Ad Atticum 8.3
Ad Atticum 8.3
Headnote
Cicero to Atticus, written from Cales on the twelfth day before the Kalends of March 49 BC (the manuscript dateline: Scr. in Caleno xii K. Mart. a. 705 (49)). This is the dramatic centerpiece of Ad Atticum book 8 — the long deliberation letter in which Cicero, having decided in 7.26 that “if there is to be war, I have decided to be with Pompey,” now actually tries the decision against the facts on the ground. Pompey has fallen back to Apulia; Caesar has Picenum; Domitius is bottled up at Corfinium and calling for help. Within days Pompey will fail to relieve him, Domitius will surrender, and the road to Brundisium and across the Adriatic will be all that is left.
The letter is built as a formal deliberatio in two columns: section 2 sets out the case for following Pompey out of Italy (gratitude, friendship, the cause of the Republic, the intolerableness of remaining under one man’s power); sections 3–4 set out the case against, and constitute one of Cicero’s most pitiless audits of Pompey’s whole political career — the indictments lined up in anaphoric ille ille ille, from nursing Caesar up in the first place to the present “most disgraceful flight” from Rome. Section 4 turns to the practical impossibilities: the Lower Sea in midwinter, his brother and son to think of, the fasces laureati of his still-unrelinquished Cilician imperium as so many compedes (“chains”) he would have to drag aboard. Section 6 weighs the historical precedents for staying behind under a tyrant — L.~Philippus, L.~Flaccus, Q.~Mucius Scaevola the Pontifex under Cinna, against Thrasybulus the Athenian liberator — and then circles back to the embarrassment of those same fasces: Caesar might offer a triumph, and to accept or to refuse would be equally ruinous. Section 7 breaks the symmetry with a newsflash: a despatch has just come in by night that Caesar is at Corfinium, that Domitius has a firm army and wants to fight, that Pompey cannot in honour leave him in the lurch; there is even a faint hope from Spain that Afranius is closing in on Trebonius in the Pyrenees. The whole letter, Cicero says at the end, is written sedatiore animo quam proxime scripseram — “with a steadier mind than I wrote with last time” — and ends, characteristically, by laying the whole question back in Atticus’s lap. The section numbering jumps from 4 to 6 (the editors leave no §5) and the manuscript has a textual crux at the sentence on accepting or refusing the offered triumph.
Thrown into confusion by matters of the gravest and most miserable kind, and not having the chance of deliberating with you face to face, I wanted nevertheless to make use of your judgement. The whole deliberation is this: if Pompey leaves Italy, which I suspect he is going to do, what do you think I should do? And so that you can the more easily give me advice, I shall set out briefly what comes into my mind on either side of the question.
maximis et miserrimis rebus perturbatus, cum coram tecum mihi potestas deliberandi non esset, uti tamen tuo consilio volui. deliberatio autem omnis haec est, si Pompeius Italia excedat, quod eum facturum esse suspicor, quid mihi agendum putes. et quo facilius consilium dare possis, quid in utramque partem mihi in mentem veniat explicabo brevi.
What draws me, on the one hand, is Pompey’s signal services on behalf of my own safety, and the close friendship I have with him; and beyond that the cause of the Republic itself; so that it seems to me my course of action must be joined to his course of action, and my fortune to his fortune. There is this further consideration. If I stay, and abandon the company of all those most loyal and most distinguished citizens, I have to fall under the power of one man. He, it is true, gives signs in many ways that he is a friend to me — and that he should be so I took care for, well in advance, as you well know, on suspicion of the storm now hanging over us; nevertheless two things have to be weighed: how much trust can be reposed in him, and whether, even granting it were perfectly certain that he would be a friend to us, it is the part of a brave man and a good citizen to remain in that city in which he has held the highest offices and commands, has accomplished the greatest things, has been invested with the most distinguished priesthood, but will be none of those things which he has been — and to take on the risk of some attendant dishonour, should the day ever come when Pompey recovers the Republic.
cum merita Pompei summa erga salutem meam familiaritasque quae mihi cum eo est, tum ipsa rei publicae causa me adducit ut mihi vel consilium meum cum illius consilio vel fortuna mea cum illius fortuna coniungenda esse videatur. accedit illud. si maneo et illum comitatum optimorum et clarissimorum civium desero, cadendum est in unius potestatem. qui etsi multis rebus significat se nobis esse amicum (et ut esset a me est, tute scis, propter suspicionem huius impendentis tempestatis multo ante provisum), tamen utrumque considerandum est et quanta fides ei sit habenda et, si maxime exploratum sit eum nobis amicum fore, sitne viri fortis et boni civis esse in ea urbe in qua cum summis honoribus imperiisque usus sit, res maximas gesserit, sacerdotio sit amplissimo praeditus, non futurus sit, qui fuerit, subeundumque periculum sit cum aliquo fore dedecore, si quando Pompeius rem publicam reciperarit.
On this side of the matter, then, these are the considerations. Look now at what stands on the other side. Nothing has been done by our Pompey wisely, nothing bravely; I add: nothing except against my advice and my authority. I leave aside the old chapters — that it was he who nursed up Caesar against the Republic, who built him up, who armed him; he the sponsor of laws carried by violence and against the auspices; he the annexer of Further Gaul; he the father-in-law; he the augur at the adoption of P. Clodius; he keener on bringing me back than on never letting me be expelled; he the extender of Caesar’s province; he his abettor in everything during his absence; he too, in his own third consulship, when he had at last begun to act the defender of the Republic, who exerted himself to have ten tribunes of the plebs propose that Caesar’s candidacy be considered in his absence — a point he also ratified by a law of his own — and who, on the Kalends of March, blocked the consul Marcus Marcellus when Marcellus was moving to set a term to Caesar’s command of the Gauls. But, leaving those things aside, what could be more shameful, what more disordered, than this departure from the city — or rather, this most disgraceful flight? What terms would not have been worth accepting, rather than abandoning one’s country?
in hac parte haec sunt. vide nunc quae sint in altera. nihil actum est a Pompeio nostro sapienter, nihil fortiter, addo etiam nihil nisi contra consilium auctoritatemque meam. omitto illa vetera, quod istum in rem publicam ille aluit, auxit, armavit, ille legibus per vim et contra auspicia ferendis auctor, ille Galliae ulterioris adiunctor, ille gener, ille in adoptando P. Clodio augur, ille restituendi mei quam retinendi studiosior, ille provinciae propagator, ille absentis in omnibus adiutor, idem etiam tertio consulatu, postquam esse defensor rei publicae coepit, contendit ut decem tribuni pl. ferrent ut absentis ratio haberetur, quod idem ipse sanxit lege quadam sua, Marcoque Marcello consuli finienti provincias Gallias Kalendarum Martiarum die restitit—sed ut haec omittam, quid foedius, quid perturbatius hoc ab urbe discessu sive potius turpissima fuga? quae condicio non accipienda fuit potius quam relinquenda patria?
The terms were bad, I grant; but was anything worse than this? “But he will recover the Republic.” When? Or what has been put in readiness toward that hope? Has not the Picene country been lost? Has not the road to the city been thrown open? Has not all the money, both public and private, been handed over to the adversary? In short there is no cause, no force, no place to which any who wish the Republic defended can muster. Apulia has been chosen, the emptiest part of Italy and the one furthest removed from the brunt of this war; it looks like flight, and access to the sea, sought out of despair. I took Capua unwillingly, not that I would shirk that duty, but in a cause in which there was no resentment from any order, no open resentment from private citizens, some from the loyal but blunted, as such resentment commonly is; and, as I myself perceived, the mass of people and every man at the bottom of the heap was leaning to the other side, and many were hungry for an overturn of affairs — I told the man himself I would take nothing on without a garrison and without money. So I had nothing whatever to do, because I saw from the start that nothing was being looked for but flight. If I follow that flight now, where to? Not with him: when I had set out to join him, I found out that Caesar was in those parts, so that I could not safely reach Luceria. We should have to sail the Lower Sea, on an uncertain course, in the dead of winter. Come now: with my brother, or without him and with my son? But how? In either alternative there will be the greatest difficulty and the greatest pain of mind. And what an onslaught there will be from Caesar against us when we are gone, and against our property! sharper than against the rest, because he will think perhaps that in doing violence to us he has something which will play well with the people. Come now, these chains of mine, these laurelled fasces of mine I mean, how troublesome to carry them out of Italy! And what place will be safe for us, even granting that the waves are calmed for our use, until we have come to Pompey? And by what route, or to where, we have no idea.
malae condiciones erant, fateor, sed num quid hoc peius? at reciperabit rem publicam. quando? aut quid ad eam spem est parati? non ager Picenus amissus? non patefactum iter ad urbem? non pecunia omnis et publica et privata adversario tradita? denique nulla causa, nullae vires, nulla sedes quo concurrant qui rem publicam defensam velint. Apulia delecta est, inanissima pars Italiae et ab impetu huius belli remotissima; fuga et maritima opportunitas visa quaeri desperatione. invite cepi Capuam, non quo munus illud defugerem, sed in ea causa in qua nullus esset ordinum, nullus apertus privatorum dolor, bonorum autem esset aliquis sed hebes, ut solet, et, ut ipse sensi, esset multitudo et infimus quisque propensus in alteram partem, multi mutationis rerum cupidi, dixi ipsi me nihil suscepturum sine praesidio et sine pecunia. itaque habui nihil omnino negoti, quod ab initio vidi nihil quaeri praeter fugam. eam si nunc sequor, quonam? cum illo non; ad quem cum essem profectus, cognovi in iis locis esse Caesarem, ut tuto Luceriam venire non possem. infero mari nobis incerto cursu hieme maxima navigandum est. age iam, cum fratre an sine eo cum filio? at quo modo? in utraque enim re summa difficultas erit summus animi dolor; qui autem impetus illius erit in nos absentis fortunasque nostras! acrior quam in ceterorum, quod putabit fortasse in nobis violandis aliquid se habere populare. age iam, has compedes, fascis, inquam, hos laureatos ecferre ex Italia quam molestum est! qui autem locus erit nobis tutus, ut iam placatis utamur fluctibus, ante quam ad illum venerimus? qua autem aut quo nihil scimus.
But if I stay behind, and there proves to be a place for me on this side, I shall have done what L. Philippus did in the supremacy of Cinna, what L. Flaccus did, what Q. Mucius did — however that course of action in the end fell out for the last of them; he used to say even so that he saw that what did happen would happen, but preferred this to coming armed against the walls of his country. Thrasybulus did otherwise, and perhaps better. But there is a settled rationale and view in that course of Mucius’s; there is also one in that of Philippus; and one must serve the time, and one must not let the time slip when it is given. But on this very point those same fasces of mine bring their own embarrassment. Suppose he is a friend to me — which is uncertain, but suppose it: he will offer a triumph. Not to accept may be dangerous; to accept would be invidious in the eyes of the loyalists. “What a difficult and inextricable matter!” you say. And yet it must be extricated. For what else can be done? And lest you suppose me more inclined to staying because I have used more words on that side — it may be, as happens in many investigations, that this side is the more voluble and that the more true. So, as one deliberating with even temper on a matter of the highest moment, please give me your counsel. A ship has been got ready for us both at Caieta and at Brundisium.
at si restitero et fuerit nobis in hac parte locus, idem fecero quod in Cinnae dominatione L. Philippus, quod L. Flaccus, quod Q. Mucius, quoquo modo ea res huic quidem cecidit; qui tamen ita dicere solebat se id fore videre quod factum est sed malle quam armatum ad patriae moenia accedere. aliter Thrasybulus et fortasse melius. sed est certa quaedam illa Muci ratio atque sententia, est illa etiam Philippi, et cum sit necesse servire tempori et non amittere tempus cum sit datum. sed in hoc ipso habent tamen idem fasces molestiam. sit enim nobis amicus, quod incertum est, sed sit; deferet triumphum. † non accipere ne periculosum sit,† invidiosum ad bonos. o rem inquis difficilem et inexplicabilem! atqui explicanda est. quid enim fieri potest? ac ne me existimaris ad manendum esse propensiorem quod plura in eam partem verba fecerim, potest fieri, quod fit in multis quaestionibus, ut res verbosior haec fuerit, illa verior. quam ob rem ut maxima de re aequo animo deliberanti ita mihi des consilium velim. navis et in Caieta est parata nobis et Brundisi.
But look — news, while I am writing this very letter by night here at Cales; look — a despatch: Caesar at Corfinium, Domitius at Corfinium with a firm army and eager to fight. I do not think our Gnaeus will so far commit himself as to leave Domitius in the lurch — although he had sent Scipio ahead to Brundisium with two cohorts, and had written to the consuls that the legion which Faustus had levied for him should, by his preference, be led to Sicily by the consul. But to desert Domitius will be shameful when Domitius is calling for his help. I have a hope — not, indeed, a great one, but in these parts a firm one — that Afranius has fought Trebonius in the Pyrenees, that Trebonius has been driven off, and that your Fabius too has come over with cohorts; the upshot being that Afranius is approaching with large forces. If that is so, perhaps the war will be carried on in Italy. As for myself, since Caesar’s route was uncertain — he was thought likely to march either to Capua or to Luceria — I sent Lepta to Pompey with a letter; I myself returned to Formiae so as not to fall into his hands somewhere. I wanted you to know all this, and I have written it with a steadier mind than I wrote with last time, putting in no judgement of my own but asking for yours.
sed ecce nuntii scribente me haec ipsa noctu in Caleno, ecce litterae Caesarem ad Corfinium, Domitium Corfini cum firmo exercitu et pugnare cupiente. non puto etiam hoc Gnaeum nostrum commissurum ut Domitium relinquat; etsi Brundisium Scipionem cum cohortibus duabus praemiserat, legionem ei Fausto conscriptam in Siciliam sibi placere a consule duci scripserat ad consules. sed turpe Domitium deserere erit implorantem eius auxilium. est quaedam spes mihi quidem non magna sed in his locis firma Afranium in Pyrenaeo cum Trebonio pugnasse, pulsum Trebonium, etiam Fabium tuum transisse cum cohortibus, summa autem Afranium cum magnis copiis adventare. id si est, in Italia fortasse manebitur. ego autem cum esset incertum iter Caesaris, quod vel ad Capuam vel ad Luceriam iturus putabatur, Leptam misi ad Pompeium et litteras; ipse ne quo inciderem reverti Formias. haec te scire volui scripsique sedatiore animo quam proxime scripseram, nullum meum iudicium interponens sed exquirens tuum.