, in which likewise the ears and habit must be spared; or a transferred one, which most, as it were by certain stars, marks and lights up speech.

Equidem propinquum nostrum P. Crassum illum Divitem cum multis aliis rebus elegantem hominem et ornatum tum praecipue in hoc efferendum et laudandum puto, quod, cum P. Scaevolae frater esset, solitus est ei persaepe dicere neque illum in iure civili satis illi arti facere posse, nisi dicendi copiam adsumpsisset —quod quidem hic, qui mecum consul fuit, filius eius est consecutus—neque se ante causas amicorum tractare atque agere coepisse, quam ius civile didicisset.

The continuity of words follows, which especially desires two things: arrangement first, then a certain measure and form. Of arrangement, it is to compose and build words so that neither be their meeting harsh nor gaping, but in some way close-jointed and smooth. In which my father-in-law’s character was wittily played upon by him who could most elegantly do it, Lucilius: “How prettily are the words composed! As all the little dice fitted skillfully into the pavement and inlay-work, vermicular!” When he had said this, mocking Albucius, he did not refrain from me either: “I have Crassus as son-in-law, that you not be more rhetorical.” What then? This Crassus, since he abuses my name — what does he do? That, surely (as he wishes and I should wish), somewhat better than Albucius. But on me he played, as he is wont.

Quid vero ille M. Cato? Nonne et eloquentia tanta fuit, quantam illa tempora atque illa aetas in hac civitate ferre maximam potuit, et iuris civilis omnium peritissimus? Verecundius hac de re iam dudum loquor, quod adest vir in dicendo summus, quem ego unum oratorem maxime admiror; sed tamen idem hoc semper ius civile contempsit.

Yet this arrangement of words must be kept, of which I am speaking; which makes the speech bound, coherent, smooth, evenly flowing. You will attain this if the last words shall so be joined with the first that follow that neither do they harshly meet nor too widely part.

Verum, quoniam sententiae atque opinionis meae voluistis esse participes, nihil occultabo et, quoad potero, vobis exponam, quid de quaque re sentiam. Antoni incredibilis quaedam et prope singularis et divina vis ingeni videtur, etiam si hac scientia iuris nudata sit, posse se facile ceteris armis prudentiae tueri atque defendere; quam ob rem hic nobis sit exceptus; ceteros vero non dubitabo primum inertiae condemnare sententia mea, post etiam impudentiae;

This diligence is followed also by the measure and the form of words; which I now fear may seem to this Catulus to be childish. For those ancients thought verses ought to be applied even in this prose speech, that is, certain rhythms — for they wished there to be in speeches closes punctuated by the measure of words and thoughts (not by marks of our breathlessness or of weariness, nor by copyists’ marks, but by the measure of words and thoughts); and Isocrates is said first to have established this — that he might bind the unkempt habit of the ancients in speaking, for the sake of pleasure and the ears, in rhythms (as his pupil Naucrates writes).

nam volitare in foro, haerere in iure ac praetorum tribunalibus, iudicia privata magnarum rerum obire, in quibus saepe non de facto, sed de aequitate ac iure certetur, iactare se in causis centumviralibus, in quibus usucapionum, tutelarum, gentilitatum, agnationum, adluvionum, circumluvionum, nexorum, mancipiorum, parietum, luminum, stillicidiorum, testamentorum ruptorum aut ratorum, ceterarumque rerum innumerabilium iura versentur, cum omnino, quid suum, quid alienum, qua re denique civis aut peregrinus, servus aut liber quispiam sit, ignoret, insignis est impudentiae.

For these two things were contrived for pleasure by the musicians, who once were the same as the poets — verse and song — that by both the rhythm of words and the measure of voices they might overcome the satiety of the ears with delight. These two then — I mean the regulation of voice and the closing of words — they thought were to be transferred from poetry to eloquence, as far as the severity of speech could bear.

Illa vero deridenda adrogantia est, in minoribus navigiis rudem esse se confiteri, quinqueremis autem aut etiam maiores gubernare didicisse. Tu mihi cum in circulo decipiare adversari stipulatiuncula et cum obsignes tabellas clientis tui, quibus in tabellis id sit scriptum, quo ille capiatur, ego tibi ullam causam maiorem committendam putem? Citius hercule is, qui duorum scalmorum naviculam in portu everterit, in Euxino ponto Argonautarum navem gubernarit.

In which is most of all this: that if a verse is brought about in speech by the joining of words, it is a fault — and yet we wish that joining, like the verse, to fall in rhythm and to be squared and brought to fulness. Nor of many things is there one matter which more distinguishes the orator from the unskilled and ignorant of speaking, than that he, untaught, pours out unkemptly as much as he can and what he says by breath, not by art, he limits; while the orator so binds the thought with words that he embraces it by some rhythm both bound and free.

Quid? si ne parvae quidem causae sunt, sed saepe maximae, in quibus certatur de iure civili, quod tandem os est eius patroni, qui ad eas causas sine ulla scientia iuris audet accedere? Quae potuit igitur esse causa maior, quam illius militis? de cuius morte cum domum falsus ab exercitu nuntius venisset et pater eius re credita testamentum mutasset et, quem ei visum esset, fecisset heredem essetque ipse mortuus, res delata est ad centumviros, cum miles domum revenisset egissetque lege in hereditatem paternam testamento exheres filius. Nempe in ea causa quaesitum est de iure civili, possetne paternorum bonorum exheres esse filius, quem pater testamento neque heredem neque exheredem scripsisset nominatim.

For when he has bound it by form and measures, he relaxes and frees it by changing the order, that the words be neither bound as it were by some fixed law of verse, nor so loose as to wander. In what way then shall we set ourselves to so great a duty, as to suppose we can attain this force of speaking rhythmically? The thing is not so difficult as necessary. For nothing is so tender, nor so flexible, nor that follows so easily wherever you lead, as speech.

Quid? qua de re inter Marcellos et Claudios patricios centumviri iudicarunt, cum Marcelli ab liberti filio stirpe, Claudii patricii eiusdem hominis hereditatem gente ad se redisse dicerent, nonne in ea causa fuit oratoribus de toto stirpis et gentilitatis iure dicendum?

From this verses, from this same different rhythms are produced; from this also this prose speech of various measures and many kinds. For there are not different words of conversation, of contention, nor are they taken from another kind for daily use, from another for the stage and pomp. But these we, when we have lifted them up lying in the middle, like the softest wax shape and fashion at our pleasure. Therefore as at one time we are weighty, at another subtle, at another we hold something middle: so the kind of speech follows our settled feeling, and is changed and turned to every pleasure of the ears and motion of minds.

Quid? quod item in centumvirali iudicio certatum esse accepimus, cum Romam in exsilium venisset, cui Romae exsulare ius esset, si se ad aliquem quasi patronum applicavisset, intestatoque esset mortuus, nonne in ea causa ius applicationis obscurum sane et ignotum patefactum in iudicio atque inlustratum est a patrono?

But as in most matters nature itself has incredibly fashioned this, so in speech: that those things which contained in themselves the greatest utility, the same had also most either of dignity or even of grace. For the safety and the salvation of all, we see this state of this whole world and of nature: that the heaven is round, and the earth is in the middle and is held by its own force and will; that the sun is borne about it, that it approaches the wintry sign and thence gradually rises into the opposite quarter; that the moon by its approach and recess receives the sun’s light; that the same five stars complete the same spaces by unequal motion and course.

Quid? nuper, cum ego C. Sergi Oratae contra hunc nostrum Antonium iudicio privato causam defenderem, nonne omnis nostra in iure versata defensio est? Cum enim M. Marius Gratidianus aedis Oratae vendidisset neque servire quandam earum aedium partem in mancipi lege dixisset, defendebamus, quicquid fuisset incommodi in mancipio, id si venditor scisset neque declarasset, praestare debere.

These have such force that, a little changed, they cannot cohere; such beauty that no shape can even be thought more ornate. Refer your mind now to the form and shape of men, or even of the rest of living things. You will find no part of the body, without some necessity, added on, and the whole shape as it were perfected by art, not by chance. What in those trees? In which the trunk, the branches, the leaves are not, in short, save for keeping and preserving their nature; nowhere yet is any part except graceful.

Quo quidem in genere familiaris noster M. Buculeius, homo neque meo iudicio stultus et suo valde sapiens et ab iuris studio non abhorrens, simili in re quodam modo nuper erravit: nam cum aedis L. Fufio venderet, in mancipio lumina, uti tum essent, ita recepit; Fufius autem, simul atque aedificari coeptum est in quadam parte urbis, quae modo ex illis aedibus conspici posset, egit statim cum Buculeio, quod, cuicumque particulae caeli officeretur, quamvis esset procul, mutari lumina putabat.

Let us leave nature and look at the arts. What in a ship is so necessary as the sides, as the holds, as the prow, as the stern, as the spars, as the sails, as the masts? Which yet have in their look so much grace, that they seem to have been invented not only for safety, but also for pleasure. Columns hold up temples and porticoes; yet they have no more usefulness than dignity. The pediment of the Capitol and of other temples necessity itself, not grace, fashioned. For when account had been had how on each side of the roof water might run off, the dignity of the pediment followed the temple’s utility — so that, even if the Capitol were set up in heaven, where there could be no rain, it seems it would have had no dignity without a pediment.

Quid vero? clarissima M’. Curi causa Marcique Coponi nuper apud centumviros quo concursu hominum, qua exspectatione defensa est? Cum Q. Scaevola, aequalis et conlega meus, homo omnium et disciplina iuris civilis eruditissimus et ingenio prudentiaque acutissimus et oratione maxime limatus atque subtilis atque, ut ego soleo dicere, iuris peritorum eloquentissimus, eloquentium iuris peritissimus, ex scripto testamentorum iura defenderet negaretque, nisi postumus et natus et, ante quam in suam tutelam veniret, mortuus esset, heredem eum esse posse, qui esset secundum postumum et natum et mortuum heres institutus; ego autem defenderem eum hac tum mente fuisse, qui testamentum fecisset, ut, si filius non esset, qui in suam tutelam veniret, M’. Curius esset heres, num destitit uterque nostrum in ea causa in auctoritatibus, in exemplis, in testamentorum formulis, hoc est, in medio iure civili versari?

The same likewise happens in all parts of speech: that some sweetness and charm follows the utility and almost necessity. For the closes and the punctuations of words were brought by the closing of breath and the straits of the breath. That invention is so sweet that, even if anyone had infinite breath given him, we should not yet wish him to draw out his words. So pleasing has been found to our ears that which not only could be tolerable but also easy to men’s lungs.

Omitto iam plura exempla causarum amplissimarum, quae sunt innumerabilia: capitis nostri saepe potest accidere ut causae versentur in iure. Etenim si C. Mancinum, nobilissimum atque optimum virum atque consularem, cum eum propter invidiam Numantini foederis pater patratus ex s. c. Numantinis dedidisset eumque illi non recepissent posteaque Mancinus domum revenisset neque in senatum introire dubitasset, P. Rutilius, M. filius, tribunus plebis, iussit educi, quod eum civem negaret esse, quia memoria sic esset proditum, quem pater suus aut populus vendidisset aut pater patratus dedidisset, ei nullum esse postliminium, quam possumus reperire ex omnibus rebus civilibus causam contentionemque maiorem quam de ordine, de civitate, de libertate, de capite hominis consularis, praesertim cum haec non in crimine aliquo, quod ille posset infitiari, sed in civili iure consisteret?

The longest combination of words, then, is what can be rolled out in one breath. But this is the measure of nature; another, of art. For since rhythms are several, the iamb and the trochee, the frequent ones, Aristotle, your Aristotle, Catulus, sets aside from the orator. They yet by nature run themselves into our speech and conversation. But marked are the strikings of those rhythms and minute feet. So first of all the heroic foot — the dactyl and anapest, the spondee — invites us. In which it is allowed to advance with impunity for two feet only, or a little more, lest we plainly fall into a verse or the likeness of a verse. “High are the twin towers, by which.” These three heroic feet at the openings of continuing words fall sufficiently becomingly.

Similique in genere, inferiore ordine, si quis apud nos servisset ex populo foederato seseque liberasset et postea domum revenisset, quaesitum est apud maiores nostros, num is ad suos postliminio redisset et amisisset hanc civitatem.

Most approved by that same Aristotle is the paean, which is double. For it either rises from a long syllable, which three short follow, as these words “cease, begin, restrain”; or from three short syllables in succession, the last drawn out and long, as those are “had subdued, hoof-beating.” And that philosopher likes to begin from the former paean, to end with the latter; the latter paean is, not in the number of syllables but in the measure of the ears (which is keener and more certain judgment), about equal to the cretic, which is from a long, a short, and a long: as “What guard shall I seek, or pursue? whither now —” From which rhythm Fannius began: “If, Quirites, his threats.” This rhythm Aristotle thinks more apt for closes, which he wishes mostly to be ended by a long syllable.

Quid? de libertate, quo iudicium gravius esse nullum potest, nonne ex iure civili potest esse contentio, cum quaeritur, is, qui domini voluntate census sit, continuone, an, ubi lustrum sit conditum, liber sit? Quid? quod usu memoria patrum venit, ut paterfamilias, qui ex Hispania Romam venisset, cum uxorem praegnantem in provincia reliquisset, Romae alteram duxisset neque nuntium priori remisisset, mortuusque esset intestato et ex utraque filius natus esset, mediocrisne res in contentionem adducta est, cum quaereretur de duobus civium capitibus et de puero, qui ex posteriore natus erat, et de eius matre, quae, si iudicaretur certis quibusdam verbis, non novis nuptiis fieri cum superiore divortium, in concubinae locum duceretur?

These things, however, do not require so keen a care and diligence as does that of the poets — whom necessity compels, and rhythms and measures themselves, so to enclose words in a verse that nothing may be even by the smallest breath shorter or longer than is needed. Speech is more free, and plainly, as it is said, is so truly loose — not so as to flee or err, but so as to regulate itself without bonds. For I agree with Theophrastus, who thinks that speech, polished and made (in some way), ought to be rhythmical not strictly but more loosely.

Haec igitur et horum similia iura suae civitatis ignorantem erectum et celsum, alacri et prompto ore atque vultu, huc atque illuc intuentem vagari cum magna caterva toto foro, praesidium clientibus atque opem amicis et prope cunctis civibus lucem ingeni et consili sui porrigentem atque tendentem, nonne in primis flagitiosum putandum est?

For, as he conjectures, both from those measures by which this customary verse is brought about, the anapaest afterwards flowered out (a longer rhythm); thence flowed that more licentious and richer dithyramb, whose limbs and feet, as the same says, lie spread through every richer speech. And if it is rhythmical in all sounds and voices that has certain pressings and what we can measure by equal intervals, this kind of rhythms is rightly set in the praise of speech, provided they be not continuous. For if that breathless and flowing chatter without intervals is to be deemed rude and unpolished, what other reason is there why it should be rejected, save that nature itself modulates the voice for men’s ears? Which cannot happen unless rhythm is in the voice.

Et quoniam de impudentia dixi, castigemus etiam segnitatem hominum atque inertiam; nam si esset ista cognitio iuris magna atque difficilis, tamen utilitatis magnitudo deberet homines ad suscipiendum discendi laborem impellere: sed, o di immortales, non dicerem hoc, audiente Scaevola, nisi ipse dicere soleret nullius artis sibi faciliorem cognitionem videri.

But there is no rhythm in continuity. Distinction and the striking of equal — or often various — intervals brings about rhythm, which we can mark in falling drops (which are distinguished by intervals), but cannot in a rushing river. If then this loose continuity of words is much more apt and pleasant when it is distinguished by joints and limbs than when continued and prolonged, those limbs will have to be measured. If they are shorter at the end, that as it were ambit of words is broken; for so the Greeks call these turnings of speech. So either the latter must be equal to the former, the last to the first; or, what is even better and more pleasant, longer.

Quod quidem certis de causis a plerisque aliter existimatur: primum, quia veteres illi, qui huic scientiae praefuerunt, obtinendae atque augendae potentiae suae causa pervulgari artem suam noluerunt; deinde, postea quam est editum, expositis a Cn. Flavio primum actionibus, nulli fuerunt, qui illa artificiose digesta generatim componerent; nihil est enim, quod ad artem redigi possit, nisi ille prius, qui illa tenet, quorum artem instituere vult, habet illam scientiam, ut ex eis rebus, quarum ars nondum sit, artem efficere possit.

These things have indeed been said by those philosophers whom you most love, Catulus. So I more often call them as witnesses, that, by praising my authorities, I may flee the charge of frivolities.” “Of what frivolities?” said Catulus. “Or what can be brought into that disputation more elegant, or more subtly said at all?”

Hoc video, dum breviter voluerim dicere, dictum a me esse paulo obscurius; sed experiar et dicam, si potero, planius. Omnia fere, quae sunt conclusa nunc artibus, dispersa et dissipata quondam fuerunt; ut in musicis numeri et voces et modi; in geometria lineamenta, formae, intervalla, magnitudines; in astrologia caeli conversio, ortus, obitus motusque siderum; in grammaticis poetarum pertractatio, historiarum cognitio, verborum interpretatio, pronuntiandi quidam sonus; in hac denique ipsa ratione dicendi excogitare, ornare, disponere, meminisse, agere, †ignota quondam omnibus et diffusa late videbantur.

“But I fear,” said Crassus, “that these may either seem too hard for these to follow, or, because they are not handed down in the common discipline, that we may seem to wish them to seem greater and more difficult.” Then Catulus: “You err, Crassus,” he said, “if you think either I or any of these expects from you these daily and common things. Those things you say, we wish to be said; nor so much to be said as to be said in that way. Nor do I answer this for myself only, but for all of these without any doubt.”

Adhibita est igitur ars quaedam extrinsecus ex alio genere quodam, quod sibi totum philosophi adsumunt, quae rem dissolutam divulsamque conglutinaret et ratione quadam constringeret. Sit ergo in iure civili finis hic: legitimae atque usitatae in rebus causisque civium aequabilitatis conservatio.

“For my part,” said Antonius, “I have now found him whom I had said in the little book I wrote I had not found — the eloquent man. But I have not interrupted you even for the sake of praising, lest anything of this so brief time of your speech should be lessened by one of my words.”

Tum sunt notanda genera et ad certum numerum paucitatemque revocanda. Genus autem id est, quod sui similis communione quadam, specie autem differentis, duas aut pluris complectitur partis; partes autem sunt, quae generibus eis, ex quibus manant, subiciuntur; omniaque, quae sunt vel generum vel partium nomina, definitionibus, quam vim habeant, est exprimendum; est enim definitio rerum earum, quae sunt eius rei propriae, quam definire volumus, brevis et circumscripta quaedam explicatio.

“By this rule, then,” said Crassus, “both by exercise and by the pen — which both other things and this most adorns and polishes — speech must be shaped by us. Yet this is not of so great labour as it seems, nor are these things to be directed by the keenest standard of rhythmicians or of musicians. Only this we must bring about: that speech does not flow on, does not wander, does not stop within, does not run too far out — that it be distinguished by limbs, that it have absolute turnings. Nor must we always use the unbroken and as it were turning of words, but often speech must be broken into smaller limbs, which yet themselves must be bound by rhythms.

Hisce ego rebus exempla adiungerem, nisi apud quos haec haberetur oratio cernerem; nunc complectar, quod proposui, brevi: si enim aut mihi facere licuerit, quod iam diu cogito, aut alius quispiam aut me impedito occuparit aut mortuo effecerit, ut primum omne ius civile in genera digerat, quae perpauca sunt, deinde eorum generum quasi quaedam membra dispertiat, tum propriam cuiusque vim definitione declaret, perfectam artem iuris civilis habebitis, magis magnam atque uberem quam difficilem et obscuram.

Nor let the paean or the heroic disturb you. They will themselves run into speech; they themselves, I say, will offer themselves and answer when not called. Only let there be that habit of writing and speaking, that thoughts may be ended by words, and the joining of those words may be born from longer and freer rhythms — most of all the heroic, or the former paean, or the cretic, but variously and distinctly let it settle. For likeness is most marked in coming to rest. And if the first and last feet have been preserved by this rationale, the middle ones can lie hidden, provided the very circuit of words be not either shorter than the ears expect, or longer than strength and breath bears.

Atque interea tamen, dum haec, quae dispersa sunt, coguntur, vel passim licet carpentem et conligentem undique repleri iusta iuris civilis scientia. Nonne videtis equitem Romanum, hominem acutissimo omnium ingenio, sed minime ceteris artibus eruditum, C. Aculeonem, qui mecum vivit semperque vixit, ita tenere ius civile, ut ei, cum ab hoc discesseritis, nemo de eis, qui peritissimi sunt, anteponatur?

The closes I think must be even more diligently kept than the previous parts, because in them most of all is the perfection and absoluteness judged. For of a verse the first and middle and last part is equally attended to, which, in whatever part it stumbles, is weakened. In speech, however, few perceive the first parts, most the last. Which since they appear and are understood, must be varied, lest they be rejected either by the judgments of minds or by the satiety of ears.

Omnia sunt enim posita ante oculos, conlocata in usu cotidiano, in congressione hominum atque in foro; neque ita multis litteris aut voluminibus magnis continentur; eadem enim elata sunt primum a pluribus, deinde paucis verbis commutatis etiam ab eisdem scriptoribus scripta sunt saepius.

Two or three feet at the end must be kept and noted, provided the previous parts will not be shorter and clipped. These ought to be either chorees or heroic, or alternating; or in that latter paean which Aristotle approves, or in the cretic equal to it. The changes of these will bring it about that neither shall those who hear be sated by disgust at likeness, nor we seem to do, by set design, what we shall do.

Accedit vero, quo facilius percipi cognoscique ius civile possit, quod minime plerique arbitrantur, mira quaedam in cognoscendo suavitas et delectatio; nam, sive quem haec Aeliana studia delectant, plurima est et in omni iure civili et in pontificum libris et in xii tabulis antiquitatis effigies, quod et verborum vetustas prisca cognoscitur et actionum genera quaedam maiorum consuetudinem vitamque declarant; sive quem civilis scientia, quam Scaevola non putat oratoris esse propriam, sed cuiusdam ex alio genere prudentiae, totam hanc descriptis omnibus civitatis utilitatibus ac partibus xii tabulis contineri videbit: sive quem ista praepotens et gloriosa philosophia delectat,—dicam audacius—hosce habet fontis omnium disputationum suarum, qui iure civili et legibus continentur: ex his enim et dignitatem maxime expetendam videmus, cum vera virtus atque honestus labor honoribus, praemiis, splendore decoratur, vitia autem hominum atque fraudes damnis, ignominiis, vinclis, verberibus, exsiliis, morte multantur;

If that Antipater of Sidon — whom you well remember, Catulus — was wont to pour out hexameters and other verses on the spur of the moment in various measures and rhythms, and the practice of an ingenious and remembering man so prevailed that, when he had thrown himself in mind and will to the verse, the words followed: how much more easily shall we attain that in speech, with practice and habit applied!

et docemur non infinitis concertationumque plenis disputationibus, sed auctoritate nutuque legum domitas habere libidines, coercere omnis cupiditates, nostra tueri, ab alienis mentis, oculos, manus abstinere.

But that no one may wonder how the multitude of unskilled in listening notices these things — both in every kind, and in this very thing, there is some great force and incredible nature. For all by some silent sense, without any art or reason, distinguish what is right and faulty in arts and reasonings. And while they do this in paintings and statues and other works, for the understanding of which they have less equipment from nature, much more do they show it in the judgment of words, rhythms, and voices, since these are fixed in common sense, and nature has wished none to be wholly without them.

Fremant omnes licet, dicam quod sentio: bibliothecas me hercule omnium philosophorum unus mihi videtur xii tabularum libellus, si quis legum fontis et capita viderit, et auctoritatis pondere et utilitatis ubertate superare.

So all are moved not only by skilfully placed words, but also by rhythms and voices. For how few there are who hold the art of rhythms and measures? But in these, if there is offence even a little — that anything is made shorter by contraction or longer by drawing out — whole theatres cry out. Does not the same happen in voices, that not only choirs and concerts, but also each one to himself, even singers in mismatch are cast out by the multitude and the people?

Ac si nos, id quod maxime debet, nostra patria delectat, cuius rei tanta est vis ac tanta natura, ut Ithacam illam in asperrimis saxulis tamquam nidulum adfixam sapientissimus vir immortalitati anteponeret, quo amore tandem inflammati esse debemus in eius modi patriam, quae una in omnibus terris domus est virtutis, imperi, dignitatis? Cuius primum nobis mens, mos, disciplina nota esse debet, vel quia est patria parens omnium nostrum, vel quia tanta sapientia fuisse in iure constituendo putanda est quanta fuit in his tantis opibus imperi comparandis.

It is wonderful — when there is the greatest difference in doing between the learned and the rude — how little the difference is in judging. For art, since it has set out from nature, unless nature moves and delights, seems to have done nothing at all. There is nothing so akin to our minds as rhythms and voices, by which we are roused and inflamed and softened and made languid and led often to cheerfulness and to gloom. The highest force of which is more apt for songs and singing — not neglected, as it seems to me, by Numa the most learned king and by our ancestors, as the lyres and pipes and verses of the Salii at solemn banquets show; most of all celebrated by ancient Greece. With which and like things would that you had preferred to argue rather than these childish transfers of words!

Percipietis etiam illam ex cognitione iuris laetitiam et voluptatem, quod, quantum praestiterint nostri maiores prudentia ceteris gentibus, tum facillime intellegetis, si cum illorum Lycurgo et Dracone et Solone nostras leges conferre volueritis; incredibile est enim, quam sit omne ius civile praeter hoc nostrum inconditum ac paene ridiculum; de quo multa soleo in sermonibus cotidianis dicere, cum hominum nostrorum prudentiam ceteris omnibus et maxime Graecis antepono. His ego de causis dixeram, Scaevola, eis, qui perfecti oratores esse vellent, iuris civilis esse cognitionem necessariam.

But as in a verse the multitude sees if there is a fault, so in our speech, if anything halts, it feels — but it does not pardon the poet, while it grants it to us. Yet all silent see that what we have said is not apt and perfect. Therefore those ancients — as we see today some too — when they could not bring about a circuit and as it were an orb of words (for that we have lately even begun to be able or to dare), used to speak three or two, or some even single words; who in that infancy yet held that natural thing which men’s ears demanded — that what they said should be equal, and they should use equal pauses for breathing.

Iam vero ipsa per sese quantum adferat eis, qui ei praesunt, honoris, gratiae, dignitatis, quis ignorat? Itaque, ut apud Graecos infimi homines mercedula adducti ministros se praebent in iudiciis oratoribus, ei, qui apud illos pragmatikoi/ vocantur, sic in nostra civitate contra amplissimus quisque et clarissimus vir, ut ille, qui propter hanc iuris civilis scientiam sic appellatus a summo poeta est: egregie cordatus homo, catus Aelius Sextus, multique praeterea, qui, cum ingenio sibi auctore dignitatem peperissent, perfecerunt ut in respondendo iure auctoritate plus etiam quam ipso ingenio valerent.

I have set out, as far as I could, what I judged most pertained to the ornament of speech. For I have spoken of the praise of single words; I have spoken of their joining; I have spoken of rhythm and form. But if you also ask the habit of speech and as it were some colour, there is one full but yet smooth, and one slender, not without sinews and strength, and one which, partaking of each kind, is praised in a certain mediocrity. On these three figures should sit a colour of grace not painted with rouge, but spread by blood.

Senectuti vero celebrandae et ornandae quod honestius potest esse perfugium quam iuris interpretatio? Equidem mihi hoc subsidium iam inde ab adulescentia comparavi, non solum ad causarum usum forensem, sed etiam ad decus atque ornamentum senectutis, ut, cum me vires, quod fere iam tempus adventat, deficere coepissent, ista ab solitudine domum meam vindicarem. Quid est enim praeclarius quam honoribus et rei publicae muneribus perfunctum senem posse suo iure dicere idem, quod apud Ennium dicat ille Pythius Apollo, se esse eum, unde sibi, si non populi et reges, at omnes sui cives consilium expetant, summarum rerum incerti: quos ego ope mea †ex incertis certos compotesque consili dimitto, ut ne res temere tractent turbidas:

Then at last this orator must be so shaped by us, both in words and in thoughts, that, as those who use arms or the wrestling-school, he should think he has to have account not only of avoiding or striking, but also that he move with grace; as those who are versed in the handling of arms, so should he in words for the apt composition and becomingness, but in thoughts for the gravity of speech. Words and thoughts are shaped almost countlessly, which I know enough is known to you. But between the shaping of words and of thoughts there is this difference: that of words is removed if you change the words; that of thoughts remains, whatever words you wish to use.

est enim sine dubio domus iuris consulti totius oraculum civitatis; testis est huiusce Q. Muci ianua et vestibulum, quod in eius infirmissima valetudine adfectaque iam aetate maxima cotidie frequentia civium ac summorum hominum splendore celebratur.

Although you do this, I yet think you ought to be warned that you should not think there is anything else to be the orator’s, that is outstanding and wonderful, except, in single words, to hold those three things — that we should use transferred words frequently, sometimes coined, rarely also very ancient ones. In the continuous speech, when we have held both the smoothness of joining and the rationale of rhythms which I have spoken of, then must all speech, as it were with lights, be distinguished and frequented with thoughts and words.

Iam illa non longam orationem desiderant, quam ob rem existimem publica quoque iura, quae sunt propria civitatis atque imperi, tum monumenta rerum gestarum et vetustatis exempla oratori nota esse debere; nam ut in rerum privatarum causis atque iudiciis depromenda saepe oratio est ex iure civili et idcirco, ut ante diximus, oratori iuris civilis scientia necessaria est, sic in causis publicis iudiciorum, contionum, senatus omnis haec et antiquitatis memoria et publici iuris auctoritas et regendae rei publicae ratio ac scientia tamquam aliqua materies eis oratoribus, qui versantur in re publica, subiecta esse debet.

For dwelling on one subject moves very much; and the bright unfolding and the placing of matters under the eye, almost as if they were being done; which both in setting forth a matter avail most, and for illustrating what is set forth, and for amplifying — so that to those who hear, what we shall amplify shall seem to be as great as speech can effect. To this is contrary often a running over; and signification of more for understanding than you have said; and the distinctly clipped brevity, and lessening, and joined to it the irony not strange to Caesar’s precepts;

Non enim causidicum nescio quem neque clamatorem aut rabulam hoc sermone nostro conquirimus, sed eum virum, qui primum sit eius artis antistes, cuius cum ipsa natura magnam homini facultatem daret, auctor tamen esse deus putatur, ut id ipsum, quod erat hominis proprium, non partum per nos, sed divinitus ad nos delatum videretur; deinde, qui possit non tam caduceo quam nomine oratoris ornatus incolumis vel inter hostium tela versari; tum, qui scelus fraudemque nocentis possit dicendo subicere odio civium supplicioque constringere; idemque ingeni praesidio innocentiam iudiciorum poena liberare; idemque languentem labentemque populum aut ad decus excitare aut ab errore deducere aut inflammare in improbos aut incitatum in bonos mitigare; qui denique, quemcumque in animis hominum motum res et causa postulet, eum dicendo vel excitare possit vel sedare.

and digression from the subject, in which when there has been pleasure, then the return to the subject ought to be apt and neat. And the laying down of what you are to say; and a setting-apart from what has been said; and a return to the proposition, and repetition, and the apt closing of the reasoning. Then for the sake of amplifying or diminishing, the over-statement and going-beyond truth; and questioning, and a kind of inquiry akin to it, and the setting out of one’s own thought; then that which most as it were creeps into men’s minds: dissimulation that says other things and means other; which is most pleasing when it is handled not with the contention of speech but with conversation. Then doubt; then distribution; then correction either before or after you have spoken or when you reject something from yourself. There is also pre-fortification for what you are to attack, and casting onto another;

Hanc vim si quis existimat aut ab eis, qui de dicendi ratione scripserunt, expositam esse aut a me posse exponi tam brevi, vehementer errat neque solum inscientiam meam sed ne rerum quidem magnitudinem perspicit: equidem vobis, quoniam ita voluistis, fontis, unde hauriretis, atque itinera ipsa ita putavi esse demonstranda, non ut ipse dux essem, quod et infinitum est et non necessarium, sed ut commonstrarem tantum viam et, ut fieri solet, digitum ad fontis intenderem.’

consultation, which is as it were deliberating with those very ones before whom you speak; the imitation of morals and life either in persons or without them — a great ornament of speech, apt for conciliating minds especially, but often also for moving;

’Mihi vero’ inquit Mucius ’satis superque abs te videtur istorum studiis, si modo sunt studiosi, esse factum; nam, ut Socratem illum solitum aiunt dicere perfectum sibi opus esse, si qui satis esset concitatus cohortatione sua ad studium cognoscendae percipiendaeque virtutis; quibus enim id persuasum esset, ut nihil mallent esse se, quam bonos viros, eis reliquam facilem esse doctrinam; sic ego intellego, si in haec, quae patefecit oratione sua Crassus, intrare volueritis, facillime vos ad ea, quae cupitis, perventuros, ab hoc aditu ianuaque patefacta.’

the bringing in of feigned persons, the weightiest light of amplifying; description; the leading into error; an impulse to mirth; pre-occupation; then those two which most move: likeness and example; division; interruption; contention; reticence; commendation; some free voice and even unreining for the sake of amplifying; anger; rebuke; promise; entreaty; supplication; a brief turning aside from the proposition (not as the earlier digression); purgation; conciliation; injury; wishing and execration. With these lights mostly thoughts illustrate speech.

’Nobis vero’ inquit Sulpicius ’ista sunt pergrata perque iucunda; sed pauca etiam requirimus in primisque ea, quae valde breviter a te, Crasse, de ipsa arte percursa sunt, cum illa te et non contemnere et didicisse confiterere: ea si paulo latius dixeris, expleris omnem exspectationem diuturni desideri nostri; nam nunc, quibus studendum rebus esset accepimus, quod ipsum est tamen magnum; sed vias earum rerum rationemque cupimus cognoscere.’

Of speech itself, as of arms, there is either threat for use and as it were attack, or for grace itself. For doubling of words has sometimes force, sometimes charm; and a word a little changed and bent away; and the frequent repetition of the same word, now from the beginning, now turned to the end; and the rush upon the same words; and concourse and joining and progression and a kind of distinguishing of the same word more often placed; and the recalling of a word; and those that end alike or fall alike or are matched with equal returns or are like one another.

’Quid si,’ inquit Crassus ’quoniam ego, quo facilius vos apud me tenerem, vestrae potius obsecutus sum voluntati, quam aut consuetudini aut naturae meae, petimus ab Antonio, ut ea, quae continet neque adhuc protulit, ex quibus unum libellum sibi excidisse iam dudum questus est, explicet nobis et illa dicendi mysteria enuntiet?’ ’Ut videtur,’ inquit Sulpicius; ’nam Antonio dicente etiam quid tu intellegas, sentiemus.’

There is also a kind of climax and turning-back and neat transposition of words; and the contrary; and the loose; and turning aside; and reproof; and exclamation; and lessening; and what is set in many cases; and what, drawn from single matters proposed, is referred to single ones; and the reasoning subjoined to the proposition; and likewise in the distributed the reasoning placed under; and permission; and again another doubt; and something unforeseen; and enumeration; and another correction; and dispersion; and the continuous and the broken; and image; and answer to oneself; and changing; and disjunction; and order; and reference; and digression; and circumscription.

’Peto igitur’ inquit Crassus ’a te, quoniam id nobis, Antoni, hominibus id aetatis oneris ab horum adulescentium studiis imponitur, ut exponas, quid eis de rebus, quas a te quaeri vides, sentias.’ ’Deprehensum equidem me’ inquit Antonius ’plane video atque sentio, non solum quod ea requiruntur a me, quorum sum ignarus atque insolens, sed quia, quod in causis valde fugere soleo, ne tibi, Crasse, succedam, id me nunc isti vitare non sinunt;

These mostly, and like to these, or even more, are those things which by thoughts and shapings of words illustrate speech.” “Which I see you, Crassus,” said Cotta, “— because you think they are known to us — have poured out without definitions and without examples.” “For my part,” said Crassus, “I did not think those things either, which I said before, were new to you, but I obeyed all your wish.

verum hoc ingrediar ad ea, quae vultis, audacius, quod idem mihi spero usu esse venturum in hac disputatione, quod in dicendo solet, ut nulla exspectetur ornata oratio: neque enim sum de arte dicturus, quam numquam didici, sed de mea consuetudine; ipsaque illa, quae in commentarium meum rettuli, sunt eius modi, non aliqua mihi doctrina tradita, sed in rerum usu causisque tractata; quae si vobis, hominibus eruditissimis, non probabuntur, vestram iniquitatem accusatote, qui ex me ea quaesieritis, quae ego nescirem; meam facilitatem laudatote, cum vobis non meo iudicio, sed vestro studio inductus non gravate respondero.’

About these matters that sun has admonished me to be briefer, which itself now sliding has compelled me too to roll out these things almost slipping. But yet the demonstration of this kind, and the doctrine itself, is common; the use, however, is the weightiest, and in this whole study of speaking the most difficult.

Tum Crassus ’perge modo,’ inquit ’Antoni; nullum est enim periculum, ne quid tu eloquare nisi ita prudenter, ut neminem nostrum paeniteat ad hunc te sermonem impulisse.’ ’Ego vero,’ inquit, ’pergam et id faciam, quod in principio fieri in omnibus disputationibus oportere censeo, ut, quid illud sit, de quo disputetur, explanetur, ne vagari et errare cogatur oratio, si ei, qui inter se dissenserint, non idem esse illud, de quo agitur, intellegant.

Therefore, since about all the ornament of speech all topics have been, if not laid open, at least pointed out, now let us see what is apt — that is, what is most becoming in speech. Although that is plain — that not to every cause, nor every hearer, nor every person, nor every time does one kind of speech agree. For both capital cases require some kind of sound of words, another of private and small ones;

Nam si forte quaereretur quae esset ars imperatoris, constituendum putarem principio, quis esset imperator; qui cum esset constitutus administrator quidam belli gerendi, tum adiungeremus de exercitu, de castris, de agminibus, de signorum conlationibus, de oppidorum oppugnationibus, de commeatu, de insidiis faciendis atque vitandis, de reliquis rebus, quae essent propriae belli administrandi; quarum qui essent animo et scientia compotes, eos esse imperatores dicerem, utererque exemplis Africanorum et Maximorum, Epaminondam atque Hannibalem atque eius generis homines nominarem.

and another kind of speaking deliberations, another laudations, another judgments, another conversations, another consolation, another rebuke, another disputation, another history requires. It also matters who hear: senate or people or judges; many or few or single, and what kind. The orators themselves, of what age, honour, authority, must seem; the time, of peace or war, of haste or leisure.

Sin autem quaereremus quis esset is, qui ad rem publicam moderandam usum et scientiam et studium suum contulisset, definirem hoc modo: qui quibus rebus utilitas rei publicae pareretur augereturque, teneret eisque uteretur, hunc rei publicae rectorem et consili publici auctorem esse habendum, praedicaremque P. Lentulum principem illum et Ti. Gracchum patrem et Q. Metellum et P. Africanum et C. Laelium et innumerabilis alios cum ex nostra civitate tum ex ceteris.

So in this place there is nothing that can seem to be precepted, save that we choose the figure of fuller and slenderer speech, and likewise of that middle, suited to what we shall be doing. The same ornaments may be used, sometimes more contendedly, sometimes more loosely. To be able in every matter to do what becomes is of art and nature; to know what becomes when, is of prudence.

Sin autem quaereretur quisnam iuris consultus vere nominaretur, eum dicerem, qui legum et consuetudinis eius, qua privati in civitate uterentur, et ad respondendum et ad agendum et ad cavendum peritus esset, et ex eo genere Sex. Aelium, M’. Manilium, P. Mucium nominarem. Atque, ut iam ad leviora artium studia veniam, si musicus, si grammaticus, si poeta quaeratur, possim similiter explicare, quid eorum quisque profiteatur et quo non amplius ab quoque sit postulandum. Philosophi denique ipsius, qui de sua vi ac sapientia unus omnia paene profitetur, est tamen quaedam descriptio, ut is, qui studeat omnium rerum divinarum atque humanarum vim naturam causasque nosse et omnem bene vivendi rationem tenere et persequi, nomine hoc appelletur.

But all these things are as they are delivered. Delivery, I say, in speaking, alone is queen. Without this the highest orator can be in no number, and one of middling ability, equipped with this, often surpasses the highest. Demosthenes is said to have given to delivery the first place, when he was asked what was first in speaking; to it the second; to it the third. From which that of Aeschines also seems to me even better said: who, when on account of the disgrace of his trial he had withdrawn from Athens and had betaken himself to Rhodes, asked by the Rhodians, is reported to have read that outstanding speech which he had spoken in Ctesiphon against Demosthenes. When he had read it through, he was asked the next day to read also that which had been said on the other side by Demosthenes for Ctesiphon. When he had read it with most sweet and great voice, all wondering: “How much,” he said, “would you have wondered, if you had heard the man himself!” From which he sufficiently signified how much was in delivery, since he thought the same speech would be another with the speaker changed.

Oratorem autem, quoniam de eo quaerimus, equidem non facio eundem quem Crassus, qui mihi visus est omnem omnium rerum atque artium scientiam comprehendere uno oratoris officio ac nomine; atque eum puto esse, qui et verbis ad audiendum iucundis et sententiis ad probandum accommodatis uti possit in causis forensibus atque communibus: hunc ego appello oratorem eumque esse praeterea instructum voce et actione et lepore quodam volo.

What was there in Gracchus, whom you better remember, Catulus, that, when I was a boy, was so greatly noted? “Whither, wretched, shall I betake me? Whither shall I turn? To the Capitol? But it is wet with my brother’s blood. Or home? That I see my mother lamenting, wretched, and cast down?” Which were so delivered by him, by his eyes, voice, gesture, that even his enemies could not hold back their tears. These things I say at greater length, because this whole kind orators (who are actors of truth itself) have left, while imitators of truth — actors — have seized it.

Crassus vero mihi noster visus est oratoris facultatem non illius artis terminis, sed ingeni sui finibus immensis paene describere; nam et civitatum regendarum oratori gubernacula sententia sua tradidit, in quo per mihi mirum visum est, Scaevola, te hoc illi concedere, cum saepissime tibi senatus breviter impoliteque dicenti maximis sit de rebus adsensus. M. vero Scaurus, quem non longe ruri apud se esse audio, vir regendae rei publicae scientissimus, si audierit hanc auctoritatem gravitatis et consili sui vindicari a te, Crasse, quod eam oratoris propriam esse dicas, iam, credo, huc veniat et hanc loquacitatem nostram vultu ipso aspectuque conterreat; qui quamquam est in dicendo minime contemnendus, prudentia tamen rerum magnarum magis quam dicendi arte nititur.

Without doubt in every matter truth conquers imitation; but if it could effect enough in delivery by itself, we should not have need of art at all. But because the movement of the soul, which most must be either declared or imitated by delivery, is often so disturbed that it is obscured and almost overwhelmed, those things must be shaken off which obscure, and those which are eminent and ready must be taken.

Neque vero, si quis utrumque potest, aut ille consili publici auctor ac senator bonus ob eam ipsam causam orator est aut hic disertus atque eloquens, si est idem in procuratione civitatis egregius, illam scientiam dicendi copia est consecutus: multum inter se distant istae facultates longeque sunt diversae atque seiunctae neque eadem ratione ac via M. Cato, P. Africanus, Q. Metellus, C. Laelius, qui omnes eloquentes fuerunt, orationem suam et rei publicae dignitatem exornabant. Neque enim est interdictum aut a rerum natura aut a lege aliqua atque more, ut singulis hominibus ne amplius quam singulas artis nosse liceat.

For every motion of the soul has from nature its own face and sound and gesture; and the whole body of a man, and all his face, and all his voices, like strings on a lyre, so sound, as they are struck by the motion of the soul. For voices, like chords, are stretched, which respond to each touch — sharp, low; quick, slow; great, small. Among all of which yet there is in each kind a moderate one; and from these have flowed several other kinds: smooth, harsh; contracted, diffuse; with continuous, with broken breath; broken, split; thinned, swelled with bent sound;

Qua re non, si eloquentissimus Athenis Pericles idemque in ea civitate plurimos annos princeps consili publici fuit, idcirco eiusdem hominis atque artis utraque facultas existimanda est, nec, si P. Crassus idem fuit eloquens et iuris peritus, ob eam causam inest in facultate dicendi iuris civilis scientia.

for there is none of these kinds which is not handled by art and moderation. These are set out for the actor, as for the painter, for varying his colours. For one kind of voice anger takes for itself: sharp, urged on, frequently breaking off: “My brother himself urges me, wretched, to deliver my children to the jaws” — and what you, Antonius, brought forward a little while ago: “Did you dare to set yourself apart” and “Will any one notice this? Bind, beat” — and almost the whole of Atreus. Another, pity and grief: flexible, full, broken, with a tearful voice: “Whither now shall I turn me? What way shall I begin to enter? My father’s house? Or to the daughters of Pelias?” And: “O father, O country, O house of Priam!” — and what follows: “All this I saw burning, and Priam’s life torn from him by force.”

Nam si ut quisque in aliqua arte et facultate excellens aliam quoque artem sibi adsumpserit, is perficiet ut, quod praeterea sciet, id eius, in quo excellet, pars quaedam esse videatur, licet ista ratione dicamus pila bene et duodecim scriptis ludere proprium esse iuris civilis, quoniam utrumque eorum P. Mucius optime fecerit; eademque ratione dicantur ei quos fusikou/s Graeci nominant eidem poetae, quoniam Empedocles physicus egregium poema fecerit. At hoc ne philosophi quidem ipsi, qui omnia sicut propria sua esse atque a se possideri volunt, dicere audent, geometriam aut musicam philosophi esse, quia Platonem omnes in illis artibus praestantissimum fuisse fateantur.

Another, fear: lowered and hesitating and cast down: “In many ways have I been beset — by sickness, exile, and want; then panic has crushed all my wisdom from my breath; my mother threatens dire torment of life and death — what no one is of so firm a mind and so great confidence that he will not feel his blood shrink with fear and grow pale.”

Ac si iam placet omnis artis oratori subiungere, tolerabilius est sic potius dicere, ut, quoniam dicendi facultas non debeat esse ieiuna atque nuda, sed aspersa atque distincta multarum rerum iucunda quadam varietate, sit boni oratoris multa auribus accepisse, multa vidisse, multa animo et cogitatione, multa etiam legendo percucurrisse, neque ea ut sua possedisse sed ut aliena libasse; fateor enim callidum quendam hunc et nulla in re tironem ac rudem nec peregrinum atque hospitem in agendo esse debere.

Another, force: stretched, vehement, threatening with a kind of impulse of weight: “Again Thyestes comes attended by Atreus; again now he comes upon me, rouses me from rest. A greater mass for me, a greater evil to be mixed, that I may dash and crush his bitter heart.” Another, pleasure: poured out, gentle, tender, cheerful, slack: “But when she had brought to herself the wreath for binding the marriage, while she pretended to give it eagerly to herself, then to you, gaily, learnedly and daintily, she brought it.” Another, distress: without pity, somewhat heavy and brought through with one pressing and tone: “In the season when Paris joined Helen in unwedded marriage, I was then heavy with child, having now fulfilled my months for bearing; at the same time Hecuba bore Polydorus, her last child.”

Neque vero istis tragoediis tuis, quibus uti philosophi maxime solent, Crasse, perturbor, quod ita dixisti, neminem posse eorum mentis, qui audirent, aut inflammare dicendo aut inflammatas restinguere, cum eo maxime vis oratoris magnitudoque cernatur, nisi qui rerum omnium naturam et mores hominum atque rationes penitus perspexerit, in quo philosophia sit oratori necessario percipienda; quo in studio hominum quoque ingeniosissimorum otiosissimorumque totas aetates videmus esse contritas. Quorum ego copiam magnitudinemque cognitionis atque artis non modo non contemno, sed etiam vehementer admiror; nobis tamen, qui in hoc populo foroque versamur, satis est ea de motibus animorum et scire et dicere quae non abhorrent ab hominum moribus.

All these motions gesture must follow — not that of the stage, expressing words, but declaring the whole matter and thought, not by demonstration but by signification, with the inflection of the sides, this strong and manly, not from the stage and from actors but from arms or even from the wrestling-school. The hand less talkative, with the fingers following the words, not expressing them; the arm thrown out longer, like a kind of weapon of speech; the stamp of the foot at the beginning or end of contention.

Quis enim umquam orator magnus et gravis, cum iratum adversario iudicem facere vellet, haesitavit ob eam causam, quod nesciret, quid esset iracundia, fervorne mentis an cupiditas puniendi doloris? Quis, cum ceteros animorum motus aut iudicibus aut populo dicendo miscere atque agitare vellet, ea dixit, quae a philosophis dici solent? qui partim omnino motus negant in animis ullos esse debere, quique eos in iudicum mentibus concitent, scelus eos nefarium facere; partim, qui tolerabiliores volunt esse et ad veritatem vitae propius accedere, permediocris ac potius levis motus debere esse dicunt.

But all is in the face; in the face itself the eyes hold the lordship over all. Wherefore those old men of ours, who used not to praise even Roscius greatly when he wore a mask. For all action is of the soul, and the face is the image of the soul; the eyes its indicators. For this is the one part of the body which can produce as many significations and changes as there are motions of the soul. Nor is there anyone who could produce the same with eyes shut. Theophrastus indeed says one Tauriscus was wont to call an actor turned away who, in delivering, was looking at something.

Orator autem omnia haec, quae putantur in communi vitae consuetudine mala ac molesta et fugienda, multo maiora et acerbiora verbis facit; itemque ea, quae vulgo expetenda atque optabilia videntur, dicendo amplificat atque ornat; neque vult ita sapiens inter stultos videri, ut ei, qui audiant, aut illum ineptum et Graeculum putent, aut, etiam si valde probent ingenium, oratoris sapientiam admirentur, se esse stultos moleste ferant;

So great moderation is of the eyes. For the look of the face must not be too much changed, lest we be carried either to ineptitudes or to some crookedness; the eyes are those by whose intentness, slackness, glance, mirth, we should signify the motions of soul aptly with the very kind of speech. For delivery is, as it were, the speech of the body, the more it must be agreeable to the mind. The eyes, however, nature gave us — as to a horse or lion bristles, tail, ears — for declaring the motions of the soul.

sed ita peragrat per animos, ita sensus hominum mentisque pertractat, ut non desideret philosophorum descriptiones neque exquirat oratione, summum illud bonum in animone sit an in corpore, virtute an voluptate definiatur, an haec inter se iungi copularique possint; an vero, ut quibusdam visum, nihil certum sciri, nihil plane cognosci et percipi possit; quarum rerum fateor magnam multiplicemque esse disciplinam et multas copiosas variasque rationes.

Therefore in our delivery, after the voice, the face avails most; and that is governed by the eyes. And in all those things which belong to delivery, there is some force given by nature; for which reason it is by this also that the unskilled, the multitude, indeed the foreigners are most moved. For words move no one save him who is joined by the fellowship of the same tongue. Often keen thoughts also fly past the senses of men not keen. Delivery, which carries on its face the motion of soul, moves all. For all are stirred by the same motions of soul, and recognise them by the same marks in others, and indicate them in themselves.

Sed aliud quiddam, longe aliud, Crasse, quaerimus: acuto homine nobis opus est et natura usuque callido, qui sagaciter pervestiget, quid sui cives eique homines, quibus aliquid dicendo persuadere velit, cogitent, sentiant, opinentur, exspectent; teneat oportet venas cuiusque generis, aetatis, ordinis, et eorum, apud quos aliquid aget aut erit acturus, mentis sensusque degustet;

For the use and praise of delivery the voice without doubt holds the greatest part; which we must first wish for; then, whatever it shall be, we must guard it. About which it is no part of this kind of precepts how the voice should be served — although I much think it should be served. But this seems not foreign to the duty of this our conversation: that, as I said a little before, in most things what is most useful is also, somehow, most becoming. For nothing is more useful for keeping the voice than frequent change; nothing more harmful than uninterrupted, poured-out contention.

philosophorum autem libros reservet sibi ad huiusce modi Tusculani requiem atque otium, ne, si quando ei dicendum erit de iustitia et fide, mutuetur a Platone; qui, cum haec exprimenda verbis arbitraretur, novam quandam finxit in libris civitatem; usque eo illa, quae dicenda de iustitia putabat, a vitae consuetudine et a civitatum moribus abhorrebant.

What is more apt for our ears and the sweetness of delivery than alternation, variety, change? So that same Gracchus — what you can hear, Catulus, from Licinius your client, a lettered man, whom Gracchus had as a slave at hand — was wont to have, with a little ivory pipe, a man standing secretly behind him when he spoke in assembly, an expert who would quickly blow that note by which he could either rouse him when slack or call him back from contention.” “By Hercules, I have heard,” said Catulus, “and I have often admired that man’s diligence as also learning and science.”

Quod si ea probarentur in populis atque in civitatibus, quis tibi, Crasse, concessisset, clarissimo viro et amplissimo et principi civitatis, ut illa diceres in maxima contione tuorum civium, quae dixisti? "Eripite nos ex miseriis, eripite ex faucibus eorum, quorum crudelitas nisi nostro sanguine non potest expleri; nolite sinere nos cuiquam servire, nisi vobis universis, quibus et possumus et debemus." Omitto miserias, in quibus, ut illi aiunt, vir fortis esse non potest; omitto faucis, ex quibus te eripi vis, ne iudicio iniquo exsorbeatur sanguis tuus, quod sapienti negant accidere posse: servire vero non modo te, sed universum senatum, cuius tum causam agebas, ausus es dicere?

“For my part,” said Crassus, “I am also grieved that those men slipped into that ruin in the commonwealth. But that net is being woven, and that rationale of living in the state is shown to posterity, that we now desire to have like to those citizens whom our fathers did not bear.” “Let go, I beg, that conversation, Crassus,” said Iulius, “and bring yourself back to Gracchus’s pipe; whose rationale I do not yet plainly understand.”

Potestne virtus, Crasse, servire istis auctoribus, quorum tu praecepta oratoris facultate complecteris? Quae et semper et sola libera est, quaeque, etiam si corpora capta sint armis aut constricta vinculis, tamen suum ius atque omnium rerum impunitam libertatem tenere debeat. Quae vero addidisti, non modo senatum servire posse populo, sed etiam debere, quis hoc philosophus tam mollis, tam languidus, tam enervatus, tam omnia ad voluptatem corporis doloremque referens probare posset, senatum servire populo, cui populus ipse moderandi et regendi sui potestatem quasi quasdam habenas tradidisset?

“In every voice,” said Crassus, “there is something middle, but each voice has its own. From this it is useful and pleasant to ascend the voice gradually (for to shout from the start is something rustic), and the same is salutary for confirming the voice. Then there is some extreme of contention, which yet is more inward than the sharpest cry, beyond which the pipe will not let you advance, and now from the very contention will call you back. There is likewise on the contrary something heaviest in slackness, by which one descends as it were by steps of sounds. This variety, and this course through all sounds of voice, will both keep itself, and bring sweetness to delivery. But you will leave the piper at home; the sense of this habit you will bring with you to the Forum.

Itaque haec cum a te divinitus ego dicta arbitrarer, P. Rutilius Rufus, homo doctus et philosophiae deditus, non modo parum commode, sed etiam turpiter et flagitiose dicta esse dicebat; idemque Servium Galbam, quem hominem probe commeminisse se aiebat, pergraviter reprehendere solebat, quod is, L. Scribonio quaestionem in eum ferente, populi misericordiam concitasset, cum M. Cato, Galbae gravis atque acer inimicus, aspere apud populum Romanum et vehementer esset locutus, quam orationem in Originibus suis exposuit ipse.

I have brought out what I could, not as I wished but as the straits of time have compelled me; for it is well noted to charge the matter on time, when, if you wished, you could not bring more.” “You yourself,” said Catulus, “have gathered everything, as far as I can judge, so divinely, that you seem not to have taken from the Greeks but to be able to teach those very ones these things. I am glad to have been made partaker of this conversation; and I should have wished my son-in-law, your friend, Hortensius, had been present, whom indeed I trust to be outstanding in all the praises which you have embraced in your speech.”

Reprehendebat igitur Galbam Rutilius, quod is C. Sulpici Gali propinqui sui Q. pupillum filium ipse paene in umeros suos extulisset, qui patris clarissimi recordatione et memoria fletum populo moveret, et duos filios suos parvos tutelae populi commendasset ac se, tamquam in procinctu testamentum faceret sine libra atque tabulis, populum Romanum tutorem instituere dixisset illorum orbitati. Itaque, cum et invidia et odio populi tum Galba premeretur, hisce eum tragoediis liberatum ferebat; quod item apud Catonem scriptum esse video, nisi pueris et lacrimis usus esset, poenas eum daturum fuisse. Haec Rutilius valde vituperabat et huic humilitati dicebat vel exsilium fuisse vel mortem anteponendam.

And Crassus: “You say ‘to be’?” he said. “I now judge him so to be, and so judged when, in my consulship, he defended the cause of Africa in the senate, and lately, even more, when he spoke for the king of Bithynia. So you see rightly, Catulus. For I see that to that young man neither nature nor learning is wanting.

Neque vero hoc solum dixit, sed ipse et sensit et fecit: nam cum esset ille vir exemplum, ut scitis, innocentiae cumque illo nemo neque integrior esset in civitate neque sanctior, non modo supplex iudicibus esse noluit, sed ne ornatius quidem aut liberius causam dici suam, quam simplex ratio veritatis ferebat. Paulum huic Cottae tribuit partium, disertissimo adulescenti, sororis suae filio; dixit item causam illam quadam ex parte Q. Mucius, more suo, nullo apparatu, pure et dilucide.

The more, Cotta, you must keep watch and labour, and you, Sulpicius. For he is no middling orator who, as it were, springs up into your generation, but with most keen talent and burning zeal and outstanding learning and singular memory. Whom, although I favour, I yet wish him to excel his own age; that he should outrun you who are so much younger is scarcely honourable.” “But now let us rise,” he said, “and let us care for ourselves and at last loosen our minds and care from this contention of disputation.”

Quod si tu tunc, Crasse, dixisses, qui subsidium oratori ex illis disputationibus, quibus philosophi utuntur, ad dicendi copiam petendum esse paulo ante dicebas, et, si tibi pro P. Rutilio non philosophorum more, sed tuo licuisset dicere, quamvis scelerati illi fuissent, sicuti fuerunt pestiferi cives supplicioque digni, tamen omnem eorum importunitatem ex intimis mentibus evellisset vis orationis tuae. Nunc talis vir amissus est, dum causa ita dicitur, ut si in illa commenticia Platonis civitate res ageretur. Nemo ingemuit, nemo inclamavit patronorum, nihil cuiquam doluit, nemo est questus, nemo rem publicam imploravit, nemo supplicavit; quid multa? pedem nemo in illo iudicio supplosit, credo, ne Stoicis renuntiaretur.

Then Sulpicius: “What then? Shall we suffer Caesar,” he said, “— who though he yields wit to M. Crassus, yet himself works much more in this study — not to set out for us this whole kind of joking: what it is and whence it is drawn? — especially since he confesses that the force and usefulness of salt and urbanity are so great?” “What if,” said Iulius, “I agree with Antonius when he says there is no art of salt?”

Imitatus est homo Romanus et consularis veterem illum Socratem, qui, cum omnium sapientissimus esset sanctissimeque vixisset, ita in iudicio capitis pro se ipse dixit, ut non supplex aut reus, sed magister aut dominus videretur esse iudicum. Quin etiam, cum ei scriptam orationem disertissimus orator Lysias attulisset, quam, si ei videretur, edisceret, ut ea pro se in iudicio uteretur, non invitus legit et commode scriptam esse dixit; "sed" inquit "ut, si mihi calceos Sicyonios attulisses, non uterer, quamvis essent habiles atque apti ad pedem, quia non essent viriles," sic illam orationem disertam sibi et oratoriam videri, fortem et virilem non videri. Ergo ille quoque damnatus est; neque solum primis sententiis, quibus tantum statuebant iudices, damnarent an absolverent, sed etiam illis, quas iterum legibus ferre debebant;

Here, when Sulpicius had fallen silent, “As if,” said Crassus, “of these things themselves of which Antonius has long been speaking there were any art. There is a certain observation, as he himself said, of those things which avail in speaking. If this could make men eloquent, who would not be eloquent? For who could not learn these things either easily or surely in some way? But I think there is in these precepts this force and this usefulness: not that we should be led by art to discovering what to say, but that those things which we attain by nature, by zeal, by exercise, we may either trust to be right or understand to be faulty, when we have learned with what they should be referred.

erat enim Athenis reo damnato, si fraus capitalis non esset, quasi poenae aestimatio; et sententia cum iudicibus daretur, interrogabatur reus, quam quasi aestimationem commeruisse se maxime confiteretur. Quod cum interrogatus Socrates esset, respondit sese meruisse ut amplissimis honoribus et praemiis decoraretur et ut ei victus cotidianus in Prytaneo publice praeberetur, qui honos apud Graecos maximus habetur.

Therefore, Caesar, I too ask you: that, if you please, you should argue about this whole kind of joking, what you feel — lest some part of speaking, since you have so wished, in this such gathering and in so careful a conversation, seem to have been passed over.” “For my part,” said he, “since you exact the contribution from a guest, Crassus, I shall not bring it about that, by fleeing, I should give you any reason for refusing. Although I am wont often to wonder at the impudence of those who play their part on the stage when Roscius is looking on; for who can move himself, whose faults that man does not see? So I now, with Crassus listening, shall first speak about wit, and shall teach as it were the sow how to talk to the orator — whom, when Catulus had lately heard, he said the others ought to be grass.”

Cuius responso iudices sic exarserunt, ut capitis hominem innocentissimum condemnarent; qui quidem si absolutus esset, quod me hercule, etiam si nihil ad nos pertinet, tamen propter eius ingeni magnitudinem vellem, quonam modo istos philosophos ferre possemus, qui nunc, cum ille damnatus est nullam aliam ob culpam nisi propter dicendi inscientiam, tamen a se oportere dicunt peti praecepta dicendi? Quibuscum ego non pugno, utrum sit melius aut verius: tantum dico et aliud illud esse atque hoc et hoc sine illo summum esse posse.

Then he: “Catulus was joking,” he said, “especially since he himself so speaks that he seems should be fed on ambrosia. But let us hear you, Caesar, that we may see Antonius’s remaining matter.” And Antonius: “Very few things remain to me,” he said, “but yet, weary now from my labour and journey of disputation, I shall rest in Caesar’s speech as in some most opportune wayside inn.” “Yet,” said Iulius, “you will say my hospitality is not too generous; for as soon as you have tasted ever so little I shall thrust you out and cast you on the road.

Nam quod ius civile, Crasse, tam vehementer amplexus es, video quid egeris; tum, cum dicebas, videbam; primum Scaevolae te dedisti, quem omnes amare meritissimo pro eius eximia suavitate debemus; cuius artem cum indotatam esse et incomptam videres, verborum eam dote locupletasti et ornasti; deinde quod in ea tu plus operae laborisque consumpseras, cum eius studi tibi et hortator et magister esset domi, veritus es, nisi istam artem oratione exaggerasses, ne operam perdidisses.

And lest I keep you longer, I shall set out very briefly what I think of this whole subject. About laughter there are five things to be asked: first, what it is; second, whence it is; third, whether it is the orator’s part to wish to stir laughter; fourth, how far; fifth, what the kinds of laughable things are. As for the first — what laughter itself is, by what means it is roused, where it lies, in what way it arises and so suddenly bursts out that we cannot hold it back when we wish, and how at once it seizes the sides, the mouth, the veins, the eyes, the face — let Democritus see to it. For this does not concern this conversation; and even if it concerned it, I should not be ashamed of not knowing what not even those knew who promised it.

Sed ego ne cum ista quidem arte pugno. Sit sane tanta quantam tu illam esse vis—etenim sine controversia et magna est et late patet et ad multos pertinet et summo in honore semper fuit et clarissimi cives ei studio etiam hodie praesunt—sed vide, Crasse, ne dum novo et alieno ornatu velis ornare iuris civilis scientiam, suo quoque eam concesso et tradito spolies atque denudes.

The seat and as it were the region of the laughable — this is what we ask next — is contained in a certain ugliness and deformity. For these things are laughed at, alone or chiefly, which mark and point out some ugliness, but not in an ugly way. As for the third question — it is plainly the orator’s part to stir laughter, either because cheerfulness itself wins goodwill for the man through whom it has been roused; or because all admire the keenness often set in one word, especially of him who answers, sometimes also of him who challenges; or because it breaks the adversary, hinders him, lightens him, deters him, refutes him; or because it shows that the orator himself is a polished man, learned, urbane, and most of all because it softens and relaxes gloom and severity, and often dissolves by jest and laughter hateful matters which are not easily to be dissolved by arguments.

Nam, si ita diceres, qui iuris consultus esset, esse eum oratorem, itemque qui esset orator, iuris eundem esse consultum, praeclaras duas artis constitueres atque inter se paris et eiusdem socias dignitatis. Nunc vero iuris consultum sine hac eloquentia, de qua quaerimus, fateris esse posse, fuisseque plurimos; oratorem negas, nisi illam scientiam adsumpserit, esse posse. Ita est tibi iuris consultus ipse per se nihil nisi leguleius quidam cautus et acutus, praeco actionum, cantor formularum, auceps syllabarum; sed quia saepe utitur orator subsidio iuris in causis, idcirco istam iuris scientiam eloquentiae tamquam ancillulam pedisequamque adiunxisti.

How far the laughable is to be handled by the orator must be looked at most diligently — which we put in the fourth place. For neither marked wickedness joined with crime, nor in turn marked misery, is the subject of laughter. For the criminal men prefer to be wounded by some greater force than that of the laughable; the wretched they are unwilling to mock, unless they happen to flaunt themselves. We must spare especially the affection in which men are held, lest we speak rashly against those who are loved.

Quod vero impudentiam admiratus es eorum patronorum, qui aut, cum parva nescirent, magna profiterentur aut ea, quae maxima essent in iure civili, tractare auderent in causis, cum ea nescirent numquamque didicissent, utriusque rei facilis est et prompta defensio. Nam neque illud est mirandum, qui, quibus verbis coemptio fiat, nesciat, eundem eius mulieris, quae coemptionem fecerit, causam posse defendere; nec, si parvi navigi et magni eadem est in gubernando scientia, idcirco qui, quibus verbis erctum cieri oporteat, nesciat, idem erciscundae familiae causam agere non possit.

This moderation, then, must first be applied in jesting; therefore those things are most easily made play of which deserve neither great hatred nor the greatest pity. For which reason all the matter of the laughable is in those vices which are in the life of men neither dear nor calamitous, nor of those who seem to be hurried off to punishment for crime; and these, prettily handled, are laughed at.

Nam, quod maximas centumviralis causas in iure positas protulisti, quae tandem earum causa fuit, quae ab homine eloquenti iuris imperito non ornatissime potuerit dici? Quibus quidem in causis omnibus, sicut in ipsa M’. Curi, quae abs te nuper est dicta, et in C. Hostili Mancini controversia atque in eo puero, qui ex altera natus erat uxore, non remisso nuntio superiori, fuit inter peritissimos homines summa de iure dissensio: quaero igitur, quid adiuverit oratorem in his causis iuris scientia, cum hic iuris consultus superior fuerit discessurus, qui esset non suo artificio, sed alieno, hoc est, non iuris scientia, sed eloquentia, sustentatus.

The deformity and faults of the body are also a sufficiently pretty matter for jesting; but we ask the same as in other matters most must be asked: how far. In which not only is this prescribed — that nothing should be done dully — but also, even if you can speak most laughably, both must be avoided by the orator: that the jest be neither buffoonish nor mimic. What sort these are, we shall now more easily understand when we come to the very kinds of the laughable. For there are two kinds of wit, one of which is handled in a thing, the other in a saying:

Equidem hoc saepe audivi: cum aedilitatem P. Crassus peteret eumque maior natu et iam consularis Ser. Galba adsectaretur, quod Crassi filiam Gaio filio suo despondisset, accessisse ad Crassum consulendi causa quendam rusticanum, qui cum Crassum seduxisset atque ad eum rettulisset responsumque ab eo verum magis quam ad suam rem accommodatum abstulisset, ut eum tristem Galba vidit, nomine appellavit quaesivitque, qua de re ad Crassum rettulisset; ex quo ut audivit commotumque

in a thing, whenever something is told as in a kind of little story — as you once, Crassus, against Memmius: that he had bitten the arm of Largus when at Tarracina they had quarrelled with him about a girl. The whole story was salty, and yet wholly invented by yourself. You added a closing piece: that throughout Tarracina then on all the walls had been inscribed the letters “L. L. L. M. M.”; and when you asked what this was, some old townsman had told you,

ut vidit hominem, "suspenso" inquit "animo et occupato Crassum tibi respondisse video," deinde ipsum Crassum manu prehendit et "heus tu," inquit "quid tibi in mentem venit ita respondere?" Tum ille fidenter homo peritissimus confirmare ita se rem habere, ut respondisset, nec dubium esse posse; Galba autem adludens varie et copiose multas similitudines adferre multaque pro aequitate contra ius dicere; atque illum, cum disserendo par esse non posset— quamquam fuit Crassus in numero disertorum, sed par Galbae nullo modo—ad auctores confugisse et id, quod ipse diceret, et in P. Muci fratris sui libris et in Sex. Aeli commentariis scriptum protulisse ac tamen concessisse Galbae disputationem sibi probabilem et prope veram videri.

“Lacerat lacertum Largi mordax Memmius” — “Snappy Memmius lacerates the arm of Largus.” You see how witty this kind is, how elegant, how oratorical — whether you have something true to tell, which is yet to be sprinkled with little fictions, or whether you invent. The virtue of this kind is that you should so set forth what was done that the morals of the man you are telling about, his speech, his face, all things, may be expressed; that to those who hear, those things may seem to be then and there happening and being done.

Ac tamen, quae causae sunt eius modi, ut de earum iure dubium esse non possit, omnino in iudicium vocari non solent. Num quis eo testamento, quod paterfamilias ante fecit quam ei filius natus esset, hereditatem petit? Nemo; quia constat agnascendo rumpi testamentum; ergo in hoc genere iuris iudicia nulla sunt: licet igitur impune oratori omnem hanc partem iuris non controversi ignorare, quae pars sine dubio multo maxima est;

The laughable is also in the thing which is wont to be drawn from a certain corrupted imitation, as the same Crassus: “By your nobility, by your family!” What else made the assembly laugh, but that imitation of his face and voice? But when he said, “By your statues!” and added a little even of gesture by stretching out his arm, we laughed more vehemently. Of this kind is that famous Roscian imitation of an old man: “For you, Antipho, do I sow these things, he says; it is doting old age, when I hear.” Yet this whole kind is so laughable that it must be handled most cautiously. For it belongs to mimes and to character-actors, if the imitation is too much — like obscenity. The orator should snatch the imitation, that he who hears may think more than he sees; he should also keep up his free-born manner and modesty by avoiding ugliness of words and obscenity of things.

in eo autem iure, quod ambigitur inter peritissimos, non est difficile oratori eius partis, quamcumque defendet, auctorem aliquem invenire; a quo cum amentatas hastas acceperit, ipse eas oratoris lacertis viribusque torquebit. Nisi vero—bona venia huius optimi viri dixerim—Scaevolae tu libellis aut praeceptis soceri tui causam M’. Curi defendisti, non adripuisti patrocinium aequitatis et defensionem testamentorum ac voluntatis mortuorum.

These are the two kinds of the laughable which is set in the thing, which are proper to continuous wit, in which men’s morals are described and so shaped that — either by some matter narrated, of what kind they are, may be understood, or by an imitation briefly thrown in upon some marked vice — they may be detected for derision.

Ac mea quidem sententia—frequens enim te audivi atque adfui—multo maiorem partem sententiarum sale tuo et lepore et politissimis facetiis pellexisti, cum et illud nimium acumen inluderes et admirarere ingenium Scaevolae qui excogitasset nasci prius oportere quam emori; cumque multa conligeres et ex legibus et ex senatus consultis et ex vita ac sermone communi non modo acute sed etiam ridicule ac facete, ubi si verba, non rem sequeremur, confici nihil posset: itaque hilaritatis plenum iudicium ac laetitiae fuit; in quo quid tibi iuris civilis exercitatio profuerit, non intellego; dicendi vis egregia, summa festivitate et venustate coniuncta, profuit.

In the saying, however, the laughable is what is moved by some keenness of word or thought; but as in that earlier kind of either narration or imitation the likeness of mimes and character-actors must be avoided, so in this the buffoonish quickness of tongue must be most greatly fled by the orator. How then shall we distinguish from Crassus, from Catulus, from the rest, your friend Granius, or my friend Vargula? It does not, by Hercules, come into my mind. For they are quick-tongued; than Granius, indeed, none was quicker. This, I think, first: that we should not feel bound to say a saying every time one can be said.

Ipse ille Mucius paterni iuris defensor et quasi patrimoni propugnator sui, quid in illa causa, cum contra te diceret, attulit, quod de iure civili depromptum videretur? Quam legem recitavit? Quid patefecit dicendo, quod fuisset imperitis occultius? Nempe eius omnis oratio versata est in eo, ut scriptum plurimum valere oportere defenderet; at in hoc genere pueri apud magistros exercentur omnes, cum in eius modi causis alias scriptum, alias aequitatem defendere docentur.

A tiny witness came forward. “May I question him?” said Philippus. Then the questor, hurrying: “Only briefly.” Hereupon he: “You will not accuse me — I shall question him very tinily.” Witty. But the judge sitting was L. Aurifex, shorter himself than even the witness; the whole laugh was turned upon the judge: the witticism seemed wholly buffoonish. Therefore those things which can fall on those whom you would not wish, however pretty they are, are still by their kind buffoonish;

Et, credo, in illa militis causa, si tu aut heredem aut militem defendisses, ad Hostilianas te actiones, non ad tuam vim et oratoriam facultatem contulisses: tu vero, vel si testamentum defenderes, sic ageres, ut omne omnium testamentorum ius in eo iudicio positum videretur, vel si causam ageres militis, patrem eius, ut soles, dicendo a mortuis excitasses; statuisses ante oculos; complexus esset filium flensque eum centum viris commendasset; lapides me hercule omnis flere ac lamentari coegisses, ut totum illud vti lingva nvn- cvpassit non in xii tabulis, quas tu omnibus bibliothecis anteponis, sed in magistri carmine scriptum videretur.

as that fellow who wishes to be quick-tongued — and by Hercules he is — Appius; but sometimes he slips into this buffoonish fault. “I will dine with you,” he said to my friend Gaius Sextius, who has only one eye, “for I see there is room for one only.” This is buffoonish, both because he challenged without cause, and because he yet said what would fit all one-eyed men. These things, because they are thought premeditated, are less laughed at. That outstanding answer of Sextius, on the spot: “Wash your hand,” he said,

Nam quod inertiam accusas adulescentium, qui istam artem primum facillimam non ediscant, quae quam sit facilis, illi viderint, qui eius artis adrogantia, quasi difficillima sit, ita subnixi ambulant, deinde etiam tu ipse videris, qui eam artem facilem esse dicis, quam concedis adhuc artem omnino non esse, sed aliquando, si quis aliam artem didicerit, ut hanc artem efficere possit, tum esse illam artem futuram; deinde, quod sit plena delectationis; in quo tibi remittunt omnes istam voluptatem et ea se carere patiuntur; nec quisquam est eorum, qui, si iam sit ediscendum sibi aliquid, non Teucrum Pacuvi malit quam Manilianas venalium vendendorum leges ediscere;

“and dine.” So observation of the time and the moderation of the wit itself, and the temperance and rarity of sayings, will distinguish the orator from the buffoon — also that we speak with a cause, not so as to seem laughable, but so as to gain something; while they speak the whole day and without cause. For what did Vargula gain when, when the candidate A. Sempronius had embraced him with his brother Marcus: “Boy, drive off the flies”? He was hunting laughter — which is, in my judgment, the slenderest fruit of talent. The time of speaking, then, we shall measure by prudence and gravity. Would that we had some art for these! But mistress is nature.

tum autem quod amore patriae censes nos nostrorum maiorum inventa nosse debere, non vides veteres leges aut ipsas sua vetustate consenuisse aut novis legibus esse sublatas? Quod vero viros bonos iure civili fieri putas, quia legibus et praemia proposita sint virtutibus et supplicia vitiis, equidem putabam virtutem hominibus, si modo tradi ratione possit, instituendo et persuadendo, non minis et vi ac metu tradi. Nam ipsum quidem illud etiam sine cognitione iuris, quam sit bellum cavere malum, scire possumus.

Now let us set out summarily the kinds themselves which most stir laughter. Let this then be the first division: that what is wittily said has its wit at one time in the matter, at another in the word; men are most delighted, however, if at any time the laughter is moved jointly by matter and word together. But remember this: whatever topics I shall touch, from which the laughable is drawn — from those same topics weighty thoughts can also be drawn. So great is the difference, that gravity is set in honest and severe matters, jest in slightly base and as it were misshapen ones — as we may both praise an honest slave with the same words, and, if he is worthless, joke. Laughable is that old saying of Nero about a thievish slave: that he was the only one in whose case nothing at home was either sealed or shut up — which same thing is wont to be said of a good slave.

De me autem ipso, cui uni tu concedis, ut sine ulla iuris scientia tamen causis satis facere possim, tibi hoc, Crasse, respondeo, neque me umquam ius civile didicisse neque tamen in eis causis, quas in iure possem defendere, umquam istam scientiam desiderasse; aliud est enim esse artificem cuiusdam generis atque artis, aliud in communi vita et vulgari hominum consuetudine nec hebetem nec rudem.

But this is by the same words; from the same topics arise all things. For when Sp. Carvilius — limping heavily from a wound received for the commonwealth, and on that account ashamed to come out in public — was told by his mother: “Why don’t you come out, my Spurius? As often as you take a step, may the memory of your virtues come to you” — that is splendid and weighty. But when Glaucia said to Calvinus, who was limping: “Where is that old saw, ‘Surely he is not limping (claudicat)?’ But here he is limping (clodicat)!” — that is laughable. And both are drawn from what could be observed in the limping. “What is more lazy (ignavius) than this Navius?” Scipio said sternly. But to a foul-smelling man Philippus said, “I see I am being beset (circumveniri) by you” — somewhat laughably. But each kind contains the likeness of a word changed by a single letter.

Cui nostrum licet fundos nostros obire aut res rusticas vel fructus causa vel delectationis invisere? Tamen nemo tam sine oculis, tam sine mente vivit, ut quid sit sementis ac messis, quid arborum putatio ac vitium, quo tempore anni aut quo modo ea fiant omnino nesciat. Num igitur si qui fundus inspiciendus aut si mandandum aliquid procuratori de agri cultura aut imperandum vilico est, Magonis Karthaginiensis sunt libri perdiscendi? an hac communi intellegentia contenti esse possumus? Cur ergo non eidem in iure civili, praesertim cum in causis et in negotiis et in foro conteramur, satis instructi esse possumus ad hoc dumtaxat, ne in nostra patria peregrini atque advenae esse videamur?

Sayings from ambiguity are reckoned the most clever, but they do not always lie in jest, often also in gravity. To the elder Africanus, when he was fitting on a wreath for his head at a banquet, when it kept breaking, P. Licinius Varus said: “Don’t be surprised if it doesn’t fit; for the head is great.” Both praiseworthy and honourable. But of the same kind is: “It is enough for Calvus that he says little.” In short: there is no kind of jest from the same of which severe and weighty things may not be drawn.

Ac si iam sit causa aliqua ad nos delata obscurior, difficile, credo, sit, cum hoc Scaevola communicare; quamquam ipsi omnia, quorum negotium est, consulta ad nos et exquisita deferunt. An vero, si de re ipsa, si de finibus, cum in rem praesentem non venimus, si de tabulis et perscriptionibus controversia est, contortas res et saepe difficilis necessario perdiscimus; si leges nobis aut si hominum peritorum responsa cognoscenda sunt, veremur ne ea, si ab adulescentia iuri civili minus studuerimus, non queamus cognoscere? Nihilne igitur prodest oratori iuris civilis scientia? Non possum negare prodesse ullam scientiam, ei praesertim, cuius eloquentia copia rerum debeat esse ornata; sed multa et magna et difficilia sunt ea, quae sunt oratori necessaria, ut eius industriam in plura studia distrahere nolim.

This too must be observed: not all laughable things are witty. For what can be so laughable as a clown? But it is by mouth, by face, by imitating manners, by voice, finally by his very body that he is laughed at. I can call him salty, and so, not so that I should wish such an orator, but so that I should wish such a mime. Therefore this first kind, which most of all moves laughter, is not for us: the morose, the superstitious, the suspicious, the boastful, the fool — natures themselves are laughed at, characters which we are wont to set in motion, not to act.

Quis neget opus esse oratori in hoc oratorio motu statuque Rosci gestum et venustatem? Tamen nemo suaserit studiosis dicendi adulescentibus in gestu discendo histrionum more elaborare. Quid est oratori tam necessarium quam vox? Tamen me auctore nemo dicendi studiosus Graecorum more tragoedorum voci serviet, qui et annos compluris sedentes declamitant et cotidie, ante quam pronuntient, vocem cubantes sensim excitant eandemque, cum egerunt, sedentes ab acutissimo sono usque ad gravissimum sonum recipiunt et quasi quodam modo conligunt. Hoc nos si facere velimus, ante condemnentur ei, quorum causas receperimus, quam totiens, quotiens praescribitur, Paeanem aut hymnum recitarimus.

The second kind is in imitation, very laughable, but only by stealth, if at all, and quickly may we use it; otherwise it is least free; the third, the distortion of the face, is not worthy of us; the fourth, obscenity, is not only not worthy of the Forum but scarcely worthy of a free man’s banquet. So many things being subtracted from this oratorical topic, the witty things which remain are seen to be set either in the matter, as I divided before, or in the word. For what is witty in whatever words you use, is contained in the matter; what loses its salt when the words are changed, has all its charm in the words.

Quod si in gestu, qui multum oratorem adiuvat, et in voce, quae una maxime eloquentiam vel commendat vel sustinet, elaborare nobis non licet ac tantum in utroque adsequi possumus, quantum in hac acie cotidiani muneris spati nobis datur, quanto minus est ad iuris civilis perdiscendi occupationem descendendum? Quod et summatim percipi sine doctrina potest et hanc habet ab illis rebus dissimilitudinem, quod vox et gestus subito sumi et aliunde adripi non potest, iuris utilitas ad quamque causam quamvis repente vel a peritis vel de libris depromi potest.

Ambiguous sayings are first of all keen and set in the word, not in the matter; but they do not often move great laughter — they are praised rather as prettily, as elegantly, said. As of that Titius, who, when he was busy playing ball, and was thought also to break sacred images by night, and his comrades were asking after him when he had not come to the field, Vespa Terentius excused him, saying that he had broken his arm. Or that of Africanus in Lucilius: “What of Decius? Do you wish to make him a little nut, or pierced through?”

Itaque illi disertissimi homines ministros habent in causis iuris peritos, cum ipsi sint im peritissimi, ei qui, ut abs te paulo ante dictum est, pragmatici vocantur; in quo nostri omnino melius multo, quod clarissimorum hominum auctoritate leges et iura tecta esse voluerunt. Sed tamen non fugisset hoc Graecos homines, si ita necesse esse arbitrati essent, oratorem ipsum erudire in iure civili, non ei pragmaticum adiutorem dare.

Or, Crassus, that friend of yours, Granius: “He’s not worth a sixth.” If you ask, he who is called quick-tongued most excels in this kind; but other things move greater laughter. Ambiguity by itself is approved indeed, as I said, very greatly; for it seems the part of an ingenious man to be able to draw the force of a word into another sense than the rest take it. But it stirs admiration rather than laughter, unless it happens to fall in upon some other kind of laughable. Of which kinds I shall now run through.

Nam quod dicis senectutem a solitudine vindicari iuris civilis scientia, fortasse etiam pecuniae magnitudine; sed nos non quid nobis utile, verum quid oratori necessarium sit, quaerimus. Quamquam, quoniam multa ad oratoris similitudinem ab uno artifice sumimus, solet idem Roscius dicere se, quo plus sibi aetatis accederet, eo tardiores tibicinis modos et cantus remissiores esse facturum. Quod si ille astrictus certa quadam numerorum moderatione et pedum tamen aliquid ad requiem senectutis excogitat, quanto facilius nos non laxare modos, sed totos mutare possumus?

You know that this is the most familiar kind of the laughable: when we expect one thing and another is said. Here our own error stirs the laugh in us. If ambiguity is also mixed in, it becomes saltier. As in Novius the man seems compassionate, who sees one being led off after judgment; he asks: “For how much was he assigned?” “A thousand sesterces.” If he had only added “you may take him,” that would be the kind of laughable beyond expectation; but because he added “I add nothing — you may take him,” with the ambiguous added, the other kind of laughable, the saying was, in my view, the saltiest. This is graceful when in altercation a word is snatched from the adversary and from it, as Catulus did to Philippus, something is hurled at the very man who challenged.

Neque enim hoc te, Crasse, fallit, quam multa sint et quam varia genera dicendi, id quod haud sciam an tu primus ostenderis, qui iam diu multo dicis remissius et lenius quam solebas; neque minus haec tamen tua gravissimi sermonis lenitas, quam illa summa vis et contentio probatur: multique oratores fuerunt, ut illum Scipionem audimus et Laelium, qui omnia sermone conficerent paulo intentiore, numquam, ut Ser. Galba, lateribus aut clamore contenderent. Quod si iam hoc facere non poteris aut noles, vereris ne tua domus talis et viri et civis, si a litigiosis hominibus non colatur, a ceteris deseratur? Equidem tantum absum ab ista sententia, ut non modo non arbitrer subsidium senectutis in eorum, qui consultum veniant, multitudine esse ponendum, sed tamquam portum aliquem exspectem istam quam tu times, solitudinem. Subsidium enim bellissimum existimo esse senectuti otium.

Since there are several kinds of ambiguity, about which there is some more subtle teaching, we shall have to be on the watch and to fowl for words; in which, if we avoid those that are colder (we must beware lest the saying seem fetched), we shall yet say very many things keenly. The second kind is that which has a slight change of word, what — set in a single letter — the Greeks call paronomasia: as Cato’s “nobiliorem mobiliorem”; or, when he had said to someone, “Let us go for a walk (deambulatum),” and the other said, “What was the need of de?” he answered: “On the contrary — what was the need of you?” Or that answer of his

Reliqua vero etiam si adiuvant, historiam dico et prudentiam iuris publici et antiquitatis memoriam et exemplorum copiam, si quando opus erit, a viro optimo et istis rebus instructissimo, familiari meo Congo mutuabor, neque repugnabo, quo minus, id quod modo hortatus es, omnia legant, omnia audiant, in omni recto studio atque humanitate versentur; sed me hercule non ita multum spati mihi habere videntur, si modo ea facere et persequi volent, quae a te, Crasse, praecepta sunt; qui mihi prope iam nimis duras leges imponere visus es huic aetati, sed tamen ad id, quod cupiunt, adipiscendum prope necessarias.

“If you are unchaste both adversus (front) and aversus (back).” The interpretation of a name has also keenness, when you turn to the laughable why anyone is so called: as I lately, of Nummius the briber — that as Neoptolemus took his name at Troy, so this man took his name on the Campus Martius. All these are contained in the word. Often a verse is also wittily inserted, either as it is or with a little change, or some part of a verse — as that of Statius’s by Scaurus when he was angered, from which there are some who say your law on citizenship was born, Crassus: “St, be silent — what is this clamour? Whose neither mother nor father — such confidence? Take that pride away.” Now in Caelius’s case, Antonius, what you said was useful even to the matter: when the witness was saying that the money had been put forward by him and he had a more dainty son, with the man already going off, “Don’t you feel, old man, that you have been touched for thirty minae?”

Nam et subitae ad propositas causas exercitationes et accuratae ac meditatae commentationes ac stilus ille tuus, quem tu vere dixisti perfectorem dicendi esse ac magistrum, multi sudoris est; et illa orationis suae cum scriptis alienis comparatio et de alieno scripto subita vel laudandi vel vituperandi vel comprobandi vel refellendi causa disputatio non mediocris contentionis est vel ad memoriam vel ad imitandum.

Into this kind are also thrown proverbs, as that of Scipio when Asellus was boasting that he had traversed all the provinces in his service: “Drive the little ass” and the rest. So these too — since by changing the words they cannot keep the same grace — should be drawn as set not in the matter, but in the words.

Illud vero fuit horribile, quod me hercule vereor ne maiorem vim ad deterrendum habuerit quam ad cohortandum: voluisti enim in suo genere unum quemque nostrum quasi quendam esse Roscium; dixistique non tam ea, quae recta essent, probari, quam quae prava, fastidiis adhaerescere; quod ego non tam fastidiose in nobis quam in histrionibus spectari puto;

Set also in the word is a not dull kind which arises from this — when you seem to take the matter according to the word, not according to the meaning. Of this one kind is wholly composed the old mime Tutor, very laughable indeed. But I leave aside the mimes; only I wish this kind of laughable to be marked with some signal and noted matter. Of this kind is what you, Crassus, said to him who lately asked you whether you would be put out if he had come to you well before light: “You will not be a bother to me,” you said. “You will then have me wakened?” said he. And you: “Surely I had said that you would not

itaque nos raucos saepe attentissime audiri video; tenet enim res ipsa atque causa; at Aesopum, si paulum inrauserit, explodi. A quibus enim nihil praeter voluptatem aurium quaeritur, in eis offenditur, simul atque imminuitur aliquid de voluptate, in eloquenti autem multa sunt quae teneant; quae si omnia summa non sunt et pleraque tamen magna sunt, necesse est ea ipsa, quae sunt, mirabilia videri.

be a bother.” Of this same kind is that old saying: that Maluginensis, M. Scipio, when from his century he was returning Acidinus as consul, and the herald said, “Pronounce on L. Manlius”: “A good man,” said he, “and an outstanding citizen, I judge him.” Laughable too is that of L. Porcius Nasica to Cato the censor, when the latter asked: “According to the conviction of your soul, do you have a wife?” “By Hercules,” he said, “not according to my soul’s conviction.” These things are either cold or salty when something else has been expected. For nature, as I said before, delights us with our own error; from which, when we are as it were deceived in our expectation, we laugh.

Ergo, ut ad primum illud revertar, sit orator nobis is, qui, ut Crassus descripsit, accommodate ad persuadendum possit dicere; is autem concludatur in ea, quae sunt in usu civitatum vulgari ac forensi, remotisque ceteris studiis, quamvis ea sint ampla atque praeclara, in hoc uno opere, ut ita dicam, noctes et dies urgeatur; imiteturque illum, cui sine dubio summa vis dicendi conceditur, Atheniensem Demosthenem, in quo tantum studium fuisse tantusque labor dicitur, ut primum impedimenta naturae diligentia industriaque superaret, cumque ita balbus esset, ut eius ipsius artis, cui studeret, primam litteram non posset dicere, perfecit meditando, ut nemo planius esse locutus putaretur; deinde cum spiritus eius esset angustior, tantum continenda anima in dicendo est adsecutus, ut una continuatione verborum, id quod eius scripta declarant, binae ei contentiones vocis et remissiones continerentur;

In words also are those which are drawn either from speech changed, or from the transferred meaning of a single word, or from the inversion of words. From change: as once when Rusca was carrying a law on age, his opponent M. Servilius said: “Tell me, M. Pinarius, if I shall speak against you, will you abuse me as you have done the others?” He said: “As you sow, so shall you reap.”

qui etiam, ut memoriae proditum est, coniectis in os calculis, summa voce versus multos uno spiritu pronuntiare consuescebat; neque is consistens in loco, sed inambulans atque ascensu ingrediens arduo.

From metaphor: as when the elder Scipio, when the Corinthians were promising him a statue in the place where there were others of generals, said the cavalry kind would not please. Words are inverted, as: when Crassus was speaking before the judge M. Perperna for Aculeo, on the other side, against Aculeo and for Gratidianus, was L. Aelius Lamia, deformed, as you know; when he was hatefully interrupting, “Let us hear,” said Crassus, “the pretty boy”; when laughter had broken out, “I could not,” said Lamia, “shape my own form, but my talent I could”; then Crassus: “Let us hear the eloquent one,” he said. There was a much more vehement laugh. These too are graceful — as in weighty thoughts, so in witticisms; for I said long ago that the rationale of jest is one and of severity another,

Hisce ego cohortationibus, Crasse, ad studium et ad laborem incitandos iuvenis vehementer adsentior; cetera, quae conlegisti ex variis et diversis studiis et artibus, tametsi ipse es omnia consecutus, tamen ab oratoris proprio officio atque munere seiuncta esse arbitror.’ Haec cum Antonius dixisset, sane dubitare visus est Sulpicius et Cotta, utrius oratio propius ad veritatem videretur accedere.

but that of weighty things and jests there is one matter. Words referred contrarily then most of all adorn a speech, the same kind being often also witty, as that famous Servius Galba: when he was nominating his own friends as judges to the tribune of the plebs L. Scribonius, and Libo said: “When at last, Galba, will you come out of your dining-room?” he said: “When you, out of someone else’s bedroom.” Not far from this kind is that of Glaucia to Metellus: “You have a villa at Tibur, a sheepfold (cors) on the Palatine.” I think I have said the kinds of words which are witty.

Tum Crassus ’operarium nobis quendam, Antoni, oratorem facis atque haud scio an aliter sentias et utare tua illa mirifica ad refellendum consuetudine, qua tibi nemo umquam praestitit; cuius quidem ipsius facultatis exercitatio oratorum propria est, sed iam in philosophorum consuetudine versatur maximeque eorum, qui de omni re proposita in utramque partem solent copiosissime dicere.

Of matters there are more, and they, as I said before, are more laughed at; in which is narration, a thing surely difficult; for those things must be expressed and set before the eyes which are likely and like the truth (which is proper to narration), and which are, what is proper to the laughable, somewhat ugly. An example, that it may be most brief, is that of Crassus on Memmius, which I set down before. To this kind let us also add the narrations of fables.

Verum ego non solum arbitrabar, his praesertim audientibus, a me informari oportere, qualis esse posset is, qui habitaret in subselliis neque quicquam amplius adferret, quam quod causarum necessitas postularet, sed maius quiddam videbam, cum censebam oratorem, praesertim in nostra re publica, nullius ornamenti expertem esse oportere. Tu autem, quoniam exiguis quibusdam finibus totum oratoris munus circumdedisti, hoc facilius nobis expones ea, quae abs te de officiis praeceptisque oratoris quaesita sunt; sed opinor secundum hunc diem; satis enim multa a nobis hodie dicta sunt.

Something is also drawn from history, as when Sex. Titius said he was Cassandra: “I,” said Antonius, “can name many of your Aiaxes son of Oileus.” From likeness is also: which has either a comparison or as it were an image. A comparison: as that Gallus once, a witness against Piso, when he had said that countless money had been given to the prefect Magius, and Scaurus had refuted this by Magius’s slenderness: “You err, Scaurus,” said he. “For I do not say that Magius preserved it, but that as a man naked might gather nuts, so he carried it off in his belly.” Or that of M. Cicero the elder, my friend’s father, this excellent man’s father: “Our men are like Syrian slaves: as

Nunc et Scaevola, quoniam in Tusculanum ire constituit, paulum requiescet, dum se calor frangat; et nos ipsi, quoniam id temporis est, valetudini demus operam.’ Placuit sic omnibus. Tum Scaevola ’sane’ inquit ’vellem non constituissem in Tusculanum me hodie venturum esse L. Aelio; libenter audirem Antonium’; et, cum exsurgeret, simul adridens ’neque enim’ inquit ’tam mihi molestus fuit, quod ius nostrum civile pervellit, quam iucundus, quod se id nescire confessus est.’

Quintus my brother, as I set out to recall to mind and to consign to this third book the conversation which Crassus held after Antonius’s discussion, a sharp recollection has renewed my old grief and trouble of soul. For that talent worthy of immortality, that humanity, that virtue of L. Crassus was extinguished by his sudden death scarcely ten days after the day which is contained in this and the previous book.

Magna nobis pueris, Quinte frater, si memoria tenes, opinio fuit L. Crassum non plus attigisse doctrinae, quam quantum prima illa puerili institutione potuisset; M. autem Antonium omnino omnis eruditionis expertem atque ignarum fuisse; erantque multi qui, quamquam non ita se rem habere arbitrarentur, tamen, quo facilius nos incensos studio discendi a doctrina deterrerent, libenter id, quod dixi, de illis oratoribus praedicarent, ut, si homines non eruditi summam essent prudentiam atque incredibilem eloquentiam consecuti, inanis omnis noster esse labor et stultum in nobis erudiendis patris nostri, optimi ac prudentissimi viri, studium videretur.

For when he had returned to Rome on the last day of the stage games, deeply moved by that speech which was reported to have been made in the assembly by Philippus — who, it was agreed, had said: “I must look for some other counsel; with that senate I cannot conduct the commonwealth” — early on the Ides of September both he himself and a crowded senate came at Drusus’s summons into the curia. There Drusus, after he had complained much about Philippus, brought the matter before the senate concerning that very thing — that the consul had inveighed so weightily in the assembly against that order.

Quos tum, ut pueri, refutare domesticis testibus patre et C. Aculeone propinquo nostro et L. Cicerone patruo solebamus, quod de Crasso pater et Aculeo, quocum erat nostra matertera, quem Crassus dilexit ex omnibus plurimum, et patruus, qui cum Antonio in Ciliciam profectus una decesserat, multa nobis de eius studio et doctrina saepe narravit; cumque nos cum consobrinis nostris, Aculeonis filiis, et ea disceremus, quae Crasso placerent, et ab eis doctoribus, quibus ille uteretur, erudiremur, etiam illud saepe intelleximus, cum essemus eius domi, quod vel pueri sentire poteramus, illum et Graece sic loqui, nullam ut nosse aliam linguam videretur, et doctoribus nostris ea ponere in percontando eaque ipsum omni in sermone tractare, ut nihil esse ei novum, nihil inauditum videretur.

Here, as I have often seen agreed among the wisest men, although it had nearly always happened to Crassus, when he had spoken anything more carefully, that he was thought never to have spoken better, yet by the consensus of all it was so judged at that time: that the rest had always been surpassed by Crassus, but on that day even he himself was surpassed by himself. For he lamented the chance and bereavement of the senate, whose patrimony of dignity was being torn away by the consul (who ought to be like a good parent or faithful guardian), as if by some criminal robber. Nor was it to be wondered at, if, when by his own counsels he had ruined the commonwealth, he should reject from the commonwealth the senate’s counsel.

De Antonio vero, quamquam saepe ex humanissimo homine patruo nostro acceperamus, quem ad modum ille vel Athenis vel Rhodi se doctissimorum hominum sermonibus dedisset, tamen ipse adulescentulus, quantum illius ineuntis aetatis meae patiebatur pudor, multa ex eo saepe quaesivi. Non erit profecto tibi, quod scribo, hoc novum; nam iam tum ex me audiebas mihi illum ex multis variisque sermonibus nullius rei, quae quidem esset in eis artibus, de quibus aliquid existimare possem, rudem aut ignarum esse visum.

When he had brought, as it were, certain firebrands of words to the man — vehement and eloquent and chief of all in resisting, Philippus — Philippus did not bear it, and burned with grave anger, and, having seized pledges, set about coercing Crassus. In which very place many things are reported to have been said by Crassus divinely, when he denied that man could be his consul, to whom he himself was no senator. “Or do you, when you have reckoned the whole authority of our entire order as a pledge and have cut it down before the eyes of the Roman people, suppose me to be terrified by these pledges? Not those things must you cut down, if you wish to coerce L. Crassus: this tongue must be cut out by you, by which, even if torn out, my liberty by the very breath shall confound your lust.”

Sed fuit hoc in utroque eorum, ut Crassus non tam existimari vellet non didicisse, quam illa despicere et nostrorum hominum in omni genere prudentiam Graecis anteferre; Antonius autem probabiliorem hoc populo orationem fore censebat suam, si omnino didicisse numquam putaretur; atque ita se uterque graviorem fore, si alter contemnere, alter ne nosse quidem Graecos videretur.

Many things are said by him on that day, with the highest contention of soul and body, weightily and abundantly, and it was indeed his outstanding statement, his “swan-song” — which we, awaiting more from him, used to come, as it were, to his house and tomb after his death, that we might see at least the very place in which he had lastly stood. The pain of his side at once attacked him in saying; sweat broke out, then a chill came on. So, having returned home with a fever, on the seventh day after, he died of pleurisy.

Quorum consilium quale fuerit, nihil sane ad hoc tempus; illud autem est huius institutae scriptionis ac temporis, neminem eloquentia non modo sine dicendi doctrina, sed ne sine omni quidem sapientia florere umquam et praestare potuisse. Etenim ceterae fere artes se ipsae per se tuentur singulae; bene dicere autem, quod est scienter et perite et ornate dicere, non habet definitam aliquam regionem, cuius terminis saepta teneatur: omnia, quaecumque in hominum disceptationem cadere possunt, bene sunt ei dicenda, qui hoc se posse profitetur, aut eloquentiae nomen relinquendum est.

O the deceitful hope of men, and the delusive fortune, and our vain studies, which, in mid-course, are often broken and dashed and shipwrecked before they could see the harbour! For while Crassus’s life had been busy with the labours of canvassing, of duties, of cases, while he was outweighing all by his usefulness — towards the end, even by his authority — that age had then come which both gave him not labour and gave him commendation. As long as some, even of his close friends, did not approve those wonderful deeds of his — that he had withdrawn himself from the courts and ceased to be the leader of cases. Yet to himself, however much he relaxed of forensic labour, the auctorship of public affairs would have been increased. And for me, neither the highest dignity of his consular kind, nor his most diligent and devoted friendship to me, would have given so much pleasure as that great work of his, in the senate, on the day before his death.

Qua re equidem et in nostra civitate et in ipsa Graecia, quae semper haec summa duxit, multos et ingeniis eximiis et magna laude dicendi sine summa rerum omnium scientia fuisse fateor; talem vero exsistere eloquentiam, qualis fuit in Crasso et Antonio, non cognitis rebus omnibus, quae ad tantam prudentiam pertinerent, tantamque dicendi copiam, quanta in illis fuit, non potuisse confirmo.

For of his death there are many memorials and many griefs left to me. Mine indeed: for I have lost a man — distinguished, the friendliest of all to me, with whom I lived most intimately, the foremost of all in dignity, in my judgment, and the most distinguished in eloquence; whose work in cases had been most pleasant to me. Of all our citizens too. For he was, as it seemed to all wise men, the brightest light of our state, who could have raised it both by his counsel and by his speech, ablaze in either, when bent upon the help of his brother and to the safety of the commonwealth.

Quo etiam feci libentius, ut eum sermonem, quem illi quondam inter se de his rebus habuissent, mandarem litteris, vel ut illa opinio, quae semper fuisset, tolleretur, alterum non doctissimum, alterum plane indoctum fuisse; vel ut ea, quae existimarem a summis oratoribus de eloquentia divinitus esse dicta, custodirem litteris, si ullo modo adsequi complectique potuissem; vel me hercule etiam ut laudem eorum iam prope senescentem, quantum ego possem, ab oblivione hominum atque a silentio vindicarem.

For when by Drusus’s law the senatorial courts had been overthrown, and again the order of senators with the order of equestrians had been brought into contention, there was nothing of his speech in that case more vehement, more weighty, more eloquent than that, than to which I was a frequent hearer in his other cases. Yet, broken in body, with strength shattered, his soul was not bent at all, and he lifted himself up by speaking; and, the rest having departed almost from terror, he poured into the senate, as it were a will, the testimony of his counsel and judgment about the commonwealth — that for him, who was now perishing, it was easy to die.

Nam si ex scriptis cognosci ipsi suis potuissent, minus hoc fortasse mihi esse putassem laborandum; sed cum alter non multum, quod quidem exstaret, et id ipsum adulescens, alter nihil admodum scripti reliquisset, deberi hoc a me tantis hominum ingeniis putavi, ut, cum etiam nunc vivam illorum memoriam teneremus, hanc immortalem redderem, si possem.

I lament that great citizen, and (since I cannot go further) that I have lost so great an ornament of speech and of public counsel. Just so, surely as the most wretched among many other things, I bewail the death of L. Crassus before all. For when did I see him, but with that lessening of pain we feel for friends with whom even our closeness has been lessened? But, by Hercules, when I see his image, when I read his speeches — although the very things he said grow old in my soul — yet a certain solemn shape, even in the writing, is set before me of L. Crassus.

Quod hoc etiam spe adgredior maiore ad probandum, quia non de Ser. Galbae aut C. Carbonis eloquentia scribo aliquid, in quo liceat mihi fingere, si quid velim, nullius memoria iam me refellente, sed edo haec eis cognoscenda, qui eos ipsos, de quibus loquor, saepe audierunt; ut duos summos viros eis, qui neutrum illorum viderint, eorum, quibus ambo illi oratores cogniti sint, vivorum et praesentium memoria teste commendemus.

What, then, can be greater than this — that we should bear, for our orators of these times, that they should be most distinguished and most outstanding (for so they are), and yet a longing, a memory, a desire is yet excited in us, of those who have already gone before? Wherefore, do you not yet judge it to be true, what I am wont to say to you in our daily conversations: that, even now, after the death of L. Crassus, I see no orator, when I have heard him, who can satisfy my hearing — let alone my judgment.

Nec vero te, carissime frater atque optime, rhetoricis nunc quibusdam libris, quos tu agrestis putas, insequor ut erudiam; quid enim tua potest esse oratione aut subtilius aut ornatius? Sed sive iudicio, ut soles dicere, sive, ut ille pater eloquentiae de se Isocrates scripsit ipse, pudore a dicendo et timiditate ingenua quadam refugisti, sive, ut ipse iocari soleo, unum putasti satis esse non modo in una familia rhetorem, sed paene in tota civitate, non tamen arbitror tibi hos libros in eo fore genere, quod merito propter eorum, qui de dicendi ratione disputarunt, ieiunitatem bonarum artium possit inludi; nihil enim mihi quidem videtur in Crassi et Antoni sermone esse praeteritum, quod quisquam summis ingeniis, acerrimis studiis, optima doctrina, maximo usu cognosci ac percipi potuisse arbitraretur, quod tu facillime poteris iudicare, qui prudentiam rationemque dicendi per te ipsum, usum autem per nos percipere voluisti.

He did not see the horrible and pitiful chances of those very ones who, then young men, had given themselves to Crassus. Of whom Gaius Cotta, whom he had left flourishing, a few days after Crassus’s death, was driven by hatred from the tribunate, and not many months from that time was cast out of the state. Sulpicius, who had been in the same flame of hatred, made it his business in his tribunate to strip those whom, as a private man, he had lived with most closely, of all dignity. Whose life, indeed, blooming towards the highest glory of eloquence, was snatched by the sword, and the punishment of his recklessness was set, not without great evil to the commonwealth.

Sed quo citius hoc, quod suscepimus, non mediocre munus conficere possimus, omissa nostra adhortatione ad eorum, quos proposuimus, sermonem disputationemque veniamus.

I think you, Crassus, both by the flower of your life and by the opportuneness of your death, were both adorned and extinguished by divine counsel. For you would either have had to undergo, according to your manly soul and constancy, the cruelty of the citizens’ steel; or, if any fortune had freed you from the atrocity of death, that same would have forced you to be a spectator of the funerals of your country. Nor would only the dominance of the wicked have been a grief to you, but also the victory of the good — because of the slaughter of citizens mixed with it.

Postero igitur die, quam illa erant acta, hora fere secunda, cum etiam tum in lecto Crassus esset et apud eum Sulpicius sederet, Antonius autem inambularet cum Cotta in porticu, repente eo Q. Catulus senex cum C. Iulio fratre venit; quod ubi audivit, commotus Crassus surrexit omnesque admirati maiorem aliquam esse causam eorum adventus suspicati sunt.

For me, indeed, my brother Quintus, when I think of both the chances of those of whom I spoke before, and what we ourselves have borne and felt for our incredible and singular love for the commonwealth, your opinion often seems to me true and wise — you who, on account of so many, so great, and so headlong falls of the most distinguished and the best of men, have always called me back from all contention and conflict of soul.

Qui cum inter se, ut ipsorum usus ferebat, amicissime consalutassent: ’quid vos tandem?’ Crassus ’num quidnam’ inquit ’novi?’ ’Nihil sane,’ inquit Catulus ’etenim vides esse ludos; sed—vel tu nos ineptos licet’ inquit ’vel molestos putes—cum ad me in Tusculanum’ inquit ’heri vesperi venisset Caesar de Tusculano suo, dixit mihi a se Scaevolam hinc euntem esse conventum, ex quo mira quaedam se audisse dicebat; te, quem ego totiens omni ratione temptans ad disputandum elicere non potuissem, permulta de eloquentia cum Antonio disseruisse et tamquam in schola prope ad Graecorum consuetudinem disputasse:

But since these things now cannot be undone for us, and our highest labours are softened by the great glory of compensation, let us press on to those consolations which can be both pleasant for our settled troubles, and salutary for those still pricking us; and let us hand to memory the rest, and well-nigh last, conversation of L. Crassus; and to him, if not equal to his talent, yet according to our zeal, let us pay back the merited and owed thanks.

ita me frater exoravit ne ipsum quidem a studio audiendi nimis abhorrentem, sed me hercule verentem, ne molesti vobis interveniremus, ut huc secum venirem; etenim Scaevolam ita dicere aiebat, bonam partem sermonis in hunc diem esse dilatam. Hoc tu si cupidius factum existimas, Caesari attribues; si familiarius, utrique nostrum; nos quidem, nisi forte molesti intervenimus, venisse delectat.’

For there is none of us who, when he reads Plato’s wonderfully written books, in which Socrates is expressed in nearly all of them, although those things are written divinely, does not yet suspect something greater of him about whom they are written. Which we likewise ask — not from you, who give us all the highest things, but from the rest who shall take this into their hands — that they suspect something greater of L. Crassus than what shall be expressed by us.

Tum Crassus ’equidem, quaecumque vos causa huc attulisset, laetarer, cum apud me viderem homines mihi carissimos et amicissimos; sed tamen, vere dicam, quaevis mallem fuisset, quam ista, quam dicis. Ego enim, ut, quem ad modum sentio, loquar, numquam mihi minus quam hesterno die placui; magis adeo id facilitate quam alia ulla culpa mea contigit, qui, dum obsequor adulescentibus, me senem esse sum oblitus fecique id, quod ne adulescens quidem feceram, ut eis de rebus, quae doctrina aliqua continerentur, disputarem. Sed hoc tamen cecidit mihi peropportune, quod transactis iam meis partibus ad Antonium audiendum venistis.’

For we who were not present at the conversation, and to whom Gaius Cotta had handed down only the topics and thoughts of this disputation, in what kind of speech we had recognised each orator, this very thing in their conversation we have tried to sketch out. But if anyone — led by common opinion — shall think Antonius leaner or Crassus fuller than they are introduced by us, he will be one of those who either has not heard them or cannot judge. For each was, as I set forth before, both outstanding to all in zeal, talent, and learning, and perfect in his own kind, so that this ornament of speech was neither lacking in Antonius nor overflowing in Crassus.

Tum Caesar ’equidem,’ inquit ’Crasse, ita sum cupidus in illa longiore te ac perpetua disputatione audiendi, ut, si id mihi minus contingat, vel hoc sim cotidiano tuo sermone contentus; itaque experiar equidem illud, ut ne Sulpicius familiaris meus aut Cotta plus quam ego apud te valere videantur, et te exorabo profecto, ut mihi quoque et Catulo tuae suavitatis aliquid impertias; sin tibi id minus libebit, non te urgebo neque committam, ut, dum vereare tu ne sis ineptus, me esse iudices.’

When, therefore, they had departed before noon and had rested a little, this Cotta said he had especially noticed: that all that midday time Crassus had spent in the keenest and most attentive thought; and he himself, who well knew his face when he had to speak, and the gaze of his eyes when in thought, and had often seen them in the greatest cases — then, of set purpose, while the others were resting, came into the alcove in which Crassus had reclined on a couch. When he felt that Crassus was fixed in thought, he at once withdrew, and in that silence about two hours were spent. Then, when all had come to Crassus, the day now bending to the afternoon, “What, Crassus,” said Iulius, “do we go to sit? Although we have come not to demand it of you, but to remind you.”

Tum ille ’ego me hercule’ inquit, ’Caesar, ex omnibus Latinis verbis huius verbi vim vel maximam semper putavi; quem enim nos ineptum vocamus, is mihi videtur ab hoc nomen habere ductum, quod non sit aptus, idque in sermonis nostri consuetudine perlate patet; nam qui aut tempus quid postulet non videt aut plura loquitur aut se ostentat aut eorum, quibuscum est, vel dignitatis vel commodi rationem non habet aut denique in aliquo genere aut inconcinnus aut multus est, is ineptus esse dicitur.

Then Crassus: “Do you think me so impudent that I should suppose I can owe you this duty especially any longer?” “Where then will the place be?” he said. “Does the middle of the wood please? For it is the most shady and cool of places.” “Indeed,” said Crassus, “in that place there is a seat not unsuited to this our conversation.” When this had pleased the rest also, they came into the wood, and there, with great expectation of hearing, they sit down.

Hoc vitio cumulata est eruditissima illa Graecorum natio; itaque quod vim huius mali Graeci non vident, ne nomen quidem ei vitio imposuerunt; ut enim quaeras omnia, quo modo Graeci ineptum appellent, non reperies. Omnium autem ineptiarum, quae sunt innumerabiles, haud sciam an nulla sit maior quam, ut illi solent, quocumque in loco, quoscumque inter homines visum est, de rebus aut difficillimis aut non necessariis argutissime disputare. Hoc nos ab istis adulescentibus facere inviti et recusantes heri coacti sumus.’

Then Crassus: “Both your authority and friendship,” he said, “and Antonius’s easiness, have snatched from me, in my best case, the liberty of refusing. Although in the dividing of our disputation, when he took for himself those things which the orator ought to say, but left to me to set forth how those things ought to be ornated, he divided what cannot be separated. For since all speech consists of matter and words, neither can the words have a seat if you should subtract the matter, nor can the matter have light if you remove the words.

Tum Catulus ’ne Graeci quidem,’ inquit ’Crasse, qui in civitatibus suis clari et magni fuerunt, sicuti tu es nosque omnes in nostra re publica volumus esse, horum Graecorum, qui se inculcant auribus nostris, similes fuerunt, nec in otio sermones huius modi disputationesque fugiebant.

And to me, the ancients seem, having grasped something greater in their souls, to have seen far more than the edge of our talents can look upon — they who said all these things which are above and beneath are one, and bound up by one force and by one consensus of nature. For there is no kind of things which, torn from the rest, could either of itself stand, or, if the rest should be without it, could keep its own force and eternity.

Ac si tibi videntur, qui temporis, qui loci, qui hominum rationem non habent, inepti, sicut debent videri, num tandem aut locus hic non idoneus videtur, in quo porticus haec ipsa, ubi nunc ambulamus, et palaestra et tot locis sessiones gymnasiorum et Graecorum disputationum memoriam quodam modo commovent? Aut num importunum tempus in tanto otio, quod et raro datur et nunc peroptato nobis datum est? Aut homines ab hoc genere disputationis alieni, qui omnes ei sumus, ut sine his studiis vitam nullam esse ducamus?’

But if this seems too great a rationale to be grasped by men’s sense or thought, there is also that true voice of Plato, surely not unheard by you, Catulus: that all the doctrine of these freeborn and human arts is contained by some one chain of fellowship. For when the force of that reasoning is seen by which the causes of things and their outcomes are known, a wonderful concord, as it were, of all branches of knowledge and a harmony is found.

’Omnia ista’ inquit Crassus ’ego alio modo interpretor, qui primum palaestram et sedes et porticus etiam ipsos, Catule, Graecos exercitationis et delectationis causa non disputationis invenisse arbitror; nam et saeculis multis ante gymnasia inventa sunt, quam in eis philosophi garrire coeperunt, et hoc ipso tempore, cum omnia gymnasia philosophi teneant, tamen eorum auditores discum audire quam philosophum malunt; qui simul ut increpuit, in media oratione de maximis rebus et gravissimis disputantem philosophum omnes unctionis causa relinquunt; ita levissimam delectationem gravissimae, ut ipsi ferunt, utilitati anteponunt.

But if this also seems higher than that we, lying flat on the ground, can look up to it, yet that surely which we have embraced, which we profess, which we have undertaken, we ought to know and hold. For there is one eloquence — what both I said yesterday, and Antonius signified in several places of his morning speech — into whatever shores or regions of disputation it is brought.

Otium autem quod dicis esse, adsentior; verum oti fructus est non contentio animi, sed relaxatio. Saepe ex socero meo audivi, cum is diceret socerum suum Laelium semper fere cum Scipione solitum rusticari eosque incredibiliter repuerascere esse solitos, cum rus ex urbe tamquam e vinclis evolavissent. Non audeo dicere de talibus viris, sed tamen ita solet narrare Scaevola, conchas eos et umbilicos ad Caietam et ad Laurentum legere consuesse et ad omnem animi remissionem ludumque descendere.

For whether it speaks about the nature of heaven or of earth, of divine or of human force; whether from a lower place or from an equal or from a higher; whether to drive men or to teach or to deter or to rouse or to turn back or to inflame or to soothe; whether to few or to many, whether among foreigners or with one’s own or with oneself — speech is led off by streams, not by springs, and wherever it goes, by the same equipment and ornament it is accompanied.

Sic enim res sese habet, ut, quem ad modum volucris videmus procreationis atque utilitatis suae causa effingere et construere nidos, easdem autem, cum aliquid effecerint, levandi laboris sui causa passim ac libere solutas opere volitare, sic nostri animi negotiis forensibus atque urbano opere defessi gestiant ac volitare cupiant vacui cura ac labore.

But since we are now overwhelmed by the opinions not only of the common people, but also of men lightly learned, who, what they cannot embrace whole, these they more easily handle torn apart and as it were rent in pieces — and who, as body from soul, so words from thoughts they separate (without the perishing of which neither can come about) — I shall not undertake more in my speech than is laid on me. I shall only signify briefly that no ornament of words can be found, save when the thoughts have been distinguished and expressed, nor is there any thought illustrious without the light of words.

Itaque illud ego, quod in causa Curiana Scaevolae dixi, non dixi secus ac sentiebam: nam "si," inquam "Scaevola, nullum erit testamentum recte factum, nisi quod tu scripseris, omnes ad te cives cum tabulis veniemus, omnium testamenta tu scribes unus. Quid igitur?" inquam "quando ages negotium publicum? quando amicorum? quando tuum? quando denique nihil ages?" Tum illud addidi "mihi enim liber esse non videtur, qui non aliquando nihil agit." In qua permaneo, Catule, sententia meque, cum huc veni, hoc ipsum nihil agere et plane cessare delectat.

But before I try to touch those things by which I think speech is to be ornated and lit up, I shall briefly set out what I think about the universal kind of speaking. There is no nature, as it seems to me, which does not have within its own kind several things unlike one another, which are yet judged worthy of similar praise. For we perceive by the ears many things which, although they delight us by sounds, are yet so various that what you have just heard seems most pleasant. And by the eyes are gathered well-nigh countless pleasures, which so seize us that they delight one sense in unlike kinds. The other senses too disparate pleasures delight, so that the judgment of the most outstanding sweetness is hard.

Nam, quod addidisti tertium, vos esse eos, qui vitam insuavem sine his studiis putaretis, id me non modo non hortatur ad disputandum, sed etiam deterret. Nam ut C. Lucilius, homo doctus et perurbanus, dicere solebat ea, quae scriberet neque se ab indoctissimis neque a doctissimis legi velle, quod alteri nihil intellegerent, alteri plus fortasse quam ipse; de quo etiam scripsit "Persium non curo legere,"—hic fuit enim, ut noramus, omnium fere nostrorum hominum doctissimus—"Laelium Decumum volo," quem cognovimus virum bonum et non inlitteratum, sed nihil ad Persium; sic ego, si iam mihi disputandum sit de his nostris studiis, nolim equidem apud rusticos, sed multo minus apud vos; malo enim non intellegi orationem meam quam reprehendi.’

And the same which is in the natures of things can be transferred also to the arts. There is one art of modelling, in which Myro, Polyclitus, Lysippus were outstanding, all unlike one another, but yet in such a way that you would wish no one of them to be unlike himself. There is one art and rationale of painting, and yet most unlike one another are Zeuxis, Aglaophon, Apelles; nor is any of these one to whom anything in his own art seems wanting. And if this is wonderful in those, as it were, mute arts, and yet true, how much more wonderful in speech and in the tongue? Which, although it moves in the same thoughts and words, has the highest dissimilarities — not so that some should be blamed, but so that those who are agreed to be praised may yet in unlike kinds be praised.

Tum Caesar ’equidem,’ inquit ’Catule, iam mihi videor navasse operam, quod huc venerim; nam haec ipsa recusatio disputationis disputatio quaedam fuit mihi quidem periucunda. Sed cur impedimus Antonium, cuius audio esse partis, ut de tota eloquentia disserat, quemque iam dudum et Cotta et Sulpicius exspectat?’

And this is first to be seen in the poets, with whom is the closest kinship to orators: how unlike one another are Ennius, Pacuvius, and Accius; how unlike, among the Greeks, Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides — although nearly equal praise is assigned to all in unlike kinds of writing.

’Ego vero’ inquit Crassus ’neque Antonium verbum facere patiar et ipse obmutescam, nisi prius a vobis impetraro’—’Quidnam?’ inquit Catulus. ’Ut hic sitis hodie.’ Tum, cum ille dubitaret, quod ad fratrem promiserat, ’ego’ inquit Iulius ’pro utroque respondeo: sic faciemus; atque ista quidem condicione, vel ut verbum nullum faceres, me teneres.’

Look now upon those men, and gaze upon them — concerning whose faculty we are inquiring what is the difference of their pursuits and natures. Sweetness Isocrates, subtlety Lysias, keenness Hyperides, resounding Aeschines, force Demosthenes had. Which of them was not outstanding? Yet who is like anyone but himself? Weight Africanus had, gentleness Laelius, harshness Galba, a flowing and singing thing Carbo. Which of these was not chief in those times? And yet each was chief in his own kind.

Hic Catulus adrisit et simul, ’praecisa’ inquit ’mihi quidem est dubitatio, quoniam neque domi imperaram et hic, apud quem eram futurus, sine mea sententia tam facile promisit.’ Tum omnes oculos in Antonium coniecerunt, et ille ’audite vero, audite,’ inquit ’hominem enim audietis de schola atque a magistro et Graecis litteris eruditum, et eo quidem loquar confidentius, quod Catulus auditor accessit, cui non solum nos Latini sermonis, sed etiam Graeci ipsi solent suae linguae subtilitatem elegantiamque concedere.

But why should I seek out old examples, when I may use present and living ones? What pleasanter has ever fallen on our ears than the speech of this Catulus? — which is so pure, that he seems to speak Latin almost alone; and so weighty, that, in singular dignity, all human kindness and charm is yet present. In short, listening to him I am wont so to judge: that whatever you should add or change or take away, the speech would be more faulty and the worse.

Sed quia tamen hoc totum, quicquid est, sive artificium sive studium dicendi, nisi accessit os, nullum potest esse, docebo vos, discipuli, id quod ipse non didici, quid de omni genere dicendi sentiam.’

Has not our Caesar here brought a kind of new principle of speech and introduced an almost singular kind of speaking? Who, except him, has ever handled tragic matters almost in comic vein, gloomy ones lightly, severe ones cheerfully, forensic ones with almost stage grace, and so that neither was the jest excluded by the greatness of the matters, nor was the gravity diminished by the wit?

Hic postea quam adriserunt, ’res mihi videtur esse’ inquit ’facultate praeclara, arte mediocris; ars enim earum rerum est, quae sciuntur; oratoris autem omnis actio opinionibus, non scientia, continetur; nam et apud eos dicimus, qui nesciunt, et ea dicimus, quae nescimus ipsi; itaque et illi alias aliud eisdem de rebus et sentiunt et iudicant et nos contrarias saepe causas dicimus, non modo ut Crassus contra me dicat aliquando aut ego contra Crassum, cum alterutri necesse sit falsum dicere, sed etiam ut uterque nostrum eadem de re alias aliud defendat, cum plus uno verum esse non possit. Ut igitur in eius modi re, quae mendacio nixa sit, quae ad scientiam non saepe perveniat, quae opiniones hominum et saepe errores aucupetur, ita dicam, si causam putatis esse, cur audiatis.’

Behold, present here, two nearly contemporaries, Sulpicius and Cotta. What so unlike between them? What so outstanding in his own kind? The one polished and subtle, setting forth the matter with proper and apt words; he sticks always in the case, and when he has most keenly seen what should be proved to the judge, omitting other arguments, on this he fixes his mind and speech. But Sulpicius, with the bravest impulse of soul, with the fullest and greatest voice, with the highest contention of body and dignity of motion, has also such weight and abundance of words that alone of all he seems to be by nature most equipped for speaking.

’Nos vero et valde quidem’ Catulus inquit ’putamus atque eo magis, quod nulla mihi ostentatione videris esse usurus; exorsus es enim non gloriose, ut tu putas, magis a veritate, quam a nescio qua dignitate.’

I come back now to ourselves, since we have always been so compared that, as it were, we have been called by the conversations of men into some judgment of contention. What so unlike as I in speaking and Antonius? — when he is such an orator that nothing can be more outstanding than he, while I, although I am dissatisfied with myself, am yet most especially joined with him in comparison. Do you see what kind of orator Antonius is? Strong, vehement, moved in pleading, fortified and hedged on every side of the case, keen, sharp, kernel-cleared, dwelling on each thing in its place, honourably yielding, keenly pursuing, terrifying, supplicating, with the highest variety of speech, with no satiety to our ears.

’Ut igitur de ipso genere sum confessus,’ inquit Antonius ’artem esse non maximam, sic illud adfirmo, praecepta posse quaedam dari peracuta ad pertractandos animos hominum et ad excipiendas eorum voluntates. Huius rei scientiam si quis volet magnam quandam artem esse dicere, non repugnabo; etenim cum plerique temere ac nulla ratione causas in foro dicant, non nulli autem propter exercitationem aut propter consuetudinem aliquam callidius id faciant, non est dubium quin, si quis animadverterit, quid sit, qua re alii melius quam alii dicant, id possit notare: ergo id qui toto in genere fecerit, is si non plane artem, at quasi artem quandam invenerit.

As for ourselves, whoever we are in speaking — since we seem to you to be in some account — we surely differ much from his kind. What kind that is, it is not for me to say, because each man is least known to himself, and most hardly each can judge of himself. But still the unlikeness can be understood from the moderate measure of my own motion, and from this — that the footsteps in which I have first set out, in those I am wont mostly to peroration, and that somewhat greater labour and care vexes me in choosing words than thoughts, fearing lest, if my speech is a little obsolete, it should not seem to have been worthy of expectation and silence.

Atque utinam, ut mihi illa videor videre in foro atque in causis, item nunc, quem ad modum ea reperirentur, possem vobis exquirere! Sed de me videro; nunc hoc propono, quod mihi persuasi, quamvis ars non sit, tamen nihil esse perfecto oratore praeclarius; nam ut usum dicendi omittam, qui in omni pacata et libera civitate dominatur, tanta oblectatio est in ipsa facultate dicendi, ut nihil hominum aut auribus aut mentibus iucundius percipi possit.

Now if among us who are present there are such great unlikenesses, such fixed proper qualities of each, and in that variety it is rather the better faculty than the kind that distinguishes the better from the worse, and everything is praised which is perfect in its own kind — what do you suppose, if we should wish to embrace all who anywhere are or have been orators, will not the result be that, as many as the orators, almost so many kinds of speaking are found? From which discussion of mine perhaps that may occur — that, if there are well-nigh countless, as it were, forms and figures of speaking, unlike in appearance, praiseworthy in kind, things which differ among themselves cannot be shaped by the same precepts and one institution.

Qui enim cantus moderata oratione dulcior inveniri potest? Quod carmen artificiosa verborum conclusione aptius? Qui actor imitanda quam orator suscipienda veritate iucundior? Quid autem subtilius quam crebrae acutaeque sententiae? Quid admirabilius quam res splendore inlustrata verborum? Quid plenius quam omni genere rerum cumulata oratio? Neque ulla non propria oratoris res est, quae quidem ornate dici graviterque debet.

Which is not so. And this is most diligently to be looked at by those who train and instruct anyone: whither each man’s nature seems most to bear him. For we see that from the same school, as it were, of the foremost masters and teachers in each one’s kind, have come pupils unlike one another, and yet praiseworthy, when the teacher’s training was adapted to each one’s nature.

Huius est in dando consilio de maximis rebus cum dignitate explicata sententia; eiusdem et languentis populi incitatio et effrenati moderatio; eadem facultate et fraus hominum ad perniciem et integritas ad salutem vocatur. Quis cohortari ad virtutem ardentius, quis a vitiis acrius revocare, quis vituperare improbos asperius, quis laudare bonos ornatius, quis cupiditatem vehementius frangere accusando potest? Quis maerorem levare mitius consolando?

Of which especially marked is that example — to leave the rest of arts aside — which Isocrates, the singular teacher, used to say: that he was wont to use spurs on Ephorus, but, on the other hand, the bridle on Theopompus. For the one, leaping with audacity of words, he restrained; the other, hesitating and as it were bashful, he urged on. Nor did he make them like one another, but only added to one and shaved from the other, so that he shaped in each what each one’s nature would bear.

Historia vero testis temporum, lux veritatis, vita memoriae, magistra vitae, nuntia vetustatis, qua voce alia nisi oratoris immortalitati commendatur? Nam si qua est ars alia, quae verborum aut faciendorum aut legendorum scientiam profiteatur; aut si quisquam dicitur nisi orator formare orationem eamque variare et distinguere quasi quibusdam verborum sententiarumque insignibus; aut si via ulla nisi ab hac una arte traditur aut argumentorum aut sententiarum aut denique discriptionis atque ordinis, fateamur aut hoc, quod haec ars profiteatur, alienum esse aut cum alia aliqua arte esse commune: sed si in hac una est ea ratio atque doctrina, non, si qui aliarum artium bene locuti sunt, eo minus id est huius unius proprium;

These things had to be foretold by me, that, if not all the things proposed by me are stuck to the zeal of all of you and to that kind which each of you approves in speaking, you might feel that that kind is being expressed by me which most is approved by myself. Therefore those things must both be done by the orator which Antonius set out, and be said in some way. What better way of speaking, then — for of delivery I shall see later — than that we speak Latin, plainly, ornately, aptly and congruently to whatever is being treated?

sed ut orator de eis rebus, quae ceterarum artium sunt, si modo eas cognovit, ut heri Crassus dicebat, optime potest dicere, sic ceterarum artium homines ornatius illa sua dicunt, si quid ab hac arte didicerunt.

As to the first two of these I have spoken of, I do not think the rationale of pure and clear speech is expected from me. For we do not try to teach speaking him who does not know to talk; nor to hope that he who cannot speak Latin will speak ornately; nor that he who does not say what we may understand can say something we shall admire. Let us therefore leave aside these things which have an easy understanding and a necessary use. For the one is handed down by letters and a boy’s instruction; the other is brought to bear so that what each one says may be understood — which we see is so necessary that yet there can be nothing less.

Neque enim si de rusticis rebus agricola quispiam aut etiam, id quod multi, medicus de morbis aut si de pingendo pictor aliquis diserte scripserit aut dixerit, idcirco illius artis putanda est eloquentia; in qua quia vis magna est in hominum ingeniis, eo multi etiam sine doctrina aliquid omnium generum atque artium consequuntur; sed, quid cuiusque sit proprium, etsi ex eo iudicari potest, cum videris, quid quaeque doceat, tamen hoc certius esse nihil potest, quam quod omnes artes aliae sine eloquentia suum munus praestare possunt, orator sine ea nomen obtinere suum non potest; ut ceteri, si diserti sint, aliquid ab hoc habeant, hic, nisi domesticis se instruxerit copiis, aliunde dicendi copiam petere non possit.’

But all elegance of speaking, although it is polished by the science of letters, is yet increased by reading the orators and poets. For those ancients, who could not yet adorn what they said, all spoke nearly splendidly. Those who shall have grown accustomed to their conversation cannot, even if they wish, speak otherwise than in Latin. Yet we shall not have to use those words which our usage no longer uses, save sometimes for the sake of ornament sparingly, as I shall show; but the man who has been zealously and much turned over in old writings will be able so to use accustomed words as to use the choicest.

Tum Catulus ’etsi,’ inquit ’Antoni, minime impediendus est interpellatione iste cursus orationis tuae, patiere tamen mihique ignosces; "non enim possum quin exclamem," ut ait ille in Trinummo: ita vim oratoris cum exprimere subtiliter visus es, tum laudare copiosissime; quod quidem eloquentem vel optime facere oportet, ut eloquentiam laudet; debet enim ad eam laudandam ipsam illam adhibere, quam laudat. Sed perge porro; tibi enim adsentior vestrum esse hoc totum diserte dicere, idque si quis in alia arte faciat, eum adsumpto aliunde uti bono, non proprio nec suo.’

And in order to speak Latin, not only must we look that we should bring forth those words which no one would justly reproach, and so preserve them in their cases and times and gender and number that nothing be confused or out of agreement or backward — but the very tongue and breath and sound of voice itself is to be regulated.

Et Crassus ’nox te’ inquit ’nobis, Antoni, expolivit hominemque reddidit; nam hesterno sermone unius cuiusdam operis, ut ait Caecilius, remigem aliquem aut baiulum nobis oratorem descripseras, inopem quendam humanitatis atque inurbanum.’ Tum Antonius ’heri enim’ inquit ’hoc mihi proposueram, ut, si te refellissem, hos a te discipulos abducerem; nunc, Catulo audiente et Caesare, videor debere non tam pugnare tecum quam quid ipse sentiam dicere.

I do not wish letters to be expressed too pedantically, nor to be obscured too negligently; I do not wish words to come out meagrely lifeless, nor swelled and as it were heavily panted. For of voice I do not yet say those things which belong to delivery, but this — what seems to me as it were joined with conversation. For there are certain faults which there is no one but desires to flee: a soft voice or womanly, or as it were unmeasured, off-tune, absurd.

Sequitur igitur, quoniam nobis est hic, de quo loquimur, in foro atque in oculis civium constituendus, ut videamus, quid ei negoti demus cuique eum muneri velimus esse praepositum; nam Crassus heri, cum vos, Catule et Caesar, non adessetis, posuit breviter in artis distributione idem, quod Graeci plerique posuerunt, neque sane quid ipse sentiret, sed quid ab illis diceretur, ostendit: duo prima genera quaestionum esse, in quibus eloquentia versaretur, unum infinitum, alterum certum.

There is, however, a fault which some pursue of set purpose: a rustic and rural voice delights some, that the more, if it sound thus, their conversation may seem to retain antiquity. As your friend, Catulus, L. Cotta, seems to me to delight in the heaviness of his tongue and the rural sound of his voice; and he thinks what he says will seem ancient if it is plainly rustic. But your sound and that subtlety of yours delights me — I leave aside that of words, although it is the chief thing — but that, reasoning brings, letters teach, the habit of reading and of speaking confirms. I mean this sweetness which comes out of the mouth: which, just as among the Greeks the speech of the Athenians, so in Latin speech is most proper to this city.

Infinitum mihi videbatur id dicere, in quo aliquid generatim quaereretur, hoc modo: expetendane esset eloquentia? expetendine honores? Certum autem, in quo quid in personis et in constituta re et definita quaereretur; cuius modi sunt, quae in foro atque in civium causis disceptationibusque versantur.

At Athens long ago the learning of the Athenians themselves perished; only the home of pursuits remains in that city, in which the citizens are at leisure, and foreigners enjoy them, captured in some way by the name of the city and its authority. Yet any unlearned Athenian will easily surpass the most learned Asiatic men — not in words, but in the sound of voice, and not so much by speaking well as sweetly. Our men devote themselves less to letters than the Latins; yet of those city-bred you know — among whom is the least of letters — there is no one who would not easily overcome the most lettered of all togaed men, Quintus Valerius of Sora, by the gentleness of his voice and the very pressure and sound of his mouth.

Ea mihi videntur aut in lite oranda aut in consilio dando esse posita; nam illud tertium, quod et a Crasso tactum est et, ut audio, ille ipse Aristoteles, qui haec maxime inlustravit, adiunxit, etiam si opus est, minus est tamen necessarium.’ ’Quidnam?’ inquit Catulus; ’an laudationes? Id enim video poni genus tertium.’

Therefore, since there is some certain voice proper to the Roman race and city, in which nothing may offend, nothing displease, nothing be marked, nothing sound or smell foreign — let us follow that, and learn to flee not only rustic harshness but also foreign novelty.

’Ita,’ inquit Antonius ’et in eo quidem genere scio et me et omnis, qui adfuerunt, delectatos esse vehementer, cum a te est Popilia, mater vestra, laudata, cui primum mulieri hunc honorem in nostra civitate tributum puto. Sed non omnia, quaecumque loquimur, mihi videntur ad artem et ad praecepta esse revocanda;

For when I hear my mother-in-law Laelia — for women more easily preserve uncorrupted antiquity, who, having had no part in the conversation of many, always hold those things which they first learned — but I so hear her that I seem to be hearing Plautus or Naevius. So upright and simple is the very sound of her voice, that she seems to bring nothing of ostentation or imitation. From which I judge that her father so spoke, so her ancestors — not roughly as that man I spoke of, not vastly, not rustically, not gappingly, but pressed and evenly and gently.

ex eis enim fontibus, unde ad omnia ornamenta dicendi praecepta sumuntur, licebit etiam laudationem ornare neque illa elementa desiderare, quae ut nemo tradat, quis est qui nesciat, quae sint in homine laudanda? Positis enim eis rebus, quas Crassus in illius orationis suae, quam contra conlegam censor habuit, principio dixit: quae natura aut fortuna darentur hominibus, in eis rebus se vinci posse animo aequo pati; quae ipsi sibi homines parare possent, in eis rebus se pati non posse vinci; qui laudabit quempiam, intelleget exponenda sibi esse fortunae bona;

Therefore our Cotta — whose broadness, Sulpicius, you sometimes imitate, dropping the letter i and saying e most fully — seems to me to imitate not the ancient orators but the harvesters.” Here, when Sulpicius himself had laughed, “So I shall deal with you,” said Crassus. “Since you wished me to speak, you shall hear something of your faults.” “Would that we might!” he said. “For that very thing we wish; and if you do it, many faults, I think, we shall lay aside today.”

ea sunt generis, pecuniae, propinquorum, amicorum, opum, valetudinis, formae, virium, ingeni et ceterarum rerum, quae sunt aut corporis aut extraneae; si habuerit, bene rebus eis usum; si non habuerit, sapienter caruisse; si amiserit, moderate tulisse; deinde, quid sapienter is, quem laudet, quid liberaliter, quid fortiter, quid iuste, quid magnifice, quid pie, quid grate, quid humaniter, quid denique cum aliqua virtute aut fecerit aut tulerit: haec et quae sunt eius generis facile videbit, qui volet laudare; et qui vituperare, contraria.’

“But not without my own danger,” said Crassus, “can I rebuke you, Sulpicius, since Antonius said you seemed to him most like himself.” Then he: “You yourself indeed warned us that we should imitate those things which were greatest in each. From which I fear lest I be nothing of yours but the imitator of the foot-stamp and a few words and some movement, perhaps.” “Therefore those things which you have from me,” said Crassus, “I do not rebuke, lest I deride myself — and they are far more and greater than you say. Those, however, which are plainly yours, or expressed by imitation from someone, of these I shall warn you, if some place shall remind me.

’Cur igitur dubitas,’ inquit Catulus, ’facere hoc tertium genus, quoniam est in ratione rerum? Non enim, si est facilius, eo de numero quoque est excerpendum.’ ’Quia nolo,’ inquit, ’omnia, quae cadunt aliquando in oratorem, quamvis exigua sint, ea sic tractare, quasi nihil possit dici sine praeceptis suis;

Let us pass over then the precepts of speaking Latin, which boyish learning hands down, and which subtler knowledge and the rationale of letters nourishes, or the habit of daily and household conversation; books confirm them, and the reading of the ancient orators and poets. Nor let us linger longer on that other point — to argue by what means we may attain that what we say be understood:

nam et testimonium saepe dicendum est ac non numquam etiam accuratius, ut mihi etiam necesse fuit in Sex. Titium, seditiosum civem et turbulentum; explicavi in eo testimonio dicendo omnia consilia consulatus mei, quibus illi tribuno plebis pro re publica restitissem, quaeque ab eo contra rem publicam facta arbitrarer, exposui; diu retentus sum, multa audivi, multa respondi. Num igitur placet, cum de eloquentia praecipias, aliquid etiam de testimoniis dicendis quasi in arte tradere?’

by speaking, of course, in Latin, with words usual and pointing properly to those things we wish to be signified and made plain; without ambiguous word or speech, without too long a continuity of words, without too far drawing out things which by way of likeness are transferred from other matters; without thoughts torn apart, without backward times, without confused persons, without disturbed order. In short: the whole matter is so easy that it often seems to me very strange when it is more difficult to understand what the patron wishes to say than if he himself, who calls in the patron, were to speak about his own affair.

’Nihil sane’ inquit Catulus ’necesse est.’ ’Quid si, quod saepe summis viris accidit, mandata sint exponenda aut in senatu ab imperatore aut ad imperatorem aut ad regem aut ad populum aliquem a senatu, num quia genere orationis in eius modi causis accuratiore est utendum, idcirco pars etiam haec causarum numeranda videtur aut propriis praeceptis instruenda?’ ’Minime vero,’ inquit Catulus; ’non enim deerit homini diserto in eius modi rebus facultas ex ceteris rebus et causis comparata.’

For those who bring cases to us, mostly themselves teach us so that you do not desire it to be said more plainly. But the same matters, as soon as Fufius or your contemporary Pomponius begins to plead, I do not equally understand what they say, unless I attend most carefully. So confused is the speech, so disturbed, that nothing is first, nothing second; and there is so great an unaccustomedness and a throng of words that the speech, which ought to bring light to matters, brings obscurity and shadows; and they seem in some way themselves to drown out themselves in speaking.

’Ergo item’ inquit ’illa, quae saepe diserte agenda sunt et quae ego paulo ante, cum eloquentiam laudarem, dixi oratoris esse, neque habent suum locum ullum in divisione partium neque certum praeceptorum genus et agenda sunt non minus diserte, quam quae in lite dicuntur, obiurgatio, cohortatio, consolatio, quorum nihil est, quod non summa dicendi ornamenta desideret; sed ex artificio res istae praecepta non quaerunt.’

But, if it pleases — since I hope these things at any rate seem troublesome and putrid to you, the elder ones — let us pass to the rest, somewhat more burdensome.” “But you see,” said Antonius, “how unwillingly we are doing other things and how unwillingly we are listening to you, who could be drawn — for I conjecture from myself — leaving everything else to follow you. So polished is your speech on rough matters, so full on meagre, so new on most common.”

’Plane’ inquit Catulus ’adsentior.’ ’Age vero,’ inquit Antonius ’qualis oratoris et quanti hominis in dicendo putas esse historiam scribere?’ ’Si, ut Graeci scripserunt, summi,’ inquit Catulus; ’si, ut nostri, nihil opus est oratore; satis est non esse mendacem.’ ’Atqui, ne nostros contemnas,’ inquit Antonius, ’Graeci quoque ipsi sic initio scriptitarunt, ut noster Cato, ut Pictor, ut Piso;

“For those two parts were easy, Antonius,” he said, “which I have just run through or rather almost passed over: of speaking Latin and of speaking plainly. The rest are great, complex, various, weighty, in which all wonder of talent, all praise of eloquence is contained. For no one ever wondered at an orator because he spoke Latin; if it is otherwise, they laugh, and they do not think him an orator only, but even a man. No one has lifted up with words him who had so spoken that those who were present understood what he said, but they have despised him who could less do that.

erat enim historia nihil aliud nisi annalium confectio, cuius rei memoriaeque publicae retinendae causa ab initio rerum Romanarum usque ad P. Mucium pontificem maximum res omnis singulorum annorum mandabat litteris pontifex maximus referebatque in album et proponebat tabulam domi, potestas ut esset populo cognoscendi, eique etiam nunc annales maximi nominantur.

In whom, then, do men shudder? Whom do they gaze upon stupefied as he speaks? At whom do they cry out? Whom do they think a god, so to say, among men? Those who speak distinctly, who set out clearly, who copiously, who illustriously both with matters and words, and in the very speech as it were make some rhythm and verse — that is, what I mean by ornately. Those same who so moderate themselves as the dignity of matters, of persons, demands — those are to be praised in that kind of praise which I call apt and congruent.

Hanc similitudinem scribendi multi secuti sunt, qui sine ullis ornamentis monumenta solum temporum, hominum, locorum gestarumque rerum reliquerunt; itaque qualis apud Graecos Pherecydes, Hellanicus, Acusilas fuit aliique permulti, talis noster Cato et Pictor et Piso, qui neque tenent, quibus rebus ornetur oratio—modo enim huc ista sunt importata—et, dum intellegatur quid dicant, unam dicendi laudem putant esse brevitatem.

Antonius said he had not yet seen those who so spoke, and said this name of eloquence was to be assigned to them alone. Therefore deride and despise — on my counsel — all those who think they have embraced all the orator’s force in the precepts of those rhetoricians as they are now called, and have not yet been able to understand what character they hold or what they profess. For everything in the life of men — since the orator moves in it and that is his subject-matter — must be sought, heard, read, argued, handled, stirred up.

Paulum se erexit et addidit maiorem historiae sonum vocis vir optimus, Crassi familiaris, Antipater; ceteri non exornatores rerum, sed tantum modo narratores fuerunt.’ ’Est,’ inquit Catulus ’ut dicis; sed iste ipse Caelius neque distinxit historiam varietate colorum neque verborum conlocatione et tractu orationis leni et aequabili perpolivit illud opus; sed ut homo neque doctus neque maxime aptus ad dicendum, sicut potuit, dolavit; vicit tamen, ut dicis, superiores.’

For eloquence is one of the highest virtues; although all virtues are equal and on a par, yet there is in appearance one more comely and brighter than another, as is this faculty, which, having grasped the knowledge of things, so sets out the perceptions and counsels of mind by words that it can drive those who hear, wherever it shall lean. As its force is the greater, the more must it be joined to uprightness and the highest prudence; if to those without these virtues we should hand the abundance of speaking, we shall not have made them orators but shall have given certain weapons to madmen.

’Minime mirum,’ inquit Antonius ’si ista res adhuc nostra lingua inlustrata non est; nemo enim studet eloquentiae nostrorum hominum, nisi ut in causis atque in foro eluceat; apud Graecos autem eloquentissimi homines remoti a causis forensibus cum ad ceteras res inlustris tum ad historiam scribendam maxime se applicaverunt: namque et Herodotum illum, qui princeps genus hoc ornavit, in causis nihil omnino versatum esse accepimus; atqui tanta est eloquentia, ut me quidem, quantum ego Graece scripta intellegere possum, magno opere delectet; et post illum Thucydides omnis dicendi artificio mea sententia facile vicit;

This rationale of thinking and pronouncing and the force of speaking, the ancient Greeks called wisdom; from this came the Lycurgi, the Pittaci, the Solons; and from this likeness our Coruncanii, Fabricii, Catones, Scipiones, perhaps not so learned, but with similar impulse and disposition of mind. Others with the same prudence, but with a different counsel about the pursuits of life, sought rest and leisure: as Pythagoras, Democritus, Anaxagoras, transferred themselves wholly from governing states to the knowledge of things; which life, on account of its tranquility and the sweetness of the science itself (than which nothing is more pleasant to men), has delighted more men than has been useful to commonwealths.

qui ita creber est rerum frequentia, ut verborum prope numerum sententiarum numero consequatur, ita porro verbis est aptus et pressus, ut nescias, utrum res oratione an verba sententiis inlustrentur: atqui ne hunc quidem, quamquam est in re publica versatus, ex numero accepimus eorum, qui causas dictitarunt; et hos ipsos libros tum scripsisse dicitur, cum a re publica remotus atque, id quod optimo cuique Athenis accidere solitum est, in exsilium pulsus esset;

So when men of the most outstanding talents had given themselves to that pursuit, out of that highest faculty of free and empty time the most learned men, abounding in too much leisure and richest talents, took on themselves to handle and seek and investigate far more things than was necessary. For that old learning seems the same — both the teacher of doing rightly and of speaking well. Nor were the teachers separate, but the same were teachers of living and of speaking — as that Phoenix in Homer, who says he was given by Achilles’ father Peleus as companion to the young man for war, that he might make him an orator of words and an actor of deeds.

hunc consecutus est Syracosius Philistus, qui, cum Dionysi tyranni familiarissimus esset, otium suum consumpsit in historia scribenda maximeque Thucydidem est, ut mihi videtur, imitatus. Postea vero ex clarissima quasi rhetoris officina duo praestantes ingenio, Theopompus et Ephorus ab Isocrate magistro impulsi se ad historiam contulerunt; causas omnino numquam attigerunt.

But as men accustomed to constant and daily labour, when on account of weather they are kept from work, betake themselves to ball or knucklebones or dice, or even invent for themselves some new game in their leisure — so those, kept from public business as it were from work, by the times or by their own will idle, betook themselves wholly, some to poets, some to geometers, some to musicians; some, too, like the dialecticians, brought forth for themselves a new study and game; and in those arts which were discovered, that the minds of boys might be shaped to humanity and virtue, they used up all their time and ages.

Denique etiam a philosophia profectus princeps Xenophon, Socraticus ille, post ab Aristotele Callisthenes, comes Alexandri, scripsit historiam, et is quidem rhetorico paene more; ille autem superior leniore quodam sono est usus, et qui illum impetum oratoris non habeat, vehemens fortasse minus, sed aliquanto tamen est, ut mihi quidem videtur, dulcior. Minimus natu horum omnium Timaeus, quantum autem iudicare possum, longe eruditissimus et rerum copia et sententiarum varietate abundantissimus et ipsa compositione verborum non impolitus magnam eloquentiam ad scribendum attulit, sed nullum usum forensem.’

But because there were some — and many — who flourished in public life by reason of the twin wisdom of doing and speaking which cannot be separated, like Themistocles, Pericles, Theramenes, or who, less themselves engaged in public affairs, were yet teachers of this same wisdom, like Gorgias, Thrasymachus, Isocrates — there were found those who, themselves abounding in learning and talents, but recoiling from civic affairs and public business by some judgment of mind, harassed and despised this practice of speaking;

Haec cum ille dixisset, ’quid est,’ inquit ’Catule?’ Caesar; ’ubi sunt, qui Antonium Graece negant scire? Quot historicos nominavit! Quam scienter, quam proprie de uno quoque dixit!’ ’Id me hercule’ inquit Catulus ’admirans illud iam mirari desino, quod multo magis ante mirabar, hunc, cum haec nesciret, in dicendo posse tantum.’ ’Atqui, Catule,’ inquit Antonius ’non ego utilitatem aliquam ad dicendum aucupans horum libros et non nullos alios, sed delectationis causa, cum est otium, legere soleo.

of whom Socrates was the leader, who, by the testimony of all the learned and by the judgment of the whole of Greece, was easily first of all in prudence and keenness and grace and subtlety, and indeed in eloquence, variety, abundance, into whichever side he had given himself. From those who handled, did, taught these things which we are now seeking — when they were called by one name (because all knowledge of the best things and exercise in them was named philosophy) — Socrates snatched away this common name, and separated by his own disputations the science of feeling wisely and speaking ornately, although they cohered in fact. His talent and various conversations Plato handed to immortality by his writings, since Socrates himself had left no letter.

Quid ergo est? Est, fatebor, aliquid tamen; ut, cum in sole ambulem, etiam si ego aliam ob causam ambulem, fieri natura tamen, ut colorer, sic, cum istos libros ad Misenum—nam Romae vix licet—studiosius legerim, sentio illorum tactu orationem meam quasi colorari. Sed ne latius hoc vobis patere videatur, haec dumtaxat in Graecis intellego, quae ipsi, qui scripserunt, voluerunt vulgo intellegi:

Hence arose that division as it were of tongue and heart — absurd surely and unprofitable and to be reproved — that some teach us to be wise, others to speak. For when several had risen mostly from Socrates, because each had grasped one thing from his various and diverse and on every side spread disputations, families were sown among one another quarrelling, much severed and unlike — when yet all the philosophers wished to be called and judged themselves to be Socratics.

in philosophos vestros si quando incidi, deceptus indicibus librorum, qui sunt fere inscripti de rebus notis et inlustribus, de virtute, de iustitia, de honestate, de voluptate, verbum prorsus nullum intellego; ita sunt angustis et concisis disputationibus inligati; poetas omnino quasi alia quadam lingua locutos non conor attingere. Cum eis me, ut dixi, oblecto, qui res gestas aut orationes scripserunt suas aut qui ita loquuntur, ut videantur voluisse esse nobis, qui non sumus eruditissimi, familiares.

And first from Plato himself Aristotle and Xenocrates, of whom one held the name of the Peripatetics, the other of the Academy. Then from Antisthenes, who in Socrates’ conversation had most loved patience and hardness, the Cynics first, then the Stoics. Then from Aristippus, whom those rather voluptuous disputations had pleased, flowed the Cyrenaic philosophy, which he and his successors defended simply; while these, who now measure all by pleasure, while they do this more bashfully, neither satisfy dignity (which they do not despise) nor protect pleasure (which they wish to embrace). There were also other kinds of philosophers — who almost all said they were Socratics — Eretrians, Herillians, Megarians, Pyrrhonians; but these have long ago been broken and extinguished by the force and arguments of these.

Sed illuc redeo: videtisne, quantum munus sit oratoris historia? Haud scio an flumine orationis et varietate maximum; neque eam reperio usquam separatim instructam rhetorum praeceptis; sita sunt enim ante oculos. Nam quis nescit primam esse historiae legem, ne quid falsi dicere audeat? Deinde ne quid veri non audeat? Ne quae suspicio gratiae sit in scribendo? Ne quae simultatis?

Of those that remain, that philosophy which has undertaken the patronage of pleasure, even if it seems to anyone true, is yet far from that man whom we are seeking, and whom we wish to be the author of public counsel and the leader of governing the state, and chief of opinion and eloquence in the senate, before the people, in public causes. Yet no injury will be done by us to that philosophy. It will not be repelled from where it shall wish to enter, but will rest in its little gardens — where it wishes, where, even reclining softly and daintily, it calls us off from the Rostra, from the courts, from the curia. Wisely perhaps, especially in this commonwealth.

Haec scilicet fundamenta nota sunt omnibus, ipsa autem exaedificatio posita est in rebus et verbis: rerum ratio ordinem temporum desiderat, regionum descriptionem; vult etiam, quoniam in rebus magnis memoriaque dignis consilia primum, deinde acta, postea eventus exspectentur, et de consiliis significari quid scriptor probet et in rebus gestis declarari non solum quid actum aut dictum sit, sed etiam quo modo, et cum de eventu dicatur, ut causae explicentur omnes vel casus vel sapientiae vel temeritatis hominumque ipsorum non solum res gestae, sed etiam, qui fama ac nomine excellant, de cuiusque vita atque natura;

But I am not now asking what philosophy is most true, but what is most joined to the orator. So let us send those men off without any insult; for they are good men, and (since they think themselves so) blessed. Let us only warn them that, even if it is most true, they should hold it silent like a mystery — that they say it is not the wise man’s part to be in public life. For if they shall persuade us and every best man of this, they cannot themselves be — what they most desire — at leisure.

verborum autem ratio et genus orationis fusum atque tractum et cum lenitate quadam aequabiliter profluens sine hac iudiciali asperitate et sine sententiarum forensibus aculeis persequendum est. Harum tot tantarumque rerum videtisne nulla esse praecepta, quae in artibus rhetorum reperiantur? In eodem silentio multa alia oratorum officia iacuerunt, cohortationes, praecepta, consolationes, admonita, quae tractanda sunt omnia disertissime, sed locum suum in his artibus, quae traditae sunt, habent nullum.

The Stoics, however — whom I least disapprove — I yet send away, nor do I fear them angry, since they do not at all know how to be angry. To them I owe this thanks: that they alone of all said eloquence is virtue and wisdom. But there is doubtless in them what greatly recoils from the orator we are equipping. Either because they say all who are not wise are slaves, robbers, enemies, mad — and yet that no one is wise. But it is most absurd to commit an assembly or senate or any gathering of men to him to whom no one of those who are present seems to be sane, no one a citizen, no one a free man.

Atque in hoc genere illa quoque est infinita silva, quod oratori plerique, ut etiam Crassus ostendit, duo genera ad dicendum dederunt: unum de certa definitaque causa, quales sunt, quae in litibus, quae in deliberationibus versantur, addat, si quis volet, etiam laudationes; alterum, quod appellant omnes fere scriptores, explicat nemo, infinitam generis sine tempore et sine persona quaestionem. Hoc quid et quantum sit, cum dicunt, intellegere mihi non videntur:

It is added that they have a kind of speech perhaps subtle and surely keen, but, for an orator, meagre, unaccustomed, recoiling from the ears of the common folk, obscure, empty, dry, and yet of such a kind that to use it before the multitude is in no way possible. For other things seem good and bad to the Stoics and to the rest of the citizens — or rather, the nations — different is the force of honour, of disgrace, of reward, of punishment; truly or falsely, nothing for the present matters; but if we should follow them, we shall never be able to bring any matter to a head by speaking.

si enim est oratoris, quaecumque res infinite posita sit, de ea posse dicere, dicendum erit ei, quanta sit solis magnitudo, quae forma terrae; de mathematicis, de musicis rebus non poterit quin dicat hoc onere suscepto recusare; denique ei, qui profitetur esse suum non solum de eis controversiis, quae temporibus et personis notatae sunt, hoc est, de omnibus forensibus, sed etiam de generum infinitis quaestionibus dicere, nullum potest esse genus orationis, quod sit exceptum.

The Peripatetics and the Academics remain. Although the name of the Academics is one, the opinions are two. For Speusippus, Plato’s sister’s son, and Xenocrates who heard Plato, and Polemo and Crantor who heard Xenocrates, did not greatly disagree from Aristotle, who together with them had heard Plato; in the abundance and variety of speaking they were perhaps not equal. Arcesilas first, who had heard Polemo, snatched up especially this from Plato’s various books and Socratic conversations: that nothing certain can be perceived either by the senses or by the soul. He, having used a certain extraordinary charm of speaking, is said to have spurned all judgment of soul and sense; and he first established (although it had been chiefly Socratic) not to show what he himself thought, but to argue against what each had said he thought.

Sed si illam quoque partem quaestionum oratori volumus adiungere vagam et liberam et late patentem, ut de rebus bonis aut malis, expetendis aut fugiendis, honestis aut turpibus, utilibus aut inutilibus, de virtute, de iustitia, de continentia, de prudentia, de magnitudine animi, de liberalitate, de pietate, de amicitia, de officio, de fide, de ceteris virtutibus contrariisque vitiis dicendum oratori putemus; itemque de re publica, de imperio, de re militari, de disciplina civitatis, de hominum moribus, adsumamus eam quoque partem, sed ita, ut sit circumscripta modicis regionibus.

Hence flowed this more recent Academy, in which Carneades stood out by a kind of divine swiftness of talent and abundance of speaking. Although I have known many of his hearers at Athens, I can yet name most certain authorities: my father-in-law Scaevola, who as a young man heard him at Rome; and my friend Q. Metellus, son of Lucius, that most distinguished man, who said that Carneades had been heard by him as a young man at Athens, in his old age, for many days.

Equidem omnia, quae pertinent ad usum civium, morem hominum, quae versantur in consuetudine vitae, in ratione rei publicae, in hac societate civili, in sensu hominis communi, in natura, in moribus, comprehendenda esse oratori puto; si minus ut separatim de his rebus philosophorum more respondeat, at certe ut in causa prudenter possit intexere; hisce autem ipsis de rebus ut ita loquatur, uti ei, qui iura, qui leges, qui civitates constituerunt, locuti sunt, simpliciter et splendide, sine ulla serie disputationum et sine ieiuna concertatione verborum.

These — as the rivers from the Apennine, so from the common ridge of wisdom — were made the partings of doctrines: so that the philosophers as it were flow down into the upper sea, the Ionian, a Greek and harboured one, while the orators are slipped into this lower, Tuscan and barbarian one, full of rocks and dangers, in which even Ulysses himself wandered.

Hoc loco ne qua sit admiratio, si tot tantarumque rerum nulla a me praecepta ponentur, sic statuo: ut in ceteris artibus, cum tradita sint cuiusque artis difficillima, reliqua, quia aut faciliora aut similia sint, tradi non necesse esse; ut in pictura, qui hominum unam speciem pingere perdidicerit, posse eum cuiusvis vel formae vel aetatis, etiam si non didicerit, pingere neque esse periculum, qui leonem aut taurum pingat egregie, ne idem in multis aliis quadrupedibus facere non possit—neque est omnino ars ulla, in qua omnia, quae illa arte effici possint, a doctore tradantur, sed qui primarum et certarum rerum genera ipsa didicerunt, reliqua non incommode per se adsequentur—

Therefore, if we are content with this eloquence and this orator, who knows either that he must deny what is charged against him, or, if he cannot, then to show that what the accused did was either rightly done, or by another’s fault, or by injustice, or by law, or not against law, or imprudently, or necessarily, or that the matter must not be claimed under the name by which it is charged, or that the case is not being managed as it ought and was lawful — and if you think it enough to learn what those writers of the art teach, which yet Antonius has set out far more ornately and copiously than they say it — but if you are content with these, and with what you wished to be said by me, you compel the orator out of an enormous and unbounded field into a really narrow ring.

similiter arbitror in hac sive ratione sive exercitatione dicendi, qui illam vim adeptus sit, ut eorum mentis, qui aut de re publica aut de ipsius rebus aut de eis, contra quos aut pro quibus dicat, cum aliqua statuendi potestate audiant, ad suum arbitrium movere possit, illum de toto illo genere reliquarum orationum non plus quaesiturum esse, quid dicat, quam Polyclitum illum, cum Herculem fingebat, quem ad modum pellem aut hydram fingeret, etiam si haec numquam separatim facere didicisset.’

But if you wish to follow that ancient Pericles, or this man, more familiar to us because of the multitude of his writings, Demosthenes; and if you have fallen in love with that brilliant and exceptional sight of the perfect orator, and his beauty — either this Carneadean or that Aristotelian force is to be grasped by you.

Tum Catulus ’praeclare mihi videris, Antoni, posuisse’ inquit ’ante oculos, quid discere oporteret eum, qui orator esset futurus, quid, etiam si non didicisset, ex eo, quod didicisset, adsumeret; deduxisti enim totum hominem in duo genera solum causarum, cetera innumerabilia exercitationi et similitudini reliquisti: sed videto ne in istis duobus generibus hydra tibi sit et pellis, Hercules autem et alia opera maiora in illis rebus, quas praetermittis, relinquantur; non enim mihi minus operis videtur de universis generibus rerum quam de singulorum causis ac multo etiam maius de natura deorum quam de hominum litibus dicere.’ ’Non est ita,’ inquit Antonius;

For, as I said before, those ancients up to Socrates joined the knowledge and science of all things which pertain to the morals of men, to life, to virtue, to the commonwealth, with the rationale of speaking. Afterwards, when (as I have set out) the eloquent had been parted from the learned by Socrates, and thereafter the philosophers, like all the Socratics, despised eloquence, and the orators wisdom, neither touched anything of the other’s part, save what these borrowed from those, or those from these — from which they would have drawn promiscuously, if they had wished to remain in their pristine community.

’dicam enim tibi, Catule, non tam doctus quam, id quod est maius, expertus: omnium ceterarum rerum oratio, mihi crede, ludus est homini non hebeti neque inexercitato neque communium litterarum et politioris humanitatis experti; in causarum contentionibus magnum est quoddam opus atque haud sciam an de humanis operibus longe maximum; in quibus vis oratoris plerumque ab imperitis exitu et victoria iudicatur; ubi adest armatus adversarius, qui sit et feriendus et repellendus; ubi saepe is, qui rei dominus futurus est, alienus atque iratus aut etiam amicus adversario et inimicus tibi est; cum aut docendus is est aut dedocendus aut reprimendus aut incitandus aut omni ratione ad tempus, ad causam oratione moderandus (in quo saepe benevolentia ad odium, odium autem ad benevolentiam deducendum est); aut tamquam machinatione aliqua tum ad severitatem tum ad remissionem animi, tum ad tristitiam tum ad laetitiam est contorquendus;

But as the ancient pontiffs, on account of the multitude of sacrifices, wished there to be three men as banqueters, when they themselves had been instituted by Numa to perform also that banquet sacrifice of the games — so the Socratics severed from themselves the pleaders of cases, and from the common name of philosophy, when the ancients had wished there to be a wonderful fellowship of speaking and understanding.

omnium sententiarum gravitate, omnium verborum ponderibus est utendum; accedat oportet actio varia, vehemens, plena animi, plena spiritus, plena doloris, plena veritatis. In his operibus si quis illam artem comprehenderit, ut tamquam Phidias Minervae signum efficere possit, non sane, quem ad modum, ut in clipeo idem artifex, minora illa opera facere discat, laborabit.’

Since these things are so, I shall a little plead for myself, and I shall ask you that what I shall say you should think to be said, not about myself, but about the orator. For I am one who, though taught with the highest zeal of my father in boyhood, and brought to the Forum so much talent (as I myself feel — not so much as perhaps I seem to you), cannot say that I have learned these things which I am now embracing as I shall say they ought to be learned. For of all I came most early to public causes, and at twenty-one called into court a most noble and most eloquent man. The Forum was my school; my master was practice and the laws and institutions of the Roman people and the custom of the ancestors.

Tum Catulus ’quo ista maiora ac mirabiliora fecisti, eo me maior exspectatio tenet quibusnam rationibus quibusque praeceptis ea tanta vis comparetur; non quo mea quidem iam intersit—neque enim aetas id mea desiderat et aliud genus quoddam dicendi nos secuti sumus, qui numquam sententias de manibus iudicum vi quadam orationis extorsimus ac potius placatis eorum animis tantum, quantum ipsi patiebantur, accepimus—sed tamen ista tua nullum ad usum meum, tantum cognoscendi studio adductus requiro.

I tasted only a little of those arts of which I am speaking, when I was quaestor in Asia, having got the rhetorician of about my own age from the Academy, that Metrodorus of whose memory Antonius spoke; and on my way back from there, at Athens — where I should have lingered longer, had I not been angry with the Athenians, who would not put on the mysteries again, to which I had come two days too late. So this — that I embrace so great a knowledge and force of learning — is not for me but rather against me. For I am arguing not what I can do, but what the orator can; and all those who set out the rhetorical arts most ridiculously: for they write of the kinds of suits, of openings, of narrations.

Nec mihi opus est Graeco aliquo doctore, qui mihi pervulgata praecepta decantet, cum ipse numquam forum, numquam ullum iudicium aspexerit; ut Peripateticus ille dicitur Phormio, cum Hannibal Karthagine expulsus Ephesum ad Antiochum venisset exsul proque eo, quod eius nomen erat magna apud omnis gloria, invitatus esset ab hospitibus suis, ut eum, quem dixi, si vellet, audiret; cumque is se non nolle dixisset, locutus esse dicitur homo copiosus aliquot horas de imperatoris officio et de omni re militari. Tum, cum ceteri, qui illum audierant, vehementer essent delectati, quaerebant ab Hannibale, quidnam ipse de illo philosopho iudicaret: hic Poenus non optime Graece, sed tamen libere respondisse fertur, multos se deliros senes saepe vidisse, sed qui magis quam Phormio deliraret vidisse neminem.

But the force of eloquence is so great that it grasps the origin, force, and changes of all things, all virtues, duties, all nature, which contains the morals of men, the souls, the life; the same describes morals, laws, rights, governs the commonwealth, and ornately and copiously speaks of everything, to whatever matter it pertains.

Neque me hercule iniuria; quid enim aut adrogantius aut loquacius fieri potuit quam Hannibali, qui tot annis de imperio cum populo Romano omnium gentium victore certasset, Graecum hominem, qui numquam hostem, numquam castra vidisset, numquam denique minimam partem ullius publici muneris attigisset, praecepta de re militari dare? Hoc mihi facere omnes isti, qui de arte dicendi praecipiunt, videntur; quod enim ipsi experti non sunt, id docent ceteros; sed hoc minus fortasse errant, quod non te, ut Hannibalem ille, sed pueros aut adulescentulos docere conantur.’

In this kind we move as much as we can, as much as we are strong by talent, by moderate learning, by use; nor do we yield much in disputation to those who have set up their tent of life in philosophy alone.

’Erras, Catule,’ inquit Antonius ’nam egomet in multos iam Phormiones incidi. Quis enim est istorum Graecorum, qui quemquam nostrum quicquam intellegere arbitretur? Ac mihi quidem non ita molesti sunt; facile omnis perpetior et perfero; nam aut aliquid adferunt, quod mihi non displiceat, aut efficiunt, ut me non didicisse minus paeniteat; dimitto autem eos non tam contumeliose quam philosophum illum Hannibal, et eo fortasse plus habeo etiam negoti. Sed tamen est eorum doctrina, quantum ego iudicare possum, perridicula:

For what can my friend Gaius Velleius bring why pleasure should be the highest good, that I could not more copiously either defend, if I wished, or refute, from those topics which Antonius set out, by this practice of speaking — in which Velleius is unschooled, and each of us has been versed? What is there, that either Sextus Pompeius or the two Balbi, or my friend who lived with Panaetius, M. Vigellius the Stoic, could say of the virtue of men in such an argument, in which I should have to yield to them, or any of you?

dividunt enim totam rem in duas partis, in causae controversiam et in quaestionis: causam appellant rem positam in disceptatione reorum et controversia; quaestionem autem rem positam in infinita dubitatione; de causa praecepta dant; de altera parte dicendi mirum silentium est.

For philosophy is not like the rest of the arts. For what can he do in geometry who has not learned? What in music? He must either be silent or not even be reckoned sane. But these things which are in philosophy are dug out by talents to elicit what in each thing is like the truth, and they are polished by exercised speech. Our common orator here, if he is less learned, but yet exercised in speaking, by this very common exercise will beat off those of ours, nor will he allow himself to be despised and contemned by them.

Deinde quinque faciunt quasi membra eloquentiae, invenire quid dicas, inventa disponere, deinde ornare verbis, post memoriae mandare, tum ad extremum agere ac pronuntiare; rem sane non reconditam; quis enim hoc non sua sponte viderit, neminem posse dicere, nisi et quid diceret et quibus verbis et quo ordine diceret haberet et ea meminisset? Atque haec ego non reprehendo, sed ante oculos posita esse dico, ut eas item quattuor, quinque, sexve partis vel etiam septem, quoniam aliter ab aliis digeruntur, in quas est ab his omnis oratio distributa:

But if anyone shall ever come forth who can in the Aristotelian manner speak on every subject on either side, and in every case set out two contrary speeches by his precepts; or who in this manner of Arcesilas and Carneades shall argue against everything that is laid down — and shall add to that rationale this rhetorical use and habit and exercise of speaking, he will be the true, the perfect, the only orator. For neither without the forensic sinews can the orator be sufficiently vehement and weighty, nor without variety of learning sufficiently polished and wise.

iubent enim exordiri ita, ut eum, qui audiat, benevolum nobis faciamus et docilem et attentum; deinde rem narrare, et ita ut veri similis narratio sit, ut aperta, ut brevis; post autem dividere causam aut proponere; nostra confirmare argumentis ac rationibus; deinde contraria refutare; tum autem alii conclusionem orationis et quasi perorationem conlocant, alii iubent, ante quam peroretur, ornandi aut augendi causa digredi, deinde concludere ac perorare.

Therefore let us suffer that ancient Corax to hatch his own chicks in the nest, that they may fly out as hateful and troublesome shouters; and let us allow that I-know-not-who Pamphilus to portray, in fillets, so great a matter as if it were certain childish playthings. Let us ourselves, by this so brief disputation of yesterday’s and today’s day, set out the orator’s whole duty — provided that thing be so great that it seems to be embraced in all the philosophers’ books which none of those orators of yours has ever touched.”

Ne haec quidem reprehendo; sunt enim concinne distributa, sed tamen, id quod necesse fuit hominibus expertibus veritatis, non perite: quae enim praecepta principiorum et narrationum esse voluerunt, ea in totis orationibus sunt conservanda;

Then Catulus: “In no way, by Hercules,” he said, “Crassus, is it to be wondered at that there is in you so great a force of speaking, or sweetness, or copiousness. Of you indeed I before judged that you spoke by nature in such a way that you seemed to me not only the highest orator but also the wisest man. Now I understand that you have always reckoned even more important those things which look towards wisdom, and that out of these has flowed this copiousness of speaking. Yet, when I recall all the steps of your age, and consider your life and pursuits, I do not see at what time you learned those things, nor do I understand you to have been greatly given to those pursuits, men, books. And yet I cannot decide whether more I should wonder that you, in your such occupations, could have learned those things which you persuade me are the greatest helps; or, if you could not, that you can speak in this way.”

nam ego mihi benevolum iudicem facilius facere possum, cum sum in cursu orationis, quam cum omnia sunt inaudita; docilem autem non cum polliceor me demonstraturum, sed tum, cum doceo et explano; attentum vero crebro tota actione excitandis mentibus iudicum, non prima denuntiatione efficere possumus.

Here Crassus: “This,” he said, “Catulus, I would have you persuade yourself first: that I do not, when I argue about the orator, do much otherwise than I should do, if I had to speak about an actor. For I should deny that he could satisfy in gesture, unless he had learned the wrestling-school, unless he had learned to dance. Nor when I said this would it be necessary that I be an actor, but perhaps not a foolish judge of another’s art.

Iam vero narrationem quod iubent veri similem esse et apertam et brevem, recte nos admonent: quod haec narrationis magis putant esse propria quam totius orationis, valde mihi videntur errare; omninoque in hoc omnis est error, quod existimant artificium esse hoc quoddam non dissimile ceterorum, cuius modi de ipso iure civili hesterno die Crassus componi posse dicebat: ut genera rerum primum exponerentur, in quo vitium est, si genus ullum praetermittitur; deinde singulorum partes generum, in quo et deesse aliquam partem et superare mendosum est; tum verborum omnium definitiones, in quibus neque abesse quicquam decet neque redundare.

Similarly now I am speaking of the orator at your urging — of the highest, of course; for always, whatever art or faculty is asked about, the question is wont to be of the absolute and perfect. Therefore, if you wish me to be even an orator, even tolerably good, even good — I shall not resist; for why should I now be silly? I know I am so reckoned. But if it is so, I am surely not the highest. For there is no thing among men either harder or greater, or which requires more helps of learning.

Sed hoc si in iure civili, si etiam in parvis aut mediocribus rebus doctiores adsequi possunt, non idem sentio tanta hac in re tamque immensa posse fieri; sin autem qui arbitrantur, deducendi sunt ad eos, qui haec docent; omnia iam explicata et perpolita adsequentur; sunt enim innumerabiles de his rebus libri neque abditi neque obscuri: sed videant quid velint; ad ludendumne an ad pugnandum arma sint sumpturi; aliud enim pugna et acies, aliud ludus campusque noster desiderat; ac tamen ars ipsa ludicra armorum et gladiatori et militi prodest aliquid; sed animus acer et praesens et acutus idem atque versutus invictos viros efficit non difficilius arte coniuncta.

And yet, since we must argue about the orator, I must speak about the highest orator. For the force and nature of the matter cannot be understood, of what kind and how great it is, unless the perfect is set before the eyes. As for me, Catulus, I confess that I do not now live in those books and with those men, nor indeed (which you rightly remember) ever had any time set apart for learning, nor have given to learning so much time as my boyish age and forensic holidays have allowed me.

Qua re ego tibi oratorem sic iam instituam, si potuero, ut quid efficere possit ante perspiciam: sit enim mihi tinctus litteris; audierit aliquid, legerit, ista ipsa praecepta acceperit; temptabo quid deceat, quid voce, quid viribus, quid spiritu, quid lingua efficere possit. Si intellegam posse ad summos pervenire, non solum hortabor, ut elaboret, sed etiam, si vir quoque bonus mihi videbitur esse, obsecrabo; tantum ego in excellenti oratore et eodem bono viro pono esse ornamenti universae civitati; sin videbitur, cum omnia summe fecerit, tamen ad mediocris oratores esse venturus, permittam ipsi quid velit; molestus magno opere non ero; sin plane abhorrebit et erit absurdus, ut se contineat aut ad aliud studium transferat, admonebo;

And, if you ask, Catulus, what I think of that learning of yours: I think there is need of so much time not to a talented man, who has the Forum, the curia, cases, the commonwealth before him, as those have taken on themselves to whom learning has lasted to the end of life. For all arts are handled differently by those who transfer them to use, differently by those who, delighted with the handling of the arts themselves, are about to do nothing else in life. The Samnite gladiator-master here is now in extreme old age and is exercising daily, for he cares for nothing else; but Q. Velocius as a boy had learned a little, but, because he was apt for it and had wholly mastered it, was, as is said in Lucilius, “Although a good Samnite himself in the school and with the wooden swords, severe enough to anyone”; but he gave more pains to the Forum, to friends, to private affairs. Valerius sang every day, for he was an actor: what else could he do?

nam neque is, qui optime potest, deserendus ullo modo est a cohortatione nostra neque is, qui aliquid potest, deterrendus: quod alterum divinitatis mihi cuiusdam videtur, alterum, vel non facere quod non optime possis, vel facere quod non pessime facias, humanitatis, tertium vero illud, clamare contra quam deceat et quam possit, hominis est, ut tu, Catule, de quodam clamatore dixisti, stultitiae suae quam plurimos testis domestico praeconio conligentis.

But our friend Numerius Furius sings when it is convenient, for he is a head of household, a Roman knight; as a boy he learned what was to be learned. The same rationale is in these greatest arts. Day and night we used to see Q. Tubero, a man of the highest virtue and prudence, when he was giving pains to philosophy. But his uncle Africanus you would scarcely understand to be doing this, although he was doing it. These things are easily learned if you both take so much as is needed, and have one who can teach faithfully, and yourself know how to learn;

De hoc igitur, qui erit talis, ut cohortandus adiuvandusque sit, ita loquamur, ut ei tradamus ea dumtaxat, quae nos usus docuit, ut nobis ducibus veniat eo, quo sine duce ipsi pervenimus, quoniam meliora docere non possumus.

but if you wish to do nothing else in your whole life, the very handling and inquiry produces something out of itself daily, that you may track it down with idle delight. So it happens that the stirring of subjects is unbounded, the knowledge easy, if practice confirms the learning, moderate effort is given, memory and zeal remain. But it is always pleasant to learn — as if I should wish to play knucklebones excellently, or be held by zeal for the ball — even, perhaps, if I cannot attain it. But others, because they do brilliantly, are more vehemently than the case requires delighted, as Titius with the ball, Brulla with the knucklebones.

Atque ut a familiari nostro exordiar, hunc ego, Catule, Sulpicium primum in causa parvula adulescentulum audivi voce et forma et motu corporis et reliquis rebus aptis ad hoc munus, de quo quaerimus, oratione autem celeri et concitata, quod erat ingeni, et verbis effervescentibus et paulo nimium redundantibus, quod erat aetatis. Non sum aspernatus; volo enim se efferat in adulescente fecunditas; nam facilius sicut in vitibus revocantur ea, quae se nimium profuderunt, quam, si nihil valet materies, nova sarmenta cultura excitantur; item volo esse in adulescente, unde aliquid amputem; non enim potest in eo sucus esse diuturnus, quod nimis celeriter est maturitatem exsecutum.

Therefore there is no reason why anyone should fear the magnitude of the arts because old men learn them. For either old men have approached them, or are detained in those studies right up to old age, or are most slow. The matter, in my view, is thus: that, unless what each could learn quickly, he could never altogether master.”

Vidi statim indolem neque dimisi tempus et eum sum cohortatus, ut forum sibi ludum putaret esse ad discendum, magistrum autem, quem vellet, eligeret; me quidem si audiret, L. Crassum: quod iste adripuit et ita sese facturum confirmavit atque etiam addidit, gratiae scilicet causa, me quoque sibi magistrum futurum. Vix annus intercesserat ab hoc sermone cohortationis meae, cum iste accusavit C. Norbanum, defendente me: non est credibile quid interesse mihi sit visum inter eum, qui tum erat et qui anno ante fuerat. Omnino in illud genus eum Crassi magnificum atque praeclarum natura ipsa ducebat, sed ea non satis proficere potuisset, nisi eodem studio atque imitatione intendisset atque ita dicere consuesset, ut tota mente Crassum atque omni animo intueretur.

“Now, now,” said Catulus, “Crassus, I understand what you say. And by Hercules I agree. I see well enough that for you, a man most keen at mastering, there has been time enough for learning those things you say.” “Do you persist,” said Crassus, “in thinking that what I say I am saying about myself, not about the matter? But now, if it pleases, let us return to our institutes.” “It does please me,” said Catulus.

Ergo hoc sit primum in praeceptis meis, ut demonstremus, quem imitetur atque ita, ut, quae maxime excellent in eo, quem imitabitur, ea diligentissime persequatur; tum accedat exercitatio, qua illum, quem delegerit, imitando effingat atque exprimat, non ut multos imitatores saepe cognovi, qui aut ea, quae facilia sunt, aut etiam illa, quae insignia ac paene vitiosa, consectantur imitando.

Then Crassus: “Whither, then, does this so long and so deeply drawn-out discourse look? These two parts which remain to me, of illustrating the speech and of crowning the whole eloquence — of which one demands ornate speaking, the other apt — have this force: that the speech be as pleasing as possible, that it flow into the senses of those who hear as much as possible, and that it be furnished with as many things as possible.

Nihil est facilius, quam amictum imitari alicuius aut statum aut motum; si vero etiam vitiosi aliquid est, id sumere et in eo vitio similem esse non magnum est, ut ille, qui nunc etiam, amissa voce, furit in re publica, Fufius, nervos in dicendo C. Fimbriae, quos tamen habuit ille, non adsequitur, oris pravitatem et verborum latitudinem imitatur; sed tamen ille nec deligere scivit, cuius potissimum similis esset, et in eo ipso, quem delegerat, imitari etiam vitia voluit;

But this forensic equipment, litigious, keen, drawn from the opinions of the common people, is small and quite mendicant. That itself, again, which those hand down who profess themselves teachers of speaking, is not much greater than that vulgar and forensic stock. We need furnishing and exquisite matters gathered, sought, and brought together from every side — as it is for you to do, Caesar, next year; as I laboured in my aedileship, because I did not think I could satisfy this people with everyday and homespun matters.

qui autem ita faciet, ut oportet, primum vigilet necesse est in deligendo; deinde, quem probarit, in eo, quae maxime excellent, ea diligentissime persequatur. Quid enim causae censetis esse cur aetates extulerint singulae singula prope genera dicendi? Quod non tam facile in nostris oratoribus possumus iudicare, quia scripta, ex quibus iudicium fieri posset, non multa sane reliquerunt, quam in Graecis, ex quorum scriptis, cuiusque aetatis quae dicendi ratio voluntasque fuerit, intellegi potest.

The rationale of choosing and arranging and concluding words, or even — without rationale — practice itself, is easy. Of matters there is a great wood. Since the Greeks no longer hold this, and on that account our youth nearly unlearns by learning, even Latins (so it pleases the gods) in this two-year stretch have arisen as teachers of speaking. Whom I, as censor, removed by my edict — not because, as some, I am told, said, I should not wish the talents of the youth to be sharpened, but on the contrary, I should not wish their talents to be dulled, their shamelessness strengthened.

Antiquissimi fere sunt, quorum quidem scripta constent, Pericles atque Alcibiades et eadem aetate Thucydides, subtiles, acuti, breves, sententiisque magis quam verbis abundantes: non potuisset accidere, ut unum genus esset omnium, nisi aliquem sibi proponerent ad imitandum. Consecuti sunt hos Critias, Theramenes, Lysias: multa Lysiae scripta sunt; non nulla Critiae; de Theramene audimus; omnes etiam tum retinebant illum Pericli sucum, sed erant paulo uberiore filo.

For I saw that, among the Greeks, of whatever kind they were, there was, beyond this exercise of the tongue, some kind of doctrine and science worthy of culture; but these new masters I understood could teach nothing save daring; which, even when joined with good things, is by itself greatly to be fled. Since this alone was being handed down, and since it was a school of impudence, I thought it was the censor’s part to look out lest it should creep further.

Ecce tibi est exortus Isocrates, magister istorum omnium, cuius e ludo tamquam ex equo Troiano meri principes exierunt; sed eorum partim in pompa, partim in acie inlustres esse voluerunt. Atque et illi, Theopompi, Ephori, Philisti, Naucratae multique alii naturis differunt, voluntate autem similes sunt et inter sese et magistri; et hi, qui se ad causas contulerunt, ut Demosthenes, Hyperides, Lycurgus, Aeschines, Dinarchus aliique complures, etsi inter se pares non fuerunt, tamen omnes sunt in eodem veritatis imitandae genere versati, quorum quam diu mansit imitatio, tam diu genus illud dicendi studiumque vixit;

Although I do not so lay down and decree these things as if I were despairing that those things on which we have argued can be handed down and polished in Latin. For both our tongue and the nature of things suffers that the ancient and outstanding prudence of the Greeks be transferred to our use and custom. But there is need of learned men, of whom thus far in our country there have been none in this kind. But if any shall ever stand forth, they will be set even before the Greeks.

postea quam exstinctis his omnis eorum memoria sensim obscurata est et evanuit, alia quaedam dicendi molliora ac remissiora genera viguerunt. Inde Demochares, quem aiunt sororis filium fuisse Demostheni; tum Phalereus ille Demetrius omnium istorum mea sententia politissimus, aliique horum similes exstiterunt. Quae si volemus usque ad hoc tempus persequi, intellegemus, ut hodie etiam Alabandensem illum Meneclem et eius fratrem Hieroclem, quos ego audivi, tota imitetur Asia, sic semper fuisse aliquem, cuius se similis plerique esse vellent.

Speech then is adorned first by kind and as it were by a certain colour and sap of its own. For that it be weighty, that it be pleasing, that it be learned, that it be liberal, that it be admirable, that it be polished, that it have feeling, that it have grief as much as is needed — that does not lie in single joints. These things are seen in the whole body. Then, that it be sprinkled, as it were, with flowers of words and thoughts — that ought not to be diffused evenly through the whole speech, but so distinguished that there should be, as in ornament, certain marks set out and lights.

Hanc igitur similitudinem qui imitatione adsequi volet, cum exercitationibus crebris atque magnis tum scribendo maxime persequatur; quod si haec noster Sulpicius faceret, multo eius oratio esset pressior; in qua nunc interdum, ut in herbis rustici solent dicere in summa ubertate, inest luxuries quaedam, quae stilo depascenda est.’

A kind of speaking, then, must be chosen which most holds those who hear, and which not only delights but delights without satiety. For I do not think it is now expected from me to warn that you should beware lest your speech be meagre, lest unkempt, lest vulgar, lest obsolete. Something else greater both your talents and your ages exhort me to.

Hic Sulpicius ’me quidem’ inquit ’recte mones, idque mihi gratum est; sed ne te quidem, Antoni, multum scriptitasse arbitror.’ Tum ille ’quasi vero’ inquit ’non ea praecipiam aliis, quae mihi ipsi desint: sed tamen ne tabulas quidem conficere existimor: verum et in hoc ex re familiari mea et in illo ex eo, quod dico, quantulum id cumque est, quid faciam iudicari potest.

For it is hard to say what cause there is why those things which most strike our senses with pleasure and most keenly stir us at first sight, we are most quickly turned away from in a kind of disgust and satiety. How much more flowery in beauty and variety of colours are most paintings new than old? Which yet, even if they have at first sight caught us, do not delight us long; whereas we are held by those very rude and obsolete features in old paintings. How much softer and more dainty in song are the inflexions and the false little notes than the fixed and severe? At which not only the austere, but, if they happen too often, the multitude itself cries out.

Atque esse tamen multos videmus, qui neminem imitentur et suapte natura, quod velint, sine cuiusquam similitudine consequantur; quod et in vobis animadverti recte potest, Caesar et Cotta; quorum alter inusitatum nostris quidem oratoribus leporem quendam et salem, alter acutissimum et subtilissimum dicendi genus est consecutus; neque vero vester aequalis C. Curio, patre mea sententia vel eloquentissimo temporibus illis, quemquam mihi magno opere videtur imitari; qui tamen verborum gravitate et elegantia et copia suam quandam expressit quasi formam figuramque dicendi; quod ego maxime iudicare potui in ea causa, quam ille contra me apud centumviros pro fratribus Cossis dixit; in qua nihil illi defuit, quod non modo copiosus, sed etiam sapiens orator habere deberet.

It is to be seen in the rest of the senses: that we are less long delighted by perfumes seasoned with the highest and keenest sweetness than by these moderate ones; and what seems to smell of earth is more praised than what seems to smell of saffron. In touch itself there is a measure both of softness and of smoothness. Even taste, which is the most pleasure-loving of all the senses, and which is moved by sweetness above the other senses, how quickly does it scorn and reject what is very sweet! Who can drink or eat what is sweet for long? — when in each kind those things which lightly move the sense with pleasure most easily flee satiety.

Verum ut aliquando ad causas deducamus illum, quem constituimus, et eas quidem, in quibus plusculum negoti est, iudiciorum atque litium—riserit aliquis fortasse hoc praeceptum; est enim non tam acutum quam necessarium magisque monitoris non fatui quam eruditi magistri—hoc ei primum praecipiemus, quascumque causas erit tractaturus, ut eas diligenter penitusque cognoscat.

So in all things disgust is the neighbour of the greatest pleasures. Wherefore we should the less wonder at this in speech, in which we can judge from poets or from orators that whatever poetry or speech be neat, distinguished, ornate, festive, without intermission, without reproach, without variety, even painted with bright colours, cannot be lasting in delight. And we are the more quickly offended by the orator’s or the poet’s curls and rouge, because the senses by nature, not by mind, are sated in too much pleasure. In writings and in sayings the painted faults are known not only by the ears but, even more, by the judgment of the soul.

Hoc in ludo non praecipitur; faciles enim causae ad pueros deferuntur; lex peregrinum vetat in murum ascendere; ascendit; hostis reppulit: accusatur. Nihil est negoti eius modi causam cognoscere; recte igitur nihil de causa discenda praecipiunt; haec est enim in ludo causarum formula fere. At vero in foro tabulae testimonia, pacta conventa stipulationes, cognationes adfinitates, decreta responsa, vita denique eorum, qui in causa versantur, tota cognoscenda est; quarum rerum neglegentia plerasque causas et maxime privatas—sunt

Therefore though to us “well and brilliantly” be often said, “prettily and gaily” I will not have too often said. Although that very exclamation, “It cannot be better,” I would have frequent. But yet let that admiration and highest praise in speaking have some shadow and recess, that what is illumined may seem more to stand out and shine.

enim multo saepe obscuriores—videmus amitti. Ita non nulli, dum operam suam multam existimari volunt, ut toto foro volitare et a causa ad causam ire videantur, causas dicunt incognitas; in quo est illa quidem magna offensio vel neglegentiae, susceptis rebus, vel perfidiae, receptis; sed etiam illa maior opinione, quod nemo potest de ea re, quam non novit, non turpissime dicere: ita dum inertiae vituperationem, quae maior est, contemnunt, adsequuntur etiam illam, quam magis ipsi fugiunt, tarditatis.

Roscius never plays this verse with the gesture he can: “For the wise man seeks honour as the reward of virtue, not booty.” But he throws it off entirely, that in the next: “But what do I see? Hedged with steel, he holds the sacred seats” — he may push, may look, may admire, may stupefy. What of that other: “What guard shall I seek?” — how gently, how slackly, how unanimatedly! For there presses next: “O father, O country, O house of Priam!” — at which a delivery so great could not be moved, if it had been used up by the previous motion and exhausted. Nor did the actors see this before the poets themselves, and finally those too who composed the music; from each of which something is lowered, then increased, thinned, swelled, varied, distinguished.

Equidem soleo dare operam, ut de sua quisque re me ipse doceat et ut ne quis alius adsit, quo liberius loquatur, et agere adversari causam, ut ille agat suam et quicquid de sua re cogitarit in medium proferat: itaque cum ille discessit, tris personas unus sustineo summa animi aequitate, meam, adversari, iudicis. Qui locus est talis, ut plus habeat adiumenti quam incommodi, hunc iudico esse dicendum; ubi plus mali quam boni reperio, id totum abiudico atque eicio.

So let our orator be ornate and pleasing — nor indeed can he be otherwise — but in such a way that he has a sweetness austere and solid, not sweet and over-cooked. For the precepts that are given for ornament are of such a kind that anyone, even the most faulty orator, can set them out. Therefore, as I said before, first the wood of matters and thoughts must be gathered, of which Antonius spoke. These must be shaped by the very thread and kind of speech, illustrated by words, varied by thoughts.

Ita adsequor, ut alio tempore cogitem quid dicam et alio dicam; quae duo plerique ingenio freti simul faciunt; sed certe eidem illi melius aliquanto dicerent, si aliud sumendum sibi tempus ad cogitandum, aliud ad dicendum putarent.

The highest praise of eloquence is to amplify a matter by ornament, which avails not only for raising something and lifting it up higher by speech, but also for thinning and casting it down. This is required in all those topics which Antonius said are applied for producing the credit of speech, either when we explain anything, or when we conciliate minds, or when we rouse them.

Cum rem penitus causamque cognovi, statim occurrit animo, quae sit causa ambigendi; nihil est enim, quod inter homines ambigatur, sive ex crimine causa constat, ut facinoris, sive ex controversia, ut hereditatis, sive ex deliberatione, ut belli, sive ex persona, ut laudis, sive ex disputatione, ut de ratione vivendi, in quo non aut quid factum sit aut fiat futurumve sit quaeratur aut quale sit aut quid vocetur.

But in this last thing I have spoken of, amplification can do the most, and that is the one praise of the orator, and especially proper. Even greater is that exercise which Antonius placed in the closing speech and at first rejected — of praising and blaming. For nothing is more apt for exaggerating and amplifying speech than to be able to do each of these in the fullest way.

Ac nostrae fere causae, quae quidem sunt criminum, plerumque infitiatione defenduntur; nam et de pecuniis repetundis quae maximae sunt, neganda fere sunt omnia, et de ambitu raro illud datur, ut possis liberalitatem atque benignitatem ab ambitu atque largitione seiungere; de sicariis, de veneficiis, de peculatu infitiari necesse est: id est igitur genus primum causarum in iudiciis ex controversia facti; in deliberationibus plerumque ex futuri, raro ex instantis aut acti.

There follow also those topics which, although they ought to be proper to cases and clinging in their sinews, yet, because they are wont to be handled about the universal matter, were called by the ancients common — of which some have a kind of keen accusation or complaint of vices and faults with amplification, against which nothing is wont to be said and nothing can be: as against an embezzler, against a traitor, against a parricide. These should be used when the charges have been confirmed; otherwise they are dry and empty;

Saepe etiam res non sit necne, sed qualis sit quaeritur; ut cum L. Opimi causam defendebat apud populum, audiente me, C. Carbo consul, nihil de C. Gracchi nece negabat, sed id iure pro salute patriae factum esse dicebat; ut eidem Carboni tribuno plebis alia tum mente rem publicam capessenti P. Africanus de Ti. Graccho interroganti responderat iure caesum videri; iure autem omnia defenduntur, quae sunt eius generis, ut aut oportuerit aut licuerit aut necesse fuerit aut imprudentia aut casu facta esse videantur.

others have entreaty or pity; others, indeed, two-sided disputations, in which copiously on both sides the universal kind may be argued. This exercise, now thought to be proper to those two philosophies of which I spoke before, was among the ancients of those from whom the whole rationale and abundance of speaking on forensic matters was sought. For of virtue, of duty, of right and good, of dignity, utility, honour, disgrace, reward, punishment, and like matters, we ought to have both force and art for speaking on each side.

Iam quid vocetur, quaeritur, cum quo verbo quid appellandum sit, contenditur; ut mihi ipsi cum hoc Sulpicio fuit in Norbani causa summa contentio; pleraque enim de eis, quae ab isto obiciebantur, cum confiterer, tamen ab illo maiestatem minutam negabam, ex quo verbo lege Appuleia tota illa causa pendebat.

But since we have been driven from our possession and left in a small and litigious little farm, and we, advocates of others, could not hold and protect our own, from those who have broken into our patrimony — what is most unworthy — let us borrow what we need.

Atque in hoc genere causarum non nulli praecipiunt ut verbum illud, quod causam facit, breviter uterque definiat, quod mihi quidem perquam puerile videri solet: alia est enim, cum inter doctos homines de eis ipsis rebus, quae versantur in artibus, disputatur, verborum definitio, ut cum quaeritur, quid sit ars, quid sit lex, quid sit civitas, in quibus hoc praecipit ratio et doctrina, ut vis eius rei, quam definias, sic exprimatur, ut neque absit quicquam neque supersit;

Those, then, who now indeed take their name from a small portion of the city and place — and are called Peripatetic or Academic philosophers — but in old time, by reason of their outstanding knowledge of the greatest things, were called by the Greeks “political” philosophers, by the name of the universal commonwealth — say that all civic speech moves in one of two kinds of these: either of a definite controversy in fixed times and parties (in this way: “Should our captives be received back from the Carthaginians by returning theirs?”); or, of one who asks generally about the universal kind: “What altogether ought to be decreed and felt about a captive?” The earlier of these two kinds they call cause or controversy; and they define it by three: suit, deliberation, or laudation. The other, however, is called an unbounded question and as it were a consultation put forward.

quod quidem in illa causa neque Sulpicius fecit neque ego facere conatus sum; nam quantum uterque nostrum potuit, omni copia dicendi dilatavit, quid esset maiestatem minuere: etenim definitio primum reprehenso verbo uno aut addito aut dempto saepe extorquetur e manibus; deinde genere ipso doctrinam redolet exercitationemque paene puerilem: tum et in sensum et in mentem iudicis intrare non potest, ante enim praeterlabitur, quam percepta est.

And they so far speak, and use this division too in setting things up. But in such a way that they recover their lost possession not by right or by judgment, but, finally, by force; and that, not by civil law, but by breaking off a twig of the property, they seem to take possession by usage. For that other kind, which is defined by times, places, parties, they hold; and that itself only by a fringe — for now with Philo, who I hear is most flourishing in the Academy, the inquiry into and exercise of these very cases is being celebrated. The other only they name in the first handing-down of the art and say it is the orator’s. But neither do they set out the force or the nature of it, nor its parts, nor its kinds; so that it had been better passed by altogether than to have been touched and abandoned. For now they are understood to be silent through poverty; then they would have seemed silent through judgment.

Sed in eo genere, in quo quale sit quid, ambigitur, exsistit etiam ex scripti interpretatione saepe contentio, in quo nulla potest esse nisi ex ambiguo controversia; nam illud ipsum, quod scriptum a sententia discrepat, genus quoddam habet ambigui; quod tum explicatur, cum ea verba, quae desunt, suggesta sunt, quibus additis defenditur sententiam scripti perspicuam fuisse; ex contrariisque scriptis si quid ambigitur, non novum genus nascitur, sed superioris generis causa duplicatur; idque aut numquam diiudicari poterit aut ita diiudicabitur, ut referendis praeteritis verbis id scriptum, quodcumque defendemus, suppleatur; ita fit, ut unum genus in eis causis, quae propter scriptum ambiguntur, relinquatur, si est scriptum aliquid ambigue.

Every matter, therefore, has the same nature of being doubted, on which question and dispute can be made — whether it be argued in unbounded consultations, or in those cases which move in the state and forensic dispute. Nor is there any which is not referred to either the force and rationale of knowing or of doing.

Ambiguorum autem cum plura genera sunt, quae mihi videntur ei melius nosse, qui dialectici appellantur, hi autem nostri ignorare, qui non minus nosse debeant, tum illud est frequentissimum in omni consuetudine vel sermonis vel scripti, cum idcirco aliquid ambigitur, quod aut verbum aut verba sint praetermissa.

For either the very knowledge and science of a thing is sought, as “Is virtue to be desired for its own dignity, or for some fruit?” Or the counsel of doing is asked, as “Should the wise man take part in the commonwealth?”

Iterum autem peccant, cum genus hoc causarum, quod in scripti interpretatione versatur, ab illis causis, in quibus, qualis quaeque res sit, disceptatur, seiungunt; nusquam enim tam quaeritur, quale sit genus ipsum rei quam in scripto, quod totum a facti controversia separatum est.

There are three modes of knowing: conjecture, definition, and (so to say) consequence. For what is in a thing is asked by conjecture, as “Is there wisdom in the human race?” What force each thing has, definition sets out, as if it be asked, “What is wisdom?” Consequence is handled when it is asked what follows from each thing, as “Is it sometimes the part of a good man to lie?”

Ita tria sunt omnino genera, quae in disceptationem et controversiam cadere possint: quid fiat factum futurumve sit, aut quale sit, aut quo modo nominetur; nam illud quidem, quod quidam Graeci adiungunt, "rectene factum sit," totum in eo est "quale sit." Sed iam ad institutum revertar meum.

They come back again to conjecture and divide it into four kinds. For either it is asked what something is, in this way: “Is right by nature among men, or in opinions?” Or what is the origin of each thing, as “What is the beginning of laws or of commonwealths?” Or the cause and reason, as if it should be asked, “Why do most learned men disagree on the greatest matters?” Or about a change, as if it should be argued, “Whether virtue can perish in a man, or be turned to vice.”

Cum igitur accepta causa et genere cognito rem tractare coepi, nihil prius constituo, quam quid sit illud, quo mihi sit referenda omnis illa oratio, quae sit propria quaestionis et iudici; deinde illa duo diligentissime considero, quorum alterum commendationem habet nostram aut eorum, quos defendimus, alterum est accommodatum ad eorum animos, apud quos dicimus, ad id, quod volumus, commovendos.

The disputes of definition are either when it is asked what is impressed, as it were, in the common mind, as if it should be argued: “Is that the right which is useful to the greatest part?” Or when it is asked what is each thing’s own, as: “Is to speak ornately the orator’s own, or can someone besides do it?” Or when the matter is distributed into parts, as if it should be asked, “How many kinds are there of things to be sought? Are there three: of the body, of the soul, of external things?” Or when the form and as it were the natural mark of each thing is described, as if there be sought the kinds of the avaricious, the seditious, the boastful.

Ita omnis ratio dicendi tribus ad persuadendum rebus est nixa: ut probemus vera esse, quae defendimus; ut conciliemus eos nobis, qui audiunt; ut animos eorum, ad quemcumque causa postulabit motum, vocemus.

Two first kinds of questions of consequence are laid down. For either the dispute is simple, as if it be argued whether glory is to be sought; or from comparison, “Is praise or wealth more to be sought?” Of the simple, there are three modes: about things to be sought or fled, as “Are honours to be sought, or poverty to be fled?”; about the just or unjust, as “Is it just to revenge wrongs even against kinsfolk?”; about the honourable or base, as: “Is it honourable to die for glory?”

Ad probandum autem duplex est oratori subiecta materies: una rerum earum, quae non excogitantur ab oratore, sed in re positae ratione tractantur, ut tabulae, testimonia, pacta conventa, quaestiones, leges, senatus consulta, res iudicatae, decreta, responsa, reliqua, si quae sunt, quae non reperiuntur ab oratore, sed ad oratorem a causa atque a re deferuntur; altera est, quae tota in disputatione et in argumentatione oratoris conlocata est;

Of comparison there are two modes. One when it is asked whether something is the same or has some difference: as to fear and to revere, as a king and a tyrant, as a flatterer and a friend. The other when it is asked what is preferable to what, as: “Are wise men led by the praise of each best man, or by popular praise?” These disputes which are referred to knowledge are about thus described by the most learned men.

ita in superiore genere de tractandis argumentis, in hoc autem etiam de inveniendis cogitandum est. Atque isti quidem, qui docent, cum causas in plura genera secuerunt, singulis generibus argumentorum copiam suggerunt; quod etiam si ad instituendos adulescentulos magis aptum est, ut, simul ac posita causa sit, habeant quo se referant, unde statim expedita possint argumenta depromere, tamen et tardi ingeni est rivulos consectari, fontis rerum non videre, et iam aetatis est ususque nostri a capite quod velimus arcessere et unde omnia manent videre.

Those, however, which are referred to action, either move in the dispute of duty (in which kind it is asked what is right and to be done, under which topic the whole wood of virtues and vices is set); or are handled in some movement of soul to be either produced or calmed or removed. To this kind are subjected exhortations, rebukes, consolations, pity, and every impulsion to every motion of soul, and, if the case so bear, mitigation.

Et primum genus illud earum rerum, quae ad oratorem deferuntur, meditatum nobis in perpetuum ad omnem usum similium rerum esse debebit; nam et pro tabulis et contra tabulas et pro testibus et contra testis et pro quaestionibus et contra quaestiones et item de ceteris rebus eiusdem generis vel separatim dicere solemus de genere universo vel definite de singulis temporibus, hominibus, causis; quos quidem locos—vobis hoc, Cotta et Sulpici, dico—multa commentatione atque meditatione paratos atque expeditos habere debetis.

These kinds and modes of all disputes being set out, it is nothing to the purpose if in any matter our partition has differed from Antonius’s division: the same members are in each one’s discussion, but parted and assigned a little differently by me and by him. Now I shall move on to the rest, and call myself back to my own task and weight. For from those topics which Antonius set out, all arguments are to be taken for each kind of question. But to one kind one topic will be more apt than another. About which it is unnecessary to say anything, not so much because it is long as because it is plain.

Longum est enim nunc me explicare, qua ratione aut confirmare aut infirmare testis, tabulas, quaestiones oporteat. Haec sunt omnia ingeni vel mediocris, exercitationis autem maximae; artem quidem et praecepta dumtaxat hactenus requirunt, ut certis dicendi luminibus ornentur.

The most ornate, then, are those speeches which range most widely and bring and turn themselves from a private and singular controversy to setting out the force of the universal kind, so that those who hear, with the nature, kind, and universal matter known, may decide about the single parties, charges, and suits.

Itemque illa, quae sunt alterius generis, quae tota ab oratore pariuntur, excogitationem non habent difficilem, explicationem magis inlustrem perpolitamque desiderant; itaque cum haec duo nobis quaerenda sint in causis, primum quid, deinde quo modo dicamus, alterum, quod totum arte tinctum videtur, tametsi artem requirit, tamen prudentiae est paene mediocris quid dicendum sit videre; alterum est, in quo oratoris vis illa divina virtusque cernitur, ea, quae dicenda sunt, ornate, copiose varieque dicere.

Antonius has exhorted you, young men, to this practice of exercise, and thought that you should be drawn from minute and narrow contests to the whole force and variety of arguing. Therefore this duty is not of a few little books, as those think who have written about the rationale of speaking; nor of the Tusculan villa or this morning walk or our after-noon sitting. For not only must our tongue be sharpened and forged, but the breast must be loaded and filled with the sweetness, abundance, and variety of the greatest and most numerous matters.

Qua re illam partem superiorem, quoniam semel ita vobis placuit, non recusabo quo minus perpoliam atque conficiam—quantum consequar, vos iudicabitis—quibus ex locis ad eas tris res, quae ad fidem faciendam solae valent, ducatur oratio, ut et concilientur animi et doceantur et moveantur; haec sunt enim tria. Ea vero quem ad modum inlustrentur, praesto est, qui omnis docere possit, qui hoc primus in nostros mores induxit, qui maxime auxit, qui solus effecit.

For ours — if indeed we are orators, if in the disputes of citizens, if in dangers, if in public deliberations we are to be applied as authors and chiefs — ours, I say, is all that possession of prudence and learning, into which men, abounding in leisure while we are busy, have leapt as upon something fallen and empty; and either, mocking the orator (as Socrates does in the Gorgias), they bandy words; or they teach in a few books some of the orator’s art and entitle them rhetorical, as if those things were not the rhetoricians’ own which are said by them on justice, on duty, on instituting and governing states, on every rationale of living, and indeed of nature.

Namque ego, Catule,—dicam enim non reverens adsentandi suspicionem—neminem esse oratorem paulo inlustriorem arbitror neque Graecum neque Latinum quem aetas nostra tulerit, quem non et saepe et diligenter audierim; itaque si quid est in me—quod iam sperare videor, quoniam quidem vos, his ingeniis homines, tantum operae mihi ad audiendum datis—ex eo est, quod nihil quisquam umquam me audiente egit orator, quod non in memoria mea penitus insederit: itaque ego is, qui sum, quantuscumque sum ad iudicandum, omnibus auditis oratoribus, sine ulla dubitatione sic statuo et iudico, neminem omnium tot et tanta, quanta sint in Crasso, habuisse ornamenta dicendi.

Which since we cannot now from elsewhere — they must be taken by us from those very men by whom we have been despoiled. Provided we transfer those things to this civil science to which they pertain and at which they look; and provided, as I said before, we do not waste our whole life in learning these matters. But when we have seen the springs (which, unless one quickly come to know, he will never come to know at all), then, as often as need shall be, from them we shall draw as much as the matter shall require.

Quam ob rem, si vos quoque hoc idem existimatis, non erit, ut opinor, iniqua partitio, si, cum ego hunc oratorem, quem nunc fingo, ut institui, crearo, aluero, confirmaro, tradam eum Crasso et vestiendum et ornandum.’

For there is not so keen an edge in the natures and talents of men that anyone could see such great matters unless they have been pointed out; nor yet is there so great obscurity in matters that a man of keen talent cannot deeply discern them, if only he has looked. In this so vast, so unbounded a field, when the orator may freely range, and wherever he has stood, stand on his own ground, all the equipment and ornament of speaking easily abounds.

Tum Crassus, ’tu vero,’ inquit ’Antoni, perge, ut instituisti; neque enim est boni neque liberalis parentis, quem procrearis et eduxeris, eum non et vestire et ornare, praesertim cum te locupletem esse negare non possis. Quod enim ornamentum, quae vis, qui animus, quae dignitas illi oratori defuit, qui in causa peroranda non dubitavit excitare reum consularem et eius diloricare tunicam et iudicibus cicatrices adversas senis imperatoris ostendere? qui idem, hoc accusante Sulpicio, cum hominem seditiosum furiosumque defenderet, non dubitavit seditiones ipsas ornare ac demonstrare gravissimis verbis multos saepe impetus populi non iniustos esse, quos praestare nemo posset; multas etiam e re publica seditiones saepe esse factas, ut cum reges essent exacti, ut cum tribunicia potestas esset constituta; illam Norbani seditionem ex luctu civium et ex Caepionis odio, qui exercitum amiserat, neque reprimi potuisse et iure esse conflatam?

For the abundance of matters begets the abundance of words; and if there is honour in the very things spoken about, there arises out of the matter a kind of natural splendour in words. Let only him who shall speak or write be liberally trained by his early education and learning, and burn with zeal and be helped by nature, and be exercised in unbounded disputations of universal kinds, and have chosen the most ornate writers and orators for knowing and imitating — he will surely not need those teachers to know how to construct and illumine words. So easily, in the abundance of matters, does nature itself, if only it has been exercised, slip without a guide to the ornaments of speech.”

Potuit hic locus tam anceps, tam inauditus, tam lubricus, tam novus sine quadam incredibili vi ac facultate dicendi tractari? Quid ego de Cn. Manli, quid de Q. Regis commiseratione dicam? Quid de aliis innumerabilibus? In quibus hoc non maxime enituit quod tibi omnes dant, acumen quoddam singulare, sed haec ipsa, quae nunc ad me delegare vis, ea semper in te eximia et praestantia fuerunt.’

Here Catulus: “Immortal gods,” he said, “Crassus, what variety of matters, what force, what abundance you have grasped, and out of what straits have you dared to lead the orator and to set him in the kingdom of his ancestors! For we have heard that those ancient teachers and authors of speaking thought no kind of disputation alien from themselves, and were always engaged in every rationale of speech.

Tum Catulus ’ego vero’ inquit ’in vobis hoc maxime admirari soleo, quod, cum inter vos in dicendo dissimillimi sitis, ita tamen uterque vestrum dicat, ut ei nihil neque a natura denegatum neque a doctrina non delatum esse videatur; qua re, Crasse, neque tu tua suavitate nos privabis, ut, si quid ab Antonio aut praetermissum aut relictum sit, non explices; neque te, Antoni, si quid non dixeris, existimabimus non potuisse potius quam a Crasso dici maluisse.’

Of whom Hippias of Elis, when he had come to Olympia at that great five-yearly celebration of the games, boasted, almost with all Greece listening, that there was nothing in any art of all things that he himself did not know — and that not only did he hold those arts which contain the liberal and free-born doctrines, geometry, music, the knowledge of letters and poets, and what is said of the natures of things, of the morals of men, of commonwealths — but also that he had made by his own hand the ring he had on, the cloak he was clothed with, the slippers he had put on.

Hic Crassus ’quin tu,’ inquit ’Antoni, omittis ista, quae proposuisti, quae nemo horum desiderat: quibus ex locis ea, quae dicenda sunt in causis, reperiantur; quae quamquam a te novo quodam modo praeclareque dicuntur, sunt tamen et re faciliora et praeceptis pervagata; illa deprome nobis unde adferas, quae saepissime tractas semperque divinitus.’

Of course this man went too far. But from him is easy conjecture how much those orators sought for themselves of the most distinguished arts — when they did not even shrink from baser ones. What shall I say of Prodicus of Ceos, Thrasymachus of Chalcedon, Protagoras of Abdera? Of whom each one, as much as in those times was possible, both argued and wrote about the nature of things.

’Depromam equidem,’ inquit ’et quo facilius id a te exigam, quod peto, nihil tibi a me postulanti recusabo. Meae totius rationis in dicendo et istius ipsius facultatis, quam modo Crassus in caelum verbis extulit, tres sunt res, ut ante dixi: una conciliandorum hominum, altera docendorum, tertia concitandorum.

That very Gorgias of Leontini, with whom as patron, as Plato wished, the orator yielded to the philosopher — who either was never overcome by Socrates and that conversation of Plato is not true, or, if he was overcome, then surely Socrates was more eloquent and skilled and (as you call him) more copious and a better orator. But this man, in that very book of Plato, professes that he will speak most copiously of every matter, whatever may be called into dispute and question. He first of all dared, in the assembly, to demand on what each wished to hear; to whom such honour was given by Greece, that for him alone of all there was set up at Delphi a statue not gilded but golden.

Harum trium partium prima lenitatem orationis, secunda acumen, tertia vim desiderat; nam hoc necesse est, ut is, qui nobis causam adiudicaturus sit, aut inclinatione voluntatis propendeat in nos aut defensionis argumentis adducatur aut animi permotione cogatur. Sed quoniam illa pars, in qua rerum ipsarum explicatio ac defensio posita est, videtur omnem huius generis quasi doctrinam continere, de ea primum loquemur et pauca dicemus: pauca enim sunt, quae usu iam tractata et animo quasi notata habere videamur.

But these whom I have named, and very many besides, the highest teachers of speaking, were at one time. From whom it can be understood that the matter is, as you say, Crassus: that the name of orator among the ancients in Greece flourished with somewhat greater abundance and glory.

Ac tibi sapienter monenti, Crasse, libenter adsentiemur, ut singularum causarum defensiones quas solent magistri pueris tradere, relinquamus, aperiamus autem capita ea, unde omnis ad omnem et causam et orationem disputatio ducitur. Neque enim quotiens verbum aliquod est scribendum nobis, totiens eius verbi litterae sunt cogitatione conquirendae; nec quotiens causa dicenda est, totiens ad eius causae seposita argumenta revolvi nos oportet, sed habere certos locos, qui, ut litterae ad verbum scribendum, sic illi ad causam explicandam statim occurrant.

Wherefore I doubt the more whether more praise should be assigned to you or more blame to the Greeks: that you, born in another tongue and other customs, in a most busy state, distracted either by the affairs of nearly all private men or by the management of the world and the steerage of the highest empire, have grasped so great a force and knowledge of matters, and have joined all of it with the science and exercise of him who avails by counsel and speech in the state — while they, born in letters and burning with these studies, but flowing in leisure, not only have acquired nothing, but have not even kept what was left and handed down and their own.”

Sed hi loci ei demum oratori prodesse possunt, qui est versatus in rerum vel usu, quem aetas denique adferet, vel auditione et cogitatione, quae studio et diligentia praecucurrit aetatem. Nam si tu mihi quamvis eruditum hominem adduxeris, quamvis acrem et acutum in cogitando, quamvis ad pronuntiandum expeditum, si erit idem in consuetudine civitatis, in exemplis, in institutis, in moribus ac voluntatibus civium suorum hospes, non multum ei loci proderunt illi, ex quibus argumenta promuntur: subacto mihi ingenio opus est, ut agro non semel arato, sed novato et iterato, quo meliores fetus possit et grandiores edere; subactio autem est usus, auditio, lectio, litterae.

Then Crassus: “Not in this matter alone, Catulus,” he said, “but in many others too, the magnitudes of the arts have been diminished by the distribution and separation of parts. Or do you suppose that, when that famous Hippocrates of Cos lived, there were then other doctors who healed diseases, others who healed wounds, others who healed eyes? Surely with Euclid or Archimedes, surely with Damon or Aristoxenus in music, surely with Aristophanes or Callimachus in letters, those things were not so torn apart that no one embraced the universal kind, and that one set apart for himself one part, another another, in which to labour?

Ac primum naturam causae videat, quae numquam latet, factumne sit quaeratur, an quale sit, an quod nomen habeat; quo perspecto statim occurrit naturali quadam prudentia, non his subductionibus, quas isti docent, quid faciat causam, id est, quo sublato controversia stare non possit; deinde quid veniat in iudicium: quod isti sic iubent quaerere: interfecit Opimius Gracchum. Quid facit causam? Quod rei publicae causa, cum ex senatus consulto ad arma vocasset. Hoc tolle, causa non erit. At id ipsum negat contra leges licuisse Decius. Veniet igitur in iudicium licueritne ex senatus consulto servandae rei publicae causa. Perspicua sunt haec quidem et in vulgari prudentia sita; sed illa quaerenda, quae et ab accusatore et a defensore argumenta ad id, quod in iudicium venit, spectantia debent adferri.

For my part, I have often heard this from my father and my father-in-law: that our men also, who wished to excel in glory of wisdom, were wont to embrace everything which our state then knew. They remembered Sextus Aelius; M.’ Manilius indeed we ourselves have seen walking across the Forum — which was a sign that he who did this offered to all his fellow-citizens the abundance of his counsel. To these, both as they walked and as they sat at home in their high seat, men used to come — not only that they might consult them about the civil law, but also about giving a daughter in marriage, about buying a farm, about cultivating a field, about every duty or business.

Atque hic illud videndum est, in quo summus est error istorum magistrorum, ad quos liberos nostros mittimus, non quo hoc quidem ad dicendum magno opere pertineat, sed tamen ut videatis, quale sit genus hoc eorum, qui sibi eruditi videntur. Hebes atque impolitum: constituunt enim in partiendis orationum modis duo genera causarum: unum appellant, in quo sine personis atque temporibus de universo genere quaeratur; alterum, quod personis certis et temporibus definiatur; ignari omnis controversias ad universi generis vim et naturam referri;

This was the wisdom of that old P. Crassus, of Tiberius Coruncanius, of my son-in-law’s great-grandfather Scipio (a most prudent man) — all of whom were Pontifex Maximus, that things divine and human might be referred to them. The same gave their counsel and faith in the senate, before the people, in the cases of friends, at home and on military service.

nam in ea ipsa causa, de qua ante dixi, nihil pertinet ad oratoris locos Opimi persona, nihil Deci; de ipso enim universo genere infinita quaestio est, num poena videatur esse adficiendus, qui civem ex senatus consulto patriae conservandae causa interemerit, cum id per leges non liceret; nulla denique est causa, in qua id, quod in iudicium venit, reorum personis ac non generum ipsorum universa dubitatione quaeratur.

For what was lacking to M. Cato besides this most polished doctrine from across the sea? Did he, because he had learned the civil law, not plead cases? Or, because he could plead, did he neglect the science of law? In each kind he both laboured and excelled. Did he, because of the favour gathered from private men’s affairs, become slower in undertaking public affairs? No one was braver before the people, no one a better senator; the same easily the best general; in short, nothing in this state in those times could be known or learned that he did not both investigate and know — and even write.

Quin etiam in eis ipsis, ubi de facto ambigitur, ceperitne pecunias contra leges P. Decius, argumenta et criminum et defensionis revocentur oportet ad genus et ad naturam universam: quod sumptuosus, de luxurie, quod alieni appetens, de avaritia, quod seditiosus, de turbulentis et malis civibus, quod a multis arguitur, de genere testium; contraque, quae pro reo dicentur, omnia necessario a tempore atque homine ad communis rerum et generum summas revolventur.

Now, on the contrary, most come naked and unarmed to the gaining of offices and to the conduct of public affairs, equipped with no knowledge of things, with no science. But if anyone excels above the rest, he flaunts himself if he brings one thing — either martial virtue or some military experience (which now indeed have grown obsolete); or the science of law, but not even of all of it (for the pontifical law, which is joined to it, no one learns); or eloquence, which they think is set in shouting and in the rush of words. The fellowship and kinship of all the good arts, indeed of the very virtues, they do not know.

Atque haec forsitan homini non omnia, quae sunt in natura rerum, celeriter animo comprehendenti permulta videantur, quae veniant in iudicium tum, cum de facto quaeratur; sed tamen criminum multitudo est et defensionum, non locorum infinita.

But to bring the speech back to the Greeks, whom in this kind of conversation we cannot do without (for as examples of virtue must be sought from ours, so of doctrine from them) — there are said to have been seven, at one time, who were both held and called wise. All these except Thales of Miletus presided over their states. Who is reported more learned in those same times than Pisistratus, or whose eloquence more equipped with letters? — who is said first to have so arranged Homer’s books, before confused, as we now have them. He, indeed, was not useful to his fellow-citizens, but yet so flourished in eloquence that he excelled in letters and learning.

Quae vero, cum de facto non ambigitur, quaeruntur, qualia sint, ea si ex reis numeres, et innumerabilia sunt et obscura; si ex rebus, valde et modica et inlustria; nam si Mancini causam in uno Mancino ponimus, quotienscumque is, quem pater patratus dediderit, receptus non erit, totiens causa nova nascetur; sin illa controversia causam facit, videaturne ei, quem pater patratus dediderit, si is non sit receptus, postliminium esse, nihil ad artem dicendi nec ad argumenta defensionis Mancini nomen pertinet;

What of Pericles? About whose force of speaking we have heard this: that, when he spoke against the will of the Athenians somewhat sternly for the safety of his country, yet that very thing which he said against the popular men seemed popular to all and pleasant. On whose lips the old comic poets — even when they spoke ill of him (which was then permitted at Athens) — said that charm dwelt; and so great a force was in him that, in the minds of those who had heard him, he left as it were certain stings. But him no declaimer had taught to bark by the water-clock, but, as we have heard, that famous Anaxagoras of Clazomenae, the highest man in the science of the greatest matters. So this man, outstanding in learning, counsel, eloquence, presided over Athens for forty years, both in city and in war affairs.

ac, si quid adfert praeterea hominis aut dignitas aut indignitas, extra quaestionem est et ea tamen ipsa oratio ad universi generis disputationem referatur necesse est. Haec ego non eo consilio disputo, ut homines eruditos redarguam; quamquam reprehendendi sunt qui in genere definiendo istas causas describunt in personis et in temporibus positas esse; nam etsi incurrunt tempora et personae, tamen intellegendum est, non ex eis, sed ex genere quaestionis pendere causas.

What of Critias? what of Alcibiades? Not, indeed, good men for their states, but surely learned and eloquent — were they not trained in Socratic disputations? Who polished Dion of Syracuse with all doctrines? Was it not Plato? And the same man drove him on, equipped him, armed him, not only as master of his tongue, but of his soul and virtue, to free his country. With other arts, then, did Plato train this Dion, with others did Isocrates train that most distinguished man Timotheus, son of Conon the most outstanding general — himself the highest general and a most learned man? Or with others did that famous Pythagorean Lysis train the Theban Epaminondas, who I do not know whether he was the single highest man of all Greece? Or Xenophon Agesilaus? Or Philolaus Archytas of Tarentum? Or Pythagoras himself that whole old Greece of Italy, which once was called Magna?

Sed hoc nihil ad me; nullum enim nobis certamen cum istis esse debet; tantum satis est intellegi ne hoc quidem eos consecutos, quod in tanto otio etiam sine hac forensi exercitatione efficere potuerunt, ut genera rerum discernerent eaque paulo subtilius explicarent.

I do not think so; for I see thus: that there was a single doctrine of all things which were worthy of a learned man, and of him who would excel in the commonwealth. Those who had received it, if they had been equally strong in talent for delivery and had given themselves also to speaking with no recoil of nature, excelled in eloquence.

Verum hoc, ut dixi, nihil ad me; illud ad me ac multo etiam magis ad vos, Cotta noster et Sulpici: quo modo nunc se istorum artes habent, pertimescenda est multitudo causarum; est enim infinita, si in personis ponitur; quot homines, tot causae; sin ad generum universas quaestiones referuntur, ita modicae et paucae sunt, ut eas omnis diligentes et memores et sobrii oratores percursas animo et prope dicam decantatas habere debeant; nisi forte existimatis a M’. Curio causam didicisse L. Crassum et ea re multa attulisse, quam ob rem postumo non nato Curium tamen heredem Coponi esse oporteret:

So Aristotle himself, when he saw Isocrates flourishing through the noble birth of his pupils — because he had transferred his disputations from forensic and civic causes to an empty elegance of speech — suddenly changed nearly the whole form of his discipline, and quoted, with a slight change, that verse of Philoctetes. For he says it is base to him to be silent when barbarians; but Aristotle, when Isocrates speaks. So he ornated and lit up that whole doctrine, and joined the knowledge of matters with the practice of speech. Nor did this escape the wisest king Philip, who summoned this man as teacher for his son Alexander, that from him he might receive both the precepts of doing and of speaking.

nihil ad copiam argumentorum neque ad causae vim ac naturam nomen Coponi aut Curi pertinuit; in genere erat universo rei negotique, non in tempore ac nominibus, omnis quaestio: cum scriptum ita sit si mihi filivs genitvr, isqve privs moritvr, et cetera, tvm mihi ille sit heres, si natus filius non sit, videaturne is, qui filio mortuo institutus heres sit, heres esse: perpetui iuris et universi generis quaestio non hominum nomina, sed rationem dicendi et argumentorum fontis desiderat.

Now whoever wishes — let him call by my leave a philosopher who hands down to us the abundance of matters and speech — by the name of orator. Or whether he prefer to call this orator (whom I say has wisdom joined to eloquence) a philosopher, I shall not hinder; provided this stand: that neither the speechlessness of him who knows the matter but cannot set it out by speaking, nor the ignorance of him to whom the matter is not at hand though words are not wanting, is to be praised. Of which, if one had to be wished, I should rather choose unspoken prudence than chattering folly. But if we ask what one excels of all, the palm must be given to the learned orator;

In quo etiam isti nos iuris consulti impediunt a discendoque deterrent; video enim in Catonis et in Bruti libris nominatim fere referri, quid alicui de iure viro aut mulieri responderit; credo, ut putaremus in hominibus, non in re consultationis aut dubitationis causam aliquam fuisse; ut, quod homines innumerabiles essent, debilitati a iure cognoscendo voluntatem discendi simul cum spe perdiscendi abiceremus. Sed haec Crassus aliquando nobis expediet et exponet discripta generatim; est enim, ne forte nescias, heri nobis ille hoc, Catule, pollicitus se ius civile, quod nunc diffusum et dissipatum esset, in certa genera coacturum et ad artem facilem redacturum.’

whom if they suffer to be the same as the philosopher, the controversy is removed. But if they part them, those will be the lower in this — that in the perfect orator there is all that science of theirs, while in the philosophers’ knowledge eloquence does not necessarily lie; which, although they despise it, must yet seem to bring some heap to their arts.” When Crassus had said this, he was silent for a little, and there was silence from the rest.

’Et quidem’ inquit Catulus ’haudquaquam id est difficile Crasso, qui et, quod disci potuit de iure, didicit et, quod eis, qui eum docuerunt, defuit, ipse adferet, ut, quae sint in iure, vel apte discribere vel ornate inlustrare possit.’ ’Ergo’ inquit ’ista’ Antonius ’tum a Crasso discemus, cum se de turba et a subselliis in otium, ut cogitat, soliumque contulerit.’

Then Cotta: “For my part, Crassus,” he said, “I cannot complain that you seem to me to have argued something else, which you had not undertaken; for you have brought somewhat more than was assigned to you and laid down by us. But surely those parts of yours were that you should speak about illustrating the speech, and you yourself had now begun, and had described all the praise of speech in four parts. When you had spoken about the first two enough, indeed (but, as you yourself said, swiftly and briefly), you had made two for yourself remaining: how we might first speak ornately, then aptly.

’Iam id quidem saepe’ inquit Catulus ’ex eo audivi, cum diceret sibi iam certum esse a iudiciis causisque discedere; sed, ut ipsi soleo dicere, non licebit; neque enim auxilium suum saepe a viris bonis frustra implorari patietur neque id aequo animo feret civitas, quae si voce L. Crassi carebit, ornamento quodam se spoliatam putabit.’ ’Nam hercle,’ inquit Antonius ’si haec vere a Catulo dicta sunt, tibi mecum in eodem est pistrino, Crasse, vivendum; et istam oscitantem et dormitantem sapientiam Scaevolarum et ceterorum beatorum otio concedamus.’

When you had entered on this, suddenly a kind of tide of your talent snatched you far from the land and carried you out into the deep, almost out of the sight of all. For you, having grasped the whole knowledge of things, did not indeed hand it down to us; for time was not so much. But what you have profited with these, I do not know. Me indeed you have driven wholly into the Academy. In which I should wish that to be true which you often laid down: that it is not necessary to use up one’s life, and that he can discern all those things who has only looked at them. But even if it is sometimes denser, or if I am slower, I shall surely never rest nor be wearied before I have grasped those two-headed paths and methods of arguing on either side and against everything.”

Adrisit hic Crassus leniter et ’pertexe modo,’ inquit ’Antoni, quod exorsus es; me tamen ista oscitans sapientia, simul atque ad eam confugero, in libertatem vindicabit.’ ’Huius quidem loci, quem modo sum exorsus, hic est finis,’ inquit Antonius; ’quoniam intellegeretur non in hominum innumerabilibus personis neque in infinita temporum varietate, sed in generum causis atque naturis omnia sita esse, quae in dubium vocarentur, genera autem esse definita non solum numero, sed etiam paucitate, ut eam materiem orationis, quae cuiusque esset generis, studiosi qui essent dicendi, omnibus locis discriptam, instructam ornatamque comprehenderent, rebus dico et sententiis.

Then Caesar: “One thing,” he said, “most has stirred me from your speech, Crassus: that you said that he who could not learn anything quickly could ever entirely master it. So that it is not difficult for me to make trial, and either at once to grasp those things which you have lifted with words to the heavens, or, if I cannot, not to lose time, since I can yet be content with these of ours.”

Ea vi sua verba parient, quae semper satis ornata mihi quidem videri solent, si eius modi sunt, ut ea res ipsa peperisse videatur; ac si verum quaeritis, quod mihi quidem videatur —nihil enim aliud adfirmare possum nisi sententiam et opinionem meam—hoc instrumentum causarum et generum universorum in forum deferre debemus neque, ut quaeque res delata ad nos erit, tum denique scrutari locos, ex quibus argumenta eruamus; quae quidem omnibus, qui ea mediocriter modo considerarint, studio adhibito et usu pertractata esse possunt; sed tamen animus referendus est ad ea capita et ad illos, quos saepe iam appellavi, locos, ex quibus omnia ad omnem orationem inventa ducuntur, atque hoc totum est sive artis sive animadversionis sive consuetudinis nosse regiones, intra quas venere et pervestiges, quod quaeras:

Here Sulpicius: “For my part,” said he, “Crassus, I am wanting neither for that Aristotle nor Carneades nor any of the philosophers. Either think me to be despairing of mastering those things, or — what I do — to despise them. To me this common knowledge of forensic and common matters is great enough for that eloquence at which I aim. From which itself, however, I do not know very many things; which then at last, when some case to be pleaded by me requires it, I ask. Therefore, unless you happen to be wearied and if we are not heavy to you, come back to those things which pertain to the praise and splendour of speech itself; which I wished to hear from you, not so as to despair of attaining eloquence, but so as to learn something more.”

ubi eum locum omnem cogitatione saepseris, si modo usum rerum percallueris, nihil te effugiet atque omne, quod erit in re, occurret atque incidet. Et sic, cum ad inveniendum in dicendo tria sint: acumen, deinde ratio, quam licet, si volumus, appellemus artem, tertium diligentia, non possum equidem non ingenio primas concedere, sed tamen ipsum ingenium diligentia etiam ex tarditate incitat;

Then Crassus: “You ask common matters,” he said, “and not unknown to you, Sulpicius. For who has not taught about that kind, has not trained, has not even left writings? But I shall humour you, and I shall set out for you briefly only those things which are known to me. I shall yet judge that we must come back to those who are the authors and inventors of these surely small matters.

diligentia, inquam, quae cum omnibus in rebus tum in causis defendendis plurimum valet. Haec praecipue colenda est nobis; haec semper adhibenda; haec nihil est quod non adsequatur: causa ut penitus, quod initio dixi, nota sit, diligentia est; ut adversarium attente audiamus atque ut eius non solum sententias sed etiam verba omnia excipiamus, vultus denique perspiciamus omnis, qui sensus animi plerumque indicant, diligentia est;

All speech, then, is composed of words, of which we must first see the rationale singly, then jointly. For there is one ornament of speech which lies in single words; another which consists of words joined continuously. Therefore we use words either of those which are proper and as it were the fixed names of things, born almost together with the things themselves; or of those which are transferred and as it were placed in another’s place; or of those which we make new and shape ourselves.

id tamen dissimulanter facere, ne sibi ille aliquid proficere videatur, prudentia est; deinde ut in eis locis, quos proponam paulo post, pervolvatur animus, ut penitus insinuet in causam, ut sit cura et cogitatione intentus, diligentia est; ut his rebus adhibeat tamquam lumen aliquod memoriam, ut vocem, ut

In proper words, then, the orator’s praise is to flee what is cast off and obsolete and to use what is choice and bright, in which something full and resounding seems to be. But in this kind of proper words a certain choice must be had, and that must be weighed by some judgment of the ears; in which the habit of speaking well also avails most.

viris, diligentia est. Inter ingenium quidem et diligentiam perpaulum loci reliquum est arti: ars demonstrat tantum, ubi quaeras, atque ubi sit illud, quod studeas invenire; reliqua sunt in cura, attentione animi, cogitatione, vigilantia, adsiduitate, labore; complectar uno verbo, quo saepe iam usi sumus, diligentia; qua una virtute omnes virtutes reliquae continentur.

So that which the unskilled commonly say of orators — “This man uses good words,” or “Some other does not” — is not weighed by any art, but is judged by some natural sense, as it were. In which it is not great praise to avoid fault, although it is great. But this is, as it were, a single ground and foundation: the use and abundance of good words.

Nam orationis quidem copia videmus ut abundent philosophi, qui, ut opinor—sed tu haec, Catule, melius—nulla dant praecepta dicendi nec idcirco minus, quaecumque res proposita est, suscipiunt, de qua copiose et abundanter loquantur.’

But what the orator himself builds, and where he applies art — that, it seems to me, must be sought and set out by us. There are three things, then, in single words which the orator should bring for illustrating and adorning speech: either an unaccustomed word, or a new-coined, or a transferred.

Tum Catulus ’est,’ inquit ’ut dicis, Antoni, ut plerique philosophi nulla tradant praecepta dicendi et habeant paratum tamen quid de quaque re dicant; sed Aristoteles, is, quem ego maxime admiror, posuit quosdam locos, ex quibus omnis argumenti via non modo ad philosophorum disputationem, sed etiam ad hanc orationem, qua in causis utimur, inveniretur; a quo quidem homine iam dudum, Antoni, non aberrat oratio tua, sive tu similitudine illius divini ingeni in eadem incurris vestigia sive etiam illa ipsa legisti atque didicisti, quod quidem mihi magis veri simile videtur; plus enim te operae Graecis dedisse rebus video quam putaramus.’

Unaccustomed are mostly old and through their antiquity long since dropped from the use of daily speech, which are freer for the licence of poets than ours; but rarely some poetic word has dignity also in speech. Nor would I shrink from saying, with Caelius, “In what season the Punic came into Italy”; nor “offspring” or “stock” or “to declare aloud” or “to call by name”; or, as you, Catulus, are wont, “I did not deem” or “opined”; or many others, by which, when set in place, the speech is wont often to seem grander and more ancient.

Tum ille ’verum’ inquit ’ex me audies, Catule: semper ego existimavi iucundiorem et probabiliorem huic populo oratorem fore, qui primum quam minimam artifici alicuius, deinde nullam Graecarum rerum significationem daret: atque ego idem existimavi pecudis esse, non hominis, cum tantas res Graeci susciperent, profiterentur, agerent seseque et videndi res obscurissimas et bene vivendi et copiose dicendi rationem daturos hominibus pollicerentur, non admovere aurem et, si palam audire eos non auderes, ne minueres apud tuos civis auctoritatem tuam, subauscultando tamen excipere voces eorum et procul quid narrarent attendere. Itaque feci, Catule, et istorum omnium summatim causas et genera ipsa gustavi.’

Coined words are those which are produced and made by the speaker himself, either by joining words, as: “Then a panic crushes from my breast all my wisdom,” or “Surely you do not wish his crooked-tongued malices” — for both versutiloquas and expectorat are words made from joining, not born; but often even without joining words are coined, like “that abandoned old age (senium)”, “the gods of begetting (di genitales)”, “to bend down (incurvescere) with abundance of berries.”

’Valde hercule’ inquit Catulus ’timide tamquam ad aliquem libidinis scopulum sic tuam mentem ad philosophiam appulisti, quam haec civitas aspernata numquam est; nam et referta quondam Italia Pythagoreorum fuit tum, cum erat in hac gente magna illa Graecia; ex quo etiam quidam Numam Pompilium, regem nostrum, fuisse Pythagoreum ferunt, qui annis ante permultis fuit quam ipse Pythagoras; quo etiam maior vir habendus est, quoniam illam sapientiam constituendae civitatis duobus prope saeculis ante cognovit, quam eam Graeci natam esse senserunt; et certe non tulit ullos haec civitas clariores aut auctoritate graviores aut humanitate politiores P. Africano, C. Laelio, L. Furio, qui secum eruditissimos homines ex Graecia palam semper habuerunt.

The third mode of transferring a word is widely open. Necessity, forced by want and straits, gave it birth; afterwards pleasantness and delight made it celebrated. For as clothing, found first to ward off cold, was afterwards begun to be applied also to the body’s adornment and dignity, so the transfer of a word was set up for the sake of poverty, made frequent for delight. For “the vine sets gems,” “there is luxury in the grasses,” “glad crops,” even peasants say. For what can scarcely be made plain by the proper word — when said by transfer, the likeness of the thing we have set in another’s word illustrates that which we wish to be understood.

Atque ego hoc ex eis saepe audivi, cum dicerent pergratum Atheniensis et sibi fecisse et multis principibus civitatis, quod, cum ad senatum legatos de suis maximis rebus mitterent, tris illius aetatis nobilissimos philosophos misissent, Carneadem et Critolaum et Diogenem; itaque eos, dum Romae essent, et a se et ab aliis frequenter auditos; quos tu cum haberes auctores, Antoni, miror cur philosophiae sicut Zethus ille Pacuvianus prope bellum indixeris.’

These transfers are as it were borrowings, when you take from another what you do not have. Those are a little bolder, which do not show poverty, but bring some splendour to speech. Of which I would not lay down for you either the reasoning of inventing or the kinds.

’Minime,’ inquit Antonius; ’ac sic decrevi philosophari potius, ut Neoptolemus apud Ennium "paucis: nam omnino haud placet." Sed tamen haec est mea sententia, quam videbar exposuisse: ego ista studia non improbo, moderata modo sint: opinionem istorum studiorum et suspicionem artifici apud eos, qui res iudicent, oratori adversariam esse arbitror, imminuit enim et oratoris auctoritatem et orationis fidem.

Of likeness it is the brevity drawn into a single word — which word, set in another’s place as in its own, if it is recognised, delights; if it has nothing similar, is rejected. But those things ought to be transferred which either make the matter brighter, as all those: “The sea bristles, the shadows are doubled, and the blackness of night and storm cloud darkens; flame quivers among the clouds, the heaven trembles with thunder, hail mixed with copious rain falls suddenly headlong, on every side all the winds break out, savage whirlwinds rise, the deep boils with seething.” All this, that it might be brighter, was said by words transferred through likeness;

Sed, ut eo revocetur, unde huc declinavit oratio, ex tribus istis clarissimis philosophis, quos Romam venisse dixisti, videsne Diogenem eum fuisse, qui diceret artem se tradere bene disserendi et vera ac falsa diiudicandi, quam verbo Graeco dialektikh/n appellaret? In hac arte, si modo est haec ars, nullum est praeceptum, quo modo verum inveniatur, sed tantum est, quo modo iudicetur;

or by which the whole thing of some deed or counsel is more signified, as he who, of one hiding it on purpose lest what was being done could be understood, by two transferred words, by likeness itself, signifies: “Since he wraps himself round in words, fences himself with guile.” Sometimes brevity also is got by transfer, as that “If the weapon flew from his hand”: the imprudence of a weapon let go could not be set out more briefly by proper words than has been signified by one transferred.

nam et omne, quod eloquimur sic, ut id aut esse dicamus aut non esse, et, si simpliciter dictum sit, suscipiunt dialectici, ut iudicent, verumne sit an falsum, et, si coniuncte sit elatum et adiuncta sint alia, iudicant, rectene adiuncta sint et verane summa sit unius cuiusque rationis, et ad extremum ipsi se compungunt suis acuminibus et multa quaerendo reperiunt non modo ea, quae iam non possint ipsi dissolvere, sed etiam quibus ante exorsa et potius detexta prope retexantur.

In this kind it often seems to me wonderful what the cause is, that all are more pleased by transferred and foreign words than by proper and their own. For if a thing has not its name and proper word — as the foot in a ship, as nexum which is done by the scale, as in a wife divorce — necessity forces us to take from elsewhere what we do not have. But in the greatest abundance of one’s own words men are yet much more delighted by foreign ones, if they are transferred with reason.

Hic nos igitur Stoicus iste nihil adiuvat, quoniam, quem ad modum inveniam quid dicam, non docet; atque idem etiam impedit, quod et multa reperit, quae negat ullo modo posse dissolvi, et genus sermonis adfert non liquidum, non fusum ac profluens, sed exile, aridum, concisum ac minutum, quod si qui probabit, ita probabit, ut oratori tamen aptum non esse fateatur; haec enim nostra oratio multitudinis est auribus accommodanda, ad oblectandos animos, ad impellendos, ad ea probanda, quae non aurificis statera, sed populari quadam trutina examinantur;

I think this happens, either because it is some sign of talent to leap over what lies before our feet and take other things sought from afar; or because he who hears is led by his thought elsewhere and yet does not stray, which is the greatest delight; or because in single words a thing and a whole likeness is brought about; or because every transfer, which has been taken with reason, is brought to the senses themselves, especially of the eyes — which is the keenest sense.

qua re istam artem totam dimittimus, quae in excogitandis argumentis muta nimium est, in iudicandis nimium loquax. Critolaum istum, quem cum Diogene venisse commemoras, puto plus huic nostro studio prodesse potuisse; erat enim ab isto Aristotele, a cuius inventis tibi ego videor non longe aberrare. Atque inter hunc Aristotelem, cuius et illum legi librum, in quo exposuit dicendi artis omnium superiorum, et illos, in quibus ipse sua quaedam de eadem arte dixit, et hos germanos huius artis magistros hoc mihi visum est interesse, quod ille eadem acie mentis, qua rerum omnium vim naturamque viderat, haec quoque aspexit, quae ad dicendi artem, quam ille despiciebat, pertinebant; illi autem, qui hoc solum colendum ducebant, habitarunt in hac una ratione tractanda non eadem prudentia qua ille, sed usu in hoc uno genere studioque maiore.

For both “the smell of urbanity” and “the softness of humanity” and “the murmur of the sea” and “the sweetness of speech” are drawn from the other senses; but those of the eyes are far keener, which place almost before the gaze of the soul what we cannot perceive and see. For there is nothing in the nature of things whose word and name we cannot use of other things. Whence a likeness can be drawn — and it can be drawn from all things — thence one word, transferred, containing the likeness, will bring light to speech.

Carneadi vero vis incredibilis illa dicendi et varietas perquam esset optanda nobis, qui nullam umquam in illis suis disputationibus rem defendit quam non probarit, nullam oppugnavit quam non everterit. Sed hoc maius est quiddam quam ab his, qui haec tradunt et docent, postulandum sit.

In this kind unlikeness must first be fled. “Vast vaults of heaven”: however much Ennius brought a sphere onto the stage, as is said, yet in a sphere the likeness of a vault cannot be. “Live, Ulysses; while you may; with your eyes the last beam of light snatch up” — he did not say “seek” or “take” (for that would have the delay of one hoping to live longer), but “snatch”: this word is fitted to that

Ego autem, si quem nunc plane rudem institui ad dicendum velim, his potius tradam adsiduis uno opere eandem incudem diem noctemque tundentibus, qui omnis tenuissimas particulas atque omnia minima mansa ut nutrices infantibus pueris in os inserant; sin sit is, qui et doctrina mihi liberaliter institutus et aliquo iam imbutus usu et satis acri ingenio esse videatur, illuc eum rapiam, ubi non seclusa aliqua acula teneatur, sed unde universum flumen erumpat; qui illi sedis et quasi domicilia omnium argumentorum commonstret et ea breviter inlustret verbisque definiat.

which he had said before, “while you may.” Then it must be looked at lest the likeness be drawn from afar. “Syrtis” of patrimony — I should rather say “rock”; “Charybdis” of goods — rather “whirlpool.” For the eyes of the mind are more easily borne to those things which are seen than to those which are heard. And since this is the very highest praise in transferring words — that what is transferred should strike the sense — all baseness must be fled in those things to which the likeness will draw the minds of those who hear.

Quid enim est, in quo haereat, qui viderit omne, quod sumatur in oratione aut ad probandum aut ad refellendum, aut ex re sua sumi vi atque natura aut adsumi foris? Ex sua vi, cum aut res quae sit tota quaeratur, aut pars eius, aut vocabulum quod habeat, aut quippiam, rem illam quod attingat; extrinsecus autem, cum ea, quae sunt foris neque haerent in rei natura, conliguntur.

I would not have said that by Africanus’s death the commonwealth was “castrated”; I would not have Glaucia called “the dung of the curia.” Even though the likeness be there, in each is a deformed thinking of likeness. I would not have it either greater than the matter requires (“a tempest of revelry”), or less (“a revelry of a tempest”). I would not have the word that is transferred narrower than that proper one and its own would have been: “What is it, pray? What do you nod me away from approach?” It would be better, “you forbid, prohibit, frighten away” — since he had said: “Get back here, lest my touch or shadow harm the good.”

Si res tota quaeritur, definitione universa vis explicanda est, sic: "si maiestas est amplitudo ac dignitas civitatis, is eam minuit, qui exercitum hostibus populi Romani tradidit, non qui eum, qui id

If you fear that the transfer may seem somewhat too harsh, it must often be softened by a word set before. As if, when M. Cato had died, anyone should say the senate had been left “orphaned,” that would be a little harsh; but “so to say, orphaned” is somewhat milder. For a transfer ought to be modest, so that it may seem brought to a foreign place, not to have broken in; and to have come on sufferance, not by force.

fecisset, populi Romani potestati tradidit." Sin pars, partitione, hoc modo: "aut senatui parendum de salute rei publicae fuit aut aliud consilium instituendum aut sua sponte faciendum; aliud consilium, superbum; suum, adrogans; utendum igitur fuit consilio senatus." Si ex vocabulo, ut Carbo: "si consul est, qui consulit patriae,

But there is no more flowery way in single words, nor any which brings more light to speech. For that which flows from this kind is not in one word transferred, but is connected from several joined, so that one thing is said, another to be understood: “Nor shall I let myself again on the one rock, as once the Achaean fleet, dash myself.” And: “You err, you err. For when you leap and trust yourself, the strong reins of the laws will rein you in, and the yoke of empire will press you down.”

quid aliud fecit Opimius?" Sin ab eo, quod rem attingit, plures sunt argumentorum sedes ac loci, nam et coniuncta quaeremus et genera et partis generibus subiectas et similitudines et dissimilitudines et contraria et consequentia et consentanea et quasi praecurrentia et repugnantia et causas rerum vestigabimus et ea, quae ex causis orta sint, et maiora, paria, minora quaeremus.

A like matter being taken, the words proper to it are then transferred to another matter, as I said. This is a great ornament of speech, in which obscurity must be fled. For these things, when carried too far in this kind, become what are called enigmas. The way is not in a word but in a speech, that is, in the continuity of words. Nor again does that turning and changing have a kind of fashioning in a word but in speech: “Africa trembles with terrible tumult, the rough land.” For the Africans is taken Africa: nor was the word made (as “the rock-breaking sea”), nor transferred (as “the sea is softened”), but for ornament’s sake one proper word is changed for another. “Cease, Rome, your enemies — and the great plains are witnesses.” This way is grave in adornment of speech and often to be taken; of this kind: that Mars of war is common, to call Ceres for crops, Liber for wine, Neptune for the sea, the curia for the senate, the Campus for the assemblies, the toga for peace, arms and weapons for war.

Ex coniunctis sic argumenta ducuntur: "si pietati summa tribuenda laus est, debetis moveri, cum Q. Metellum tam pie lugere videatis." Ex genere autem: "si magistratus in populi Romani esse potestate debent, quid Norbanum accusas, cuius tribunatus

Likewise in the same kind, both virtues and vices are named for those very persons in whom they reside: “Luxury, when it broke into the house”; “Avarice penetrated where”; or “Faith availed, justice carried it through.” You see this whole kind: when, by an inflected and changed word, the same matter is uttered more ornately. To which are neighbouring those less ornate but yet not to be unknown — when we wish something to be understood: either the whole from a part (as for buildings when we say walls or roofs); or a part from the whole (as when we say one squadron for the cavalry of the Roman people); or several from one: “But the Roman, even though the matter is well done, in his heart trembles”; or when from many one is understood: “We are the Romans, who before were Rudini” (Rudine, Ennius’s home). Or in whatever way — not as it is said, in this kind is it understood, but as it is felt.

voluntati paruit civitatis?" Ex parte autem ea, quae est subiecta generi: "si omnes, qui rei publicae consulunt, cari nobis esse debent, certe in primis imperatores, quorum consiliis, virtute, periculis retinemus et nostram salutem et imperi dignitatem." Ex similitudine autem: "si ferae partus suos diligunt, qua nos in liberos nostros indulgentia

We often also misuse a word, not so elegantly as in transferring, but, even if more freely, sometimes not impudently — as when we say “grand speech” for “long,” “minute soul” for “small.” Now do you see those things to be not of a word but of a speech, which are connected from several transfers, as I have set out? But these — which I have said are either changed or to be otherwise understood than they are said — are transferred in a certain way.

esse debemus?" At ex dissimilitudine: "si barbarorum est in diem vivere, nostra consilia sempiternum tempus spectare debent." Atque utroque in genere et similitudinis et dissimilitudinis exempla sunt ex aliorum factis aut dictis aut eventis et fictae narrationes saepe ponendae. Iam ex contrario:

So it happens that all the virtue and praise of single words arises from three things: if there be either an old word — which yet usage can bear; or a coined one, either by joining or by novelty, in which likewise the ears and habit must be spared; or a transferred one, which most, as it were by certain stars, marks and lights up speech.

"si Gracchus nefarie, praeclare Opimius." Ex consequentibus: "si et ferro interfectus ille et tu inimicus eius cum gladio cruento comprehensus in illo ipso loco et nemo praeter te ibi visus est et causa nemini et tu semper audax, quid est quod de facinore dubitare possimus?" Ex consentaneis et ex praecurrentibus et ex repugnantibus, ut olim Crassus adulescens: "non si Opimium defendisti, Carbo, idcirco te isti bonum civem putabunt: simulasse te et aliquid quaesisse perspicuum est, quod Ti. Gracchi mortem saepe in contionibus deplorasti, quod P. Africani necis socius fuisti, quod eam legem in tribunatu tulisti, quod

The continuity of words follows, which especially desires two things: arrangement first, then a certain measure and form. Of arrangement, it is to compose and build words so that neither be their meeting harsh nor gaping, but in some way close-jointed and smooth. In which my father-in-law’s character was wittily played upon by him who could most elegantly do it, Lucilius: “How prettily are the words composed! As all the little dice fitted skillfully into the pavement and inlay-work, vermicular!” When he had said this, mocking Albucius, he did not refrain from me either: “I have Crassus as son-in-law, that you not be more rhetorical.” What then? This Crassus, since he abuses my name — what does he do? That, surely (as he wishes and I should wish), somewhat better than Albucius. But on me he played, as he is wont.

semper a bonis dissedisti." Ex causis autem rerum sic: "avaritiam si tollere vultis, mater eius est tollenda, luxuries." Ex eis autem, quae sunt orta de causis: "si aerari copiis et ad belli adiumenta et ad ornamenta pacis utimur, vectigalibus

Yet this arrangement of words must be kept, of which I am speaking; which makes the speech bound, coherent, smooth, evenly flowing. You will attain this if the last words shall so be joined with the first that follow that neither do they harshly meet nor too widely part.

serviamus." Maiora autem et minora et paria comparabimus sic: ex maiore: "si bona existimatio divitiis praestat et pecunia tanto opere expetitur, quanto gloria magis est expetenda!" ex minore: hic parvae consuetudinis causa huius mortem tam fert familiariter: quid si ipse amasset? Quid hic mihi faciet patri? Ex pari: "est eiusdem et eripere et contra rem publicam

This diligence is followed also by the measure and the form of words; which I now fear may seem to this Catulus to be childish. For those ancients thought verses ought to be applied even in this prose speech, that is, certain rhythms — for they wished there to be in speeches closes punctuated by the measure of words and thoughts (not by marks of our breathlessness or of weariness, nor by copyists’ marks, but by the measure of words and thoughts); and Isocrates is said first to have established this — that he might bind the unkempt habit of the ancients in speaking, for the sake of pleasure and the ears, in rhythms (as his pupil Naucrates writes).

largiri pecunias." Foris autem adsumuntur ea, quae non sua vi, sed extranea sublevantur, ut haec: "hoc verum est; dixit enim Q. Lutatius. Hoc falsum est; habita enim quaestio est. Hoc sequi necesse est; recito enim tabulas." De quo genere toto paulo ante dixi.

For these two things were contrived for pleasure by the musicians, who once were the same as the poets — verse and song — that by both the rhythm of words and the measure of voices they might overcome the satiety of the ears with delight. These two then — I mean the regulation of voice and the closing of words — they thought were to be transferred from poetry to eloquence, as far as the severity of speech could bear.

Haec, ut brevissime dici potuerunt, ita a me dicta sunt; ut enim si aurum cui, quod esset multifariam defossum, commonstrare vellem, satis esse deberet, si signa et notas ostenderem locorum, quibus cognitis ipse sibi foderet et id quod vellet parvo labore, nullo errore, inveniret; sic has ego argumentorum no ta vi notas quae quaerenti demonstrant, ubi sint; reliqua cura et cogitatione eruuntur;

In which is most of all this: that if a verse is brought about in speech by the joining of words, it is a fault — and yet we wish that joining, like the verse, to fall in rhythm and to be squared and brought to fulness. Nor of many things is there one matter which more distinguishes the orator from the unskilled and ignorant of speaking, than that he, untaught, pours out unkemptly as much as he can and what he says by breath, not by art, he limits; while the orator so binds the thought with words that he embraces it by some rhythm both bound and free.

quod autem argumentorum genus cuique causarum generi maxime conveniat, non est artis exquisitae praescribere, sed est mediocris ingeni iudicare, neque enim nunc id agimus, ut artem aliquam dicendi explicemus, sed ut doctissimis hominibus usus nostri quasi quaedam monita tradamus. Hic igitur locis in mente et cogitatione defixis et in omni re ad dicendum posita excitatis, nihil erit quod oratorem effugere possit non modo in forensibus disceptationibus, sed omnino in ullo genere dicendi.

For when he has bound it by form and measures, he relaxes and frees it by changing the order, that the words be neither bound as it were by some fixed law of verse, nor so loose as to wander. In what way then shall we set ourselves to so great a duty, as to suppose we can attain this force of speaking rhythmically? The thing is not so difficult as necessary. For nothing is so tender, nor so flexible, nor that follows so easily wherever you lead, as speech.

Si vero adsequetur, ut talis videatur, qualem se videri velit et animos eorum ita adficiat, apud quos aget, ut eos quocumque velit vel trahere vel rapere possit, nihil profecto praeterea ad dicendum requiret. Iam illud videmus nequaquam satis esse reperire quid dicas, nisi id inventum tractare possis;

From this verses, from this same different rhythms are produced; from this also this prose speech of various measures and many kinds. For there are not different words of conversation, of contention, nor are they taken from another kind for daily use, from another for the stage and pomp. But these we, when we have lifted them up lying in the middle, like the softest wax shape and fashion at our pleasure. Therefore as at one time we are weighty, at another subtle, at another we hold something middle: so the kind of speech follows our settled feeling, and is changed and turned to every pleasure of the ears and motion of minds.

tractatio autem varia esse debet, ne aut cognoscat artem qui audiat aut defetigetur similitudinis satietate: proponi oportet quid adferas et qua re ita sit ostendere; ex eisdem illis locis interdum concludere, relinquere alias alioque transire; saepe non proponere ac ratione ipsa adferenda quid proponendum fuerit, declarare; si cui quid simile dicas, prius ut simile dicas confirmes, deinde quod agitur, adiungas; interpuncta argumentorum plerumque occulas, ne quis ea numerare possit, ut re distinguantur, verbis confusa esse videantur.

But as in most matters nature itself has incredibly fashioned this, so in speech: that those things which contained in themselves the greatest utility, the same had also most either of dignity or even of grace. For the safety and the salvation of all, we see this state of this whole world and of nature: that the heaven is round, and the earth is in the middle and is held by its own force and will; that the sun is borne about it, that it approaches the wintry sign and thence gradually rises into the opposite quarter; that the moon by its approach and recess receives the sun’s light; that the same five stars complete the same spaces by unequal motion and course.

Haec properans ut et apud doctos et semidoctus ipse percurro, ut aliquando ad illa maiora veniamus: nihil est enim in dicendo, Catule, maius, quam ut faveat oratori is, qui audiet, utique ipse sic moveatur, ut impetu quodam animi et perturbatione magis quam iudicio aut consilio regatur: plura enim multo homines iudicant odio aut amore aut cupiditate aut iracundia aut dolore aut laetitia aut spe aut timore aut errore aut aliqua permotione mentis quam veritate aut praescripto aut iuris norma aliqua aut iudici formula aut legibus.

These have such force that, a little changed, they cannot cohere; such beauty that no shape can even be thought more ornate. Refer your mind now to the form and shape of men, or even of the rest of living things. You will find no part of the body, without some necessity, added on, and the whole shape as it were perfected by art, not by chance. What in those trees? In which the trunk, the branches, the leaves are not, in short, save for keeping and preserving their nature; nowhere yet is any part except graceful.

Qua re, nisi quid vobis aliud placet, ad illa pergamus.’ ’Paulum’ inquit Catulus ’etiam nunc deesse videtur eis rebus, Antoni, quas exposuisti, quod sit tibi ante explicandum, quam illuc proficiscare, quo te dicis intendere.’ ’Quidnam?’ inquit. ’Qui ordo tibi placeat’ inquit Catulus ’et quae dispositio argumentorum, in qua tu mihi semper deus videri soles.’

Let us leave nature and look at the arts. What in a ship is so necessary as the sides, as the holds, as the prow, as the stern, as the spars, as the sails, as the masts? Which yet have in their look so much grace, that they seem to have been invented not only for safety, but also for pleasure. Columns hold up temples and porticoes; yet they have no more usefulness than dignity. The pediment of the Capitol and of other temples necessity itself, not grace, fashioned. For when account had been had how on each side of the roof water might run off, the dignity of the pediment followed the temple’s utility — so that, even if the Capitol were set up in heaven, where there could be no rain, it seems it would have had no dignity without a pediment.

’Vide quam sim’ inquit ’deus in isto genere, Catule: non hercule mihi nisi admonito venisset in mentem; ut possis existimare me in ea, in quibus non numquam aliquid efficere videor, usu solere in dicendo vel casu potius incurrere. Ac res quidem ista, quam ego, quia non noram, sic tamquam ignotum hominem praeteribam, tantum potest in dicendo, ut ad vincendum nulla plus possit; sed tamen mihi videris ante tempus a me rationem ordinis et disponendarum rerum requisisse;

The same likewise happens in all parts of speech: that some sweetness and charm follows the utility and almost necessity. For the closes and the punctuations of words were brought by the closing of breath and the straits of the breath. That invention is so sweet that, even if anyone had infinite breath given him, we should not yet wish him to draw out his words. So pleasing has been found to our ears that which not only could be tolerable but also easy to men’s lungs.

nam si ego omnem vim oratoris in argumentis et in re ipsa per se comprobanda posuissem, tempus esset iam de ordine argumentorum et de conlocatione rerum aliquid dicere; sed cum tria sint a me proposita, de uno dictum, cum de duobus reliquis dixero, tum erit denique de disponenda tota oratione quaerendum.

The longest combination of words, then, is what can be rolled out in one breath. But this is the measure of nature; another, of art. For since rhythms are several, the iamb and the trochee, the frequent ones, Aristotle, your Aristotle, Catulus, sets aside from the orator. They yet by nature run themselves into our speech and conversation. But marked are the strikings of those rhythms and minute feet. So first of all the heroic foot — the dactyl and anapest, the spondee — invites us. In which it is allowed to advance with impunity for two feet only, or a little more, lest we plainly fall into a verse or the likeness of a verse. “High are the twin towers, by which.” These three heroic feet at the openings of continuing words fall sufficiently becomingly.

Valet igitur multum ad vincendum probari mores et instituta et facta et vitam eorum, qui agent causas, et eorum, pro quibus, et item improbari adversariorum, animosque eorum, apud quos agetur, conciliari quam maxime ad benevolentiam cum erga oratorem tum erga illum, pro quo dicet orator. Conciliantur autem animi dignitate hominis, rebus gestis, existimatione vitae; quae facilius ornari possunt, si modo sunt, quam fingi, si nulla sunt. Sed haec adiuvant in oratore: lenitas vocis, vultus pudor is significatio, verborum comitas; si quid persequare acrius, ut invitus et coactus facere videare. Facilitatis, liberalitatis, mansuetudinis, pietatis, grati animi, non appetentis, non avidi signa proferre perutile est; eaque omnia, quae proborum, demissorum, non acrium, non pertinacium, non litigiosorum, non acerborum sunt, valde benevolentiam conciliant abalienantque ab eis, in quibus haec non sunt; itaque eadem sunt in adversarios ex contrario conferenda.

Most approved by that same Aristotle is the paean, which is double. For it either rises from a long syllable, which three short follow, as these words “cease, begin, restrain”; or from three short syllables in succession, the last drawn out and long, as those are “had subdued, hoof-beating.” And that philosopher likes to begin from the former paean, to end with the latter; the latter paean is, not in the number of syllables but in the measure of the ears (which is keener and more certain judgment), about equal to the cretic, which is from a long, a short, and a long: as “What guard shall I seek, or pursue? whither now —” From which rhythm Fannius began: “If, Quirites, his threats.” This rhythm Aristotle thinks more apt for closes, which he wishes mostly to be ended by a long syllable.

Sed genus hoc totum orationis in eis causis excellit, in quibus minus potest inflammari animus iudicis acri et vehementi quadam incitatione; non enim semper fortis oratio quaeritur, sed saepe placida, summissa, lenis, quae maxime commendat reos. Reos autem appello non eos modo, qui arguuntur, sed omnis, quorum de re disceptatur; sic enim olim loquebantur.

These things, however, do not require so keen a care and diligence as does that of the poets — whom necessity compels, and rhythms and measures themselves, so to enclose words in a verse that nothing may be even by the smallest breath shorter or longer than is needed. Speech is more free, and plainly, as it is said, is so truly loose — not so as to flee or err, but so as to regulate itself without bonds. For I agree with Theophrastus, who thinks that speech, polished and made (in some way), ought to be rhythmical not strictly but more loosely.

Horum igitur exprimere mores oratione iustos, integros, religiosos, timidos, perferentis iniuriarum mirum quiddam valet; et hoc vel in principiis vel in re narranda vel in perorando tantam habet vim, si est suaviter et cum sensu tractatum, ut saepe plus quam causa valeat. Tantum autem efficitur sensu quodam ac ratione dicendi, ut quasi mores oratoris effingat oratio; genere enim quodam sententiarum et genere verborum, adhibita etiam actione leni facilitatemque significante efficitur, ut probi, ut bene morati, ut boni viri esse videamur.

For, as he conjectures, both from those measures by which this customary verse is brought about, the anapaest afterwards flowered out (a longer rhythm); thence flowed that more licentious and richer dithyramb, whose limbs and feet, as the same says, lie spread through every richer speech. And if it is rhythmical in all sounds and voices that has certain pressings and what we can measure by equal intervals, this kind of rhythms is rightly set in the praise of speech, provided they be not continuous. For if that breathless and flowing chatter without intervals is to be deemed rude and unpolished, what other reason is there why it should be rejected, save that nature itself modulates the voice for men’s ears? Which cannot happen unless rhythm is in the voice.

Huic autem est illa dispar adiuncta ratio orationis, quae alio quodam genere mentis iudicum permovet impellitque, ut aut oderint aut diligant aut invideant aut salvum velint aut metuant aut sperent aut cupiant aut abhorreant aut laetentur aut maereant aut misereantur aut poenire velint aut ad eos motus deducantur, si qui finitimi sunt et de propinquis ac talibus animi permotionibus.

But there is no rhythm in continuity. Distinction and the striking of equal — or often various — intervals brings about rhythm, which we can mark in falling drops (which are distinguished by intervals), but cannot in a rushing river. If then this loose continuity of words is much more apt and pleasant when it is distinguished by joints and limbs than when continued and prolonged, those limbs will have to be measured. If they are shorter at the end, that as it were ambit of words is broken; for so the Greeks call these turnings of speech. So either the latter must be equal to the former, the last to the first; or, what is even better and more pleasant, longer.

Atque illud optandum est oratori, ut aliquam permotionem animorum sua sponte ipsi adferant ad causam iudices ad id, quod utilitas oratoris feret, accommodatam; facilius est enim currentem, ut aiunt, incitare quam commovere languentem; sin id aut non erit aut erit obscurius, sicut medico diligenti, priusquam conetur aegro adhibere medicinam, non solum morbus eius, cui mederi volet, sed etiam consuetudo valentis et natura corporis cognoscenda est, sic equidem cum adgredior in ancipiti causa et gravi ad animos iudicum pertractandos, omni mente in ea cogitatione curaque versor, ut odorer, quam sagacissime possim, quid sentiant, quid existiment, quid exspectent, quid velint, quo deduci oratione facillime posse videantur.

These things have indeed been said by those philosophers whom you most love, Catulus. So I more often call them as witnesses, that, by praising my authorities, I may flee the charge of frivolities.” “Of what frivolities?” said Catulus. “Or what can be brought into that disputation more elegant, or more subtly said at all?”

Si se dant et, ut ante dixi, sua sponte, quo impellimus, inclinant atque propendent, accipio quod datur et ad id, unde aliquis flatus ostenditur, vela do; sin est integer quietusque iudex, plus est operis; sunt enim omnia dicendo excitanda, nihil adiuvante natura. Sed tantam vim habet illa, quae recte a bono poeta dicta est flexanima atque omnium regina rerum oratio, ut non modo inclinantem excipere aut stantem inclinare, sed etiam adversantem ac repugnantem, ut imperator fortis ac bonus, capere possit.

“But I fear,” said Crassus, “that these may either seem too hard for these to follow, or, because they are not handed down in the common discipline, that we may seem to wish them to seem greater and more difficult.” Then Catulus: “You err, Crassus,” he said, “if you think either I or any of these expects from you these daily and common things. Those things you say, we wish to be said; nor so much to be said as to be said in that way. Nor do I answer this for myself only, but for all of these without any doubt.”

Haec sunt illa, quae me ludens Crassus modo flagitabat, cum a me divinitus tractari solere diceret et in causa M’. Aquili Gaique Norbani non nullisque aliis quasi praeclare acta laudaret, quae me hercule ego, Crasse, cum a te tractantur in causis, horrere soleo: tanta vis animi, tantus impetus, tantus dolor oculis, vultu, gestu, digito denique isto tuo significari solet; tantum est flumen gravissimorum optimorumque verborum, tam integrae sententiae, tum verae, tam novae, tam sine pigmentis fucoque puerili, ut mihi non solum tu incendere iudicem, sed ipse ardere videaris.

“For my part,” said Antonius, “I have now found him whom I had said in the little book I wrote I had not found — the eloquent man. But I have not interrupted you even for the sake of praising, lest anything of this so brief time of your speech should be lessened by one of my words.”

Neque fieri potest ut doleat is, qui audit, ut oderit, ut invideat, ut pertimescat aliquid, ut ad fletum misericordiamque deducatur, nisi omnes illi motus, quos orator adhibere volet iudici, in ipso oratore impressi esse atque inusti videbuntur. Quod si fictus aliqui dolor suscipiendus esset et si in eius modi genere orationis nihil esset nisi falsum atque imitatione simulatum, maior ars aliqua forsitan esset requirenda: nunc ego, quid tibi, Crasse, quid ceteris accidat, nescio; de me autem causa nulla est cur apud homines prudentissimos atque amicissimos mentiar: non me hercule umquam apud iudices aut dolorem aut misericordiam aut invidiam aut odium dicendo excitare volui quin ipse in commovendis iudicibus eis ipsis sensibus, ad quos illos adducere vellem, permoverer;

“By this rule, then,” said Crassus, “both by exercise and by the pen — which both other things and this most adorns and polishes — speech must be shaped by us. Yet this is not of so great labour as it seems, nor are these things to be directed by the keenest standard of rhythmicians or of musicians. Only this we must bring about: that speech does not flow on, does not wander, does not stop within, does not run too far out — that it be distinguished by limbs, that it have absolute turnings. Nor must we always use the unbroken and as it were turning of words, but often speech must be broken into smaller limbs, which yet themselves must be bound by rhythms.

neque est enim facile perficere ut irascatur ei, cui tu velis, iudex, si tu ipse id lente ferre videare; neque ut oderit eum, quem tu velis, nisi te ipsum flagrantem odio ante viderit; neque ad misericordiam adducetur, nisi tu ei signa doloris tui verbis, sententiis, voce, vultu, conlacrimatione denique ostenderis; ut enim nulla materies tam facilis ad exardescendum est, quae nisi admoto igni ignem concipere possit, sic nulla mens est tam ad comprehendendam vim oratoris parata, quae possit incendi, nisi ipse inflammatus ad eam et ardens accesserit.

Nor let the paean or the heroic disturb you. They will themselves run into speech; they themselves, I say, will offer themselves and answer when not called. Only let there be that habit of writing and speaking, that thoughts may be ended by words, and the joining of those words may be born from longer and freer rhythms — most of all the heroic, or the former paean, or the cretic, but variously and distinctly let it settle. For likeness is most marked in coming to rest. And if the first and last feet have been preserved by this rationale, the middle ones can lie hidden, provided the very circuit of words be not either shorter than the ears expect, or longer than strength and breath bears.

Ac, ne hoc forte magnum ac mirabile esse videatur hominem totiens irasci, totiens dolere, totiens omni motu animi concitari, praesertim in rebus alienis, magna vis est earum sententiarum atque eorum locorum, quos agas tractesque dicendo, nihil ut opus sit simulatione et fallaciis; ipsa enim natura orationis eius, quae suscipitur ad aliorum animos permovendos, oratorem ipsum magis etiam quam quemquam eorum qui audiunt permovet.

The closes I think must be even more diligently kept than the previous parts, because in them most of all is the perfection and absoluteness judged. For of a verse the first and middle and last part is equally attended to, which, in whatever part it stumbles, is weakened. In speech, however, few perceive the first parts, most the last. Which since they appear and are understood, must be varied, lest they be rejected either by the judgments of minds or by the satiety of ears.

Et ne hoc in causis, in iudiciis, in amicorum periculis, in concursu hominum, in civitate, in foro accidere miremur, cum agitur non solum ingeni nostri existimatio, nam id esset levius;—quamquam, cum professus sis te id posse facere, quod pauci, ne id quidem neglegendum est;—sed alia sunt maiora multo, fides, officium, diligentia, quibus rebus adducti, etiam cum alienissimos defendimus, tamen eos alienos, si ipsi viri boni

Two or three feet at the end must be kept and noted, provided the previous parts will not be shorter and clipped. These ought to be either chorees or heroic, or alternating; or in that latter paean which Aristotle approves, or in the cretic equal to it. The changes of these will bring it about that neither shall those who hear be sated by disgust at likeness, nor we seem to do, by set design, what we shall do.

volumus haberi, existimare non possumus—sed, ut dixi, ne hoc in nobis mirum esse videatur, quid potest esse tam fictum quam versus, quam scaena, quam fabulae? Tamen in hoc genere saepe ipse vidi, ut ex persona mihi ardere oculi hominis histrionis viderentur †spondalli illa dicentis: segregare abs te ausu’s ausus es aut sine illo Salamina ingredi? neque paternum aspectum es veritus? Numquam illum aspectum dicebat, quin mihi Telamo iratus furere luctu fili videretur; at idem inflexa ad miserabilem sonum voce, cum aetate exacta indigem liberum lacerasti, orbasti, exstinxti; neque fratris necis, neque eius gnati parvi, qui tibi in tutelam est traditus, flens ac lugens dicere videbatur; quae si ille histrio, cotidie cum ageret, tamen recte agere sine dolore non poterat, quid Pacuvium putatis in scribendo leni animo ac remisso fuisse?

If that Antipater of Sidon — whom you well remember, Catulus — was wont to pour out hexameters and other verses on the spur of the moment in various measures and rhythms, and the practice of an ingenious and remembering man so prevailed that, when he had thrown himself in mind and will to the verse, the words followed: how much more easily shall we attain that in speech, with practice and habit applied!

Fieri nullo modo potuit. Saepe enim audivi poetam bonum neminem—id quod a Democrito et Platone in scriptis relictum esse dicunt—sine inflammatione animorum exsistere posse et sine quodam adflatu quasi furoris. Qua re nolite existimare me ipsum, qui non heroum veteres casus fictosque luctus velim imitari atque adumbrare dicendo neque actor sim alienae personae, sed auctor meae, cum mihi M’. Aquilius in civitate retinendus esset, quae in illa causa peroranda fecerim, sine magno dolore fecisse:

But that no one may wonder how the multitude of unskilled in listening notices these things — both in every kind, and in this very thing, there is some great force and incredible nature. For all by some silent sense, without any art or reason, distinguish what is right and faulty in arts and reasonings. And while they do this in paintings and statues and other works, for the understanding of which they have less equipment from nature, much more do they show it in the judgment of words, rhythms, and voices, since these are fixed in common sense, and nature has wished none to be wholly without them.

quem enim ego consulem fuisse, imperatorem ornatum a senatu, ovantem in Capitolium ascendisse meminissem, hunc cum adflictum, debilitatum, maerentem, in summum discrimen adductum viderem, non prius sum conatus misericordiam aliis commovere quam misericordia sum ipse captus. Sensi equidem tum magno opere moveri iudices, cum excitavi maestum ac sordidatum senem et cum ista feci, quae tu, Crasse, laudas, non arte, de qua quid loquar nescio, sed motu magno animi ac dolore, ut discinderem tunicam, ut cicatrices ostenderem.

So all are moved not only by skilfully placed words, but also by rhythms and voices. For how few there are who hold the art of rhythms and measures? But in these, if there is offence even a little — that anything is made shorter by contraction or longer by drawing out — whole theatres cry out. Does not the same happen in voices, that not only choirs and concerts, but also each one to himself, even singers in mismatch are cast out by the multitude and the people?

Cum C. Marius maerorem orationis meae praesens ac sedens multum lacrimis suis adiuvaret cumque ego illum crebro appellans conlegam ei suum commendarem atque ipsum advocatum ad communem imperatorum fortunam defendendam invocarem, non fuit haec sine meis lacrimis, non sine dolore magno miseratio omniumque deorum et hominum et civium et sociorum imploratio; quibus omnibus verbis, quae a me tum sunt habita, si dolor afuisset meus, non modo non miserabilis, sed etiam inridenda fuisset oratio mea. Quam ob rem hoc vos doceo, Sulpici, bonus ego videlicet atque eruditus magister, ut in dicendo irasci, ut dolere, ut flere possitis.

It is wonderful — when there is the greatest difference in doing between the learned and the rude — how little the difference is in judging. For art, since it has set out from nature, unless nature moves and delights, seems to have done nothing at all. There is nothing so akin to our minds as rhythms and voices, by which we are roused and inflamed and softened and made languid and led often to cheerfulness and to gloom. The highest force of which is more apt for songs and singing — not neglected, as it seems to me, by Numa the most learned king and by our ancestors, as the lyres and pipes and verses of the Salii at solemn banquets show; most of all celebrated by ancient Greece. With which and like things would that you had preferred to argue rather than these childish transfers of words!

Quamquam te quidem quid hoc doceam, qui in accusando sodali meo tantum incendium non oratione solum, sed etiam multo magis vi et dolore et ardore animi concitaras, ut ego ad id restinguendum vix conarer accedere? Habueras enim tu omnia in causa superiora: vim, fugam, lapidationem, crudelitatem tribuniciam in Caepionis gravi miserabilique casu in iudicium vocabas; deinde principem et senatus et civitatis, M. Aemilium, lapide percussum esse constabat; vi pulsum e templo L. Cottam et T. Didium, cum intercedere vellent rogationi, nemo poterat negare.

But as in a verse the multitude sees if there is a fault, so in our speech, if anything halts, it feels — but it does not pardon the poet, while it grants it to us. Yet all silent see that what we have said is not apt and perfect. Therefore those ancients — as we see today some too — when they could not bring about a circuit and as it were an orb of words (for that we have lately even begun to be able or to dare), used to speak three or two, or some even single words; who in that infancy yet held that natural thing which men’s ears demanded — that what they said should be equal, and they should use equal pauses for breathing.

Accedebat ut haec tu adulescens pro re publica queri summa cum dignitate existimarere; ego, homo censorius, vix satis honeste viderer seditiosum civem et in hominis consularis calamitate crudelem posse defendere. Erant optimi cives iudices, bonorum virorum plenum forum, vix ut mihi tenuis quaedam venia daretur excusationis, quod tamen eum defenderem, qui mihi quaestor fuisset. Hic ego quid dicam me artem aliquam adhibuisse? Quid fecerim, narrabo; si placuerit, vos meam defensionem in aliquo artis loco reponetis.

I have set out, as far as I could, what I judged most pertained to the ornament of speech. For I have spoken of the praise of single words; I have spoken of their joining; I have spoken of rhythm and form. But if you also ask the habit of speech and as it were some colour, there is one full but yet smooth, and one slender, not without sinews and strength, and one which, partaking of each kind, is praised in a certain mediocrity. On these three figures should sit a colour of grace not painted with rouge, but spread by blood.

Omnium seditionum genera, vitia, pericula conlegi eamque orationem ex omni rei publicae nostrae temporum varietate repetivi conclusique ita, ut dicerem, etsi omnes semper molestae seditiones fuissent, iustas tamen fuisse non nullas et prope necessarias. Tum illa, quae modo Crassus commemorabat, egi: neque reges ex hac civitate exigi neque tribunos plebis creari neque plebiscitis totiens consularem potestatem minui neque provocationem, patronam illam civitatis ac vindicem libertatis, populo Romano dari sine nobilium dissensione potuisse; ac, si illae seditiones saluti huic civitati fuissent, non continuo, si quis motus populi factus esset, id C. Norbano in nefario crimine atque in fraude capitali esse ponendum. Quod si umquam populo Romano concessum esset ut iure incitatus videretur, id quod docebam saepe esse concessum, nullam illa causa iustiorem fuisse. Tum omnem orationem traduxi et converti in increpandam Caepionis fugam, in deplorandum interitum exercitus: sic et eorum dolorem, qui lugebant suos, oratione refricabam et animos equitum Romanorum, apud quos tum iudices causa agebatur, ad Q. Caepionis odium, a quo erant ipsi propter iudicia abalienati, renovabam.

Then at last this orator must be so shaped by us, both in words and in thoughts, that, as those who use arms or the wrestling-school, he should think he has to have account not only of avoiding or striking, but also that he move with grace; as those who are versed in the handling of arms, so should he in words for the apt composition and becomingness, but in thoughts for the gravity of speech. Words and thoughts are shaped almost countlessly, which I know enough is known to you. But between the shaping of words and of thoughts there is this difference: that of words is removed if you change the words; that of thoughts remains, whatever words you wish to use.

Quod ubi sensi me in possessionem iudici ac defensionis meae constitisse, quod et populi benevolentiam mihi conciliaram, cuius ius etiam cum seditionis coniunctione defenderam, et iudicum animos totos vel calamitate civitatis vel luctu ac desiderio propinquorum vel odio proprio in Caepionem ad causam nostram converteram, tum admiscere huic generi orationis vehementi atque atroci genus illud alterum, de quo ante disputavi, lenitatis et mansuetudinis coepi: me pro meo sodali, qui mihi in liberum loco more maiorum esse deberet, et pro mea omni fama prope fortunisque decernere; nihil mihi ad existimationem turpius, nihil ad dolorem acerbius accidere posse, quam si is, qui saepe alienissimis a me, sed meis tamen civibus saluti existimarer fuisse, sodali meo auxilium ferre non potuissem.

Although you do this, I yet think you ought to be warned that you should not think there is anything else to be the orator’s, that is outstanding and wonderful, except, in single words, to hold those three things — that we should use transferred words frequently, sometimes coined, rarely also very ancient ones. In the continuous speech, when we have held both the smoothness of joining and the rationale of rhythms which I have spoken of, then must all speech, as it were with lights, be distinguished and frequented with thoughts and words.

Petebam a iudicibus ut illud aetati meae, ut honoribus, ut rebus gestis, si iusto, si pio dolore me esse adfectum viderent, concederent; praesertim si in aliis causis intellexissent omnia me semper pro amicorum periculis, nihil umquam pro me ipso deprecatum. Sic in illa omni defensione atque causa, quod esse in arte positum videbatur, ut de lege Appuleia dicerem, ut quid esset minuere maiestatem explicarem, perquam breviter perstrinxi atque attigi; his duabus partibus orationis, quarum altera commendationem habet, altera concitationem, quae minime praeceptis artium sunt perpolitae, omnis est a me illa causa tractata, ut et acerrimus in Caepionis invidia renovanda et in meis moribus erga meos necessarios declarandis mansuetissimus viderer: ita magis adfectis animis iudicum quam doctis, tua, Sulpici, est a nobis tum accusatio victa.’

For dwelling on one subject moves very much; and the bright unfolding and the placing of matters under the eye, almost as if they were being done; which both in setting forth a matter avail most, and for illustrating what is set forth, and for amplifying — so that to those who hear, what we shall amplify shall seem to be as great as speech can effect. To this is contrary often a running over; and signification of more for understanding than you have said; and the distinctly clipped brevity, and lessening, and joined to it the irony not strange to Caesar’s precepts;

Hic Sulpicius, ’vere hercle,’ inquit ’Antoni, ista commemoras; nam ego nihil umquam vidi, quod tam e manibus elaberetur, quam mihi tum est elapsa illa ipsa causa. Cum enim, quem ad modum dixisti, tibi ego non iudicium, sed incendium tradidissem, quod tuum principium, di immortales, fuit! qui timor! quae dubitatio, quanta haesitatio tractusque verborum! Ut tu illud initio, quod tibi unum ad ignoscendum homines dabant, tenuisti, te pro homine pernecessario, quaestore tuo, dicere! Quam tibi primum munisti ad te audiendum viam.

and digression from the subject, in which when there has been pleasure, then the return to the subject ought to be apt and neat. And the laying down of what you are to say; and a setting-apart from what has been said; and a return to the proposition, and repetition, and the apt closing of the reasoning. Then for the sake of amplifying or diminishing, the over-statement and going-beyond truth; and questioning, and a kind of inquiry akin to it, and the setting out of one’s own thought; then that which most as it were creeps into men’s minds: dissimulation that says other things and means other; which is most pleasing when it is handled not with the contention of speech but with conversation. Then doubt; then distribution; then correction either before or after you have spoken or when you reject something from yourself. There is also pre-fortification for what you are to attack, and casting onto another;

Ecce autem, cum te nihil aliud profecisse arbitrarer, nisi ut homines tibi civem improbum defendenti ignoscendum propter necessitudinem arbitrarentur, serpere occulte coepisti, nihil dum aliis suspicantibus, me vero iam pertimescente, ut illam non Norbani seditionem, sed populi Romani iracundiam neque eam iniustam, sed meritam ac debitam fuisse defenderes. Deinde qui locus a te praetermissus est in Caepionem? Ut tu illa omnia odio, invidia, misericordia miscuisti! Neque haec solum in defensione, sed etiam in Scauro ceterisque meis testibus, quorum testimonia non refellendo, sed ad eundem impetum populi confugiendo refutasti;

consultation, which is as it were deliberating with those very ones before whom you speak; the imitation of morals and life either in persons or without them — a great ornament of speech, apt for conciliating minds especially, but often also for moving;

quae cum abs te modo commemorarentur, equidem nulla praecepta desiderabam; ipsam tamen istam demonstrationem defensionum tuarum abs te ipso commemoratam doctrinam esse non mediocrem puto.’ ’Atqui, si ita placet,’ inquit Antonius ’trademus etiam, quae nos sequi in dicendo quaeque maxime spectare solemus; docuit enim iam nos longa vita ususque rerum maximarum, ut quibus rebus animi hominum moverentur teneremus.

the bringing in of feigned persons, the weightiest light of amplifying; description; the leading into error; an impulse to mirth; pre-occupation; then those two which most move: likeness and example; division; interruption; contention; reticence; commendation; some free voice and even unreining for the sake of amplifying; anger; rebuke; promise; entreaty; supplication; a brief turning aside from the proposition (not as the earlier digression); purgation; conciliation; injury; wishing and execration. With these lights mostly thoughts illustrate speech.

Equidem primum considerare soleo, postuletne causa; nam neque parvis in rebus adhibendae sunt hae dicendi faces neque ita animatis hominibus, ut nihil ad eorum mentis oratione flectendas proficere possimus, ne aut inrisione aut odio digni putemur, si aut tragoedias agamus in nugis aut convellere adoriamur ea, quae non possint commoveri.

Of speech itself, as of arms, there is either threat for use and as it were attack, or for grace itself. For doubling of words has sometimes force, sometimes charm; and a word a little changed and bent away; and the frequent repetition of the same word, now from the beginning, now turned to the end; and the rush upon the same words; and concourse and joining and progression and a kind of distinguishing of the same word more often placed; and the recalling of a word; and those that end alike or fall alike or are matched with equal returns or are like one another.

Iam quoniam haec fere maxime sunt in iudicum animis aut, quicumque illi erunt, apud quos agemus, oratione molienda, amor odium iracundia, invidia misericordia, spes laetitia, timor molestia: sentimus amorem conciliari, si id iure videamur, quod sit utile ipsis, apud quos agamus, defendere, aut si pro bonis viris aut certe pro eis, qui illis boni atque utiles sint, laborare, namque haec res amorem magis conciliat, illa virtutis defensio caritatem; plusque proficit, si proponitur spes utilitatis futurae quam praeteriti benefici commemoratio.

There is also a kind of climax and turning-back and neat transposition of words; and the contrary; and the loose; and turning aside; and reproof; and exclamation; and lessening; and what is set in many cases; and what, drawn from single matters proposed, is referred to single ones; and the reasoning subjoined to the proposition; and likewise in the distributed the reasoning placed under; and permission; and again another doubt; and something unforeseen; and enumeration; and another correction; and dispersion; and the continuous and the broken; and image; and answer to oneself; and changing; and disjunction; and order; and reference; and digression; and circumscription.

Enitendum est ut ostendas in ea re, quam defendas, aut dignitatem esse aut utilitatem, eumque, cui concilies hunc amorem, significes nihil ad utilitatem suam rettulisse ac nihil omnino fecisse causa sua; invidetur enim commodis hominum ipsorum, studiis autem eorum ceteris commodandi favetur.

These mostly, and like to these, or even more, are those things which by thoughts and shapings of words illustrate speech.” “Which I see you, Crassus,” said Cotta, “— because you think they are known to us — have poured out without definitions and without examples.” “For my part,” said Crassus, “I did not think those things either, which I said before, were new to you, but I obeyed all your wish.

Videndumque hoc loco est ne, quos ob benefacta diligi volemus, eorum laudem atque gloriam, cui maxime invideri solet, nimis efferre videamur; atque eisdem his ex locis et in alios odium struere discemus et a nobis ac nostris demovere; eademque haec genera sunt tractanda in iracundia vel excitanda vel sedanda; nam si, quod ipsis, qui audiunt, perniciosum aut inutile sit, id factum augeas, odium creatur; sin, quod aut in bonos viros aut in eos, quos minime quisque debuerit, aut in rem publicam, tum excitatur, si non tam acerbum odium, tamen aut invidiae aut odi non dissimilis offensio;

About these matters that sun has admonished me to be briefer, which itself now sliding has compelled me too to roll out these things almost slipping. But yet the demonstration of this kind, and the doctrine itself, is common; the use, however, is the weightiest, and in this whole study of speaking the most difficult.

item timor incutitur aut ex ipsorum periculis aut ex communibus: interior est ille proprius; sed hic quoque communis ad eandem similitudinem est perducendus. Par atque una ratio est spei, laetitiae, molestiae; sed haud sciam an acerrimus longe sit omnium motus invidiae nec minus virium opus sit in ea comprimenda quam in excitanda. Invident autem homines maxime paribus aut inferioribus, cum se relictos sentiunt, illos autem dolent evolasse; sed etiam superioribus invidetur saepe vehementer et eo magis, si intolerantius se iactant et aequabilitatem communis iuris praestantia dignitatis aut fortunae suae transeunt; quae si inflammanda sunt, maxime dicendum est non esse virtute parata, deinde etiam vitiis atque peccatis, tum, si erunt honestiora atque graviora, tamen non esse tanta illa merita, quantam insolentiam hominis quantumque fastidium;

Therefore, since about all the ornament of speech all topics have been, if not laid open, at least pointed out, now let us see what is apt — that is, what is most becoming in speech. Although that is plain — that not to every cause, nor every hearer, nor every person, nor every time does one kind of speech agree. For both capital cases require some kind of sound of words, another of private and small ones;

ad sedandum autem, magno illa labore, magnis periculis esse parta nec ad suum commodum, sed ad aliorum esse conlata; eum que, si quam gloriam peperisse videatur, tamen etsi ea non sit iniqua merces periculi, tamen ea non delectari totamque abicere atque deponere; omninoque perficiendum est, quoniam plerique sunt invidi maximeque hoc est commune vitium et perpetuum, invidetur autem praestanti florentique fortunae, ut haec opinio minuatur et illa excellens opinione fortuna cum laboribus et miseriis permixta esse videatur.

and another kind of speaking deliberations, another laudations, another judgments, another conversations, another consolation, another rebuke, another disputation, another history requires. It also matters who hear: senate or people or judges; many or few or single, and what kind. The orators themselves, of what age, honour, authority, must seem; the time, of peace or war, of haste or leisure.

Iam misericordia movetur, si is, qui audit, adduci potest ut illa, quae de altero deplorentur, ad suas res revocet, quas aut tulerit acerbas aut timeat, ut intuens alium crebro ad se ipsum revertatur; et cum singuli casus humanarum miseriarum graviter accipiuntur, si dicuntur dolenter, tum adflicta et prostrata virtus maxime luctuosa est. Et ut illa altera pars orationis, quae probitatis commendatione boni viri debet speciem tueri, lenis, ut saepe iam dixi, atque summissa, sic haec, quae suscipitur ab oratore ad commutandos animos atque omni ratione flectendos, intenta ac vehemens esse debet.

So in this place there is nothing that can seem to be precepted, save that we choose the figure of fuller and slenderer speech, and likewise of that middle, suited to what we shall be doing. The same ornaments may be used, sometimes more contendedly, sometimes more loosely. To be able in every matter to do what becomes is of art and nature; to know what becomes when, is of prudence.

Sed est quaedam in his duobus generibus, quorum alterum lene, alterum vehemens esse volumus, difficilis ad distinguendum similitudo; nam et ex illa lenitate, qua conciliamur eis, qui audiunt, ad hanc vim acerrimam, qua eosdem excitamus, influat oportet aliquid, et ex hac vi non numquam animi aliquid inflandum est illi lenitati; neque est ulla temperatior oratio quam illa, in qua asperitas contentionis oratoris ipsius humanitate conditur, remissio autem lenitatis quadam gravitate et contentione firmatur.

But all these things are as they are delivered. Delivery, I say, in speaking, alone is queen. Without this the highest orator can be in no number, and one of middling ability, equipped with this, often surpasses the highest. Demosthenes is said to have given to delivery the first place, when he was asked what was first in speaking; to it the second; to it the third. From which that of Aeschines also seems to me even better said: who, when on account of the disgrace of his trial he had withdrawn from Athens and had betaken himself to Rhodes, asked by the Rhodians, is reported to have read that outstanding speech which he had spoken in Ctesiphon against Demosthenes. When he had read it through, he was asked the next day to read also that which had been said on the other side by Demosthenes for Ctesiphon. When he had read it with most sweet and great voice, all wondering: “How much,” he said, “would you have wondered, if you had heard the man himself!” From which he sufficiently signified how much was in delivery, since he thought the same speech would be another with the speaker changed.

In utroque autem genere dicendi et illo, in quo vis atque contentio quaeritur, et hoc, quod ad vitam et mores accommodatur, et principia tarda sunt et exitus item spissi et producti esse debent. Nam neque adsiliendum statim est ad genus illud orationis; abest enim totum a causa et homines prius ipsum illud, quod proprium sui iudici est, audire desiderant; nec cum in eam rationem ingressus sis, celeriter discedendum est;

What was there in Gracchus, whom you better remember, Catulus, that, when I was a boy, was so greatly noted? “Whither, wretched, shall I betake me? Whither shall I turn? To the Capitol? But it is wet with my brother’s blood. Or home? That I see my mother lamenting, wretched, and cast down?” Which were so delivered by him, by his eyes, voice, gesture, that even his enemies could not hold back their tears. These things I say at greater length, because this whole kind orators (who are actors of truth itself) have left, while imitators of truth — actors — have seized it.

non enim, sicut argumentum, simul atque positum est, adripitur alterumque et tertium poscitur, ita misericordiam aut invidiam aut iracundiam, simul atque intuleris, possis commovere: argumentum ratio ipsa confirmat idque, simul atque emissum est, adhaerescit; illud autem genus orationis non cognitionem iudicis, sed magis perturbationem requirit, quam consequi nisi multa et varia et copiosa oratione et simili contentione actionis nemo potest;

Without doubt in every matter truth conquers imitation; but if it could effect enough in delivery by itself, we should not have need of art at all. But because the movement of the soul, which most must be either declared or imitated by delivery, is often so disturbed that it is obscured and almost overwhelmed, those things must be shaken off which obscure, and those which are eminent and ready must be taken.

qua re qui aut breviter aut summisse dicunt, docere iudicem possunt, commovere non possunt; in quo sunt omnia. Iam illud perspicuum est, omnium rerum in contrarias partis facultatem ex eisdem suppeditari locis. Sed argumento resistendum est aut eis, quae comprobandi eius causa sumuntur, reprehendendis aut demonstrando, id, quod concludere illi velint, non effici ex propositis nec esse consequens, aut, si ita non refellas, adferendum est in contrariam partem, quod sit aut gravius aut aeque grave.

For every motion of the soul has from nature its own face and sound and gesture; and the whole body of a man, and all his face, and all his voices, like strings on a lyre, so sound, as they are struck by the motion of the soul. For voices, like chords, are stretched, which respond to each touch — sharp, low; quick, slow; great, small. Among all of which yet there is in each kind a moderate one; and from these have flowed several other kinds: smooth, harsh; contracted, diffuse; with continuous, with broken breath; broken, split; thinned, swelled with bent sound;

Illa autem, quae aut conciliationis causa leniter aut permotionis vehementer aguntur, contrariis commotionibus auferenda sunt, ut odio benevolentia, ut misericordia invidia tollatur. Suavis autem est et vehementer saepe utilis iocus et facetiae; quae, etiam si alia omnia tradi arte possunt, naturae sunt propria certe neque ullam artem desiderant: in quibus tu longe aliis mea sententia, Caesar, excellis; quo magis mihi etiam aut testis esse potes nullam esse artem salis aut, si qua est, eam tu potissimum nos docere.’

for there is none of these kinds which is not handled by art and moderation. These are set out for the actor, as for the painter, for varying his colours. For one kind of voice anger takes for itself: sharp, urged on, frequently breaking off: “My brother himself urges me, wretched, to deliver my children to the jaws” — and what you, Antonius, brought forward a little while ago: “Did you dare to set yourself apart” and “Will any one notice this? Bind, beat” — and almost the whole of Atreus. Another, pity and grief: flexible, full, broken, with a tearful voice: “Whither now shall I turn me? What way shall I begin to enter? My father’s house? Or to the daughters of Pelias?” And: “O father, O country, O house of Priam!” — and what follows: “All this I saw burning, and Priam’s life torn from him by force.”

’Ego vero,’ inquit ’omni de re facilius puto esse ab homine non inurbano, quam de ipsis facetiis disputari. Itaque cum quosdam Graecos inscriptos libros esse vidissem de ridiculis, non nullam in spem veneram posse me ex eis aliquid discere; inveni autem ridicula et salsa multa Graecorum; nam et Siculi in eo genere et Rhodii et Byzantii et praeter ceteros Attici excellunt; sed qui eius rei rationem quandam conati sunt artemque tradere, sic insulsi exstiterunt, ut nihil aliud eorum nisi ipsa insulsitas rideatur;

Another, fear: lowered and hesitating and cast down: “In many ways have I been beset — by sickness, exile, and want; then panic has crushed all my wisdom from my breath; my mother threatens dire torment of life and death — what no one is of so firm a mind and so great confidence that he will not feel his blood shrink with fear and grow pale.”

qua re mihi quidem nullo modo videtur doctrina ista res posse tradi. Etenim cum duo genera sint facetiarum, alterum aequabiliter in omni sermone fusum, alterum peracutum et breve, illa a veteribus superior cavillatio, haec altera dicacitas nominata est. Leve nomen habet utraque res. Quippe; leve enim est totum hoc risum movere.

Another, force: stretched, vehement, threatening with a kind of impulse of weight: “Again Thyestes comes attended by Atreus; again now he comes upon me, rouses me from rest. A greater mass for me, a greater evil to be mixed, that I may dash and crush his bitter heart.” Another, pleasure: poured out, gentle, tender, cheerful, slack: “But when she had brought to herself the wreath for binding the marriage, while she pretended to give it eagerly to herself, then to you, gaily, learnedly and daintily, she brought it.” Another, distress: without pity, somewhat heavy and brought through with one pressing and tone: “In the season when Paris joined Helen in unwedded marriage, I was then heavy with child, having now fulfilled my months for bearing; at the same time Hecuba bore Polydorus, her last child.”

Verum tamen, ut dicis, Antoni, multum in causis persaepe lepore et facetiis profici vidi. Sed cum illo in genere perpetuae festivitatis ars non desideretur (natura enim fingit homines et creat imitatores et narratores facetos adiuvante et vultu et voce et ipso genere sermonis) tum vero in hoc altero dicacitatis quid habet ars loci, cum ante illud facete dictum emissum haerere debeat, quam cogitari potuisse videatur?

All these motions gesture must follow — not that of the stage, expressing words, but declaring the whole matter and thought, not by demonstration but by signification, with the inflection of the sides, this strong and manly, not from the stage and from actors but from arms or even from the wrestling-school. The hand less talkative, with the fingers following the words, not expressing them; the arm thrown out longer, like a kind of weapon of speech; the stamp of the foot at the beginning or end of contention.

Quid enim hic meus frater ab arte adiuvari potuit, cum a Philippo interrogatus quid latraret, furem se videre respondit? Quid in omni oratione Crassus vel apud centum viros contra Scaevolam vel contra accusatorem Brutum, cum pro Cn. Plancio diceret? Nam id, quod tu mihi tribuis, Antoni, Crasso est omnium sententia concedendum; non enim fere quisquam reperietur praeter hunc in utroque genere leporis excellens: et illo, quod in perpetuitate sermonis, et hoc, quod in celeritate atque dicto est.

But all is in the face; in the face itself the eyes hold the lordship over all. Wherefore those old men of ours, who used not to praise even Roscius greatly when he wore a mask. For all action is of the soul, and the face is the image of the soul; the eyes its indicators. For this is the one part of the body which can produce as many significations and changes as there are motions of the soul. Nor is there anyone who could produce the same with eyes shut. Theophrastus indeed says one Tauriscus was wont to call an actor turned away who, in delivering, was looking at something.

Nam haec perpetua contra Scaevolam Curiana defensio tota redundavit hilaritate quadam et ioco; dicta illa brevia non habuit; parcebat enim adversari dignitati, in quo ipse conservabat suam; quod est hominibus facetis et dicacibus difficillimum, habere hominum rationem et temporum et ea, quae occurrunt, cum salsissime dici possunt, tenere; itaque non nulli ridiculi homines hoc ipsum non insulse interpretantur;

So great moderation is of the eyes. For the look of the face must not be too much changed, lest we be carried either to ineptitudes or to some crookedness; the eyes are those by whose intentness, slackness, glance, mirth, we should signify the motions of soul aptly with the very kind of speech. For delivery is, as it were, the speech of the body, the more it must be agreeable to the mind. The eyes, however, nature gave us — as to a horse or lion bristles, tail, ears — for declaring the motions of the soul.

dicere enim aiunt Ennium, flammam a sapiente facilius ore in ardente opprimi, quam bona dicta teneat; haec scilicet bona dicta, quae salsa sint; nam ea dicta appellantur proprio iam nomine. Sed ut in Scaevola continuit ea Crassus atque in illo altero genere, in quo nulli aculei contumeliarum inerant, causam illam disputationemque e lusit, sic in Bruto, quem oderat et quem dignum contumelia iudicabat, utroque genere pugnavit.

Therefore in our delivery, after the voice, the face avails most; and that is governed by the eyes. And in all those things which belong to delivery, there is some force given by nature; for which reason it is by this also that the unskilled, the multitude, indeed the foreigners are most moved. For words move no one save him who is joined by the fellowship of the same tongue. Often keen thoughts also fly past the senses of men not keen. Delivery, which carries on its face the motion of soul, moves all. For all are stirred by the same motions of soul, and recognise them by the same marks in others, and indicate them in themselves.

Quam multa de balneis, quas nuper ille vendiderat, quam multa de amisso patrimonio dixit! Atque illa brevia, cum ille diceret se sine causa sudare, "minime" inquit "modo enim existi de balneis." Innumerabilia alia fuerunt, sed non minus iucunda illa perpetua: cum enim Brutus duo lectores excitasset et alteri de colonia Narbonensi Crassi orationem legendam dedisset, alteri de lege Servilia, et cum contraria inter sese de re publica capita contulisset, noster hic facetissime tris patris Bruti de iure civili libellos tribus legendos dedit.

For the use and praise of delivery the voice without doubt holds the greatest part; which we must first wish for; then, whatever it shall be, we must guard it. About which it is no part of this kind of precepts how the voice should be served — although I much think it should be served. But this seems not foreign to the duty of this our conversation: that, as I said a little before, in most things what is most useful is also, somehow, most becoming. For nothing is more useful for keeping the voice than frequent change; nothing more harmful than uninterrupted, poured-out contention.

Ex libro primo: "forte evenit ut in Privernati essemus." "Brute, testificatur pater se tibi Privernatem fundum reliquisse." Deinde ex libro secundo: "in Albano eramus ego et Marcus filius." "Sapiens videlicet homo cum primis nostrae civitatis norat hunc gurgitem; metuebat ne, cum is nihil haberet, nihil esse ei relictum putaretur." Tum ex libro tertio, in quo finem scribendi fecit—tot enim, ut audivi Scaevolam dicere, sunt veri Bruti libri—"in Tiburti forte adsedimus ego et Marcus filius." "Ubi sunt hi fundi, Brute, quos tibi pater publicis commentariis consignatos reliquit? Quod nisi puberem te, inquit, iam haberet, quartum librum composuisset et se

What is more apt for our ears and the sweetness of delivery than alternation, variety, change? So that same Gracchus — what you can hear, Catulus, from Licinius your client, a lettered man, whom Gracchus had as a slave at hand — was wont to have, with a little ivory pipe, a man standing secretly behind him when he spoke in assembly, an expert who would quickly blow that note by which he could either rouse him when slack or call him back from contention.” “By Hercules, I have heard,” said Catulus, “and I have often admired that man’s diligence as also learning and science.”

etiam in balneis lotum cum filio scriptum reliquisset." Quis est igitur qui non fateatur hoc lepore atque his facetiis non minus refutatum esse Brutum quam illis tragoediis, quas egit idem, cum casu in eadem causa efferretur anus Iunia. Pro di immortales, quae fuit illa, quanta vis! quam inexspectata! quam repentina! cum coniectis oculis, gestu omni ei imminenti, summa gravitate et celeritate verborum "Brute, quid sedes? Quid illam anum patri nuntiare vis tuo? Quid illis omnibus, quorum imagines duci vides? Quid maioribus tuis? Quid L. Bruto, qui hunc populum dominatu regio liberavit? Quid te agere? Cui rei, cui gloriae, cui virtuti studere? Patrimonione augendo? At id non est nobilitatis.

“For my part,” said Crassus, “I am also grieved that those men slipped into that ruin in the commonwealth. But that net is being woven, and that rationale of living in the state is shown to posterity, that we now desire to have like to those citizens whom our fathers did not bear.” “Let go, I beg, that conversation, Crassus,” said Iulius, “and bring yourself back to Gracchus’s pipe; whose rationale I do not yet plainly understand.”

Sed fac esse, nihil superest; libidines totum dissipaverunt. An iuri civili? Est paternum. Sed dicet te, cum aedis venderes, ne in rutis quidem et caesis solium tibi paternum recepisse. An rei militari? Qui numquam castra videris! An eloquentiae? Quae neque est in te, et, quicquid est vocis ac linguae, omne in istum turpissimum calumniae quaestum contulisti! Tu lucem aspicere audes? Tu hos intueri? Tu in foro, tu in urbe, tu in civium esse conspectu? Tu illam mortuam, tu imagines ipsas non perhorrescis? Quibus non modo imitandis, sed ne conlocandis

“In every voice,” said Crassus, “there is something middle, but each voice has its own. From this it is useful and pleasant to ascend the voice gradually (for to shout from the start is something rustic), and the same is salutary for confirming the voice. Then there is some extreme of contention, which yet is more inward than the sharpest cry, beyond which the pipe will not let you advance, and now from the very contention will call you back. There is likewise on the contrary something heaviest in slackness, by which one descends as it were by steps of sounds. This variety, and this course through all sounds of voice, will both keep itself, and bring sweetness to delivery. But you will leave the piper at home; the sense of this habit you will bring with you to the Forum.

quidem tibi locum ullum reliquisti." Sed haec tragica atque divina; faceta autem et urbana innumerabilia vel ex una contione meministis; nec enim maior contentio umquam fuit nec apud populum gravior oratio quam huius contra conlegam in censura nuper neque lepore et festivitate conditior. Qua re tibi, Antoni, utrumque adsentior et multum facetias in dicendo prodesse saepe et eas arte nullo modo posse tradi: illud quidem admiror, te nobis in eo genere tribuisse tantum et non huius rei quoque palmam ut ceterarum Crasso detulisse.’

I have brought out what I could, not as I wished but as the straits of time have compelled me; for it is well noted to charge the matter on time, when, if you wished, you could not bring more.” “You yourself,” said Catulus, “have gathered everything, as far as I can judge, so divinely, that you seem not to have taken from the Greeks but to be able to teach those very ones these things. I am glad to have been made partaker of this conversation; and I should have wished my son-in-law, your friend, Hortensius, had been present, whom indeed I trust to be outstanding in all the praises which you have embraced in your speech.”

Tum Antonius ’ego vero ita fecissem,’ inquit ’nisi interdum in hoc Crasso paulum inviderem; nam esse quamvis facetum atque salsum non nimis est per se ipsum invidendum; sed cum omnium sit venustissimus et urbanissimus, omnium gravissimum et severissimum et esse et videri, quod isti contigit uni, id mihi vix ferendum videbatur.’

And Crassus: “You say ‘to be’?” he said. “I now judge him so to be, and so judged when, in my consulship, he defended the cause of Africa in the senate, and lately, even more, when he spoke for the king of Bithynia. So you see rightly, Catulus. For I see that to that young man neither nature nor learning is wanting.

Hic cum adrisisset ipse Crassus, ’ac tamen,’ inquit Antonius ’cum artem esse facetiarum, Iuli, ullam negares, aperuisti quiddam, quod praecipiendum videretur: haberi enim dixisti rationem oportere hominum, rei, temporis, ne quid iocus de gravitate decerperet; quod quidem in primis a Crasso observari solet. Sed hoc praeceptum praetermittendarum est facetiarum, cum eis nihil opus sit; nos autem quo modo utamur, cum opus sit, quaerimus, ut in adversarium et maxime, si eius stultitia poterit agitari; in testem stultum, cupidum, levem, si facile homines audituri videbuntur.

The more, Cotta, you must keep watch and labour, and you, Sulpicius. For he is no middling orator who, as it were, springs up into your generation, but with most keen talent and burning zeal and outstanding learning and singular memory. Whom, although I favour, I yet wish him to excel his own age; that he should outrun you who are so much younger is scarcely honourable.” “But now let us rise,” he said, “and let us care for ourselves and at last loosen our minds and care from this contention of disputation.”

Omnino probabiliora sunt, quae lacessiti dicimus quam quae priores, nam et ingeni celeritas maior est, quae apparet in respondendo, et humanitatis est responsio; videmur enim quieturi fuisse, nisi essemus lacessiti, ut in ipsa ista contione nihil fere dictum est ab hoc, quod quidem facetius dictum videretur, quod non provocatus responderit; erat autem tanta in Domitio gravitas, tanta auctoritas, ut, quod esset ab eo obiectum, lepore magis levandum quam contentione frangendum videretur.’

Then Sulpicius: “What then? Shall we suffer Caesar,” he said, “— who though he yields wit to M. Crassus, yet himself works much more in this study — not to set out for us this whole kind of joking: what it is and whence it is drawn? — especially since he confesses that the force and usefulness of salt and urbanity are so great?” “What if,” said Iulius, “I agree with Antonius when he says there is no art of salt?”

Tum Sulpicius ’quid igitur? Patiemur’ inquit ’Caesarem, qui quamquam M. Crasso facetias concedit, tamen multo in eo studio magis ipse elaborat, non explicare nobis totum genus hoc iocandi quale sit et unde ducatur; praesertim cum tantam vim et utilitatem salis et urbanitatis esse fateatur?’ ’Quid, si’ inquit Iulius ’adsentior Antonio dicenti nullam esse artem salis?’

Here, when Sulpicius had fallen silent, “As if,” said Crassus, “of these things themselves of which Antonius has long been speaking there were any art. There is a certain observation, as he himself said, of those things which avail in speaking. If this could make men eloquent, who would not be eloquent? For who could not learn these things either easily or surely in some way? But I think there is in these precepts this force and this usefulness: not that we should be led by art to discovering what to say, but that those things which we attain by nature, by zeal, by exercise, we may either trust to be right or understand to be faulty, when we have learned with what they should be referred.

Hic cum Sulpicius reticuisset, ’quasi vero’ inquit Crassus ’horum ipsorum, de quibus Antonius iam diu loquitur, ars ulla sit: observatio quaedam est, ut ipse dixit, earum rerum, quae in dicendo valent; quae si eloquentis facere posset, quis esset non eloquens? Quis enim haec non vel facile vel certe aliquo modo posset ediscere? Sed ego in his praeceptis hanc vim et hanc utilitatem esse arbitror, non ut ad reperiendum quod dicamus, arte ducamur sed ut ea, quae natura, quae studio, quae exercitatione consequimur, aut recta esse confidamus aut prava intellegamus, cum quo referenda sint didicerimus.

Therefore, Caesar, I too ask you: that, if you please, you should argue about this whole kind of joking, what you feel — lest some part of speaking, since you have so wished, in this such gathering and in so careful a conversation, seem to have been passed over.” “For my part,” said he, “since you exact the contribution from a guest, Crassus, I shall not bring it about that, by fleeing, I should give you any reason for refusing. Although I am wont often to wonder at the impudence of those who play their part on the stage when Roscius is looking on; for who can move himself, whose faults that man does not see? So I now, with Crassus listening, shall first speak about wit, and shall teach as it were the sow how to talk to the orator — whom, when Catulus had lately heard, he said the others ought to be grass.”

Qua re, Caesar, ego quoque hoc a te peto, ut, si tibi videtur, disputes de hoc toto iocandi genere quid sentias, ne qua forte dicendi pars, quoniam ita voluistis, in hoc tali coetu atque in tam accurato sermone praeterita esse videatur.’ ’Ego vero,’ inquit ille ’quoniam conlectam a conviva, Crasse, exigis, non committam ut, si defugerim, tibi causam aliquam recusandi dem. Quamquam soleo saepe mirari eorum impudentiam, qui agunt in scaena gestum inspectante Roscio; quis enim sese commovere potest, cuius ille vitia non videat? Sic ego nunc, Crasso audiente, primum loquar de facetiis et docebo sus, ut aiunt, oratorem eum, quem cum Catulus nuper audisset, faenum alios aiebat esse oportere.’

Then he: “Catulus was joking,” he said, “especially since he himself so speaks that he seems should be fed on ambrosia. But let us hear you, Caesar, that we may see Antonius’s remaining matter.” And Antonius: “Very few things remain to me,” he said, “but yet, weary now from my labour and journey of disputation, I shall rest in Caesar’s speech as in some most opportune wayside inn.” “Yet,” said Iulius, “you will say my hospitality is not too generous; for as soon as you have tasted ever so little I shall thrust you out and cast you on the road.

Tum ille ’iocabatur’ inquit ’Catulus, praesertim cum ita dicat ipse, ut ambrosia alendus esse videatur. Verum te, Caesar, audiamus, ut Antoni reliqua videamus.’ Et Antonius ’perpauca quidem mihi restant,’ inquit ’sed tamen defessus iam labore atque itinere disputationis meae requiescam in Caesaris sermone quasi in aliquo peropportuno deversorio.’ ’Atqui’ inquit Iulius ’non nimis liberale hospitium meum dices; nam te in viam, simul ac perpaulum gustaris, extrudam et eiciam.

And lest I keep you longer, I shall set out very briefly what I think of this whole subject. About laughter there are five things to be asked: first, what it is; second, whence it is; third, whether it is the orator’s part to wish to stir laughter; fourth, how far; fifth, what the kinds of laughable things are. As for the first — what laughter itself is, by what means it is roused, where it lies, in what way it arises and so suddenly bursts out that we cannot hold it back when we wish, and how at once it seizes the sides, the mouth, the veins, the eyes, the face — let Democritus see to it. For this does not concern this conversation; and even if it concerned it, I should not be ashamed of not knowing what not even those knew who promised it.

Ac ne diutius vos demorer, de omni isto genere quid sentiam perbreviter exponam. De risu quinque sunt, quae quaerantur: unum, quid sit; alterum, unde sit; tertium, sitne oratoris risum velle movere; quartum, quatenus; quintum, quae sint genera ridiculi. Atque illud primum, quid sit ipse risus, quo pacto concitetur, ubi sit, quo modo exsistat atque ita repente erumpat, ut eum cupientes tenere nequeamus, et quo modo simul latera, os, venas, oculos, vultum occupet, viderit Democritus; neque enim ad hunc sermonem hoc pertinet, et, si pertineret, nescire me tamen id non puderet, quod ne illi quidem scirent, qui pollicerentur.

The seat and as it were the region of the laughable — this is what we ask next — is contained in a certain ugliness and deformity. For these things are laughed at, alone or chiefly, which mark and point out some ugliness, but not in an ugly way. As for the third question — it is plainly the orator’s part to stir laughter, either because cheerfulness itself wins goodwill for the man through whom it has been roused; or because all admire the keenness often set in one word, especially of him who answers, sometimes also of him who challenges; or because it breaks the adversary, hinders him, lightens him, deters him, refutes him; or because it shows that the orator himself is a polished man, learned, urbane, and most of all because it softens and relaxes gloom and severity, and often dissolves by jest and laughter hateful matters which are not easily to be dissolved by arguments.

Locus autem et regio quasi ridiculi—nam id proxime quaeritur—turpitudine et deformitate quadam continetur; haec enim ridentur vel sola vel maxime, quae notant et designant turpitudinem aliquam non turpiter. Est autem, ut ad illud tertium veniam, est plane oratoris movere risum; vel quod ipsa hilaritas benevolentiam conciliat ei, per quem excitata est; vel quod admirantur omnes acumen uno saepe in verbo positum maxime respondentis, non numquam etiam lacessentis; vel quod frangit adversarium, quod impedit, quod elevat, quod deterret, quod refutat; vel quod ipsum oratorem politum esse hominem significat, quod eruditum, quod urbanum, maxime quod tristitiam ac severitatem mitigat et relaxat odiosasque res saepe, quas argumentis dilui non facile est, ioco risuque dissolvit.

How far the laughable is to be handled by the orator must be looked at most diligently — which we put in the fourth place. For neither marked wickedness joined with crime, nor in turn marked misery, is the subject of laughter. For the criminal men prefer to be wounded by some greater force than that of the laughable; the wretched they are unwilling to mock, unless they happen to flaunt themselves. We must spare especially the affection in which men are held, lest we speak rashly against those who are loved.

Quatenus autem sint ridicula tractanda oratori, perquam diligenter videndum est, quod in quarto loco quaerendi posueramus. Nam nec insignis improbitas et scelere iuncta nec rursus miseria insignis agitata ridetur: facinerosos enim maiore quadam vi quam ridiculi vulnerari volunt; miseros inludi nolunt, nisi se forte iactant; parcendum autem maxime est caritati hominum, ne temere in eos dicas, qui diliguntur.

This moderation, then, must first be applied in jesting; therefore those things are most easily made play of which deserve neither great hatred nor the greatest pity. For which reason all the matter of the laughable is in those vices which are in the life of men neither dear nor calamitous, nor of those who seem to be hurried off to punishment for crime; and these, prettily handled, are laughed at.

Haec igitur adhibenda est primum in iocando moderatio; itaque ea facillime luduntur, quae neque odio magno neque misericordia maxima digna sunt; quam ob rem materies omnis ridiculorum est in eis vitiis, quae sunt in vita hominum neque carorum neque calamitosorum neque eorum, qui ob facinus ad supplicium rapiendi videntur; eaque belle agitata ridentur.

The deformity and faults of the body are also a sufficiently pretty matter for jesting; but we ask the same as in other matters most must be asked: how far. In which not only is this prescribed — that nothing should be done dully — but also, even if you can speak most laughably, both must be avoided by the orator: that the jest be neither buffoonish nor mimic. What sort these are, we shall now more easily understand when we come to the very kinds of the laughable. For there are two kinds of wit, one of which is handled in a thing, the other in a saying:

Est etiam deformitatis et corporis vitiorum satis bella materies ad iocandum; sed quaerimus idem, quod in ceteris rebus maxime quaerendum est, quatenus; in quo non modo illud praecipitur, ne quid insulse, sed etiam, si quid perridicule possis, vitandum est oratori utrumque, ne aut scurrilis iocus sit aut mimicus. Quae cuius modi sint facilius iam intellegemus, cum ad ipsa ridiculorum genera venerimus. Duo sunt enim genera facetiarum, quorum alterum re tractatur, alterum dicto:

in a thing, whenever something is told as in a kind of little story — as you once, Crassus, against Memmius: that he had bitten the arm of Largus when at Tarracina they had quarrelled with him about a girl. The whole story was salty, and yet wholly invented by yourself. You added a closing piece: that throughout Tarracina then on all the walls had been inscribed the letters “L. L. L. M. M.”; and when you asked what this was, some old townsman had told you,

re, si quando quid tamquam aliqua fabella narratur, ut olim tu, Crasse, in Memmium, comedisse eum lacertum Largi, cum esset cum eo Tarracinae de amicula rixatus: salsa, ac tamen a te ipso ficta tota narratio; addidisti clausulam: tota Tarracina tum omnibus in parietibus inscriptas fuisse litteras L. L. L. M. M.; cum quaereres id quid esset, senem tibi quendam oppidanum dixisse:

“Lacerat lacertum Largi mordax Memmius” — “Snappy Memmius lacerates the arm of Largus.” You see how witty this kind is, how elegant, how oratorical — whether you have something true to tell, which is yet to be sprinkled with little fictions, or whether you invent. The virtue of this kind is that you should so set forth what was done that the morals of the man you are telling about, his speech, his face, all things, may be expressed; that to those who hear, those things may seem to be then and there happening and being done.

"lacerat lacertum Largi mordax Memmius." Perspicitis genus hoc quam sit facetum, quam elegans, quam oratorium, sive habeas vere quod narrare possis, quod tamen est mendaciunculis aspergendum, sive fingas. Est autem huius generis virtus, ut ita facta demonstres, ut mores eius, de quo narres, ut sermo, ut vultus omnes exprimantur, ut eis, qui audiunt, tum geri illa fierique videantur.

The laughable is also in the thing which is wont to be drawn from a certain corrupted imitation, as the same Crassus: “By your nobility, by your family!” What else made the assembly laugh, but that imitation of his face and voice? But when he said, “By your statues!” and added a little even of gesture by stretching out his arm, we laughed more vehemently. Of this kind is that famous Roscian imitation of an old man: “For you, Antipho, do I sow these things, he says; it is doting old age, when I hear.” Yet this whole kind is so laughable that it must be handled most cautiously. For it belongs to mimes and to character-actors, if the imitation is too much — like obscenity. The orator should snatch the imitation, that he who hears may think more than he sees; he should also keep up his free-born manner and modesty by avoiding ugliness of words and obscenity of things.

In re est item ridiculum, quod ex quadam depravata imitatione sumi solet, ut idem Crassus: "per tuam nobilitatem, per vestram familiam!" Quid aliud fuit, in quo contio rideret, nisi illa vultus et vocis imitatio? "Per tuas statuas!" vero cum dixit et extento bracchio paulum etiam de gestu addidit, vehementius risimus. Ex hoc genere est illa Rosciana imitatio senis: "tibi ego, Antipho, has sero, inquit; seniumst, quom audio." Atqui ita est totum hoc ipso genere ridiculum, ut cautissime tractandum sit; mimorum est enim et ethologorum, si nimia est imitatio, sicut obscenitas. Orator surripiat oportet imitationem, ut is, qui audiet, cogitet plura quam videat; praestet idem ingenuitatem et ruborem suum verborum turpitudine et rerum obscenitate vitanda.

These are the two kinds of the laughable which is set in the thing, which are proper to continuous wit, in which men’s morals are described and so shaped that — either by some matter narrated, of what kind they are, may be understood, or by an imitation briefly thrown in upon some marked vice — they may be detected for derision.

Ergo haec duo genera sunt eius ridiculi, quod in re positum est, quae sunt propria perpetuarum facetiarum, in quibus describuntur hominum mores et ita effinguntur, ut aut re narrata aliqua quales sint intellegantur aut imitatione breviter iniecta in aliquo insigni ad inridendum vitio reperiantur.

In the saying, however, the laughable is what is moved by some keenness of word or thought; but as in that earlier kind of either narration or imitation the likeness of mimes and character-actors must be avoided, so in this the buffoonish quickness of tongue must be most greatly fled by the orator. How then shall we distinguish from Crassus, from Catulus, from the rest, your friend Granius, or my friend Vargula? It does not, by Hercules, come into my mind. For they are quick-tongued; than Granius, indeed, none was quicker. This, I think, first: that we should not feel bound to say a saying every time one can be said.

In dicto autem ridiculum est id, quod verbi aut sententiae quodam acumine movetur; sed ut in illo superiore genere vel narrationis vel imitationis vitanda est mimorum et ethologorum similitudo, sic in hoc scurrilis oratori dicacitas magno opere fugienda est. Qui igitur distinguemus a Crasso, a Catulo, a ceteris familiarem vestrum Granium aut Vargulam amicum meum? Non me hercule in mentem mihi quidem venit: sunt enim dicaces; Granio quidem nemo dicacior. Hoc, opinor, primum, ne, quotienscumque potuerit dictum dici, necesse habeamus dicere.

A tiny witness came forward. “May I question him?” said Philippus. Then the questor, hurrying: “Only briefly.” Hereupon he: “You will not accuse me — I shall question him very tinily.” Witty. But the judge sitting was L. Aurifex, shorter himself than even the witness; the whole laugh was turned upon the judge: the witticism seemed wholly buffoonish. Therefore those things which can fall on those whom you would not wish, however pretty they are, are still by their kind buffoonish;

Pusillus testis processit. "Licet" inquit "rogare?" Philippus. Tum quaesitor properans "modo breviter." Hic ille "non accusabis: perpusillum rogabo." Ridicule. Sed sedebat iudex L. Aurifex brevior ipse quam testis etiam: omnis est risus in iudicem conversus; visum est totum scurrile ridiculum. Ergo haec, quae cadere possunt in quos nolis, quamvis sint bella, sunt tamen ipso genere scurrilia;

as that fellow who wishes to be quick-tongued — and by Hercules he is — Appius; but sometimes he slips into this buffoonish fault. “I will dine with you,” he said to my friend Gaius Sextius, who has only one eye, “for I see there is room for one only.” This is buffoonish, both because he challenged without cause, and because he yet said what would fit all one-eyed men. These things, because they are thought premeditated, are less laughed at. That outstanding answer of Sextius, on the spot: “Wash your hand,” he said,

ut iste, qui se vult dicacem et me hercule est, Appius, sed non numquam in hoc vitium scurrile delabitur. "Cenabo" inquit "apud te," huic lusco familiari meo, C. Sextio; "uni enim locum esse video." Est hoc scurrile, et quod sine causa lacessivit et tamen id dixit, quod in omnis luscos conveniret; ea, quia meditata putantur esse, minus ridentur: illud egregium Sexti et ex tempore "manus lava"

“and dine.” So observation of the time and the moderation of the wit itself, and the temperance and rarity of sayings, will distinguish the orator from the buffoon — also that we speak with a cause, not so as to seem laughable, but so as to gain something; while they speak the whole day and without cause. For what did Vargula gain when, when the candidate A. Sempronius had embraced him with his brother Marcus: “Boy, drive off the flies”? He was hunting laughter — which is, in my judgment, the slenderest fruit of talent. The time of speaking, then, we shall measure by prudence and gravity. Would that we had some art for these! But mistress is nature.

inquit "et cena." Temporis igitur ratio et ipsius dicacitatis moderatio et temperantia et raritas dictorum distinguent oratorem a scurra, et quod nos cum causa dicimus, non ut ridiculi videamur, sed ut proficiamus aliquid, illi totum diem et sine causa. Quid enim est Vargula adsecutus, cum eum candidatus A. Sempronius cum M. fratre suo complexus esset "puer, abige muscas"? Risum quaesivit, qui est mea sententia vel tenuissimus ingeni fructus. Tempus igitur dicendi prudentia et gravitate moderabimur; quarum utinam artem aliquam haberemus! Sed domina natura est.

Now let us set out summarily the kinds themselves which most stir laughter. Let this then be the first division: that what is wittily said has its wit at one time in the matter, at another in the word; men are most delighted, however, if at any time the laughter is moved jointly by matter and word together. But remember this: whatever topics I shall touch, from which the laughable is drawn — from those same topics weighty thoughts can also be drawn. So great is the difference, that gravity is set in honest and severe matters, jest in slightly base and as it were misshapen ones — as we may both praise an honest slave with the same words, and, if he is worthless, joke. Laughable is that old saying of Nero about a thievish slave: that he was the only one in whose case nothing at home was either sealed or shut up — which same thing is wont to be said of a good slave.

Nunc exponamus genera ipsa summatim, quae risum maxime moveant. Haec igitur sit prima partitio, quod facete dicatur, id alias in re habere, alias in verbo facetias; maxime autem homines delectari, si quando risus coniuncte re verboque moveatur. Sed hoc mementote, quoscumque locos attingam, unde ridicula ducantur, ex eisdem locis fere etiam gravis sententias posse duci: tantum interest, quod gravitas honestis in rebus severisque, iocus in turpiculis et quasi deformibus ponitur, velut eisdem verbis et laudare frugi servum possimus et, si est nequam, iocari. Ridiculum est illud Neronianum vetus in furaci servo: solum esse, cui domi nihil sit nec obsignatum nec occlusum, quod idem in bono servo dici solet.

But this is by the same words; from the same topics arise all things. For when Sp. Carvilius — limping heavily from a wound received for the commonwealth, and on that account ashamed to come out in public — was told by his mother: “Why don’t you come out, my Spurius? As often as you take a step, may the memory of your virtues come to you” — that is splendid and weighty. But when Glaucia said to Calvinus, who was limping: “Where is that old saw, ‘Surely he is not limping (claudicat)?’ But here he is limping (clodicat)!” — that is laughable. And both are drawn from what could be observed in the limping. “What is more lazy (ignavius) than this Navius?” Scipio said sternly. But to a foul-smelling man Philippus said, “I see I am being beset (circumveniri) by you” — somewhat laughably. But each kind contains the likeness of a word changed by a single letter.

Sed hoc eisdem verbis; ex eisdem autem locis nascuntur omnia. Nam quod Sp. Carvilio graviter claudicanti ex vulnere ob rem publicam accepto et ob eam causam verecundanti in publicum prodire mater dixit "quin prodis, mi Spuri? quotienscumque gradum facies, totiens tibi tuarum virtutum veniat in mentem," praeclarum et grave est: quod Calvino Glaucia claudicanti "ubi est vetus illud: num claudicat? at hic clodicat"! hoc ridiculum est; et utrumque ex eo, quod in claudicatione animadverti potuit, est ductum. "Quid hoc Navio ignavius?" severe Scipio; at in male olentem "video me a te circumveniri" subridicule Philippus; at utrumque genus continet verbi ad litteram immutati similitudo.

Sayings from ambiguity are reckoned the most clever, but they do not always lie in jest, often also in gravity. To the elder Africanus, when he was fitting on a wreath for his head at a banquet, when it kept breaking, P. Licinius Varus said: “Don’t be surprised if it doesn’t fit; for the head is great.” Both praiseworthy and honourable. But of the same kind is: “It is enough for Calvus that he says little.” In short: there is no kind of jest from the same of which severe and weighty things may not be drawn.

Ex ambiguo dicta vel argutissima putantur, sed non semper in ioco, saepe etiam in gravitate versantur. Africano illi superiori coronam sibi in convivio ad caput accommodanti, cum ea saepius rumperetur, P. Licinius Varus "noli mirari," inquit "si non convenit, caput enim magnum est": et laudabile et honestum; at ex eodem genere est "Calvo satis est, quod dicit parum." Ne multa: nullum genus est ioci, quo non ex eodem severa et gravia sumantur.

This too must be observed: not all laughable things are witty. For what can be so laughable as a clown? But it is by mouth, by face, by imitating manners, by voice, finally by his very body that he is laughed at. I can call him salty, and so, not so that I should wish such an orator, but so that I should wish such a mime. Therefore this first kind, which most of all moves laughter, is not for us: the morose, the superstitious, the suspicious, the boastful, the fool — natures themselves are laughed at, characters which we are wont to set in motion, not to act.

Atque hoc etiam animadvertendum est, non esse omnia ridicula faceta. Quid enim potest esse tam ridiculum quam sannio est? Sed ore, vultu, imitandis moribus, voce, denique corpore ridetur ipso; salsum hunc possum dicere atque ita, non ut eius modi oratorem esse velim, sed ut mimum. Qua re primum genus hoc, quod risum vel maxime movet, non est nostrum: morosum, superstitiosum, suspiciosum, gloriosum, stultum: naturae ridentur ipsae, quas personas agitare solemus, non sustinere.

The second kind is in imitation, very laughable, but only by stealth, if at all, and quickly may we use it; otherwise it is least free; the third, the distortion of the face, is not worthy of us; the fourth, obscenity, is not only not worthy of the Forum but scarcely worthy of a free man’s banquet. So many things being subtracted from this oratorical topic, the witty things which remain are seen to be set either in the matter, as I divided before, or in the word. For what is witty in whatever words you use, is contained in the matter; what loses its salt when the words are changed, has all its charm in the words.

Alterum genus est in imitatione admodum ridiculum, sed nobis furtim tantum uti licet, si quando, et cursim; aliter enim minime est liberale; tertium, oris depravatio, non digna nobis; quartum, obscenitas, non solum non foro digna, sed vix convivio liberorum. Detractis igitur tot rebus ex hoc oratorio loco facetiae reliquae sunt, quae aut in re, ut ante divisi, positae videntur esse aut in verbo; nam quod, quibuscumque verbis dixeris, facetum tamen est, re continetur; quod mutatis verbis salem amittit, in verbis habet omnem leporem.

Ambiguous sayings are first of all keen and set in the word, not in the matter; but they do not often move great laughter — they are praised rather as prettily, as elegantly, said. As of that Titius, who, when he was busy playing ball, and was thought also to break sacred images by night, and his comrades were asking after him when he had not come to the field, Vespa Terentius excused him, saying that he had broken his arm. Or that of Africanus in Lucilius: “What of Decius? Do you wish to make him a little nut, or pierced through?”

Ambigua sunt in primis acuta atque in verbo posita, non in re; sed non saepe magnum risum movent; magis ut belle, ut litterate dicta laudantur; ut in illum Titium, qui cum studiose pila luderet et idem signa sacra noctu frangere putaretur gregalesque eum, cum in campum non venisset, requirerent, excusavit Vespa Terentius, quod eum bracchium fregisse diceret; ut illud Africani, quod est apud Lucilium Quid Decius? Nuculam an confixum vis facere? inquit:

Or, Crassus, that friend of yours, Granius: “He’s not worth a sixth.” If you ask, he who is called quick-tongued most excels in this kind; but other things move greater laughter. Ambiguity by itself is approved indeed, as I said, very greatly; for it seems the part of an ingenious man to be able to draw the force of a word into another sense than the rest take it. But it stirs admiration rather than laughter, unless it happens to fall in upon some other kind of laughable. Of which kinds I shall now run through.

ut tuus amicus, Crasse, Granius, "non esse sextantis." Et si quaeritis, is, qui appellatur dicax, hoc genere maxime excellet; sed risum movent alia maiorem. Ambiguum per se ipsum probatur id quidem, ut ante dixi, vel maxime; ingeniosi enim videtur vim verbi in aliud, atque ceteri accipiant, posse ducere; sed admirationem magis quam risum movet, nisi si quando incidit in aliud quoque genus ridiculi, quae genera percurram equidem.

You know that this is the most familiar kind of the laughable: when we expect one thing and another is said. Here our own error stirs the laugh in us. If ambiguity is also mixed in, it becomes saltier. As in Novius the man seems compassionate, who sees one being led off after judgment; he asks: “For how much was he assigned?” “A thousand sesterces.” If he had only added “you may take him,” that would be the kind of laughable beyond expectation; but because he added “I add nothing — you may take him,” with the ambiguous added, the other kind of laughable, the saying was, in my view, the saltiest. This is graceful when in altercation a word is snatched from the adversary and from it, as Catulus did to Philippus, something is hurled at the very man who challenged.

Sed scitis esse notissimum ridiculi genus, cum aliud exspectamus, aliud dicitur: hic nobismet ipsis noster error risum movet: quod si admixtum est etiam ambiguum, fit salsius; ut apud Novium videtur esse misericors ille, qui iudicatum duci videt: percontatur ita: "quanti addictus?" "Mille nummum." Si addidisset tantummodo "ducas licet"; esset illud genus ridiculi praeter exspectationem; sed quia addidit "nihil addo, ducas licet"; addito ambiguo altero genere ridiculi, fuit, ut mihi quidem videtur, salsissimus. Hoc tum est venustum, cum in altercatione arripitur ab adversario verbum et ex eo, ut a Catulo in Philippum, in eum ipsum aliquid, qui lacessivit, infligitur.

Since there are several kinds of ambiguity, about which there is some more subtle teaching, we shall have to be on the watch and to fowl for words; in which, if we avoid those that are colder (we must beware lest the saying seem fetched), we shall yet say very many things keenly. The second kind is that which has a slight change of word, what — set in a single letter — the Greeks call paronomasia: as Cato’s “nobiliorem mobiliorem”; or, when he had said to someone, “Let us go for a walk (deambulatum),” and the other said, “What was the need of de?” he answered: “On the contrary — what was the need of you?” Or that answer of his

Sed cum plura sint ambigui genera, de quibus est doctrina quaedam subtilior, attendere et aucupari verba oportebit; in quo, ut ea, quae sint frigidiora, vitemus,—est enim cavendum, ne arcessitum dictum putetur—permulta tamen acute dicemus. Alterum genus est, quod habet parvam verbi immutationem, quod in littera positum Graeci vocant paronomasi/an, ut "Nobiliorem mobiliorem" Cato; aut, ut idem, cum cuidam dixisset "eamus deambulatum" et ille "quid opus fuit de?" "Immo vero" inquit "quid opus fuit te?" Aut eiusdem responsio

“If you are unchaste both adversus (front) and aversus (back).” The interpretation of a name has also keenness, when you turn to the laughable why anyone is so called: as I lately, of Nummius the briber — that as Neoptolemus took his name at Troy, so this man took his name on the Campus Martius. All these are contained in the word. Often a verse is also wittily inserted, either as it is or with a little change, or some part of a verse — as that of Statius’s by Scaurus when he was angered, from which there are some who say your law on citizenship was born, Crassus: “St, be silent — what is this clamour? Whose neither mother nor father — such confidence? Take that pride away.” Now in Caelius’s case, Antonius, what you said was useful even to the matter: when the witness was saying that the money had been put forward by him and he had a more dainty son, with the man already going off, “Don’t you feel, old man, that you have been touched for thirty minae?”

illa "si tu et adversus et aversus impudicus es." Etiam interpretatio nominis habet acumen, cum ad ridiculum convertas, quam ob rem ita quis vocetur; ut ego nuper Nummium divisorem, ut Neoptolemum ad Troiam, sic illum in campo Martio nomen invenisse; atque haec omnia verbo continentur. Saepe etiam versus facete interponitur, vel ut est vel paululum immutatus, aut aliqua pars versus, ut Stati a Scauro stomachante; ex quo sunt non nulli, qui tuam legem de civitate natam, Crasse, dicant: st, tacete, quid hoc clamoris? Quibus nec mater nec pater, tanta confidentia? Auferte istam enim superbiam. Nam in Caelio sane etiam ad causam utile fuit tuum illud, Antoni, cum ille a se pecuniam profectam diceret testis et haberet filium delicatiorem, abeunte iam illo, sentin senem esse tactum triginta minis?

Into this kind are also thrown proverbs, as that of Scipio when Asellus was boasting that he had traversed all the provinces in his service: “Drive the little ass” and the rest. So these too — since by changing the words they cannot keep the same grace — should be drawn as set not in the matter, but in the words.

In hoc genus coniciuntur etiam proverbia, ut illud Scipionis, cum Asellus omnis se provincias stipendia merentem peragrasse gloriaretur: "agas asellum" et cetera; qua re ea quoque, quoniam mutatis verbis non possunt retinere eandem venustatem, non in re, sed in verbis posita ducantur.

Set also in the word is a not dull kind which arises from this — when you seem to take the matter according to the word, not according to the meaning. Of this one kind is wholly composed the old mime Tutor, very laughable indeed. But I leave aside the mimes; only I wish this kind of laughable to be marked with some signal and noted matter. Of this kind is what you, Crassus, said to him who lately asked you whether you would be put out if he had come to you well before light: “You will not be a bother to me,” you said. “You will then have me wakened?” said he. And you: “Surely I had said that you would not

Est etiam in verbo positum non insulsum genus ex eo, cum ad verbum, non ad sententiam rem accipere videare; ex quo uno genere totus est Tutor, mimus vetus, oppido ridiculus. Sed abeo a mimis; tantum genus huius ridiculi insigni aliqua et nota re notari volo; est autem ex hoc genere illud, quod tu, Crasse, nuper ei, qui te rogasset, num tibi molestus esset futurus, si ad te bene ante lucem venisset, "tu vero" inquisti "molestus non eris." "Iubebis igitur te" inquit "suscitari?" Et tu "certe negaram te molestum

be a bother.” Of this same kind is that old saying: that Maluginensis, M. Scipio, when from his century he was returning Acidinus as consul, and the herald said, “Pronounce on L. Manlius”: “A good man,” said he, “and an outstanding citizen, I judge him.” Laughable too is that of L. Porcius Nasica to Cato the censor, when the latter asked: “According to the conviction of your soul, do you have a wife?” “By Hercules,” he said, “not according to my soul’s conviction.” These things are either cold or salty when something else has been expected. For nature, as I said before, delights us with our own error; from which, when we are as it were deceived in our expectation, we laugh.

futurum." Ex eodem hoc vetus illud est, quod aiunt Maluginensem illum M. Scipionem, cum ex centuria sua renuntiaret Acidinum consulem praecoque dixisset "dic de L. Manlio": "virum bonum" inquit "egregiumque civem esse arbitror." Ridicule etiam illud L. Porcius Nasica censori Catoni; cum ille "ex tui animi sententia tu uxorem habes?" "Non hercule" inquit "ex mei animi sententia." Haec aut frigida sunt aut tum salsa, cum aliud est exspectatum. Natura enim nos, ut ante dixi, noster delectat error; ex quo, cum quasi decepti sumus exspectatione, ridemus.

In words also are those which are drawn either from speech changed, or from the transferred meaning of a single word, or from the inversion of words. From change: as once when Rusca was carrying a law on age, his opponent M. Servilius said: “Tell me, M. Pinarius, if I shall speak against you, will you abuse me as you have done the others?” He said: “As you sow, so shall you reap.”

In verbis etiam illa sunt, quae aut ex immutata oratione ducuntur aut ex unius verbi translatione aut ex inversione verborum. Ex immutatione, ut olim Rusca cum legem ferret annalem, dissuasor M. Servilius "dic mihi," inquit "M. Pinari, num, si contra te dixero, mihi male dicturus es, ut ceteris fecisti?" "Ut sementem feceris, ita metes" inquit.

From metaphor: as when the elder Scipio, when the Corinthians were promising him a statue in the place where there were others of generals, said the cavalry kind would not please. Words are inverted, as: when Crassus was speaking before the judge M. Perperna for Aculeo, on the other side, against Aculeo and for Gratidianus, was L. Aelius Lamia, deformed, as you know; when he was hatefully interrupting, “Let us hear,” said Crassus, “the pretty boy”; when laughter had broken out, “I could not,” said Lamia, “shape my own form, but my talent I could”; then Crassus: “Let us hear the eloquent one,” he said. There was a much more vehement laugh. These too are graceful — as in weighty thoughts, so in witticisms; for I said long ago that the rationale of jest is one and of severity another,

Ex translatione autem, ut, cum Scipio ille maior Corinthiis statuam pollicentibus eo loco, ubi aliorum essent imperatorum, turmalis dixit displicere. Invertuntur autem verba, ut, Crassus apud M. Perpernam iudicem pro Aculeone cum diceret, aderat contra Aculeonem Gratidiano L. Aelius Lamia, deformis, ut nostis; qui cum interpellaret odiose, "audiamus" inquit "pulchellum puerum" Crassus; cum esset arrisum, "non potui mihi" inquit Lamia "formam ipse fingere, ingenium potui"; tum hic "audiamus" inquit "disertum": multo etiam arrisum est vehementius. Sunt etiam illa venusta ut in gravibus sententiis, sic in facetiis— dixi enim dudum rationem aliam esse ioci, aliam severitatis,

but that of weighty things and jests there is one matter. Words referred contrarily then most of all adorn a speech, the same kind being often also witty, as that famous Servius Galba: when he was nominating his own friends as judges to the tribune of the plebs L. Scribonius, and Libo said: “When at last, Galba, will you come out of your dining-room?” he said: “When you, out of someone else’s bedroom.” Not far from this kind is that of Glaucia to Metellus: “You have a villa at Tibur, a sheepfold (cors) on the Palatine.” I think I have said the kinds of words which are witty.

gravium autem et iocorum unam esse materiam—ornant igitur in primis orationem verba relata contrarie, quod idem genus saepe est etiam facetum, ut Servius ille Galba cum iudices L. Scribonio tribuno plebis ferret familiaris suos et dixisset Libo "quando tandem, Galba, de triclinio tuo exibis?" "cum tu" inquit "de cubiculo alieno." A quo genere ne illud quidem plurimum distat, quod Glaucia Metello "villam in Tiburti habes, cortem in Palatio." Ac verborum quidem genera, quae essent faceta, dixisse me puto;

Of matters there are more, and they, as I said before, are more laughed at; in which is narration, a thing surely difficult; for those things must be expressed and set before the eyes which are likely and like the truth (which is proper to narration), and which are, what is proper to the laughable, somewhat ugly. An example, that it may be most brief, is that of Crassus on Memmius, which I set down before. To this kind let us also add the narrations of fables.

rerum plura sunt, eaque magis, ut dixi ante, ridentur; in quibus est narratio, res sane difficilis; exprimenda enim sunt et ponenda ante oculos ea, quae videantur et veri similia, quod est proprium narrationis, et quae sint, quod ridiculi proprium est, subturpia; cuius exemplum, ut brevissimum, sit sane illud, quod ante posui, Crassi de Memmio. Et ad hoc genus ascribamus etiam narrationes apologorum.

Something is also drawn from history, as when Sex. Titius said he was Cassandra: “I,” said Antonius, “can name many of your Aiaxes son of Oileus.” From likeness is also: which has either a comparison or as it were an image. A comparison: as that Gallus once, a witness against Piso, when he had said that countless money had been given to the prefect Magius, and Scaurus had refuted this by Magius’s slenderness: “You err, Scaurus,” said he. “For I do not say that Magius preserved it, but that as a man naked might gather nuts, so he carried it off in his belly.” Or that of M. Cicero the elder, my friend’s father, this excellent man’s father: “Our men are like Syrian slaves: as

Trahitur etiam aliquid ex historia, ut, cum Sex. Titius se Cassandram esse diceret, "multos" inquit Antonius "possum tuos Aiaces Oileos nominare." Est etiam ex similitudine, quae aut conlationem habet aut tamquam imaginem: conlationem, ut ille Gallus olim testis in Pisonem, cum innumerabilem Magio praefecto pecuniam dixisset datam idque Scaurus tenuitate Magi redargueret, "erras," inquit "Scaure; ego enim Magium non conservasse dico, sed tamquam nudus nuces legeret, in ventre abstulisse"; ut illud M. Cicero senex, huius viri optimi, nostri familiaris, pater, "nostros homines similis esse Syrorum venalium: ut

each one knew Greek best, so was he the most worthless.” Greatly laughed at also are images which are mostly drawn into deformity or some bodily fault, with the likeness of something more shameful: as that one of mine against Helvius Mancia: “Now I shall show what kind of man you are.” When he said, “Show, please,” I pointed to a Gaul painted on the Marian Cimbric shield under the Novae Tabernae, twisted, with tongue thrust out, with cheeks streaming. There was a laugh; nothing seemed so like Mancia. Or to Titus Pinarius, who twisted his chin in speaking: “Then might he speak, if he wished, when he had broken a nut.”

quisque optime Graece sciret, ita esse nequissimum." Valde autem ridentur etiam imagines, quae fere in deformitatem aut in aliquod vitium corporis ducuntur cum similitudine turpioris: ut meum illud in Helvium Manciam "iam ostendam cuius modi sis," cum ille "ostende, quaeso"; demonstravi digito pictum Gallum in Mariano scuto Cimbrico sub Novis distortum, eiecta lingua, buccis fluentibus; risus est commotus; nihil tam Manciae simile visum est; ut cum Tito Pinario mentum in dicendo intorquenti: "tum ut

Also those which, for the sake of diminishing or amplifying, are brought to incredible wonder; as you, Crassus, in the assembly: “So great did Memmius appear to himself that, as he came down to the Forum, he ducked his head at the Fabian arch.” Of which kind is also that which Scipio at Numantia, when he was angered with C. Metellus, is said to have said: “If his mother

diceret, si quid vellet, si nucem fregisset." Etiam illa, quae minuendi aut augendi causa ad incredibilem admirationem efferuntur; velut tu, Crasse, in contione: "ita sibi ipsum magnum videri Memmium, ut in forum descendens caput ad fornicem Fabianum demitteret"; ex quo genere etiam illud est, quod Scipio apud Numantiam, cum stomacharetur cum C. Metello, dixisse dicitur: "si quintum pareret mater

were to bear a fifth, she would bear an ass.” Clever signification, too, is when by some small thing — and often by a single word — an obscure and hidden matter is illustrated; as when, when P. Cornelius — a man, as was thought, greedy and thievish but outstandingly brave and a good general — was thanking C. Fabricius because he, an enemy, had made him consul, especially in a great and serious war: “There is no reason,” said he, “why you should thank me, if I preferred to be despoiled rather than sold.” Or as when Asellus reproached Africanus with that unhappy lustrum, he said: “Don’t be surprised; for he who removed you from the rank of aerarii closed the lustrum and sacrificed the bull.” There is a silent suspicion that Mummius bound the state by religion, in that he eased Asellus from disgrace. There is also urbane dissimulation, when other things are said than what you feel — not in that kind of which I spoke before, when you say contraries, as Crassus to Lamia, but when in your whole kind of speech you sport with severity, when you feel one thing and speak another;

eius, asinum fuisse parituram." Arguta etiam significatio est, cum parva re et saepe verbo res obscura et latens inlustratur; ut, cum C. Fabricio P. Cornelius, homo, ut existimabatur, avarus et furax, sed egregie fortis et bonus imperator, gratias ageret, quod se homo inimicus consulem fecisset, bello praesertim magno et gravi "nihil est, quod mihi gratias agas," inquit "si malui compilari quam venire"; ut Asello Africanus obicienti lustrum illud infelix, "noli" inquit "mirari; is enim, qui te ex aerariis exemit, lustrum condidit et taurum immolavit." Tacita suspicio est, ut religione civitatem obstrinxisse videatur Mummius, quod Asellum ignominia levarit. Urbana etiam dissimulatio est, cum alia dicuntur ac sentias, non illo genere, de quo ante dixi, cum contraria dicas, ut Lamiae Crassus, sed cum toto genere orationis severe ludas, cum aliter sentias ac loquare;

as our Scaevola, when Septumuleius of Anagnia (for whose handing over of Gaius Gracchus’s head gold was weighed in payment) asked that he should take him as his prefect to Asia: “What do you wish, you mad man?” said he. “So great is the multitude of bad citizens that I assure you of this: if you stay at Rome, you will come within a few years to the greatest fortune.”

ut noster Scaevola Septumuleio illi Anagnino, cui pro C. Gracchi capite erat aurum repensum, roganti, ut se in Asiam praefectum duceret "quid tibi vis," inquit "insane? tanta malorum est multitudo civium, ut tibi ego hoc confirmem, si Romae manseris, te paucis annis ad maximas pecunias esse venturum."

Of this kind Fannius in his annals says this Africanus Aemilianus was outstanding, and calls him by the Greek word eiron; but, as those who know these things better tell us, Socrates I think in this irony and dissimulation by far excelled all in charm and humanity. The kind is most elegant and salty with weight, and apt both for oratorical pleadings and for urbane conversations.

In hoc genere Fannius in annalibus suis Africanum hunc Aemilianum dicit fuisse egregium et Graeco eum verbo appellat ei)/rwna; sed, uti ei ferunt, qui melius haec norunt, Socratem opinor in hac ironia dissimulantiaque longe lepore et humanitate omnibus praestitisse. Genus est perelegans et cum gravitate salsum cumque oratoriis dictionibus tum urbanis sermonibus accommodatum.

And by Hercules all these things which I am arguing about wit are not greater seasonings of forensic actions than of all conversations. For just as that saying in Cato — who reported many things, of which I set down some by way of example — seems to me very well noted: that C. Publicius was wont to say P. Mummius was a man for any time. So in fact the matter stands: that there is no time of life in which it is not becoming for charm and humanity to move.

Et hercule omnia haec, quae a me de facetiis disputantur, non maiora forensium actionum quam omnium sermonum condimenta sunt. Nam sicut quod apud Catonem est—qui multa rettulit, ex quibus a me exempli causa non nulla ponuntur—per mihi scitum videtur, C. Publicium solitum dicere "P. Mummium cuiusvis temporis hominem esse," sic profecto se res habet, nullum ut sit vitae tempus, in quo non deceat leporem humanitatemque versari.

But I come back to the rest. Akin to this dissimulation is when a faulty thing is called by an honourable word: as when Africanus the censor was moving from his tribe a certain centurion who had not been at the battle of Paulus, and the man said he had remained in camp for the sake of the watch and asked why he was being marked by him: “I do not love,” said he,

Sed redeo ad cetera. Est huic finitimum dissimulationi, cum honesto verbo vitiosa res appellatur; ut cum Africanus censor tribu movebat eum centurionem, qui in Pauli pugna non adfuerat, cum ille se custodiae causa diceret in castris remansisse quaereretque, cur ab eo notaretur, "non amo" inquit

“the over-diligent.” Keen too is when from another’s speech you take a meaning different from his. As Maximus to Salinator: when Tarentum had been lost and yet Livius had kept the citadel and from it had made many distinguished engagements, and some years later Maximus had recovered that town and Salinator asked him to remember that by his work Tarentum had been recovered: “Why,” said he, “should I not remember? For I should never have

"nimium diligentis." Acutum etiam illud est, cum ex alterius oratione aliud excipias atque ille vult; ut Salinatori Maximus, cum Tarento amisso arcem tamen Livius retinuisset multaque ex ea proelia praeclara fecisset, cum aliquot post annis Maximus id oppidum recepisset rogaretque eum Salinator, ut meminisset opera sua se Tarentum recepisse, "quidni" inquit "meminerim? Numquam enim

recovered it, if you had not lost it.” There are also those somewhat absurd things, but for that very reason often laughable, very apt not only for mimes but in some way also for us: “A foolish fellow, after he had begun to have property, died.” “And what is that woman of yours?” “A wife.” “Like, by Hercules.” “And while he was at the waters, he never died.” This kind is lighter and, as I said, mimic, but has sometimes a place even with us, that even one not foolish, as if foolishly, may say something with salt: as Mancia to you, Antonius, when he had heard you, the censor, were summoned by M. Duronius for bribery,

recepissem, nisi tu perdidisses." Sunt etiam illa subabsurda, sed eo ipso nomine saepe ridicula, non solum mimis perapposita, sed etiam quodam modo nobis: homo fatuus, postquam rem habere coepit, est emortuus. Et quid est tibi ista mulier? Uxor. Similis me dius fidius. Et quamdiu ad aquas fuit, numquam est emortuus. Genus hoc levius et, ut dixi, mimicum, sed habet non numquam aliquid etiam apud nos loci, ut vel non stultus quasi stulte cum sale dicat aliquid: ut tibi, Antoni, Mancia, cum audisset te censorem a M. Duronio de ambitu postulatum,

“Now at last,” said he, “you may handle your own business.” Such things are greatly laughed at, and by Hercules everything that is said by prudent men with the dissimulation, as it were, of not understanding, somewhat absurdly and with salt. Of which kind is also not seeming to understand what you do understand: as Pontidius — “What do you think of one who is caught in adultery?” — “Slow!” Or I myself, when I would not accept Metellus’s excuse for my eyes in his levy

"aliquando" inquit "tibi tuum negotium agere licebit." Valde haec ridentur et hercule omnia, quae a prudentibus quasi per simulationem non intellegendi subabsurde salseque dicuntur. Ex quo genere est etiam non videri intellegere quod intellegas, ut Pontidius "qualem existimas, qui in adulterio deprehenditur?" "tardum!" ut ego, qui in dilectu Metello, cum excusationem oculorum a me non acciperet

and he had said: “You then see nothing?” “Yes I do,” said I; “from the Esquiline gate I see your villa.” Or that of Nasica, who, when he had come to the poet Ennius and was asking for him at the door, was told by the maid he was not at home — Nasica felt she had said it by her master’s order, and that he was inside. A few days afterwards, when Ennius came to Nasica’s and was asking for him at the door, Nasica shouted out that he was not at home. Ennius said: “What? Do I not know your voice?” Nasica: “You are an impudent man: when I was looking for you, I believed your maid that you were not at home; you do not believe me myself?” Pretty too is that, from which the man who has spoken is laughed at in the very kind in which he has spoken;

et dixisset "tu igitur nihil vides?" "ego vero" inquam "a porta Esquilina video villam tuam;" ut illud Nasicae, qui cum ad poetam Ennium venisset eique ab ostio quaerenti Ennium ancilla dixisset domi non esse, Nasica sensit illam domini iussu dixisse et illum intus esse; paucis post diebus cum ad Nasicam venisset Ennius et eum ad ianuam quaereret, exclamat Nasica domi non esse, tum Ennius "quid? ego non cognosco vocem" inquit "tuam?" Hic Nasica "homo es impudens: ego cum te quaererem ancillae tuae credidi te domi non esse, tu mihi non credis ipsi?" Est bellum illud quoque, ex quo is, qui dixit inridetur in eo ipso genere, quo dixit;

as when Q. Opimius the consular, who as a young man had been ill spoken of, said to the festive Egilius — who seemed somewhat soft but was not — “What now, my Egilia? When are you coming to me with your distaff and wool?” “By Pollux, I do not dare,” he said; “for my mother forbade me to go near disreputable women.”

ut, cum Q. Opimius consularis, qui adulescentulus male audisset, festivo homini Egilio, qui videretur mollior nec esset, dixisset "quid tu, Egilia mea? quando ad me venis cum tua colu et lana?" "Non pol" inquit "audeo, nam me ad famosas vetuit mater accedere."

Salty too are those things which have a hidden suspicion of the laughable; of which kind is that of the Sicilian, when an acquaintance was complaining to him that he said his wife had hanged herself on a fig-tree: “Please,” he said, “give me some shoots of that tree to plant.” Of the same kind is what Catulus said to a bad orator who, in the epilogue, thought he had stirred pity, and after he had sat down asked Catulus whether he seemed to have moved pity: “Greatly indeed,” said he, “for I think there is no one so hard to whom your speech does not seem worthy

Salsa sunt etiam, quae habent suspicionem ridiculi absconditam, quo in genere est Siculi illud, cui cum familiaris quidam quereretur quod diceret uxorem suam suspendisse se de ficu, "amabo te," inquit "da mihi ex ista arbore quos seram surculos." In eodem genere est, quod Catulus dixit cuidam oratori malo: qui cum in epilogo misericordiam se movisse putaret, postquam adsedit, rogavit hunc videreturne misericordiam movisse, "ac magnam quidem," inquit "neminem enim puto esse tam durum, cui non oratio tua misericordia

of pity.” By Hercules, there are also the angry and as it were grumpy laughable things, not when they are said by a grumpy man (for then it is not salt but nature that is laughed at); in which to me that of Novius seems most salty: “Why are you weeping, father?” “It would be strange if I sang: I have been condemned.” To this kind is opposed as it were the patient and slow kind of the laughable, as when Cato had been struck by a man who was carrying a chest, and the man said “Take care,” Cato asked: “Are you carrying anything else

digna visa sit." Me tamen hercule etiam illa valde movent stomachosa et quasi submorosa ridicula, non cum a moroso dicuntur; tum enim non sal, sed natura ridetur; in quo, ut mihi videtur, persalsum illud est apud Novium: "quid ploras, pater?" "Mirum ni cantem: condemnatus sum." Huic generi quasi contrarium est ridiculi genus patientis ac lenti, ut, cum Cato percussus esset ab eo, qui arcam ferebat, cum ille diceret "cave," rogavit "num quid aliud ferret

besides the chest?” Salty too is the rebuke of stupidity, as that Sicilian, to whom the praetor Scipio was giving as patron of the case his guest, a noble man but utterly stupid: “Please, praetor,” said he, “give that patron to my adversary, then give me none.” Those things move us also which by conjecture are explained far otherwise than they are, but keenly and neatly: as when Scaurus was accusing Rutilius of bribery — when he himself had been made consul and Rutilius had failed — and showed in his accounts the letters A. F. P. R., and said it meant “Acted, by faith of Publius Rutilius” (whereas Rutilius himself said “Made before, reported afterwards”); C. Canius, the Roman knight, when assisting Rufus, exclaimed that neither was meant by those letters. “What then?” said Scaurus. “Aemilius did it, Rutilius is punished.” Discrepancies are also laughed at:

praeter arcam." Est etiam stultitiae salsa reprehensio, ut ille Siculus, cui praetor Scipio patronum causae dabat hospitem suum, hominem nobilem, sed admodum stultum, "quaeso," inquit "praetor, adversario meo da istum patronum, deinde mihi neminem dederis." Movent illa etiam, quae coniectura explanantur longe aliter atque sunt, sed acute atque concinne; ut, cum Scaurus accusaret Rutilium ambitus, cum ipse consul esset factus, ille repulsam tulisset, et in eius tabulis ostenderet litteras A. F. P. R. idque diceret esse, actum fide P. Rutili; Rutilius autem, ante factum, post relatum; C. Canius, eques Romanus, cum Rufo adesset, exclamat, neutrum illis litteris declarari: "quid ergo?" inquit Scaurus; "Aemilius fecit, plectitur Rutilius." Ridentur etiam discrepantia:

“What is missing in this man, except wealth and virtue?” Pretty also is the friendly rebuke as of one going wrong: as when Granius rebuked Albius for rejoicing over Scaevola’s complete acquittal, when something seemed to have been proved against him from his own tablets, and he did not understand that judgment had been given against his tablets.

"quid huic abest nisi res et virtus?" Bella etiam est familiaris reprehensio quasi errantis; ut cum obiurgavit Albium Granius quod, cum eius tabulis quiddam ab Albucio probatum videretur, et valde absoluto Scaevola gauderet neque intellegeret contra suas tabulas esse iudicatum.

Like to this is also a friendly admonition in giving counsel: as when Granius advised a bad orator who had bruised his voice in speaking, to drink cold honey-wine as soon as he should have come home — “I shall ruin my voice,” he said,

Huic similis est etiam admonitio in consilio dando familiaris, ut, cum patrono malo, cum vocem in dicendo obtudisset, suadebat Granius, ut mulsum frigidum biberet, simul ac domum redisset, "perdam" inquit "vocem,

“if I do that.” “Better,” said Granius, “than your client.” Pretty too is when something is said as suited to each: as Scaurus had some envy from this — that he had taken the goods of Phrygio Pompeius, a rich man, without a will, and he was sitting as advocate for the defendant Bestia, when a certain funeral was being led, the prosecutor C. Memmius said: “See, Scaurus — a dead man is being snatched away. If you can be the possessor.”

si id fecero": "melius est" inquit "quam reum." Bellum etiam est, cum quid cuique sit consentaneum dicitur; ut, cum Scaurus non nullam haberet invidiam ex eo, quod Phrygionis Pompei, locupletis hominis, bona sine testamento possederat, sederetque advocatus reo Bestiae, cum funus quoddam duceretur, accusator C. Memmius "vide," inquit "Scaure, mortuus rapitur, si potes esse possessor."

But of all these, nothing is more laughable than what is beyond expectation. Of which there are countless examples — as that of the elder Appius, who, in the senate, when business was on the public lands and the Thorian law, and Lucullus was being attacked by those who said that the public lands were being grazed off by his cattle: “That is not Lucullus’s flock,” he said, “you err.” He seemed to be defending Lucullus. “I take it to be free; for it grazes wherever it likes.”

Sed ex his omnibus nihil magis ridetur, quam quod est praeter exspectationem, cuius innumerabilia sunt exempla, vel Appi maioris illius, qui in senatu, cum ageretur de agris publicis et de lege Thoria et peteretur Lucullus ab eis, qui a pecore eius depasci agros publicos dicerent, "non est" inquit "Luculli pecus illud; erratis";—defendere Lucullum videbatur—"ego liberum puto esse: qua libet pascitur."

I like also that of the famous Scipio who struck down Tiberius Gracchus: when many reproaches had been thrown against him by M. Flaccus, who put forward P. Mucius as judge: “I reject him as biased,” he said. There was a murmur. “Ah,” he said, “conscript fathers, I am not rejecting him as biased against me, but against all.” From this Crassus, however, comes nothing wittier: when the witness Silus had hurt Piso, by saying that he had heard a thing about him, “It can happen, Silus,” said he, “that he, from whom you say you heard it, said it in anger.” Silus nodded. “It can also be that you did not rightly understand him.” That too he nodded with his whole head, that he might give himself to Crassus. “It can also happen,” he said, “that what you say you heard, you never heard at all.” This came so beyond expectation that the laughter of all overwhelmed the witness. Of this kind Novius is full, of whom is the familiar joke

Placet etiam mihi illud Scipionis illius, qui Ti. Gracchum perculit: cum ei M. Flaccus multis probris obiectis P. Mucium iudicem tulisset; "eiero," inquit "iniquus est"; cum esset admurmuratum, "ah," inquit "P. C., non ego mihi illum iniquum eiero, verum omnibus." Ab hoc vero Crasso nihil facetius: cum laesisset testis Silus Pisonem, quod se in eum audisse dixisset, "potest fieri," inquit "Sile, ut is, unde te audisse dicis, iratus dixerit." Adnuit Silus. "Potest etiam, ut tu non recte intellexeris." Id quoque toto capite adnuit, ut se Crasso daret. "Potest etiam fieri," inquit "ut omnino, quod te audisse dicis, numquam audieris." Hoc ita praeter exspectationem accidit, ut testem omnium risus obrueret. Huius generis est plenus Novius, cuius iocus est familiaris

“The wise man, if you shall be cold, shall tremble,” and very many others. Often it is also witty to grant the adversary the very thing he is taking away from you: as Gaius Laelius, when one ill-born said to him that he was unworthy of his ancestors: “By Hercules,” said he, “you are worthy of yours.” Often too laughable things are said sentenciously, as M. Cincius, on the day he carried his law on gifts and presents, when C. Cento came forward and contemptuously enough asked, “What are you proposing, Cinciole?” said: “So that you may buy, Gaius, if you wish to use anything.”

"sapiens si algebis, tremes" et alia permulta. Saepe etiam facete concedas adversario id ipsum, quod tibi ille detrahit; ut C. Laelius, cum ei quidam malo genere natus diceret, indignum esse suis maioribus, "at hercule" inquit "tu tuis dignus." Saepe etiam sententiose ridicula dicuntur, ut M. Cincius, quo die legem de donis et muneribus tulit, cum C. Cento prodisset et satis contumeliose "quid fers, Cinciole?" quaesisset, "ut emas," inquit "Gai, si uti velis."

Often too one wittily wishes things which cannot happen: as M. Lepidus, when the others were exercising in the Campus and he himself had reclined on the grass, said: “I should wish this were labouring.” Salty too is to answer slowly to those asking and as it were inquiring something they would not wish: as the censor Lepidus, when he had taken away M. Antistius of Pyrgi’s horse and his friends were shouting and asking what he should answer his father, why his horse was being taken from him when he was the best farmer, the most thrifty, most modest, most frugal: “I,” he said,

Saepe etiam salse, quae fieri non possunt, optantur; ut M. Lepidus, cum, ceteris se in campo exercentibus, ipse in herba recubuisset, "vellem hoc esset," inquit "laborare." Salsum est etiam quaerentibus et quasi percontantibus lente respondere quod nolint; ut censor Lepidus, cum M. Antistio Pyrgensi equum ademisset amicique cum vociferarentur et quaererent, quid ille patri suo responderet, cur ademptum sibi equum diceret, cum optimus colonus, parcissimus, modestissimus, frugalissimus esset, "me istorum" inquit

“believe none of those things.” Other things are gathered by the Greeks — execrations, expressions of wonder, threatenings; but these very things I seem to myself to have distributed into too many kinds. For those which are contained in the rationale and force of a word are mostly fixed and defined, which (as I said before) are wont rather to be praised than laughed at;

"nihil credere." Conliguntur a Graecis, alia non nulla, exsecrationes, admirationes, minationes; sed haec ipsa nimis mihi videor in multa genera discripsisse; nam illa, quae verbi ratione et vi continentur, certa fere ac definita sunt; quae plerumque, ut ante dixi, laudari magis quam rideri solent;

but these which are in the very matter and thought are countless in their parts, few in their kinds. For laughter is moved by the deceiving of expectations, by deriding others’ natures, by indicating one’s own laughably, by the likeness of something more shameful, by dissimulation, by saying somewhat absurd things, and by reproving foolish ones. Therefore he who would speak jocosely should be steeped, as it were, in nature suited for these kinds and in habits — that to each kind of laughable his very face be also fitted. The more severe and gloomier this is — as in you, Crassus — the saltier the things said are wont to seem.

haec autem, quae sunt in re ipsa et sententia, partibus sunt innumerabilia, generibus pauca; exspectationibus enim decipiendis et naturis aliorum inridendis ipsorum ridicule indicandis et similitudine turpioris et dissimulatione et subabsurda dicendo et stulta reprehendendo risus moventur. Itaque imbuendus est is, qui iocose volet dicere, quasi natura quadam apta ad haec genera et moribus, ut ad cuiusque modi genus ridiculi vultus etiam accommodetur; qui quidem quo severior est et tristior, ut in te, Crasse, hoc illa, quae dicuntur, salsiora videri solent.

But now you, Antonius — who said you would gladly rest in this wayside inn of my speech, as though you had turned aside into the Pomptine territory, neither pleasant nor healthful place — I think you should reckon you have rested long enough, and continue the rest of your journey.” “I have indeed,” he said, “and most cheerfully entertained by you, both more learned through you, and now also bolder for jesting. For I do not fear that anyone will think me lighter in this kind, since you have brought forward to me as my authorities Fabricii, Africani, Maximi, Catones, Lepidi.

Sed iam tu, Antoni, qui hoc deversorio sermonis mei libenter acquieturum te esse dixisti, tamquam in Pomptinum deverteris, neque amoenum neque salubrem locum, censeo, ut satis diu te putes requiesse et iter reliquum conficere pergas.’ ’Ego vero, atque hilare quidem a te acceptus,’ inquit ’et cum doctior per te, tum etiam audacior factus iam ad iocandum; non enim vereor ne quis me in isto genere leviorem iam putet, quoniam quidem tu Fabricios mihi auctores et Africanos, Maximos, Catones, Lepidos protulisti.

But you have what you wish to hear from me, of which indeed I had to speak more carefully and to think; for the rest are easier, and from what has been said all the rest are born. For when I have approached the case and pursued everything in thought as far as I could; when I have seen and recognised both the arguments of the case, and those topics by which the minds of the judges are conciliated, and those by which they are moved — then I lay down what each case has of good, what of bad. For there is hardly any matter that can be brought into the speaker’s dispute or controversy that does not have both, but how much of each, this matters.

Sed habetis ea, quae vultis ex me audire, de quibus quidem accuratius dicendum et cogitandum fuit; nam cetera faciliora sunt atque ex eis, quae dicta sunt, reliqua nascuntur omnia. Ego enim cum ad causam sum adgressus atque omnia cogitando, quoad facere potui, persecutus, cum et argumenta causae et eos locos, quibus animi iudicum conciliantur, et illos, quibus permoventur, vidi atque cognovi, tum constituo quid habeat causa quaeque boni, quid mali; nulla enim fere potest res in dicendi disceptationem aut controversiam vocari, quae non habeat utrumque, sed, quantum habeat, id refert;

My own method in speaking is wont to be this: that what good I have I embrace, ornate, exaggerate; there I stop, there I dwell, there I cling. From a bad and faulty thing of the case I so withdraw — not so that I should appear to flee it, but so that, by ornating and amplifying that good thing, the whole may be buried hidden. And if the case lies in arguments, I most strongly maintain whichever are firmest, whether they are several or some one; but if the case is in conciliation or in moving, I bring myself most to that part which most can move men’s minds.

mea autem ratio haec esse in dicendo solet, ut, boni quod habeam, id amplectar, exornem, exaggerem, ibi commorer, ibi habitem, ibi haeream; a malo autem vitioque causae ita recedam, non ut me id fugere appareat, sed ut totum bono illo ornando et augendo dissimulatum obruatur; et, si causa est in argumentis, firmissima quaeque maxime tueor, sive plura sunt sive aliquod unum; sin autem in conciliatione aut in permotione causa est, ad eam me potissimum partem, quae maxime movere animos hominum potest, confero.

The summary of this kind, in fine, is this: that if my speech in refuting the adversary can be firmer than in establishing my own things, I bring all my weapons against him; if our things can be more easily approved than his refuted, I try to draw their minds away from the contrary defence and to lead them to ours.

Summa denique huius generis haec est, ut si in refellendo adversario firmior esse oratio quam in confirmandis nostris rebus potest, omnia in illum tela conferam; si nostra probari facilius, quam illa redargui possunt, abducere animos a contraria defensione et ad nostram conor deducere.

Two things finally — which seem easiest, since I cannot do those that are harder — I claim for myself by my own right. One: that to a troublesome or difficult argument or topic I sometimes answer nothing at all — at which perhaps someone will rightly laugh; for who is there who cannot do that? But I am now arguing about my own faculty, not about others’; and I confess that, if anything presses too vehemently, I am wont so to yield that I seem to flee not only with my shield not cast away but not even shifted to the back; but to apply in speaking a kind of show and pomp like a battle’s flight; and to take stand in my place of refuge so that I seem to have given way not for fleeing the enemy but for taking up a position.

Duo denique illa, quae facillima videntur, quoniam quae difficiliora sunt, non possum, mihi pro meo iure sumo: unum, ut molesto aut difficili argumento aut loco non numquam omnino nihil respondeam, quod forsitan aliquis iure inriserit; quis enim est, qui id facere non possit? sed tamen ego de mea nunc, non de aliorum facultate disputo confiteorque me, si quae premat res vehementius, ita cedere solere, ut non modo non abiecto, sed ne reiecto quidem scuto fugere videar, sed adhibere quandam in dicendo speciem atque pompam et pugnae similem fugam; consistere vero in meo praesidio sic, ut non fugiendi hostis, sed capiendi loci causa cessisse videar;

The second is what I think most to be guarded and provided against by the orator and what is wont to vex me most: I am wont to labour not so much that I may help the case as that I may not hurt it. Not that one should not strive in each, but it is much more disgraceful for the orator to seem to have hurt the case than to have not helped it. But what is this, Catulus, you and your neighbours together? Do you, as is fit, despise this matter?” “By no means,” said he; “but Caesar seemed to wish to say something on this very point.” “Most willingly,” said Antonius, “let him say it, either to refute or to inquire.”

alterum est illud, quod ego maxime oratori cavendum et providendum puto quodque me sollicitare summe solet: non tam ut prosim causis, elaborare soleo, quam ut ne quid obsim; non quin enitendum sit in utroque, sed tamen multo est turpius oratori nocuisse videri causae quam non profuisse. Sed quid hoc loco vos inter vos, Catule? An haec, ut sunt contemnenda, contemnitis?’ ’Minime,’ inquit ille ’sed Caesar de isto ipso quiddam velle dicere videbatur.’ ’Me vero libente’ inquit Antonius ’dixerit sive refellendi causa sive quaerendi.’

Then Iulius: “By Hercules, Antonius,” he said, “I have always been one to say of you as orator that you, of all in speaking, seem to me the most guarded; and that this very thing is the proper of your praise — that nothing has ever been said by you that hurt the man for whom you spoke. And I remember, when conversation had been begun by Crassus and me, with many listening, and Crassus was praising your eloquence with many words, that I said, with the rest of your praises, that this was the greatest: that you both said what was needed and did not say what was not needed.

Tum Iulius ’ego me hercule,’ inquit ’Antoni, semper is fui, qui de te oratore sic praedicarem, unum te in dicendo mihi videri tectissimum propriumque hoc esse laudis tuae nihil a te umquam esse dictum, quod obesset ei, pro quo diceres; idque memoria teneo, cum mihi sermo cum hoc Crasso, multis audientibus, esset institutus Crassusque plurimis verbis eloquentiam laudaret tuam, dixisse me cum ceteris tuis laudibus hanc esse vel maximam quod non solum quod opus esset diceres, sed etiam quod non opus esset non diceres;

Then I remember he answered me that other things were highly to be praised in you, but that this — to say what was alien and would hurt the man for whom each man was speaking — was the part of a wicked and treacherous man; therefore he who did not do this seemed to him not eloquent but only an upright man, while he who did this — wicked. Now if you please, Antonius, I would have you show why you think this so great a thing — to do nothing harmful in the case — that nothing seems to you greater in the orator.”

tum illum mihi respondere memini, cetera in te summe esse laudanda, illud vero improbi esse hominis et perfidiosi, dicere quod alienum esset et noceret ei, pro quo quisque diceret; qua re non sibi eum disertum, qui id non faceret, videri, sed improbum, qui faceret. Nunc, si tibi videtur, Antoni, demonstres velim, qua re tu hoc ita magnum putes nihil in causa mali facere, ut nihil tibi in oratore maius esse videatur.’

“I shall say, Caesar,” he said, “what I understand. But you and you all,” he said, “remember this: that I am not speaking of the divinity of the perfect orator, but of the moderate measure of my own exercise and habit. Crassus’s answer is of an outstanding and singular talent, to whom indeed it has seemed something prodigious that any orator could be found who, by speaking, could do something hurtful and harm him whom he was defending.

’Dicam equidem, Caesar,’ inquit ’quid intellegam, sed et tu et vos hoc omnes,’ inquit, ’mementote, non me de perfecti oratoris divinitate quadam loqui, sed de exercitationis et consuetudinis meae mediocritate. Crassi quidem responsum excellentis cuiusdam est ingeni ac singularis; cui quidem portenti simile esse visum est posse aliquem inveniri oratorem, qui aliquid mali faceret dicendo obessetque ei, quem defenderet;

For he conjectures from himself, whose force of talent is so great that he thinks no one says anything against himself save knowingly. But I am now arguing not about an outstanding and exceptional, but about a well-nigh common and shared force. So among the Greeks it is reported that the famous Athenian Themistocles was of incredible greatness of counsel and talent. To him a learned man and chief among scholars is said to have come up, and to have promised that he would hand down to him the art of memory, which was then for the first time being brought forward; when Themistocles asked what that art could effect, the teacher said, “so that you may remember everything”; and Themistocles answered that the man would do him a greater favour if he taught him to forget what he wished, than if he taught him to remember.

facit enim de se coniecturam; cuius tanta vis ingeni est, ut neminem nisi consulto putet, quod contra se ipsum sit, dicere; sed ego non de praestanti quadam et eximia, sed prope de vulgari et communi vi nunc disputo. Ita apud Graecos fertur incredibili quadam magnitudine consili atque ingeni Atheniensis ille fuisse Themistocles; ad quem quidam doctus homo atque in primis eruditus accessisse dicitur eique artem memoriae, quae tum primum proferebatur, pollicitus esse se traditurum; cum ille quaesisset quidnam illa ars efficere posset, dixisse illum doctorem, ut omnia meminisset; et ei Themistoclem respondisse gratius sibi illum esse facturum, si se oblivisci quae vellet quam si meminisse docuisset.

Do you see what force in a man of the keenest talent, what kind and how great a mind there was? Who so answered that we may understand nothing from his soul, once it had been poured in, ever could have flowed out — when indeed it had been more desirable to him to be able to forget what he wished not to remember, than to remember what he had once heard or seen. But neither, on account of this answer of Themistocles, must we not give pains to memory, nor on account of Crassus’s outstanding prudence is that caution and timidity of mine in cases to be neglected. For neither of those men brought any faculty for me, but only signified his own.

Videsne quae vis in homine acerrimi ingeni, quam potens et quanta mens fuerit? Qui ita responderit, ut intellegere possemus nihil ex illius animo, quod semel esset infusum, umquam effluere potuisse; cum quidem ei fuerit optabilius oblivisci posse potius quod meminisse nollet quam quod semel audisset vidissetve meminisse. Sed neque propter hoc Themistocli responsum memoriae nobis opera danda non est neque illa mea cautio et timiditas in causis propter praestantem prudentiam Crassi neglegenda est; uterque enim istorum non mihi attulit aliquam, sed suam significavit facultatem.

For very many things in cases must be looked round at in every part of the speech, lest you should offend or strike on something. Often some witness either does no harm, or less harm, unless he is challenged. The defendant prays, the advocates press that we should attack, that we should abuse, finally that we should question; I am not moved, I do not obey, I do not satisfy them. Nor yet do I gain any praise; for the unskilled can more easily reproach what you have foolishly said than praise what you have wisely been silent about.

Etenim permulta sunt in causis in omni parte orationis circumspicienda, ne quid offendas, ne quo inruas: saepe aliqui testis aut non laedit aut minus laedit, nisi lacessatur; orat reus, urgent advocati, ut invehamur, ut male dicamus, denique ut interrogemus: non moveor, non obtempero, non satis facio; neque tamen ullam adsequor laudem; homines enim imperiti facilius quod stulte dixeris reprehendere quam quod sapienter tacueris laudare possunt.

How much harm is here, if you have hurt an angry, not foolish, not light witness! For he has both will to harm in his anger, and force in his talent, and weight in his life. Nor, even though Crassus does not commit this, do many therefore not commit it often. Than which nothing is wont to seem to me more disgraceful, than that out of the orator’s saying or answer or question this conversation follows: “He has killed.” “The adversary?” “On the contrary,” they say, “himself and the man whom

Hic quantum fit mali, si iratum, si non stultum, si non levem testem laeseris! Habet enim et voluntatem nocendi in iracundia et vim in ingenio et pondus in vita. Nec, si hoc Crassus non committit, ideo non multi et saepe committunt. Quo quidem mihi turpius videri nihil solet, quam quod ex oratoris dicto aliquo aut responso aut rogato sermo ille sequitur: "occidit." "Adversariumne?" "Immo vero" aiunt "se et eum, quem

he is defending.” Crassus does not think this can happen save by perfidy. But I most often see in cases men least bad doing something bad. What of that which I said before, that I am wont to give way and (to speak more plainly) to flee those things which most heavily press my case — when others do not do this and dwell in the camp of the enemy and dismiss their own garrisons, do they hurt their cases moderately when they either confirm the adversaries’ supports or open up things they cannot heal?

defendit." Hoc Crassus non putat nisi perfidia accidere posse; ego autem saepissime video in causis aliquid mali facere homines minime malos. Quid, illud, quod supra dixi, solere me cedere et, ut planius dicam, fugere ea, quae valde causam meam premerent, cum id non faciunt alii versanturque in hostium castris ac sua praesidia dimittunt, mediocriterne causis nocent, cum aut adversariorum adiumenta confirmant aut ea, quae sanare nequeunt, exulcerant?

What if they have no regard for the persons whom they defend — if those things which are odious in them they do not soften by lessening, but make more odious by praising and lifting them up; how much harm is in that? What if you should inveigh more bitterly and contumeliously against men dear and pleasing to the judges, with no preliminary fortification of speech: would you not estrange the judges from yourself?

Quid, cum personarum, quas defendunt, rationem non habent, si, quae sunt in eis invidiosa, non mitigant extenuando, sed laudando et efferendo invidiosiora faciunt, quantum est in eo tandem mali? Quid, si in homines caros iudicibusque iucundos sine ulla praemunitione orationis acerbius et contumeliosius invehare, nonne a te iudices abalienes?

What if those vices or disadvantages which are in some one or several judges, you, in reproaching them in adversaries, do not understand that you are inveighing against the judges — is that a slight fault? What if, when you speak for another, you make the case your own, or, hurt, are carried away by anger and abandon the case, do you do no harm? In which I, not because I gladly hear myself ill spoken of, but because I do not gladly leave the case, am thought too patient and slow — as when I rebuked you yourself, Sulpicius, that you were attacking the assistant, not the adversary. From this also I gain that, if anyone speaks ill of me, he seems either insolent or plainly insane.

Quid, si, quae vitia aut incommoda sunt in aliquo iudice uno aut pluribus, ea tu in adversariis exprobrando non intellegas te in iudices invehi, mediocre ne peccatum est? Quid, si, cum pro altero dicas, litem tuam facias aut laesus efferare iracundia, causam relinquas, nihilne noceas? In quo ego, non quo libenter male audiam, sed quia causam non libenter relinquo, nimium patiens et lentus existimor; ut, cum te ipsum, Sulpici, obiurgabam, quod ministratorem peteres, non adversarium; ex quo etiam illud adsequor, ut, si quis mihi male dicat, petulans aut plane insanus esse videatur.

In the arguments themselves, if you have laid down anything either openly false, or contrary to what you have said or are about to say, or by its very kind removed from the practice of trials and the Forum — do you do no harm? In short: all my care is wont to be in this — for I shall say it again — that, if I can, I should accomplish something good by speaking; if not, that at least I should do nothing bad.

In ipsis autem argumentis si quid posueris aut aperte falsum aut ei, quod dixeris dicturusve sis, contrarium aut genere ipso remotum ab usu iudiciorum ac foro, nihilne noceas? Quid multa? Omnis cura mea solet in hoc versari semper—dicam enim saepius—si possim ut boni efficiam aliquid dicendo; sin id minus, ut certe ne quid mali.

So now I come back, Catulus, to that on which you praised me a little before — to the order and arrangement of subjects and topics. Of which there is a twofold rationale: one which the nature of cases brings; the other which is gathered by the orator’s judgment and prudence. For that we should say something before the matter, then set the matter forth, afterwards prove it by confirming our supports and refuting contraries, then conclude and so peroration — this the very nature of speaking prescribes.

Itaque nunc illuc redeo, Catule, in quo tu me paulo ante laudabas, ad ordinem conlocationemque rerum ac locorum; cuius ratio est duplex; altera, quam adfert natura causarum, altera, quae oratorum iudicio et prudentia comparatur: nam ut aliquid ante rem dicamus, deinde ut rem exponamus, post ut eam probemus nostris praesidiis confirmandis, contrariis refutandis, deinde ut concludamus atque ita peroremus, hoc dicendi natura ipsa praescribit;

But how we should arrange those things which must be said for proving and teaching, that is most especially proper to the orator’s prudence. For many arguments occur, many which seem profitable in speaking; but of these some are so light that they should be despised; some, even if they have any help, are sometimes such that there is some fault in them, and that which seems to profit is not worth being joined with some bad thing.

ut vero statuamus ea, quae probandi et docendi causa dicenda sunt, quem ad modum componamus, id est vel maxime proprium oratoris prudentiae. Multa enim occurrunt argumenta; multa, quae in dicendo profutura videantur; sed eorum partim ita levia sunt, ut contemnenda sint; partim, etiam si quid habent adiumenti, sunt non numquam eius modi, ut insit in eis aliquid viti neque tanti sit illud, quod prodesse videatur, ut cum aliquo malo coniungatur;

Of those, however, which are useful and firm — if they are yet, as often happens, very many — those which are either lightest or like others heavier, I think should be set apart and removed from the speech. For my part, when I gather the arguments of cases, I am wont not so much to count them as to weigh them.

quae autem utilia sunt atque firma, si ea tamen, ut saepe fit, valde multa sunt, ea, quae ex eis aut levissima sunt aut aliis gravioribus consimilia, secerni arbitror oportere atque ex oratione removeri: equidem cum conligo argumenta causarum, non tam ea numerare soleo quam expendere.

And since, as I have often said, by three things we lead men to our opinion — either by teaching, or conciliating, or moving — one of these three things is to be put in front of us, that we may seem to wish nothing else save to teach. The other two, like blood in bodies, must be diffused through continuous speeches. For both the openings and the rest of the parts of speech, of which we shall presently say a few things, ought greatly to have this force: that they may be able to bear

Et quoniam, quod saepe iam dixi, tribus rebus homines ad nostram sententiam perducimus, aut docendo aut conciliando aut permovendo, una ex tribus his rebus res prae nobis est ferenda, ut nihil aliud nisi docere velle videamur; reliquae duae, sicuti sanguis in corporibus, sic illae in perpetuis orationibus fusae esse debebunt; nam et principia et ceterae partes orationis, de quibus paulo post pauca dicemus, habere hanc vim magno opere debent, ut ad eorum

on the moving of the minds before whom one is to plead. But to those parts of speech which, even if they teach nothing by arguing, yet by persuading and moving accomplish very much — although the chief and proper place is in the opening and in the peroration — to digress from what you have proposed and are pleading is yet often useful, for the moving of minds.

mentis, apud quos agetur, movendas per tinere possint. Sed his partibus orationis quae, etsi nihil docent argumentando, persuadendo tamen et commovendo perficiunt plurimum, quamquam maxime proprius est locus et in exordiendo et in perorando, digredi tamen ab eo, quod proposueris atque agas, permovendorum animorum causa saepe utile est;

So either when the matter has been narrated and set forth, often a place is given for digressing for moving minds, or after our arguments have been confirmed, or contraries refuted, or in each place, or in all of them, if the case has the dignity and abundance, this can rightly be done. And those cases are weightiest and fullest for amplifying and adorning, which give the most outlets for such digressions, that we may use those topics by which the impulses of the minds of those who hear are either driven on or turned back.

itaque vel re narrata et exposita saepe datur ad commovendos animos digrediendi locus, vel argumentis nostris confirmatis vel contrariis refutatis vel utroque loco vel omnibus, si habet eam causa dignitatem atque copiam, recte id fieri potest; eaeque causae sunt ad augendum et ad ornandum gravissimae atque plenissimae, quae plurimos exitus dant ad eius modi digressionem, ut eis locis uti liceat, quibus animorum impetus eorum, qui audiant, aut impellantur aut reflectantur.

I also rebuke those who put first what is least firm; in which I think those err too who, when they bring in several patrons (which has never pleased me), in proportion as they think there is least power in any of them, so they wish him to speak first. The matter requires this — that the expectation of those who hear should be met as quickly as possible. If at the beginning satisfaction has not been given to it, much more must be laboured at in the rest of the case. For a case is in a bad way which does not seem at once, as it begins to be spoken, to become better.

Atque etiam in illo reprehendo eos, qui, quae minime firma sunt, ea prima conlocant; in quo illos quoque errare arbitror, qui, si quando—id quod mihi numquam placuit—pluris adhibent patronos, ut in quoque eorum minimum putant esse, ita eum primum volunt dicere: res enim hoc postulat, ut eorum exspectationi, qui audiunt, quam celerrime succurratur; cui si initio satis factum non sit; multo plus sit in reliqua causa laborandum; male enim se res habet, quae non statim, ut dici coepta est, melior fieri videtur.

So as in the orator each best one, so in the speech let each firmest matter be first; provided in each it is held that what is excellent is also kept for the peroration. If there are middling things (for the faulty ought to have no place anywhere), let them be cast into the middle throng and herd.

Ergo ut in oratore optimus quisque, sic in oratione firmissimum quodque sit primum; dum illud tamen in utroque teneatur, ut ea, quae excellent, serventur etiam ad perorandum; si quae erunt mediocria, nam vitiosis nusquam esse oportet locum, in mediam turbam atque in gregem coniciantur.

All these things being considered, then at last what is to be said first, I am wont to think of last: what opening to use. For if I have ever wished to find this first, none has come to me save either meagre or trifling or vulgar or common. The openings of speaking ought always to be careful and keen and equipped with thoughts, fitting in words, and indeed proper to the cases. For first, as it were, comes the recognition and commendation of the speech in the opening, which ought immediately to soothe and entice him who hears.

Hisce omnibus rebus consideratis tum denique id, quod primum est dicendum, postremum soleo cogitare, quo utar exordio. Nam si quando id primum invenire volui, nullum mihi occurrit nisi aut exile aut nugatorium aut vulgare aut commune. Principia autem dicendi semper cum accurata et acuta et instructa sententiis, apta verbis, tum vero causarum propria esse debent; prima est enim quasi cognitio et commendatio orationis in principio, quaeque continuo eum, qui audit, permulcere atque allicere debet;

In which I am wont to wonder not at those who have given no pains to this matter, but at a man chiefly eloquent and learned, Philippus, who is wont so to rise to speak, that he does not know what first word he is to have. He even says that, when he has warmed up his arm, he is then wont to fight; and he does not consider that those very ones from whom he draws this likeness throw their first spears so gently as to serve grace very greatly and to spare their remaining strength.

in quo admirari soleo non equidem istos, qui nullam huic rei operam dederunt, sed hominem in primis disertum atque eruditum, Philippum, qui ita solet surgere ad dicendum, ut quod primum verbum habiturus sit, nesciat; et ait idem, cum bracchium concalfecerit, tum se solere pugnare; neque attendit eos ipsos, unde hoc simile ducat, primas illas hastas ita iactare leniter, ut et venustati vel maxime serviant et reliquis viribus suis consulant.

Nor is there doubt that the opening of speaking ought not often to be vehement and pugnacious; but if even in that very gladiatorial contest of life — by sword decided — many things happen before the engagement that seem to avail not for wounding but for show, how much more must this be looked at in speaking, in which not so much force as delight is required! Lastly, there is nothing in the nature of all things that pours itself out wholly and unrolls itself entirely on a sudden. Thus all things which happen and which are most keenly performed, nature herself has fringed about with gentler beginnings.

Nec est dubium, quin exordium dicendi vehemens et pugnax non saepe esse debeat; sed si in ipso illo gladiatorio vitae certamine, quo ferro decernitur, tamen ante congressum multa fiunt, quae non ad vulnus, sed ad speciem valere videantur, quanto hoc magis in oratione est spectandum, in qua non vis potius quam delectatio postulatur! Nihil est denique in natura rerum omnium, quod se universum profundat et quod totum repente evolvat; sic omnia, quae fiunt quaeque aguntur acerrime, lenioribus principiis natura ipsa praetexuit.

These things in speaking are not to be sought from outside somewhere, but to be taken from the very inwards of the case. So when the whole case has been thoroughly tested and seen through, and all the topics found and equipped, one must consider what opening to use.

Haec autem in dicendo non extrinsecus alicunde quaerenda, sed ex ipsis visceribus causae sumenda sunt; idcirco tota causa pertemptata atque perspecta, locis omnibus inventis atque instructis considerandum est quo principio sit utendum.

Thus they will be both easily found — they will be taken from those things which will be most copious either in the arguments or in those parts to which I said one ought often to digress. So they will bring some weight, since they will have been drawn nearly from the inmost defence; and it will be plain that they are not common nor capable of being transferred to other cases, but that they have flowered out from deep in the case being then pleaded.

Sic et facile reperientur; sumentur enim ex eis rebus, quae erunt uberrimae vel in argumentis vel in eis partibus, ad quas dixi digredi saepe oportere; ita et momenti aliquid adferent, cum erunt paene ex intima defensione deprompta, et apparebit ea non modo non esse communia nec in alias causas posse transferri, sed penitus ex ea causa quae tum agatur, effloruisse.

Every opening will have to have either a signification of the whole matter to be pleaded, or an entrance to the case and a way of being fortified, or some kind of ornament and dignity. But as we set vestibules and approaches before houses and temples, so we must set openings before cases in proportion to their size. So in small and infrequent cases it is often more advantageous to begin from the matter itself.

Omne autem principium aut rei totius, quae agetur, significationem habere debebit aut aditum ad causam et communitionem aut quoddam ornamentum et dignitatem; sed oportet, ut aedibus ac templis vestibula et aditus, sic causis principia pro portione rerum praeponere; itaque in parvis atque infrequentibus causis ab ipsa re est exordiri saepe commodius;

But when an opening must be used, as for the most part it must, thoughts may be drawn either from the defendant or from the adversary, or from the matter, or from those before whom one is to plead. From the defendant (I call defendants those whose case is at stake): things which signify a good man, generous, calamity-stricken, worthy of pity; things which avail against false accusation; from the adversary, contraries from the same topics in the main;

sed cum erit utendum principio, quod plerumque erit, aut ex reo aut ex adversario aut ex re aut ex eis, apud quos agetur, sententias duci licebit. Ex reo (reos appello, quorum res est), quae significent bonum virum, quae liberalem, quae calamitosum, quae misericordia dignum, quae valeant contra falsam criminationem; ex adversario eisdem ex locis fere contraria;

from the matter — if cruel, if wicked, if unexpected, if undeserved, if pitiful, if ungrateful, if unworthy, if new, if such cannot be restored or healed; from those before whom one is to plead — that we should make them favourable and well-thinking, which is more readily brought about by acting than by asking. This indeed must be diffused through the whole speech and not least at the end. But yet many openings are born from this kind.

ex re, si crudelis, si nefanda, si praeter opinionem, si immerito, si misera, si ingrata, si indigna, si nova, si quae restitui sanarique non possit; ex eis autem, apud quos agetur, ut benevolos beneque existimantis efficiamus, quod agendo efficitur melius quam rogando. Est id quidem in totam orationem confundendum nec minime in extremam; sed tamen multa principia ex eo genere gignuntur.

For the Greeks teach that we should, in the opening, make the judge attentive and teachable. Which are useful — but no more proper to the opening than to the rest of the parts. They are easier in the openings — both because men are then most attentive when they expect everything, and they can more readily be made teachable in the beginnings; for what is said in the openings is brighter than what is said in the middles of cases by way of arguing or refuting.

Nam et attentum monent Graeci ut principio faciamus iudicem et docilem; quae sunt utilia, sed non principi magis propria quam reliquarum partium; faciliora etiam in principiis, quod et attenti tum maxime sunt, cum omnia exspectant, et dociles magis in initiis esse possunt; inlustriora enim sunt, quae in principiis quam quae in mediis causis dicuntur aut arguendo aut refellendo.

The greatest abundance of openings, for either luring or rousing the judge, we shall draw from those topics for moving the soul which will lie in the case. These yet should not be wholly unfolded in the opening, but the judge should only be lightly impelled at first, so that the rest of the speech may rush upon him already inclined.

Maximam autem copiam principiorum ad iudicem aut adliciendum aut incitandum ex eis locis trahemus, qui ad motus animorum conficiendos inerunt in causa, quos tamen totos explicare in principio non oportebit, sed tantum impelli iudicem primo leviter, ut iam inclinato reliqua incumbat oratio.

But the opening should be so connected with the following speech that it may seem not, as a citharist’s prelude, something tacked on, but a member cohering with the whole body. For some, when they have produced their meditated piece, so pass to the rest as if they did not wish a hearing for themselves. And that prelude must be of such a kind, not as that of the Samnites, who brandish their spears before the fight, with which in the fighting they make no use, but with the very thoughts at which they have prelude they may also be able to fight.

Conexum autem ita sit principium consequenti orationi, ut non tamquam citharoedi prooemium adfictum aliquid, sed cohaerens cum omni corpore membrum esse videatur. Nam non nulli, cum illud meditati ediderunt, sic ad reliqua transeunt, ut audientiam fieri sibi non velle videantur. Atque eius modi illa prolusio debet esse, non ut Samnitium, qui vibrant hastas ante pugnam, quibus in pugnando nihil utuntur, sed ut ipsis sententiis, quibus proluserint, vel pugnare possint.

As for narrating the matter — that they bid be brief, if brevity must be called the case where no word overflows: brief is L. Crassus’s speech. But if brevity is then, when there is just so much of words as is needed, sometimes it is needed; but often it is harmful, especially in narrating, not only because it brings obscurity, but because it removes that virtue which is the greatest of narration: that it be pleasing and apt for persuading. Look at Terence’s: “For after he came forth from boyhood...”

Narrare vero rem quod breviter iubent, si brevitas appellanda est, cum verbum nullum redundat, brevis est L. Crassi oratio; sin tum est brevitas, cum tantum verborum est quantum necesse est, aliquando id opus est; sed saepe obest vel maxime in narrando, non solum quod obscuritatem adfert, sed etiam quod eam virtutem, quae narrationis est maxima, ut iucunda et ad persuadendum accommodata sit, tollit. Videant illa nam is postquam excessit ex ephebis

How long the narration is! The morals of the youth himself, the slave’s questioning, the death of Chrysis, the look and form and lamenting of his sister — the rest is most variously and pleasantly told. But if he had sought this brevity: “She is carried out, we go, we come to the tomb, she is laid on the fire” — he could have got the whole done in some ten short verses. Although that very “she is carried out, we go” is so clipped that it is not brevity that has been served but rather grace.

quam longa est narratio! Mores adulescentis ipsius et servilis percontatio, mors Chrysidis, vultus et forma et lamentatio sororis, reliqua pervarie iucundeque narrantur. Quod si hanc brevitatem quaesisset: effertur, imus, ad sepulcrum venimus, in ignem imposita est, fere decem versiculis totum conficere potuisset; quamquam hoc ipsum "effertur, imus," concisum est ita, ut non brevitati servitum sit, sed magis venustati.

For if there had been nothing but “she is laid on the fire,” yet the whole matter could easily have been known. But narration distinguished by persons and punctuated by speeches has merriment; and what you say has been done is more probable, when you set out the way it has been done; and it is much plainer to understand, if it is constituted at some length and not run over with that brevity.

Quod si nihil fuisset, nisi "in ignem imposita est," tamen res tota cognosci facile potuisset. Sed et festivitatem habet narratio distincta personis et interpuncta sermonibus, et est et probabilius, quod gestum esse dicas, cum quem ad modum actum sit exponas, et multo apertius ad intellegendum est, si †constituitur aliquando ac non ista brevitate percurritur.

For narration must be as plain as the rest. But this must be more laboured at, because it is harder not to be obscure in narrating a matter than either in the opening or in arguing or in perorating. With even greater danger this part of speech is obscure than the rest: either because, if anything has been said somewhat obscurely in some other place, only that perishes which has been so said, while an obscure narration darkens the whole speech; or because other things, if you have said them somewhat obscurely once, you can say more plainly in another place, but the narration has only one place in the case. The narration will be perspicuous if usual words are used, if the order of times is preserved, if it is told without interruption.

Apertam enim narrationem tam esse oportet quam cetera; sed hoc magis in hac elaborandum est, quod et difficilius est non esse obscurum in re narranda quam aut in principio aut in argumentando aut in perorando; et maiore etiam periculo haec pars orationis obscura est quam ceterae, vel quia, si quo alio in loco est dictum quid obscurius, tantum id perit, quod ita dictum est, narratio obscura totam occaecat orationem; vel quod alia possis, semel si obscurius dixeris, dicere alio loco planius, narrationis unus est in causa locus. Erit autem perspicua narratio, si verbis usitatis, si ordine temporum servato, si non interrupte narrabitur.

But when narration must be used or not, that is of judgment. For neither, if the matter is known and there is no doubt what has been done, must one narrate; nor, if the adversary has narrated, unless we are to refute. And if it is to be narrated sometimes, neither shall we keenly pursue those things which would create suspicion and charge and be against us, and we shall draw off whatever we can; that what Crassus thinks, if it ever happens, happens by perfidy, not by stupidity — that we hurt our case — may not happen. For it pertains to the summary of the whole case whether the matter has been set out cautiously or the contrary; for the narration is the spring of all the rest of the speech.

Sed quando utendum sit aut non sit narratione, id est consili; neque enim si nota res est nec dubium quid gestum sit, narrare oportet, nec si adversarius narravit, nisi si refellemus; ac si quando erit narrandum, nec illa, quae suspicionem et crimen efficient contraque nos erunt, acriter persequemur et, quicquid potuerit, detrahemus; ne illud, quod Crassus, si quando fiat, perfidia, non stultitia fieri putat, ut causae noceamus, accidat. Nam ad summam totius causae pertinet, caute an contra demonstrata res sit, quod omnis orationis reliquae fons est narratio.

Next, the case must be set down, in which we must see what comes into controversy. Then the supports of the case must be supplied jointly, both for refuting the contraries and for confirming yours. For one method in cases is of that speech which avails for proving the argument; and that asks both for confirmation and for reprehension. But because neither can what is said against be reproved unless you confirm yours, nor can yours be confirmed unless you reprove theirs, on that account these are joined both in nature and in usefulness and in handling.

Sequitur, ut causa ponatur, in quo videndum est, quid in controversiam veniat; tum suggerenda sunt firmamenta causae coniuncte et infirmandis contrariis et tuis confirmandis. Namque una in causis ratio quaedam est eius orationis, quae ad probandam argumentationem valet; ea autem et confirmationem et reprehensionem quaerit; sed quia neque reprehendi, quae contra dicuntur, possunt, nisi tua confirmes, neque haec confirmari, nisi illa reprehendas, idcirco haec et natura et utilitate et tractatione coniuncta sunt.

All things must mostly be concluded with amplifying matters either by inflaming the judge or by softening him. And all things, both with the previous topics of speech and especially in the last, must be brought together for moving the minds of the judges as much as possible and calling them to our advantage.

Omnia autem concludenda sunt plerumque rebus augendis vel inflammando iudice vel mitigando; omniaque cum superioribus orationis locis tum maxime extremo ad mentis iudicum quam maxime permovendas et ad utilitatem nostram vocandas conferenda sunt.

Nor does there now seem to be any reason why we should set apart those precepts which are to be handed down on hortations or laudations: for most are common. Yet still to advise something or dissuade something seems to me of the weightiest character. For it belongs to a wise and to an honourable and to an eloquent man to set out his counsel on the greatest matters — that you may foresee in your mind, prove by authority, persuade by speech. And these things must be carried on in the senate with less display: for it is a wise body, and place must be left for many others to speak; even the suspicion of showing off talent must be avoided.

Neque sane iam causa videtur esse cur secernamus ea praecepta, quae de suasionibus tradenda sunt aut laudationibus, sunt enim pleraque communia, sed tamen suadere aliquid aut dissuadere gravissimae mihi personae videtur esse; nam et sapientis est consilium explicare suum de maximis rebus et honesti et diserti, ut mente providere, auctoritate probare, oratione persuadere possis. Atque haec in senatu minore apparatu agenda sunt; sapiens enim est consilium multisque aliis dicendi relinquendus locus, vitanda etiam ingeni ostentationis suspicio:

A public meeting holds all the force of speech and asks for weight and variety. So in advising nothing is more to be desired than dignity. For he who pursues utility looks not at what the persuader most wishes, but at what is sometimes more attainable. There is no one, especially in so renowned a state, who does not think dignity above all is to be sought; but utility for the most part wins, when there is the underlying fear that, if it be neglected, even dignity cannot be retained.

contio capit omnem vim orationis et gravitatem varietatemque desiderat. Ergo in suadendo nihil est optabilius quam dignitas; nam qui utilitatem petit, non quid maxime velit suasor, sed quid interdum magis sequatur, videt. Nemo est enim, praesertim in tam clara civitate, quin putet expetendam maxime dignitatem, sed vincit utilitas plerumque, cum subest ille timor ea neglecta ne dignitatem quidem posse retineri.

The controversy among men’s opinions is either on which is more useful, or, even when it is agreed which is, the contention is whether thought should rather be had for honour or for utility. These often seem to fight together. He who shall defend utility will count up the advantages of peace, of resources, of power, of revenues, of military protection, of the rest by which we measure fruit by utility, and likewise the disadvantages of the contraries. He who urges to dignity will gather the examples of the ancestors, which were glorious even with danger; he will increase the immortal memory of posterity; he will defend that utility is born of praise and is always joined with dignity.

Controversia autem est inter hominum sententias aut in illo, utrum sit utilius; aut etiam, cum id convenit, certatur, utrum honestati potius an utilitati consulendum sit; quae quia pugnare inter se saepe videntur, qui utilitatem defendet, enumerabit commoda pacis, opum, potentiae, vectigalium, praesidi militum, ceterarum rerum, quarum fructum utilitate metimur, itemque incommoda contrariorum; qui ad dignitatem impellit, maiorum exempla, quae erant vel cum periculo gloriosa, conliget, posteritatis immortalem memoriam augebit, utilitatem ex laude nasci defendet semperque eam cum dignitate esse coniunctam.

But what can or cannot be done, and what is even necessary or not, in either thing must most be inquired. For all deliberation is cut off if it is understood that something cannot be done, or if necessity is brought; and he who has shown this when others did not see it has seen most.

Sed quid fieri possit aut non possit quidque etiam sit necesse aut non sit, in utraque re maxime est quaerendum; inciditur enim omnis iam deliberatio, si intellegitur non posse fieri aut si necessitas adfertur; et qui id docuit non videntibus aliis, is plurimum vidit.

For giving counsel about the commonwealth the chief thing is to know the commonwealth; for speaking probably, to know the morals of the state, which, because they often change, the kind of speech must often be changed too. And although the force of eloquence is one in the main, yet because the highest dignity is of the people, the weightiest case is of the commonwealth, the greatest movements are of the multitude, the kind of speech also must seem to be applied as somewhat grander and brighter; and the greatest part of the speech must be applied to the movements of minds — sometimes by exhortation or by some recalling, to be roused either to hope or to fear or to desire or to glory; often also to be called back from rashness, anger, hope, injury, envy, cruelty.

Ad consilium autem de re publica dandum caput est nosse rem publicam; ad dicendum vero probabiliter nosse mores civitatis, qui quia crebro mutantur, genus quoque orationis est saepe mutandum; et quamquam una fere vis est eloquentiae, tamen quia summa dignitas est populi, gravissima causa rei publicae, maximi motus multitudinis, genus quoque dicendi grandius quoddam et inlustrius esse adhibendum videtur; maximaque pars orationis admovenda est ad animorum motus non numquam aut cohortatione aut commemoratione aliqua aut in spem aut in metum aut ad cupiditatem aut ad gloriam concitandos, saepe etiam a temeritate, iracundia, spe, iniuria, invidia, crudelitate revocandos.

It happens that, because the assembly seems to be the orator’s greatest stage, we are roused by nature herself to a more ornate kind of speaking. For the multitude has a kind of force such that, just as a piper without his pipes, so an orator without a multitude listening cannot be eloquent.

Fit autem ut, quia maxima quasi oratoris scaena videatur contionis esse, natura ipsa ad ornatius dicendi genus excitemur; habet enim multitudo vim quandam talem, ut, quem ad modum tibicen sine tibiis canere, sic orator sine multitudine audiente eloquens esse non possit.

And since there are many and various lapses among the people, the contrary acclamation of the people is to be avoided. This is roused either by some fault of speech — if anything seems to have been said roughly, arrogantly, basely, sordidly, by some fault of mind — or by an offence at the men or by envy (which is either just, or comes from accusation and rumour); or if the matter is displeasing; or if the multitude is in some movement of its own desire or fear. To these four causes are opposed as many medicines: rebuke, if there is authority; admonition, as a gentler rebuke; promise that, if they will hear, they will approve; entreaty, which is feeble, but sometimes useful.

Et cum sint populares multi variique lapsus, vitanda est acclamatio adversa populi, quae aut orationis peccato aliquo excitatur, si aspere, si arroganter, si turpiter, si sordide, si quo animi vitio dictum esse aliquid videtur, aut hominum offensione vel invidia, quae aut iusta est aut ex criminatione atque fama, aut res si displicet, aut si est in aliquo motu suae cupiditatis aut metus multitudo. His quattuor causis totidem medicinae opponuntur: tum obiurgatio, si est auctoritas; tum admonitio quasi lenior obiurgatio; tum promissio, si audierint, probaturos; tum deprecatio, quod est infirmum, sed non numquam utile.

In no place do witticisms profit more, and swiftness, and some brief saying not without dignity and with charm. For nothing is so easy as for the multitude to be drawn from gloom — and often from bitterness — by something said suitably and briefly and keenly and cheerfully. I have set out for you, as I could, in each kind of cases what I am wont to follow, what to flee, what to look at, and on what method altogether to move in cases.

Nullo autem loco plus facetiae prosunt et celeritas et breve aliquod dictum nec sine dignitate et cum lepore; nihil enim tam facile quam multitudo a tristitia et saepe ab acerbitate commode et breviter et acute et hilare dicto deducitur. Exposui fere, ut potui, vobis in utroque genere causarum quae sequi solerem, quae fugere, quae spectare quaque omnino in causis ratione versari.

Nor is that third kind of laudation hard, which I had at first set apart, as it were, from our precepts. Both because there are many kinds of speeches both weightier and of greater abundance about which hardly anyone would give precept, and because we are not wont to use laudations very much, I was setting this whole topic aside. For the Greeks themselves wrote laudations more for the sake of reading and pleasure or of adorning some man, than for the sake of this forensic utility; whose books are extant, in which Themistocles, Aristides, Agesilaus, Epaminondas, Philippus, Alexander, and others are praised. Our laudations, which we use in the Forum, either have the bare and unornamented brevity of testimony or are written for a funeral assembly, which is least apt for the praise of speech. But still — since they must sometimes be used and sometimes even written (as Gaius Laelius wrote for Quintus Tubero when he was praising his uncle Africanus, or so that we ourselves, for ornament, in the Greek manner, may be able to praise whom we wish) — let this topic too be handled by us.

Nec illud tertium laudationum genus est difficile, quod ego initio quasi a praeceptis nostris secreveram; sed et quia multa sunt orationum genera et graviora et maioris copiae, de quibus nemo fere praeciperet, et quod nos laudationibus non ita multum uti soleremus, totum hunc segregabam locum; ipsi enim Graeci magis legendi et delectationis aut hominis alicuius ornandi quam utilitatis huius forensis causa laudationes scriptitaverunt; quorum sunt libri, quibus Themistocles, Aristides, Agesilaus, Epaminondas, Philippus, Alexander aliique laudantur; nostrae laudationes, quibus in foro utimur, aut testimoni brevitatem habent nudam atque inornatam aut scribuntur ad funebrem contionem, quae ad orationis laudem minime accommodata est. Sed tamen, quoniam est utendum aliquando, non numquam etiam scribendum, vel ut Q. Tuberoni Africanum avunculum laudanti scripsit C. Laelius, vel ut nosmet ipsi ornandi causa Graecorum more, si quos velimus, laudare possimus, sit a nobis quoque tractatus hic locus.

It is plain, then, that some things in a man are to be desired, others praised. Birth, beauty, strength, wealth, riches, and the rest which fortune gives, either externally or to the body, do not have in themselves true praise, which is thought owed only to virtue; but yet, because virtue itself is most discerned in the use and moderation of those things, these goods of nature and fortune must also be handled in laudations. In which the highest praise is: not to have lifted oneself up in power, not to have been insolent in money, not to have set oneself before others on account of the abundance of fortune, so that resources and stores may seem to have given the means and matter not to pride and lust but to goodness and moderation.

Perspicuum est igitur alia esse in homine optanda, alia laudanda: genus, forma, vires, opes, divitiae cetera que, quae fortuna dat aut extrinsecus aut corpori, non habent in se veram laudem, quae deberi virtuti uni putatur; sed tamen, quod ipsa virtus in earum rerum usu et moderatione maxime cernitur, tractanda in laudationibus etiam haec sunt naturae et fortunae bona; in quibus est summa laus non extulisse se in potestate, non fuisse insolentem in pecunia, non se praetulisse aliis propter abundantiam fortunae, ut opes et copiae non superbiae videantur ac libidini, sed bonitati ac moderationi facultatem et materiam dedisse.

Virtue itself, which is praiseworthy of itself and without which nothing can be praised, has yet several parts, of which one is more apt than another for laudation. For there are some virtues which are seen as set in the morals of men and in a certain kindness and beneficence; others which are in some faculty of talent or in greatness and strength of soul. For clemency, justice, kindness, faith, courage in common dangers are pleasant to hear in laudations;

Virtus autem, quae est per se ipsa laudabilis et sine qua nihil laudari potest, tamen habet pluris partis, quarum alia est alia ad laudationem aptior; sunt enim aliae virtutes, quae videntur in moribus hominum et quadam comitate ac beneficentia positae; aliae, quae in ingeni aliqua facultate aut animi magnitudine ac robore; nam clementia, iustitia, benignitas, fides, fortitudo in periculis communibus iucunda est auditu in laudationibus;

all these virtues are reckoned profitable not so much to those who have them, as to the human race. Wisdom, and greatness of soul (by which all human things are reckoned slight and as nothing), and a certain force of talent in inventing, and even eloquence have admiration no less, but pleasantness less. For these seem rather to adorn and protect those whom we praise, than those before whom we praise. But yet in praising these kinds of virtues too must be joined; for the ears of men bear that those things which are pleasing and pleasant, and also those which are wonderful in virtue, should be praised.

omnes enim hae virtutes non tam ipsis, qui eas habent, quam generi hominum fructuosae putantur. Sapientia et magnitudo animi, qua omnes res humanae tenues ac pro nihilo putantur, et in excogitando vis quaedam ingeni et ipsa eloquentia admirationis habet non minus, iucunditatis minus: ipsos enim magis videntur, quos laudamus, quam illos, apud quos laudamus, ornare ac tueri. Sed tamen in laudando iungenda sunt etiam haec genera virtutum; ferunt enim aures hominum cum illa, quae iucunda et grata, tum etiam illa, quae mirabilia sunt in virtute, laudari.

And since each single virtue has certain offices and duties, and to each its own praise is owed, it must be set out in the praise of justice what the man being praised did with faith, with equity, with such a kind of duty. Likewise in the rest, the deeds done will be fitted to the kind, force, and name of each virtue.

Et quoniam singularum virtutum sunt certa quaedam officia ac munera et sua cuique virtuti laus propria debetur, erit explicandum in laude iustitiae, quid cum fide, quid cum aequabilitate, quid cum eius modi aliquo officio is, qui laudabitur, fecerit; itemque in ceteris res gestae ad cuiusque virtutis genus et vim et nomen accommodabuntur.

The most pleasing praise is held to be of those deeds which seem to have been undertaken by brave men without profit and reward; but those which were also with their own labour and danger, these have the richest abundance for praise: both because they can be most ornately said, and most easily heard. For that finally seems the virtue of an outstanding man, which is fruitful to others, but to himself either toilsome or dangerous or at any rate gratis. Great too is wont to seem that praise — to have borne adverse chances wisely, not to have been broken by fortune, to have kept dignity in harsh circumstances.

Gratissima autem laus eorum factorum habetur, quae suscepta videntur a viris fortibus sine emolumento ac praemio; quae vero etiam cum labore ac periculo ipsorum, haec habent uberrimam copiam ad laudandum, quod et dici ornatissime possunt et audiri facillime; ea enim denique virtus esse videtur praestantis viri, quae est fructuosa aliis, ipsi aut laboriosa aut periculosa aut certe gratuita. Magna etiam illa laus et admirabilis videri solet tulisse casus sapienter adversos, non fractum esse fortuna, retinuisse in rebus asperis dignitatem;

Nor yet do they not adorn — honours had, decreed rewards of virtue, deeds approved by men’s judgments. In which it is part of laudation that even good fortune itself is assigned to the judgment of the immortal gods. The matters to be taken should be either outstanding for greatness, or first by novelty, or singular in their very kind. For neither small nor common nor vulgar things are wont to seem worthy of admiration or even of praise.

neque tamen illa non ornant, habiti honores, decreta virtutis praemia, res gestae iudiciis hominum comprobatae; in quibus etiam felicitatem ipsam deorum immortalium iudicio tribui laudationis est. Sumendae autem res erunt aut magnitudine praestabiles aut novitate primae aut genere ipso singulares; neque enim parvae neque usitatae neque vulgares admiratione aut omnino laude dignae videri solent.

There is also in laudation a brilliant comparison with other outstanding men. About this kind I have wished to say a little more than I had shown — not so much for forensic use (which has been treated by me throughout this whole conversation), as that you might see this: that, if laudations are in the orator’s office (which no one denies), the knowledge of all the virtues, without which laudation cannot be effected, is necessary to the orator.

Est etiam cum ceteris praestantibus viris comparatio in laudatione praeclara. De quo genere libitum mihi est paulo plura quam ostenderam dicere, non tam propter usum forensem, qui est a me omni hoc sermone tractatus, quam ut hoc videretis, si laudationes essent in oratoris officio, quod nemo negat, oratori virtutum omnium cognitionem, sine qua laudatio effici non possit, esse necessariam.

It is now plain that the precepts of blaming must be drawn from the contrary vices. At the same time, this is before our eyes: that neither can a good man be praised properly and copiously without knowledge of the virtues, nor an evil one be marked and blamed sufficiently distinctly and harshly without knowledge of the vices. And these topics, both of praising and of blaming, must often be used by us in every kind of cases.

Iam vituperandi praecepta contrariis ex vitiis sumenda esse perspicuum est; simul est illud ante oculos, nec bonum virum proprie et copiose laudari sine virtutum nec improbum notari ac vituperari sine vitiorum cognitione satis insignite atque aspere posse. Atque his locis et laudandi et vituperandi saepe nobis est utendum in omni genere causarum.

You have what I think about discovering and arranging matters. I shall add also about memory, that I may relieve Crassus of labour and leave nothing for him to discuss except those things by which these are adorned.” “Go on, then,” said Crassus, “for gladly I see you, the master once recognised and now also unrolled from those wrappings of your dissimulation, laid bare. And in that you leave me nothing or not much, you do most commodiously, and it is welcome to me.”

Habetis de inveniendis rebus disponendisque quid sentiam; adiungam etiam de memoria, ut labore Crassum levem neque ei quicquam aliud, de quo disserat, relinquam nisi ea, quibus haec exornentur.’ ’Perge vero,’ inquit Crassus ’libenter enim te cognitum iam artificem aliquandoque evolutum illis integumentis dissimulationis tuae nudatumque perspicio; et quod mihi nihil aut quod non multum relinquis, percommode facis estque mihi gratum.’

“How much I shall have left to you,” said Antonius, “will be in your power. For if you wish to act truly, I leave everything to you; but if to dissemble, you must see how to satisfy these. But to come back to the matter, I am not,” he said, “of so great a talent as Themistocles was, that I should prefer the art of forgetting to that of memory; and I owe thanks to that famous Simonides of Ceos, who, they say, first brought forward the art of memory.

’Iam istuc, quantum tibi ego reliquerim,’ inquit Antonius ’erit in tua potestate; si enim vere agere volueris, omnia tibi relinquo; sin dissimulare, tu quem ad modum his satis facias, videris. Sed, ut ad rem redeam, non sum tanto ego’ inquit ’ingenio, quanto Themistocles fuit, ut oblivionis artem quam memoriae malim; gratiamque habeo Simonidi illi Cio, quem primum ferunt artem memoriae protulisse.

They say that, when Simonides was dining at Crannon in Thessaly with Scopas, a fortunate and noble man, and had sung the song which he had written about him, in which much had been written, in the way of poets, in praise of Castor and Pollux for ornament — Scopas in too sordid a manner told Simonides he would give him half of what they had agreed for that song. The rest he should seek from his Tyndaridae, whom he had praised equally, if it pleased him.

Dicunt enim, cum cenaret Crannone in Thessalia Simonides apud Scopam fortunatum hominem et nobilem cecinissetque id carmen, quod in eum scripsisset, in quo multa ornandi causa poetarum more in Castorem scripta et Pollucem fuissent, nimis illum sordide Simonidi dixisse se dimidium eius ei, quod pactus esset, pro illo carmine daturum; reliquum a suis Tyndaridis, quos aeque laudasset, peteret, si ei videretur.

A little later they say it was reported to Simonides to come out: that two young men were standing at the door who were urgently calling him out. He rose, came out, saw no one. In this interval the room in which Scopas was banqueting fell down. By that ruin Scopas himself, with his kinsfolk, was crushed and killed. When his people wished to bury them and could not in any way distinguish them as crushed, Simonides is said to have been the demonstrator for burying each — from this, that he had remembered in what place each of them had reclined. Warned by this matter, he is reported to have discovered that order is what most brings light to memory.

Paulo post esse ferunt nuntiatum Simonidi, ut prodiret; iuvenis stare ad ianuam duo quosdam, qui eum magno opere evocarent; surrexisse illum, prodisse, vidisse neminem: hoc interim spatio conclave illud, ubi epularetur Scopas, concidisse; ea ruina ipsum cum cognatis oppressum suis interisse: quos cum humare vellent sui neque possent obtritos internoscere ullo modo, Simonides dicitur ex eo, quod meminisset quo eorum loco quisque cubuisset, demonstrator unius cuiusque sepeliendi fuisse; hac tum re admonitus invenisse fertur ordinem esse maxime, qui memoriae lumen adferret.

So those who would exercise this part of talent must take places, and shape in their minds the things they wish to keep in memory and place them in those places. Thus it would happen that the order of the places kept the order of the things, and the things themselves were marked by the figures of the things; and we should use the places as wax, the images as letters.

Itaque eis, qui hanc partem ingeni exercerent, locos esse capiendos et ea, quae memoria tenere vellent effingenda animo atque in eis locis conlocanda; sic fore, ut ordinem rerum locorum ordo conservaret, res autem ipsas rerum effigies notaret atque ut locis pro cera, simulacris pro litteris uteremur.

What use of memory, what utility, what force is the orator’s, why need I say? To hold what you have learned in the receiving of the case, what you have yourself thought; that all your thoughts be fixed in the soul, all the equipment of words written out; so to listen either to him from whom you learn, or to him to whom you must answer, that they may seem to you not to pour their speech into your ears, but to inscribe it on your soul. So those alone who have a vigorous memory know what and how far and how they shall speak, what they have answered, what is left. The same men also remember many things from other cases now and then handled by themselves, much they have heard from others.

Qui sit autem oratori memoriae fructus, quanta utilitas, quanta vis, quid me attinet dicere? tenere, quae didiceris in accipienda causa, quae ipse cogitaris? omnis fixas esse in animo sententias? omnem descriptum verborum apparatum? ita audire vel eum, unde discas, vel eum, cui respondendum sit, ut illi non infundere in auris tuas orationem, sed in animo videantur inscribere? Itaque soli qui memoria vigent, sciunt quid et quatenus et quo modo dicturi sint, quid responderint, quid supersit: eidemque multa ex aliis causis aliquando a se acta, multa ab aliis audita meminerunt.

I confess therefore that the nature of this good is principal, as of all those things of which I spoke before. But this whole art of speaking — or whatever image and likeness of art it is — has this force: not that it should beget and produce some whole of which there is no part in our talents, but that those things which have already arisen and been produced in us, it should bring out and confirm.

Qua re confiteor equidem huius boni naturam esse principem, sicut earum rerum, de quibus ante locutus sum, omnium; sed haec ars tota dicendi, sive artis imago quaedam et similitudo est, habet hanc vim, non ut totum aliquid, cuius in ingeniis nostris pars nulla sit, pariat et procreet, verum ut ea, quae sunt orta iam in nobis et procreata, educet atque confirmet;

Yet hardly any one is of so keen a memory that, with the matters not arranged and noted, he could embrace the order of all words or thoughts; nor again of so dull a memory as not to be helped by this habit and exercise. For he saw this prudently, whether Simonides or some other invented it: that those things are most stamped on our minds which are handed down and impressed by the senses; and that the keenest of all our senses is that of seeing. So things which are perceived by the ears or by thought can most easily be kept in mind, if they are also handed to our minds by the recommendation of the eyes — that things blind and removed from the judgment of sight a certain shape and image and figure should mark, so that what we could scarcely embrace by thinking, we should as it were hold by gazing upon.

verum tamen neque tam acri memoria fere quisquam est, ut, non dispositis notatisque rebus, ordinem verborum omnium aut sententiarum complectatur, neque vero tam hebeti, ut nihil hac consuetudine et exercitatione adiuvetur. Vidit enim hoc prudenter sive Simonides sive alius quis invenit, ea maxime animis effingi nostris, quae essent a sensu tradita atque impressa; acerrimum autem ex omnibus nostris sensibus esse sensum videndi; qua re facillime animo teneri posse ea, quae perciperentur auribus aut cogitatione, si etiam commendatione oculorum animis traderentur; ut res caecas et ab aspectus iudicio remotas conformatio quaedam et imago et figura ita notaret, ut ea, quae cogitando complecti vix possemus, intuendo quasi teneremus.

By these forms and bodies, just as by all things which come under sight, our memory is reminded and roused; but a seat is needed, since a body cannot be understood without a place. Therefore, that I may not be too long and unfamiliar in a known and well-worn matter — many places must be used, illustrious, set out, with moderate intervals; images, however, that are active, keen, marked, which can quickly come and strike the soul. This faculty both exercise will give (from which habit is born), and the noting of like words turned and changed by cases or transferred from a part to a kind, and the shaping of a whole thought by the image of one word — by the rationale and method of some chief painter who distinguishes places by variety of forms.

His autem formis atque corporibus, sicut omnibus, quae sub aspectum veniunt, admonetur memoria nostra atque excitatur; sede opus est, etenim corpus intellegi sine loco non potest. Qua re ne in re nota et pervulgata multus et insolens sim, locis est utendum multis, inlustribus, explicatis, modicis intervallis; imaginibus autem agentibus, acribus, insignitis, quae occurrere celeriterque percutere animum possint; quam facultatem et exercitatio dabit, ex qua consuetudo gignitur, et similium verborum conversa et immutata casibus aut traducta ex parte ad genus notatio et unius verbi imagine totius sententiae informatio pictoris cuiusdam summi ratione et modo formarum varietate locos distinguentis.

The memory of words, however, which is less necessary to us, is distinguished by greater variety of images. For there are many words which, like joints, connect the limbs of speech, which can be shaped by no likeness; for them we must invent images for ourselves, which we should always use. The memory of matters is the orator’s own; this we can mark with single persons well placed, that we should grasp the thoughts by images, the order by places.

Sed verborum memoria, quae minus est nobis necessaria, maiore imaginum varietate distinguitur; multa enim sunt verba, quae quasi articuli conectunt membra orationis, quae formari similitudine nulla possunt; eorum fingendae sunt nobis imagines, quibus semper utamur; rerum memoria propria est oratoris; eam singulis personis bene positis notare possumus, ut sententias imaginibus, ordinem locis comprehendamus.

Nor is it true, what is said by the slothful, that memory is overwhelmed by the weight of images, and that even what nature could of itself have held is obscured. For I have seen the foremost men with well-nigh divine memory: at Athens Charmadas, in Asia (whom they say is alive today) Metrodorus of Scepsis. Each of these said that, just as one writes letters in wax, so he wrote out by images in those places he had what he wished to remember. Therefore by this exercise memory is not to be dug out, if there is none in nature; but surely, if it lurks, it must be called forth.

Neque verum est, quod ab inertibus dicitur, opprimi memoriam imaginum pondere et obscurari etiam id, quod per se natura tenere potuisset: vidi enim ego summos homines et divina prope memoria, Athenis Charmadam, in Asia, quem vivere hodie aiunt, Scepsium Metrodorum, quorum uterque tamquam litteris in cera, sic se aiebat imaginibus in eis locis, quos haberet, quae meminisse vellet, perscribere. Qua re hac exercitatione non eruenda memoria est, si est nulla naturalis; sed certe, si latet, evocanda est.

You have a man’s tolerably long discourse — would that not an impudent one! That, certainly, of one not too modest; who, with you, Catulus, listening, with L. Crassus also listening, has said so much about the rationale of speaking. For the age of those over there should perhaps have moved me less. But you will surely pardon me, if you will hear what now drove me to this loquacity unusual to me.”

Habetis sermonem bene longum hominis, utinam non impudentis! Illud quidem certe, non nimis verecundi; qui quidem, cum te, Catule, tum etiam L. Crasso audiente, de dicendi ratione tam multa dixerim; nam istorum aetas minus me fortasse movere debuit. Sed mihi ignoscetis profecto, si modo, quae causa me nunc ad hanc insolitam mihi loquacitatem impulerit, acceperitis.’

“We do indeed,” said Catulus, “— for I answer this both for myself and for my brother — not only pardon you, but love you and owe you great thanks. And while we recognise your kindness and easy nature, we wonder at this knowledge and abundance. For my part I think I have gained this too, that I am freed from a great error and from that wonder which, with many others, I was always wont to feel — whence came that great divinity of yours in cases. For I did not think you had touched these things, which I now see you have most diligently learned and gathered from every side, and, taught by use, have in part corrected, in part approved.

’Nos vero,’ inquit Catulus ’etenim pro me hoc et pro meo fratre respondeo, non modo tibi ignoscimus, sed te diligimus magnamque tibi habemus gratiam; et cum humanitatem et facilitatem agnoscimus tuam, tum admiramur istam scientiam et copiam. Equidem etiam hoc me adsecutum puto, quod magno sum levatus errore et illa admiratione liberatus, quod multis cum aliis semper admirari solebam, unde esset illa tanta tua in causis divinitas; nec enim te ista attigisse arbitrabar, quae diligentissime cognosse et undique conlegisse usuque doctum partim correxisse video, partim comprobasse;

Nor on that account do I admire your eloquence less, but your virtue and diligence much more. And at the same time I rejoice that the judgment of my mind is approved, by which I have always laid down that no one can attain praise of wisdom and eloquence without the highest zeal and labour and learning. But yet what is that thing you said would happen — that we should pardon you, if we knew what cause had driven you to the conversation? For what other cause is there but that you have wished to humour us and the eagerness of these young men, who have heard you most attentively?”

neque eo minus eloquentiam tuam et multo magis virtutem et diligentiam admiror et simul gaudeo iudicium animi mei comprobari, quod semper statui neminem sapientiae laudem et eloquentiae sine summo studio et labore et doctrina consequi posse. Sed tamen quidnam est id quod dixisti fore, ut tibi ignosceremus, si cognossemus, quae te causa in sermonem impulisset? Quae est enim alia causa, nisi quod nobis et horum adulescentium studio, qui te attentissime audierunt, morem gerere voluisti?’

Then he: “I wished,” he said, “to take away from Crassus all refusal, whom I knew a little before to come to this kind of conversation either too modestly or too unwillingly (I do not wish to say more fastidiously of so sweet a man). For what could he say? That he is a consular and a censorial man? Our case is the same. Will he plead his age? He is four years younger. That he does not know these things — which I, late, snatched up in haste, in spare hours, as they say, while he from boyhood with the highest zeal, with the highest teachers? I shall say nothing of his talent, to which no one was equal. For when I was speaking, no one ever was so contemptuous of himself that he did not hope to speak either better or in the same way; when Crassus speaks, no one is so arrogant as to trust that he would ever speak similarly. Therefore, lest these such men have come in vain, let us at last hear you, Crassus.”

Tum ille ’adimere’ inquit ’omnem recusationem Crasso volui, quem ego paulo ante sciebam vel pudentius vel invitius, nolo enim dicere de tam suavi homine fastidiosius, ad hoc genus sermonis accedere. Quid enim poterit dicere? Consularem se esse hominem et censorium? Eadem nostra causa est. An aetatem adferet? Quadriennio minor est. An se haec nescire? Quae ego sero, quae cursim arripui, quae subsicivis operis, ut aiunt, iste a puero, summo studio, summis doctoribus. Nihil dicam de ingenio, cui par nemo fuit: etenim me dicentem qui audiret, nemo umquam tam sui despiciens fuit quin speraret aut melius aut eodem modo se posse dicere; Crasso dicente nemo tam arrogans, qui similiter se umquam dicturum esse confideret. Quam ob rem ne frustra hi tales viri venerint, te aliquando, Crasse, audiamus.’

Then he: “Granting that those things are so,” he said, “Antonius — which are very much otherwise — what at last have you left to me today, or to any man, that could be said? For I shall speak truly, my dearest friends, what I feel: I have often heard learned men. Why do I say often? Rather, sometimes; for how could I do so often, who came as a boy to the Forum and never was away thence longer than my quaestorship? But yet I heard, as I was saying yesterday, when I was at Athens, the most learned men, and in Asia that very Metrodorus of Scepsis, when he was disputing about these very matters; nor has anyone seemed to me more copious or more subtle in this kind of speaking than this man has been today. But if it were otherwise and I should understand something passed over by Antonius, I should not be so uncivil and almost inhuman as to refuse what I felt you wished.”

Tum ille ’ut ita ista esse concedam,’ inquit ’Antoni, quae sunt valde secus, quid mihi tu tandem hodie aut cuiquam homini quod dici possit reliquisti? Dicam enim vere, amicissimi homines, quod sentio: saepe ego doctos homines, quid dico saepe? immo non numquam; saepe enim qui potui, qui puer in forum venerim neque inde umquam diutius quam quaestor afuerim? Sed tamen audivi, ut heri dicebam, et Athenis cum essem, doctissimos viros et in Asia istum ipsum Scepsium Metrodorum, cum de his ipsis rebus disputaret; neque vero mihi quisquam copiosius umquam visus est neque subtilius in hoc genere dicendi quam iste hodie esse versatus: quod si esset aliter et aliquid intellegerem ab Antonio praetermissum, non essem tam inurbanus et paene inhumanus, ut in eo gravarer, quod vos cupere sentirem.’

Then Sulpicius: “Have you forgotten then, Crassus,” he said, “that Antonius so divided with you: that he himself should set out the orator’s equipment, and leave to you its distinguishing and ornament?” Here he: “First, who allowed Antonius,” he said, “both to make the parts and to take whichever he wished himself first? Then, if I have rightly understood, since I was hearing very gladly, he seemed to me to have spoken jointly on each.” “He, however,” said Cotta, “did not touch the ornaments of speech, nor that praise from which eloquence has its name.” “Antonius then,” said Crassus, “has left me the words; he himself has taken the matter.”

Tum Sulpicius ’an ergo’ inquit ’oblitus es, Crasse, Antonium ita partitum esse tecum, ut ipse instrumentum oratoris exponeret, tibi eius distinctionem atque ornatum relinqueret?’ Hic ille ’primum quis Antonio permisit,’ inquit ’ut et partis faceret et utram vellet prior ipse sumeret? Deinde, ego si recte intellexi, cum valde libenter audirem, mihi coniuncte est visus de utraque re dicere.’ ’Ille vero’ inquit Cotta ’ornamenta orationis non attigit neque eam laudem, ex qua eloquentia nomen suum invenit.’ ’Verba igitur’ inquit Crassus ’mihi reliquit Antonius, rem ipse sumpsit.’

Then Caesar: “If he has left to you what is harder,” he said, “we have a reason why we should desire to hear you. But if what is easier, you have no reason to refuse.” And Catulus: “What of what you said, Crassus,” he said, “that, if we should remain with you today, you would humour us — do you think this is nothing to your faith?” Then Cotta, smiling: “I could yield to you, Crassus,” he said, “but see lest Catulus has brought any religious bond. This is censorial business: how that fits a censorial man, you see.” “Come now,” he said, “as you wish. But now indeed, since the time is what it is, I think we should rise and rest. After noon, if so it is convenient to you, we shall speak about something — unless perhaps you prefer to put it off to tomorrow.” All said they wished either at once, or, if he himself preferred, after noon, yet to hear as soon as possible.

Tum Caesar ’si, quod difficilius est, id tibi reliquit, est nobis’ inquit ’causa, cur te audire cupiamus; sin, quod facilius, tibi causa non est, cur recuses.’ Et Catulus ’quid, quod dixisti,’ inquit ’Crasse, si hic hodie apud te maneremus, te morem nobis esse gesturum, nihilne ad fidem tuam putas pertinere?’ Tum Cotta ridens ’possem tibi,’ inquit ’Crasse, concedere: sed vide ne quid Catulus attulerit religionis: opus hoc censorium est, id autem committere vides quam homini censorio conveniat.’ ’Agite vero’ ille inquit ’ut vultis. Sed nunc quidem, quoniam est id temporis, surgendum censeo et requiescendum; post meridiem, si ita vobis est commodum, loquemur aliquid, nisi forte in crastinum differre mavultis.’ Omnes se vel statim vel si ipse post meridiem mallet, quam primum tamen audire velle dixerunt.

Quintus my brother, as I set out to recall to mind and to consign to this third book the conversation which Crassus held after Antonius’s discussion, a sharp recollection has renewed my old grief and trouble of soul. For that talent worthy of immortality, that humanity, that virtue of L. Crassus was extinguished by his sudden death scarcely ten days after the day which is contained in this and the previous book.

Instituenti mihi, Quinte frater, eum sermonem referre et mandare huic tertio libro, quem post Antoni disputationem Crassus habuisset, acerba sane recordatio veterem animi curam molestiamque renovavit. Nam illud immortalitate dignum ingenium, illa humanitas, illa virtus L. Crassi morte exstincta subita est vix diebus decem post eum diem, qui hoc et superiore libro continetur.

For when he had returned to Rome on the last day of the stage games, deeply moved by that speech which was reported to have been made in the assembly by Philippus — who, it was agreed, had said: “I must look for some other counsel; with that senate I cannot conduct the commonwealth” — early on the Ides of September both he himself and a crowded senate came at Drusus’s summons into the curia. There Drusus, after he had complained much about Philippus, brought the matter before the senate concerning that very thing — that the consul had inveighed so weightily in the assembly against that order.

Ut enim Romam rediit extremo ludorum scaenicorum die, vehementer commotus oratione ea, quae ferebatur habita esse in contione a Philippo, quem dixisse constabat videndum sibi esse aliud consilium; illo senatu se rem publicam gerere non posse, mane Idibus Septembribus et ille et senatus frequens vocatu Drusi in curiam venit; ibi cum Drusus multa de Philippo questus esset, rettulit ad senatum de illo ipso, quod in eum ordinem consul tam graviter in contione esset invectus.

Here, as I have often seen agreed among the wisest men, although it had nearly always happened to Crassus, when he had spoken anything more carefully, that he was thought never to have spoken better, yet by the consensus of all it was so judged at that time: that the rest had always been surpassed by Crassus, but on that day even he himself was surpassed by himself. For he lamented the chance and bereavement of the senate, whose patrimony of dignity was being torn away by the consul (who ought to be like a good parent or faithful guardian), as if by some criminal robber. Nor was it to be wondered at, if, when by his own counsels he had ruined the commonwealth, he should reject from the commonwealth the senate’s counsel.

Hic, ut saepe inter homines sapientissimos constare vidi, quamquam hoc Crasso, cum aliquid accuratius dixisset, semper fere contigisset, ut numquam dixisse melius putaretur, tamen omnium consensu sic esse tum iudicatum ceteros a Crasso semper omnis, illo autem die etiam ipsum a se superatum. Deploravit enim casum atque orbitatem senatus, cuius ordinis a consule, qui quasi parens bonus aut tutor fidelis esse deberet, tamquam ab aliquo nefario praedone diriperetur patrimonium dignitatis; neque vero esse mirandum, si, cum suis consiliis rem publicam profligasset, consilium senatus a re publica repudiaret.

When he had brought, as it were, certain firebrands of words to the man — vehement and eloquent and chief of all in resisting, Philippus — Philippus did not bear it, and burned with grave anger, and, having seized pledges, set about coercing Crassus. In which very place many things are reported to have been said by Crassus divinely, when he denied that man could be his consul, to whom he himself was no senator. “Or do you, when you have reckoned the whole authority of our entire order as a pledge and have cut it down before the eyes of the Roman people, suppose me to be terrified by these pledges? Not those things must you cut down, if you wish to coerce L. Crassus: this tongue must be cut out by you, by which, even if torn out, my liberty by the very breath shall confound your lust.”

Hic cum homini et vehementi et diserto et in primis forti ad resistendum Philippo quasi quasdam verborum faces admovisset, non tulit ille et graviter exarsit pigneribusque ablatis Crassum instituit coercere. Quo quidem ipso in loco multa a Crasso divinitus dicta esse ferebantur, cum sibi illum consulem esse negaret, cui senator ipse non esset. ’An tu, cum omnem auctoritatem universi ordinis pro pignere putaris eamque in conspectu populi Romani concideris, me his existimas pigneribus terreri? Non tibi illa sunt caedenda, si L. Crassum vis coercere: haec tibi est incidenda lingua, qua vel evulsa spiritu ipso libidinem tuam libertas mea refutabit.’

Many things are said by him on that day, with the highest contention of soul and body, weightily and abundantly, and it was indeed his outstanding statement, his “swan-song” — which we, awaiting more from him, used to come, as it were, to his house and tomb after his death, that we might see at least the very place in which he had lastly stood. The pain of his side at once attacked him in saying; sweat broke out, then a chill came on. So, having returned home with a fever, on the seventh day after, he died of pleurisy.

Permulta tum vehementissima contentione animi, ingeni, virium ab eo dicta esse constabat sententiamque eam, quam senatus frequens secutus est ornatissimis et gravissimis verbis, ut populo Romano satis fieret, numquam senatus neque consilium rei publicae neque fidem defuisse ab eo dictam et eundem, id quod in auctoritatibus perscriptis exstat, scribendo adfuisse.

O the deceitful hope of men, and the delusive fortune, and our vain studies, which, in mid-course, are often broken and dashed and shipwrecked before they could see the harbour! For while Crassus’s life had been busy with the labours of canvassing, of duties, of cases, while he was outweighing all by his usefulness — towards the end, even by his authority — that age had then come which both gave him not labour and gave him commendation. As long as some, even of his close friends, did not approve those wonderful deeds of his — that he had withdrawn himself from the courts and ceased to be the leader of cases. Yet to himself, however much he relaxed of forensic labour, the auctorship of public affairs would have been increased. And for me, neither the highest dignity of his consular kind, nor his most diligent and devoted friendship to me, would have given so much pleasure as that great work of his, in the senate, on the day before his death.

Illa tamquam cycnea fuit divini hominis vox et oratio, quam quasi exspectantes post eius interitum veniebamus in curiam, ut vestigium illud ipsum, in quo ille postremum institisset, contueremur: namque tum latus ei dicenti condoluisse sudoremque multum consecutum esse audiebamus; ex quo cum cohorruisset, cum febri domum rediit dieque septimo lateris dolore consumptus est.

For of his death there are many memorials and many griefs left to me. Mine indeed: for I have lost a man — distinguished, the friendliest of all to me, with whom I lived most intimately, the foremost of all in dignity, in my judgment, and the most distinguished in eloquence; whose work in cases had been most pleasant to me. Of all our citizens too. For he was, as it seemed to all wise men, the brightest light of our state, who could have raised it both by his counsel and by his speech, ablaze in either, when bent upon the help of his brother and to the safety of the commonwealth.

O fallacem hominum spem fragilemque fortunam et inanis nostras contentiones, quae medio in spatio saepe franguntur et corruunt aut ante in ipso cursu obruuntur, quam portum conspicere potuerunt! Nam quam diu Crassi fuit ambitionis labore vita districta, tam diu privatis magis officiis et ingeni laude floruit quam fructu amplitudinis aut rei publicae dignitate; qui autem annus ei primus ab honorum perfunctione aditum omnium concessu ad summam auctoritatem dabat, is eius omnem spem atque omnia vitae consilia morte pervertit.

For when by Drusus’s law the senatorial courts had been overthrown, and again the order of senators with the order of equestrians had been brought into contention, there was nothing of his speech in that case more vehement, more weighty, more eloquent than that, than to which I was a frequent hearer in his other cases. Yet, broken in body, with strength shattered, his soul was not bent at all, and he lifted himself up by speaking; and, the rest having departed almost from terror, he poured into the senate, as it were a will, the testimony of his counsel and judgment about the commonwealth — that for him, who was now perishing, it was easy to die.

Fuit hoc luctuosum suis, acerbum patriae, grave bonis omnibus; sed ei tamen rem publicam casus secuti sunt, ut mihi non erepta L. Crasso a dis immortalibus vita, sed donata mors esse videatur. Non vidit flagrantem bello Italiam, non ardentem invidia senatum, non sceleris nefarii principes civitatis reos, non luctum filiae, non exsilium generi, non acerbissimam C. Mari fugam, non illam post reditum eius caedem omnium crudelissimam, non denique in omni genere deformatam eam civitatem, in qua ipse florentissima multum omnibus gloria praestitisset.

I lament that great citizen, and (since I cannot go further) that I have lost so great an ornament of speech and of public counsel. Just so, surely as the most wretched among many other things, I bewail the death of L. Crassus before all. For when did I see him, but with that lessening of pain we feel for friends with whom even our closeness has been lessened? But, by Hercules, when I see his image, when I read his speeches — although the very things he said grow old in my soul — yet a certain solemn shape, even in the writing, is set before me of L. Crassus.

Et quoniam attigi cogitatione vim varietatemque fortunae, non vagabitur oratio mea longius atque eis fere ipsis definietur viris, qui hoc sermone, quem referre suscepimus, continentur. Quis enim non iure beatam L. Crassi mortem illam, quae est a multis saepe defleta, dixerit, cum horum ipsorum sit, qui tum cum illo postremum fere conlocuti sunt, eventum recordatus? Tenemus enim memoria Q. Catulum, virum omni laude praestantem, cum sibi non incolumem fortunam, sed exsilium et fugam deprecaretur, esse coactum, ut vita se ipse privaret.

What, then, can be greater than this — that we should bear, for our orators of these times, that they should be most distinguished and most outstanding (for so they are), and yet a longing, a memory, a desire is yet excited in us, of those who have already gone before? Wherefore, do you not yet judge it to be true, what I am wont to say to you in our daily conversations: that, even now, after the death of L. Crassus, I see no orator, when I have heard him, who can satisfy my hearing — let alone my judgment.

Iam M. Antoni in eis ipsis rostris, in quibus ille rem publicam constantissime consul defenderat quaeque censor imperatoriis manubiis ornarat, positum caput illud fuit, a quo erant multorum civium capita servata; neque vero longe ab eo C. Iuli caput hospitis Etrusci scelere proditum cum L. Iuli fratris capite iacuit, ut ille, qui haec non vidit, et vixisse cum re publica pariter et cum illa simul exstinctus esse videatur. Neque enim propinquum suum, maximi animi virum, P. Crassum, suapte interfectum manu neque conlegae sui, pontificis maximi, sanguine simulacrum Vestae respersum esse vidit; cui maerori, qua mente ille in patriam fuit, etiam C. Carbonis, inimicissimi hominis, eodem illo die mors fuisset nefaria;

He did not see the horrible and pitiful chances of those very ones who, then young men, had given themselves to Crassus. Of whom Gaius Cotta, whom he had left flourishing, a few days after Crassus’s death, was driven by hatred from the tribunate, and not many months from that time was cast out of the state. Sulpicius, who had been in the same flame of hatred, made it his business in his tribunate to strip those whom, as a private man, he had lived with most closely, of all dignity. Whose life, indeed, blooming towards the highest glory of eloquence, was snatched by the sword, and the punishment of his recklessness was set, not without great evil to the commonwealth.

non vidit eorum ipsorum, qui tum adulescentes Crasso se dicarant, horribilis miserosque casus; ex quibus C. Cotta, quem ille florentem reliquerat, paucis diebus post mortem Crassi depulsus per invidiam tribunatu non multis ab eo tempore mensibus eiectus est e civitate; Sulpicius autem, qui in eadem invidiae flamma fuisset, quibuscum privatus coniunctissime vixerat, hos in tribunatu spoliare instituit omni dignitate; cui quidem ad summam gloriam eloquentiae efflorescenti ferro erepta vita est et poena temeritatis non sine magno rei publicae malo constituta.

I think you, Crassus, both by the flower of your life and by the opportuneness of your death, were both adorned and extinguished by divine counsel. For you would either have had to undergo, according to your manly soul and constancy, the cruelty of the citizens’ steel; or, if any fortune had freed you from the atrocity of death, that same would have forced you to be a spectator of the funerals of your country. Nor would only the dominance of the wicked have been a grief to you, but also the victory of the good — because of the slaughter of citizens mixed with it.

Ego vero te, Crasse, cum vitae flore tum mortis opportunitate divino consilio et ornatum et exstinctum esse arbitror; nam tibi aut pro virtute animi constantiaque tua civilis ferri subeunda fuit crudelitas aut, si qua te fortuna ab atrocitate mortis vindicasset, eadem esse te funerum patriae spectatorem coegisset; neque solum tibi improborum dominatus, sed etiam propter admixtam civium caedem bonorum victoria maerori fuisset.

For me, indeed, my brother Quintus, when I think of both the chances of those of whom I spoke before, and what we ourselves have borne and felt for our incredible and singular love for the commonwealth, your opinion often seems to me true and wise — you who, on account of so many, so great, and so headlong falls of the most distinguished and the best of men, have always called me back from all contention and conflict of soul.

Mihi quidem, Quinte frater, et eorum casus, de quibus ante dixi, et ea, quae nosmet ipsi ob amorem in rem publicam incredibilem et singularem pertulimus ac sensimus, cogitanti sententia saepe tua vera ac sapiens videri solet, qui propter tot tantos tam praecipitisque casus clarissimorum hominum atque optimorum virorum me semper ab omni contentione ac dimicatione animi revocasti.

But since these things now cannot be undone for us, and our highest labours are softened by the great glory of compensation, let us press on to those consolations which can be both pleasant for our settled troubles, and salutary for those still pricking us; and let us hand to memory the rest, and well-nigh last, conversation of L. Crassus; and to him, if not equal to his talent, yet according to our zeal, let us pay back the merited and owed thanks.

Sed quoniam haec iam neque in integro nobis esse possunt et summi labores nostri magna compensati gloria mitigantur, pergamus ad ea solacia, quae non modo sedatis molestiis iucunda, sed etiam haerentibus salutaria nobis esse possint, sermonemque L. Crassi reliquum ac paene postremum memoriae prodamus, atque ei, si nequaquam parem illius ingenio, at pro nostro tamen studio meritam gratiam debitamque referamus.

For there is none of us who, when he reads Plato’s wonderfully written books, in which Socrates is expressed in nearly all of them, although those things are written divinely, does not yet suspect something greater of him about whom they are written. Which we likewise ask — not from you, who give us all the highest things, but from the rest who shall take this into their hands — that they suspect something greater of L. Crassus than what shall be expressed by us.

Neque enim quisquam nostrum, cum libros Platonis mirabiliter scriptos legit, in quibus omnibus fere Socrates exprimitur, non, quamquam illa scripta sunt divinitus, tamen maius quiddam de illo, de quo scripta sunt, suspicatur; quod item nos postulamus non a te quidem, qui nobis omnia summa tribuis, sed a ceteris, qui haec in manus sument, maius ut quiddam de L. Crasso, quam quantum a nobis exprimetur, suspicentur.

For we who were not present at the conversation, and to whom Gaius Cotta had handed down only the topics and thoughts of this disputation, in what kind of speech we had recognised each orator, this very thing in their conversation we have tried to sketch out. But if anyone — led by common opinion — shall think Antonius leaner or Crassus fuller than they are introduced by us, he will be one of those who either has not heard them or cannot judge. For each was, as I set forth before, both outstanding to all in zeal, talent, and learning, and perfect in his own kind, so that this ornament of speech was neither lacking in Antonius nor overflowing in Crassus.

Nos enim, qui ipsi sermoni non interfuissemus et quibus C. Cotta tantum modo locos ac sententias huius disputationis tradidisset, quo in genere orationis utrumque oratorem cognoveramus, id ipsum sumus in eorum sermone adumbrare conati: quod si quis erit, qui ductus opinione vulgi aut Antonium ieiuniorem aut Crassum pleniorem fuisse putet, quam quo modo a nobis uterque inductus est, is erit ex eis, qui aut illos non audierit aut iudicare non possit; nam fuit uterque, ut exposui antea, cum studio atque ingenio et doctrina praestans omnibus, tum in suo genere perfectus, ut neque in Antonio deesset hic ornatus orationis neque in Crasso redundaret.

When, therefore, they had departed before noon and had rested a little, this Cotta said he had especially noticed: that all that midday time Crassus had spent in the keenest and most attentive thought; and he himself, who well knew his face when he had to speak, and the gaze of his eyes when in thought, and had often seen them in the greatest cases — then, of set purpose, while the others were resting, came into the alcove in which Crassus had reclined on a couch. When he felt that Crassus was fixed in thought, he at once withdrew, and in that silence about two hours were spent. Then, when all had come to Crassus, the day now bending to the afternoon, “What, Crassus,” said Iulius, “do we go to sit? Although we have come not to demand it of you, but to remind you.”

Ut igitur ante meridiem discesserunt paulumque requierunt, in primis hoc a se Cotta animadversum esse dicebat, omne illud tempus meridianum Crassum in acerrima atque attentissima cogitatione posuisse seseque, qui vultum eius, cum ei dicendum esset, obtutumque oculorum in cogitando probe nosset atque in maximis causis saepe vidisset, tum dedita opera quiescentibus aliis in eam exedram venisse, in qua Crassus posito lectulo recubuisset, cumque eum defixum in cogitatione esse sensisset, statim recessisse atque in eo silentio duas horas fere esse consumptas. Deinde cum omnes inclinato iam in posmeridianum tempus die venissent ad Crassum, ’quid est, Crasse,’ inquit Iulius ’imusne sessum? Etsi admonitum venimus te, non flagitatum.’

Then Crassus: “Do you think me so impudent that I should suppose I can owe you this duty especially any longer?” “Where then will the place be?” he said. “Does the middle of the wood please? For it is the most shady and cool of places.” “Indeed,” said Crassus, “in that place there is a seat not unsuited to this our conversation.” When this had pleased the rest also, they came into the wood, and there, with great expectation of hearing, they sit down.

Tum Crassus ’an me tam impudentem esse existimatis, ut vobis hoc praesertim munus putem me diutius posse debere?’ ’Quinam igitur’ inquit ’ille locus? An in media silva placet? Est enim is maxime et opacus et frigidus.’ ’Sane,’ inquit Crassus ’etenim est in eo loco sedes huic nostro non importuna sermoni.’ Cum placuisset idem ceteris, in silvam venitur et ibi magna cum audiendi exspectatione considitur.

Then Crassus: “Both your authority and friendship,” he said, “and Antonius’s easiness, have snatched from me, in my best case, the liberty of refusing. Although in the dividing of our disputation, when he took for himself those things which the orator ought to say, but left to me to set forth how those things ought to be ornated, he divided what cannot be separated. For since all speech consists of matter and words, neither can the words have a seat if you should subtract the matter, nor can the matter have light if you remove the words.

Tum Crassus ’cum auctoritas atque amicitia vestra tum Antoni facilitas eripuit’ inquit ’mihi in optima mea causa libertatem recusandi: quamquam in partienda disputatione nostra, cum sibi de eis, quae dici ab oratore oporteret, sumeret, mihi autem relinqueret, ut explicarem, quem ad modum illa ornari oporteret, ea divisit, quae seiuncta esse non possunt. Nam cum omnis ex re atque verbis constet oratio, neque verba sedem habere possunt, si rem subtraxeris, neque res lumen, si verba semoveris.

And to me, the ancients seem, having grasped something greater in their souls, to have seen far more than the edge of our talents can look upon — they who said all these things which are above and beneath are one, and bound up by one force and by one consensus of nature. For there is no kind of things which, torn from the rest, could either of itself stand, or, if the rest should be without it, could keep its own force and eternity.

Ac mihi quidem veteres illi maius quiddam animo complexi plus multo etiam vidisse videntur, quam quantum nostrorum ingeniorum acies intueri potest, qui omnia haec, quae supra et subter, unum esse et una vi atque una consensione naturae constricta esse dixerunt; nullum est enim genus rerum, quod aut avulsum a ceteris per se ipsum constare aut quo cetera si careant, vim suam atque aeternitatem conservare possint.

But if this seems too great a rationale to be grasped by men’s sense or thought, there is also that true voice of Plato, surely not unheard by you, Catulus: that all the doctrine of these freeborn and human arts is contained by some one chain of fellowship. For when the force of that reasoning is seen by which the causes of things and their outcomes are known, a wonderful concord, as it were, of all branches of knowledge and a harmony is found.

Sed si haec maior esse ratio videtur, quam ut hominum possit sensu aut cogitatione comprehendi, est etiam illa Platonis vera et tibi, Catule, certe non inaudita vox, omnem doctrinam harum ingenuarum et humanarum artium uno quodam societatis vinculo contineri; ubi enim perspecta vis est rationis eius, qua causae rerum atque exitus cognoscuntur, mirus quidam omnium quasi consensus doctrinarum concentusque reperitur.

But if this also seems higher than that we, lying flat on the ground, can look up to it, yet that surely which we have embraced, which we profess, which we have undertaken, we ought to know and hold. For there is one eloquence — what both I said yesterday, and Antonius signified in several places of his morning speech — into whatever shores or regions of disputation it is brought.

Sed si hoc quoque videtur esse altius, quam ut id nos humi strati suspicere possimus, illud certe tamen, quod amplexi sumus, quod profitemur, quod suscepimus, nosse et tenere debemus. Una est enim, quod et ego hesterno die dixi et aliquot locis antemeridiano sermone significavit Antonius, eloquentia, quascumque in oras disputationis regionesve delata est;

For whether it speaks about the nature of heaven or of earth, of divine or of human force; whether from a lower place or from an equal or from a higher; whether to drive men or to teach or to deter or to rouse or to turn back or to inflame or to soothe; whether to few or to many, whether among foreigners or with one’s own or with oneself — speech is led off by streams, not by springs, and wherever it goes, by the same equipment and ornament it is accompanied.

nam sive de caeli natura loquitur sive de terrae, sive de divina vi sive de humana, sive ex inferiore loco sive ex aequo sive ex superiore, sive ut impellat homines sive ut doceat sive ut deterreat sive ut concitet sive ut reflectat sive ut incendat sive ut leniat, sive ad paucos sive ad multos sive inter alienos sive cum suis sive secum, rivis est diducta oratio, non fontibus, et, quocumque ingreditur, eodem est instructu ornatuque comitata.

But since we are now overwhelmed by the opinions not only of the common people, but also of men lightly learned, who, what they cannot embrace whole, these they more easily handle torn apart and as it were rent in pieces — and who, as body from soul, so words from thoughts they separate (without the perishing of which neither can come about) — I shall not undertake more in my speech than is laid on me. I shall only signify briefly that no ornament of words can be found, save when the thoughts have been distinguished and expressed, nor is there any thought illustrious without the light of words.

Sed quoniam oppressi iam sumus opinionibus non modo vulgi, verum etiam hominum leviter eruditorum, qui, quae complecti tota nequeunt, haec facilius divulsa et quasi discerpta contrectant, et qui tamquam ab animo corpus, sic a sententiis verba seiungunt, quorum sine interitu fieri neutrum potest, non suscipiam oratione mea plus quam mihi imponitur; tantum significabo brevi neque verborum ornatum inveniri posse non partis expressisque sententiis, neque esse ullam sententiam inlustrem sine luce verborum.

But before I try to touch those things by which I think speech is to be ornated and lit up, I shall briefly set out what I think about the universal kind of speaking. There is no nature, as it seems to me, which does not have within its own kind several things unlike one another, which are yet judged worthy of similar praise. For we perceive by the ears many things which, although they delight us by sounds, are yet so various that what you have just heard seems most pleasant. And by the eyes are gathered well-nigh countless pleasures, which so seize us that they delight one sense in unlike kinds. The other senses too disparate pleasures delight, so that the judgment of the most outstanding sweetness is hard.

Sed prius quam illa conor attingere, quibus orationem ornari atque inluminari putem, proponam breviter quid sentiam de universo genere dicendi. Natura nulla est, ut mihi videtur, quae non habeat in suo genere res compluris dissimilis inter se, quae tamen consimili laude dignentur; nam et auribus multa percipimus, quae etsi nos vocibus delectant, tamen ita sunt varia saepe, ut id, quod proximum audias, iucundissimum esse videatur; et oculis conliguntur paene innumerabiles voluptates, quae nos ita capiunt, ut unum sensum in dissimili genere delectent; et reliquos sensus voluptates oblectant dispares, ut sit difficile iudicium excellentis maxime suavitatis.

And the same which is in the natures of things can be transferred also to the arts. There is one art of modelling, in which Myro, Polyclitus, Lysippus were outstanding, all unlike one another, but yet in such a way that you would wish no one of them to be unlike himself. There is one art and rationale of painting, and yet most unlike one another are Zeuxis, Aglaophon, Apelles; nor is any of these one to whom anything in his own art seems wanting. And if this is wonderful in those, as it were, mute arts, and yet true, how much more wonderful in speech and in the tongue? Which, although it moves in the same thoughts and words, has the highest dissimilarities — not so that some should be blamed, but so that those who are agreed to be praised may yet in unlike kinds be praised.

Atque hoc idem, quod est in naturis rerum, transferri potest etiam ad artis; una fingendi est ars, in qua praestantes fuerunt Myro, Polyclitus, Lysippus, qui omnes inter se dissimiles fuerunt, sed ita tamen, ut neminem sui velis esse dissimilem; una est ars ratioque picturae, dissimillimique tamen inter se Zeuxis, Aglaophon, Apelles, neque eorum quisquam est, cui quicquam in arte sua deesse videatur. Et si hoc in his quasi mutis artibus est mirandum et tamen verum, quanto admirabilius in oratione atque in lingua? Quae cum in eisdem sententiis verbisque versetur, summas habet dissimilitudines; non sic, ut alii vituperandi sint, sed ut ei, quos constet esse laudandos, in dispari tamen genere laudentur.

And this is first to be seen in the poets, with whom is the closest kinship to orators: how unlike one another are Ennius, Pacuvius, and Accius; how unlike, among the Greeks, Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides — although nearly equal praise is assigned to all in unlike kinds of writing.

Atque id primum in poetis cerni licet, quibus est proxima cognatio cum oratoribus: quam sunt inter sese Ennius, Pacuvius Acciusque dissimiles, quam apud Graecos Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides, quamquam omnibus par paene laus in dissimili scribendi genere tribuitur!

Look now upon those men, and gaze upon them — concerning whose faculty we are inquiring what is the difference of their pursuits and natures. Sweetness Isocrates, subtlety Lysias, keenness Hyperides, resounding Aeschines, force Demosthenes had. Which of them was not outstanding? Yet who is like anyone but himself? Weight Africanus had, gentleness Laelius, harshness Galba, a flowing and singing thing Carbo. Which of these was not chief in those times? And yet each was chief in his own kind.

Aspicite nunc eos homines atque intuemini, quorum de facultate quaerimus quid intersit inter oratorum studia atque naturas: suavitatem Isocrates, subtilitatem Lysias, acumen Hyperides, sonitum Aeschines, vim Demosthenes habuit. Quis eorum non egregius? tamen quis cuiusquam nisi sui similis? Gravitatem Africanus, lenitatem Laelius, asperitatem Galba, profluens quiddam habuit Carbo et canorum. Quis horum non princeps temporibus illis fuit? et suo tamen quisque in genere princeps.

But why should I seek out old examples, when I may use present and living ones? What pleasanter has ever fallen on our ears than the speech of this Catulus? — which is so pure, that he seems to speak Latin almost alone; and so weighty, that, in singular dignity, all human kindness and charm is yet present. In short, listening to him I am wont so to judge: that whatever you should add or change or take away, the speech would be more faulty and the worse.

Sed quid ego vetera conquiram, cum mihi liceat uti praesentibus exemplis atque vivis? Quid iucundius auribus nostris umquam accidit huius oratione Catuli? quae est pura sic, ut Latine loqui paene solus videatur, sic autem gravis, ut in singulari dignitate omnis tamen adsit humanitas ac lepos. Quid multa? istum audiens equidem sic iudicare soleo, quicquid aut addideris aut mutaris aut detraxeris, vitiosius et deterius futurum.

Has not our Caesar here brought a kind of new principle of speech and introduced an almost singular kind of speaking? Who, except him, has ever handled tragic matters almost in comic vein, gloomy ones lightly, severe ones cheerfully, forensic ones with almost stage grace, and so that neither was the jest excluded by the greatness of the matters, nor was the gravity diminished by the wit?

Quid, noster hic Caesar nonne novam quandam rationem attulit orationis et dicendi genus induxit prope singulare? Quis umquam res praeter hunc tragicas paene comice, tristis remisse, severas hilare, forensis scaenica prope venustate tractavit atque ita, ut neque iocus magnitudine rerum excluderetur nec gravitas facetiis minueretur?

Behold, present here, two nearly contemporaries, Sulpicius and Cotta. What so unlike between them? What so outstanding in his own kind? The one polished and subtle, setting forth the matter with proper and apt words; he sticks always in the case, and when he has most keenly seen what should be proved to the judge, omitting other arguments, on this he fixes his mind and speech. But Sulpicius, with the bravest impulse of soul, with the fullest and greatest voice, with the highest contention of body and dignity of motion, has also such weight and abundance of words that alone of all he seems to be by nature most equipped for speaking.

Ecce praesentes duo prope aequales Sulpicius et Cotta. Quid tam inter se dissimile? quid tam in suo genere praestans? Limatus alter et subtilis, rem explicans propriis aptisque verbis; haeret in causa semper et quid iudici probandum sit cum acutissime vidit, omissis ceteris argumentis in eo mentem orationemque defigit; Sulpicius autem fortissimo quodam animi impetu, plenissima et maxima voce, summa contentione corporis et dignitate motus, verborum quoque ea gravitate et copia est, ut unus ad dicendum instructissimus a natura esse videatur.

I come back now to ourselves, since we have always been so compared that, as it were, we have been called by the conversations of men into some judgment of contention. What so unlike as I in speaking and Antonius? — when he is such an orator that nothing can be more outstanding than he, while I, although I am dissatisfied with myself, am yet most especially joined with him in comparison. Do you see what kind of orator Antonius is? Strong, vehement, moved in pleading, fortified and hedged on every side of the case, keen, sharp, kernel-cleared, dwelling on each thing in its place, honourably yielding, keenly pursuing, terrifying, supplicating, with the highest variety of speech, with no satiety to our ears.

Ad nosmet ipsos iam revertor, quoniam sic fuimus semper comparati, ut hominum sermonibus quasi in aliquod contentionis iudicium vocaremur. Quid tam dissimile quam ego in dicendo et Antonius? cum ille is sit orator, ut nihil eo possit esse praestantius, ego autem, quamquam memet mei paenitet, cum hoc maxime tamen in comparatione coniungar. Videtisne, genus hoc quod sit Antoni? Forte, vehemens, commotum in agendo, praemunitum et ex omni parte causae saeptum, acre, acutum, enucleatum, in sua quaque re commorans, honeste cedens, acriter insequens, terrens, supplicans, summa orationis varietate, nulla nostrarum aurium satietate.

As for ourselves, whoever we are in speaking — since we seem to you to be in some account — we surely differ much from his kind. What kind that is, it is not for me to say, because each man is least known to himself, and most hardly each can judge of himself. But still the unlikeness can be understood from the moderate measure of my own motion, and from this — that the footsteps in which I have first set out, in those I am wont mostly to peroration, and that somewhat greater labour and care vexes me in choosing words than thoughts, fearing lest, if my speech is a little obsolete, it should not seem to have been worthy of expectation and silence.

Nos autem, quicumque in dicendo sumus, quoniam esse aliquo in numero vobis videmur, certe tamen ab huius multum genere distamus; quod quale sit, non est meum dicere, propterea quod minime sibi quisque notus est et difficillime de se quisque sentit; sed tamen dissimilitudo intellegi potest et ex motus mei mediocritate et ex eo, quod, quibus vestigiis primum institi, in eis fere soleo perorare et quod aliquanto me maior in verbis quam in sententiis eligendis labor et cura torquet verentem, ne, si paulo obsoletior fuerit oratio, non digna exspectatione et silentio fuisse videatur.

Now if among us who are present there are such great unlikenesses, such fixed proper qualities of each, and in that variety it is rather the better faculty than the kind that distinguishes the better from the worse, and everything is praised which is perfect in its own kind — what do you suppose, if we should wish to embrace all who anywhere are or have been orators, will not the result be that, as many as the orators, almost so many kinds of speaking are found? From which discussion of mine perhaps that may occur — that, if there are well-nigh countless, as it were, forms and figures of speaking, unlike in appearance, praiseworthy in kind, things which differ among themselves cannot be shaped by the same precepts and one institution.

Quod si in nobis, qui adsumus, tantae dissimilitudines sunt, tam certae res cuiusque propriae et in ea varietate fere melius a deteriore facultate magis quam genere distinguitur atque omne laudatur, quod in suo genere perfectum est, quid censetis, si omnis, qui ubique sunt aut fuerunt oratores, amplecti voluerimus, nonne fore ut, quot oratores, totidem paene reperiantur genera dicendi? Ex qua mea disputatione forsitan occurrat illud, si paene innumerabiles sint quasi formae figuraeque dicendi, specie dispares, genere laudabiles, non posse ea, quae inter se discrepant, eisdem praeceptis atque una institutione formari.

Which is not so. And this is most diligently to be looked at by those who train and instruct anyone: whither each man’s nature seems most to bear him. For we see that from the same school, as it were, of the foremost masters and teachers in each one’s kind, have come pupils unlike one another, and yet praiseworthy, when the teacher’s training was adapted to each one’s nature.

Quod non est ita, diligentissimeque hoc est eis, qui instituunt aliquos atque erudiunt, videndum, quo sua quemque natura maxime ferre videatur. Etenim videmus ex eodem quasi ludo summorum in suo cuiusque genere artificum et magistrorum exisse discipulos dissimilis inter se ac tamen laudandos, cum ad cuiusque naturam institutio doctoris accommodaretur.

Of which especially marked is that example — to leave the rest of arts aside — which Isocrates, the singular teacher, used to say: that he was wont to use spurs on Ephorus, but, on the other hand, the bridle on Theopompus. For the one, leaping with audacity of words, he restrained; the other, hesitating and as it were bashful, he urged on. Nor did he make them like one another, but only added to one and shaved from the other, so that he shaped in each what each one’s nature would bear.

Cuius est vel maxime insigne illud exemplum, ut ceteras artis omittamus, quod dicebat Isocrates doctor singularis se calcaribus in Ephoro, contra autem in Theopompo frenis uti solere: alterum enim exsultantem verborum audacia reprimebat alterum cunctantem et quasi verecundantem incitabat. Neque eos similis effecit inter se, sed tantum alteri adfinxit, de altero limavit, ut id conformaret in utroque, quod utriusque natura pateretur.

These things had to be foretold by me, that, if not all the things proposed by me are stuck to the zeal of all of you and to that kind which each of you approves in speaking, you might feel that that kind is being expressed by me which most is approved by myself. Therefore those things must both be done by the orator which Antonius set out, and be said in some way. What better way of speaking, then — for of delivery I shall see later — than that we speak Latin, plainly, ornately, aptly and congruently to whatever is being treated?

Haec eo mihi praedicenda fuerunt, ut, si non omnia, quae proponerentur a me, ad omnium vestrum studium et ad genus id, quod quisque vestrum in dicendo probaret, adhaerescerent, id a me genus exprimi sentiretis, quod maxime mihi ipsi probaretur. Ergo haec et agenda sunt ab oratore, quae explicavit Antonius, et dicenda quodam modo. Quinam igitur dicendi est modus melior, nam de actione post videro, quam ut Latine, ut plane, ut ornate, ut ad id, quodcumque agetur, apte congruenterque dicamus?

As to the first two of these I have spoken of, I do not think the rationale of pure and clear speech is expected from me. For we do not try to teach speaking him who does not know to talk; nor to hope that he who cannot speak Latin will speak ornately; nor that he who does not say what we may understand can say something we shall admire. Let us therefore leave aside these things which have an easy understanding and a necessary use. For the one is handed down by letters and a boy’s instruction; the other is brought to bear so that what each one says may be understood — which we see is so necessary that yet there can be nothing less.

Atque eorum quidem, quae duo prima dixi, rationem non arbitror exspectari a me puri dilucidique sermonis, neque enim conamur docere eum dicere, qui loqui nesciat; nec sperare, qui Latine non possit, hunc ornate esse dicturum; neque vero, qui non dicat quod intellegamus, hunc posse quod admiremur dicere. Linquamus igitur haec, quae cognitionem habent facilem, usum necessarium. Nam alterum traditur litteris doctrinaque puerili, alterum adhibetur ob eam causam, ut intellegatur quid quisque dicat, quod videmus ita esse necessarium, ut tamen eo minus nihil esse possit.

But all elegance of speaking, although it is polished by the science of letters, is yet increased by reading the orators and poets. For those ancients, who could not yet adorn what they said, all spoke nearly splendidly. Those who shall have grown accustomed to their conversation cannot, even if they wish, speak otherwise than in Latin. Yet we shall not have to use those words which our usage no longer uses, save sometimes for the sake of ornament sparingly, as I shall show; but the man who has been zealously and much turned over in old writings will be able so to use accustomed words as to use the choicest.

Sed omnis loquendi elegantia, quamquam expolitur scientia litterarum, tamen augetur legendis oratoribus et poetis; sunt enim illi veteres, qui ornare nondum poterant ea, quae dicebant, omnes prope praeclare locuti; quorum sermone adsuefacti qui erunt, ne cupientes quidem poterunt loqui nisi Latine. Neque tamen erit utendum verbis eis, quibus iam consuetudo nostra non utitur, nisi quando ornandi causa parce, quod ostendam; sed usitatis ita poterit uti, lectissimis ut utatur, is, qui in veteribus erit scriptis studiose et multum volutatus.

And in order to speak Latin, not only must we look that we should bring forth those words which no one would justly reproach, and so preserve them in their cases and times and gender and number that nothing be confused or out of agreement or backward — but the very tongue and breath and sound of voice itself is to be regulated.

Atque, ut Latine loquamur, non solum videndum est, ut et verba efferamus ea, quae nemo iure reprehendat, et ea sic et casibus et temporibus et genere et numero conservemus, ut ne quid perturbatum ac discrepans aut praeposterum sit, sed etiam lingua et spiritus et vocis sonus est ipse moderandus.

I do not wish letters to be expressed too pedantically, nor to be obscured too negligently; I do not wish words to come out meagrely lifeless, nor swelled and as it were heavily panted. For of voice I do not yet say those things which belong to delivery, but this — what seems to me as it were joined with conversation. For there are certain faults which there is no one but desires to flee: a soft voice or womanly, or as it were unmeasured, off-tune, absurd.

Nolo exprimi litteras putidius, nolo obscurari neglegentius; nolo verba exiliter exanimata exire, nolo inflata et quasi anhelata gravius. Nam de voce nondum ea dico, quae sunt actionis, sed hoc, quod mihi cum sermone quasi coniunctum videtur: sunt enim certa vitia, quae nemo est quin effugere cupiat; mollis vox aut muliebris aut quasi extra modum absona atque absurda.

There is, however, a fault which some pursue of set purpose: a rustic and rural voice delights some, that the more, if it sound thus, their conversation may seem to retain antiquity. As your friend, Catulus, L. Cotta, seems to me to delight in the heaviness of his tongue and the rural sound of his voice; and he thinks what he says will seem ancient if it is plainly rustic. But your sound and that subtlety of yours delights me — I leave aside that of words, although it is the chief thing — but that, reasoning brings, letters teach, the habit of reading and of speaking confirms. I mean this sweetness which comes out of the mouth: which, just as among the Greeks the speech of the Athenians, so in Latin speech is most proper to this city.

Est autem vitium, quod non nulli de industria consectantur: rustica vox et agrestis quosdam delectat, quo magis antiquitatem, si ita sonet, eorum sermo retinere videatur; ut tuus, Catule, sodalis, L. Cotta, gaudere mihi videtur gravitate linguae sonoque vocis agresti et illud, quod loquitur, priscum visum iri putat, si plane fuerit rusticanum. Me autem tuus sonus et subtilitas ista delectat, omitto verborum, quamquam est caput; verum id adfert ratio, docent litterae, confirmat consuetudo et legendi et loquendi; sed hanc dico suavitatem, quae exit ex ore; quae quidem ut apud Graecos Atticorum, sic in Latino sermone huius est urbis maxime propria.

At Athens long ago the learning of the Athenians themselves perished; only the home of pursuits remains in that city, in which the citizens are at leisure, and foreigners enjoy them, captured in some way by the name of the city and its authority. Yet any unlearned Athenian will easily surpass the most learned Asiatic men — not in words, but in the sound of voice, and not so much by speaking well as sweetly. Our men devote themselves less to letters than the Latins; yet of those city-bred you know — among whom is the least of letters — there is no one who would not easily overcome the most lettered of all togaed men, Quintus Valerius of Sora, by the gentleness of his voice and the very pressure and sound of his mouth.

Athenis iam diu doctrina ipsorum Atheniensium interiit, domicilium tantum in illa urbe remanet studiorum, quibus vacant cives, peregrini fruuntur capti quodam modo nomine urbis et auctoritate; tamen eruditissimos homines Asiaticos quivis Atheniensis indoctus non verbis, sed sono vocis nec tam bene quam suaviter loquendo facile superabit. Nostri minus student litteris quam Latini; tamen ex istis, quos nostis, urbanis, in quibus minimum est litterarum, nemo est quin litteratissimum togatorum omnium, Q. Valerium Soranum, lenitate vocis atque ipso oris pressu et sono facile vincat.

Therefore, since there is some certain voice proper to the Roman race and city, in which nothing may offend, nothing displease, nothing be marked, nothing sound or smell foreign — let us follow that, and learn to flee not only rustic harshness but also foreign novelty.

Qua re cum sit quaedam certa vox Romani generis urbisque propria, in qua nihil offendi, nihil displicere, nihil animadverti possit, nihil sonare aut olere peregrinum, hanc sequamur neque solum rusticam asperitatem, sed etiam peregrinam insolentiam fugere discamus.

For when I hear my mother-in-law Laelia — for women more easily preserve uncorrupted antiquity, who, having had no part in the conversation of many, always hold those things which they first learned — but I so hear her that I seem to be hearing Plautus or Naevius. So upright and simple is the very sound of her voice, that she seems to bring nothing of ostentation or imitation. From which I judge that her father so spoke, so her ancestors — not roughly as that man I spoke of, not vastly, not rustically, not gappingly, but pressed and evenly and gently.

Equidem cum audio socrum meam Laeliam—facilius enim mulieres incorruptam antiquitatem conservant, quod multorum sermonis expertes ea tenent semper, quae prima didicerunt—sed eam sic audio, ut Plautum mihi aut Naevium videar audire, sono ipso vocis ita recto et simplici est, ut nihil ostentationis aut imitationis adferre videatur; ex quo sic locutum esse eius patrem iudico, sic maiores; non aspere ut ille, quem dixi, non vaste, non rustice, non hiulce, sed presse et aequabiliter et leniter.

Therefore our Cotta — whose broadness, Sulpicius, you sometimes imitate, dropping the letter i and saying e most fully — seems to me to imitate not the ancient orators but the harvesters.” Here, when Sulpicius himself had laughed, “So I shall deal with you,” said Crassus. “Since you wished me to speak, you shall hear something of your faults.” “Would that we might!” he said. “For that very thing we wish; and if you do it, many faults, I think, we shall lay aside today.”

Qua re Cotta noster, cuius tu illa lata, Sulpici, non numquam imitaris, ut Iota litteram tollas et E plenissimum dicas, non mihi oratores antiquos, sed messores videtur imitari.’ Hic cum adrisisset ipse Sulpicius, ’sic agam vobiscum’ inquit Crassus ’ut quoniam me loqui voluistis, aliquid de vestris vitiis audiatis.’ ’Utinam quidem!’ inquit ille ’id enim ipsum volumus, idque si feceris, multa, ut arbitror, hic hodie vitia ponemus.’

“But not without my own danger,” said Crassus, “can I rebuke you, Sulpicius, since Antonius said you seemed to him most like himself.” Then he: “You yourself indeed warned us that we should imitate those things which were greatest in each. From which I fear lest I be nothing of yours but the imitator of the foot-stamp and a few words and some movement, perhaps.” “Therefore those things which you have from me,” said Crassus, “I do not rebuke, lest I deride myself — and they are far more and greater than you say. Those, however, which are plainly yours, or expressed by imitation from someone, of these I shall warn you, if some place shall remind me.

’At enim non sine meo periculo’ Crassus inquit ’possum, Sulpici, te reprehendere, quoniam Antonius mihi te simillimum dixit sibi videri.’ Tum ille ’tu vero, quod monuit idem, ut ea, quae in quoque maxima essent, imitaremur; ex quo vereor ne nihil sim tui nisi supplosionem pedis imitatus et pauca quaedam verba et aliquem, si forte, motum.’ ’Ergo ista,’ inquit Crassus ’quae habes a me, non reprehendo, ne me ipsum inrideam—sunt autem ea multo et plura et maiora, quam dicis—quae autem sunt tua plane aut imitatione ex aliquo expressa, de his te, si qui me forte locus admonuerit, commonebo.

Let us pass over then the precepts of speaking Latin, which boyish learning hands down, and which subtler knowledge and the rationale of letters nourishes, or the habit of daily and household conversation; books confirm them, and the reading of the ancient orators and poets. Nor let us linger longer on that other point — to argue by what means we may attain that what we say be understood:

Praetereamus igitur praecepta Latine loquendi quae puerilis doctrina tradit et subtilior cognitio ac ratio litterarum alit aut consuetudo sermonis cotidiani ac domestici, libri confirmant et lectio veterum oratorum et poetarum; neque vero in illo altero diutius commoremur, ut disputemus, quibus rebus adsequi possimus, ut ea, quae dicamus, intellegantur:

by speaking, of course, in Latin, with words usual and pointing properly to those things we wish to be signified and made plain; without ambiguous word or speech, without too long a continuity of words, without too far drawing out things which by way of likeness are transferred from other matters; without thoughts torn apart, without backward times, without confused persons, without disturbed order. In short: the whole matter is so easy that it often seems to me very strange when it is more difficult to understand what the patron wishes to say than if he himself, who calls in the patron, were to speak about his own affair.

Latine scilicet dicendo, verbis usitatis ac proprie demonstrantibus ea, quae significari ac declarari volemus, sine ambiguo verbo aut sermone, non nimis longa continuatione verborum, non valde productis eis, quae similitudinis causa ex aliis rebus transferuntur, non discerptis sententiis, non praeposteris temporibus, non confusis personis, non perturbato ordine. Quid multa? Tam facilis est tota res, ut mihi permirum saepe videatur, cum difficilius intellegatur, quid patronus velit dicere, quam si ipse ille, qui patronum adhibet, de re sua diceret.

For those who bring cases to us, mostly themselves teach us so that you do not desire it to be said more plainly. But the same matters, as soon as Fufius or your contemporary Pomponius begins to plead, I do not equally understand what they say, unless I attend most carefully. So confused is the speech, so disturbed, that nothing is first, nothing second; and there is so great an unaccustomedness and a throng of words that the speech, which ought to bring light to matters, brings obscurity and shadows; and they seem in some way themselves to drown out themselves in speaking.

Isti enim, qui ad nos causas deferunt, ita nos plerumque ipsi docent, ut non desideres planius dici; easdem res autem simul ac Fufius aut vester aequalis Pomponius agere coepit, non aeque quid dicant, nisi admodum attendi, intellego; ita confusa est oratio, ita perturbata, nihil ut sit primum, nihil ut secundum, tantaque insolentia ac turba verborum, ut oratio, quae lumen adhibere rebus debet, ea obscuritatem et tenebras adferat atque ut quodam modo ipsi sibi in dicendo obstrepere videantur.

But, if it pleases — since I hope these things at any rate seem troublesome and putrid to you, the elder ones — let us pass to the rest, somewhat more burdensome.” “But you see,” said Antonius, “how unwillingly we are doing other things and how unwillingly we are listening to you, who could be drawn — for I conjecture from myself — leaving everything else to follow you. So polished is your speech on rough matters, so full on meagre, so new on most common.”

Verum, si placet, quoniam haec satis spero vobis quidem certe maioribus molesta et putida videri, ad reliqua aliquanto odiosiora pergamus.’ ’Atqui vides’ inquit Antonius ’quam alias res agamus quam te inviti audiamus, qui adduci possimus— de me enim conicio—relictis ut rebus omnibus te sectemur; te audiamus ita de horridis rebus nitida, de ieiunis plena, de pervulgatis nova quaedam est oratio tua.’

“For those two parts were easy, Antonius,” he said, “which I have just run through or rather almost passed over: of speaking Latin and of speaking plainly. The rest are great, complex, various, weighty, in which all wonder of talent, all praise of eloquence is contained. For no one ever wondered at an orator because he spoke Latin; if it is otherwise, they laugh, and they do not think him an orator only, but even a man. No one has lifted up with words him who had so spoken that those who were present understood what he said, but they have despised him who could less do that.

’Faciles enim,’ inquit ’Antoni, partes eae fuerunt duae, quas modo percucurri vel potius paene praeterii, Latine loquendi planeque dicendi; reliquae sunt magnae, implicatae, variae, graves, quibus omnis admiratio ingeni, omnis laus eloquentiae continetur; nemo enim umquam est oratorem, quod Latine loqueretur, admiratus; si est aliter, inrident, neque eum oratorem tantum modo, sed hominem non putant; nemo extulit eum verbis, qui ita dixisset, ut, qui adessent, intellegerent quid diceret, sed contempsit eum, qui minus id facere potuisset.

In whom, then, do men shudder? Whom do they gaze upon stupefied as he speaks? At whom do they cry out? Whom do they think a god, so to say, among men? Those who speak distinctly, who set out clearly, who copiously, who illustriously both with matters and words, and in the very speech as it were make some rhythm and verse — that is, what I mean by ornately. Those same who so moderate themselves as the dignity of matters, of persons, demands — those are to be praised in that kind of praise which I call apt and congruent.

In quo igitur homines exhorrescunt? Quem stupefacti dicentem intuentur? In quo exclamant? Quem deum, ut ita dicam, inter homines putant? Qui distincte, qui explicate, qui abundanter, qui inluminate et rebus et verbis dicunt et in ipsa oratione quasi quendam numerum versumque conficiunt, id est, quod dico, ornate. Qui idem ita moderantur, ut rerum, ut personarum dignitates ferunt, ei sunt in eo genere laudandi laudis, quod ego aptum et congruens nomino.

Antonius said he had not yet seen those who so spoke, and said this name of eloquence was to be assigned to them alone. Therefore deride and despise — on my counsel — all those who think they have embraced all the orator’s force in the precepts of those rhetoricians as they are now called, and have not yet been able to understand what character they hold or what they profess. For everything in the life of men — since the orator moves in it and that is his subject-matter — must be sought, heard, read, argued, handled, stirred up.

Qui ita dicerent, eos negavit adhuc se vidisse Antonius et eis hoc nomen dixit eloquentiae solis esse tribuendum. Qua re omnis istos me auctore deridete atque contemnite, qui se horum, qui nunc ita appellantur, rhetorum praeceptis omnem oratoriam vim complexos esse arbitrantur neque adhuc quam personam teneant aut quid profiteantur intellegere potuerunt. Vero enim oratori, quae sunt in hominum vita, quandoquidem in ea versatur orator atque ea est ei subiecta materies, omnia quaesita, audita, lecta, disputata, tractata, agitata esse debent.

For eloquence is one of the highest virtues; although all virtues are equal and on a par, yet there is in appearance one more comely and brighter than another, as is this faculty, which, having grasped the knowledge of things, so sets out the perceptions and counsels of mind by words that it can drive those who hear, wherever it shall lean. As its force is the greater, the more must it be joined to uprightness and the highest prudence; if to those without these virtues we should hand the abundance of speaking, we shall not have made them orators but shall have given certain weapons to madmen.

Est enim eloquentia una quaedam de summis virtutibus; quamquam sunt omnes virtutes aequales et pares, sed tamen est specie alia magis alia formosa et inlustris, sicut haec vis, quae scientiam complexa rerum sensa mentis et consilia sic verbis explicat, ut eos, qui audiant, quocumque incubuerit, possit impellere; quae quo maior est vis, hoc est magis probitate iungenda summaque prudentia; quarum virtutum expertibus si dicendi copiam tradiderimus, non eos quidem oratores effecerimus, sed furentibus quaedam arma dederimus.

This rationale of thinking and pronouncing and the force of speaking, the ancient Greeks called wisdom; from this came the Lycurgi, the Pittaci, the Solons; and from this likeness our Coruncanii, Fabricii, Catones, Scipiones, perhaps not so learned, but with similar impulse and disposition of mind. Others with the same prudence, but with a different counsel about the pursuits of life, sought rest and leisure: as Pythagoras, Democritus, Anaxagoras, transferred themselves wholly from governing states to the knowledge of things; which life, on account of its tranquility and the sweetness of the science itself (than which nothing is more pleasant to men), has delighted more men than has been useful to commonwealths.

Hanc, inquam, cogitandi pronuntiandique rationem vimque dicendi veteres Graeci sapientiam nominabant; hinc illi Lycurgi, hinc Pittaci, hinc Solones atque ab hac similitudine Coruncanii nostri, Fabricii, Catones, Scipiones fuerunt, non tam fortasse docti, sed impetu mentis simili et voluntate. Eadem autem alii prudentia, sed consilio ad vitae studia dispari quietem atque otium secuti, ut Pythagoras, Democritus, Anaxagoras, a regendis civitatibus totos se ad cognitionem rerum transtulerunt; quae vita propter tranquillitatem et propter ipsius scientiae suavitatem, qua nihil est hominibus iucundius, pluris, quam utile fuit rebus publicis, delectavit.

So when men of the most outstanding talents had given themselves to that pursuit, out of that highest faculty of free and empty time the most learned men, abounding in too much leisure and richest talents, took on themselves to handle and seek and investigate far more things than was necessary. For that old learning seems the same — both the teacher of doing rightly and of speaking well. Nor were the teachers separate, but the same were teachers of living and of speaking — as that Phoenix in Homer, who says he was given by Achilles’ father Peleus as companion to the young man for war, that he might make him an orator of words and an actor of deeds.

Itaque, ut ei studio se excellentissimis ingeniis homines dediderunt, ex ea summa facultate vacui ac liberi temporis multo plura, quam erat necesse, doctissimi homines otio nimio et ingeniis uberrimis adfluentes curanda sibi esse ac quaerenda et investiganda duxerunt. Nam vetus quidem illa doctrina eadem videtur et recte faciendi et bene dicendi magistra; neque disiuncti doctores, sed eidem erant vivendi praeceptores atque dicendi, ut ille apud Homerum Phoenix, qui se a Peleo patre Achilli iuveni comitem esse datum dicit ad bellum, ut efficeret oratorem verborum actoremque rerum.

But as men accustomed to constant and daily labour, when on account of weather they are kept from work, betake themselves to ball or knucklebones or dice, or even invent for themselves some new game in their leisure — so those, kept from public business as it were from work, by the times or by their own will idle, betook themselves wholly, some to poets, some to geometers, some to musicians; some, too, like the dialecticians, brought forth for themselves a new study and game; and in those arts which were discovered, that the minds of boys might be shaped to humanity and virtue, they used up all their time and ages.

Sed ut homines labore adsiduo et cotidiano adsueti, cum tempestatis causa opere prohibentur, ad pilam se aut ad talos aut ad tesseras conferunt aut etiam novum sibi ipsi aliquem excogitant in otio ludum, sic illi a negotiis publicis tamquam ab opere aut temporibus exclusi aut voluntate sua feriati totos se alii ad poetas, alii ad geometras, alii ad musicos contulerunt, alii etiam, ut dialectici, novum sibi ipsi studium ludumque pepererunt atque in eis artibus, quae repertae sunt, ut puerorum mentes ad humanitatem fingerentur atque virtutem, omne tempus atque aetates suas consumpserunt.

But because there were some — and many — who flourished in public life by reason of the twin wisdom of doing and speaking which cannot be separated, like Themistocles, Pericles, Theramenes, or who, less themselves engaged in public affairs, were yet teachers of this same wisdom, like Gorgias, Thrasymachus, Isocrates — there were found those who, themselves abounding in learning and talents, but recoiling from civic affairs and public business by some judgment of mind, harassed and despised this practice of speaking;

Sed quod erant quidam eique multi, qui aut in re publica propter ancipitem, quae non potest esse seiuncta, faciendi dicendique sapientiam florerent, ut Themistocles, ut Pericles, ut Theramenes, aut, qui minus ipsi in re publica versarentur, sed huius tamen eiusdem sapientiae doctores essent, ut Gorgias, Thrasymachus, Isocrates, inventi sunt, qui, cum ipsi doctrina et ingeniis abundarent, a re autem civili et a negotiis animi quodam iudicio abhorrerent, hanc dicendi exercitationem exagitarent atque contemnerent;

of whom Socrates was the leader, who, by the testimony of all the learned and by the judgment of the whole of Greece, was easily first of all in prudence and keenness and grace and subtlety, and indeed in eloquence, variety, abundance, into whichever side he had given himself. From those who handled, did, taught these things which we are now seeking — when they were called by one name (because all knowledge of the best things and exercise in them was named philosophy) — Socrates snatched away this common name, and separated by his own disputations the science of feeling wisely and speaking ornately, although they cohered in fact. His talent and various conversations Plato handed to immortality by his writings, since Socrates himself had left no letter.

quorum princeps Socrates fuit, is qui omnium eruditorum testimonio totiusque iudicio Graeciae cum prudentia et acumine et venustate et subtilitate tum vero eloquentia, varietate, copia, quam se cumque in partem dedisset omnium fuit facile princeps, eis que, qui haec, quae nunc nos quaerimus, tractarent, agerent, docerent, cum nomine appellarentur uno, quod omnis rerum optimarum cognitio atque in eis exercitatio philosophia nominaretur, hoc commune nomen eripuit sapienterque sentiendi et ornate dicendi scientiam re cohaerentis disputationibus suis separavit; cuius ingenium variosque sermones immortalitati scriptis suis Plato tradidit, cum ipse litteram Socrates nullam reliquisset.

Hence arose that division as it were of tongue and heart — absurd surely and unprofitable and to be reproved — that some teach us to be wise, others to speak. For when several had risen mostly from Socrates, because each had grasped one thing from his various and diverse and on every side spread disputations, families were sown among one another quarrelling, much severed and unlike — when yet all the philosophers wished to be called and judged themselves to be Socratics.

Hinc discidium illud exstitit quasi linguae atque cordis, absurdum sane et inutile et reprehendendum, ut alii nos sapere, alii dicere docerent. Nam cum essent plures orti fere a Socrate, quod ex illius variis et diversis et in omnem partem diffusis disputationibus alius aliud apprehenderat, proseminatae sunt quasi familiae dissentientes inter se et multum disiunctae et dispares, cum tamen omnes se philosophi Socraticos et dici vellent et esse arbitrarentur.

And first from Plato himself Aristotle and Xenocrates, of whom one held the name of the Peripatetics, the other of the Academy. Then from Antisthenes, who in Socrates’ conversation had most loved patience and hardness, the Cynics first, then the Stoics. Then from Aristippus, whom those rather voluptuous disputations had pleased, flowed the Cyrenaic philosophy, which he and his successors defended simply; while these, who now measure all by pleasure, while they do this more bashfully, neither satisfy dignity (which they do not despise) nor protect pleasure (which they wish to embrace). There were also other kinds of philosophers — who almost all said they were Socratics — Eretrians, Herillians, Megarians, Pyrrhonians; but these have long ago been broken and extinguished by the force and arguments of these.

Ac primo ab ipso Platone Aristoteles et Xenocrates, quorum alter Peripateticorum, alter Academiae nomen obtinuit, deinde ab Antisthene, qui patientiam et duritiam in Socratico sermone maxime adamarat, Cynici primum, deinde Stoici, tum ab Aristippo, quem illae magis voluptariae disputationes delectarant, Cyrenaica philosophia manavit, quam ille et eius posteri simpliciter defenderunt, hi, qui nunc voluptate omnia metiuntur, dum verecundius id agunt, nec dignitati satis faciunt, quam non aspernantur, nec voluptatem tuentur, quam amplexari volunt. Fuerunt etiam alia genera philosophorum, qui se omnes fere Socraticos esse dicebant, Eretricorum, Erilliorum, Megaricorum, Pyrrhoneorum; sed ea horum vi et disputationibus sunt iam diu fracta et exstincta.

Of those that remain, that philosophy which has undertaken the patronage of pleasure, even if it seems to anyone true, is yet far from that man whom we are seeking, and whom we wish to be the author of public counsel and the leader of governing the state, and chief of opinion and eloquence in the senate, before the people, in public causes. Yet no injury will be done by us to that philosophy. It will not be repelled from where it shall wish to enter, but will rest in its little gardens — where it wishes, where, even reclining softly and daintily, it calls us off from the Rostra, from the courts, from the curia. Wisely perhaps, especially in this commonwealth.

Ex illis autem quae remanent, ea philosophia, quae suscepit patrocinium voluptatis, etsi cui vera videatur, procul abest tamen ab eo viro, quem quaerimus et quem auctorem publici consili et regendae civitatis ducem et sententiae atque eloquentiae principem in senatu, in populo, in causis publicis esse volumus. Nec ulla tamen ei philosophiae fiet iniuria a nobis; non enim repelletur inde, quo adgredi cupiet, sed in hortulis quiescet suis, ubi vult, ubi etiam recubans molliter et delicate nos avocat a Rostris, a iudiciis, a curia, fortasse sapienter, hac praesertim re publica.

But I am not now asking what philosophy is most true, but what is most joined to the orator. So let us send those men off without any insult; for they are good men, and (since they think themselves so) blessed. Let us only warn them that, even if it is most true, they should hold it silent like a mystery — that they say it is not the wise man’s part to be in public life. For if they shall persuade us and every best man of this, they cannot themselves be — what they most desire — at leisure.

Verum ego non quaero nunc, quae sit philosophia verissima, sed quae oratori coniuncta maxime; qua re istos sine ulla contumelia dimittamus; sunt enim et boni viri et, quoniam sibi ita videntur, beati; tantumque eos admoneamus, ut illud, etiam si est verissimum, tacitum tamen tamquam mysterium teneant, quod negant versari in re publica esse sapientis; nam si hoc nobis atque optimo cuique persuaserint, non poterunt ipsi esse, id quod maxime cupiunt, otiosi.

The Stoics, however — whom I least disapprove — I yet send away, nor do I fear them angry, since they do not at all know how to be angry. To them I owe this thanks: that they alone of all said eloquence is virtue and wisdom. But there is doubtless in them what greatly recoils from the orator we are equipping. Either because they say all who are not wise are slaves, robbers, enemies, mad — and yet that no one is wise. But it is most absurd to commit an assembly or senate or any gathering of men to him to whom no one of those who are present seems to be sane, no one a citizen, no one a free man.

Stoicos autem, quos minime improbo, dimitto tamen nec eos iratos vereor, quoniam omnino irasci nesciunt; atque hanc eis habeo gratiam, quod soli ex omnibus eloquentiam virtutem ac sapientiam esse dixerunt. Sed nimirum est in his, quod ab hoc, quem instruimus oratore, valde abhorreat; vel quod omnis, qui sapientes non sint, servos, latrones, hostis, insanos esse dicunt, neque tamen quemquam esse sapientem: valde autem est absurdum ei contionem aut senatum aut ullum coetum hominum committere, cui nemo illorum, qui adsint, sanus, nemo civis, nemo liber esse videatur.

It is added that they have a kind of speech perhaps subtle and surely keen, but, for an orator, meagre, unaccustomed, recoiling from the ears of the common folk, obscure, empty, dry, and yet of such a kind that to use it before the multitude is in no way possible. For other things seem good and bad to the Stoics and to the rest of the citizens — or rather, the nations — different is the force of honour, of disgrace, of reward, of punishment; truly or falsely, nothing for the present matters; but if we should follow them, we shall never be able to bring any matter to a head by speaking.

Accedit quod orationis etiam genus habent fortasse subtile et certe acutum, sed, ut in oratore, exile, inusitatum, abhorrens ab auribus vulgi, obscurum, inane, ieiunum, ac tamen eius modi, quo uti ad vulgus nullo modo possit: alia enim et bona et mala videntur Stoicis et ceteris civibus vel potius gentibus; alia vis honoris, ignominiae, praemi, supplici; vere an secus nihil ad hoc tempus; sed ea si sequamur, nullam umquam rem dicendo expedire possimus.

The Peripatetics and the Academics remain. Although the name of the Academics is one, the opinions are two. For Speusippus, Plato’s sister’s son, and Xenocrates who heard Plato, and Polemo and Crantor who heard Xenocrates, did not greatly disagree from Aristotle, who together with them had heard Plato; in the abundance and variety of speaking they were perhaps not equal. Arcesilas first, who had heard Polemo, snatched up especially this from Plato’s various books and Socratic conversations: that nothing certain can be perceived either by the senses or by the soul. He, having used a certain extraordinary charm of speaking, is said to have spurned all judgment of soul and sense; and he first established (although it had been chiefly Socratic) not to show what he himself thought, but to argue against what each had said he thought.

Reliqui sunt Peripatetici et Academici; quamquam Academicorum nomen est unum, sententiae duae; nam Speusippus Platonis sororis filius et Xenocrates, qui Platonem audierat, et qui Xenocratem Polemo et Crantor, nihil ab Aristotele, qui una audierat Platonem, magno opere dissensit; copia fortasse et varietate dicendi pares non fuerunt: Arcesilas primum, qui Polemonem audierat, ex variis Platonis libris sermonibusque Socraticis hoc maxime adripuit, nihil esse certi quod aut sensibus aut animo percipi possit; quem ferunt eximio quodam usum lepore dicendi aspernatum esse omne animi sensusque iudicium primumque instituisse—quamquam id fuit Socraticum maxime—non quid ipse sentiret ostendere, sed contra id, quod quisque se sentire dixisset, disputare.

Hence flowed this more recent Academy, in which Carneades stood out by a kind of divine swiftness of talent and abundance of speaking. Although I have known many of his hearers at Athens, I can yet name most certain authorities: my father-in-law Scaevola, who as a young man heard him at Rome; and my friend Q. Metellus, son of Lucius, that most distinguished man, who said that Carneades had been heard by him as a young man at Athens, in his old age, for many days.

Hinc haec recentior Academia manavit, in qua exstitit divina quadam celeritate ingeni dicendique copia Carneades; cuius ego etsi multos auditores cognovi Athenis, tamen auctores certissimos laudare possum et socerum meum Scaevolam, qui eum Romae audivit adulescens, et Q. Metellum L. F. familiarem meum, clarissimum virum, qui illum a se adulescente Athenis iam adfectum senectute multos dies auditum esse dicebat.

These — as the rivers from the Apennine, so from the common ridge of wisdom — were made the partings of doctrines: so that the philosophers as it were flow down into the upper sea, the Ionian, a Greek and harboured one, while the orators are slipped into this lower, Tuscan and barbarian one, full of rocks and dangers, in which even Ulysses himself wandered.

Haec autem, ut ex Appennino fluminum, sic ex communi sapientiae iugo sunt doctrinarum facta divortia, ut philosophi tamquam in superum mare Ionium defluerent Graecum quoddam et portuosum, oratores autem in inferum hoc, Tuscum et barbarum, scopulosum atque infestum laberentur, in quo etiam ipse Ulixes errasset.

Therefore, if we are content with this eloquence and this orator, who knows either that he must deny what is charged against him, or, if he cannot, then to show that what the accused did was either rightly done, or by another’s fault, or by injustice, or by law, or not against law, or imprudently, or necessarily, or that the matter must not be claimed under the name by which it is charged, or that the case is not being managed as it ought and was lawful — and if you think it enough to learn what those writers of the art teach, which yet Antonius has set out far more ornately and copiously than they say it — but if you are content with these, and with what you wished to be said by me, you compel the orator out of an enormous and unbounded field into a really narrow ring.

Qua re, si hac eloquentia atque hoc oratore contenti sumus, qui sciat aut negare oportere, quod arguare, aut, si id non possis, tum ostendere, quod is fecerit, qui insimuletur, aut recte factum aut alterius culpa aut iniuria aut ex lege aut non contra legem aut imprudentia aut necessario, aut non eo nomine usurpandum, quo arguatur, aut non ita agi, ut debuerit ac licuerit; et, si satis esse putatis ea, quae isti scriptores artis docent, discere, quae multo tamen ornatius, quam ab illis dicuntur, et uberius explicavit Antonius—sed, si his contenti estis atque eis etiam, quae dici voluistis a me, ex ingenti quodam oratorem immensoque campo in exiguum sane gyrum compellitis.

But if you wish to follow that ancient Pericles, or this man, more familiar to us because of the multitude of his writings, Demosthenes; and if you have fallen in love with that brilliant and exceptional sight of the perfect orator, and his beauty — either this Carneadean or that Aristotelian force is to be grasped by you.

Sin veterem illum Periclem aut hunc etiam, qui familiarior nobis propter scriptorum multitudinem est, Demosthenem sequi vultis et si illam praeclaram et eximiam speciem oratoris perfecti et pulcritudinem adamastis, aut vobis haec Carneadia aut illa Aristotelia vis comprehendenda est.

For, as I said before, those ancients up to Socrates joined the knowledge and science of all things which pertain to the morals of men, to life, to virtue, to the commonwealth, with the rationale of speaking. Afterwards, when (as I have set out) the eloquent had been parted from the learned by Socrates, and thereafter the philosophers, like all the Socratics, despised eloquence, and the orators wisdom, neither touched anything of the other’s part, save what these borrowed from those, or those from these — from which they would have drawn promiscuously, if they had wished to remain in their pristine community.

Namque, ut ante dixi, veteres illi usque ad Socratem omnem omnium rerum, quae ad mores hominum, quae ad vitam, quae ad virtutem, quae ad rem publicam pertinebant, cognitionem et scientiam cum dicendi ratione iungebant; postea dissociati, ut exposui, a Socrate diserti a doctis et deinceps a Socraticis item omnibus philosophi eloquentiam despexerunt, oratores sapientiam, neque quicquam ex alterius parte tetigerunt, nisi quod illi ab his aut ab illis hi mutuarentur; ex quo promisce haurirent, si manere in pristina communione voluissent.

But as the ancient pontiffs, on account of the multitude of sacrifices, wished there to be three men as banqueters, when they themselves had been instituted by Numa to perform also that banquet sacrifice of the games — so the Socratics severed from themselves the pleaders of cases, and from the common name of philosophy, when the ancients had wished there to be a wonderful fellowship of speaking and understanding.

Sed ut pontifices veteres propter sacrificiorum multitudinem tris viros epulones esse voluerunt, cum essent ipsi a Numa, ut etiam illud ludorum epulare sacrificium facerent, instituti, sic Socratici a se causarum actores et a communi philosophiae nomine separaverunt, cum veteres dicendi et intellegendi mirificam societatem esse voluissent.

Since these things are so, I shall a little plead for myself, and I shall ask you that what I shall say you should think to be said, not about myself, but about the orator. For I am one who, though taught with the highest zeal of my father in boyhood, and brought to the Forum so much talent (as I myself feel — not so much as perhaps I seem to you), cannot say that I have learned these things which I am now embracing as I shall say they ought to be learned. For of all I came most early to public causes, and at twenty-one called into court a most noble and most eloquent man. The Forum was my school; my master was practice and the laws and institutions of the Roman people and the custom of the ancestors.

Quae cum ita sint, paululum equidem de me deprecabor et petam a vobis, ut ea, quae dicam, non de memet ipso, sed de oratore dicere putetis. Ego enim sum is, qui cum summo studio patris in pueritia doctus essem et in forum ingeni tantum, quantum ipse sentio, non tantum, quantum ipse forsitan vobis videar, detulissem, non possim dicere me haec, quae nunc complector, perinde, ut dicam discenda esse, didicisse; quippe qui omnium maturrime ad publicas causas accesserim annosque natus unum et viginti nobilissimum hominem et eloquentissimum in iudicium vocarim; cui disciplina fuerit forum, magister usus et leges et instituta populi Romani mosque maiorum.

I tasted only a little of those arts of which I am speaking, when I was quaestor in Asia, having got the rhetorician of about my own age from the Academy, that Metrodorus of whose memory Antonius spoke; and on my way back from there, at Athens — where I should have lingered longer, had I not been angry with the Athenians, who would not put on the mysteries again, to which I had come two days too late. So this — that I embrace so great a knowledge and force of learning — is not for me but rather against me. For I am arguing not what I can do, but what the orator can; and all those who set out the rhetorical arts most ridiculously: for they write of the kinds of suits, of openings, of narrations.

Paulum sitiens istarum artium, de quibus loquor, gustavi, quaestor in Asia cum essem, aequalem fere meum ex Academia rhetorem nactus, Metrodorum illum, de cuius memoria commemoravit Antonius; et inde decedens Athenis, ubi ego diutius essem moratus, nisi Atheniensibus, quod mysteria non referrent, ad quae biduo serius veneram, suscensuissem; qua re hoc, quod complector tantam scientiam vimque doctrinae, non modo non pro me, sed contra me est potius—non enim quid ego, sed quid orator possit disputo—atque hos omnis, qui artis rhetoricas exponunt, perridiculos; scribunt enim de litium genere et de principiis et de narrationibus;

But the force of eloquence is so great that it grasps the origin, force, and changes of all things, all virtues, duties, all nature, which contains the morals of men, the souls, the life; the same describes morals, laws, rights, governs the commonwealth, and ornately and copiously speaks of everything, to whatever matter it pertains.

illa vis autem eloquentiae tanta est, ut omnium rerum, virtutum, officiorum omnisque naturae, quae mores hominum, quae animos, quae vitam continet, originem, vim mutationesque teneat, eadem mores, leges, iura describat, rem publicam regat, omniaque, ad quamcumque rem pertineant, ornate copioseque dicat.

In this kind we move as much as we can, as much as we are strong by talent, by moderate learning, by use; nor do we yield much in disputation to those who have set up their tent of life in philosophy alone.

In quo genere nos quidem versamur tantum quantum possumus, quantum ingenio, quantum mediocri doctrina, quantum usu valemus; neque tamen istis, qui in una philosophia quasi tabernaculum vitae suae conlocarunt, multum sane in disputatione concedimus.

For what can my friend Gaius Velleius bring why pleasure should be the highest good, that I could not more copiously either defend, if I wished, or refute, from those topics which Antonius set out, by this practice of speaking — in which Velleius is unschooled, and each of us has been versed? What is there, that either Sextus Pompeius or the two Balbi, or my friend who lived with Panaetius, M. Vigellius the Stoic, could say of the virtue of men in such an argument, in which I should have to yield to them, or any of you?

Quid enim meus familiaris C. Velleius adferre potest, quam ob rem voluptas sit summum bonum, quod ego non copiosius possim vel tutari, si velim, vel refellere ex illis locis, quos exposuit Antonius, hac dicendi exercitatione, in qua Velleius est rudis, unus quisque nostrum versatus? Quid est, quod aut Sex. Pompeius aut duo Balbi aut meus amicus, qui cum Panaetio vixit, M. Vigellius de virtute hominum Stoici possint dicere, qua in disputatione ego his debeam aut vestrum quisquam concedere?

For philosophy is not like the rest of the arts. For what can he do in geometry who has not learned? What in music? He must either be silent or not even be reckoned sane. But these things which are in philosophy are dug out by talents to elicit what in each thing is like the truth, and they are polished by exercised speech. Our common orator here, if he is less learned, but yet exercised in speaking, by this very common exercise will beat off those of ours, nor will he allow himself to be despised and contemned by them.

Non est enim philosophia similis artium reliquarum: nam quid faciet in geometria qui non didicerit? quid in musicis? Aut taceat oportebit aut ne sanus quidem iudicetur. Haec vero, quae sunt in philosophia, ingeniis eruuntur ad id, quod in quoque veri simile est, eliciendum acutis atque acribus eaque exercitata oratione poliuntur. Hic noster vulgaris orator, si minus erit doctus, at tamen in dicendo exercitatus, hac ipsa exercitatione communi istos quidem nostros verberabit neque se ab eis contemni ac despici sinet;

But if anyone shall ever come forth who can in the Aristotelian manner speak on every subject on either side, and in every case set out two contrary speeches by his precepts; or who in this manner of Arcesilas and Carneades shall argue against everything that is laid down — and shall add to that rationale this rhetorical use and habit and exercise of speaking, he will be the true, the perfect, the only orator. For neither without the forensic sinews can the orator be sufficiently vehement and weighty, nor without variety of learning sufficiently polished and wise.

sin aliquis exstiterit aliquando, qui Aristotelio more de omnibus rebus in utramque partem possit dicere et in omni causa duas contrarias orationes, praeceptis illius cognitis, explicare aut hoc Arcesilae modo et Carneadi contra omne, quod propositum sit, disserat, quique ad eam rationem adiungat hunc rhetoricum usum moremque exercitationemque dicendi, is sit verus, is perfectus, is solus orator. Nam neque sine forensibus nervis satis vehemens et gravis nec sine varietate doctrinae satis politus et sapiens esse orator potest.

Therefore let us suffer that ancient Corax to hatch his own chicks in the nest, that they may fly out as hateful and troublesome shouters; and let us allow that I-know-not-who Pamphilus to portray, in fillets, so great a matter as if it were certain childish playthings. Let us ourselves, by this so brief disputation of yesterday’s and today’s day, set out the orator’s whole duty — provided that thing be so great that it seems to be embraced in all the philosophers’ books which none of those orators of yours has ever touched.”

Qua re Coracem istum veterem patiamur nos quidem pullos suos excludere in nido, qui evolent clamatores odiosi ac molesti, Pamphilumque nescio quem sinamus in infulis tantam rem tamquam puerilis delicias aliquas depingere; nosque ipsi hac tam exigua disputatione hesterni et hodierni diei totum oratoris munus explicemus, dum modo illa res tanta sit, ut omnibus philosophorum libris, quos nemo oratorum istorum umquam attigit, comprehensa esse videatur.’

Then Catulus: “In no way, by Hercules,” he said, “Crassus, is it to be wondered at that there is in you so great a force of speaking, or sweetness, or copiousness. Of you indeed I before judged that you spoke by nature in such a way that you seemed to me not only the highest orator but also the wisest man. Now I understand that you have always reckoned even more important those things which look towards wisdom, and that out of these has flowed this copiousness of speaking. Yet, when I recall all the steps of your age, and consider your life and pursuits, I do not see at what time you learned those things, nor do I understand you to have been greatly given to those pursuits, men, books. And yet I cannot decide whether more I should wonder that you, in your such occupations, could have learned those things which you persuade me are the greatest helps; or, if you could not, that you can speak in this way.”

Tum Catulus ’haudquaquam hercule’ inquit ’Crasse, mirandum est esse in te tantam dicendi vel vim vel suavitatem vel copiam; quem quidem antea natura rebar ita dicere, ut mihi non solum orator summus, sed etiam sapientissimus homo viderere; nunc intellego illa te semper etiam potiora duxisse, quae ad sapientiam spectarent, atque ex his hanc dicendi copiam fluxisse. Sed tamen cum omnis gradus aetatis recordor tuae cumque vitam tuam ac studia considero, neque, quo tempore ista didiceris, video, nec magno opere te istis studiis, hominibus, libris intellego deditum. Neque tamen possum statuere, utrum magis mirer te illa, quae mihi persuades maxima esse adiumenta, potuisse in tantis tuis occupationibus perdiscere, an, si non potueris, posse isto modo dicere.’

Here Crassus: “This,” he said, “Catulus, I would have you persuade yourself first: that I do not, when I argue about the orator, do much otherwise than I should do, if I had to speak about an actor. For I should deny that he could satisfy in gesture, unless he had learned the wrestling-school, unless he had learned to dance. Nor when I said this would it be necessary that I be an actor, but perhaps not a foolish judge of another’s art.

Hic Crassus ’hoc tibi’ inquit ’Catule, primum persuadeas velim, me non multo secus facere, cum de oratore disputem, ac facerem, si esset mihi de histrione dicendum. Negarem enim posse eum satis facere in gestu, nisi palaestram, nisi saltare didicisset; neque, ea cum dicerem, me esse histrionem necesse esset, sed fortasse non stultum alieni artifici existimatorem.

Similarly now I am speaking of the orator at your urging — of the highest, of course; for always, whatever art or faculty is asked about, the question is wont to be of the absolute and perfect. Therefore, if you wish me to be even an orator, even tolerably good, even good — I shall not resist; for why should I now be silly? I know I am so reckoned. But if it is so, I am surely not the highest. For there is no thing among men either harder or greater, or which requires more helps of learning.

Similiter nunc de oratore vestro impulsu loquor, summo scilicet; semper enim, quacumque de arte aut facultate quaeritur, de absoluta et perfecta quaeri solet. Qua re si iam me vultis esse oratorem, si etiam sat bonum, si bonum denique, non repugnabo; quid enim nunc sim ineptus? Ita me existimari scio: quod si ita est, summus tamen certe non sum; neque enim apud homines res est ulla difficilior neque maior neque quae plura adiumenta doctrinae desideret.

And yet, since we must argue about the orator, I must speak about the highest orator. For the force and nature of the matter cannot be understood, of what kind and how great it is, unless the perfect is set before the eyes. As for me, Catulus, I confess that I do not now live in those books and with those men, nor indeed (which you rightly remember) ever had any time set apart for learning, nor have given to learning so much time as my boyish age and forensic holidays have allowed me.

Ac tamen, quoniam de oratore nobis disputandum est, de summo oratore dicam necesse est; vis enim et natura rei, nisi perfecta ante oculos ponitur, qualis et quanta sit intellegi non potest. Me autem, Catule, fateor neque hodie in istis libris et cum istis hominibus vivere nec vero, id quod tu recte commeministi, ullum umquam habuisse sepositum tempus ad discendum ac tantum tribuisse doctrinae temporis, quantum mihi puerilis aetas, forenses feriae concesserint.

And, if you ask, Catulus, what I think of that learning of yours: I think there is need of so much time not to a talented man, who has the Forum, the curia, cases, the commonwealth before him, as those have taken on themselves to whom learning has lasted to the end of life. For all arts are handled differently by those who transfer them to use, differently by those who, delighted with the handling of the arts themselves, are about to do nothing else in life. The Samnite gladiator-master here is now in extreme old age and is exercising daily, for he cares for nothing else; but Q. Velocius as a boy had learned a little, but, because he was apt for it and had wholly mastered it, was, as is said in Lucilius, “Although a good Samnite himself in the school and with the wooden swords, severe enough to anyone”; but he gave more pains to the Forum, to friends, to private affairs. Valerius sang every day, for he was an actor: what else could he do?

Ac, si quaeris, Catule, de doctrina ista quid ego sentiam, non tantum ingenioso homini et ei, qui forum, qui curiam, qui causas, qui rem publicam spectet, opus esse arbitror temporis, quantum sibi ei sumpserunt, quos discentis vita defecit: omnes enim artes aliter ab eis tractantur, qui eas ad usum transferunt, aliter ab eis, qui ipsarum artium tractatu delectati nihil in vita sunt aliud acturi. Magister hic Samnitium summa iam senectute est et cotidie commentatur, nihil enim curat aliud: at Q. Velocius puer addidicerat, sed quod erat aptus ad illud totumque cognorat, fuit, ut est apud Lucilium, quamvis bonus ipse Samnis in ludo ac rudibus cuivis satis asper; sed plus operae foro tribuebat, amicis, rei familiari. Valerius cotidie cantabat; erat enim scaenicus: quid faceret aliud?

But our friend Numerius Furius sings when it is convenient, for he is a head of household, a Roman knight; as a boy he learned what was to be learned. The same rationale is in these greatest arts. Day and night we used to see Q. Tubero, a man of the highest virtue and prudence, when he was giving pains to philosophy. But his uncle Africanus you would scarcely understand to be doing this, although he was doing it. These things are easily learned if you both take so much as is needed, and have one who can teach faithfully, and yourself know how to learn;

At Numerius Furius, noster familiaris, cum est commodum, cantat; est enim paterfamilias, est eques Romanus; puer didicit quod discendum fuit. Eadem ratio est harum artium maximarum; dies et noctis virum summa virtute et prudentia videbamus, philosopho cum operam daret, Q. Tuberonem; at eius avunculum vix intellegeres id agere, cum ageret tamen, Africanum. Ista discuntur facile, si et tantum sumas, quantum opus sit, et habeas qui docere

but if you wish to do nothing else in your whole life, the very handling and inquiry produces something out of itself daily, that you may track it down with idle delight. So it happens that the stirring of subjects is unbounded, the knowledge easy, if practice confirms the learning, moderate effort is given, memory and zeal remain. But it is always pleasant to learn — as if I should wish to play knucklebones excellently, or be held by zeal for the ball — even, perhaps, if I cannot attain it. But others, because they do brilliantly, are more vehemently than the case requires delighted, as Titius with the ball, Brulla with the knucklebones.

fideliter possit et scias etiam ipse discere, sed si tota vita nihil velis aliud agere, ipsa tractatio et quaestio cotidie ex se gignit aliquid, quod cum desidiosa delectatione vestiges. Ita fit, ut agitatio rerum sit infinita, cognitio facilis, si usus doctrinam confirmet, mediocris opera tribuatur, memoria studiumque permaneat. Libet autem semper discere; ut si velim ego talis optime ludere aut pilae studio tenear, etiam fortasse, si adsequi non possim; at alii, quia praeclare faciunt, vehementius, quam causa postulat, delectantur, ut Titius pila, Brulla talis.

Therefore there is no reason why anyone should fear the magnitude of the arts because old men learn them. For either old men have approached them, or are detained in those studies right up to old age, or are most slow. The matter, in my view, is thus: that, unless what each could learn quickly, he could never altogether master.”

Qua re nihil est quod quisquam magnitudinem artium ex eo, quod senes discunt, pertimescat, namque aut senes ad eas accesserunt aut usque ad senectutem in studiis detinentur aut sunt tardissimi; res quidem se mea sententia sic habet, ut, nisi quod quisque cito potuerit, numquam omnino possit perdiscere.’

“Now, now,” said Catulus, “Crassus, I understand what you say. And by Hercules I agree. I see well enough that for you, a man most keen at mastering, there has been time enough for learning those things you say.” “Do you persist,” said Crassus, “in thinking that what I say I am saying about myself, not about the matter? But now, if it pleases, let us return to our institutes.” “It does please me,” said Catulus.

’Iam, iam,’ inquit Catulus ’intellego, Crasse, quid dicas; et hercule adsentior; satis video tibi homini ad perdiscendum acerrimo ad ea cognoscenda, quae dicis, fuisse temporis.’ ’Pergisne’ inquit Crassus ’me, quae dicam, de me, non de re putare dicere? Sed iam, si placet, ad instituta redeamus.’ ’Mihi vero’ Catulus inquit ’placet.’

Then Crassus: “Whither, then, does this so long and so deeply drawn-out discourse look? These two parts which remain to me, of illustrating the speech and of crowning the whole eloquence — of which one demands ornate speaking, the other apt — have this force: that the speech be as pleasing as possible, that it flow into the senses of those who hear as much as possible, and that it be furnished with as many things as possible.

Tum Crassus ’quorsum igitur haec spectat’ inquit ’tam longa et tam alte repetita oratio? Hae duae partes, quae mihi supersunt, inlustrandae orationis ac totius eloquentiae cumulandae, quarum altera dici postulat ornate, altera apte, hanc habent vim, ut sit quam maxime iucunda, quam maxime in sensus eorum, qui audiunt, influat et quam plurimis sit rebus instructa;

But this forensic equipment, litigious, keen, drawn from the opinions of the common people, is small and quite mendicant. That itself, again, which those hand down who profess themselves teachers of speaking, is not much greater than that vulgar and forensic stock. We need furnishing and exquisite matters gathered, sought, and brought together from every side — as it is for you to do, Caesar, next year; as I laboured in my aedileship, because I did not think I could satisfy this people with everyday and homespun matters.

instrumentum autem hoc forense, litigiosum, acre, tractum ex vulgi opinionibus exiguum saneque mendicum est; illud rursus ipsum, quod tradunt isti, qui profitentur se dicendi magistros, non multum est maius quam illud vulgare ac forense: apparatu nobis opus est et rebus exquisitis, undique conlectis, arcessitis, comportatis, ut tibi, Caesar, faciendum est ad annum; ut ego in aedilitate laboravi, quod cotidianis et vernaculis rebus satis facere me posse huic populo non putabam.

The rationale of choosing and arranging and concluding words, or even — without rationale — practice itself, is easy. Of matters there is a great wood. Since the Greeks no longer hold this, and on that account our youth nearly unlearns by learning, even Latins (so it pleases the gods) in this two-year stretch have arisen as teachers of speaking. Whom I, as censor, removed by my edict — not because, as some, I am told, said, I should not wish the talents of the youth to be sharpened, but on the contrary, I should not wish their talents to be dulled, their shamelessness strengthened.

Verborum eligendorum et conlocandorum et concludendorum facilis est vel ratio vel sine ratione ipsa exercitatio; rerum est silva magna, quam cum Graeci iam non tenerent ob eamque causam iuventus nostra dedisceret paene discendo, etiam Latini, si dis placet, hoc biennio magistri dicendi exstiterunt; quos ego censor edicto meo sustuleram, non quo, ut nescio quos dicere aiebant, acui ingenia adulescentium nollem, sed contra ingenia obtundi nolui, conroborari impudentiam.

For I saw that, among the Greeks, of whatever kind they were, there was, beyond this exercise of the tongue, some kind of doctrine and science worthy of culture; but these new masters I understood could teach nothing save daring; which, even when joined with good things, is by itself greatly to be fled. Since this alone was being handed down, and since it was a school of impudence, I thought it was the censor’s part to look out lest it should creep further.

Nam apud Graecos, cuicuimodi essent, videbam tamen esse praeter hanc exercitationem linguae doctrinam aliquam et humanitate dignam scientiam, hos vero novos magistros nihil intellegebam posse docere, nisi ut auderent; quod etiam cum bonis rebus coniunctum per se ipsum est magno opere fugiendum: hoc cum unum traderetur et cum impudentiae ludus esset, putavi esse censoris, ne longius id serperet, providere.

Although I do not so lay down and decree these things as if I were despairing that those things on which we have argued can be handed down and polished in Latin. For both our tongue and the nature of things suffers that the ancient and outstanding prudence of the Greeks be transferred to our use and custom. But there is need of learned men, of whom thus far in our country there have been none in this kind. But if any shall ever stand forth, they will be set even before the Greeks.

Quamquam non haec ita statuo atque decerno, ut desperem Latine ea, de quibus disputavimus, tradi ac perpoliri posse, patitur enim et lingua nostra et natura rerum veterem illam excellentemque prudentiam Graecorum ad nostrum usum moremque transferri, sed hominibus opus est eruditis, qui adhuc in hoc quidem genere nostri nulli fuerunt; sin quando exstiterint, etiam Graecis erunt anteponendi.

Speech then is adorned first by kind and as it were by a certain colour and sap of its own. For that it be weighty, that it be pleasing, that it be learned, that it be liberal, that it be admirable, that it be polished, that it have feeling, that it have grief as much as is needed — that does not lie in single joints. These things are seen in the whole body. Then, that it be sprinkled, as it were, with flowers of words and thoughts — that ought not to be diffused evenly through the whole speech, but so distinguished that there should be, as in ornament, certain marks set out and lights.

Ornatur igitur oratio genere primum et quasi colore quodam et suco suo; nam ut gravis, ut suavis, ut erudita sit, ut liberalis, ut admirabilis, ut polita, ut sensus, ut doloris habeat quantum opus sit, non est singulorum articulorum; in toto spectantur haec corpore. Ut porro conspersa sit quasi verborum sententiarumque floribus, id non debet esse fusum aequabiliter per omnem orationem, sed ita distinctum, ut sint quasi in ornatu disposita quaedam insignia et lumina.

A kind of speaking, then, must be chosen which most holds those who hear, and which not only delights but delights without satiety. For I do not think it is now expected from me to warn that you should beware lest your speech be meagre, lest unkempt, lest vulgar, lest obsolete. Something else greater both your talents and your ages exhort me to.

Genus igitur dicendi est eligendum, quod maxime teneat eos, qui audiant, et quod non solum delectet, sed etiam sine satietate delectet; non enim a me iam exspectari puto, ut moneam, ut caveatis, ne exilis, ne inculta sit vestra oratio, ne vulgaris, ne obsoleta; aliud quiddam maius et ingenia me hortantur vestra et aetates.

For it is hard to say what cause there is why those things which most strike our senses with pleasure and most keenly stir us at first sight, we are most quickly turned away from in a kind of disgust and satiety. How much more flowery in beauty and variety of colours are most paintings new than old? Which yet, even if they have at first sight caught us, do not delight us long; whereas we are held by those very rude and obsolete features in old paintings. How much softer and more dainty in song are the inflexions and the false little notes than the fixed and severe? At which not only the austere, but, if they happen too often, the multitude itself cries out.

Difficile enim dictu est, quaenam causa sit, cur ea, quae maxime sensus nostros impellunt voluptate et specie prima acerrime commovent, ab eis celerrime fastidio quodam et satietate abalienemur. Quanto colorum pulcritudine et varietate floridiora sunt in picturis novis pleraque quam in veteribus! Quae tamen, etiam si primo aspectu nos ceperunt, diutius non delectant; cum eidem nos in antiquis tabulis illo ipso horrido obsoletoque teneamur. Quanto molliores sunt et delicatiores in cantu flexiones et falsae voculae quam certae et severae! Quibus tamen non modo austeri, sed, si saepius fiunt, multitudo ipsa reclamat.

It is to be seen in the rest of the senses: that we are less long delighted by perfumes seasoned with the highest and keenest sweetness than by these moderate ones; and what seems to smell of earth is more praised than what seems to smell of saffron. In touch itself there is a measure both of softness and of smoothness. Even taste, which is the most pleasure-loving of all the senses, and which is moved by sweetness above the other senses, how quickly does it scorn and reject what is very sweet! Who can drink or eat what is sweet for long? — when in each kind those things which lightly move the sense with pleasure most easily flee satiety.

Licet hoc videre in reliquis sensibus, unguentis minus diu nos delectari summa et acerrima suavitate conditis quam his moderatis, et magis laudari quod terram quam quod crocum olere videatur; in ipso tactu esse modum et mollitudinis et levitatis. Quin etiam gustatus, qui est sensus ex omnibus maxime voluptarius quique dulcitudine praeter ceteros sensus commovetur, quam cito id, quod valde dulce est, aspernatur ac respuit! Quis potione uti aut cibo dulci diutius potest? cum utroque in genere ea, quae leviter sensum voluptate moveant, facillime fugiant satietatem.

So in all things disgust is the neighbour of the greatest pleasures. Wherefore we should the less wonder at this in speech, in which we can judge from poets or from orators that whatever poetry or speech be neat, distinguished, ornate, festive, without intermission, without reproach, without variety, even painted with bright colours, cannot be lasting in delight. And we are the more quickly offended by the orator’s or the poet’s curls and rouge, because the senses by nature, not by mind, are sated in too much pleasure. In writings and in sayings the painted faults are known not only by the ears but, even more, by the judgment of the soul.

Sic omnibus in rebus voluptatibus maximis fastidium finitimum est; quo hoc minus in oratione miremur in qua vel ex poetis vel oratoribus possumus iudicare concinnam, distinctam, ornatam, festivam, sine intermissione, sine reprehensione, sine varietate, quamvis claris sit coloribus picta vel poesis vel oratio, non posse in delectatione esse diuturna. Atque eo citius in oratoris aut in poetae cincinnis ac fuco offenditur, quod sensus in nimia voluptate natura, non mente satiantur; in scriptis et in dictis non aurium solum, sed animi iudicio etiam magis infucata vitia noscuntur.

Therefore though to us “well and brilliantly” be often said, “prettily and gaily” I will not have too often said. Although that very exclamation, “It cannot be better,” I would have frequent. But yet let that admiration and highest praise in speaking have some shadow and recess, that what is illumined may seem more to stand out and shine.

Qua re "bene et praeclare" quamvis nobis saepe dicatur; "belle et festive" nimium saepe nolo; quamquam illa ipsa exclamatio "non potest melius" sit velim crebra; sed habeat tamen illa in dicendo admiratio ac summa laus umbram aliquam et recessum, quo magis id, quod erit inluminatum, exstare atque eminere videatur.

Roscius never plays this verse with the gesture he can: “For the wise man seeks honour as the reward of virtue, not booty.” But he throws it off entirely, that in the next: “But what do I see? Hedged with steel, he holds the sacred seats” — he may push, may look, may admire, may stupefy. What of that other: “What guard shall I seek?” — how gently, how slackly, how unanimatedly! For there presses next: “O father, O country, O house of Priam!” — at which a delivery so great could not be moved, if it had been used up by the previous motion and exhausted. Nor did the actors see this before the poets themselves, and finally those too who composed the music; from each of which something is lowered, then increased, thinned, swelled, varied, distinguished.

Numquam agit hunc versum Roscius eo gestu, quo potest: nam sapiens virtuti honorem praemium, haud praedam petit: sed abicit prorsus, ut in proximo: set quid video? Ferro saeptus possidet sedis sacras, incidat, aspiciat, admiretur, stupescat. Quid, ille alter quid petam praesidi? quam leniter, quam remisse, quam non actuose! instat enim o pater, o patria, o Priami domus! in quo tanta commoveri actio non posset, si esset consumpta superiore motu et exhausta. Neque id actores prius viderunt quam ipsi poetae, quam denique illi etiam, qui fecerunt modos, a quibus utrisque summittitur aliquid, deinde augetur, extenuatur, inflatur, variatur, distinguitur.

So let our orator be ornate and pleasing — nor indeed can he be otherwise — but in such a way that he has a sweetness austere and solid, not sweet and over-cooked. For the precepts that are given for ornament are of such a kind that anyone, even the most faulty orator, can set them out. Therefore, as I said before, first the wood of matters and thoughts must be gathered, of which Antonius spoke. These must be shaped by the very thread and kind of speech, illustrated by words, varied by thoughts.

Ita sit nobis igitur ornatus et suavis orator—nec tamen potest aliter esse—ut suavitatem habeat austeram et solidam, non dulcem atque decoctam. Nam ipsa ad ornandum praecepta, quae dantur, eius modi sunt, ut ea quivis vel vitiosissimus orator explicare possit; qua re, ut ante dixi, primum silva rerum ac sententiarum comparanda est, qua de parte dixit Antonius; haec formanda filo ipso et genere orationis, inluminanda verbis, varianda sententiis.

The highest praise of eloquence is to amplify a matter by ornament, which avails not only for raising something and lifting it up higher by speech, but also for thinning and casting it down. This is required in all those topics which Antonius said are applied for producing the credit of speech, either when we explain anything, or when we conciliate minds, or when we rouse them.

Summa autem laus eloquentiae est amplificare rem ornando, quod valet non solum ad augendum aliquid et tollendum altius dicendo, sed etiam ad extenuandum atque abiciendum. Id desideratur omnibus eis in locis, quos ad fidem orationis faciendam adhiberi dixit Antonius, vel cum explanamus aliquid vel cum conciliamus animos vel cum concitamus,

But in this last thing I have spoken of, amplification can do the most, and that is the one praise of the orator, and especially proper. Even greater is that exercise which Antonius placed in the closing speech and at first rejected — of praising and blaming. For nothing is more apt for exaggerating and amplifying speech than to be able to do each of these in the fullest way.

sed in hoc, quod postremum dixi, amplificatio potest plurimum, eaque una laus oratoris est et propria maxime. Etiam maior est illa exercitatio quam extremo sermone instruxit Antonius, primo reiciebat, laudandi et vituperandi; nihil est enim ad exaggerandam et amplificandam orationem accommodatius, quam utrumque horum cumulatissime facere posse.

There follow also those topics which, although they ought to be proper to cases and clinging in their sinews, yet, because they are wont to be handled about the universal matter, were called by the ancients common — of which some have a kind of keen accusation or complaint of vices and faults with amplification, against which nothing is wont to be said and nothing can be: as against an embezzler, against a traitor, against a parricide. These should be used when the charges have been confirmed; otherwise they are dry and empty;

Consequentur etiam illi loci, qui quamquam proprii causarum et inhaerentes in earum nervis esse debent, tamen quia de universa re tractari solent, communes a veteribus nominati sunt; quorum partim habent vitiorum et peccatorum acrem quandam cum amplificatione incusationem aut querelam, contra quam dici nihil solet nec potest, ut in depeculatorem, in proditorem, in parricidam; quibus uti confirmatis criminibus oportet, aliter enim ieiuni sunt atque inanes;

others have entreaty or pity; others, indeed, two-sided disputations, in which copiously on both sides the universal kind may be argued. This exercise, now thought to be proper to those two philosophies of which I spoke before, was among the ancients of those from whom the whole rationale and abundance of speaking on forensic matters was sought. For of virtue, of duty, of right and good, of dignity, utility, honour, disgrace, reward, punishment, and like matters, we ought to have both force and art for speaking on each side.

alii autem habent deprecationem aut miserationem; alii vero ancipitis disputationes, in quibus de universo genere in utramque partem disseri copiose licet. Quae exercitatio nunc propria duarum philosophiarum, de quibus ante dixi, putatur, apud antiquos erat eorum, a quibus omnis de rebus forensibus dicendi ratio et copia petebatur; de virtute enim, de officio, de aequo et bono, de dignitate, utilitate, honore, ignominia, praemio, poena similibusque de rebus in utramque partem dicendi etiam nos et vim et artem habere debemus.

But since we have been driven from our possession and left in a small and litigious little farm, and we, advocates of others, could not hold and protect our own, from those who have broken into our patrimony — what is most unworthy — let us borrow what we need.

Sed quoniam de nostra possessione depulsi in parvo et eo litigioso praediolo relicti sumus et aliorum patroni nostra tenere tuerique non potuimus, ab eis, quod indignissimum est, qui in nostrum patrimonium inruperunt, quod opus est nobis mutuemur.

Those, then, who now indeed take their name from a small portion of the city and place — and are called Peripatetic or Academic philosophers — but in old time, by reason of their outstanding knowledge of the greatest things, were called by the Greeks “political” philosophers, by the name of the universal commonwealth — say that all civic speech moves in one of two kinds of these: either of a definite controversy in fixed times and parties (in this way: “Should our captives be received back from the Carthaginians by returning theirs?”); or, of one who asks generally about the universal kind: “What altogether ought to be decreed and felt about a captive?” The earlier of these two kinds they call cause or controversy; and they define it by three: suit, deliberation, or laudation. The other, however, is called an unbounded question and as it were a consultation put forward.

Dicunt igitur nunc quidem illi, qui ex particula parva urbis ac loci nomen habent et Peripatetici philosophi aut Academici nominantur, olim autem propter eximiam rerum maximarum scientiam a Graecis politici philosophi appellati universarum rerum publicarum nomine vocabantur, omnem civilem orationem in horum alterutro genere versari: aut de finita controversia certis temporibus ac reis; hoc modo: placeatne a Karthaginiensibus captivos nostros redditis suis recuperari? aut infinite de universo genere quaerentis: quid omnino de captivo statuendum ac sentiendum sit? Atque horum superius illud genus causam aut controversiam appellant eamque tribus, lite aut deliberatione aut laudatione, definiunt; haec autem altera quaestio infinita et quasi proposita consultatio nominatur.

And they so far speak, and use this division too in setting things up. But in such a way that they recover their lost possession not by right or by judgment, but, finally, by force; and that, not by civil law, but by breaking off a twig of the property, they seem to take possession by usage. For that other kind, which is defined by times, places, parties, they hold; and that itself only by a fringe — for now with Philo, who I hear is most flourishing in the Academy, the inquiry into and exercise of these very cases is being celebrated. The other only they name in the first handing-down of the art and say it is the orator’s. But neither do they set out the force or the nature of it, nor its parts, nor its kinds; so that it had been better passed by altogether than to have been touched and abandoned. For now they are understood to be silent through poverty; then they would have seemed silent through judgment.

Atque hactenus loquantur etiam hac in instituendo divisione utuntur, sed ita, non ut iure aut iudicio, vi denique recuperare amissam possessionem, sed ut iure civili surculo defringendo usurpare videantur. Nam illud alterum genus, quod est temporibus, locis, reis definitum, obtinent, atque id ipsum lacinia—nunc enim apud Philonem, quem in Academia maxime vigere audio, etiam harum iam causarum cognitio exercitatioque celebratur—alterum vero tantum modo in prima arte tradenda nominant et oratoris esse dicunt; sed neque vim neque naturam eius nec partis nec genera proponunt, ut praeteriri omnino fuerit satius quam attactum deseri; nunc enim inopia reticere intelleguntur, tum iudicio viderentur.

Every matter, therefore, has the same nature of being doubted, on which question and dispute can be made — whether it be argued in unbounded consultations, or in those cases which move in the state and forensic dispute. Nor is there any which is not referred to either the force and rationale of knowing or of doing.

Omnis igitur res eandem habet naturam ambigendi, de qua quaeri et disceptari potest, sive in infinitis consultationibus disceptatur sive in eis causis, quae in civitate et forensi disceptatione versantur; neque est ulla, quae non aut ad cognoscendi aut ad agendi vim rationemque referatur;

For either the very knowledge and science of a thing is sought, as “Is virtue to be desired for its own dignity, or for some fruit?” Or the counsel of doing is asked, as “Should the wise man take part in the commonwealth?”

nam aut ipsa cognitio rei scientiaque perquiritur, ut virtus suamne propter dignitatem an propter fructum aliquem expetatur; aut agendi consilium exquiritur, ut sitne sapienti capessenda res publica.

There are three modes of knowing: conjecture, definition, and (so to say) consequence. For what is in a thing is asked by conjecture, as “Is there wisdom in the human race?” What force each thing has, definition sets out, as if it be asked, “What is wisdom?” Consequence is handled when it is asked what follows from each thing, as “Is it sometimes the part of a good man to lie?”

Cognitionis autem tres modi, coniectura, definitio et, ut ita dicam, consecutio: nam quid in re sit, coniectura quaeritur, ut illud, sitne in humano genere sapientia, quam autem vim quaeque res habeat, definitio explicat, ut si quaeratur, quid sit sapientia; consecutio autem tractatur, cum quid quamque rem sequatur, anquiritur, ut illud, sitne aliquando mentiri boni viri.

They come back again to conjecture and divide it into four kinds. For either it is asked what something is, in this way: “Is right by nature among men, or in opinions?” Or what is the origin of each thing, as “What is the beginning of laws or of commonwealths?” Or the cause and reason, as if it should be asked, “Why do most learned men disagree on the greatest matters?” Or about a change, as if it should be argued, “Whether virtue can perish in a man, or be turned to vice.”

Redeunt rursus ad coniecturam eamque in quattuor genera dispertiunt; nam aut quid sit quaeritur, hoc modo: naturane sit ius inter homines an in opinionibus; aut, quae sit origo cuiusque rei, ut quod sit initium legum aut rerum publicarum; aut causa et ratio, ut si quaeratur, cur doctissimi homines de maximis rebus dissentiant; aut de immutatione, ut, si disputetur, num interire virtus in homine aut num in vitium possit convertere.

The disputes of definition are either when it is asked what is impressed, as it were, in the common mind, as if it should be argued: “Is that the right which is useful to the greatest part?” Or when it is asked what is each thing’s own, as: “Is to speak ornately the orator’s own, or can someone besides do it?” Or when the matter is distributed into parts, as if it should be asked, “How many kinds are there of things to be sought? Are there three: of the body, of the soul, of external things?” Or when the form and as it were the natural mark of each thing is described, as if there be sought the kinds of the avaricious, the seditious, the boastful.

Definitionis autem sunt disceptationes aut, cum quaeritur, quid in communi mente quasi impressum sit, ut si disseratur, idne sit ius, quod maximae parti sit utile; aut, cum quid cuiusque sit proprium exquiritur, ut ornate dicere propriumne sit oratoris an id etiam aliquis praeterea facere possit, aut, cum res distribuitur in partis, ut si quaeratur, quot sint genera rerum expetendarum, ut sintne tria, corporis, animi externarumque rerum, aut, cum, quae forma et quasi naturalis nota cuiusque sit, describitur, ut si quaeratur avari species, seditiosi, gloriosi.

Two first kinds of questions of consequence are laid down. For either the dispute is simple, as if it be argued whether glory is to be sought; or from comparison, “Is praise or wealth more to be sought?” Of the simple, there are three modes: about things to be sought or fled, as “Are honours to be sought, or poverty to be fled?”; about the just or unjust, as “Is it just to revenge wrongs even against kinsfolk?”; about the honourable or base, as: “Is it honourable to die for glory?”

Consecutionis autem duo prima quaestionum genera ponuntur; nam aut simplex est disceptatio, ut si disseratur, expetendane sit gloria, aut ex comparatione, laus an divitiae magis expetendae sint; simplicium autem sunt tres modi: de expetendis fugiendisve rebus, ut expetendine honores sint, num fugienda paupertas; de aequo aut iniquo, ut aequumne sit ulcisci iniurias etiam propinquorum; de honesto aut turpi, ut hoc, sitne honestum gloriae causa mortem obire.

Of comparison there are two modes. One when it is asked whether something is the same or has some difference: as to fear and to revere, as a king and a tyrant, as a flatterer and a friend. The other when it is asked what is preferable to what, as: “Are wise men led by the praise of each best man, or by popular praise?” These disputes which are referred to knowledge are about thus described by the most learned men.

Comparationis autem duo sunt modi: unus, cum idemne sit an aliquid intersit quaeritur; ut metuere et vereri, ut rex et tyrannus, ut adsentator et amicus; alter, cum quid praestet aliud alii quaeritur, ut illud, optimine cuiusque sapientes an populari laude ducantur. Atque eae quidem disceptationes, quae ad cognitionem referuntur, sic fere a doctissimis hominibus describuntur.

Those, however, which are referred to action, either move in the dispute of duty (in which kind it is asked what is right and to be done, under which topic the whole wood of virtues and vices is set); or are handled in some movement of soul to be either produced or calmed or removed. To this kind are subjected exhortations, rebukes, consolations, pity, and every impulsion to every motion of soul, and, if the case so bear, mitigation.

Quae vero referuntur ad agendum, aut in offici disceptatione versantur, quo in genere quid rectum faciendumque sit quaeritur, cui loco omnis virtutum et vitiorum est silva subiecta, aut in animorum aliqua permotione aut gignenda aut sedanda tollendave tractantur. Huic generi subiectae sunt cohortationes, obiurgationes, consolationes, miserationes omnisque ad omnem animi motum et impulsio et, si ita res feret, mitigatio.

These kinds and modes of all disputes being set out, it is nothing to the purpose if in any matter our partition has differed from Antonius’s division: the same members are in each one’s discussion, but parted and assigned a little differently by me and by him. Now I shall move on to the rest, and call myself back to my own task and weight. For from those topics which Antonius set out, all arguments are to be taken for each kind of question. But to one kind one topic will be more apt than another. About which it is unnecessary to say anything, not so much because it is long as because it is plain.

Explicatis igitur his generibus ac modis disceptationum omnium nihil sane ad rem pertinet, si qua in re discrepavit ab Antoni divisione nostra partitio: eadem sunt membra in utriusque disputatione, sed paulo secus a me atque ab illo partita ac tributa. Nunc ad reliqua progrediar meque ad meum munus pensumque revocabo. Nam ex illis locis, quos exposuit Antonius, omnia sunt ad quaeque genera quaestionum argumenta sumenda; sed aliis generibus alii loci magis erunt apti; de quo non tam quia longum est quam quia perspicuum est, dici nihil est necesse.

The most ornate, then, are those speeches which range most widely and bring and turn themselves from a private and singular controversy to setting out the force of the universal kind, so that those who hear, with the nature, kind, and universal matter known, may decide about the single parties, charges, and suits.

Ornatissimae sunt igitur orationes eae, quae latissime vagantur et a privata et a singulari controversia se ad universi generis vim explicandam conferunt et convertunt, ut ei, qui audiant, natura et genere et universa re cognita de singulis reis et criminibus et litibus statuere possint.

Antonius has exhorted you, young men, to this practice of exercise, and thought that you should be drawn from minute and narrow contests to the whole force and variety of arguing. Therefore this duty is not of a few little books, as those think who have written about the rationale of speaking; nor of the Tusculan villa or this morning walk or our after-noon sitting. For not only must our tongue be sharpened and forged, but the breast must be loaded and filled with the sweetness, abundance, and variety of the greatest and most numerous matters.

Hanc ad consuetudinem exercitationis vos, adulescentes, est cohortatus Antonius atque a minutis angustisque concertationibus ad omnem vim varietatemque vos disserendi traducendos putavit; qua re non est paucorum libellorum hoc munus, ut ei, qui scripserunt de dicendi ratione, arbitrantur, neque Tusculani atque huius ambulationis antemeridianae aut nostrae posmeridianae sessionis; non enim solum acuenda nobis neque procudenda lingua est, sed onerandum complendumque pectus maximarum rerum et plurimarum suavitate, copia, varietate.

For ours — if indeed we are orators, if in the disputes of citizens, if in dangers, if in public deliberations we are to be applied as authors and chiefs — ours, I say, is all that possession of prudence and learning, into which men, abounding in leisure while we are busy, have leapt as upon something fallen and empty; and either, mocking the orator (as Socrates does in the Gorgias), they bandy words; or they teach in a few books some of the orator’s art and entitle them rhetorical, as if those things were not the rhetoricians’ own which are said by them on justice, on duty, on instituting and governing states, on every rationale of living, and indeed of nature.

Nostra est enim—si modo nos oratores, si in civium disceptationibus, si in periculis, si in deliberationibus publicis adhibendi auctores et principes sumus—nostra est, inquam, omnis ista prudentiae doctrinaeque possessio, in quam homines quasi caducam atque vacuam abundantes otio, nobis occupatis, involaverunt atque etiam aut inridentes oratorem, ut ille in Gorgia Socrates, cavillantur aut aliquid de oratoris arte paucis praecipiunt libellis eosque rhetoricos inscribunt, quasi non illa sint propria rhetorum, quae ab eisdem de iustitia, de officio, de civitatibus instituendis et regendis, de omni vivendi denique etiam de naturae ratione dicuntur.

Which since we cannot now from elsewhere — they must be taken by us from those very men by whom we have been despoiled. Provided we transfer those things to this civil science to which they pertain and at which they look; and provided, as I said before, we do not waste our whole life in learning these matters. But when we have seen the springs (which, unless one quickly come to know, he will never come to know at all), then, as often as need shall be, from them we shall draw as much as the matter shall require.

Quae quoniam iam aliunde non possumus, sumenda sunt nobis ab eis ipsis, a quibus expilati sumus; dum modo illa ad hanc civilem scientiam, quo pertinent et quam intuentur, transferamus, neque, ut ante dixi, omnem teramus in his discendis rebus aetatem; sed cum fontis viderimus, quos nisi qui celeriter cognorit, numquam cognoscet omnino, tum, quotienscumque opus erit, ex eis tantum, quantum res petet, hauriemus;

For there is not so keen an edge in the natures and talents of men that anyone could see such great matters unless they have been pointed out; nor yet is there so great obscurity in matters that a man of keen talent cannot deeply discern them, if only he has looked. In this so vast, so unbounded a field, when the orator may freely range, and wherever he has stood, stand on his own ground, all the equipment and ornament of speaking easily abounds.

nam neque tam est acris acies in naturis hominum et ingeniis, ut res tantas quisquam nisi monstratas possit videre, neque tanta tamen in rebus obscuritas, ut eas non penitus acri vir ingenio cernat, si modo aspexerit. In hoc igitur tanto tam immensoque campo cum liceat oratori vagari libere atque ubicumque constiterit, consistere in suo, facile suppeditat omnis apparatus ornatusque dicendi;

For the abundance of matters begets the abundance of words; and if there is honour in the very things spoken about, there arises out of the matter a kind of natural splendour in words. Let only him who shall speak or write be liberally trained by his early education and learning, and burn with zeal and be helped by nature, and be exercised in unbounded disputations of universal kinds, and have chosen the most ornate writers and orators for knowing and imitating — he will surely not need those teachers to know how to construct and illumine words. So easily, in the abundance of matters, does nature itself, if only it has been exercised, slip without a guide to the ornaments of speech.”

rerum enim copia verborum copiam gignit; et, si est honestas in rebus ipsis, de quibus dicitur, exsistit ex re naturalis quidam splendor in verbis. Sit modo is, qui dicet aut scribet, institutus liberaliter educatione doctrinaque puerili et flagret studio et a natura adiuvetur et in universorum generum infinitis disceptationibus exercitatus ornatissimos scriptores oratoresque ad cognoscendum imitandumque delegerit, ne ille haud sane, quem ad modum verba struat et inluminet, a magistris istis requiret; ita facile in rerum abundantia ad orationis ornamenta sine duce natura ipsa, si modo est exercitata, delabitur.’

Here Catulus: “Immortal gods,” he said, “Crassus, what variety of matters, what force, what abundance you have grasped, and out of what straits have you dared to lead the orator and to set him in the kingdom of his ancestors! For we have heard that those ancient teachers and authors of speaking thought no kind of disputation alien from themselves, and were always engaged in every rationale of speech.

Hic Catulus ’di immortales,’ inquit ’quantam rerum varietatem, quantam vim, quantam copiam, Crasse, complexus es quantisque ex angustiis oratorem educere ausus es et in maiorum suorum regno conlocare! Namque illos veteres doctores auctoresque dicendi nullum genus disputationis a se alienum putasse accepimus semperque esse in omni orationis ratione versatos;

Of whom Hippias of Elis, when he had come to Olympia at that great five-yearly celebration of the games, boasted, almost with all Greece listening, that there was nothing in any art of all things that he himself did not know — and that not only did he hold those arts which contain the liberal and free-born doctrines, geometry, music, the knowledge of letters and poets, and what is said of the natures of things, of the morals of men, of commonwealths — but also that he had made by his own hand the ring he had on, the cloak he was clothed with, the slippers he had put on.

ex quibus Elius Hippias, cum Olympiam venisset maxima illa quinquennali celebritate ludorum, gloriatus est cuncta paene audiente Graecia nihil esse ulla in arte rerum omnium quod ipse nesciret; nec solum has artis, quibus liberales doctrinae atque ingenuae continerentur, geometriam, musicam, litterarum cognitionem et poetarum atque illa, quae de naturis rerum, quae de hominum moribus, quae de rebus publicis dicerentur, se tenere sed anulum, quem haberet, pallium, quo amictus, soccos, quibus indutus esset, se sua manu confecisse.

Of course this man went too far. But from him is easy conjecture how much those orators sought for themselves of the most distinguished arts — when they did not even shrink from baser ones. What shall I say of Prodicus of Ceos, Thrasymachus of Chalcedon, Protagoras of Abdera? Of whom each one, as much as in those times was possible, both argued and wrote about the nature of things.

Scilicet nimis hic quidem est progressus, sed ex eo ipso est coniectura facilis, quantum sibi illi oratores de praeclarissimis artibus appetierint, qui ne sordidiores quidem repudiarint. Quid de Prodico Cio, de Thrasymacho Calchedonio, de Protagora Abderita loquar? quorum unus quisque plurimum ut temporibus illis etiam de natura rerum et disseruit et scripsit.

That very Gorgias of Leontini, with whom as patron, as Plato wished, the orator yielded to the philosopher — who either was never overcome by Socrates and that conversation of Plato is not true, or, if he was overcome, then surely Socrates was more eloquent and skilled and (as you call him) more copious and a better orator. But this man, in that very book of Plato, professes that he will speak most copiously of every matter, whatever may be called into dispute and question. He first of all dared, in the assembly, to demand on what each wished to hear; to whom such honour was given by Greece, that for him alone of all there was set up at Delphi a statue not gilded but golden.

Ipse ille Leontinus Gorgias, quo patrono, ut Plato voluit, philosopho succubuit orator, qui aut non est victus umquam a Socrate neque sermo ille Platonis verus est; aut, si est victus, eloquentior videlicet fuit et disertior Socrates et, ut tu appellas, copiosior et melior orator—sed hic in illo ipso Platonis libro de omni re, quaecumque in disceptationem quaestionemque vocetur, se copiosissime dicturum esse profitetur; isque princeps ex omnibus ausus est in conventu poscere qua de re quisque vellet audire; cui tantus honos habitus est a Graecia, soli ut ex omnibus Delphis non inaurata statua, sed aurea statueretur.

But these whom I have named, and very many besides, the highest teachers of speaking, were at one time. From whom it can be understood that the matter is, as you say, Crassus: that the name of orator among the ancients in Greece flourished with somewhat greater abundance and glory.

Sed hi, quos nominavi, multique praeterea summique dicendi doctores uno tempore fuerunt; ex quibus intellegi potest ita se rem habere, ut tu, Crasse, dicis, oratorisque nomen apud antiquos in Graecia maiore quadam vel copia vel gloria floruisse.

Wherefore I doubt the more whether more praise should be assigned to you or more blame to the Greeks: that you, born in another tongue and other customs, in a most busy state, distracted either by the affairs of nearly all private men or by the management of the world and the steerage of the highest empire, have grasped so great a force and knowledge of matters, and have joined all of it with the science and exercise of him who avails by counsel and speech in the state — while they, born in letters and burning with these studies, but flowing in leisure, not only have acquired nothing, but have not even kept what was left and handed down and their own.”

Quo quidem magis dubito tibine plus laudis an Graecis vituperationis statuam esse tribuendum: cum tu in alia lingua ac moribus natus occupatissima in civitate vel privatorum negotiis paene omnibus vel orbis terrae procuratione ac summi imperi gubernatione destrictus tantam vim rerum cognitionemque comprehenderis eamque omnem cum eius, qui consilio et oratione in civitate valeat, scientia atque exercitatione sociaris; illi nati in litteris ardentesque his studiis, otio vero diffluentes, non modo nihil acquisierint, sed ne relictum quidem et traditum et suum conservarint.’

Then Crassus: “Not in this matter alone, Catulus,” he said, “but in many others too, the magnitudes of the arts have been diminished by the distribution and separation of parts. Or do you suppose that, when that famous Hippocrates of Cos lived, there were then other doctors who healed diseases, others who healed wounds, others who healed eyes? Surely with Euclid or Archimedes, surely with Damon or Aristoxenus in music, surely with Aristophanes or Callimachus in letters, those things were not so torn apart that no one embraced the universal kind, and that one set apart for himself one part, another another, in which to labour?

Tum Crassus ’non in hac’ inquit ’una, Catule, re, sed in aliis etiam compluribus distributione partium ac separatione magnitudines sunt artium deminutae. An tu existimas, cum esset Hippocrates ille Cous, fuisse tum alios medicos, qui morbis, alios, qui vulneribus, alios, qui oculis mederentur? Num geometriam Euclide aut Archimede, num musicam Damone aut Aristoxeno, num ipsas litteras Aristophane aut Callimacho tractante tam discerptas fuisse, ut nemo genus universum complecteretur atque ut alius aliam sibi partem in qua elaboraret seponeret?

For my part, I have often heard this from my father and my father-in-law: that our men also, who wished to excel in glory of wisdom, were wont to embrace everything which our state then knew. They remembered Sextus Aelius; M.’ Manilius indeed we ourselves have seen walking across the Forum — which was a sign that he who did this offered to all his fellow-citizens the abundance of his counsel. To these, both as they walked and as they sat at home in their high seat, men used to come — not only that they might consult them about the civil law, but also about giving a daughter in marriage, about buying a farm, about cultivating a field, about every duty or business.

Equidem saepe hoc audivi de patre et de socero meo, nostros quoque homines, qui excellere sapientiae gloria vellent, omnia, quae quidem tum haec civitas nosset, solitos esse complecti. Meminerant illi Sex. Aelium; M’. vero Manilium nos etiam vidimus transverso ambulantem foro; quod erat insigne eum, qui id faceret, facere civibus suis omnibus consili sui copiam; ad quos olim et ita ambulantis et in solio sedentis domi sic adibatur, non solum ut de iure civili ad eos, verum etiam de filia conlocanda, de fundo emendo, de agro colendo, de omni denique aut officio aut negotio referretur.

This was the wisdom of that old P. Crassus, of Tiberius Coruncanius, of my son-in-law’s great-grandfather Scipio (a most prudent man) — all of whom were Pontifex Maximus, that things divine and human might be referred to them. The same gave their counsel and faith in the senate, before the people, in the cases of friends, at home and on military service.

Haec fuit P. Crassi illius veteris, haec Ti. Coruncani, haec proavi generi mei Scipionis prudentissimi hominis sapientia, qui omnes pontifices maximi fuerunt, ut ad eos de omnibus divinis atque humanis rebus referretur; eidemque in senatu et apud populum et in causis amicorum et domi et militiae consilium suum fidemque praestabant.

For what was lacking to M. Cato besides this most polished doctrine from across the sea? Did he, because he had learned the civil law, not plead cases? Or, because he could plead, did he neglect the science of law? In each kind he both laboured and excelled. Did he, because of the favour gathered from private men’s affairs, become slower in undertaking public affairs? No one was braver before the people, no one a better senator; the same easily the best general; in short, nothing in this state in those times could be known or learned that he did not both investigate and know — and even write.

Quid enim M. Catoni praeter hanc politissimam doctrinam transmarinam atque adventiciam defuit? Num, quia ius civile didicerat, causas non dicebat? aut quia poterat dicere, iuris scientiam neglegebat? Utroque in genere et elaboravit et praestitit. Num propter hanc ex privatorum negotiis conlectam gratiam tardior in re publica capessenda fuit? Nemo apud populum fortior, nemo melior senator; et idem facile optimus imperator; denique nihil in hac civitate temporibus illis sciri discive potuit, quod ille non cum investigarit et scierit tum etiam conscripserit.

Now, on the contrary, most come naked and unarmed to the gaining of offices and to the conduct of public affairs, equipped with no knowledge of things, with no science. But if anyone excels above the rest, he flaunts himself if he brings one thing — either martial virtue or some military experience (which now indeed have grown obsolete); or the science of law, but not even of all of it (for the pontifical law, which is joined to it, no one learns); or eloquence, which they think is set in shouting and in the rush of words. The fellowship and kinship of all the good arts, indeed of the very virtues, they do not know.

Nunc contra plerique ad honores adipiscendos et ad rem publicam gerendam nudi veniunt atque inermes, nulla cognitione rerum, nulla scientia ornati. Sin aliquis excellit unus e multis, effert se, si unum aliquid adfert, aut bellicam virtutem aut usum aliquem militarem; quae sane nunc quidem obsoleverunt; aut iuris scientiam, ne eius quidem universi; nam pontificium, quod est coniunctum, nemo discit; aut eloquentiam, quam in clamore et in verborum cursu positam putant; omnium vero bonarum artium, denique virtutum ipsarum societatem cognationemque non norunt.

But to bring the speech back to the Greeks, whom in this kind of conversation we cannot do without (for as examples of virtue must be sought from ours, so of doctrine from them) — there are said to have been seven, at one time, who were both held and called wise. All these except Thales of Miletus presided over their states. Who is reported more learned in those same times than Pisistratus, or whose eloquence more equipped with letters? — who is said first to have so arranged Homer’s books, before confused, as we now have them. He, indeed, was not useful to his fellow-citizens, but yet so flourished in eloquence that he excelled in letters and learning.

Sed ut ad Graecos referam orationem, quibus carere hoc quidem in sermonis genere non possumus —nam ut virtutis a nostris, sic doctrinae sunt ab illis exempla petenda—septem fuisse dicuntur uno tempore, qui sapientes et haberentur et vocarentur: hi omnes praeter Milesium Thalen civitatibus suis praefuerunt. Quis doctior eisdem temporibus illis aut cuius eloquentia litteris instructior fuisse traditur quam Pisistrati? qui primus Homeri libros confusos antea sic disposuisse dicitur, ut nunc habemus. Non fuit ille quidem civibus suis utilis, sed ita eloquentia floruit, ut litteris doctrinaque praestaret.

What of Pericles? About whose force of speaking we have heard this: that, when he spoke against the will of the Athenians somewhat sternly for the safety of his country, yet that very thing which he said against the popular men seemed popular to all and pleasant. On whose lips the old comic poets — even when they spoke ill of him (which was then permitted at Athens) — said that charm dwelt; and so great a force was in him that, in the minds of those who had heard him, he left as it were certain stings. But him no declaimer had taught to bark by the water-clock, but, as we have heard, that famous Anaxagoras of Clazomenae, the highest man in the science of the greatest matters. So this man, outstanding in learning, counsel, eloquence, presided over Athens for forty years, both in city and in war affairs.

Quid Pericles? de cuius vi dicendi sic accepimus, ut, cum contra voluntatem Atheniensium loqueretur pro salute patriae severius, tamen id ipsum, quod ille contra popularis homines diceret, populare omnibus et iucundum videretur; cuius in labris veteres comici, etiam cum illi male dicerent (quod tum Athenis fieri licebat), leporem habitasse dixerunt tantamque in eodem vim fuisse, ut in eorum mentibus, qui audissent, quasi aculeos quosdam relinqueret. At hunc non declamator aliqui ad clepsydram latrare docuerat, sed, ut accepimus, Clazomenius ille Anaxagoras vir summus in maximarum rerum scientia: itaque hic doctrina, consilio, eloquentia excellens quadraginta annis praefuit Athenis et urbanis eodem tempore et bellicis rebus.

What of Critias? what of Alcibiades? Not, indeed, good men for their states, but surely learned and eloquent — were they not trained in Socratic disputations? Who polished Dion of Syracuse with all doctrines? Was it not Plato? And the same man drove him on, equipped him, armed him, not only as master of his tongue, but of his soul and virtue, to free his country. With other arts, then, did Plato train this Dion, with others did Isocrates train that most distinguished man Timotheus, son of Conon the most outstanding general — himself the highest general and a most learned man? Or with others did that famous Pythagorean Lysis train the Theban Epaminondas, who I do not know whether he was the single highest man of all Greece? Or Xenophon Agesilaus? Or Philolaus Archytas of Tarentum? Or Pythagoras himself that whole old Greece of Italy, which once was called Magna?

Quid Critias? quid Alcibiades? civitatibus quidem suis non boni, sed certe docti atque eloquentes, nonne Socraticis erant disputationibus eruditi? Quis Dionem Syracosium doctrinis omnibus expolivit? Non Plato? Atque eum idem ille non linguae solum, verum etiam animi ac virtutis magister ad liberandam patriam impulit, instruxit, armavit. Aliisne igitur artibus hunc Dionem instituit Plato, aliis Isocrates clarissimum virum Timotheum Cononis praestantissimi imperatoris filium, summum ipsum imperatorem hominemque doctissimum? aut aliis Pythagorius ille Lysis Thebanum Epaminondam, haud scio an summum virum unum omnis Graeciae? aut Xenophon Agesilaum? aut Philolaus Archytam Tarentinum? aut ipse Pythagoras totam illam veterem Italiae Graeciam, quae quondam magna vocitata est?

I do not think so; for I see thus: that there was a single doctrine of all things which were worthy of a learned man, and of him who would excel in the commonwealth. Those who had received it, if they had been equally strong in talent for delivery and had given themselves also to speaking with no recoil of nature, excelled in eloquence.

Equidem non arbitror; sic enim video, unam quandam omnium rerum, quae essent homine erudito dignae atque eo, qui in re publica vellet excellere, fuisse doctrinam; quam qui accepissent, si eidem ingenio ad pronuntiandum valuissent et se ad dicendum quoque non repugnante natura dedissent, eloquentia praestitisse.

So Aristotle himself, when he saw Isocrates flourishing through the noble birth of his pupils — because he had transferred his disputations from forensic and civic causes to an empty elegance of speech — suddenly changed nearly the whole form of his discipline, and quoted, with a slight change, that verse of Philoctetes. For he says it is base to him to be silent when barbarians; but Aristotle, when Isocrates speaks. So he ornated and lit up that whole doctrine, and joined the knowledge of matters with the practice of speech. Nor did this escape the wisest king Philip, who summoned this man as teacher for his son Alexander, that from him he might receive both the precepts of doing and of speaking.

Itaque ipse Aristoteles cum florere Isocratem nobilitate discipulorum videret, quod ipse suas disputationes a causis forensibus et civilibus ad inanem sermonis elegantiam transtulisset, mutavit repente totam formam prope disciplinae suae versumque quendam Philoctetae paulo secus dixit: ille enim turpe sibi ait esse tacere, cum barbaros, hic autem, cum Isocratem pateretur dicere; itaque ornavit et inlustravit doctrinam illam omnem rerumque cognitionem cum orationis exercitatione coniunxit. Neque vero hoc fugit sapientissimum regem Philippum, qui hunc Alexandro filio doctorem accierit, a quo eodem ille et agendi acciperet praecepta et eloquendi.

Now whoever wishes — let him call by my leave a philosopher who hands down to us the abundance of matters and speech — by the name of orator. Or whether he prefer to call this orator (whom I say has wisdom joined to eloquence) a philosopher, I shall not hinder; provided this stand: that neither the speechlessness of him who knows the matter but cannot set it out by speaking, nor the ignorance of him to whom the matter is not at hand though words are not wanting, is to be praised. Of which, if one had to be wished, I should rather choose unspoken prudence than chattering folly. But if we ask what one excels of all, the palm must be given to the learned orator;

Nunc sive qui volet, eum philosophum, qui copiam nobis rerum orationisque tradat, per me appellet oratorem licet; sive hunc oratorem, quem ego dico sapientiam iunctam habere eloquentiae, philosophum appellare malet, non impediam; dum modo hoc constet, neque infantiam eius, qui rem norit, sed eam explicare dicendo non queat, neque inscientiam illius, cui res non suppetat, verba non desint, esse laudandam; quorum si alterum sit optandum, malim equidem indisertam prudentiam quam stultitiam loquacem; sin quaerimus quid unum excellat ex omnibus, docto oratori palma danda est;

whom if they suffer to be the same as the philosopher, the controversy is removed. But if they part them, those will be the lower in this — that in the perfect orator there is all that science of theirs, while in the philosophers’ knowledge eloquence does not necessarily lie; which, although they despise it, must yet seem to bring some heap to their arts.” When Crassus had said this, he was silent for a little, and there was silence from the rest.

quem si patiuntur eundem esse philosophum, sublata controversia est; sin eos diiungent, hoc erunt inferiores, quod in oratore perfecto inest illorum omnis scientia, in philosophorum autem cognitione non continuo inest eloquentia; quae quamvis contemnatur ab eis, necesse est tamen aliquem cumulum illorum artibus adferre videatur.’ Haec cum Crassus dixisset, parumper et ipse conticuit et a ceteris silentium fuit.

Then Cotta: “For my part, Crassus,” he said, “I cannot complain that you seem to me to have argued something else, which you had not undertaken; for you have brought somewhat more than was assigned to you and laid down by us. But surely those parts of yours were that you should speak about illustrating the speech, and you yourself had now begun, and had described all the praise of speech in four parts. When you had spoken about the first two enough, indeed (but, as you yourself said, swiftly and briefly), you had made two for yourself remaining: how we might first speak ornately, then aptly.

Tum Cotta ’equidem,’ inquit ’Crasse, non possum queri, quod mihi videare aliud quiddam, id quod non susceperis, disputasse; plus enim aliquanto attulisti, quam tibi erat tributum a nobis ac denuntiatum; sed certe ut eae partes fuerunt tuae, de inlustranda oratione ut diceres, et eras ipse iam ingressus atque in quattuor partis omnem orationis laudem discripseras, cum de duabus primis nobis quidem satis, sed, ut ipse dicebas, celeriter exigueque dixisses, duas tibi reliquas feceras, quem ad modum primum ornate, deinde etiam apte diceremus:

When you had entered on this, suddenly a kind of tide of your talent snatched you far from the land and carried you out into the deep, almost out of the sight of all. For you, having grasped the whole knowledge of things, did not indeed hand it down to us; for time was not so much. But what you have profited with these, I do not know. Me indeed you have driven wholly into the Academy. In which I should wish that to be true which you often laid down: that it is not necessary to use up one’s life, and that he can discern all those things who has only looked at them. But even if it is sometimes denser, or if I am slower, I shall surely never rest nor be wearied before I have grasped those two-headed paths and methods of arguing on either side and against everything.”

quo cum ingressus esses, repente te quasi quidam aestus ingeni tui procul a terra abripuit atque in altum a conspectu paene omnium abstraxit; omnem enim rerum scientiam complexus non tu quidem eam nobis tradidisti; neque enim fuit tam exigui temporis; sed apud hos quid profeceris nescio, me quidem in Academiam totum compulisti. In qua velim sit illud, quod saepe posuisti, ut non necesse sit consumere aetatem atque ut possit is illa omnia cernere, qui tantum modo aspexerit; sed etiam si est aliquando spissius aut si ego sum tardior, profecto numquam conquiescam neque defatigabor ante, quam illorum ancipitis vias rationesque et pro omnibus et contra omnia disputandi percepero.’

Then Caesar: “One thing,” he said, “most has stirred me from your speech, Crassus: that you said that he who could not learn anything quickly could ever entirely master it. So that it is not difficult for me to make trial, and either at once to grasp those things which you have lifted with words to the heavens, or, if I cannot, not to lose time, since I can yet be content with these of ours.”

Tum Caesar ’unum’ inquit ’me ex tuo sermone maxime, Crasse, commovit, quod eum negasti, qui non cito quid didicisset, umquam omnino posse perdiscere; ut mihi non sit difficile periclitari et aut statim percipere ista, quae tu verbis ad caelum extulisti, aut, si non potuerim, tempus non perdere, cum tamen his nostris possim esse contentus.’

Here Sulpicius: “For my part,” said he, “Crassus, I am wanting neither for that Aristotle nor Carneades nor any of the philosophers. Either think me to be despairing of mastering those things, or — what I do — to despise them. To me this common knowledge of forensic and common matters is great enough for that eloquence at which I aim. From which itself, however, I do not know very many things; which then at last, when some case to be pleaded by me requires it, I ask. Therefore, unless you happen to be wearied and if we are not heavy to you, come back to those things which pertain to the praise and splendour of speech itself; which I wished to hear from you, not so as to despair of attaining eloquence, but so as to learn something more.”

Hic Sulpicius ’ego vero,’ inquit ’Crasse, neque Aristotelem istum neque Carneadem nec philosophorum quemquam desidero. Vel me licet existimes desperare ista posse perdiscere vel, id quod facio, contemnere; mihi rerum forensium et communium vulgaris haec cognitio satis magna est ad eam, quam specto, eloquentiam; ex qua ipsa tamen permulta nescio; quae tum denique, cum causa aliqua, quae a me dicenda est, desiderat, quaero. Quam ob rem, nisi forte es iam defessus et si tibi non graves sumus, refer ad illa te, quae ad ipsius orationis laudem splendoremque pertinent; quae ego ex te audire volui, non ut desperarem me eloquentiam consequi posse, sed ut aliquid addiscerem.’

Then Crassus: “You ask common matters,” he said, “and not unknown to you, Sulpicius. For who has not taught about that kind, has not trained, has not even left writings? But I shall humour you, and I shall set out for you briefly only those things which are known to me. I shall yet judge that we must come back to those who are the authors and inventors of these surely small matters.

Tum Crassus ’pervulgatas res requiris’ inquit ’et tibi non incognitas, Sulpici: quis enim de isto genere non docuit, non instituit, non scriptum etiam reliquit? Sed geram morem et ea dumtaxat, quae mihi nota sunt, breviter exponam tibi; censebo tamen ad eos, qui auctores et inventores sunt harum sane minutarum rerum, revertendum.

All speech, then, is composed of words, of which we must first see the rationale singly, then jointly. For there is one ornament of speech which lies in single words; another which consists of words joined continuously. Therefore we use words either of those which are proper and as it were the fixed names of things, born almost together with the things themselves; or of those which are transferred and as it were placed in another’s place; or of those which we make new and shape ourselves.

Omnis igitur oratio conficitur ex verbis; quorum primum nobis ratio simpliciter videnda est, deinde coniuncte. Nam est quidam ornatus orationis, qui ex singulis verbis est; alius, qui ex continuatis coniunctis constat. Ergo utimur verbis aut eis, quae propria sunt et certa quasi vocabula rerum, paene una nata cum rebus ipsis; aut eis, quae transferuntur et quasi alieno in loco conlocantur; aut eis, quae novamus et facimus ipsi.

In proper words, then, the orator’s praise is to flee what is cast off and obsolete and to use what is choice and bright, in which something full and resounding seems to be. But in this kind of proper words a certain choice must be had, and that must be weighed by some judgment of the ears; in which the habit of speaking well also avails most.

In propriis igitur est verbis illa laus oratoris, ut abiecta atque obsoleta fugiat, lectis atque inlustribus utatur, in quibus plenum quiddam et sonans inesse videatur. Sed in hoc verborum genere propriorum dilectus est habendus quidam atque is aurium quodam iudicio ponderandus est; in quo consuetudo etiam bene loquendi valet plurimum.

So that which the unskilled commonly say of orators — “This man uses good words,” or “Some other does not” — is not weighed by any art, but is judged by some natural sense, as it were. In which it is not great praise to avoid fault, although it is great. But this is, as it were, a single ground and foundation: the use and abundance of good words.

Itaque hoc, quod vulgo de oratoribus ab imperitis dici solet "bonis hic verbis," aut "aliquis non bonis utitur," non arte aliqua perpenditur, sed quodam quasi naturali sensu iudicatur: in quo non magna laus est vitare vitium, quamquam est magnum, verum tamen hoc quasi solum quoddam atque fundamentum est, verborum usus et copia bonorum.

But what the orator himself builds, and where he applies art — that, it seems to me, must be sought and set out by us. There are three things, then, in single words which the orator should bring for illustrating and adorning speech: either an unaccustomed word, or a new-coined, or a transferred.

Sed quid ipse aedificet orator et in quo adiungat artem, id esse nobis quaerendum atque explicandum videtur. Tria sunt igitur in verbo simplici, quae orator adferat ad inlustrandam atque exornandam orationem: aut inusitatum verbum aut novatum aut translatum.

Unaccustomed are mostly old and through their antiquity long since dropped from the use of daily speech, which are freer for the licence of poets than ours; but rarely some poetic word has dignity also in speech. Nor would I shrink from saying, with Caelius, “In what season the Punic came into Italy”; nor “offspring” or “stock” or “to declare aloud” or “to call by name”; or, as you, Catulus, are wont, “I did not deem” or “opined”; or many others, by which, when set in place, the speech is wont often to seem grander and more ancient.

Inusitata sunt prisca fere ac vetustate ab usu cotidiani sermonis iam diu intermissa, quae sunt poetarum licentiae liberiora quam nostrae; sed tamen raro habet etiam in oratione poeticum aliquod verbum dignitatem. Neque enim illud fugerim dicere, ut Caelius "qua tempestate Poenus in Italiam venit," nec "prolem" aut "subolem" aut "effari" aut "nuncupare" aut, ut tu soles, Catule, "non rebar" aut "opinabar"; aut alia multa, quibus loco positis grandior atque antiquior oratio saepe videri solet.

Coined words are those which are produced and made by the speaker himself, either by joining words, as: “Then a panic crushes from my breast all my wisdom,” or “Surely you do not wish his crooked-tongued malices” — for both versutiloquas and expectorat are words made from joining, not born; but often even without joining words are coined, like “that abandoned old age (senium)”, “the gods of begetting (di genitales)”, “to bend down (incurvescere) with abundance of berries.”

Novantur autem verba, quae ab eo, qui dicit, ipso gignuntur ac fiunt, vel coniungendis verbis, ut haec: tum pavor sapientiam omnem mi exanimato expectorat. num non vis huius me versutiloquas malitias videtis enim et "versutiloquas" et "expectorat" ex coniunctione facta esse verba, non nata; sed saepe vel sine coniunctione verba novantur ut "ille senius desertus," ut "di genitales," ut "bacarum ubertate incurvescere."

The third mode of transferring a word is widely open. Necessity, forced by want and straits, gave it birth; afterwards pleasantness and delight made it celebrated. For as clothing, found first to ward off cold, was afterwards begun to be applied also to the body’s adornment and dignity, so the transfer of a word was set up for the sake of poverty, made frequent for delight. For “the vine sets gems,” “there is luxury in the grasses,” “glad crops,” even peasants say. For what can scarcely be made plain by the proper word — when said by transfer, the likeness of the thing we have set in another’s word illustrates that which we wish to be understood.

Tertius ille modus transferendi verbi late patet, quem necessitas genuit inopia coacta et angustiis, post autem iucunditas delectatioque celebravit. Nam ut vestis frigoris depellendi causa reperta primo, post adhiberi coepta est ad ornatum etiam corporis et dignitatem, sic verbi translatio instituta est inopiae causa, frequentata delectationis. Nam gemmare vitis, luxuriem esse in herbis, laetas segetes etiam rustici dicunt. Quod enim declarari vix verbo proprio potest, id translato cum est dictum, inlustrat id, quod intellegi volumus, eius rei, quam alieno verbo posuimus, similitudo.

These transfers are as it were borrowings, when you take from another what you do not have. Those are a little bolder, which do not show poverty, but bring some splendour to speech. Of which I would not lay down for you either the reasoning of inventing or the kinds.

Ergo haec translationes quasi mutuationes sunt, cum quod non habeas aliunde sumas, illae paulo audaciores, quae non inopiam indicant, sed orationi splendoris aliquid arcessunt; quarum ego quid vobis aut inveniendi rationem aut genera ponam?

Of likeness it is the brevity drawn into a single word — which word, set in another’s place as in its own, if it is recognised, delights; if it has nothing similar, is rejected. But those things ought to be transferred which either make the matter brighter, as all those: “The sea bristles, the shadows are doubled, and the blackness of night and storm cloud darkens; flame quivers among the clouds, the heaven trembles with thunder, hail mixed with copious rain falls suddenly headlong, on every side all the winds break out, savage whirlwinds rise, the deep boils with seething.” All this, that it might be brighter, was said by words transferred through likeness;

Similitudinis est ad verbum unum contracta brevitas, quod verbum in alieno loco tamquam in suo positum si agnoscitur, delectat, si simile nihil habet, repudiatur; sed ea transferri oportet, quae aut clariorem faciunt rem, ut illa omnia: inhorrescit mare, tenebrae conduplicantur, noctisque et nimbum occaecat nigror, flamma inter nubis coruscat, caelum tonitru contremit, grando mixta imbri largifico subita praecipitans cadit, undique omnes venti erumpunt, saevi exsistunt turbines, fervit aestu pelagus: omnia fere, quo essent clariora, translatis per similitudinem verbis dicta sunt;

or by which the whole thing of some deed or counsel is more signified, as he who, of one hiding it on purpose lest what was being done could be understood, by two transferred words, by likeness itself, signifies: “Since he wraps himself round in words, fences himself with guile.” Sometimes brevity also is got by transfer, as that “If the weapon flew from his hand”: the imprudence of a weapon let go could not be set out more briefly by proper words than has been signified by one transferred.

aut quo significatur magis res tota sive facti alicuius sive consili, ut ille, qui occultantem consulto, ne id, quod ageretur, intellegi posset, duobus translatis verbis similitudine ipsa indicat: quandoquidem is se circum vestit dictis, saepit se dolo. Non numquam etiam brevitas translatione conficitur, ut illud "si telum manu fugit": imprudentia teli missi brevius propriis verbis exponi non potuit, quam est uno significata translato.

In this kind it often seems to me wonderful what the cause is, that all are more pleased by transferred and foreign words than by proper and their own. For if a thing has not its name and proper word — as the foot in a ship, as nexum which is done by the scale, as in a wife divorce — necessity forces us to take from elsewhere what we do not have. But in the greatest abundance of one’s own words men are yet much more delighted by foreign ones, if they are transferred with reason.

Hoc in genere persaepe mihi admirandum videtur quid sit, quod omnes translatis et alienis magis delectentur verbis quam propriis et suis. Nam si res suum nomen et vocabulum proprium non habet, ut pes in navi, ut nexum, quod per libram agitur, ut in uxore divortium, necessitas cogit, quod non habeas, aliunde sumere; sed in suorum verborum maxima copia tamen homines aliena multo magis, si sunt ratione translata, delectant.

I think this happens, either because it is some sign of talent to leap over what lies before our feet and take other things sought from afar; or because he who hears is led by his thought elsewhere and yet does not stray, which is the greatest delight; or because in single words a thing and a whole likeness is brought about; or because every transfer, which has been taken with reason, is brought to the senses themselves, especially of the eyes — which is the keenest sense.

Id accidere credo, vel quod ingeni specimen est quoddam transilire ante pedes posita et alia longe repetita sumere; vel quod is, qui audit, alio ducitur cogitatione neque tamen aberrat, quae maxima est delectatio; vel quod in singulis verbis res ac totum simile conficitur; vel quod omnis translatio, quae quidem sumpta ratione est, ad sensus ipsos admovetur, maxime oculorum, qui est sensus acerrimus.

For both “the smell of urbanity” and “the softness of humanity” and “the murmur of the sea” and “the sweetness of speech” are drawn from the other senses; but those of the eyes are far keener, which place almost before the gaze of the soul what we cannot perceive and see. For there is nothing in the nature of things whose word and name we cannot use of other things. Whence a likeness can be drawn — and it can be drawn from all things — thence one word, transferred, containing the likeness, will bring light to speech.

Nam et odor urbanitatis et mollitudo humanitatis et murmur maris et dulcitudo orationis sunt ducta a ceteris sensibus; illa vero oculorum multo acriora, quae paene ponunt in conspectu animi, quae cernere et videre non possumus. Nihil est enim in rerum natura, cuius nos non in aliis rebus possimus uti vocabulo et nomine. Unde enim simile duci potest, potest autem ex omnibus, indidem verbum unum, quod similitudinem continet, translatum lumen adferet orationi.

In this kind unlikeness must first be fled. “Vast vaults of heaven”: however much Ennius brought a sphere onto the stage, as is said, yet in a sphere the likeness of a vault cannot be. “Live, Ulysses; while you may; with your eyes the last beam of light snatch up” — he did not say “seek” or “take” (for that would have the delay of one hoping to live longer), but “snatch”: this word is fitted to that

Quo in genere primum est fugienda dissimilitudo: "caeli ingentes fornices"; quamvis sphaeram in scaenam, ut dicitur, attulerit Ennius, tamen in sphaera fornicis similitudo inesse non potest. Vive, Ulixes; dum licet: oculis postremum lumen radiatum rape! non dixit "pete" non "cape,"—haberet enim moram sperantis diutius esse victurum—sed "rape": est hoc verbum ad id

which he had said before, “while you may.” Then it must be looked at lest the likeness be drawn from afar. “Syrtis” of patrimony — I should rather say “rock”; “Charybdis” of goods — rather “whirlpool.” For the eyes of the mind are more easily borne to those things which are seen than to those which are heard. And since this is the very highest praise in transferring words — that what is transferred should strike the sense — all baseness must be fled in those things to which the likeness will draw the minds of those who hear.

aptatum, quod ante dixerat, "dum licet." Deinde videndum est ne longe simile sit ductum: "Syrtim" patrimoni, "scopulum" libentius dixerim; "Charybdim" bonorum, "voraginem" potius; facilius enim ad ea, quae visa, quam ad illa, quae audita sunt, mentis oculi feruntur; et quoniam haec vel summa laus est in verbis transferendis, ut sensum feriat id, quod translatum sit, fugienda est omnis turpitudo earum rerum, ad quas eorum animos, qui audient, trahet similitudo.

I would not have said that by Africanus’s death the commonwealth was “castrated”; I would not have Glaucia called “the dung of the curia.” Even though the likeness be there, in each is a deformed thinking of likeness. I would not have it either greater than the matter requires (“a tempest of revelry”), or less (“a revelry of a tempest”). I would not have the word that is transferred narrower than that proper one and its own would have been: “What is it, pray? What do you nod me away from approach?” It would be better, “you forbid, prohibit, frighten away” — since he had said: “Get back here, lest my touch or shadow harm the good.”

Nolo dici morte Africani "castratam" esse rem publicam, nolo "stercus curiae" dici Glauciam; quamvis sit simile, tamen est in utroque deformis cogitatio similitudinis; nolo esse aut maius, quam res postulet: "tempestas comissationis"; aut minus: "comissatio tempestatis"; nolo esse verbum angustius id, quod translatum sit, quam fuisset illud proprium ac suum: quidnam est, obsecro? Quid te adirier abnutas? melius esset vetas, prohibes, absterres; quoniam ille dixerat: ilico istic, ne contagio mea bonis umbrave obsit

If you fear that the transfer may seem somewhat too harsh, it must often be softened by a word set before. As if, when M. Cato had died, anyone should say the senate had been left “orphaned,” that would be a little harsh; but “so to say, orphaned” is somewhat milder. For a transfer ought to be modest, so that it may seem brought to a foreign place, not to have broken in; and to have come on sufferance, not by force.

Atque etiam, si vereare, ne paulo durior translatio esse videatur, mollienda est praeposito saepe verbo; ut si olim, M. Catone mortuo, "pupillum" senatum quis relictum diceret, paulo durius; sin, "ut ita dicam, pupillum," aliquanto mitius: etenim verecunda debet esse translatio, ut deducta esse in alienum locum, non inrupisse, atque ut precario, non vi, venisse videatur.

But there is no more flowery way in single words, nor any which brings more light to speech. For that which flows from this kind is not in one word transferred, but is connected from several joined, so that one thing is said, another to be understood: “Nor shall I let myself again on the one rock, as once the Achaean fleet, dash myself.” And: “You err, you err. For when you leap and trust yourself, the strong reins of the laws will rein you in, and the yoke of empire will press you down.”

Modus autem nullus est florentior in singulis verbis neque qui plus luminis adferat orationi; nam illud, quod ex hoc genere profluit, non est in uno verbo translato, sed ex pluribus continuatis conectitur, ut aliud dicatur, aliud intellegendum sit: neque me patiar iterum ad unum scopulum ut olim classem Achivom offendere. atque illud, erras, erras; nam exsultantem te et praefidentem tibi repriment validae legum habenae atque imperi insistent iugo.

A like matter being taken, the words proper to it are then transferred to another matter, as I said. This is a great ornament of speech, in which obscurity must be fled. For these things, when carried too far in this kind, become what are called enigmas. The way is not in a word but in a speech, that is, in the continuity of words. Nor again does that turning and changing have a kind of fashioning in a word but in speech: “Africa trembles with terrible tumult, the rough land.” For the Africans is taken Africa: nor was the word made (as “the rock-breaking sea”), nor transferred (as “the sea is softened”), but for ornament’s sake one proper word is changed for another. “Cease, Rome, your enemies — and the great plains are witnesses.” This way is grave in adornment of speech and often to be taken; of this kind: that Mars of war is common, to call Ceres for crops, Liber for wine, Neptune for the sea, the curia for the senate, the Campus for the assemblies, the toga for peace, arms and weapons for war.

Sumpta re simili verba illius rei propria deinceps in rem aliam, ut dixi, transferuntur. Est hoc magnum ornamentum orationis, in quo obscuritas fugienda est; etenim hoc fere genere fiunt ea, quae dicuntur aenigmata; non est autem in verbo modus hic, sed in oratione, id est, in continuatione verborum. Ne illa quidem traductio atque immutatio in verbo quandam fabricationem habet sed in oratione: Africa terribili tremit horrida terra tumultu; pro Afris est sumpta Africa, neque factum est verbum, ut "mare saxifragis undis"; neque translatum, ut "mollitur mare"; sed ornandi causa proprium proprio commutatum: desine, Roma, tuos hostis et testes sunt campi magni Gravis est modus in ornatu orationis et saepe sumendus; ex quo genere haec sunt, Martem belli esse communem, Cererem pro frugibus, Liberum appellare pro vino, Neptunum pro mari, curiam pro senatu, campum pro comitiis, togam pro pace, arma ac tela pro bello;

Likewise in the same kind, both virtues and vices are named for those very persons in whom they reside: “Luxury, when it broke into the house”; “Avarice penetrated where”; or “Faith availed, justice carried it through.” You see this whole kind: when, by an inflected and changed word, the same matter is uttered more ornately. To which are neighbouring those less ornate but yet not to be unknown — when we wish something to be understood: either the whole from a part (as for buildings when we say walls or roofs); or a part from the whole (as when we say one squadron for the cavalry of the Roman people); or several from one: “But the Roman, even though the matter is well done, in his heart trembles”; or when from many one is understood: “We are the Romans, who before were Rudini” (Rudine, Ennius’s home). Or in whatever way — not as it is said, in this kind is it understood, but as it is felt.

quo item in genere et virtutes et vitia pro ipsis, in quibus illa sunt, appellantur: "luxuries quam in domum inrupit," et "quo avaritia penetravit"; aut "fides valuit, iustitia confecit." Videtis profecto genus hoc totum, cum inflexo immutatoque verbo res eadem enuntiatur ornatius; cui sunt finitima illa minus ornata, sed tamen non ignoranda, cum intellegi volumus aliquid aut ex parte totum, ut pro aedificiis cum parietes aut tecta dicimus; aut ex toto partem, ut cum unam turmam equitatum populi Romani dicimus; aut ex uno pluris: at Romanus homo, tamenetsi res bene gesta est corde suo trepidat; aut cum ex pluribus intellegitur unum: nos sumus Romani, qui fuimus ante Rudini; aut quocumque modo, non ut dictum est, in eo genere intellegitur, sed ut sensum est.

We often also misuse a word, not so elegantly as in transferring, but, even if more freely, sometimes not impudently — as when we say “grand speech” for “long,” “minute soul” for “small.” Now do you see those things to be not of a word but of a speech, which are connected from several transfers, as I have set out? But these — which I have said are either changed or to be otherwise understood than they are said — are transferred in a certain way.

Abutimur saepe etiam verbo non tam eleganter quam in transferendo, sed etiam si licentius, tamen interdum non impudenter; ut cum grandem orationem pro longa, minutum animum pro parvo dicimus. Verum illa videtisne esse non verbi, sed orationis, quae ex pluribus, ut exposui, translationibus conexa sunt? haec autem, quae aut immutata esse dixi aut aliter intellegenda ac dicerentur, sunt translata quodam modo.

So it happens that all the virtue and praise of single words arises from three things: if there be either an old word — which yet usage can bear; or a coined one, either by joining or by novelty, in which likewise the ears and habit must be spared; or a transferred one, which most, as it were by certain stars, marks and lights up speech.

Ita fit, ut omnis singulorum verborum virtus atque laus tribus exsistat ex rebus: si aut vetustum verbum sit, quod tamen consuetudo ferre possit; aut factum vel coniunctione vel novitate, in quo item est auribus consuetudinique parcendum; aut translatum, quod maxime tamquam stellis quibusdam notat et illuminat orationem.

The continuity of words follows, which especially desires two things: arrangement first, then a certain measure and form. Of arrangement, it is to compose and build words so that neither be their meeting harsh nor gaping, but in some way close-jointed and smooth. In which my father-in-law’s character was wittily played upon by him who could most elegantly do it, Lucilius: “How prettily are the words composed! As all the little dice fitted skillfully into the pavement and inlay-work, vermicular!” When he had said this, mocking Albucius, he did not refrain from me either: “I have Crassus as son-in-law, that you not be more rhetorical.” What then? This Crassus, since he abuses my name — what does he do? That, surely (as he wishes and I should wish), somewhat better than Albucius. But on me he played, as he is wont.

Sequitur continuatio verborum, quae duas res maxime, conlocationem primum, deinde modum quendam formamque desiderat. Conlocationis est componere et struere verba sic, ut neve asper eorum concursus neve hiulcus sit, sed quodam modo coagmentatus et levis; in quo lepide soceri mei persona lusit is, qui elegantissime id facere potuit, Lucilius: quam lepide le/ceis compostae! ut tesserulae omnes arte pavimento atque emblemate vermiculato. Quae cum dixisset in Albucium inludens, ne a me quidem abstinuit: Crassum habeo generum, ne rhetoricoterus tu sis. Quid ergo? Iste Crassus, quoniam eius abuteris nomine, quid efficit? Illud quidem; scilicet, ut ille vult et ego vellem, melius aliquanto quam Albucius: verum in me quidem lusit ille, ut solet.

Yet this arrangement of words must be kept, of which I am speaking; which makes the speech bound, coherent, smooth, evenly flowing. You will attain this if the last words shall so be joined with the first that follow that neither do they harshly meet nor too widely part.

Sed est tamen haec conlocatio conservanda verborum, de qua loquor; quae vinctam orationem efficit, quae cohaerentem, quae levem, quae aequabiliter fluentem; id adsequemini, si verba extrema cum consequentibus primis ita iungentur, ut neve aspere concurrant neve vastius diducantur.

This diligence is followed also by the measure and the form of words; which I now fear may seem to this Catulus to be childish. For those ancients thought verses ought to be applied even in this prose speech, that is, certain rhythms — for they wished there to be in speeches closes punctuated by the measure of words and thoughts (not by marks of our breathlessness or of weariness, nor by copyists’ marks, but by the measure of words and thoughts); and Isocrates is said first to have established this — that he might bind the unkempt habit of the ancients in speaking, for the sake of pleasure and the ears, in rhythms (as his pupil Naucrates writes).

Hanc diligentiam subsequitur modus etiam et forma verborum, quod iam vereor ne huic Catulo videatur esse puerile; versus enim veteres illi in hac soluta oratione propemodum, hoc est, numeros quosdam nobis esse adhibendos putaverunt: interspirationis enim, non defetigationis nostrae neque librariorum notis, sed verborum et sententiarum modo interpunctas clausulas in orationibus esse voluerunt; idque princeps Isocrates instituisse fertur, ut inconditam antiquorum dicendi consuetudinem delectationis atque aurium causa, quem ad modum scribit discipulus eius Naucrates, numeris astringeret.

For these two things were contrived for pleasure by the musicians, who once were the same as the poets — verse and song — that by both the rhythm of words and the measure of voices they might overcome the satiety of the ears with delight. These two then — I mean the regulation of voice and the closing of words — they thought were to be transferred from poetry to eloquence, as far as the severity of speech could bear.

Namque haec duo musici, qui erant quondam idem poetae, machinati ad voluptatem sunt, versum atque cantum, ut et verborum numero et vocum modo delectatione vincerent aurium satietatem. Haec igitur duo, vocis dico moderationem et verborum conclusionem, quoad orationis severitas pati posset, a poetica ad eloquentiam traducenda duxerunt.

In which is most of all this: that if a verse is brought about in speech by the joining of words, it is a fault — and yet we wish that joining, like the verse, to fall in rhythm and to be squared and brought to fulness. Nor of many things is there one matter which more distinguishes the orator from the unskilled and ignorant of speaking, than that he, untaught, pours out unkemptly as much as he can and what he says by breath, not by art, he limits; while the orator so binds the thought with words that he embraces it by some rhythm both bound and free.

In quo illud est vel maximum, quod versus in oratione si efficitur coniunctione verborum, vitium est, et tamen eam coniunctionem sicuti versum numerose cadere et quadrare et perfici volumus. Neque est ex multis res una, quae magis oratorem ab imperito dicendi ignaroque distinguat, quam quod ille rudis incondite fundit quantum potest et id, quod dicit, spiritu, non arte determinat, orator autem sic inligat sententiam verbis, ut eam numero quodam complectatur et astricto et soluto.

For when he has bound it by form and measures, he relaxes and frees it by changing the order, that the words be neither bound as it were by some fixed law of verse, nor so loose as to wander. In what way then shall we set ourselves to so great a duty, as to suppose we can attain this force of speaking rhythmically? The thing is not so difficult as necessary. For nothing is so tender, nor so flexible, nor that follows so easily wherever you lead, as speech.

Nam cum vinxit forma et modis, relaxat et liberat immutatione ordinis, ut verba neque adligata sint quasi certa aliqua lege versus neque ita soluta, ut vagentur. Quonam igitur modo tantum munus insistemus ut arbitremur nos hanc vim numerose dicendi consequi posse? Non est res tam difficilis quam necessaria; nihil est enim tam tenerum neque tam flexibile neque quod tam facile sequatur quocumque ducas quam oratio.

From this verses, from this same different rhythms are produced; from this also this prose speech of various measures and many kinds. For there are not different words of conversation, of contention, nor are they taken from another kind for daily use, from another for the stage and pomp. But these we, when we have lifted them up lying in the middle, like the softest wax shape and fashion at our pleasure. Therefore as at one time we are weighty, at another subtle, at another we hold something middle: so the kind of speech follows our settled feeling, and is changed and turned to every pleasure of the ears and motion of minds.

Ex hac versus, ex hac eadem dispares numeri conficiuntur; ex hac haec etiam soluta variis modis multorumque generum oratio; non enim sunt alia sermonis, alia contentionis verba, neque ex alio genere ad usum cotidianum, alio ad scaenam pompamque sumuntur; sed ea nos cum iacentia sustulimus e medio, sicut mollissimam ceram ad nostrum arbitrium formamus et fingimus. Itaque ut tum graves sumus, tum subtiles, tum medium quiddam tenemus: sic institutam nostram sententiam sequitur orationis genus idque ad omnem aurium voluptatem et animorum motum mutatur et vertitur.

But as in most matters nature itself has incredibly fashioned this, so in speech: that those things which contained in themselves the greatest utility, the same had also most either of dignity or even of grace. For the safety and the salvation of all, we see this state of this whole world and of nature: that the heaven is round, and the earth is in the middle and is held by its own force and will; that the sun is borne about it, that it approaches the wintry sign and thence gradually rises into the opposite quarter; that the moon by its approach and recess receives the sun’s light; that the same five stars complete the same spaces by unequal motion and course.

Sed ut in plerisque rebus incredibiliter hoc natura est ipsa fabricata, sic in oratione, ut ea, quae maximam utilitatem in se continerent, plurimum eadem haberent vel dignitatis vel saepe etiam venustatis. Incolumitatis ac salutis omnium causa videmus hunc statum esse huius totius mundi atque naturae, rotundum ut caelum terraque ut media sit eaque sua vi nutuque teneatur, sol ut eam circum feratur, ut accedat ad brumale signum et inde sensim ascendat in diversam partem; ut luna accessu et recessu suo solis lumen accipiat; ut eadem spatia quinque stellae dispari motu cursuque conficiant.

These have such force that, a little changed, they cannot cohere; such beauty that no shape can even be thought more ornate. Refer your mind now to the form and shape of men, or even of the rest of living things. You will find no part of the body, without some necessity, added on, and the whole shape as it were perfected by art, not by chance. What in those trees? In which the trunk, the branches, the leaves are not, in short, save for keeping and preserving their nature; nowhere yet is any part except graceful.

Haec tantam habent vim, paulum ut immutata cohaerere non possint, tantam pulchritudinem, ut nulla species ne cogitari quidem possit ornatior. Referte nunc animum ad hominum vel etiam ceterarum animantium formam et figuram. Nullam partem corporis sine aliqua necessitate adfictam totamque formam quasi perfectam reperietis arte, non casu. Quid in eis arboribus? in quibus non truncus, non rami, non folia sunt denique nisi ad suam retinendam conservandamque naturam, nusquam tamen est ulla pars nisi venusta.

Let us leave nature and look at the arts. What in a ship is so necessary as the sides, as the holds, as the prow, as the stern, as the spars, as the sails, as the masts? Which yet have in their look so much grace, that they seem to have been invented not only for safety, but also for pleasure. Columns hold up temples and porticoes; yet they have no more usefulness than dignity. The pediment of the Capitol and of other temples necessity itself, not grace, fashioned. For when account had been had how on each side of the roof water might run off, the dignity of the pediment followed the temple’s utility — so that, even if the Capitol were set up in heaven, where there could be no rain, it seems it would have had no dignity without a pediment.

Linquamus naturam artisque videamus. Quid tam in navigio necessarium quam latera, quam cavernae, quam prora, quam puppis, quam antennae, quam vela, quam mali? quae tamen hanc habent in specie venustatem, ut non solum salutis, sed etiam voluptatis causa inventa esse videantur. Columnae templa et porticus sustinent; tamen habent non plus utilitatis quam dignitatis: Capitoli fastigium illud et ceterarum aedium non venustas, sed necessitas ipsa fabricata est; nam, cum esset habita ratio, quem ad modum ex utraque tecti parte aqua delaberetur, utilitatem templi fastigi dignitas consecuta est; ut, etiam si in caelo Capitolium statueretur, ubi imber esse non posset, nullam sine fastigio dignitatem habiturum fuisse videatur.

The same likewise happens in all parts of speech: that some sweetness and charm follows the utility and almost necessity. For the closes and the punctuations of words were brought by the closing of breath and the straits of the breath. That invention is so sweet that, even if anyone had infinite breath given him, we should not yet wish him to draw out his words. So pleasing has been found to our ears that which not only could be tolerable but also easy to men’s lungs.

Hoc in omnibus item partibus orationis evenit, ut utilitatem ac prope necessitatem suavitas quaedam et lepos consequatur; clausulas enim atque interpuncta verborum animae interclusio atque angustiae spiritus attulerunt: id inventum ita est suave, ut, si cui sit infinitus spiritus datus, tamen eum perpetuare verba nolimus; id enim auribus nostris gratum est inventum, quod hominum lateribus non tolerabile solum, sed etiam facile esse posset.

The longest combination of words, then, is what can be rolled out in one breath. But this is the measure of nature; another, of art. For since rhythms are several, the iamb and the trochee, the frequent ones, Aristotle, your Aristotle, Catulus, sets aside from the orator. They yet by nature run themselves into our speech and conversation. But marked are the strikings of those rhythms and minute feet. So first of all the heroic foot — the dactyl and anapest, the spondee — invites us. In which it is allowed to advance with impunity for two feet only, or a little more, lest we plainly fall into a verse or the likeness of a verse. “High are the twin towers, by which.” These three heroic feet at the openings of continuing words fall sufficiently becomingly.

Longissima est igitur complexio verborum, quae volvi uno spiritu potest; sed hic naturae modus est, artis alius. Nam cum sint numeri plures, iambum et trochaeum frequentem segregat ab oratore Aristoteles, Catule, vester, qui natura tamen incurrunt ipsi in orationem sermonemque nostrum; sed sunt insignes percussiones eorum numerorum et minuti pedes. Qua re primum ad heroum nos dactylici et anapaesti spondi pedem invitat: in quo impune progredi licet duo dumtaxat pedes aut paulo plus, ne plane in versum aut similitudinem versus incidamus. "Altae sunt geminae, quibus." Hi tres heroi pedes in principia continuandorum verborum satis decore cadunt.

Most approved by that same Aristotle is the paean, which is double. For it either rises from a long syllable, which three short follow, as these words “cease, begin, restrain”; or from three short syllables in succession, the last drawn out and long, as those are “had subdued, hoof-beating.” And that philosopher likes to begin from the former paean, to end with the latter; the latter paean is, not in the number of syllables but in the measure of the ears (which is keener and more certain judgment), about equal to the cretic, which is from a long, a short, and a long: as “What guard shall I seek, or pursue? whither now —” From which rhythm Fannius began: “If, Quirites, his threats.” This rhythm Aristotle thinks more apt for closes, which he wishes mostly to be ended by a long syllable.

Probatur autem ab eodem illo maxime paean, qui est duplex: nam aut a longa oritur, quam tres breves consequuntur, ut haec verba "desinite, incipite, comprimite," aut a brevibus deinceps tribus, extrema producta atque longa, sicut illa sunt "domuerant, sonipedes"; atque illi philosopho ordiri placet a superiore paeane, posteriore finire; est autem paean hic posterior non syllabarum numero, sed aurium mensura, quod est acrius iudicium et certius, par fere cretico, qui est ex longa et brevi et longa: ut Quid petam praesidi, aut exsequar? quove nunc A quo numero exorsus est Fannius: "si, Quirites, minas illius." Hunc ille clausulis aptiorem putat, quas vult longa plerumque syllaba terminari.

These things, however, do not require so keen a care and diligence as does that of the poets — whom necessity compels, and rhythms and measures themselves, so to enclose words in a verse that nothing may be even by the smallest breath shorter or longer than is needed. Speech is more free, and plainly, as it is said, is so truly loose — not so as to flee or err, but so as to regulate itself without bonds. For I agree with Theophrastus, who thinks that speech, polished and made (in some way), ought to be rhythmical not strictly but more loosely.

Neque vero haec tam acrem curam diligentiamque desiderant, quam est illa poetarum; quos necessitas cogit et ipsi numeri ac modi sic verba versu includere, ut nihil sit ne spiritu quidem minimo brevius aut longius, quam necesse est. Liberior est oratio et plane, ut dicitur, sic est vere soluta, non ut fugiat tamen aut erret, sed ut sine vinculis sibi ipsa moderetur. Namque ego illud adsentior Theophrasto, qui putat orationem, quae quidem sit polita atque facta quodam modo, non astricte, sed remissius numerosam esse oportere.

For, as he conjectures, both from those measures by which this customary verse is brought about, the anapaest afterwards flowered out (a longer rhythm); thence flowed that more licentious and richer dithyramb, whose limbs and feet, as the same says, lie spread through every richer speech. And if it is rhythmical in all sounds and voices that has certain pressings and what we can measure by equal intervals, this kind of rhythms is rightly set in the praise of speech, provided they be not continuous. For if that breathless and flowing chatter without intervals is to be deemed rude and unpolished, what other reason is there why it should be rejected, save that nature itself modulates the voice for men’s ears? Which cannot happen unless rhythm is in the voice.

Etenim, sicut ille suspicatur, et ex istis modis, quibus hic usitatus versus efficitur, post anapaestus, procerior quidam numerus, effloruit, inde ille licentior et divitior fluxit dithyrambus, cuius membra et pedes, ut ait idem, sunt in omni locupleti oratione diffusa; et, si numerosum est in omnibus sonis atque vocibus, quod habet quasdam impressiones et quod metiri possumus intervallis aequalibus, recte genus hoc numerorum, dum modo ne continui sint, in orationis laude ponitur. Nam si rudis et impolita putanda est illa sine intervallis loquacitas perennis et profluens, quid est aliud causae cur repudietur, nisi quod hominum auribus vocem natura modulatur ipsa? Quod fieri, nisi inest numerus in voce, non potest.

But there is no rhythm in continuity. Distinction and the striking of equal — or often various — intervals brings about rhythm, which we can mark in falling drops (which are distinguished by intervals), but cannot in a rushing river. If then this loose continuity of words is much more apt and pleasant when it is distinguished by joints and limbs than when continued and prolonged, those limbs will have to be measured. If they are shorter at the end, that as it were ambit of words is broken; for so the Greeks call these turnings of speech. So either the latter must be equal to the former, the last to the first; or, what is even better and more pleasant, longer.

Numerus autem in continuatione nullus est; distinctio et aequalium aut saepe variorum intervallorum percussio numerum conficit, quem in cadentibus guttis, quod intervallis distinguuntur, notare possumus, in amni praecipitante non possumus. Quod si continuatio verborum haec soluta multo est aptior atque iucundior, si est articulis membrisque distincta, quam si continuata ac producta, membra illa modificata esse debebunt; quae si in extremo breviora sunt, infringitur ille quasi verborum ambitus; sic enim has orationis conversiones Graeci nominant. Qua re aut paria esse debent posteriora superioribus, et extrema primis aut, quod etiam est melius et iucundius, longiora.

These things have indeed been said by those philosophers whom you most love, Catulus. So I more often call them as witnesses, that, by praising my authorities, I may flee the charge of frivolities.” “Of what frivolities?” said Catulus. “Or what can be brought into that disputation more elegant, or more subtly said at all?”

Atque haec quidem ab eis philosophis, quos tu maxime diligis, Catule, dicta sunt; quod eo saepius testificor, ut auctoribus laudandis ineptiarum crimen effugiam.’ ’Quarum tandem?’ inquit Catulus ’aut quid disputatione ista adferri potest elegantius aut omnino dici subtilius?’

“But I fear,” said Crassus, “that these may either seem too hard for these to follow, or, because they are not handed down in the common discipline, that we may seem to wish them to seem greater and more difficult.” Then Catulus: “You err, Crassus,” he said, “if you think either I or any of these expects from you these daily and common things. Those things you say, we wish to be said; nor so much to be said as to be said in that way. Nor do I answer this for myself only, but for all of these without any doubt.”

’At enim vereor,’ inquit Crassus ’ne haec aut difficiliora istis ad persequendum esse videantur aut, quia non traduntur in vulgari ista disciplina, nos ea maiora ac difficiliora videri velle videamur.’ Tum Catulus ’erras,’ inquit ’Crasse, si aut me aut horum quemquam putas a te haec opera cotidiana et pervagata exspectare. Ista, quae dicis, dici volumus; neque tam dici quam isto dici modo; neque tibi hoc pro me solum, sed pro his omnibus sine ulla dubitatione respondeo.’

“For my part,” said Antonius, “I have now found him whom I had said in the little book I wrote I had not found — the eloquent man. But I have not interrupted you even for the sake of praising, lest anything of this so brief time of your speech should be lessened by one of my words.”

’Ego vero’ inquit Antonius ’inveni iam, quem negaram in eo, quem scripsi, libello me invenisse eloquentem. Sed eo te ne laudandi quidem causa interpellavi, ne quid de hoc tam exiguo sermonis tui tempore verbo uno meo deminueretur.’

“By this rule, then,” said Crassus, “both by exercise and by the pen — which both other things and this most adorns and polishes — speech must be shaped by us. Yet this is not of so great labour as it seems, nor are these things to be directed by the keenest standard of rhythmicians or of musicians. Only this we must bring about: that speech does not flow on, does not wander, does not stop within, does not run too far out — that it be distinguished by limbs, that it have absolute turnings. Nor must we always use the unbroken and as it were turning of words, but often speech must be broken into smaller limbs, which yet themselves must be bound by rhythms.

’Hanc igitur’ Crassus inquit ’ad legem cum exercitatione tum stilo, qui et alia et hoc maxime ornat ac limat, formanda nobis oratio est. Neque tamen hoc tanti laboris est, quanti videtur, nec sunt haec rhythmicorum aut musicorum acerrima norma dirigenda; efficiendum est illud modo nobis, ne fluat oratio, ne vagetur, ne insistat interius, ne excurrat longius, ut membris distinguatur, ut conversiones habeat absolutas. Neque semper utendum est perpetuitate et quasi conversione verborum, sed saepe carpenda membris minutioribus oratio est, quae tamen ipsa membra sunt numeris vincienda.

Nor let the paean or the heroic disturb you. They will themselves run into speech; they themselves, I say, will offer themselves and answer when not called. Only let there be that habit of writing and speaking, that thoughts may be ended by words, and the joining of those words may be born from longer and freer rhythms — most of all the heroic, or the former paean, or the cretic, but variously and distinctly let it settle. For likeness is most marked in coming to rest. And if the first and last feet have been preserved by this rationale, the middle ones can lie hidden, provided the very circuit of words be not either shorter than the ears expect, or longer than strength and breath bears.

Neque vos paean aut herous ille conturbet: ipsi occurrent orationi; ipsi, inquam, se offerent et respondebunt non vocati. Consuetudo modo illa sit scribendi atque dicendi, ut sententiae verbis finiantur eorumque verborum iunctio nascatur ab proceris numeris ac liberis, maxime heroo aut paeane priore aut cretico, sed varie distincteque considat. Notatur enim maxime similitudo in conquiescendo. Et, si primi et postremi illi pedes sunt hac ratione servati, medii possunt latere, modo ne circuitus ipse verborum sit aut brevior, quam aures exspectent, aut longior, quam vires atque anima patiatur.

The closes I think must be even more diligently kept than the previous parts, because in them most of all is the perfection and absoluteness judged. For of a verse the first and middle and last part is equally attended to, which, in whatever part it stumbles, is weakened. In speech, however, few perceive the first parts, most the last. Which since they appear and are understood, must be varied, lest they be rejected either by the judgments of minds or by the satiety of ears.

Clausulas autem diligentius etiam servandas esse arbitror quam superiora, quod in eis maxime perfectio atque absolutio iudicatur. Nam versus aeque prima et media et extrema pars attenditur, qui debilitatur, in quacumque est parte titubatum; in oratione autem pauci prima cernunt, postrema plerique: quae quoniam apparent et intelleguntur, varianda sunt, ne aut animorum iudiciis repudientur aut aurium satietate.

Two or three feet at the end must be kept and noted, provided the previous parts will not be shorter and clipped. These ought to be either chorees or heroic, or alternating; or in that latter paean which Aristotle approves, or in the cretic equal to it. The changes of these will bring it about that neither shall those who hear be sated by disgust at likeness, nor we seem to do, by set design, what we shall do.

Duo enim aut tres fere sunt extremi servandi et notandi pedes, si modo non breviora et praecisa erunt superiora; quos aut chorios aut heroos aut alternos esse oportebit aut in paeane illo posteriore, quem Aristoteles probat, aut ei pari cretico. Horum vicissitudines efficient, ut neque ei satientur, qui audient, fastidio similitudinis, nec nos id, quod faciemus, opera dedita facere videamur.

If that Antipater of Sidon — whom you well remember, Catulus — was wont to pour out hexameters and other verses on the spur of the moment in various measures and rhythms, and the practice of an ingenious and remembering man so prevailed that, when he had thrown himself in mind and will to the verse, the words followed: how much more easily shall we attain that in speech, with practice and habit applied!

Quod si Antipater ille Sidonius, quem tu probe, Catule, meministi, solitus est versus hexametros aliosque variis modis atque numeris fundere ex tempore tantumque hominis ingeniosi ac memoris valuit exercitatio, ut, cum se mente ac voluntate coniecisset in versum, verba sequerentur; quanto id facilius in oratione, exercitatione et consuetudine adhibita, consequemur!

But that no one may wonder how the multitude of unskilled in listening notices these things — both in every kind, and in this very thing, there is some great force and incredible nature. For all by some silent sense, without any art or reason, distinguish what is right and faulty in arts and reasonings. And while they do this in paintings and statues and other works, for the understanding of which they have less equipment from nature, much more do they show it in the judgment of words, rhythms, and voices, since these are fixed in common sense, and nature has wished none to be wholly without them.

Illud autem ne quis admiretur, quonam modo haec vulgus imperitorum in audiendo notet, cum in omni genere tum in hoc ipso magna quaedam est vis incredibilisque naturae. Omnes enim tacito quodam sensu sine ulla arte aut ratione quae sint in artibus ac rationibus recta ac prava diiudicant; idque cum faciunt in picturis et in signis et in aliis operibus, ad quorum intellegentiam a natura minus habent instrumenti, tum multo ostendunt magis in verborum, numerorum vocumque iudicio; quod ea sunt in communibus infixa sensibus nec earum rerum quemquam funditus natura esse voluit expertem.

So all are moved not only by skilfully placed words, but also by rhythms and voices. For how few there are who hold the art of rhythms and measures? But in these, if there is offence even a little — that anything is made shorter by contraction or longer by drawing out — whole theatres cry out. Does not the same happen in voices, that not only choirs and concerts, but also each one to himself, even singers in mismatch are cast out by the multitude and the people?

Itaque non solum verbis arte positis moventur omnes, verum etiam numeris ac vocibus. Quotus enim quisque est qui teneat artem numerorum ac modorum? At in eis si paulum modo offensum est, ut aut contractione brevius fieret aut productione longius, theatra tota reclamant. Quid, hoc non idem fit in vocibus, ut a multitudine et populo non modo catervae atque concentus, sed etiam ipsi sibi singuli discrepantes eiciantur?

It is wonderful — when there is the greatest difference in doing between the learned and the rude — how little the difference is in judging. For art, since it has set out from nature, unless nature moves and delights, seems to have done nothing at all. There is nothing so akin to our minds as rhythms and voices, by which we are roused and inflamed and softened and made languid and led often to cheerfulness and to gloom. The highest force of which is more apt for songs and singing — not neglected, as it seems to me, by Numa the most learned king and by our ancestors, as the lyres and pipes and verses of the Salii at solemn banquets show; most of all celebrated by ancient Greece. With which and like things would that you had preferred to argue rather than these childish transfers of words!

Mirabile est, cum plurimum in faciendo intersit inter doctum et rudem, quam non multum differat in iudicando. Ars enim cum a natura profecta sit, nisi natura moveat ac delectet, nihil sane egisse videatur; nihil est autem tam cognatum mentibus nostris quam numeri atque voces; quibus et excitamur et incendimur et lenimur et languescimus et ad hilaritatem et ad tristitiam saepe deducimur; quorum illa summa vis carminibus est aptior et cantibus, non neglecta, ut mihi videtur, a Numa rege doctissimo maioribusque nostris, ut epularum sollemnium fides ac tibiae Saliorumque versus indicant; maxime autem a Graecia vetere celebrata. Quibus utinam similibusque de rebus disputari quam de puerilibus his verborum translationibus maluissetis!

But as in a verse the multitude sees if there is a fault, so in our speech, if anything halts, it feels — but it does not pardon the poet, while it grants it to us. Yet all silent see that what we have said is not apt and perfect. Therefore those ancients — as we see today some too — when they could not bring about a circuit and as it were an orb of words (for that we have lately even begun to be able or to dare), used to speak three or two, or some even single words; who in that infancy yet held that natural thing which men’s ears demanded — that what they said should be equal, and they should use equal pauses for breathing.

Verum ut in versu vulgus, si est peccatum, videt, sic, si quid in nostra oratione claudicat, sentit; sed poetae non ignoscit, nobis concedit: taciti tamen omnes non esse illud, quod diximus, aptum perfectumque cernunt. Itaque illi veteres, sicut hodie etiam non nullos videmus, cum circuitum et quasi orbem verborum conficere non possent, nam id quidem nuper vel posse vel audere coepimus, terna aut bina aut non nulli singula etiam verba dicebant; qui in illa infantia naturale illud, quod aures hominum flagitabant, tenebant tamen, ut et illa essent paria, quae dicerent, et aequalibus interspirationibus uterentur.

I have set out, as far as I could, what I judged most pertained to the ornament of speech. For I have spoken of the praise of single words; I have spoken of their joining; I have spoken of rhythm and form. But if you also ask the habit of speech and as it were some colour, there is one full but yet smooth, and one slender, not without sinews and strength, and one which, partaking of each kind, is praised in a certain mediocrity. On these three figures should sit a colour of grace not painted with rouge, but spread by blood.

Exposui fere, ut potui, quae maxime ad ornatum orationis pertinere arbitrabar. Dixi enim de singulorum laude verborum, dixi de coniunctione eorum, dixi de numero atque forma; sed si habitum etiam orationis et quasi colorem aliquem requiritis, est et plena quaedam, sed tamen teres, et tenuis, non sine nervis ac viribus, et ea, quae particeps utriusque generis quadam mediocritate laudatur. His tribus figuris insidere quidam venustatis non fuco inlitus, sed sanguine diffusus debet color.

Then at last this orator must be so shaped by us, both in words and in thoughts, that, as those who use arms or the wrestling-school, he should think he has to have account not only of avoiding or striking, but also that he move with grace; as those who are versed in the handling of arms, so should he in words for the apt composition and becomingness, but in thoughts for the gravity of speech. Words and thoughts are shaped almost countlessly, which I know enough is known to you. But between the shaping of words and of thoughts there is this difference: that of words is removed if you change the words; that of thoughts remains, whatever words you wish to use.

Tum denique hic nobis orator ita conformandus est et verbis et sententiis, ut, quem ad modum qui utuntur armis aut palaestra, non solum sibi vitandi aut feriendi rationem esse habendam putet, sed etiam, ut cum venustate moveatur, ut ei qui in armorum tractatione versantur, sic verbis quidem ad aptam compositionem et decentiam, sententiis vero ad gravitatem orationis utatur. Formantur autem et verba et sententiae paene innumerabiliter, quod satis scio notum esse vobis; sed inter conformationem verborum et sententiarum hoc interest, quod verborum tollitur, si verba mutaris, sententiarum permanet, quibuscumque verbis uti velis.

Although you do this, I yet think you ought to be warned that you should not think there is anything else to be the orator’s, that is outstanding and wonderful, except, in single words, to hold those three things — that we should use transferred words frequently, sometimes coined, rarely also very ancient ones. In the continuous speech, when we have held both the smoothness of joining and the rationale of rhythms which I have spoken of, then must all speech, as it were with lights, be distinguished and frequented with thoughts and words.

Quod quidem vos etsi facitis, tamen admonendos puto, ne quid esse aliud oratoris putetis, quod quidem sit egregium atque mirabile, nisi in singulis verbis illa tria tenere, ut translatis utamur frequenter, interdum factis, raro autem etiam pervetustis. In perpetua autem oratione, cum et coniunctionis levitatem et numerorum, quam dixi, rationem tenuerimus, tum est quasi luminibus distinguenda et frequentanda omnis oratio sententiarum atque verborum.

For dwelling on one subject moves very much; and the bright unfolding and the placing of matters under the eye, almost as if they were being done; which both in setting forth a matter avail most, and for illustrating what is set forth, and for amplifying — so that to those who hear, what we shall amplify shall seem to be as great as speech can effect. To this is contrary often a running over; and signification of more for understanding than you have said; and the distinctly clipped brevity, and lessening, and joined to it the irony not strange to Caesar’s precepts;

Nam et commoratio una in re permultum movet et inlustris explanatio rerumque, quasi gerantur, sub aspectum paene subiectio; quae et in exponenda re plurimum valent et ad inlustrandum id, quod exponitur, et ad amplificandum; ut eis, qui audient, illud, quod augebimus, quantum efficere oratio poterit, tantum esse videatur; et huic contraria saepe percursio est et plus ad intellegendum, quam dixeris, significatio et distincte concisa brevitas et extenuatio et huic adiuncta inlusio a praeceptis Caesaris non abhorrens;

and digression from the subject, in which when there has been pleasure, then the return to the subject ought to be apt and neat. And the laying down of what you are to say; and a setting-apart from what has been said; and a return to the proposition, and repetition, and the apt closing of the reasoning. Then for the sake of amplifying or diminishing, the over-statement and going-beyond truth; and questioning, and a kind of inquiry akin to it, and the setting out of one’s own thought; then that which most as it were creeps into men’s minds: dissimulation that says other things and means other; which is most pleasing when it is handled not with the contention of speech but with conversation. Then doubt; then distribution; then correction either before or after you have spoken or when you reject something from yourself. There is also pre-fortification for what you are to attack, and casting onto another;

et ab re digressio, in qua cum fuerit delectatio, tum reditus ad rem aptus et concinnus esse debebit; propositioque quid sis dicturus et ab eo, quod est dictum, seiunctio et reditus ad propositum et iteratio et rationis apta conclusio; tum augendi minuendive causa veritatis supralatio atque traiectio; et rogatio atque huic finitima quasi percontatio expositioque sententiae suae; tum illa, quae maxime quasi inrepit in hominum mentis, alia dicentis ac significantis dissimulatio; quae est periucunda, cum orationis non contentione, sed sermone tractatur; deinde dubitatio, tum distributio, tum correctio vel ante vel postquam dixeris vel cum aliquid a te ipso reicias; praemunitio etiam est ad id, quod adgrediare, et traiectio in alium;

consultation, which is as it were deliberating with those very ones before whom you speak; the imitation of morals and life either in persons or without them — a great ornament of speech, apt for conciliating minds especially, but often also for moving;

communicatio, quae est quasi cum eis ipsis, apud quos dicas, deliberatio; morum ac vitae imitatio vel in personis vel sine illis, magnum quoddam ornamentum orationis et aptum ad animos conciliandos vel maxime, saepe autem etiam ad commovendos;

the bringing in of feigned persons, the weightiest light of amplifying; description; the leading into error; an impulse to mirth; pre-occupation; then those two which most move: likeness and example; division; interruption; contention; reticence; commendation; some free voice and even unreining for the sake of amplifying; anger; rebuke; promise; entreaty; supplication; a brief turning aside from the proposition (not as the earlier digression); purgation; conciliation; injury; wishing and execration. With these lights mostly thoughts illustrate speech.

personarum ficta inductio vel gravissimum lumen augendi; descriptio, erroris inductio, ad hilaritatem impulsio, anteoccupatio; tum duo illa, quae maxime movent, similitudo et exemplum; digestio, interpellatio, contentio, reticentia, commendatio; vox quaedam libera atque etiam effrenatio augendi causa; iracundia, obiurgatio, promissio, deprecatio, obsecratio, declinatio brevis a proposito, non ut superior illa digressio, purgatio, conciliatio, laesio, optatio atque exsecratio. His fere luminibus inlustrant orationem sententiae.

Of speech itself, as of arms, there is either threat for use and as it were attack, or for grace itself. For doubling of words has sometimes force, sometimes charm; and a word a little changed and bent away; and the frequent repetition of the same word, now from the beginning, now turned to the end; and the rush upon the same words; and concourse and joining and progression and a kind of distinguishing of the same word more often placed; and the recalling of a word; and those that end alike or fall alike or are matched with equal returns or are like one another.

Orationis autem ipsius tamquam armorum est vel ad usum comminatio et quasi petitio vel ad venustatem ipsa m tractatio. Nam et geminatio verborum habet interdum vim, leporem alias, et paulum immutatum verbum atque deflexum et eiusdem verbi crebra tum a primo repetitio, tum in extremum conversio et in eadem verba impetus et concursio et adiunctio et progressio et eiusdem verbi crebrius positi quaedam distinctio et revocatio verbi et illa, quae similiter desinunt aut quae cadunt similiter aut quae paribus paria referuntur aut quae sunt inter se similia.

There is also a kind of climax and turning-back and neat transposition of words; and the contrary; and the loose; and turning aside; and reproof; and exclamation; and lessening; and what is set in many cases; and what, drawn from single matters proposed, is referred to single ones; and the reasoning subjoined to the proposition; and likewise in the distributed the reasoning placed under; and permission; and again another doubt; and something unforeseen; and enumeration; and another correction; and dispersion; and the continuous and the broken; and image; and answer to oneself; and changing; and disjunction; and order; and reference; and digression; and circumscription.

Est etiam gradatio quaedam et conversio et verborum concinna transgressio et contrarium et dissolutum et declinatio et reprehensio et exclamatio et imminutio et quod in multis casibus ponitur et quod de singulis rebus propositis ductum refertur ad singula et ad propositum subiecta ratio et item in distributis supposita ratio et permissio et rursum alia dubitatio et improvisum quiddam et dinumeratio et alia correctio et dissipatio et continuatum et interruptum et imago et sibi ipsi responsio et immutatio et diiunctio et ordo et relatio et digressio et circumscriptio.

These mostly, and like to these, or even more, are those things which by thoughts and shapings of words illustrate speech.” “Which I see you, Crassus,” said Cotta, “— because you think they are known to us — have poured out without definitions and without examples.” “For my part,” said Crassus, “I did not think those things either, which I said before, were new to you, but I obeyed all your wish.

Haec enim sunt fere atque horum similia vel plura etiam esse possunt, quae sententiis orationem verborumque conformationibus inluminent.’ ’Quae quidem te, Crasse, video,’ inquit Cotta ’quod nota esse nobis putes, sine definitionibus et sine exemplis effudisse.’ ’Ego vero’ inquit Crassus ’ne illa quidem, quae supra dixi, nova vobis esse arbitrabar, sed voluntati vestrum omnium parui.

About these matters that sun has admonished me to be briefer, which itself now sliding has compelled me too to roll out these things almost slipping. But yet the demonstration of this kind, and the doctrine itself, is common; the use, however, is the weightiest, and in this whole study of speaking the most difficult.

His autem de rebus sol me ille admonuit, ut brevior essem, qui ipse iam praecipitans me quoque haec praecipitem paene evolvere coegit. Sed tamen huius generis demonstratio est et doctrina ipsa vulgaris; usus autem gravissimus et in hoc toto dicendi studio difficillimus.

Therefore, since about all the ornament of speech all topics have been, if not laid open, at least pointed out, now let us see what is apt — that is, what is most becoming in speech. Although that is plain — that not to every cause, nor every hearer, nor every person, nor every time does one kind of speech agree. For both capital cases require some kind of sound of words, another of private and small ones;

Quam ob rem quoniam de ornatu omni orationis sunt omnes, si non patefacti, at certe commonstrati loci, nunc quid aptum sit, hoc est, quid maxime deceat in oratione, videamus. Quamquam id quidem perspicuum est, non omni causae nec auditori neque personae neque tempori congruere orationis unum genus; nam et causae capitis alium quendam verborum sonum requirunt, alium rerum privatarum atque parvarum;

and another kind of speaking deliberations, another laudations, another judgments, another conversations, another consolation, another rebuke, another disputation, another history requires. It also matters who hear: senate or people or judges; many or few or single, and what kind. The orators themselves, of what age, honour, authority, must seem; the time, of peace or war, of haste or leisure.

et aliud dicendi genus deliberationes, aliud laudationes, aliud iudicia, aliud sermones, aliud consolatio, aliud obiurgatio, aliud disputatio, aliud historia desiderat. Refert etiam qui audiant, senatus an populus an iudices: frequentes an pauci an singuli, et quales: ipsique oratores qua sint aetate, honore, auctoritate, debet videri; tempus, pacis an belli, festinationis an oti.

So in this place there is nothing that can seem to be precepted, save that we choose the figure of fuller and slenderer speech, and likewise of that middle, suited to what we shall be doing. The same ornaments may be used, sometimes more contendedly, sometimes more loosely. To be able in every matter to do what becomes is of art and nature; to know what becomes when, is of prudence.

Itaque hoc loco nihil sane est quod praecipi posse videatur, nisi ut figuram orationis plenioris et tenuioris et item illius mediocris ad id, quod agemus, accommodatam deligamus. Ornamentis eisdem uti fere licebit alias contentius, alias summissius; omnique in re posse quod deceat facere artis et naturae est, scire quid quandoque deceat prudentiae.

But all these things are as they are delivered. Delivery, I say, in speaking, alone is queen. Without this the highest orator can be in no number, and one of middling ability, equipped with this, often surpasses the highest. Demosthenes is said to have given to delivery the first place, when he was asked what was first in speaking; to it the second; to it the third. From which that of Aeschines also seems to me even better said: who, when on account of the disgrace of his trial he had withdrawn from Athens and had betaken himself to Rhodes, asked by the Rhodians, is reported to have read that outstanding speech which he had spoken in Ctesiphon against Demosthenes. When he had read it through, he was asked the next day to read also that which had been said on the other side by Demosthenes for Ctesiphon. When he had read it with most sweet and great voice, all wondering: “How much,” he said, “would you have wondered, if you had heard the man himself!” From which he sufficiently signified how much was in delivery, since he thought the same speech would be another with the speaker changed.

Sed haec omnia perinde sunt, ut aguntur. Actio, inquam, in dicendo una dominatur; sine hac summus orator esse in numero nullo potest, mediocris hac instructus summos saepe superare. Huic primas dedisse Demosthenes dicitur, cum rogaretur, quid in dicendo esset primum; huic secundas, huic tertias; quo mihi melius etiam illud ab Aeschine dictum videri solet; qui cum propter ignominiam iudicii cessisset Athenis et se Rhodum contulisset, rogatus a Rhodiis legisse fertur orationem illam egregiam, quam in Ctesiphontem contra Demosthenem dixerat; qua perlecta petitum ab eo est postridie, ut legeret illam etiam, quae erat contra ab Demosthene pro Ctesiphonte dicta: quam cum suavissima et maxima voce legisset, admirantibus omnibus "quanto" inquit "magis miraremini, si audissetis ipsum!" ex quo satis significavit, quantum esset in actione, qui orationem eandem aliam fore putarit actore mutato.

What was there in Gracchus, whom you better remember, Catulus, that, when I was a boy, was so greatly noted? “Whither, wretched, shall I betake me? Whither shall I turn? To the Capitol? But it is wet with my brother’s blood. Or home? That I see my mother lamenting, wretched, and cast down?” Which were so delivered by him, by his eyes, voice, gesture, that even his enemies could not hold back their tears. These things I say at greater length, because this whole kind orators (who are actors of truth itself) have left, while imitators of truth — actors — have seized it.

Quid fuit in Graccho, quem tu melius, Catule, meministi, quod me puero tanto opere ferretur? "Quo me miser conferam? Quo vertam? In Capitoliumne? At fratris sanguine madet. An domum? Matremne ut miseram lamentantem videam et abiectam?" Quae sic ab illo esse acta constabat oculis, voce, gestu, inimici ut lacrimas tenere non possent. Haec ideo dico pluribus, quod genus hoc totum oratores, qui sunt veritatis ipsius actores, reliquerunt; imitatores autem veritatis, histriones, occupaverunt.

Without doubt in every matter truth conquers imitation; but if it could effect enough in delivery by itself, we should not have need of art at all. But because the movement of the soul, which most must be either declared or imitated by delivery, is often so disturbed that it is obscured and almost overwhelmed, those things must be shaken off which obscure, and those which are eminent and ready must be taken.

Ac sine dubio in omni re vincit imitationem veritas, sed ea si satis in actione efficeret ipsa per sese, arte profecto non egeremus; verum quia animi permotio, quae maxime aut declaranda aut imitanda est actione, perturbata saepe ita est, ut obscuretur ac paene obruatur, discutienda sunt ea, quae obscurant, et ea, quae sunt eminentia et prompta, sumenda.

For every motion of the soul has from nature its own face and sound and gesture; and the whole body of a man, and all his face, and all his voices, like strings on a lyre, so sound, as they are struck by the motion of the soul. For voices, like chords, are stretched, which respond to each touch — sharp, low; quick, slow; great, small. Among all of which yet there is in each kind a moderate one; and from these have flowed several other kinds: smooth, harsh; contracted, diffuse; with continuous, with broken breath; broken, split; thinned, swelled with bent sound;

Omnis enim motus animi suum quendam a natura habet vultum et sonum et gestum; corpusque totum hominis et eius omnis vultus omnesque voces, ut nervi in fidibus, ita sonant, ut a motu animi quoque sunt pulsae. Nam voces ut chordae sunt intentae, quae ad quemque tactum respondeant, acuta gravis, cita tarda, magna parva; quas tamen inter omnis est suo quoque in genere mediocris, atque etiam illa sunt ab his delapsa plura genera, leve asperum, contractum diffusum, continenti spiritu intermisso, fractum scissum, flexo sono extenuatum inflatum;

for there is none of these kinds which is not handled by art and moderation. These are set out for the actor, as for the painter, for varying his colours. For one kind of voice anger takes for itself: sharp, urged on, frequently breaking off: “My brother himself urges me, wretched, to deliver my children to the jaws” — and what you, Antonius, brought forward a little while ago: “Did you dare to set yourself apart” and “Will any one notice this? Bind, beat” — and almost the whole of Atreus. Another, pity and grief: flexible, full, broken, with a tearful voice: “Whither now shall I turn me? What way shall I begin to enter? My father’s house? Or to the daughters of Pelias?” And: “O father, O country, O house of Priam!” — and what follows: “All this I saw burning, and Priam’s life torn from him by force.”

nullum est enim horum generum, quod non arte ac moderatione tractetur. Hi sunt actori, ut pictori, expositi ad variandum colores. Aliud enim vocis genus iracundia sibi sumat, acutum, incitatum, crebro incidens: ipsus hortatur me frater, ut meos malis miser mandarem natos et ea, quae tu dudum, Antoni, protulisti segregare abs te ausu’s ausus es et ecquis hoc animadvortet? vincite et Atreus fere totus. Aliud miseratio ac maeror, flexibile, plenum, interruptum, flebili voce: quo nunc me vortam? quod iter incipiam ingredi? domum paternamne? anne ad Peliae filias? et illa o pater, o patria, o Priami domus! et quae sequuntur haec omnia videi inflammarei, Priamo vi vitam evitarei.

Another, fear: lowered and hesitating and cast down: “In many ways have I been beset — by sickness, exile, and want; then panic has crushed all my wisdom from my breath; my mother threatens dire torment of life and death — what no one is of so firm a mind and so great confidence that he will not feel his blood shrink with fear and grow pale.”

aliud metus, demissum et haesitans et abiectum: multis sum modis circumventus, morbo, exsilio atque inopia: tum pavor sapientiam omnem mi exanimato expectorat; mater terribilem minatur vitae cruciatum et necem, quae nemo est tam firmo ingenio et tanta confidentia, quin refugiat timido sanguen atque exalbescat metu.

Another, force: stretched, vehement, threatening with a kind of impulse of weight: “Again Thyestes comes attended by Atreus; again now he comes upon me, rouses me from rest. A greater mass for me, a greater evil to be mixed, that I may dash and crush his bitter heart.” Another, pleasure: poured out, gentle, tender, cheerful, slack: “But when she had brought to herself the wreath for binding the marriage, while she pretended to give it eagerly to herself, then to you, gaily, learnedly and daintily, she brought it.” Another, distress: without pity, somewhat heavy and brought through with one pressing and tone: “In the season when Paris joined Helen in unwedded marriage, I was then heavy with child, having now fulfilled my months for bearing; at the same time Hecuba bore Polydorus, her last child.”

aliud vis, contentum, vehemens, imminens quadam incitatione gravitatis: iterum Thyestes Atreum adtractatum advenit, iterum iam adgreditur me et quietum exsuscitat. maior mihi moles, maius miscendumst malum, qui illius acerbum cor contundam et comprimam. aliud voluptas, effusum, lene, tenerum, hilaratum ac remissum: sed sibi cum tetulit coronam ob coligandas nuptias, tibi ferebat, cum simulabat se sibi alacriter dare, tum ad te ludibunda docte et delicate detulit. aliud molestia, sine commiseratione grave quoddam et uno pressu ac sono obductum: qua tempestate Helenam Paris innuptis iunxit nuptiis, ego tum gravida, expletis iam fui ad pariendum mensibus; per idem tempus Polydorum Hecuba partu postremo parit.

All these motions gesture must follow — not that of the stage, expressing words, but declaring the whole matter and thought, not by demonstration but by signification, with the inflection of the sides, this strong and manly, not from the stage and from actors but from arms or even from the wrestling-school. The hand less talkative, with the fingers following the words, not expressing them; the arm thrown out longer, like a kind of weapon of speech; the stamp of the foot at the beginning or end of contention.

Omnis autem hos motus subsequi debet gestus, non hic verba exprimens scaenicus, sed universam rem et sententiam non demonstratione, sed significatione declarans, laterum inflexione hac forti ac virili, non ab scaena et histrionibus, sed ab armis aut etiam a palaestra; manus autem minus arguta, digitis subsequens verba, non exprimens; bracchium procerius proiectum quasi quoddam telum orationis; supplosio pedis in contentionibus aut incipiendis aut finiendis.

But all is in the face; in the face itself the eyes hold the lordship over all. Wherefore those old men of ours, who used not to praise even Roscius greatly when he wore a mask. For all action is of the soul, and the face is the image of the soul; the eyes its indicators. For this is the one part of the body which can produce as many significations and changes as there are motions of the soul. Nor is there anyone who could produce the same with eyes shut. Theophrastus indeed says one Tauriscus was wont to call an actor turned away who, in delivering, was looking at something.

Sed in ore sunt omnia, in eo autem ipso dominatus est omnis oculorum; quo melius nostri illi senes, qui personatum ne Roscium quidem magno opere laudabant; animi est enim omnis actio et imago animi vultus, indices oculi: nam haec est una pars corporis, quae, quot animi motus sunt, tot significationes et commutationes possit efficere; neque vero est quisquam qui eadem conivens efficiat. Theophrastus quidem Tauriscum quendam dicit actorem aversum solitum esse dicere, qui in agendo contuens aliquid pronuntiaret.

So great moderation is of the eyes. For the look of the face must not be too much changed, lest we be carried either to ineptitudes or to some crookedness; the eyes are those by whose intentness, slackness, glance, mirth, we should signify the motions of soul aptly with the very kind of speech. For delivery is, as it were, the speech of the body, the more it must be agreeable to the mind. The eyes, however, nature gave us — as to a horse or lion bristles, tail, ears — for declaring the motions of the soul.

Qua re oculorum est magna moderatio; nam oris non est nimium mutanda species, ne aut ad ineptias aut ad pravitatem aliquam deferamur; oculi sunt, quorum tum intentione, tum remissione, tum coniectu, tum hilaritate motus animorum significemus apte cum genere ipso orationis; est enim actio quasi sermo corporis, quo magis menti congruens esse debet; oculos autem natura nobis, ut equo aut leoni saetas, caudam, auris, ad motus animorum declarandos dedit,

Therefore in our delivery, after the voice, the face avails most; and that is governed by the eyes. And in all those things which belong to delivery, there is some force given by nature; for which reason it is by this also that the unskilled, the multitude, indeed the foreigners are most moved. For words move no one save him who is joined by the fellowship of the same tongue. Often keen thoughts also fly past the senses of men not keen. Delivery, which carries on its face the motion of soul, moves all. For all are stirred by the same motions of soul, and recognise them by the same marks in others, and indicate them in themselves.

qua re in hac nostra actione secundum vocem vultus valet; is autem oculis gubernatur. Atque in eis omnibus, quae sunt actionis, inest quaedam vis a natura data; qua re etiam hac imperiti, hac vulgus, hac denique barbari maxime commoventur: verba enim neminem movent nisi eum, qui eiusdem linguae societate coniunctus est, sententiaeque saepe acutae non acutorum hominum sensus praetervolant: actio, quae prae se motum animi fert, omnis movet; isdem enim omnium animi motibus concitantur et eos isdem notis et in aliis agnoscunt et in se ipsi indicant.

For the use and praise of delivery the voice without doubt holds the greatest part; which we must first wish for; then, whatever it shall be, we must guard it. About which it is no part of this kind of precepts how the voice should be served — although I much think it should be served. But this seems not foreign to the duty of this our conversation: that, as I said a little before, in most things what is most useful is also, somehow, most becoming. For nothing is more useful for keeping the voice than frequent change; nothing more harmful than uninterrupted, poured-out contention.

Ad actionis autem usum atque laudem maximam sine dubio partem vox obtinet; quae primum est optanda nobis; deinde, quaecumque erit, ea tuenda; de quo illud iam nihil ad hoc praecipiendi genus, quem ad modum voci serviatur: equidem tamen magno opere censeo serviendum; sed illud videtur ab huius nostri sermonis officio non abhorrere, quod, ut dixi paulo ante, plurimis in rebus quod maxime est utile, id nescio quo pacto etiam decet maxime. Nam ad vocem obtinendam nihil est utilius quam crebra mutatio; nihil perniciosius quam effusa sine intermissione contentio.

What is more apt for our ears and the sweetness of delivery than alternation, variety, change? So that same Gracchus — what you can hear, Catulus, from Licinius your client, a lettered man, whom Gracchus had as a slave at hand — was wont to have, with a little ivory pipe, a man standing secretly behind him when he spoke in assembly, an expert who would quickly blow that note by which he could either rouse him when slack or call him back from contention.” “By Hercules, I have heard,” said Catulus, “and I have often admired that man’s diligence as also learning and science.”

Quid, ad auris nostras et actionis suavitatem quid est vicissitudine et varietate et commutatione aptius? Itaque idem Gracchus, quod potes audire, Catule, ex Licinio cliente tuo, litterato homine, quem servum sibi ille habuit ad manum, cum eburneola solitus est habere fistula qui staret occulte post ipsum, cum contionaretur, peritum hominem, qui inflaret celeriter eum sonum, quo illum aut remissum excitaret aut a contentione revocaret.’ ’Audivi me hercule,’ inquit Catulus ’et saepe sum admiratus hominis cum diligentiam tum etiam doctrinam et scientiam.’

“For my part,” said Crassus, “I am also grieved that those men slipped into that ruin in the commonwealth. But that net is being woven, and that rationale of living in the state is shown to posterity, that we now desire to have like to those citizens whom our fathers did not bear.” “Let go, I beg, that conversation, Crassus,” said Iulius, “and bring yourself back to Gracchus’s pipe; whose rationale I do not yet plainly understand.”

’Ego vero,’ inquit Crassus ’ac doleo quidem illos viros in eam fraudem in re publica esse delapsos; quamquam ea tela texitur et ea in civitate ratio vivendi posteritati ostenditur, ut eorum civium, quos nostri patres non tulerunt, iam similis habere cupiamus.’ ’Mitte, obsecro,’ inquit ’Crasse,’ Iulius ’sermonem istum et te ad Gracchi fistulam refer; cuius ego nondum plane rationem intellego.’

“In every voice,” said Crassus, “there is something middle, but each voice has its own. From this it is useful and pleasant to ascend the voice gradually (for to shout from the start is something rustic), and the same is salutary for confirming the voice. Then there is some extreme of contention, which yet is more inward than the sharpest cry, beyond which the pipe will not let you advance, and now from the very contention will call you back. There is likewise on the contrary something heaviest in slackness, by which one descends as it were by steps of sounds. This variety, and this course through all sounds of voice, will both keep itself, and bring sweetness to delivery. But you will leave the piper at home; the sense of this habit you will bring with you to the Forum.

’In omni voce’ inquit Crassus ’est quiddam medium, sed suum cuique voci: hinc gradatim ascendere vocem utile et suave est (nam a principio clamare agreste quiddam est), et idem illud ad firmandam est vocem salutare; deinde est quiddam contentionis extremum, quod tamen interius est, quam acutissimus clamor, quo te fistula progredi non sinet, et iam ab ipsa contentione revocabit; est item contra quiddam in remissione gravissimum quoque tamquam sonorum gradibus descenditur. Haec varietas et hic per omnis sonos vocis cursus et se tuebitur et actioni adferet suavitatem. Sed fistulatorem domi relinquetis, sensum huius consuetudinis vobiscum ad forum deferetis.

I have brought out what I could, not as I wished but as the straits of time have compelled me; for it is well noted to charge the matter on time, when, if you wished, you could not bring more.” “You yourself,” said Catulus, “have gathered everything, as far as I can judge, so divinely, that you seem not to have taken from the Greeks but to be able to teach those very ones these things. I am glad to have been made partaker of this conversation; and I should have wished my son-in-law, your friend, Hortensius, had been present, whom indeed I trust to be outstanding in all the praises which you have embraced in your speech.”

Edidi, quae potui, non ut volui, sed ut me temporis angustiae coegerunt; scitum est enim causam conferre in tempus, cum adferre plura, si cupias, non queas.’ ’Tu vero’ inquit Catulus ’conlegisti omnia, quantum ego possum iudicare, ita divinitus, ut non a Graecis sumpsisse, sed eos ipsos haec docere posse videare; me quidem istius sermonis participem factum esse gaudeo; ac vellem ut meus gener, sodalis tuus, Hortensius, adfuisset; quem quidem ego confido omnibus istis laudibus, quas tu oratione complexus es, excellentem fore.’

And Crassus: “You say ‘to be’?” he said. “I now judge him so to be, and so judged when, in my consulship, he defended the cause of Africa in the senate, and lately, even more, when he spoke for the king of Bithynia. So you see rightly, Catulus. For I see that to that young man neither nature nor learning is wanting.

Et Crassus ’fore dicis?’ inquit, ’ego vero esse iam iudico et tum iudicavi, cum me consule in senatu causam defendit Africae nuperque etiam magis, cum pro Bithyniae rege dixit. Quam ob rem recte vides, Catule; nihil enim isti adulescenti neque a natura neque a doctrina deesse sentio:

The more, Cotta, you must keep watch and labour, and you, Sulpicius. For he is no middling orator who, as it were, springs up into your generation, but with most keen talent and burning zeal and outstanding learning and singular memory. Whom, although I favour, I yet wish him to excel his own age; that he should outrun you who are so much younger is scarcely honourable.” “But now let us rise,” he said, “and let us care for ourselves and at last loosen our minds and care from this contention of disputation.”

quo magis est tibi, Cotta, et tibi, Sulpici, vigilandum ac laborandum; non enim ille mediocris orator in vestram quasi succrescit aetatem, sed et ingenio peracri et studio flagranti et doctrina eximia et memoria singulari; cui quamquam faveo, tamen illum aetati suae praestare cupio, vobis vero illum tanto minorem praecurrere vix honestum est.’ ’Sed iam surgamus’ inquit ’nosque curemus et aliquando ab hac contentione disputationis animos nostros curamque laxemus.’

C icero by Claude

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