After I had heard Antiochus, Brutus, as was my habit, in the company of M. Piso, in the gymnasium that is called the Ptolemaeum, and with us my brother Quintus and T. Pomponius and Lucius Cicero — my cousin by blood, but a brother in affection — we agreed among ourselves to spend the afternoon walking in the Academy, chiefly because at that hour the place would be free of every crowd. And so at the appointed time we all went to Piso. From there, with talk of this and that, we covered those six stades from the Dipylon. When we had come into the spaces of the Academy, which are not without reason famous, we found the solitude we had wanted.

Non eram nescius, Brute, cum, quae summis ingeniis exquisitaque doctrina philosophi Graeco sermone tractavissent, ea Latinis litteris mandaremus, fore ut hic noster labor in varias reprehensiones incurreret. nam quibusdam, et iis quidem non admodum indoctis, totum hoc displicet philosophari. quidam autem non tam id reprehendunt, si remissius agatur, sed tantum studium tamque multam operam ponendam in eo non arbitrantur. erunt etiam, et ii quidem eruditi Graecis litteris, contemnentes Latinas, qui se dicant in Graecis legendis operam malle consumere. postremo aliquos futuros suspicor, qui me ad alias litteras vocent, genus hoc scribendi, etsi sit elegans, personae tamen et dignitatis esse negent.

Then Piso said: ’Should I call it something given us by nature, or some kind of illusion, that when we see the very places in which we have learned that men worthy of remembrance spent much of their time, we are moved more deeply than when we hear of the deeds of those same men, or read some piece of their writing? Just so I am moved now. For Plato comes into my mind, who we are told was the first to make a practice of holding discussions here; and those little gardens of his close by do not merely bring him to my memory but seem to set the man himself before my eyes. Here was Speusippus, here Xenocrates, here his pupil Polemo — whose very seat that was, the one we see. And for my own part, when I would look upon our own Senate-house — the Hostilian, I mean, not this new one, which seems to me smaller now that it has been made larger — I used to call to mind Scipio, Cato, Laelius, and above all my own grandfather; so great is the power of suggestion that lies in places; with good reason, then, has the art of memory been derived from them.’

contra quos omnis dicendum breviter existimo. Quamquam philosophiae quidem vituperatoribus satis responsum est eo libro, quo a nobis philosophia defensa et collaudata est, cum esset accusata et vituperata ab Hortensio. qui liber cum et tibi probatus videretur et iis, quos ego posse iudicare arbitrarer, plura suscepi veritus ne movere hominum studia viderer, retinere non posse. Qui autem, si maxime hoc placeat, moderatius tamen id volunt fieri, difficilem quandam temperantiam postulant in eo, quod semel admissum coe+rceri reprimique non potest, ut propemodum iustioribus utamur illis, qui omnino avocent a philosophia, quam his, qui rebus infinitis modum constituant in reque eo meliore, quo maior sit, mediocritatem desiderent.

Then Quintus said: ’It is exactly as you say, Piso. For just now, as I was coming here, that spot of Colonus turned my own thoughts toward itself, where its inhabitant Sophocles came before my eyes — Sophocles, whom you know how I admire and how I delight in him. Indeed, a kind of vision stirred me toward an older memory still, of Oedipus coming to this place and asking, in that most tender song, what these very spots might be — to no purpose, of course, yet it stirred me all the same.’ Then Pomponius said: ’But as for me, whom you are all in the habit of attacking as a devotee of Epicurus, I spend much time, as you know, with Phaedrus — whom I love beyond all others — in the gardens of Epicurus, which we passed by just now; yet, warned by the old proverb, I bear the living in mind, and still I cannot forget Epicurus, even were I to wish it, since my friends keep his likeness not only on their tablets but even on their cups and on their rings.’

sive enim ad sapientiam perveniri potest, non paranda nobis solum ea, sed fruenda etiam sapientia est; sive hoc difficile est, tamen nec modus est ullus investigandi veri, nisi inveneris, et quaerendi defatigatio turpis est, cum id, quod quaeritur, sit pulcherrimum. etenim si delectamur, cum scribimus, quis est tam invidus, qui ab eo nos abducat? sin laboramus, quis est, qui alienae modum statuat industriae? nam ut Terentianus Chremes non inhumanus, qui novum vicinum non vult ’fodere au/t arare aut a/liquid ferre de/nique’— non enim illum ab industria, sed ab inliberali labore deterret—, sic isti curiosi, quos offendit noster minime nobis iniucundus labor.

Here I said: ’Our friend Pomponius is plainly making a joke, and perhaps within his rights. For he has so settled himself at Athens that he is all but one of the Attics, and looks likely to earn that very surname. But I agree with you, Piso, that this is what happens in practice: that at the prompting of places we think rather more keenly and attentively about famous men. For you know that once I came with you to Metapontum, and would not turn aside to my host before I had seen that very place where Pythagoras ended his life, and his seat. But at this present time, though there are throughout every quarter of Athens, in the very places themselves, many tokens of men of the highest greatness, still it is that recess that moves me. For only a little while ago it belonged to Carneades, whom I seem to see — for his likeness is well known — and I think that the very seat, robbed of so great a greatness of genius, longs for that voice of his.’

Iis igitur est difficilius satis facere, qui se Latina scripta dicunt contemnere. in quibus hoc primum est in quo admirer, cur in gravissimis rebus non delectet eos sermo patrius, cum idem fabellas Latinas ad verbum e Graecis expressas non inviti legant. quis enim tam inimicus paene nomini Romano est, qui Ennii Medeam aut Antiopam Pacuvii spernat aut reiciat, quod se isdem Euripidis fabulis delectari dicat, Latinas litteras oderit? Synephebos ego, inquit, potius Caecilii aut Andriam Terentii quam utramque Menandri legam? A quibus tantum dissentio, ut, cum Sophocles vel optime scripserit Electram, tamen male conversam Atilii mihi legendam putem, de quo Lucilius:

Then Piso said: ’Since, then, each of us has something to say, what of our friend Lucius? Does he gladly visit the spot where Demosthenes and Aeschines used to fight it out against each other? For each man is drawn most by his own pursuit.’ And he, blushing, said: ’Do not ask it of me — I, who have even gone down to the Phaleric shore, to the place where they say Demosthenes used to declaim against the surf, to train himself to master the roar with his voice. And only just now I turned a little to the right off the road, to approach the tomb of Pericles. Though indeed there is no end of that in this city; for wherever we set foot, we set it down on some piece of history.’

’ferreum scriptorem’, verum, opinor, scriptorem tamen, ut legendus sit. rudem enim esse omnino in nostris poe+tis aut inertissimae segnitiae est aut fastidii delicatissimi. mihi quidem nulli satis eruditi videntur, quibus nostra ignota sunt. an Utina/m ne in nemore nihilo minus legimus quam hoc idem Graecum, quae autem de bene beateque vivendo a Platone disputata sunt, haec explicari non placebit Latine?

Then Piso said: ’And yet, Cicero, those pursuits of yours, if they look to the imitation of great men, are the mark of men of talent; but if only to the learning of the tokens of ancient memory, of the merely curious. We all urge you — already at a run, I hope — not only to wish to know the men you wish to know, but to wish to imitate them too.’ Here I said: ’Although this young man, as you see, Piso, is doing what you prescribe, still your encouragement is welcome to me.’ Then he, in the most friendly way, as was his habit, said: ’Let us all, indeed, bring everything we can to bear upon this young man’s coming of age, and above all that he impart something of his own studies to philosophy as well — whether to imitate you, whom he loves, or to be able to do that very thing he pursues with more grace. But are you to be urged by us, Lucius, or are you already inclined of your own accord? To me, at least, you seem to attend to Antiochus, whom you hear, well enough.’ Then he, shyly, or rather modestly, said: ’I do indeed; but did you hear, just now, about Carneades? I am carried off that way — yet Antiochus calls me back, and there is no one else for us to hear besides.’

Quid? si nos non interpretum fungimur munere, sed tuemur ea, quae dicta sunt ab iis, quos probamus, eisque nostrum iudicium et nostrum scribendi ordinem adiungimus, quid habent, cur Graeca anteponant iis, quae et splendide dicta sint neque sint conversa de Graecis? nam si dicent ab illis has res esse tractatas, ne ipsos quidem Graecos est cur tam multos legant, quam legendi sunt. quid enim est a Chrysippo praetermissum in Stoicis? legimus tamen Diogenem, Antipatrum, Mnesarchum, Panaetium, multos alios in primisque familiarem nostrum Posidonium. quid? Theophrastus mediocriterne delectat, cum tractat locos ab Aristotele ante tractatos? quid? Epicurei num desistunt de isdem, de quibus et ab Epicuro scriptum est et ab antiquis, ad arbitrium suum scribere? quodsi Graeci leguntur a Graecis isdem de rebus alia ratione compositis, quid est, cur nostri a nostris non legantur?

Then Piso said: ’Although this, perhaps, will not be allowed to pass off so easily, since he is here’ — he meant me — ’still I shall make bold to call you back from this New Academy to that old one, in which, as you used to hear Antiochus say, there are reckoned not only those who are called Academics — Speusippus, Xenocrates, Polemo, Crantor, and the rest — but also the old Peripatetics, whose chief was Aristotle, whom, excepting Plato, I should perhaps not be wrong to call the chief of philosophers. Turn yourself, then, to them, I beg you. For from their writings and their teachings one may draw not only all liberal learning, all history, all elegant discourse, but there is besides such a variety of arts in them that no one, without that equipment, can come properly furnished to any of the more distinguished tasks. From these men have arisen orators, from these generals and leaders of commonwealths. To come to lesser matters: mathematicians, poets, musicians, and physicians too have set out, in the end, from this workshop, as it were, of every craftsman.’ And I said:

Quamquam, si plane sic verterem Platonem aut Aristotelem, ut verterunt nostri poe+tae fabulas, male, credo, mererer de meis civibus, si ad eorum cognitionem divina illa ingenia transferrem. sed id neque feci adhuc nec mihi tamen, ne faciam, interdictum puto. locos quidem quosdam, si videbitur, transferam, et maxime ab iis, quos modo nominavi, cum inciderit, ut id apte fieri possit, ut ab Homero Ennius, Afranius a Menandro solet. Nec vero, ut noster Lucilius, recusabo, quo minus omnes mea legant. utinam esset ille Persius, Scipio vero et Rutilius multo etiam magis, quorum ille iudicium reformidans Tarentinis ait se et Consentinis et Siculis scribere. facete is quidem, sicut alia; sed neque tam docti tum erant, ad quorum iudicium elaboraret, et sunt illius scripta leviora, ut urbanitas summa appareat, doctrina mediocris.

’You know I feel the very same, Piso; but you have made mention of the matter at a good moment. For my friend Cicero here is eager to hear what the view is, regarding the ends of goods, of that old Academy you speak of, and of the Peripatetics. And we think you can explain it most easily, since you had Staseas of Naples with you for many years, and since for several months now we have seen you inquiring into these very things at Athens from Antiochus.’ And he, laughing, said: ’Come, come’ — for you wished, cleverly enough, to make me the starting-point of our discussion — ’let us set it out for the young man, if by chance we are able. For this solitude grants us what, were some god to promise it, I should never have thought possible: that I should hold a discussion in the Academy, like a philosopher. But let me not, while I oblige him, be a burden to you.’ ’A burden to me,’ I said, ’who asked you for this very thing?’ Then, when Quintus and Pomponius had said that they wished the same, Piso began. And do attend, I beg you, Brutus, to his discourse, and judge whether it seems to have embraced sufficiently the view of Antiochus — a view I take to be the one you most approve, since you have often heard his brother Aristus.

ego autem quem timeam lectorem, cum ad te ne Graecis quidem cedentem in philosophia audeam scribere? quamquam a te ipso id quidem facio provocatus gratissimo mihi libro, quem ad me de virtute misisti. Sed ex eo credo quibusdam usu venire, ut abhorreant a Latinis, quod inciderint in inculta quaedam et horrida, de malis Graecis Latine scripta deterius. quibus ego assentior, dum modo de isdem rebus ne Graecos quidem legendos putent. res vero bonas verbis electis graviter ornateque dictas quis non legat? nisi qui se plane Graecum dici velit, ut a Scaevola est praetore salutatus Athenis Albucius.

He spoke, then, thus: ’How much ornament there is in the discipline of the Peripatetics has been said by me, as briefly as I could, a little while ago. But the form of that discipline, as of nearly all the rest, is threefold: one part is of nature, a second of reasoning, a third of living. Nature was investigated by them in such a way that no part of sky, sea, or land — to speak in the poet’s manner — was passed over; indeed, when they had spoken of the first beginnings of things and of the whole world, so as to draw their conclusions not only by probable argument but even by the necessary reasoning of the mathematicians, they brought the greatest store of material, from things investigated for their own sake, to the knowledge of hidden things.

quem quidem locum comit multa venustate et omni sale idem Lucilius, apud quem praeclare Scaevola: Graecum te, Albuci, quam Romanum atque Sabinum, municipem Ponti, Tritani, centurionum, praeclarorum hominum ac primorum signiferumque, maluisti dici. Graece ergo praetor Athenis, id quod maluisti, te, cum ad me accedis, saluto: ’chaere,’ inquam, Tite! lictores, turma omnis chorusque: ’chaere, Tite!’ hinc hostis mi Albucius, hinc inimicus. Sed iure Mucius.

Aristotle pursued the origins, the ways of life, and the forms of all living creatures; Theophrastus, for his part, the natures of plants and the causes and accounts of nearly all the things brought forth from the earth; and from this knowledge the investigation of the most hidden things was made easier. By the same men were handed down precepts of reasoning, not by dialectic alone but by oratory too; and by Aristotle, as its chief author, the exercise of speaking on both sides of single questions was established — not so as always to argue against everything, in the manner of Arcesilas, and yet so as, in all matters, to bring out whatever could be said on either side.

ego autem mirari satis non queo unde hoc sit tam insolens domesticarum rerum fastidium. non est omnino hic docendi locus; sed ita sentio et saepe disserui, Latinam linguam non modo non inopem, ut vulgo putarent, sed locupletiorem etiam esse quam Graecam. quando enim nobis, vel dicam aut oratoribus bonis aut poe+tis, postea quidem quam fuit quem imitarentur, ullus orationis vel copiosae vel elegantis ornatus defuit? Ego vero, quoniam forensibus operis, laboribus, periculis non deseruisse mihi videor praesidium, in quo a populo Romano locatus sum, debeo profecto, quantumcumque possum, in eo quoque elaborare, ut sint opera, studio, labore meo doctiores cives mei, nec cum istis tantopere pugnare, qui Graeca legere malint, modo legant illa ipsa, ne simulent, et iis servire, qui vel utrisque litteris uti velint vel, si suas habent, illas non magnopere desiderent.

And when the third part sought the precepts of living well, that too was applied by them not only to the conduct of private life but also to the governing of commonwealths. From Aristotle we have learned the customs, institutions, and disciplines of nearly all the states not of Greece only but of the barbarian world as well; from Theophrastus, even their laws. And whereas each of them had taught what kind of leader it befits a man to be in a commonwealth, and had written besides, at greater length, what the best condition of a commonwealth might be, Theophrastus did this further: he showed what tendencies there are in a commonwealth, and what shifts of circumstance, by which one must steer as the situation may require. But as for the manner of passing one’s life, the one that most pleased them was indeed the quiet one, set in the contemplation and the knowledge of things; and because this was most like to the life of the gods, it seemed most worthy of the wise man. And on these matters their discourse is splendid and illustrious.

qui autem alia malunt scribi a nobis, aequi esse debent, quod et scripta multa sunt, sic ut plura nemini e nostris, et scribentur fortasse plura, si vita suppetet; et tamen, qui diligenter haec, quae de philosophia litteris mandamus, legere assueverit, iudicabit nulla ad legendum his esse potiora. quid est enim in vita tantopere quaerendum quam cum omnia in philosophia, tum id, quod his libris quaeritur, qui sit finis, quid extremum, quid ultimum, quo sint omnia bene vivendi recteque faciendi consilia referenda, quid sequatur natura ut summum ex rebus expetendis, quid fugiat ut extremum malorum? qua de re cum sit inter doctissimos summa dissensio, quis alienum putet eius esse dignitatis, quam mihi quisque tribuat, quid in omni munere vitae optimum et verissimum sit, exquirere?

As to the highest good, however — since there are two kinds of their books, one written for the public, which they called exoterikon, the other more finely worked, which they left in their notebooks — they do not always seem to say the same thing; and yet on the substance itself there is no inconsistency, at least among those I have named, nor any disagreement among them. But when the happy life is the question, and this is the one thing that philosophy ought to look to and to follow, whether it lies wholly within the power of the wise man or can be either shaken or torn away by adverse circumstances — on this they do at times seem to differ among themselves and to be in doubt. This is brought out most of all by Theophrastus’ book on the happy life, in which a great deal is granted to fortune. And if this is so, wisdom could not guarantee a happy life. This account seems to me too delicate, so to speak, and too soft, for what the force and gravity of virtue demands. Let us hold, then, to Aristotle and to his son Nicomachus, whose carefully written books on ethics are said indeed to be Aristotle’s own — though I do not see why the son could not have been like the father. As for Theophrastus, let us call upon him for most things, provided only that we hold to more firmness and strength in virtue than he held to. Let us be content, then, with these men.

an, partus ancillae sitne in fructu habendus, disseretur inter principes civitatis, P. Scaevolam M’. que Manilium, ab iisque M. Brutus dissentiet—quod et acutum genus est et ad usus civium non inutile, nosque ea scripta reliquaque eiusdem generis et legimus libenter et legemus—, haec, quae vitam omnem continent, neglegentur? nam, ut sint illa vendibiliora, haec uberiora certe sunt. quamquam id quidem licebit iis existimare, qui legerint. nos autem hanc omnem quaestionem de finibus bonorum et malorum fere a nobis explicatam esse his litteris arbitramur, in quibus, quantum potuimus, non modo quid nobis probaretur, sed etiam quid a singulis philosophiae disciplinis diceretur, persecuti sumus.

For their successors are, in my view, better than the philosophers of the other schools, but they so degenerate that they seem to have been born of their own selves. First, Theophrastus’ pupil Strato wished to be a natural philosopher; and in that, though he is great, still most of his work is novel, and very little of it concerns ethics. His pupil Lyco is rich in language, but rather thin in matters themselves. Lyco’s pupil Aristo is then neat and elegant, but that gravity which is looked for in a great philosopher was not in him; his writings are indeed many and polished, but somehow his discourse has no authority.

Ut autem a facillimis ordiamur, prima veniat in medium Epicuri ratio, quae plerisque notissima est. quam a nobis sic intelleges expositam, ut ab ipsis, qui eam disciplinam probant, non soleat accuratius explicari; verum enim invenire volumus, non tamquam adversarium aliquem convincere. accurate autem quondam a L. Torquato, homine omni doctrina erudito, defensa est Epicuri sententia de voluptate, a meque ei responsum, cum C. Triarius, in primis gravis et doctus adolescens, ei disputationi interesset.

I pass over many, among them a learned and agreeable man, Hieronymus — whom I no longer know why I should call a Peripatetic. For he set out freedom from pain as the highest good; and whoever disagrees about the highest good disagrees about the whole scheme of philosophy. Critolaus wished to imitate the ancients, and is indeed nearest to them in gravity, and his discourse runs full; and yet not even he stays within the institutions of his fathers. Diodorus, his pupil, adds freedom from pain to honour. He too is his own man, and, disagreeing about the highest good, cannot truly be called a Peripatetic. But the view of the ancients our friend Antiochus seems to me to follow most carefully, and he teaches that this same view was Aristotle’s and Polemo’s.

nam cum ad me in Cumanum salutandi causa uterque venisset, pauca primo inter nos de litteris, quarum summum erat in utroque studium, deinde Torquatus: Quoniam nacti te, inquit, sumus aliquando otiosum, certe audiam, quid sit, quod Epicurum nostrum non tu quidem oderis, ut fere faciunt, qui ab eo dissentiunt, sed certe non probes, eum quem ego arbitror unum vidisse verum maximisque erroribus animos hominum liberavisse et omnia tradidisse, quae pertinerent ad bene beateque vivendum. sed existimo te, sicut nostrum Triarium, minus ab eo delectari, quod ista Platonis, Aristoteli, Theophrasti orationis ornamenta neglexerit. nam illud quidem adduci vix possum, ut ea, quae senserit ille, tibi non vera videantur.

Our friend Lucius does wisely, then, in wishing above all to hear about the highest good; for once this is settled, everything in philosophy is settled. For in other matters, if anything has been passed over or left unknown, there is no more inconvenience than the worth of whichever of those things it is in which something has been neglected. But if the highest good is unknown, the plan of living must of necessity be unknown too; and from this there follows so great an error that men cannot know to what harbour they should make their way. But once the ends of things are known, when it is understood what is the limit both of goods and of evils, the road of life has been found, and the shaping of all our duties, since it is then asked to what each thing is to be referred;

Vide, quantum, inquam, fallare, Torquate. oratio me istius philosophi non offendit; nam et complectitur verbis, quod vult, et dicit plane, quod intellegam; et tamen ego a philosopho, si afferat eloquentiam, non asperner, si non habeat, non admodum flagitem. re mihi non aeque satisfacit, et quidem locis pluribus. sed quot homines, tot sententiae; falli igitur possumus. Quam ob rem tandem, inquit, non satisfacit? te enim iudicem aequum puto, modo quae dicat ille bene noris.

from which the plan of living happily — the thing all men long for — can be found and procured. And since there is great disagreement as to wherein this lies, we must call in that division of Carneades which our friend Antiochus is glad to use. For he saw not only how many views of the highest good there had been among philosophers up to now, but how many altogether there could possibly be. He used to deny, then, that there is any art that proceeds from itself; for the thing grasped by an art is always external to it. There is no need to make this longer with examples. For it is plain that no art turns upon itself, but that the art is one thing and the object set before the art another. Since, therefore, just as medicine is the art of health and steering the art of navigation, so prudence is the art of living, it follows of necessity that this too has been established and set going from some thing outside itself.

Nisi mihi Phaedrum, inquam, tu mentitum aut Zenonem putas, quorum utrumque audivi, cum mihi nihil sane praeter sedulitatem probarent, omnes mihi Epicuri sententiae satis notae sunt. atque eos, quos nominavi, cum Attico nostro frequenter audivi, cum miraretur ille quidem utrumque, Phaedrum autem etiam amaret, cotidieque inter nos ea, quae audiebamus, conferebamus, neque erat umquam controversia, quid ego intellegerem, sed quid probarem.

On one point, however, nearly all are agreed: that the thing with which wisdom is concerned, and which it aims to attain, must be suited and adapted to nature, and of such a kind that it invites and draws on the mind’s appetite of its own accord — what the Greeks call hormē. But what that thing is which moves us in this way and is sought by nature at the very first dawning of life — on this there is no agreement, and it is here, when the highest good is investigated, that the whole disagreement among the philosophers lies. For the whole of that inquiry which concerns the ends of good and evil — when we ask what among these is the furthest and the ultimate — has its source to be found in the question of where the first promptings of nature lie; once that is discovered, the entire discussion of the highest good and evil is drawn from it as from a head. Some hold that the first appetite is for pleasure and the first recoil from pain. Others judge that freedom from pain is what is first taken up, and pain what is first turned away from.

Quid igitur est? inquit; audire enim cupio, quid non probes. Principio, inquam, in physicis, quibus maxime gloriatur, primum totus est alienus. Democritea dicit perpauca mutans, sed ita, ut ea, quae corrigere vult, mihi quidem depravare videatur. ille atomos quas appellat, id est corpora individua propter soliditatem, censet in infinito inani, in quo nihil nec summum nec infimum nec medium nec ultimum nec extremum sit, ita ferri, ut concursionibus inter se cohaerescant, ex quo efficiantur ea, quae sint quaeque cernantur, omnia, eumque motum atomorum nullo a principio, sed ex aeterno tempore intellegi convenire.

From these others again set out — those who name what they call the primary things in accordance with nature, among which they count the soundness and preservation of all the parts, health, unimpaired senses, freedom from pain, strength, beauty, and the rest of the same kind, of which there are likenesses in our minds, as it were the first sparks and seeds of the virtues. Now since it is some one of these three by which nature is first moved, whether toward seeking or toward repelling, and since there can be nothing at all besides these three, it necessarily follows that the whole duty of avoiding or of pursuing is referred to one of them, so that the wisdom we have called the art of living is concerned with one of those three things, and from it draws the starting-point of the whole of life.

Epicurus autem, in quibus sequitur Democritum, non fere labitur. quamquam utriusque cum multa non probo, tum illud in primis, quod, cum in rerum natura duo quaerenda sint, unum, quae materia sit, ex qua quaeque res efficiatur, alterum, quae vis sit, quae quidque efficiat, de materia disseruerunt, vim et causam efficiendi reliquerunt. sed hoc commune vitium, illae Epicuri propriae ruinae: censet enim eadem illa individua et solida corpora ferri deorsum suo pondere ad lineam, hunc naturalem esse omnium corporum motum.

And from whatever it has settled upon as the thing by which nature is first moved, there will also arise an account of the right and the honourable, which can square with some one of those three, so that it is honourable either to do everything for the sake of pleasure, even if you do not attain it, or for the sake of not feeling pain, even if you cannot reach that, or for the sake of obtaining the things that are in accordance with nature, even if you achieve nothing. So it comes about that, as great as the difference is in the natural beginnings, so great is the unlikeness in the ends of good and evil. Others again, from the same beginnings, will refer every duty either to pleasure, or to not feeling pain, or to securing those primary things in accordance with nature.

deinde ibidem homo acutus, cum illud occurreret, si omnia deorsus e regione ferrentur et, ut dixi, ad lineam, numquam fore ut atomus altera alteram posset attingere itaque * * attulit rem commenticiam: declinare dixit atomum perpaulum, quo nihil posset fieri minus; ita effici complexiones et copulationes et adhaesiones atomorum inter se, ex quo efficeretur mundus omnesque partes mundi, quaeque in eo essent. Quae cum tota res est ficta pueriliter, tum ne efficit quidem, quod vult. nam et ipsa declinatio ad libidinem fingitur—ait enim declinare atomum sine causa; quo nihil turpius physico, quam fieri quicquam sine causa dicere,—et illum motum naturalem omnium ponderum, ut ipse constituit, e regione inferiorem locum petentium sine causa eripuit atomis nec tamen id, cuius causa haec finxerat, assecutus est.

Now that six views about the highest good have been set out, of the three nearest these are the champions: of pleasure, Aristippus; of not feeling pain, Hieronymus; of the enjoyment of those things we have called the primary ones in accordance with nature, Carneades — not, to be sure, as their author, but as their defender for the sake of argument. The earlier three were possible positions, of which one alone has been defended, and that vigorously. For that one should do everything for the sake of pleasure — granted that, even if we attain nothing, still that very purpose of so acting is in itself worth seeking, and honourable, and the sole good — no one has maintained. Nor has anyone thought the mere avoidance of pain to be in itself among the things worth seeking, unless one could actually escape it. But that one should do everything in order to obtain what is in accordance with nature, even if one does not attain it, and that this is both honourable and the sole thing worth seeking for its own sake and the sole good — this the Stoics do say.

nam si omnes atomi declinabunt, nullae umquam cohaerescent, sive aliae declinabunt, aliae suo nutu recte ferentur, primum erit hoc quasi provincias atomis dare, quae recte, quae oblique ferantur, deinde eadem illa atomorum, in quo etiam Democritus haeret, turbulenta concursio hunc mundi ornatum efficere non poterit. ne illud quidem physici, credere aliquid esse minimum, quod profecto numquam putavisset, si a Polyaeno, familiari suo, geometrica discere maluisset quam illum etiam ipsum dedocere. sol Democrito magnus videtur, quippe homini erudito in geometriaque perfecto, huic pedalis fortasse; tantum enim esse censet, quantus videtur, vel paulo aut maiorem aut minorem.

These, then, are the six simple views about the ends of good and evil: two without a patron, four defended. But of joined and twofold expositions of the highest good there have been in all three, and indeed there could be no more, if you look deep into the nature of things. For either pleasure can be joined to honour, as Calliphon and Dinomachus held, or freedom from pain, as Diodorus held, or the primary things of nature, as the ancients held — the same men we have named Academics and Peripatetics. But since all things cannot be said at once, for the present this much will need to be noted: that pleasure is to be set aside, since we are born for certain greater things, as will soon appear. About freedom from pain much the same is generally said as about pleasure. Since, therefore, both about pleasure with Torquatus and about honour, in which alone all good was placed, with Cato, the argument has been carried on, in the first place what was said against pleasure falls in much the same way against freedom from pain.

ita, quae mutat, ea corrumpit, quae sequitur sunt tota Democriti, atomi, inane, imagines, quae ei)/dwla nominant, quorum incursione non solum videamus, sed etiam cogitemus; infinitio ipsa, quam a)peiri/an vocant, tota ab illo est, tum innumerabiles mundi, qui et oriantur et intereant cotidie. quae etsi mihi nullo modo probantur, tamen Democritum laudatum a ceteris ab hoc, qui eum unum secutus esset, nollem vituperatum.

Nor in fact need anything else be sought against that view of Carneades. For in whatever way the highest good is so set out that it is empty of honour, neither duties nor virtues nor friendships can stand on that reckoning. And the joining to honour of either pleasure or the absence of pain makes that very honour, which it wishes to embrace, base. For to refer the things you do to ends, one of which — if a man be free of evil — one would call his being in the highest good, while the other is concerned with the lowest part of nature, is to darken all the splendour of honour, not to say to defile it. There remain the Stoics, who, when they had taken over everything from the Peripatetics and the Academics, pursued the same matters under other names. These it is better to refute one by one. But for now, to what we are about;

Iam in altera philosophiae parte, quae est quaerendi ac disserendi, quae logikh/ dicitur, iste vester plane, ut mihi quidem videtur, inermis ac nudus est. tollit definitiones, nihil de dividendo ac partiendo docet, non quo modo efficiatur concludaturque ratio tradit, non qua via captiosa solvantur ambigua distinguantur ostendit; iudicia rerum in sensibus ponit, quibus si semel aliquid falsi pro vero probatum sit, sublatum esse omne iudicium veri et falsi putat.

of those men, when we please. But the freedom from care of Democritus, which is, as it were, a tranquillity of mind — what they call euthumia — had to be set apart from this discussion, because that tranquillity of mind is itself the happy life; and we are inquiring not what it is, but whence it comes. Now the views of Pyrrho, Aristo, and Erillus, already hissed off and cast out, since they cannot fall within the circle we have drawn, were not to be brought in at all. For since this whole inquiry about the ends, and as it were the furthest bounds, of good and evil sets out from what we have said is suited and adapted to nature and is itself sought first for its own sake, this whole foundation is overturned both by those who, in matters in which there is nothing that is not either honourable or base, deny that there is any reason why one thing should be preferred to another, and think there is no difference at all among such things; and by Erillus, who, if he really held that nothing is good except knowledge, did away with every ground for taking counsel and with the very discovery of duty. With the views of the rest thus shut out, and since besides them there can be none, this view of the ancients must necessarily prevail. By the practice of the ancients, then, which the Stoics too employ, let us take our start from here.

Confirmat autem illud vel maxime, quod ipsa natura, ut ait ille, sciscat et probet, id est voluptatem et dolorem. ad haec et quae sequamur et quae fugiamus refert omnia. quod quamquam Aristippi est a Cyrenaicisque melius liberiusque defenditur, tamen eius modi esse iudico, ut nihil homine videatur indignius. ad maiora enim quaedam nos natura genuit et conformavit, ut mihi quidem videtur. ac fieri potest, ut errem, sed ita prorsus existimo, neque eum Torquatum, qui hoc primus cognomen invenerit, aut torquem illum hosti detraxisse, ut aliquam ex eo perciperet corpore voluptatem, aut cum Latinis tertio consulatu conflixisse apud Veserim propter voluptatem; quod vero securi percussit filium, privavisse se etiam videtur multis voluptatibus, cum ipsi naturae patrioque amori praetulerit ius maiestatis atque imperii.

Every living creature loves itself and, the moment it has come into being, sets about preserving itself, because this first appetite for guarding its whole life is given to it by nature — to preserve itself and to be so constituted as to be in the best condition in accordance with nature. At the outset it holds this constitution in a confused and uncertain way, so far only as to protect itself, whatever it may be, but it understands neither what it is nor what it can do nor what its own nature is. But when it has advanced a little and has begun to perceive how far each thing touches it and pertains to it, then it gradually begins to go forward and to recognize itself and to understand the reason why it has the appetite of mind we spoke of, and it begins both to seek the things it feels to be suited to its nature and to repel their opposites. Therefore for every living creature the object of its appetite lies in what is adapted to its nature. And so the end of goods turns out to be to live in accordance with nature, so constituted as to be in the best condition and most perfectly adapted to nature.

quid? T. Torquatus, is qui consul cum Cn. Octavio fuit, cum illam severitatem in eo filio adhibuit, quem in adoptionem D. Silano emancipaverat, ut eum Macedonum legatis accusantibus, quod pecunias praetorem in provincia cepisse arguerent, causam apud se dicere iuberet reque ex utraque parte audita pronuntiaret eum non talem videri fuisse in imperio, quales eius maiores fuissent, et in conspectum suum venire vetuit, numquid tibi videtur de voluptatibus suis cogitavisse? Sed ut omittam pericula, labores, dolorem etiam, quem optimus quisque pro patria et pro suis suscipit, ut non modo nullam captet, sed etiam praetereat omnes voluptates, dolores denique quosvis suscipere malit quam deserere ullam officii partem, ad ea, quae hoc non minus declarant, sed videntur leviora, veniamus. quid tibi, Torquate, quid huic Triario litterae, quid historiae cognitioque rerum, quid poe+tarum evolutio, quid tanta tot versuum memoria voluptatis affert?

But since each living creature has its own nature, it necessarily follows that the end too is, for all of them, this: that nature be fulfilled — for nothing prevents some things from being common both among the rest of the animals and between man and the beasts, since the nature of all is shared — yet those furthest and highest things which we are seeking are marked off and distributed among the kinds of living creatures, each proper to its own and suited to what the nature of each requires.

nec mihi illud dixeris: Haec enim ipsa mihi sunt voluptati, et erant illa Torquatis. Numquam hoc ita defendit Epicurus neque Metrodorus aut quisquam eorum, qui aut saperet aliquid aut ista didicisset. et quod quaeritur saepe, cur tam multi sint Epicurei, sunt aliae quoque causae, sed multitudinem haec maxime allicit, quod ita putant dici ab illo, recta et honesta quae sint, ea facere ipsa per se laetitiam, id est voluptatem. homines optimi non intellegunt totam rationem everti, si ita res se habeat. nam si concederetur, etiamsi ad corpus nihil referatur, ista sua sponte et per se esse iucunda, per se esset et virtus et cognitio rerum, quod minime ille vult, expetenda.

And so when we say that for all living creatures the furthest end is to live in accordance with nature, this is not to be taken as if we were saying that there is one single end for all; rather, just as it can rightly be said to be common to all the arts that they are concerned with some body of knowledge, while the knowledge proper to each art is its own, so to live in accordance with nature is common to all living creatures, but their natures are diverse, so that one thing is natural for a horse, another for an ox, another for a man. And yet in all there is a common highest end — and that not only among living creatures, but also among all those things which nature nourishes, increases, and protects, in which we see that the things produced from the earth do many things in a way themselves of their own accord that avail toward living and growing, so that within their own kind they may arrive at their furthest end; so that it is now permitted to embrace all things in a single comprehension and to say without hesitation that every nature is the preserver of itself and has this set before it as its end and furthest goal: to keep itself in the best state of its own kind; so that the end of all things which thrive by nature must necessarily be similar, not the same. From which it ought to be understood that for man the ultimate good is to live in accordance with nature, which we interpret thus: to live by the nature of man, complete on every side and wanting nothing.

Haec igitur Epicuri non probo, inquam. De cetero vellem equidem aut ipse doctrinis fuisset instructior— est enim, quod tibi ita videri necesse est, non satis politus iis artibus, quas qui tenent, eruditi appellantur —aut ne deterruisset alios a studiis. quamquam te quidem video minime esse deterritum. Quae cum dixissem, magis ut illum provocarem quam ut ipse loquerer, tum Triarius leniter arridens: Tu quidem, inquit, totum Epicurum paene e philosophorum choro sustulisti. quid ei reliquisti, nisi te, quoquo modo loqueretur, intellegere, quid diceret? aliena dixit in physicis nec ea ipsa, quae tibi probarentur; si qua in iis corrigere voluit, deteriora fecit. disserendi artem nullam habuit. voluptatem cum summum bonum diceret, primum in eo ipso parum vidit, deinde hoc quoque alienum; nam ante Aristippus, et ille melius. addidisti ad extremum etiam indoctum fuisse.

These things, then, must be unfolded by us — but if rather minutely, you will forgive it; for we owe a service to this young man’s age, and to one perhaps now hearing these matters for the first time. ’Quite so,’ I said, ’though even what you have said up to now was rightly said in that manner, however much it was suited to a young man.’ ’The end of things worth seeking having now been defined,’ he said, ’why this matter stands as I have said must next be demonstrated. For that reason let us begin from what I set down first, which is also in fact first, so that we may understand that every living creature loves itself. And although this admits of no doubt — for it is fixed in nature itself and grasped by each one’s own senses, so that if anyone wished to say the contrary he would not be heard — still, that we may pass over nothing, I think the reasons too should be brought forward why this is so.

Fieri, inquam, Triari, nullo pacto potest, ut non dicas, quid non probes eius, a quo dissentias. quid enim me prohiberet Epicureum esse, si probarem, quae ille diceret? cum praesertim illa perdiscere ludus esset. quam ob rem dissentientium inter se reprehensiones non sunt vituperandae, maledicta, contumeliae, tum iracundiae, contentiones concertationesque in disputando pertinaces indignae philosophia mihi videri solent.

And yet how can it be understood or even conceived that there should be any living creature that hates itself? For contrary facts would clash. For when that appetite of mind has begun deliberately to draw to itself something that harms it, because it is hostile to itself, then, since it will do this for its own sake, it will both hate itself and at the same time love itself, which cannot be. And it necessarily follows that, if a man is an enemy to himself, he will think the things that are good to be evil, and on the contrary the evil to be good, and will flee what should be sought and seek what should be fled — which is, beyond doubt, the overturning of life. Nor, if some are found who seek out either nooses or other means of destruction, or like that man in Terence who ’resolved that for so long he would do his own son the less wrong’ — as he himself says — ’until he himself should be made wretched’ — is such a man on that account to be thought an enemy to himself.

Tum Torquatus: Prorsus, inquit, assentior; neque enim disputari sine reprehensione nec cum iracundia aut pertinacia recte disputari potest. sed ad haec, nisi molestum est, habeo quae velim. An me, inquam, nisi te audire vellem, censes haec dicturum fuisse? Utrum igitur percurri omnem Epicuri disciplinam placet an de una voluptate quaeri, de qua omne certamen est? Tuo vero id quidem, inquam, arbitratu. Sic faciam igitur, inquit: unam rem explicabo, eamque maximam, de physicis alias, et quidem tibi et declinationem istam atomorum et magnitudinem solis probabo et Democriti errata ab Epicuro reprehensa et correcta permulta. nunc dicam de voluptate, nihil scilicet novi, ea tamen, quae te ipsum probaturum esse confidam.

But some are moved by grief, some by desire, and many too are carried away by anger, and when they knowingly rush into evils, they then think they are taking the best counsel for themselves. And so they say, and do not hesitate: ’Such is my way; do you do as you need to do.’ And those who had declared war upon themselves would wish to be racked by day and tortured by night, and yet they would not accuse themselves on the ground that they had counselled badly in their own affairs. For that complaint belongs to those who are dear to themselves and love themselves. Therefore, whenever it is said that a man deserves ill of himself and is to himself an enemy and a foe, and in the end flees from life, let it be understood that there underlies some cause of this kind, so that from that very fact it can be understood that each man is dear to himself.

Certe, inquam, pertinax non ero tibique, si mihi probabis ea, quae dices, libenter assentiar. Probabo, inquit, modo ista sis aequitate, quam ostendis. sed uti oratione perpetua malo quam interrogare aut interrogari. Ut placet, inquam. Tum dicere exorsus est. Primum igitur, inquit, sic agam, ut ipsi auctori huius disciplinae placet: constituam, quid et quale sit id, de quo quaerimus, non quo ignorare vos arbitrer, sed ut ratione et via procedat oratio. quaerimus igitur, quid sit extremum et ultimum bonorum, quod omnium philosophorum sententia tale debet esse, ut ad id omnia referri oporteat, ipsum autem nusquam. hoc Epicurus in voluptate ponit, quod summum bonum esse vult, summumque malum dolorem, idque instituit docere sic:

Nor indeed is it enough that there is no one who hates himself; this too must be understood, that there is no one who thinks it makes no difference to him how he himself fares. For the appetite of mind will be done away with if, just as in those matters between which there is no difference we are inclined to neither side, so in our own selves we shall judge that it makes no difference to us in what state we are. And further, if anyone should wish to say this too, it would be utterly absurd — that each man loves himself in such a way that this force of loving is referred to some other thing, and not to the very man who loves himself. When this is said of friendships, of duties, of virtues, however it is said, what is meant can still be understood; but in our own selves it cannot even be understood that we should love ourselves on account of some other thing — for example, on account of pleasure; for it is on our own account that we love pleasure, not on its account that we love ourselves.

omne animal, simul atque natum sit, voluptatem appetere eaque gaudere ut summo bono, dolorem aspernari ut summum malum et, quantum possit, a se repellere, idque facere nondum depravatum ipsa natura incorrupte atque integre iudicante. itaque negat opus esse ratione neque disputatione, quam ob rem voluptas expetenda, fugiendus dolor sit. sentiri haec putat, ut calere ignem, nivem esse albam, dulce mel. quorum nihil oportere exquisitis rationibus confirmare, tantum satis esse admonere. interesse enim inter argumentum conclusionemque rationis et inter mediocrem animadversionem atque admonitionem. altera occulta quaedam et quasi involuta aperiri, altera prompta et aperta iudicari. etenim quoniam detractis de homine sensibus reliqui nihil est, necesse est quid aut ad naturam aut contra sit a natura ipsa iudicari. ea quid percipit aut quid iudicat, quo aut petat aut fugiat aliquid, praeter voluptatem et dolorem?

And yet what is there more plainly evident than that each man is not only dear to himself, but vehemently dear? For who is there, or how few are there, in whom, when death draws near, the ’blood does not flee back in timid fright and the man go pale with fear’? It is, to be sure, a fault to shudder so violently at the dissolution of nature — which is likewise to be censured in the case of pain — but because nearly all are affected in this way, it is argument enough that nature shrinks from destruction; and the more certain men do this in a way that they are even justly censured for it, the more must it be understood that these very excesses would not have arisen in some, had there not been a certain measure set by nature. Nor do I mean the fear of death in those who flee death because they think they are being deprived of the good things of life, or because they dread certain terrors after death, or because they fear they may die in pain; for in little children, who think of none of these things, if ever in play we threaten them that we will throw them down from somewhere, they are seized with terror. Indeed even ’the wild beasts,’ says Pacuvius, ’which lack the cunning of understanding for taking precaution,’ when the terror of death is thrown upon them, ’shudder.’ And who thinks otherwise of the wise man himself, but that, even when he has resolved that he must die, he is still moved by the parting from his own and by the very leaving of the light?

Sunt autem quidam e nostris, qui haec subtilius velint tradere et negent satis esse quid bonum sit aut quid malum sensu iudicari, sed animo etiam ac ratione intellegi posse et voluptatem ipsam per se esse expetendam et dolorem ipsum per se esse fugiendum. itaque aiunt hanc quasi naturalem atque insitam in animis nostris inesse notionem, ut alterum esse appetendum, alterum aspernandum sentiamus. Alii autem, quibus ego assentior, cum a philosophis compluribus permulta dicantur, cur nec voluptas in bonis sit numeranda nec in malis dolor, non existimant oportere nimium nos causae confidere, sed et argumentandum et accurate disserendum et rationibus conquisitis de voluptate et dolore disputandum putant.

But most of all in this kind of case the force of nature is plainly visible, since many endure even beggary in order to live, and men worn out by old age are tormented by the approach of death and bear those sufferings which we see Philoctetes bearing in the plays. He, though racked by pains not to be borne, nevertheless prolonged his life by fowling, and ’slow, he transfixed the swift with the stroke of his arrows; standing, he transfixed those in flight,’ as it stands in Accius, and from the weaving of their feathers made coverings for his body.

Sed ut perspiciatis, unde omnis iste natus error sit voluptatem accusantium doloremque laudantium, totam rem aperiam eaque ipsa, quae ab illo inventore veritatis et quasi architecto beatae vitae dicta sunt, explicabo. nemo enim ipsam voluptatem, quia voluptas sit, aspernatur aut odit aut fugit, sed quia consequuntur magni dolores eos, qui ratione voluptatem sequi nesciunt, neque porro quisquam est, qui dolorem ipsum, quia dolor sit, amet, consectetur, adipisci velit, sed quia non numquam eius modi tempora incidunt, ut labore et dolore magnam aliquam quaerat voluptatem. Ut enim ad minima veniam, quis nostrum exercitationem ullam corporis suscipit laboriosam, nisi ut aliquid ex ea commodi consequatur? quis autem vel eum iure reprehenderit, qui in ea voluptate velit esse, quam nihil molestiae consequatur, vel illum, qui dolorem eum fugiat, quo voluptas nulla pariatur?

Am I speaking of the human kind, or of animals at large, when the nature of trees and plants is nearly the same? For whether, as the most learned men have held, some greater and more divine cause has engendered this force, or whether it comes about thus by chance, we see that the things the earth brings forth are kept sound by their bark and roots — which falls to animals through the distribution of the senses and a certain framing of the limbs. On this matter, indeed, though I side with those who hold that all these things are governed by nature, and that nature, were she to neglect them, could not herself exist, still I grant that those who differ on this point may think what they please; and, if they like, let them understand that whenever I say “the nature of man” I mean man — for it makes no difference here. For a person could sooner part from himself than lose the appetite for the things that serve his interest. With good reason, then, the weightiest philosophers sought the starting-point of the highest good in nature, and held that this appetite for the things suited to nature is bred into all, because they are held fast by that commendation of nature whereby they love themselves.

At vero eos et accusamus et iusto odio dignissimos ducimus, qui blanditiis praesentium voluptatum deleniti atque corrupti, quos dolores et quas molestias excepturi sint, obcaecati cupiditate non provident, similique sunt in culpa, qui officia deserunt mollitia animi, id est laborum et dolorum fuga. et harum quidem rerum facilis est et expedita distinctio. nam libero tempore, cum soluta nobis est eligendi optio, cumque nihil impedit, quo minus id, quod maxime placeat, facere possimus, omnis voluptas assumenda est, omnis dolor repellendus. temporibus autem quibusdam et aut officiis debitis aut rerum necessitatibus saepe eveniet, ut et voluptates repudiandae sint et molestiae non recusandae. itaque earum rerum hic tenetur a sapiente delectus, ut aut reiciendis voluptatibus maiores alias consequatur aut perferendis doloribus asperiores repellat. Hanc ego cum teneam sententiam, quid est cur verear, ne ad eam non possim accommodare Torquatos nostros?

Next we must consider — since it is plain enough that each is dear to himself by nature — what the nature of man is. For that is what we are inquiring into. Now it is evident that man is composed of body and mind, the parts of the mind being first, those of the body second. Then we see this too: that the body is so shaped as to surpass others, and the mind so constituted as to be both furnished with senses and possessed of a commanding intelligence, to which the whole nature of man is subject, and in which there is a certain marvellous power of reason and of knowing and of science and of all the virtues. As for the things that belong to the body, they have no authority to be compared with the parts of the mind, and they are easier to come to know. And so let us begin with these.

quos tu paulo ante cum memoriter, tum etiam erga nos amice et benivole collegisti, nec me tamen laudandis maioribus meis corrupisti nec segniorem ad respondendum reddidisti. quorum facta quem ad modum, quaeso, interpretaris? sicine eos censes aut in armatum hostem impetum fecisse aut in liberos atque in sanguinem suum tam crudelis fuisse, nihil ut de utilitatibus, nihil ut de commodis suis cogitarent? at id ne ferae quidem faciunt, ut ita ruant itaque turbent, ut earum motus et impetus quo pertineant non intellegamus, tu tam egregios viros censes tantas res gessisse sine causa?

How well suited to nature, then, are the parts of our body, and its whole figure and form and stature, is plain; nor is there any doubt that one understands which the forehead, the eyes, the ears, and the remaining parts are that are proper to man. But surely these need to be sound and vigorous and to have their natural motions and uses, so that none of them is wanting, nor sick nor crippled; for this is what nature requires. There is, moreover, also a certain bearing of the body that keeps to the motions and postures agreeing with nature; and if in these there is some fault — a twisting and distortion, or a deformed motion or posture — as if a man should walk on his hands, or backwards rather than forwards, he would plainly seem to be fleeing from himself, and, stripping the man out of the man, to hate nature. For this reason, too, certain ways of sitting, and bent and broken movements such as belong to wanton or effeminate men, are contrary to nature; so that, even if it come about through a fault of the mind, still the nature of man seems to be altered in the body.

quae fuerit causa, mox videro; interea hoc tenebo, si ob aliquam causam ista, quae sine dubio praeclara sunt, fecerint, virtutem iis per se ipsam causam non fuisse.—Torquem detraxit hosti.—Et quidem se texit, ne interiret.—At magnum periculum adiit.—In oculis quidem exercitus.—Quid ex eo est consecutus?—Laudem et caritatem, quae sunt vitae sine metu degendae praesidia firmissima.—Filium morte multavit.—Si sine causa, nollem me ab eo ortum, tam inportuno tamque crudeli; sin, ut dolore suo sanciret militaris imperii disciplinam exercitumque in gravissimo bello animadversionis metu contineret, saluti prospexit civium, qua intellegebat contineri suam.

And so, on the other hand, the moderate and even conditions, affections, and uses of the body seem to be suited to nature. Now the mind, too, ought not merely to be, but to be of a certain quality, so that it both has all its parts unimpaired and lacks none of the virtues. And in the senses each has its own virtue, namely that nothing should hinder each sense from discharging its own office in perceiving swiftly and readily those things that lie subject to the senses. But of the mind, and of that part of the mind which is sovereign and is named the intelligence, the virtues are many; yet there are two primary kinds: the one of those that are bred in by their own nature and are called involuntary, the other of those that, resting in the will, are wont to be called by a more proper name — and the surpassing excellence in the praise of minds belongs to these. To the former kind belong aptness in learning and memory, which are nearly all called by the one name of natural endowment; and those who have these virtues are called gifted. The other kind is that of the great and true virtues, which we call voluntary, such as prudence, temperance, fortitude, justice, and the rest of the same kind. And in sum these were the things to be said about body and mind, by which there is sketched out, as it were, what the nature of man requires.

atque haec ratio late patet. in quo enim maxime consuevit iactare vestra se oratio, tua praesertim, qui studiose antiqua persequeris, claris et fortibus viris commemorandis eorumque factis non emolumento aliquo, sed ipsius honestatis decore laudandis, id totum evertitur eo delectu rerum, quem modo dixi, constituto, ut aut voluptates omittantur maiorum voluptatum adipiscendarum causa aut dolores suscipiantur maiorum dolorum effugiendorum gratia.

From which it is plain that, since we are dear to ourselves and wish all things in mind and in body to be perfect, these very things are dear to us for their own sakes and hold within them the greatest weight toward living well. For one who has set before himself the preservation of himself must hold his own parts dear as well, and the dearer the more perfect they are and the more praiseworthy in their kind. For the life that is sought is one filled out with the virtues of mind and body, and in this the highest good must necessarily be placed, since it must be such as to be the limit of the things to be desired. Once this is grasped, it cannot be doubted that, since men themselves are dear to themselves in their own right and of their own accord, the parts too of both body and mind, and of those things that lie in the motion and posture of each, are cherished with their own dearness and are sought for their own sakes.

Sed de clarorum hominum factis illustribus et gloriosis satis hoc loco dictum sit. erit enim iam de omnium virtutum cursu ad voluptatem proprius disserendi locus. nunc autem explicabo, voluptas ipsa quae qualisque sit, ut tollatur error omnis imperitorum intellegaturque ea, quae voluptaria, delicata, mollis habeatur disciplina, quam gravis, quam continens, quam severa sit. Non enim hanc solam sequimur, quae suavitate aliqua naturam ipsam movet et cum iucunditate quadam percipitur sensibus, sed maximam voluptatem illam habemus, quae percipitur omni dolore detracto. nam quoniam, cum privamur dolore, ipsa liberatione et vacuitate omnis molestiae gaudemus, omne autem id, quo gaudemus, voluptas est, ut omne, quo offendimur, dolor, doloris omnis privatio recte nominata est voluptas. ut enim, cum cibo et potione fames sitisque depulsa est, ipsa detractio molestiae consecutionem affert voluptatis, sic in omni re doloris amotio successionem efficit voluptatis.

These things being set out, it is an easy inference that those things among our own are most to be sought which have the most worth — so that, of each best part which is sought for its own sake, the virtue is to be sought most of all. Thus it will come about that the virtue of the mind is set before the virtue of the body, and that the voluntary virtues of the mind overcome the involuntary ones — the voluntary, which are properly called virtues and far excel, because they are begotten of reason, than which there is nothing in man more divine. For of all the things that nature both creates and watches over, those that are either without mind or not far otherwise have their highest good in the body; so that the saying about the pig does not seem inept — that a mind was given to that beast in place of salt, to keep it from rotting. There are, moreover, certain beasts in which there is something resembling virtue, as in lions, as in dogs, in horses, in which we see certain movements not of bodies alone, as in pigs, but in some measure of minds as well. In man, however, the whole sum lies in the mind, and in the mind in reason, out of which springs virtue, which is defined as the perfecting of reason — a thing they hold must be expounded again and again.

itaque non placuit Epicuro medium esse quiddam inter dolorem et voluptatem; illud enim ipsum, quod quibusdam medium videretur, cum omni dolore careret, non modo voluptatem esse, verum etiam summam voluptatem. quisquis enim sentit, quem ad modum sit affectus, eum necesse est aut in voluptate esse aut in dolore. omnis autem privatione doloris putat Epicurus terminari summam voluptatem, ut postea variari voluptas distinguique possit, augeri amplificarique non possit.

Of the things, too, that the earth brings forth, there is a certain rearing and perfecting not unlike that of living creatures. And so we say that a vine both lives and dies, and a tree both young and old, and that it flourishes and “grows old.” From which it is not amiss to suppose that, as with living creatures, so with these there are certain things suited to their nature and others alien to it, and that there is a kind of tender of their growth and nourishment — namely the science and art of the farmer, which prunes, lops, raises up, lifts, and props, so that they can go where nature carries them; so that the vines themselves, could they speak, would confess that they ought to be so handled and tended. And now indeed — to speak of the vine above all — that which tends it is something external; for in the vine itself there is too little force present for it to thrive as well as it might, if no cultivation be applied.

At etiam Athenis, ut e patre audiebam facete et urbane Stoicos irridente, statua est in Ceramico Chrysippi sedentis porrecta manu, quae manus significet illum in hac esse rogatiuncula delectatum: ’Numquidnam manus tua sic affecta, quem ad modum affecta nunc est, desiderat?’—Nihil sane.—’At, si voluptas esset bonum, desideraret.’—Ita credo.— Non est igitur voluptas bonum. Hoc ne statuam quidem dicturam pater aiebat, si loqui posset. conclusum est enim contra Cyrenaicos satis acute, nihil ad Epicurum. nam si ea sola voluptas esset, quae quasi titillaret sensus, ut ita dicam, et ad eos cum suavitate afflueret et illaberetur, nec manus esse contenta posset nec ulla pars vacuitate doloris sine iucundo motu voluptatis. sin autem summa voluptas est, ut Epicuro placet, nihil dolere, primum tibi recte, Chrysippe, concessum est nihil desiderare manum, cum ita esset affecta, secundum non recte, si voluptas esset bonum, fuisse desideraturam. idcirco enim non desideraret, quia, quod dolore caret, id in voluptate est.

But suppose sense were now to come to the vine, so that it had a certain appetite and moved of its own accord — what do you think it would do? Will it not, of itself, see to the things it formerly obtained through the vinedresser? But do you not see that a care will be added to it, of tending its senses too, and their whole appetite, and any limbs that have been joined to it? Thus to the things it always had it will join those that came to it afterwards, and it will not have the same end its cultivator had, but will wish to live according to that nature which has afterwards been added to it. So its end of good will be like what it was before, yet not the same; for it will no longer seek the good of a plant, but of an animal. What, then, if not sense only had been given to it, but a man’s mind as well? Must not those former things both abide, so as to be tended, and these later additions be far dearer — and the better each part of the mind, the dearer — and the end of the highest good rest in that filling-out of nature, since mind and reason far and away excel? Thus that which is the last of all things to be sought, drawn from the first commendation of nature, climbs by many degrees until it arrives at the summit, which is built up out of soundness of body and out of the perfected reason of the intelligence.

Extremum autem esse bonorum voluptatem ex hoc facillime perspici potest: Constituamus aliquem magnis, multis, perpetuis fruentem et animo et corpore voluptatibus nullo dolore nec impediente nec inpendente, quem tandem hoc statu praestabiliorem aut magis expetendum possimus dicere? inesse enim necesse est in eo, qui ita sit affectus, et firmitatem animi nec mortem nec dolorem timentis, quod mors sensu careat, dolor in longinquitate levis, in gravitate brevis soleat esse, ut eius magnitudinem celeritas, diuturnitatem allevatio consoletur.

Since, then, such is the form of nature as I have set it out, if, as I said at the beginning, each person knew himself the moment he came to be, and could judge what the force of his whole nature and of its single parts might be, he would at once see what this is that we are inquiring into — the highest and uttermost of all the things we seek — and could go wrong in nothing. But as it is, from the first nature is marvellously hidden, and can be neither seen through nor known. As our years advance, however, little by little, or rather slowly, we come to know ourselves, as it were. And so that first commendation, which nature has made of us to ourselves, is uncertain and obscure, and that first appetite of the mind does only this much: that we may be able to be safe and sound. But when we begin to discern, and to feel what we are and how we differ from the rest of living creatures, then we begin to pursue the things for which we were born.

ad ea cum accedit, ut neque divinum numen horreat nec praeteritas voluptates effluere patiatur earumque assidua recordatione laetetur, quid est, quod huc possit, quod melius sit, accedere? Statue contra aliquem confectum tantis animi corporisque doloribus, quanti in hominem maximi cadere possunt, nulla spe proposita fore levius aliquando, nulla praeterea neque praesenti nec expectata voluptate, quid eo miserius dici aut fingi potest? quodsi vita doloribus referta maxime fugienda est, summum profecto malum est vivere cum dolore, cui sententiae consentaneum est ultimum esse bonorum cum voluptate vivere. nec enim habet nostra mens quicquam, ubi consistat tamquam in extremo, omnesque et metus et aegritudines ad dolorem referuntur, nec praeterea est res ulla, quae sua natura aut sollicitare possit aut angere.

The like of this we see in beasts, which at first do not stir from the place where they were born, then each moves by its own appetite. We see snakelings creep, ducklings swim, blackbirds fly, oxen use their horns, scorpions their stings — in short, that for each creature its own nature is its guide to living. And this likeness appears in the human kind as well. For little ones, at the first birth, lie there as if they had no mind at all. But when a little firmness has come to them, they use both mind and senses, and strive to raise themselves up, and use their hands, and recognize those by whom they are reared. Then they take delight in playmates and gladly gather with them, give themselves to play, are drawn by the hearing of stories, wish to be generous to others with what they have to spare, take notice of what goes on at home rather curiously, and begin to ponder something, and to learn, and wish not to be ignorant of the names of those they see; and in the things in which they vie with their playmates, if they have won, they lift themselves up with gladness, and, beaten, they are cast down and let their spirits fall. None of this, we must hold, comes about without a cause.

Praeterea et appetendi et refugiendi et omnino rerum gerendarum initia proficiscuntur aut a voluptate aut a dolore. quod cum ita sit, perspicuum est omnis rectas res atque laudabilis eo referri, ut cum voluptate vivatur. quoniam autem id est vel summum bonorum vel ultimum vel extremum —quod Graeci te/los nominant—, quod ipsum nullam ad aliam rem, ad id autem res referuntur omnes, fatendum est summum esse bonum iucunde vivere. Id qui in una virtute ponunt et splendore nominis capti quid natura postulet non intellegunt, errore maximo, si Epicurum audire voluerint, liberabuntur. istae enim vestrae eximiae pulchraeque virtutes nisi voluptatem efficerent, quis eas aut laudabilis aut expetendas arbitraretur? ut enim medicorum scientiam non ipsius artis, sed bonae valetudinis causa probamus, et gubernatoris ars, quia bene navigandi rationem habet, utilitate, non arte laudatur, sic sapientia, quae ars vivendi putanda est, non expeteretur, si nihil efficeret; nunc expetitur, quod est tamquam artifex conquirendae et

For the force of man is so begotten by nature that he seems made for grasping every virtue; and for this reason little ones are moved, without teaching, by likenesses of the virtues whose seeds they hold within them — for these are the first elements of nature, which, once enlarged, bring about virtue’s sprouting, so to speak. For since we have been so born and made as to hold within us the beginnings both of doing something, and of loving certain people, and of generosity, and of returning a kindness, and as to have minds apt for science, prudence, fortitude, and estranged from their contraries, it is not without cause that we see in children those sparks of the virtues, as I called them, from which the philosopher’s reason must be kindled, so that, following it as a kind of god for its guide, it may arrive at the uttermost of nature. For, as I have often said by now, in the feeble years and the weak mind the force of nature is discerned as if through a fog; but when, as it advances, the mind is strengthened, it does indeed recognize the force of nature, yet in such a way that it can advance further, while in itself it has only been begun.

comparandae voluptatis—quam autem ego dicam voluptatem, iam videtis, ne invidia verbi labefactetur oratio mea—. nam cum ignoratione rerum bonarum et malarum maxime hominum vita vexetur, ob eumque errorem et voluptatibus maximis saepe priventur et durissimis animi doloribus torqueantur, sapientia est adhibenda, quae et terroribus cupiditatibusque detractis et omnium falsarum opinionum temeritate derepta certissimam se nobis ducem praebeat ad voluptatem. sapientia enim est una, quae maestitiam pellat ex animis, quae nos exhorrescere metu non sinat. qua praeceptrice in tranquillitate vivi potest omnium cupiditatum ardore restincto. cupiditates enim sunt insatiabiles, quae non modo singulos homines, sed universas familias evertunt, totam etiam labefactant saepe rem publicam.

We must enter, then, into the nature of things, and see through to the very depths what she requires; for otherwise we cannot know ourselves. And because this precept was too great to seem to come from a man, it was for that reason assigned to a god. The Pythian Apollo therefore bids us know ourselves. But this knowledge of ourselves is one thing: to know the force of body and of mind, and to follow that life which has the full enjoyment of these very things. Now since this appetite of the mind was from the beginning such that we should have those things I spoke of as perfect in nature as may be, it must be confessed that, once we have attained what was sought, nature comes to rest, as it were, in that as in her uttermost, and that this is the highest good — which surely, taken whole, must of its own accord and for its own sake be sought, since it was shown before that even its single parts are to be sought for their own sakes.

ex cupiditatibus odia, discidia, discordiae, seditiones, bella nascuntur, nec eae se foris solum iactant nec tantum in alios caeco impetu incurrunt, sed intus etiam in animis inclusae inter se dissident atque discordant, ex quo vitam amarissimam necesse est effici, ut sapiens solum amputata circumcisaque inanitate omni et errore naturae finibus contentus sine aegritudine possit et sine metu vivere.

But in reckoning up the advantages of the body, if anyone shall think that pleasure has been passed over by us, let that question be deferred to another time. For whether pleasure is or is not among those things we have called first according to nature makes no difference to what we are about. For if, as it seems to me at least, pleasure does not fill out the goods of nature, it has rightly been passed over; but if it is in them, as some hold, nothing hinders this grasp of ours of the highest good. For to those things which have been established as first according to nature, if pleasure be added, some one advantage of the body will have been added, and it will not have changed that constitution of the highest good which has been set forth.

quae est enim aut utilior aut ad bene vivendum aptior partitio quam illa, qua est usus Epicurus? qui unum genus posuit earum cupiditatum, quae essent et naturales et necessariae, alterum, quae naturales essent nec tamen necessariae, tertium, quae nec naturales nec necessariae. quarum ea ratio est, ut necessariae nec opera multa nec impensa expleantur; ne naturales quidem multa desiderant, propterea quod ipsa natura divitias, quibus contenta sit, et parabilis et terminatas habet; inanium autem cupiditatum nec modus ullus nec finis inveniri potest.

And so far, indeed, our reasoning has proceeded in such a way that the whole of it was drawn from the first commendation of nature. But now let us follow another kind of argument: that not only because we love ourselves, but because each part of nature, in both body and mind, has its own force, for that reason we are moved in these matters to the highest degree of our own accord. And, to begin with the body, do you not see how, if anything in the limbs is crooked or crippled or stunted, men hide it? How they even struggle and labour, if they can bring it about, that the body’s fault either not appear or appear as little as possible? And how they endure many pains as well, for the sake of a cure, so that, even if the very use of the limbs is to be not greater but actually less, still their appearance may return to nature? For indeed, since all by nature think themselves to be sought whole, and that for no other reason but on their own account, the parts too must necessarily be sought for their own sakes, when the whole is sought for its own sake.

quodsi vitam omnem perturbari videmus errore et inscientia, sapientiamque esse solam, quae nos a libidinum impetu et a formidinum terrore vindicet et ipsius fortunae modice ferre doceat iniurias et omnis monstret vias, quae ad quietem et ad tranquillitatem ferant, quid est cur dubitemus dicere et sapientiam propter voluptates expetendam et insipientiam propter molestias esse fugiendam?

What? In the motion and posture of the body is there nothing that nature herself judges must be heeded? In what manner a man walks, sits; what the carriage of the face, what the look, may be in each? Is there nothing in these things that we account worthy or unworthy of a free man? Do we not think many men deserving of hatred who, by a certain motion or posture, seem to have scorned the law and measure of nature? And since these things are drawn from the body, what reason is there why beauty itself should not rightly be reckoned worth seeking for its own sake? For if we think the body’s crookedness and stunting are to be fled for their own sakes, why should we not also — and perhaps the more — pursue the dignity of form for its own sake? And if we flee ugliness in the posture and motion of the body, what reason is there why we should not pursue beauty? Health, too, and strength, and freedom from pain we shall seek not only for their usefulness but also for their own sakes. For since nature wishes to be filled out in all her parts, she seeks for its own sake that condition of the body which is most in keeping with nature — a nature wholly thrown into disorder if the body is sick, or in pain, or wanting in strength.

Eademque ratione ne temperantiam quidem propter se expetendam esse dicemus, sed quia pacem animis afferat et eos quasi concordia quadam placet ac leniat. temperantia est enim, quae in rebus aut expetendis aut fugiendis ut rationem sequamur monet. nec enim satis est iudicare quid faciendum non faciendumve sit, sed stare etiam oportet in eo, quod sit iudicatum. plerique autem, quod tenere atque servare id, quod ipsi statuerunt, non possunt, victi et debilitati obiecta specie voluptatis tradunt se libidinibus constringendos nec quid eventurum sit provident ob eamque causam propter voluptatem et parvam et non necessariam et quae vel aliter pararetur et qua etiam carere possent sine dolore tum in morbos gravis, tum in damna, tum in dedecora incurrunt, saepe etiam legum iudiciorumque poenis obligantur.

Let us look at the parts of the mind, whose view is more brilliant; and the loftier they are, the clearer the signs of nature they give. So great is the love of knowing and of knowledge bred in us that no one can doubt that the nature of man is swept toward these things lured by no profit. Do we not see how children are not deterred even by beatings from gazing at things and searching them out? How, when driven off, they run back? How they rejoice to know something? How they are eager to tell it to others? How they are held by a procession, by the games and spectacles of that kind, and for the sake of it endure even hunger and thirst? And what of those who take delight in liberal studies and arts — do we not see that they take no account of health or of household estate, but bear all things, captured by knowing and by knowledge itself, and balance against the greatest cares and labours the pleasure they take from learning?

Qui autem ita frui volunt voluptatibus, ut nulli propter eas consequantur dolores, et qui suum iudicium retinent, ne voluptate victi faciant id, quod sentiant non esse faciendum, ii voluptatem maximam adipiscuntur praetermittenda voluptate. idem etiam dolorem saepe perpetiuntur, ne, si id non faciant, incidant in maiorem. ex quo intellegitur nec intemperantiam propter se esse fugiendam temperantiamque expetendam, non quia voluptates fugiat, sed quia maiores consequatur.

To me, at any rate, Homer seems to have glimpsed something of this kind in what he invented about the song of the Sirens. For it does not appear that they were in the habit of calling back those who sailed past by the sweetness of their voices, or by some novelty and variety of singing, but because they professed to know many things — so that men clung fast upon their rocks out of a desire to learn. This is how they call to Ulysses (for I have translated this very passage, as I have certain others of Homer’s): O glory of the Argives, why not turn your prow, Ulysses, that with your ears you may take in our song? For no one ever yet has sailed past these blue waters on his course without first standing still, caught by the sweetness of our voices, and then, sated in his eager breast with our manifold music, gliding onward to the shores of his fathers the wiser. We hold fast the heavy struggle of the war, and the ruin that Greece, by the will of heaven, brought upon Troy, and all the traces of things that are spread across the wide earth. Homer saw that the story could not carry conviction if so great a man were held entangled by mere little ditties; what they promise is knowledge, and it is no wonder that to a man hungry for wisdom this should be dearer than his homeland. And indeed, to wish to know everything, of whatever kind, is the mark of the merely curious; but to be drawn to a desire for knowledge by the contemplation of greater things is what we must reckon the mark of the greatest of men.

Eadem fortitudinis ratio reperietur. nam neque laborum perfunctio neque perpessio dolorum per se ipsa allicit nec patientia nec assiduitas nec vigiliae nec ea ipsa, quae laudatur, industria, ne fortitudo quidem, sed ista sequimur, ut sine cura metuque vivamus animumque et corpus, quantum efficere possimus, molestia liberemus. ut enim mortis metu omnis quietae vitae status perturbatur, et ut succumbere doloribus eosque humili animo inbecilloque ferre miserum est, ob eamque debilitatem animi multi parentes, multi amicos, non nulli patriam, plerique autem se ipsos penitus perdiderunt, sic robustus animus et excelsus omni est liber cura et angore, cum et mortem contemnit, qua qui affecti sunt in eadem causa sunt, qua ante quam nati, et ad dolores ita paratus est, ut meminerit maximos morte finiri, parvos multa habere intervalla requietis, mediocrium nos esse dominos, ut, si tolerabiles sint, feramus, si minus, animo aequo e vita, cum ea non placeat, tamquam e theatro exeamus. quibus rebus intellegitur nec timiditatem ignaviamque vituperari nec fortitudinem patientiamque laudari suo nomine, sed illas reici, quia dolorem pariant, has optari, quia voluptatem.

For what burning zeal do you suppose was in Archimedes, who, while he was drawing certain figures in the dust with too close attention, did not even feel that his country had been taken? How much of Aristoxenus’ genius do we see consumed in music? With what zeal do we think Aristophanes spent his life upon letters? What of Pythagoras? What shall I say of Plato or of Democritus? Men whom we see, for the desire of learning, to have traversed the farthest lands. Those who do not see this have never loved anything great and worthy of being known. And on this point, those who say that the studies I have named are pursued for the sake of the pleasures of the mind do not understand that they are for this very reason to be sought for their own sakes — namely, because our minds delight in them with no advantage held out, and rejoice in the knowledge itself even where it is going to bring inconvenience.

Iustitia restat, ut de omni virtute sit dictum. sed similia fere dici possunt. ut enim sapientiam, temperantiam, fortitudinem copulatas esse docui cum voluptate, ut ab ea nullo modo nec divelli nec distrahi possint, sic de iustitia iudicandum est, quae non modo numquam nocet cuiquam, sed contra semper afficit cum vi sua atque natura, quod tranquillat animos, tum spe nihil earum rerum defuturum, quas natura non depravata desiderat. Et quem ad modum temeritas et libido et ignavia semper animum excruciant et semper sollicitant turbulentaeque sunt, sic inprobitas si cuius in mente consedit, hoc ipso, quod adest, turbulenta est; si vero molita quippiam est, quamvis occulte fecerit, numquam tamen id confidet fore semper occultum. plerumque improborum facta primo suspicio insequitur, dein sermo atque fama, tum accusator, tum iudex; multi etiam, ut te consule, ipsi se indicaverunt.

But what is the use of demanding more on matters so plain? Let us rather put the question to ourselves: how the movements of the stars and the contemplation of the heavenly bodies, and the knowledge of all those things that are hidden away in the obscurity of nature, move us; and what delight there is in history, which we are accustomed to pursue to the very end, going back over what we have passed by and following up what we have begun. Nor indeed am I unaware that there is utility in history, and not pleasure only.

quodsi qui satis sibi contra hominum conscientiam saepti esse et muniti videntur, deorum tamen horrent easque ipsas sollicitudines, quibus eorum animi noctesque diesque exeduntur, a diis inmortalibus supplicii causa importari putant. quae autem tanta ex improbis factis ad minuendas vitae molestias accessio potest fieri, quanta ad augendas, cum conscientia factorum, tum poena legum odioque civium? et tamen in quibusdam neque pecuniae modus est neque honoris neque imperii nec libidinum nec epularum nec reliquarum cupiditatum, quas nulla praeda umquam improbe parta minuit, sed potius inflammat, ut coe+rcendi magis quam dedocendi esse videantur.

What, when we read invented stories, from which no utility can be drawn out, and read them with pleasure? What, when we wish the names of those who have done some deed to be known to us, and their parents, their homeland, and many things besides that are not in the least necessary? What of the fact that men of the lowest fortune, with no hope of conducting affairs — craftsmen, in short — take delight in history? And we can see that those most of all wish to hear and to read of deeds done who are far from any hope of doing them, worn out by old age. From which it must necessarily be understood that in the very things which are learned and known there are inducements present, by which we are moved to learning and to knowing.

Invitat igitur vera ratio bene sanos ad iustitiam, aequitatem, fidem, neque homini infanti aut inpotenti iniuste facta conducunt, qui nec facile efficere possit, quod conetur, nec optinere, si effecerit, et opes vel fortunae vel ingenii liberalitati magis conveniunt, qua qui utuntur, benivolentiam sibi conciliant et, quod aptissimum est ad quiete vivendum, caritatem, praesertim cum omnino nulla sit causa peccandi.

The old philosophers, indeed, imagine in the islands of the blessed what the life of the wise will be like: men freed from all care, requiring no necessary furnishing or provision for life, who they suppose will do nothing else than spend the whole of their time in inquiry and in learning, in the knowledge of nature. We, however, see that this is not only the delight of the happy life but also a relief from miseries. And so many men, when they were in the power of enemies or of tyrants, many in captivity, many in exile, have lightened their pain by the pursuits of learning.

quae enim cupiditates a natura proficiscuntur, facile explentur sine ulla iniuria, quae autem inanes sunt, iis parendum non est. nihil enim desiderabile concupiscunt, plusque in ipsa iniuria detrimenti est quam in iis rebus emolumenti, quae pariuntur iniuria. Itaque ne iustitiam quidem recte quis dixerit per se ipsam optabilem, sed quia iucunditatis vel plurimum afferat. nam diligi et carum esse iucundum est propterea, quia tutiorem vitam et voluptatem pleniorem efficit. itaque non ob ea solum incommoda, quae eveniunt inprobis, fugiendam inprobitatem putamus, sed multo etiam magis, quod, cuius in animo versatur, numquam sinit eum respirare, numquam adquiescere.

The chief man of this city, Demetrius of Phalerum, when he had been driven from his country by injustice, betook himself to king Ptolemy at Alexandria. And since he excelled in this very philosophy to which we are urging you, and had been a pupil of Theophrastus, he wrote many splendid things in that calamitous leisure — not for any use of his own, of which he had been stripped, but that cultivation of his mind was for him a kind of food of humanity. For my part, I often used to hear from Cn. Aufidius, a man of praetorian rank, learned, and blind, that he was moved by a longing for the light more than for any use of it. In a word, unless sleep brought rest to our bodies and a kind of medicine for our labour, we should reckon it given against nature, for it takes away our senses and removes all activity. And so, if either nature did not seek rest, or could obtain it in some other way, we should readily put up with it — we who even now are accustomed, for the sake of doing or learning something, to take on our vigils almost against nature.

Quodsi ne ipsarum quidem virtutum laus, in qua maxime ceterorum philosophorum exultat oratio, reperire exitum potest, nisi derigatur ad voluptatem, voluptas autem est sola, quae nos vocet ad se et alliciat suapte natura, non potest esse dubium, quin id sit summum atque extremum bonorum omnium, beateque vivere nihil aliud sit nisi cum voluptate vivere.

There are, moreover, still clearer, even plainly evident and not in the least doubtful signs of nature, above all in man, of course, but in every animal: that the mind craves always to be doing something, and on no terms can endure everlasting rest. This is easy to discern in the earliest little years of children. For although I fear I may seem excessive on this kind of point, still all the old philosophers, and ours above all, go back to the cradle, because they think that in childhood the will of nature can most easily be known. We see, then, how even infants cannot keep still. And when they have advanced a little, they take delight in games even if these are toilsome, so that they cannot be deterred even by beatings, and that desire of doing something grows up together with their years. And so, not even if we supposed we should enjoy the most delightful dreams would we wish the sleep of Endymion to be given us; and if it did befall us, we should reckon it the equal of death.

Huic certae stabilique sententiae quae sint coniuncta explicabo brevi. nullus in ipsis error est finibus bonorum et malorum, id est in voluptate aut in dolore, sed in his rebus peccant, cum e quibus haec efficiantur ignorant. animi autem voluptates et dolores nasci fatemur e corporis voluptatibus et doloribus—itaque concedo, quod modo dicebas, cadere causa, si qui e nostris aliter existimant, quos quidem video esse multos, sed imperitos—, quamquam autem et laetitiam nobis voluptas animi et molestiam dolor afferat, eorum tamen utrumque et ortum esse e corpore et ad corpus referri, nec ob eam causam non multo maiores esse et voluptates et dolores animi quam corporis. nam corpore nihil nisi praesens et quod adest sentire possumus, animo autem et praeterita et futura. ut enim aeque doleamus animo, cum corpore dolemus, fieri tamen permagna accessio potest, si aliquod aeternum et infinitum impendere malum nobis opinemur. quod idem licet transferre in voluptatem, ut ea maior sit, si nihil tale metuamus.

Indeed, even the most idle of men, endowed with some singular and indescribable sluggishness, we still see to be forever moved in body and mind, and, when they are hampered by no necessary business, either to call for the dice-board, or to seek out some game, or to look for some conversation; and since they do not have the noble delights that come from learning, to chase after little gatherings and gossiping circles. Indeed, not even the beasts that we shut up for the sake of our delight, although they are fed more abundantly than if they were free, readily endure to be confined, and they long for the free and wandering movements that nature has assigned them.

Iam illud quidem perspicuum est, maximam animi aut voluptatem aut molestiam plus aut ad beatam aut ad miseram vitam afferre momenti quam eorum utrumvis, si aeque diu sit in corpore. Non placet autem detracta voluptate aegritudinem statim consequi, nisi in voluptatis locum dolor forte successerit, at contra gaudere nosmet omittendis doloribus, etiamsi voluptas ea, quae sensum moveat, nulla successerit, eoque intellegi potest quanta voluptas sit non dolere.

And so the better any man is born and trained, the less he would wish to be alive at all if, stripped of affairs to conduct, he could feed on pleasures however well prepared. For men either prefer to conduct some business privately, or, if they are of a loftier mind, take up the commonwealth by winning honours and commands, or devote themselves wholly to the pursuits of learning. In which life they are so far from chasing after pleasures that they even endure cares, anxieties, sleepless nights, and enjoy the best part of a man — which in us must be reckoned divine — the keenness of genius and of mind, neither seeking pleasure nor fleeing toil. Nor indeed do they let up either their wonder at the things that have been discovered by the ancients or their search for new ones. And since they cannot be sated by this zeal, forgetful of all other things, they think nothing low, nothing base; and so great is the power in such pursuits that we see even those who have set themselves other ends of goods, ones they steer by utility or by pleasure, nevertheless wear out their lives in inquiring into things and unfolding the workings of nature.

Sed ut iis bonis erigimur, quae expectamus, sic laetamur iis, quae recordamur. stulti autem malorum memoria torquentur, sapientes bona praeterita grata recordatione renovata delectant. est autem situm in nobis ut et adversa quasi perpetua oblivione obruamus et secunda iucunde ac suaviter meminerimus. sed cum ea, quae praeterierunt, acri animo et attento intuemur, tum fit ut aegritudo sequatur, si illa mala sint, laetitia, si bona. O praeclaram beate vivendi et apertam et simplicem et directam viam! cum enim certe nihil homini possit melius esse quam vacare omni dolore et molestia perfruique maximis et animi et corporis voluptatibus, videtisne quam nihil praetermittatur quod vitam adiuvet, quo facilius id, quod propositum est, summum bonum consequamur? clamat Epicurus, is quem vos nimis voluptatibus esse deditum dicitis, non posse iucunde vivi, nisi sapienter, honeste iusteque vivatur, nec sapienter, honeste, iuste, nisi iucunde.

Therefore this much, at least, is clear: that we are born for action. Now there are several kinds of action, such that the lesser are even put in the shade by the greater; and the greatest are, first — as it seems to me, at any rate, and to those whose system we are now treating — the consideration and knowledge of the heavenly bodies and of those things which, hidden and lying concealed by nature, reason can track down; next, the administration of public affairs, or the science of administering them; then the prudent, temperate, brave, just exercise of reason and the remaining virtues, and the actions that accord with the virtues — all of which, embracing them in a single word, we call the honourable. To both the knowledge and the practice of these we are led, once we have grown strong, with nature herself going before us. For the beginnings of all things are small, but they grow by employing their own advances — and not without reason: for in the first emergence there is a certain tenderness and softness, such that one can neither see the best things nor do them. The light of virtue and of the happy life, the two things most of all to be sought, appears later, and much later still before it is understood plainly what these are. For Plato says it splendidly: Happy is the man to whom it has fallen, even in old age, to be able to attain wisdom and true opinions! Therefore, since enough has been said about the first advantages of nature, let us now look at the greater things that follow.

neque enim civitas in seditione beata esse potest nec in discordia dominorum domus; quo minus animus a se ipse dissidens secumque discordans gustare partem ullam liquidae voluptatis et liberae potest. atqui pugnantibus et contrariis studiis consiliisque semper utens nihil quieti videre, nihil tranquilli potest.

Nature, then, both begot and shaped the body of man in such a way that some things she perfected at the first emergence, others she fashioned as the years advanced, and she made hardly any use at all of external and adventitious aids. The mind, however, she perfected, as she did the body, by the remaining things; for she furnished it with senses fit for perceiving things, so that they needed no aid, or not much, for their own confirmation. But what is most excellent and best in man, that she left undone. And yet she gave such a mind as could receive every virtue, and implanted, without teaching, small notions of the greatest things, and, as it were, set out to teach and led us into the things that were already within — the elements, so to speak, of virtue. But virtue itself she only began; nothing more.

Quodsi corporis gravioribus morbis vitae iucunditas impeditur, quanto magis animi morbis impediri necesse est! animi autem morbi sunt cupiditates inmensae et inanes divitiarum, gloriae, dominationis, libidinosarum etiam voluptatum. accedunt aegritudines, molestiae, maerores, qui exedunt animos conficiuntque curis hominum non intellegentium nihil dolendum esse animo, quod sit a dolore corporis praesenti futurove seiunctum. nec vero quisquam stultus non horum morborum aliquo laborat, nemo igitur est non miser.

And so it is our task — when I say ours, I mean it is the task of an art — to seek out, upon those beginnings that we have received, the consequences, until that which we want is brought to completion. And this is worth a good deal more, and far more to be sought for its own sake, than either the senses or those things of the body which we mentioned; for the surpassing perfection of the mind so far excels them that it can scarcely be conceived what the difference is. And so all honour, all admiration, all zeal is referred to virtue and to those actions that are in accord with virtue, and all the things that are either so present in our minds or so done are called by one name the honourable. What the notions of all these are — those, that is, that are signified by the names of things — and what the force and nature of each is, we shall see presently.

accedit etiam mors, quae quasi saxum Tantalo semper impendet, tum superstitio, qua qui est imbutus quietus esse numquam potest. praeterea bona praeterita non meminerunt, praesentibus non fruuntur, futura modo expectant, quae quia certa esse non possunt, conficiuntur et angore et metu maximeque cruciantur, cum sero sentiunt frustra se aut pecuniae studuisse aut imperiis aut opibus aut gloriae. nullas enim consequuntur voluptates, quarum potiendi spe inflammati multos labores magnosque susceperant.

But for now let us only explain that this honourable of which I speak — apart from the fact that we love our very selves — is besides, by its own nature, to be sought for its own sake. Children give the proof, in whom, as in mirrors, nature is discerned. What great zeal there is in those who contend! What great contests in themselves! How they are carried away with joy when they have won! How ashamed the beaten are! How they refuse to be found at fault! How they long to be praised! What labours do they not endure, to be foremost among their fellows! What memory there is in them of those who have done well by them, what desire to return the favour! And these things appear most of all in every best natural disposition, in which this honourable that we have in mind is, as it were, sketched out by nature.

ecce autem alii minuti et angusti aut omnia semper desperantes aut malivoli, invidi, difficiles, lucifugi, maledici, monstruosi, alii autem etiam amatoriis levitatibus dediti, alii petulantes, alii audaces, protervi, idem intemperantes et ignavi, numquam in sententia permanentes, quas ob causas in eorum vita nulla est intercapedo molestiae. igitur neque stultorum quisquam beatus neque sapientium non beatus. Multoque hoc melius nos veriusque quam Stoici. illi enim negant esse bonum quicquam nisi nescio quam illam umbram, quod appellant honestum non tam solido quam splendido nomine, virtutem autem nixam hoc honesto nullam requirere voluptatem atque ad beate vivendum se ipsa esse contentam.

But these things are in children; in those ages that are now full-formed they are clearly expressed. Who is so unlike a human being as not to be moved both by offence at baseness and by approval of honour? Who is there who does not hate a lustful, shameless youth? Who, on the other hand, does not love modesty and steadiness in that age, even where his own interest is not concerned at all? Who does not hate Pullus Numitorius of Fregellae, the traitor, although he was of service to our commonwealth? Who does not praise above all Codrus, the saviour of his city, who does not praise the daughters of Erechtheus? To whom is the name of Tubulus not hateful? Who does not love Aristides, though he is dead? Or do we forget how greatly we are moved in the hearing and in the reading, when we learn of something done with piety, with friendship, with greatness of soul?

Sed possunt haec quadam ratione dici non modo non repugnantibus, verum etiam approbantibus nobis. sic enim ab Epicuro sapiens semper beatus inducitur: finitas habet cupiditates, neglegit mortem, de diis inmortalibus sine ullo metu vera sentit, non dubitat, si ita melius sit, migrare de vita. his rebus instructus semper est in voluptate. neque enim tempus est ullum, quo non plus voluptatum habeat quam dolorum. nam et praeterita grate meminit et praesentibus ita potitur, ut animadvertat quanta sint ea quamque iucunda, neque pendet ex futuris, sed expectat illa, fruitur praesentibus ab iisque vitiis, quae paulo ante collegi, abest plurimum et, cum stultorum vitam cum sua comparat, magna afficitur voluptate. dolores autem si qui incurrunt, numquam vim tantam habent, ut non plus habeat sapiens, quod gaudeat, quam quod angatur.

Why do I speak of ourselves, who were born, taken up, and trained for praise and for honour? What shouts of the crowd and of the unlearned are raised in the theatres when those lines are spoken: ’I am Orestes’, and against him from the other: ’No, in truth, I tell you, I am Orestes!’ And when, moreover, the way out is given by each to the king, confused and at a loss — when both, then, pray to be put to death together — how often is this acted out, and ever with anything but the greatest admiration? There is no one, then, who does not approve and praise this disposition of mind, by which not only is no advantage sought, but, against advantage, faith is even kept.

optime vero Epicurus, quod exiguam dixit fortunam intervenire sapienti maximasque ab eo et gravissimas res consilio ipsius et ratione administrari neque maiorem voluptatem ex infinito tempore aetatis percipi posse, quam ex hoc percipiatur, quod videamus esse finitum. In dialectica autem vestra nullam existimavit esse nec ad melius vivendum nec ad commodius disserendum viam. In physicis plurimum posuit. ea scientia et verborum vis et natura orationis et consequentium repugnantiumve ratio potest perspici. omnium autem rerum natura cognita levamur superstitione, liberamur mortis metu, non conturbamur ignoratione rerum, e qua ipsa horribiles existunt saepe formidines. denique etiam morati melius erimus, cum didicerimus quid natura desideret. tum vero, si stabilem scientiam rerum tenebimus, servata illa, quae quasi delapsa de caelo est ad cognitionem omnium, regula, ad quam omnia iudicia rerum dirigentur, numquam ullius oratione victi sententia desistemus.

With examples of this kind not only invented stories but histories too are crammed, and ours especially. For we chose the best of men to receive the sacred objects of Ida; we sent guardians to kings; our generals vowed their own lives for the safety of their country; our consuls warned a king, a bitter enemy already drawing near our walls, to beware of poison; in our commonwealth was found a Lucretia, who atoned by a voluntary death for the violation forced upon her, and a man who killed his daughter that she might not be violated. All these things, and countless others besides — who is there who does not understand both that those who did them were drawn by the splendour of worth and were heedless of their own advantage, and that we, when we praise them, are led by nothing else than the honourable? Now that these matters have been set out briefly — for I have not pursued the abundance I might have, since there was no doubt in the case — by all this it is surely concluded that both all the virtues and that honourable which springs from them and clings within them are to be sought for their own sake.

nisi autem rerum natura perspecta erit, nullo modo poterimus sensuum iudicia defendere. quicquid porro animo cernimus, id omne oritur a sensibus; qui si omnes veri erunt, ut Epicuri ratio docet, tum denique poterit aliquid cognosci et percipi. quos qui tollunt et nihil posse percipi dicunt, ii remotis sensibus ne id ipsum quidem expedire possunt, quod disserunt. praeterea sublata cognitione et scientia tollitur omnis ratio et vitae degendae et rerum gerendarum. sic e physicis et fortitudo sumitur contra mortis timorem et constantia contra metum religionis et sedatio animi omnium rerum occultarum ignoratione sublata et moderatio natura cupiditatum generibusque earum explicatis, et, ut modo docui, cognitionis regula et iudicio ab eadem illa constituto veri a falso distinctio traditur.

But in all that honourable good of which we are speaking, nothing is so radiant, nothing of wider reach, than the bond between man and man, a kind of fellowship and sharing of advantages, and that very love of the human race. This love, born from the first begetting — in that children are cherished by those who begot them, and the whole household is bound together by marriage and by stock — creeps gradually outward: first to kinsfolk, then to relations by marriage, then to friends, after that to neighbours, then to fellow citizens and to those who are publicly our allies and friends, and at last to the embrace of the whole human kind. This disposition of the mind, rendering to each his own and guarding generously and fairly that fellowship of human union of which I speak, is called justice; and joined to it are dutifulness, kindness, generosity, good will, courtesy, and whatever else is of the same kind. And these things, while they are proper to justice, are at the same time shared with the rest of the virtues.

Restat locus huic disputationi vel maxime necessarius de amicitia, quam, si voluptas summum sit bonum, affirmatis nullam omnino fore. de qua Epicurus quidem ita dicit, omnium rerum, quas ad beate vivendum sapientia comparaverit, nihil esse maius amicitia, nihil uberius, nihil iucundius. nec vero hoc oratione solum, sed multo magis vita et factis et moribus comprobavit. quod quam magnum sit fictae veterum fabulae declarant, in quibus tam multis tamque variis ab ultima antiquitate repetitis tria vix amicorum paria reperiuntur, ut ad Orestem pervenias profectus a Theseo. at vero Epicurus una in domo, et ea quidem angusta, quam magnos quantaque amoris conspiratione consentientis tenuit amicorum greges! quod fit etiam nunc ab Epicureis. sed ad rem redeamus; de hominibus dici non necesse est.

For since man’s nature has been begotten in such a way that he has within him something inborn and, as it were, civic and communal, which the Greeks call politikon, whatever any virtue does will not be at odds with that community and that love and human fellowship which I have set out; and, in turn, just as justice itself will pour itself into the other virtues, so it will seek them out. For justice cannot be kept except by a brave man, except by a wise one. Such, then, as is this whole concord and consent of the virtues of which I speak, such is that honourable good itself, since the honourable is either virtue itself or a deed done by virtue; and a life that accords with these and answers to the virtues can be judged upright and honourable and steadfast and in keeping with nature.

Tribus igitur modis video esse a nostris de amicitia disputatum. alii cum eas voluptates, quae ad amicos pertinerent, negarent esse per se ipsas tam expetendas, quam nostras expeteremus, quo loco videtur quibusdam stabilitas amicitiae vacillare, tuentur tamen eum locum seque facile, ut mihi videtur, expediunt. ut enim virtutes, de quibus ante dictum est, sic amicitiam negant posse a voluptate discedere. nam cum solitudo et vita sine amicis insidiarum et metus plena sit, ratio ipsa monet amicitias comparare, quibus partis confirmatur animus et a spe pariendarum voluptatum seiungi non potest.

And yet this joining and intermingling of the virtues is nonetheless distinguished by the philosophers through a certain method of reasoning. For although they are so coupled and connected that all share in all, and none can be severed from another, still each has its own proper office: courage is discerned in toils and dangers, temperance in the foregoing of pleasures, prudence in the choice of goods and evils, justice in rendering to each his own. Since, then, there is in every virtue a certain care that looks, as it were, outward and reaches after others and embraces them, it comes about that friends, that brothers, that kinsmen, that relations by marriage, that fellow citizens, that everyone in the end — since we hold that there is one fellowship of mankind — are to be sought for their own sake. And yet none of these is of such a kind as to lie within the end and uttermost limit of goods.

atque ut odia, invidiae, despicationes adversantur voluptatibus, sic amicitiae non modo fautrices fidelissimae, sed etiam effectrices sunt voluptatum tam amicis quam sibi, quibus non solum praesentibus fruuntur, sed etiam spe eriguntur consequentis ac posteri temporis. quod quia nullo modo sine amicitia firmam et perpetuam iucunditatem vitae tenere possumus neque vero ipsam amicitiam tueri, nisi aeque amicos et nosmet ipsos diligamus, idcirco et hoc ipsum efficitur in amicitia, et amicitia cum voluptate conectitur. nam et laetamur amicorum laetitia aeque atque nostra et pariter dolemus angoribus.

So it comes about that two kinds of things to be sought for their own sake are found. One lies in those things in which that uttermost good is brought to completion — things which belong either to the mind or to the body. But those that are external — that is, those that are present neither in the mind nor in the body, such as friends, parents, children, kinsmen, the fatherland itself — these are indeed dear of their own accord, but they are not of the same class as the others. Nor indeed could anyone ever attain the highest good if all those things that lie outside us, though to be sought, were contained within the highest good.

quocirca eodem modo sapiens erit affectus erga amicum, quo in se ipsum, quosque labores propter suam voluptatem susciperet, eosdem suscipiet propter amici voluptatem. quaeque de virtutibus dicta sunt, quem ad modum eae semper voluptatibus inhaererent, eadem de amicitia dicenda sunt. praeclare enim Epicurus his paene verbis: ’Eadem’, inquit, scientia confirmavit animum, ne quod aut sempiternum aut diuturnum timeret malum, quae perspexit in hoc ipso vitae spatio amicitiae praesidium esse firmissimum.

"How, then," you will say, "will it be possible for it to be true that all things are referred to the highest good, if friendships, if ties of kinship, if the remaining external things are not contained within the highest good?" By this account, surely: that we guard those things which are external by the duties that arise from each particular kind of virtue. For the cultivation of a friend and of a parent, to one who discharges his duty, profits him in this very thing, that to discharge duty thus belongs among right actions, which are sprung from the virtues. These the wise indeed pursue under nature’s guidance, as though they could see; but men who are not yet perfect, and yet endowed with outstanding natural gifts, are often roused by glory, which has the look and likeness of the honourable. But if they could see, through and through, that honourable good itself, perfect and complete on every side … the one thing most splendid of all and most worthy of praise, with what joy would they be filled, when they take such delight in the shadowy notion of it?

Sunt autem quidam Epicurei timidiores paulo contra vestra convicia, sed tamen satis acuti, qui verentur ne, si amicitiam propter nostram voluptatem expetendam putemus, tota amicitia quasi claudicare videatur. itaque primos congressus copulationesque et consuetudinum instituendarum voluntates fieri propter voluptatem; cum autem usus progrediens familiaritatem effecerit, tum amorem efflorescere tantum, ut, etiamsi nulla sit utilitas ex amicitia, tamen ipsi amici propter se ipsos amentur. etenim si loca, si fana, si urbes, si gymnasia, si campum, si canes, si equos, si ludicra exercendi aut venandi consuetudine adamare solemus, quanto id in hominum consuetudine facilius fieri poterit et iustius?

For what man, given over to pleasures, what man set ablaze by the fires of his desires in laying hold of the things he had most fiercely craved, do we suppose to be flooded with so great a gladness as either the elder Africanus, when Hannibal was beaten, or the younger, when Carthage was overthrown? Whom did the descent of the Tiber on that festal day affect with so great a joy as it affected L. Paulus, when he was carried up that same river bringing King Perses captive? Come now, Lucius mine, raise up in your mind the height and excellence of the virtues:

Sunt autem, qui dicant foedus esse quoddam sapientium, ut ne minus amicos quam se ipsos diligant. quod et posse fieri intellegimus et saepe etiam videmus, et perspicuum est nihil ad iucunde vivendum reperiri posse, quod coniunctione tali sit aptius. Quibus ex omnibus iudicari potest non modo non impediri rationem amicitiae, si summum bonum in voluptate ponatur, sed sine hoc institutionem omnino amicitiae non posse reperiri.

you will no longer doubt that men who possess them, living with a great and lofty spirit, are always happy — men who understand that all the motions of fortune and the changes of circumstance and the times will be light and feeble, if once they have entered the contest of virtue. For those things which we counted among the goods of the body do indeed fill out the happiest life, but in such a way that the happy life can exist without them. For so small and slight are those additions of goods that, just as the stars are not even seen in the rays of the sun, so these are not even discerned in the splendour of the virtues. And though it is truly said that those advantages of the body count for little toward living happily, still it is too violent to say that they count for nothing;

Quapropter si ea, quae dixi, sole ipso illustriora et clariora sunt, si omnia dixi hausta e fonte naturae, si tota oratio nostra omnem sibi fidem sensibus confirmat, id est incorruptis atque integris testibus, si infantes pueri, mutae etiam bestiae paene loquuntur magistra ac duce natura nihil esse prosperum nisi voluptatem, nihil asperum nisi dolorem, de quibus neque depravate iudicant neque corrupte, nonne ei maximam gratiam habere debemus, qui hac exaudita quasi voce naturae sic eam firme graviterque comprehenderit, ut omnes bene sanos in viam placatae, tranquillae, quietae, beatae vitae deduceret? Qui quod tibi parum videtur eruditus, ea causa est, quod nullam eruditionem esse duxit, nisi quae beatae vitae disciplinam iuvaret.

for those who argue so seem to me to have forgotten the very first principles of nature which they themselves laid down. Something, then, must be granted to these things — provided you understand how much is to be granted. For it belongs to a philosopher who seeks not so much the showy as the true neither to count as nothing those things which even those showy men confessed to be in accordance with nature, and to see that there is so great a force in virtue and, so to speak, so great an authority in the honourable, that the rest, while not nothing, are yet so small as to seem to be nothing. This is the discourse of one who does not scorn all things save virtue, yet magnifies virtue itself with the praises that are its own; and, in fine, this is the explanation of the highest good, complete and perfect on every side. From here the rest, attempting to snatch up little fragments, each wished his own opinion to seem the one he had contributed.

an ille tempus aut in poe+tis evolvendis, ut ego et Triarius te hortatore facimus, consumeret, in quibus nulla solida utilitas omnisque puerilis est delectatio, aut se, ut Plato, in musicis, geometria, numeris, astris contereret, quae et a falsis initiis profecta vera esse non possunt et, si essent vera, nihil afferrent, quo iucundius, id est quo melius viveremus, eas ergo artes persequeretur, vivendi artem tantam tamque et operosam et perinde fructuosam relinqueret? non ergo Epicurus ineruditus, sed ii indocti, qui, quae pueros non didicisse turpe est, ea putant usque ad senectutem esse discenda. Quae cum dixisset, Explicavi, inquit, sententiam meam, et eo quidem consilio, tuum iudicium ut cognoscerem, quoniam mihi ea facultas, ut id meo arbitratu facerem, ante hoc tempus numquam est data.

After I had heard Antiochus, Brutus, as was my habit, in the company of M. Piso, in the gymnasium that is called the Ptolemaeum, and with us my brother Quintus and T. Pomponius and Lucius Cicero — my cousin by blood, but a brother in affection — we agreed among ourselves to spend the afternoon walking in the Academy, chiefly because at that hour the place would be free of every crowd. And so at the appointed time we all went to Piso. From there, with talk of this and that, we covered those six stades from the Dipylon. When we had come into the spaces of the Academy, which are not without reason famous, we found the solitude we had wanted.

Hic cum uterque me intueretur seseque ad audiendum significarent paratos, Primum, inquam, deprecor, ne me tamquam philosophum putetis scholam vobis aliquam explicaturum, quod ne in ipsis quidem philosophis magnopere umquam probavi. quando enim Socrates, qui parens philosophiae iure dici potest, quicquam tale fecit? eorum erat iste mos qui tum sophistae nominabantur, quorum e numero primus est ausus Leontinus Gorgias in conventu poscere quaestionem, id est iubere dicere, qua de re quis vellet audire. audax negotium, dicerem impudens, nisi hoc institutum postea translatum ad philosophos nostros esset.

Then Piso said: ’Should I call it something given us by nature, or some kind of illusion, that when we see the very places in which we have learned that men worthy of remembrance spent much of their time, we are moved more deeply than when we hear of the deeds of those same men, or read some piece of their writing? Just so I am moved now. For Plato comes into my mind, who we are told was the first to make a practice of holding discussions here; and those little gardens of his close by do not merely bring him to my memory but seem to set the man himself before my eyes. Here was Speusippus, here Xenocrates, here his pupil Polemo — whose very seat that was, the one we see. And for my own part, when I would look upon our own Senate-house — the Hostilian, I mean, not this new one, which seems to me smaller now that it has been made larger — I used to call to mind Scipio, Cato, Laelius, and above all my own grandfather; so great is the power of suggestion that lies in places; with good reason, then, has the art of memory been derived from them.’

sed et illum, quem nominavi, et ceteros sophistas, ut e Platone intellegi potest, lusos videmus a Socrate. is enim percontando atque interrogando elicere solebat eorum opiniones, quibuscum disserebat, ut ad ea, quae ii respondissent, si quid videretur, diceret. qui mos cum a posterioribus non esset retentus, Arcesilas eum revocavit instituitque ut ii, qui se audire vellent, non de se quaererent, sed ipsi dicerent, quid sentirent; quod cum dixissent, ille contra. sed eum qui audiebant, quoad poterant, defendebant sententiam suam. apud ceteros autem philosophos, qui quaesivit aliquid, tacet; quod quidem iam fit etiam in Academia. ubi enim is, qui audire vult, ita dixit: ’Voluptas mihi videtur esse summum bonum’, perpetua oratione contra disputatur, ut facile intellegi possit eos, qui aliquid sibi videri dicant, non ipsos in ea sententia esse, sed audire velle contraria. Nos commodius agimus.

Then Quintus said: ’It is exactly as you say, Piso. For just now, as I was coming here, that spot of Colonus turned my own thoughts toward itself, where its inhabitant Sophocles came before my eyes — Sophocles, whom you know how I admire and how I delight in him. Indeed, a kind of vision stirred me toward an older memory still, of Oedipus coming to this place and asking, in that most tender song, what these very spots might be — to no purpose, of course, yet it stirred me all the same.’ Then Pomponius said: ’But as for me, whom you are all in the habit of attacking as a devotee of Epicurus, I spend much time, as you know, with Phaedrus — whom I love beyond all others — in the gardens of Epicurus, which we passed by just now; yet, warned by the old proverb, I bear the living in mind, and still I cannot forget Epicurus, even were I to wish it, since my friends keep his likeness not only on their tablets but even on their cups and on their rings.’

non enim solum Torquatus dixit quid sentiret, sed etiam cur. ego autem arbitror, quamquam admodum delectatus sum eius oratione perpetua, tamen commodius, cum in rebus singulis insistas et intellegas quid quisque concedat, quid abnuat, ex rebus concessis concludi quod velis et ad exitum perveniri. cum enim fertur quasi torrens oratio, quamvis multa cuiusque modi rapiat, nihil tamen teneas, nihil apprehendas, nusquam orationem rapidam cœrceas. Omnis autem in quaerendo, quae via quadam et ratione habetur, oratio praescribere primum debet ut quibusdam in formulis ea res agetur, ut, inter quos disseritur, conveniat quid sit id, de quo disseratur.

Here I said: ’Our friend Pomponius is plainly making a joke, and perhaps within his rights. For he has so settled himself at Athens that he is all but one of the Attics, and looks likely to earn that very surname. But I agree with you, Piso, that this is what happens in practice: that at the prompting of places we think rather more keenly and attentively about famous men. For you know that once I came with you to Metapontum, and would not turn aside to my host before I had seen that very place where Pythagoras ended his life, and his seat. But at this present time, though there are throughout every quarter of Athens, in the very places themselves, many tokens of men of the highest greatness, still it is that recess that moves me. For only a little while ago it belonged to Carneades, whom I seem to see — for his likeness is well known — and I think that the very seat, robbed of so great a greatness of genius, longs for that voice of his.’

hoc positum in Phaedro a Platone probavit Epicurus sensitque in omni disputatione id fieri oportere. sed quod proximum fuit non vidit. negat enim definiri rem placere, sine quo fieri interdum non potest, ut inter eos, qui ambigunt, conveniat quid sit id, de quo agatur, velut in hoc ipso, de quo nunc disputamus. quaerimus enim finem bonorum. possumusne hic scire qualis sit, nisi contulerimus inter nos, cum finem bonorum dixerimus, quid finis, quid etiam sit ipsum bonum?

Then Piso said: ’Since, then, each of us has something to say, what of our friend Lucius? Does he gladly visit the spot where Demosthenes and Aeschines used to fight it out against each other? For each man is drawn most by his own pursuit.’ And he, blushing, said: ’Do not ask it of me — I, who have even gone down to the Phaleric shore, to the place where they say Demosthenes used to declaim against the surf, to train himself to master the roar with his voice. And only just now I turned a little to the right off the road, to approach the tomb of Pericles. Though indeed there is no end of that in this city; for wherever we set foot, we set it down on some piece of history.’

atqui haec patefactio quasi rerum opertarum, cum quid quidque sit aperitur, definitio est. qua tu etiam inprudens utebare non numquam. nam hunc ipsum sive finem sive extremum sive ultimum definiebas id esse, quo omnia, quae recte fierent, referrentur neque id ipsum usquam referretur. praeclare hoc quidem. bonum ipsum etiam quid esset, fortasse, si opus fuisset, definisses aut quod esset natura adpetendum aut quod prodesset aut quod iuvaret aut quod liberet modo. nunc idem, nisi molestum est, quoniam tibi non omnino displicet definire et id facis, cum vis, velim definias quid sit voluptas, de quo omnis haec quaestio est. Quis, quaeso, inquit, est, qui quid sit voluptas nesciat, aut qui, quo magis id intellegat, definitionem aliquam desideret?

Then Piso said: ’And yet, Cicero, those pursuits of yours, if they look to the imitation of great men, are the mark of men of talent; but if only to the learning of the tokens of ancient memory, of the merely curious. We all urge you — already at a run, I hope — not only to wish to know the men you wish to know, but to wish to imitate them too.’ Here I said: ’Although this young man, as you see, Piso, is doing what you prescribe, still your encouragement is welcome to me.’ Then he, in the most friendly way, as was his habit, said: ’Let us all, indeed, bring everything we can to bear upon this young man’s coming of age, and above all that he impart something of his own studies to philosophy as well — whether to imitate you, whom he loves, or to be able to do that very thing he pursues with more grace. But are you to be urged by us, Lucius, or are you already inclined of your own accord? To me, at least, you seem to attend to Antiochus, whom you hear, well enough.’ Then he, shyly, or rather modestly, said: ’I do indeed; but did you hear, just now, about Carneades? I am carried off that way — yet Antiochus calls me back, and there is no one else for us to hear besides.’

Me ipsum esse dicerem, inquam, nisi mihi viderer habere bene cognitam voluptatem et satis firme conceptam animo atque comprehensam. Nunc autem dico ipsum Epicurum nescire et in eo nutare eumque, qui crebro dicat diligenter oportere exprimi quae vis subiecta sit vocibus, non intellegere interdum, quid sonet haec vox voluptatis, id est quae res huic voci subiciatur. Tum ille ridens: Hoc vero, inquit, optimum, ut is, qui finem rerum expetendarum voluptatem esse dicat, id extremum, id ultimum bonorum, id ipsum quid et quale sit, nesciat! Atqui, inquam, aut Epicurus quid sit voluptas aut omnes mortales, qui ubique sunt, nesciunt. Quonam, inquit, modo? Quia voluptatem hanc esse sentiunt omnes, quam sensus accipiens movetur et iucunditate quadam perfunditur. Quid ergo?

Then Piso said: ’Although this, perhaps, will not be allowed to pass off so easily, since he is here’ — he meant me — ’still I shall make bold to call you back from this New Academy to that old one, in which, as you used to hear Antiochus say, there are reckoned not only those who are called Academics — Speusippus, Xenocrates, Polemo, Crantor, and the rest — but also the old Peripatetics, whose chief was Aristotle, whom, excepting Plato, I should perhaps not be wrong to call the chief of philosophers. Turn yourself, then, to them, I beg you. For from their writings and their teachings one may draw not only all liberal learning, all history, all elegant discourse, but there is besides such a variety of arts in them that no one, without that equipment, can come properly furnished to any of the more distinguished tasks. From these men have arisen orators, from these generals and leaders of commonwealths. To come to lesser matters: mathematicians, poets, musicians, and physicians too have set out, in the end, from this workshop, as it were, of every craftsman.’ And I said:

istam voluptatem, inquit, Epicurus ignorat? Non semper, inquam; nam interdum nimis etiam novit, quippe qui testificetur ne intellegere quidem se posse ubi sit aut quod sit ullum bonum praeter illud, quod cibo et potione et aurium delectatione et obscena voluptate capiatur. an haec ab eo non dicuntur? Quasi vero me pudeat, inquit, istorum, aut non possim quem ad modum ea dicantur ostendere! Ego vero non dubito, inquam, quin facile possis, nec est quod te pudeat sapienti adsentiri, qui se unus, quod sciam, sapientem profiteri sit ausus. nam Metrodorum non puto ipsum professum, sed, cum appellaretur ab Epicuro, repudiare tantum beneficium noluisse; septem autem illi non suo, sed populorum suffragio omnium nominati sunt.

’You know I feel the very same, Piso; but you have made mention of the matter at a good moment. For my friend Cicero here is eager to hear what the view is, regarding the ends of goods, of that old Academy you speak of, and of the Peripatetics. And we think you can explain it most easily, since you had Staseas of Naples with you for many years, and since for several months now we have seen you inquiring into these very things at Athens from Antiochus.’ And he, laughing, said: ’Come, come’ — for you wished, cleverly enough, to make me the starting-point of our discussion — ’let us set it out for the young man, if by chance we are able. For this solitude grants us what, were some god to promise it, I should never have thought possible: that I should hold a discussion in the Academy, like a philosopher. But let me not, while I oblige him, be a burden to you.’ ’A burden to me,’ I said, ’who asked you for this very thing?’ Then, when Quintus and Pomponius had said that they wished the same, Piso began. And do attend, I beg you, Brutus, to his discourse, and judge whether it seems to have embraced sufficiently the view of Antiochus — a view I take to be the one you most approve, since you have often heard his brother Aristus.

Verum hoc loco sumo verbis his eandem certe vim voluptatis Epicurum nosse quam ceteros. omnes enim iucundum motum, quo sensus hilaretur. Graece h(donh/n, Latine voluptatem vocant. Quid est igitur, inquit, quod requiras? Dicam, inquam, et quidem discendi causa magis, quam quo te aut Epicurum reprehensum velim. Ego quoque, inquit, didicerim libentius si quid attuleris, quam te reprehenderim. Tenesne igitur, inquam, Hieronymus Rhodius quid dicat esse summum bonum, quo putet omnia referri oportere? Teneo, inquit, finem illi videri nihil dolere. Quid? idem iste, inquam, de voluptate quid sentit?

He spoke, then, thus: ’How much ornament there is in the discipline of the Peripatetics has been said by me, as briefly as I could, a little while ago. But the form of that discipline, as of nearly all the rest, is threefold: one part is of nature, a second of reasoning, a third of living. Nature was investigated by them in such a way that no part of sky, sea, or land — to speak in the poet’s manner — was passed over; indeed, when they had spoken of the first beginnings of things and of the whole world, so as to draw their conclusions not only by probable argument but even by the necessary reasoning of the mathematicians, they brought the greatest store of material, from things investigated for their own sake, to the knowledge of hidden things.

Negat esse eam, inquit, propter se expetendam. Aliud igitur esse censet gaudere, aliud non dolere. Et quidem, inquit, vehementer errat; nam, ut paulo ante docui, augendae voluptatis finis est doloris omnis amotio. Non dolere, inquam, istud quam vim habeat postea videro; aliam vero vim voluptatis esse, aliam nihil dolendi, nisi valde pertinax fueris, concedas necesse est. Atqui reperies, inquit, in hoc quidem pertinacem; dici enim nihil potest verius. Estne, quaeso, inquam, sitienti in bibendo voluptas? Quis istud possit, inquit, negare? Eademne, quae restincta siti? Immo alio genere; restincta enim sitis stabilitatem voluptatis habet, inquit, illa autem voluptas ipsius restinctionis in motu est. Cur igitur, inquam, res tam dissimiles eodem nomine appellas? Quid paulo ante, inquit, dixerim nonne meministi, cum omnis dolor detractus esset, variari, non augeri voluptatem?

Aristotle pursued the origins, the ways of life, and the forms of all living creatures; Theophrastus, for his part, the natures of plants and the causes and accounts of nearly all the things brought forth from the earth; and from this knowledge the investigation of the most hidden things was made easier. By the same men were handed down precepts of reasoning, not by dialectic alone but by oratory too; and by Aristotle, as its chief author, the exercise of speaking on both sides of single questions was established — not so as always to argue against everything, in the manner of Arcesilas, and yet so as, in all matters, to bring out whatever could be said on either side.

Memini vero, inquam; sed tu istuc dixti bene Latine, parum plane. varietas enim Latinum verbum est, idque proprie quidem in disparibus coloribus dicitur, sed transfertur in multa disparia: varium poe+ma, varia oratio, varii mores, varia fortuna, voluptas etiam varia dici solet, cum percipitur e multis dissimilibus rebus dissimilis efficientibus voluptates. eam si varietatem diceres, intellegerem, ut etiam non dicente te intellego; ista varietas quae sit non satis perspicio, quod ais, cum dolore careamus, tum in summa voluptate nos esse, cum autem vescamur iis rebus, quae dulcem motum afferant sensibus, tum esse in motu voluptatem, qui faciat varietatem voluptatum, sed non augeri illam non dolendi voluptatem, quam cur voluptatem appelles nescio. An potest, inquit ille, quicquam esse suavius quam nihil dolere?

And when the third part sought the precepts of living well, that too was applied by them not only to the conduct of private life but also to the governing of commonwealths. From Aristotle we have learned the customs, institutions, and disciplines of nearly all the states not of Greece only but of the barbarian world as well; from Theophrastus, even their laws. And whereas each of them had taught what kind of leader it befits a man to be in a commonwealth, and had written besides, at greater length, what the best condition of a commonwealth might be, Theophrastus did this further: he showed what tendencies there are in a commonwealth, and what shifts of circumstance, by which one must steer as the situation may require. But as for the manner of passing one’s life, the one that most pleased them was indeed the quiet one, set in the contemplation and the knowledge of things; and because this was most like to the life of the gods, it seemed most worthy of the wise man. And on these matters their discourse is splendid and illustrious.

Immo sit sane nihil melius, inquam—nondum enim id quaero—, num propterea idem voluptas est, quod, ut ita dicam, indolentia? Plane idem, inquit, et maxima quidem, qua fieri nulla maior potest. Quid dubitas igitur, inquam, summo bono a te ita constituto, ut id totum in non dolendo sit, id tenere unum, id tueri, id defendere?

As to the highest good, however — since there are two kinds of their books, one written for the public, which they called exoterikon, the other more finely worked, which they left in their notebooks — they do not always seem to say the same thing; and yet on the substance itself there is no inconsistency, at least among those I have named, nor any disagreement among them. But when the happy life is the question, and this is the one thing that philosophy ought to look to and to follow, whether it lies wholly within the power of the wise man or can be either shaken or torn away by adverse circumstances — on this they do at times seem to differ among themselves and to be in doubt. This is brought out most of all by Theophrastus’ book on the happy life, in which a great deal is granted to fortune. And if this is so, wisdom could not guarantee a happy life. This account seems to me too delicate, so to speak, and too soft, for what the force and gravity of virtue demands. Let us hold, then, to Aristotle and to his son Nicomachus, whose carefully written books on ethics are said indeed to be Aristotle’s own — though I do not see why the son could not have been like the father. As for Theophrastus, let us call upon him for most things, provided only that we hold to more firmness and strength in virtue than he held to. Let us be content, then, with these men.

quid enim necesse est, tamquam meretricem in matronarum coetum, sic voluptatem in virtutum concilium adducere? invidiosum nomen est, infame, suspectum. itaque hoc frequenter dici solet a vobis, non intellegere nos, quam dicat Epicurus voluptatem. quod quidem mihi si quando dictum est—est autem dictum non parum saepe—, etsi satis clemens sum in disputando, tamen interdum soleo subirasci. egone non intellego, quid sit h(donh/ Graece, Latine voluptas? utram tandem linguam nescio? deinde qui fit, ut ego nesciam, sciant omnes, quicumque Epicurei esse voluerunt? quod vestri quidem vel optime disputant, nihil opus esse eum, qui philosophus futurus sit, scire litteras. itaque ut maiores nostri ab aratro adduxerunt Cincinnatum illum, ut dictator esset, sic vos de pagis omnibus colligitis bonos illos quidem viros, sed certe non pereruditos.

For their successors are, in my view, better than the philosophers of the other schools, but they so degenerate that they seem to have been born of their own selves. First, Theophrastus’ pupil Strato wished to be a natural philosopher; and in that, though he is great, still most of his work is novel, and very little of it concerns ethics. His pupil Lyco is rich in language, but rather thin in matters themselves. Lyco’s pupil Aristo is then neat and elegant, but that gravity which is looked for in a great philosopher was not in him; his writings are indeed many and polished, but somehow his discourse has no authority.

ergo illi intellegunt quid Epicurus dicat, ego non intellego? ut scias me intellegere, primum idem esse dico voluptatem, quod ille h(donh/n. et quidem saepe quaerimus verbum Latinum par Graeco et quod idem valeat; hic nihil fuit, quod quaereremus. nullum inveniri verbum potest quod magis idem declaret Latine, quod Graece, quam declarat voluptas. huic verbo omnes, qui ubique sunt, qui Latine sciunt, duas res subiciunt, laetitiam in animo, commotionem suavem iucunditatis in corpore. nam et ille apud Trabeam voluptatem animi nimiam laetitiam dicit eandem, quam ille Caecilianus, qui omnibus laetitiis laetum esse se narrat. sed hoc interest, quod voluptas dicitur etiam in animo—vitiosa res, ut Stoici putant, qui eam sic definiunt: sublationem animi sine ratione opinantis se magno bono frui—, non dicitur laetitia nec gaudium in corpore.

I pass over many, among them a learned and agreeable man, Hieronymus — whom I no longer know why I should call a Peripatetic. For he set out freedom from pain as the highest good; and whoever disagrees about the highest good disagrees about the whole scheme of philosophy. Critolaus wished to imitate the ancients, and is indeed nearest to them in gravity, and his discourse runs full; and yet not even he stays within the institutions of his fathers. Diodorus, his pupil, adds freedom from pain to honour. He too is his own man, and, disagreeing about the highest good, cannot truly be called a Peripatetic. But the view of the ancients our friend Antiochus seems to me to follow most carefully, and he teaches that this same view was Aristotle’s and Polemo’s.

in eo autem voluptas omnium Latine loquentium more ponitur, cum percipitur ea, quae sensum aliquem moveat, iucunditas. hanc quoque iucunditatem, si vis, transfer in animum; iuvare enim in utroque dicitur, ex eoque iucundum, modo intellegas inter illum, qui dicat: ’Ta/nta laetitia au/ctus sum, ut nihil co/nstet’, et eum, qui: ’Nunc demum mihi animus ardet’, quorum alter laetitia gestiat, alter dolore crucietur, esse illum medium: ’Quamquam hae/c inter nos nu/per notitia a/dmodum est’, qui nec laetetur nec angatur, itemque inter eum, qui potiatur corporis expetitis voluptatibus, et eum, qui crucietur summis doloribus, esse eum, qui utroque careat.

Our friend Lucius does wisely, then, in wishing above all to hear about the highest good; for once this is settled, everything in philosophy is settled. For in other matters, if anything has been passed over or left unknown, there is no more inconvenience than the worth of whichever of those things it is in which something has been neglected. But if the highest good is unknown, the plan of living must of necessity be unknown too; and from this there follows so great an error that men cannot know to what harbour they should make their way. But once the ends of things are known, when it is understood what is the limit both of goods and of evils, the road of life has been found, and the shaping of all our duties, since it is then asked to what each thing is to be referred;

Satisne igitur videor vim verborum tenere, an sum etiam nunc vel Graece loqui vel Latine docendus? et tamen vide, ne, si ego non intellegam quid Epicurus loquatur, cum Graece, ut videor, luculenter sciam, sit aliqua culpa eius, qui ita loquatur, ut non intellegatur. quod duobus modis sine reprehensione fit, si aut de industria facias, ut Heraclitus, ’cognomento qui skoteino/s perhibetur, quia de natura nimis obscure memoravit’, aut cum rerum obscuritas, non verborum, facit ut non intellegatur oratio, qualis est in Timaeo Platonis. Epicurus autem, ut opinor, nec non vult, si possit, plane et aperte loqui, nec de re obscura, ut physici, aut artificiosa, ut mathematici, sed de illustri et facili et iam in vulgus pervagata loquitur. Quamquam non negatis nos intellegere quid sit voluptas, sed quid ille dicat. e quo efficitur, non ut nos non intellegamus quae vis sit istius verbi, sed ut ille suo more loquatur, nostrum neglegat.

from which the plan of living happily — the thing all men long for — can be found and procured. And since there is great disagreement as to wherein this lies, we must call in that division of Carneades which our friend Antiochus is glad to use. For he saw not only how many views of the highest good there had been among philosophers up to now, but how many altogether there could possibly be. He used to deny, then, that there is any art that proceeds from itself; for the thing grasped by an art is always external to it. There is no need to make this longer with examples. For it is plain that no art turns upon itself, but that the art is one thing and the object set before the art another. Since, therefore, just as medicine is the art of health and steering the art of navigation, so prudence is the art of living, it follows of necessity that this too has been established and set going from some thing outside itself.

si enim idem dicit, quod Hieronymus, qui censet summum bonum esse sine ulla molestia vivere, cur mavult dicere voluptatem quam vacuitatem doloris, ut ille facit, qui quid dicat intellegit? sin autem voluptatem putat adiungendam eam, quae sit in motu—sic enim appellat hanc dulcem: ’in motu’, illam nihil dolentis ’in stabilitate’—, quid tendit? cum efficere non possit ut cuiquam, qui ipse sibi notus sit, hoc est qui suam naturam sensumque perspexerit, vacuitas doloris et voluptas idem esse videatur. hoc est vim afferre, Torquate, sensibus, extorquere ex animis cognitiones verborum, quibus inbuti sumus. quis enim est, qui non videat haec esse in natura rerum tria? unum, cum in voluptate sumus, alterum, cum in dolore, tertium hoc, in quo nunc equidem sum, credo item vos, nec in dolore nec in voluptate; ut in voluptate sit, qui epuletur, in dolore, qui torqueatur. tu autem inter haec tantam multitudinem hominum interiectam non vides nec laetantium nec dolentium?

On one point, however, nearly all are agreed: that the thing with which wisdom is concerned, and which it aims to attain, must be suited and adapted to nature, and of such a kind that it invites and draws on the mind’s appetite of its own accord — what the Greeks call hormē. But what that thing is which moves us in this way and is sought by nature at the very first dawning of life — on this there is no agreement, and it is here, when the highest good is investigated, that the whole disagreement among the philosophers lies. For the whole of that inquiry which concerns the ends of good and evil — when we ask what among these is the furthest and the ultimate — has its source to be found in the question of where the first promptings of nature lie; once that is discovered, the entire discussion of the highest good and evil is drawn from it as from a head. Some hold that the first appetite is for pleasure and the first recoil from pain. Others judge that freedom from pain is what is first taken up, and pain what is first turned away from.

Non prorsus, inquit, omnisque, qui sine dolore sint, in voluptate, et ea quidem summa, esse dico. Ergo in eadem voluptate eum, qui alteri misceat mulsum ipse non sitiens, et eum, qui illud sitiens bibat? Tum ille: Finem, inquit, interrogandi, si videtur, quod quidem ego a principio ita me malle dixeram hoc ipsum providens, dialecticas captiones. Rhetorice igitur, inquam, nos mavis quam dialectice disputare? Quasi vero, inquit, perpetua oratio rhetorum solum, non etiam philosophorum sit. Zenonis est, inquam, hoc Stoici. omnem vim loquendi, ut iam ante Aristoteles, in duas tributam esse partes, rhetoricam palmae, dialecticam pugni similem esse dicebat, quod latius loquerentur rhetores, dialectici autem compressius. obsequar igitur voluntati tuae dicamque, si potero, rhetorice, sed hac rhetorica philosophorum, non nostra illa forensi, quam necesse est, cum populariter loquatur, esse interdum paulo hebetiorem.

From these others again set out — those who name what they call the primary things in accordance with nature, among which they count the soundness and preservation of all the parts, health, unimpaired senses, freedom from pain, strength, beauty, and the rest of the same kind, of which there are likenesses in our minds, as it were the first sparks and seeds of the virtues. Now since it is some one of these three by which nature is first moved, whether toward seeking or toward repelling, and since there can be nothing at all besides these three, it necessarily follows that the whole duty of avoiding or of pursuing is referred to one of them, so that the wisdom we have called the art of living is concerned with one of those three things, and from it draws the starting-point of the whole of life.

sed dum dialecticam, Torquate, contemnit Epicurus, quae una continet omnem et perspiciendi quid in quaque re sit scientiam et iudicandi quale quidque sit et ratione ac via disputandi, ruit in dicendo, ut mihi quidem videtur, nec ea, quae docere vult, ulla arte distinguit, ut haec ipsa, quae modo loquebamur. summum a vobis bonum voluptas dicitur. aperiendum est igitur, quid sit voluptas; aliter enim explicari, quod quaeritur, non potest. quam si explicavisset, non tam haesitaret. aut enim eam voluptatem tueretur, quam Aristippus, id est, qua sensus dulciter ac iucunde movetur, quam etiam pecudes, si loqui possent, appellarent voluptatem, aut, si magis placeret suo more loqui, quam ut Omnés Danai atque Mycénenses. Attica pubes reliquique Graeci, qui hoc anapaesto citantur, hoc non dolere solum voluptatis nomine appellaret, illud Aristippeum contemneret, aut, si utrumque probaret, ut probat, coniungeret doloris vacuitatem cum voluptate et duobus ultimis uteretur.

And from whatever it has settled upon as the thing by which nature is first moved, there will also arise an account of the right and the honourable, which can square with some one of those three, so that it is honourable either to do everything for the sake of pleasure, even if you do not attain it, or for the sake of not feeling pain, even if you cannot reach that, or for the sake of obtaining the things that are in accordance with nature, even if you achieve nothing. So it comes about that, as great as the difference is in the natural beginnings, so great is the unlikeness in the ends of good and evil. Others again, from the same beginnings, will refer every duty either to pleasure, or to not feeling pain, or to securing those primary things in accordance with nature.

multi enim et magni philosophi haec ultima bonorum iuncta fecerunt, ut Aristoteles virtutis usum cum vitae perfectae prosperitate coniunxit, Callipho adiunxit ad honestatem voluptatem, Diodorus ad eandem honestatem addidit vacuitatem doloris. idem fecisset Epicurus, si sententiam hanc, quae nunc Hieronymi est, coniunxisset cum Aristippi vetere sententia. illi enim inter se dissentiunt. propterea singulis finibus utuntur et, cum uterque Graece egregie loquatur, nec Aristippus, qui voluptatem summum bonum dicit, in voluptate ponit non dolere, neque Hieronymus, qui summum bonum statuit non dolere, voluptatis nomine umquam utitur pro illa indolentia, quippe qui ne in expetendis quidem rebus numeret voluptatem.

Now that six views about the highest good have been set out, of the three nearest these are the champions: of pleasure, Aristippus; of not feeling pain, Hieronymus; of the enjoyment of those things we have called the primary ones in accordance with nature, Carneades — not, to be sure, as their author, but as their defender for the sake of argument. The earlier three were possible positions, of which one alone has been defended, and that vigorously. For that one should do everything for the sake of pleasure — granted that, even if we attain nothing, still that very purpose of so acting is in itself worth seeking, and honourable, and the sole good — no one has maintained. Nor has anyone thought the mere avoidance of pain to be in itself among the things worth seeking, unless one could actually escape it. But that one should do everything in order to obtain what is in accordance with nature, even if one does not attain it, and that this is both honourable and the sole thing worth seeking for its own sake and the sole good — this the Stoics do say.

duae sunt enim res quoque, ne tu verba solum putes. unum est sine dolore esse, alterum cum voluptate. vos ex his tam dissimilibus rebus non modo nomen unum —nam id facilius paterer—, sed etiam rem unam ex duabus facere conamini, quod fieri nullo modo potest. hic, qui utrumque probat, ambobus debuit uti, sicut facit re, neque tamen dividit verbis. cum enim eam ipsam voluptatem, quam eodem nomine omnes appellamus, laudat locis plurimis, audet dicere ne suspicari quidem se ullum bonum seiunctum ab illo Aristippeo genere voluptatis, atque ibi hoc dicit, ubi omnis eius est oratio de summo bono. in alio vero libro, in quo breviter comprehensis gravissimis sententiis quasi oracula edidisse sapientiae dicitur, scribit his verbis, quae nota tibi profecto, Torquate, sunt—quis enim vestrum non edidicit Epicuri kuri/as do/cas, id est quasi maxime ratas, quia gravissimae sint ad beate vivendum breviter enuntiatae sententiae?—animadverte igitur rectene hanc sententiam interpreter:

These, then, are the six simple views about the ends of good and evil: two without a patron, four defended. But of joined and twofold expositions of the highest good there have been in all three, and indeed there could be no more, if you look deep into the nature of things. For either pleasure can be joined to honour, as Calliphon and Dinomachus held, or freedom from pain, as Diodorus held, or the primary things of nature, as the ancients held — the same men we have named Academics and Peripatetics. But since all things cannot be said at once, for the present this much will need to be noted: that pleasure is to be set aside, since we are born for certain greater things, as will soon appear. About freedom from pain much the same is generally said as about pleasure. Since, therefore, both about pleasure with Torquatus and about honour, in which alone all good was placed, with Cato, the argument has been carried on, in the first place what was said against pleasure falls in much the same way against freedom from pain.

’Si ea, quae sunt luxuriosis efficientia voluptatum, liberarent eos deorum et mortis et doloris metu docerentque qui essent fines cupiditatum, nihil haberemus quod reprehenderemus, cum undique complerentur voluptatibus nec haberent ulla ex parte aliquid aut dolens aut aegrum, id est autem malum.’ Hoc loco tenere se Triarius non potuit. Obsecro, inquit, Torquate, haec dicit Epicurus? quod mihi quidem visus est, cum sciret, velle tamen confitentem audire Torquatum. At ille non pertimuit saneque fidenter: Istis quidem ipsis verbis, inquit; sed quid sentiat, non videtis. Si alia sentit, inquam, alia loquitur, numquam intellegam quid sentiat; sed plane dicit quod intellegit. idque si ita dicit, non esse reprehendendos luxuriosos, si sapientes sint, dicit absurde, similiter et si dicat non reprehendendos parricidas, si nec cupidi sint nec deos metuant nec mortem nec dolorem. et tamen quid attinet luxuriosis ullam exceptionem dari aut fingere aliquos, qui, cum luxuriose viverent, a summo philosopho non reprehenderentur eo nomine dumtaxat, cetera caverent?

Nor in fact need anything else be sought against that view of Carneades. For in whatever way the highest good is so set out that it is empty of honour, neither duties nor virtues nor friendships can stand on that reckoning. And the joining to honour of either pleasure or the absence of pain makes that very honour, which it wishes to embrace, base. For to refer the things you do to ends, one of which — if a man be free of evil — one would call his being in the highest good, while the other is concerned with the lowest part of nature, is to darken all the splendour of honour, not to say to defile it. There remain the Stoics, who, when they had taken over everything from the Peripatetics and the Academics, pursued the same matters under other names. These it is better to refute one by one. But for now, to what we are about;

sed tamen nonne reprehenderes, Epicure, luxuriosos ob eam ipsam causam, quod ita viverent, ut persequerentur cuiusque modi voluptates, cum esset praesertim, ut ais tu, summa voluptas nihil dolere? atqui reperiemus asotos primum ita non religiosos, ut edint de patella, deinde ita mortem non timentes, ut illud in ore habeant ex Hymnide: ’Mihi sex menses sa/tis sunt vitae, se/ptimum Orco spo/ndeo’. iam doloris medicamenta illa Epicurea tamquam de narthecio proment: Si gravis, brevis; si longus, levis. Unum nescio, quo modo possit, si luxuriosus sit, finitas cupiditates habere.

of those men, when we please. But the freedom from care of Democritus, which is, as it were, a tranquillity of mind — what they call euthumia — had to be set apart from this discussion, because that tranquillity of mind is itself the happy life; and we are inquiring not what it is, but whence it comes. Now the views of Pyrrho, Aristo, and Erillus, already hissed off and cast out, since they cannot fall within the circle we have drawn, were not to be brought in at all. For since this whole inquiry about the ends, and as it were the furthest bounds, of good and evil sets out from what we have said is suited and adapted to nature and is itself sought first for its own sake, this whole foundation is overturned both by those who, in matters in which there is nothing that is not either honourable or base, deny that there is any reason why one thing should be preferred to another, and think there is no difference at all among such things; and by Erillus, who, if he really held that nothing is good except knowledge, did away with every ground for taking counsel and with the very discovery of duty. With the views of the rest thus shut out, and since besides them there can be none, this view of the ancients must necessarily prevail. By the practice of the ancients, then, which the Stoics too employ, let us take our start from here.

quid ergo attinet dicere: ’Nihil haberem, quod reprehenderem, si finitas cupiditates haberent’? hoc est dicere: Non reprehenderem asotos, si non essent asoti. isto modo ne improbos quidem, si essent boni viri. hic homo severus luxuriam ipsam per se reprehendendam non putat, et hercule, Torquate, ut verum loquamur, si summum bonum voluptas est, rectissime non putat. Noli enim mihi fingere asotos, ut soletis, qui in mensam vomant, et qui de conviviis auferantur crudique postridie se rursus ingurgitent, qui solem, ut aiunt, nec occidentem umquam viderint nec orientem, qui consumptis patrimoniis egeant. nemo nostrum istius generis asotos iucunde putat vivere. mundos, elegantis, optimis cocis, pistoribus, piscatu, aucupio, venatione, his omnibus exquisitis, vitantes cruditatem, quibus vinum defusum e pleno sit chrysizon, ut ait Lucilius, cui nihildum situlus et sacculus abstulerit, adhibentis ludos et quae sequuntur, illa, quibus detractis clamat Epicurus se nescire quid sit bonum; adsint etiam formosi pueri, qui ministrent, respondeat his vestis, argentum, Corinthium, locus ipse, aedificium—hos ergo asotos bene quidem vivere aut beate numquam dixerim.

Every living creature loves itself and, the moment it has come into being, sets about preserving itself, because this first appetite for guarding its whole life is given to it by nature — to preserve itself and to be so constituted as to be in the best condition in accordance with nature. At the outset it holds this constitution in a confused and uncertain way, so far only as to protect itself, whatever it may be, but it understands neither what it is nor what it can do nor what its own nature is. But when it has advanced a little and has begun to perceive how far each thing touches it and pertains to it, then it gradually begins to go forward and to recognize itself and to understand the reason why it has the appetite of mind we spoke of, and it begins both to seek the things it feels to be suited to its nature and to repel their opposites. Therefore for every living creature the object of its appetite lies in what is adapted to its nature. And so the end of goods turns out to be to live in accordance with nature, so constituted as to be in the best condition and most perfectly adapted to nature.

ex quo efficitur, non ut voluptas ne sit voluptas, sed ut voluptas non sit summum bonum. Nec ille, qui Diogenem Stoicum adolescens, post autem Panaetium audierat, Laelius, eo dictus est sapiens, quod non intellegeret quid suavissimum esset—nec enim sequitur, ut, cui cor sapiat, ei non sapiat palatus—, sed quia parvi id duceret. O lapathe, ut iactare, nec es satis cognitu’ qui sis! In quo cognitu Laelius clamores sofo ille solebat Edere compellans gumias ex ordine nostros. praeclare Laelius, et recte sofo/s, illudque vere: O Publi, o gurges, Galloni! es homo miser, inquit. Cenasti in vita numquam bene, cum omnia in ista Consumis squilla atque acupensere cum decimano. is haec loquitur, qui in voluptate nihil ponens negat eum bene cenare, qui omnia ponat in voluptate, et tamen non negat libenter cenasse umquam Gallonium— mentiretur enim—, sed bene. ita graviter et severe voluptatem secrevit a bono. ex quo illud efficitur, qui bene cenent omnis libenter cenare, qui libenter, non continuo bene. semper Laelius bene.

But since each living creature has its own nature, it necessarily follows that the end too is, for all of them, this: that nature be fulfilled — for nothing prevents some things from being common both among the rest of the animals and between man and the beasts, since the nature of all is shared — yet those furthest and highest things which we are seeking are marked off and distributed among the kinds of living creatures, each proper to its own and suited to what the nature of each requires.

quid bene? dicet Lucilius: ’cocto, condito’, sed cedo caput cenae: ’sermone bono’, quid ex eo? ’si quaeris, libenter’; veniebat enim ad cenam, ut animo quieto satiaret desideria naturae. recte ergo is negat umquam bene cenasse Gallonium, recte miserum, cum praesertim in eo omne studium consumeret. quem libenter cenasse nemo negat. cur igitur non bene? quia, quod bene, id recte, frugaliter, honeste; ille porro male prave, nequiter, turpiter cenabat; non igitur bene. nec lapathi suavitatem acupenseri Galloni Laelius anteponebat, sed suavitatem ipsam neglegebat; quod non faceret, si in voluptate summum bonum poneret.

And so when we say that for all living creatures the furthest end is to live in accordance with nature, this is not to be taken as if we were saying that there is one single end for all; rather, just as it can rightly be said to be common to all the arts that they are concerned with some body of knowledge, while the knowledge proper to each art is its own, so to live in accordance with nature is common to all living creatures, but their natures are diverse, so that one thing is natural for a horse, another for an ox, another for a man. And yet in all there is a common highest end — and that not only among living creatures, but also among all those things which nature nourishes, increases, and protects, in which we see that the things produced from the earth do many things in a way themselves of their own accord that avail toward living and growing, so that within their own kind they may arrive at their furthest end; so that it is now permitted to embrace all things in a single comprehension and to say without hesitation that every nature is the preserver of itself and has this set before it as its end and furthest goal: to keep itself in the best state of its own kind; so that the end of all things which thrive by nature must necessarily be similar, not the same. From which it ought to be understood that for man the ultimate good is to live in accordance with nature, which we interpret thus: to live by the nature of man, complete on every side and wanting nothing.

Semovenda est igitur voluptas, non solum ut recta sequamini, sed etiam ut loqui deceat frugaliter. possumusne ergo in vita summum bonum dicere, cum id ne in cena quidem posse videamur? Quo modo autem philosophus loquitur? Tria genera cupiditatum, naturales et necessariae, naturales et non necessariae, nec naturales nec necessariae. primum divisit ineleganter; duo enim genera quae erant, fecit tria. hoc est non dividere, sed frangere. qui haec didicerunt, quae ille contemnit, sic solent: Duo genera cupiditatum, naturales et inanes, naturalium duo, necessariae et non necessariae. confecta res esset. vitiosum est enim in dividendo partem in genere numerare.

These things, then, must be unfolded by us — but if rather minutely, you will forgive it; for we owe a service to this young man’s age, and to one perhaps now hearing these matters for the first time. ’Quite so,’ I said, ’though even what you have said up to now was rightly said in that manner, however much it was suited to a young man.’ ’The end of things worth seeking having now been defined,’ he said, ’why this matter stands as I have said must next be demonstrated. For that reason let us begin from what I set down first, which is also in fact first, so that we may understand that every living creature loves itself. And although this admits of no doubt — for it is fixed in nature itself and grasped by each one’s own senses, so that if anyone wished to say the contrary he would not be heard — still, that we may pass over nothing, I think the reasons too should be brought forward why this is so.

sed hoc sane concedamus. contemnit enim disserendi elegantiam, confuse loquitur. gerendus est mos, modo recte sentiat. et quidem illud ipsum non nimium probo et tantum patior, philosophum loqui de cupiditatibus finiendis. an potest cupiditas finiri? tollenda est atque extrahenda radicitus. quis est enim, in quo sit cupiditas, quin recte cupidus dici possit? ergo et avarus erit, sed finite, et adulter, verum habebit modum, et luxuriosus eodem modo. qualis ista philosophia est, quae non interitum afferat pravitatis, sed sit contenta mediocritate vitiorum? quamquam in hac divisione rem ipsam prorsus probo, elegantiam desidero. appellet haec desideria naturae, cupiditatis nomen servet alio, ut eam, cum de avaritia, cum de intemperantia, cum de maximis vitiis loquetur, tamquam capitis accuset.

And yet how can it be understood or even conceived that there should be any living creature that hates itself? For contrary facts would clash. For when that appetite of mind has begun deliberately to draw to itself something that harms it, because it is hostile to itself, then, since it will do this for its own sake, it will both hate itself and at the same time love itself, which cannot be. And it necessarily follows that, if a man is an enemy to himself, he will think the things that are good to be evil, and on the contrary the evil to be good, and will flee what should be sought and seek what should be fled — which is, beyond doubt, the overturning of life. Nor, if some are found who seek out either nooses or other means of destruction, or like that man in Terence who ’resolved that for so long he would do his own son the less wrong’ — as he himself says — ’until he himself should be made wretched’ — is such a man on that account to be thought an enemy to himself.

Sed haec quidem liberius ab eo dicuntur et saepius. quod equidem non reprehendo; est enim tanti philosophi tamque nobilis audacter sua decreta defendere. sed tamen ex eo, quod eam voluptatem, quam omnes gentes hoc nomine appellant, videtur amplexari saepe vehementius, in magnis interdum versatur angustiis, ut hominum conscientia remota nihil tam turpe sit, quod voluptatis causa non videatur esse facturus. deinde, ubi erubuit—vis enim est permagna naturae—, confugit illuc, ut neget accedere quicquam posse ad voluptatem nihil dolentis. at iste non dolendi status non vocatur voluptas. ’Non laboro’, inquit, ’de nomine’. Quid, quod res alia tota est? Reperiam multos, vel innumerabilis potius, non tam curiosos nec tam molestos, quam vos estis, quibus, quid velim, facile persuadeam. quid ergo dubitamus, quin, si non dolere voluptas sit summa, non esse in voluptate dolor sit maximus? cur id non ita fit? Quia dolori non voluptas contraria est, sed doloris privatio.

But some are moved by grief, some by desire, and many too are carried away by anger, and when they knowingly rush into evils, they then think they are taking the best counsel for themselves. And so they say, and do not hesitate: ’Such is my way; do you do as you need to do.’ And those who had declared war upon themselves would wish to be racked by day and tortured by night, and yet they would not accuse themselves on the ground that they had counselled badly in their own affairs. For that complaint belongs to those who are dear to themselves and love themselves. Therefore, whenever it is said that a man deserves ill of himself and is to himself an enemy and a foe, and in the end flees from life, let it be understood that there underlies some cause of this kind, so that from that very fact it can be understood that each man is dear to himself.

Hoc vero non videre, maximo argumento esse voluptatem illam, qua sublata neget se intellegere omnino quid sit bonum—eam autem ita persequitur: quae palato percipiatur, quae auribus; cetera addit, quae si appelles, honos praefandus sit—hoc igitur, quod solum bonum severus et gravis philosophus novit, idem non videt ne expetendum quidem esse, quod eam voluptatem hoc eodem auctore non desideremus, cum dolore careamus.

Nor indeed is it enough that there is no one who hates himself; this too must be understood, that there is no one who thinks it makes no difference to him how he himself fares. For the appetite of mind will be done away with if, just as in those matters between which there is no difference we are inclined to neither side, so in our own selves we shall judge that it makes no difference to us in what state we are. And further, if anyone should wish to say this too, it would be utterly absurd — that each man loves himself in such a way that this force of loving is referred to some other thing, and not to the very man who loves himself. When this is said of friendships, of duties, of virtues, however it is said, what is meant can still be understood; but in our own selves it cannot even be understood that we should love ourselves on account of some other thing — for example, on account of pleasure; for it is on our own account that we love pleasure, not on its account that we love ourselves.

quam haec sunt contraria! hic si definire, si dividere didicisset, si loquendi vim, si denique consuetudinem verborum teneret, numquam in tantas salebras incidisset. nunc vides, quid faciat. quam nemo umquam voluptatem appellavit, appellat; quae duo sunt, unum facit. hanc in motu voluptatem —sic enim has suaves et quasi dulces voluptates appellat—interdum ita extenuat, ut M’. Curium putes loqui, interdum ita laudat, ut quid praeterea sit bonum neget se posse ne suspicari quidem. quae iam oratio non a philosopho aliquo, sed a censore opprimenda est. non est enim vitium in oratione solum, sed etiam in moribus. luxuriam non reprehendit, modo sit vacua infinita cupiditate et timore. hoc loco discipulos quaerere videtur, ut, qui asoti esse velint, philosophi ante fiant.

And yet what is there more plainly evident than that each man is not only dear to himself, but vehemently dear? For who is there, or how few are there, in whom, when death draws near, the ’blood does not flee back in timid fright and the man go pale with fear’? It is, to be sure, a fault to shudder so violently at the dissolution of nature — which is likewise to be censured in the case of pain — but because nearly all are affected in this way, it is argument enough that nature shrinks from destruction; and the more certain men do this in a way that they are even justly censured for it, the more must it be understood that these very excesses would not have arisen in some, had there not been a certain measure set by nature. Nor do I mean the fear of death in those who flee death because they think they are being deprived of the good things of life, or because they dread certain terrors after death, or because they fear they may die in pain; for in little children, who think of none of these things, if ever in play we threaten them that we will throw them down from somewhere, they are seized with terror. Indeed even ’the wild beasts,’ says Pacuvius, ’which lack the cunning of understanding for taking precaution,’ when the terror of death is thrown upon them, ’shudder.’ And who thinks otherwise of the wise man himself, but that, even when he has resolved that he must die, he is still moved by the parting from his own and by the very leaving of the light?

A primo, ut opinor, animantium ortu petitur origo summi boni. Simul atque natum animal est, gaudet voluptate et eam appetit ut bonum, aspernatur dolorem ut malum. De malis autem et bonis ab iis animalibus, quae nondum depravata sint, ait optime iudicari. haec et tu ita posuisti, et verba vestra sunt. quam multa vitiosa! summum enim bonum et malum vagiens puer utra voluptate diiudicabit, stante an movente? quoniam, si dis placet, ab Epicuro loqui discimus. si stante, hoc natura videlicet vult, salvam esse se, quod concedimus; si movente, quod tamen dicitis, nulla turpis voluptas erit, quae praetermittenda sit, et simul non proficiscitur animal illud modo natum a summa voluptate, quae est a te posita in non dolendo.

But most of all in this kind of case the force of nature is plainly visible, since many endure even beggary in order to live, and men worn out by old age are tormented by the approach of death and bear those sufferings which we see Philoctetes bearing in the plays. He, though racked by pains not to be borne, nevertheless prolonged his life by fowling, and ’slow, he transfixed the swift with the stroke of his arrows; standing, he transfixed those in flight,’ as it stands in Accius, and from the weaving of their feathers made coverings for his body.

Nec tamen argumentum hoc Epicurus a parvis petivit aut etiam a bestiis, quae putat esse specula naturae, ut diceret ab iis duce natura hanc voluptatem expeti nihil dolendi. nec enim haec movere potest appetitum animi, nec ullum habet ictum, quo pellat animum, status hic non dolendi, itaque in hoc eodem peccat Hieronymus. at ille pellit, qui permulcet sensum voluptate. itaque Epicurus semper hoc utitur, ut probet voluptatem natura expeti, quod ea voluptas, quae in motu sit, et parvos ad se alliciat et bestias, non illa stabilis, in qua tantum inest nihil dolere. qui igitur convenit ab alia voluptate dicere naturam proficisci, in alia summum bonum ponere?

Am I speaking of the human kind, or of animals at large, when the nature of trees and plants is nearly the same? For whether, as the most learned men have held, some greater and more divine cause has engendered this force, or whether it comes about thus by chance, we see that the things the earth brings forth are kept sound by their bark and roots — which falls to animals through the distribution of the senses and a certain framing of the limbs. On this matter, indeed, though I side with those who hold that all these things are governed by nature, and that nature, were she to neglect them, could not herself exist, still I grant that those who differ on this point may think what they please; and, if they like, let them understand that whenever I say “the nature of man” I mean man — for it makes no difference here. For a person could sooner part from himself than lose the appetite for the things that serve his interest. With good reason, then, the weightiest philosophers sought the starting-point of the highest good in nature, and held that this appetite for the things suited to nature is bred into all, because they are held fast by that commendation of nature whereby they love themselves.

Bestiarum vero nullum iudicium puto. quamvis enim depravatae non sint, pravae tamen esse possunt. ut bacillum aliud est inflexum et incurvatum de industria, aliud ita natum, sic ferarum natura non est illa quidem depravata mala disciplina, sed natura sua. nec vero ut voluptatem expetat, natura movet infantem, sed tantum ut se ipse diligat, ut integrum se salvumque velit. omne enim animal, simul et ortum est, se ipsum et omnes partes suas diligit duasque, quae maximae sunt, in primis amplectitur, animum et corpus, deinde utriusque partes. nam sunt et in animo praecipua quaedam et in corpore, quae cum leviter agnovit, tum discernere incipit, ut ea, quae prima data sunt natura, appetat asperneturque contraria.

Next we must consider — since it is plain enough that each is dear to himself by nature — what the nature of man is. For that is what we are inquiring into. Now it is evident that man is composed of body and mind, the parts of the mind being first, those of the body second. Then we see this too: that the body is so shaped as to surpass others, and the mind so constituted as to be both furnished with senses and possessed of a commanding intelligence, to which the whole nature of man is subject, and in which there is a certain marvellous power of reason and of knowing and of science and of all the virtues. As for the things that belong to the body, they have no authority to be compared with the parts of the mind, and they are easier to come to know. And so let us begin with these.

in his primis naturalibus voluptas insit necne, magna quaestio est. nihil vero putare esse praeter voluptatem, non membra, non sensus, non ingenii motum, non integritatem corporis, non valitudinem corporis, summae mihi videtur inscitiae. Atque ab isto capite fluere necesse est omnem rationem bonorum et malorum. Polemoni et iam ante Aristoteli ea prima visa sunt, quae paulo ante dixi. ergo nata est sententia veterum Academicorum et Peripateticorum, ut finem bonorum dicerent secundum naturam vivere, id est virtute adhibita frui primis a natura datis. Callipho ad virtutem nihil adiunxit nisi voluptatem, Diodorus vacuitatem doloris. * * his omnibus, quos dixi, consequentes fines sunt bonorum, Aristippo simplex voluptas, Stoicis consentire naturae, quod esse volunt e virtute, id est honeste, vivere, quod ita interpretantur: vivere cum intellegentia rerum earum, quae natura evenirent, eligentem ea, quae essent secundum naturam, reicientemque contraria.

How well suited to nature, then, are the parts of our body, and its whole figure and form and stature, is plain; nor is there any doubt that one understands which the forehead, the eyes, the ears, and the remaining parts are that are proper to man. But surely these need to be sound and vigorous and to have their natural motions and uses, so that none of them is wanting, nor sick nor crippled; for this is what nature requires. There is, moreover, also a certain bearing of the body that keeps to the motions and postures agreeing with nature; and if in these there is some fault — a twisting and distortion, or a deformed motion or posture — as if a man should walk on his hands, or backwards rather than forwards, he would plainly seem to be fleeing from himself, and, stripping the man out of the man, to hate nature. For this reason, too, certain ways of sitting, and bent and broken movements such as belong to wanton or effeminate men, are contrary to nature; so that, even if it come about through a fault of the mind, still the nature of man seems to be altered in the body.

ita tres sunt fines expertes honestatis, unus Aristippi vel Epicuri, alter Hieronymi, Carneadi tertius, tres, in quibus honestas cum aliqua accessione, Polemonis, Calliphontis, Diodori, una simplex, cuius Zeno auctor, posita in decore tota, id est in honestate; nam Pyrrho, Aristo, Erillus iam diu abiecti. reliqui sibi constiterunt, ut extrema cum initiis convenirent, ut Aristippo voluptas, Hieronymo doloris vacuitas, Carneadi frui principiis naturalibus esset extremum. Epicurus autem cum in prima commendatione voluptatem dixisset, si eam, quam Aristippus, idem tenere debuit ultimum bonorum, quod ille; sin eam, quam Hieronymus, ne fecisset idem, ut voluptatem illam Aristippi in prima commendatione poneret.

And so, on the other hand, the moderate and even conditions, affections, and uses of the body seem to be suited to nature. Now the mind, too, ought not merely to be, but to be of a certain quality, so that it both has all its parts unimpaired and lacks none of the virtues. And in the senses each has its own virtue, namely that nothing should hinder each sense from discharging its own office in perceiving swiftly and readily those things that lie subject to the senses. But of the mind, and of that part of the mind which is sovereign and is named the intelligence, the virtues are many; yet there are two primary kinds: the one of those that are bred in by their own nature and are called involuntary, the other of those that, resting in the will, are wont to be called by a more proper name — and the surpassing excellence in the praise of minds belongs to these. To the former kind belong aptness in learning and memory, which are nearly all called by the one name of natural endowment; and those who have these virtues are called gifted. The other kind is that of the great and true virtues, which we call voluntary, such as prudence, temperance, fortitude, justice, and the rest of the same kind. And in sum these were the things to be said about body and mind, by which there is sketched out, as it were, what the nature of man requires.

Nam quod ait sensibus ipsis iudicari voluptatem bonum esse, dolorem malum, plus tribuit sensibus, quam nobis leges permittunt, cum privatarum litium iudices sumus. nihil enim possumus iudicare, nisi quod est nostri iudicii—in quo frustra iudices solent, cum sententiam pronuntiant, addere: ’si quid mei iudicii est’; si enim non fuit eorum iudicii, nihilo magis hoc non addito illud est iudicatum—. quid iudicant sensus? dulce amarum, leve asperum, prope longe, stare movere, quadratum rotundum.

From which it is plain that, since we are dear to ourselves and wish all things in mind and in body to be perfect, these very things are dear to us for their own sakes and hold within them the greatest weight toward living well. For one who has set before himself the preservation of himself must hold his own parts dear as well, and the dearer the more perfect they are and the more praiseworthy in their kind. For the life that is sought is one filled out with the virtues of mind and body, and in this the highest good must necessarily be placed, since it must be such as to be the limit of the things to be desired. Once this is grasped, it cannot be doubted that, since men themselves are dear to themselves in their own right and of their own accord, the parts too of both body and mind, and of those things that lie in the motion and posture of each, are cherished with their own dearness and are sought for their own sakes.

aequam igitur pronuntiabit sententiam ratio adhibita primum divinarum humanarumque rerum scientia, quae potest appellari rite sapientia, deinde adiunctis virtutibus, quas ratio rerum omnium dominas, tu voluptatum satellites et ministras esse voluisti. quarum adeo omnium sententia pronuntiabit primum de voluptate nihil esse ei loci, non modo ut sola ponatur in summi boni sede, quam quaerimus, sed ne illo quidem modo, ut ad honestatem applicetur.

These things being set out, it is an easy inference that those things among our own are most to be sought which have the most worth — so that, of each best part which is sought for its own sake, the virtue is to be sought most of all. Thus it will come about that the virtue of the mind is set before the virtue of the body, and that the voluntary virtues of the mind overcome the involuntary ones — the voluntary, which are properly called virtues and far excel, because they are begotten of reason, than which there is nothing in man more divine. For of all the things that nature both creates and watches over, those that are either without mind or not far otherwise have their highest good in the body; so that the saying about the pig does not seem inept — that a mind was given to that beast in place of salt, to keep it from rotting. There are, moreover, certain beasts in which there is something resembling virtue, as in lions, as in dogs, in horses, in which we see certain movements not of bodies alone, as in pigs, but in some measure of minds as well. In man, however, the whole sum lies in the mind, and in the mind in reason, out of which springs virtue, which is defined as the perfecting of reason — a thing they hold must be expounded again and again.

de vacuitate doloris eadem sententia erit. reicietur etiam Carneades, nec ulla de summo bono ratio aut voluptatis non dolendive particeps aut honestatis expers probabitur. ita relinquet duas, de quibus etiam atque etiam consideret. aut enim statuet nihil esse bonum nisi honestum, nihil malum nisi turpe, cetera aut omnino nihil habere momenti aut tantum, ut nec expetenda nec fugienda, sed eligenda modo aut reicienda sint, aut anteponet eam, quam cum honestate ornatissimam, tum etiam ipsis initiis naturae et totius perfectione vitae locupletatam videbit. quod eo liquidius faciet, si perspexerit rerum inter eas verborumne sit controversia.

Of the things, too, that the earth brings forth, there is a certain rearing and perfecting not unlike that of living creatures. And so we say that a vine both lives and dies, and a tree both young and old, and that it flourishes and “grows old.” From which it is not amiss to suppose that, as with living creatures, so with these there are certain things suited to their nature and others alien to it, and that there is a kind of tender of their growth and nourishment — namely the science and art of the farmer, which prunes, lops, raises up, lifts, and props, so that they can go where nature carries them; so that the vines themselves, could they speak, would confess that they ought to be so handled and tended. And now indeed — to speak of the vine above all — that which tends it is something external; for in the vine itself there is too little force present for it to thrive as well as it might, if no cultivation be applied.

Huius ego nunc auctoritatem sequens idem faciam. quantum enim potero, minuam contentiones omnesque simplices sententias eorum, in quibus nulla inest virtutis adiunctio, omnino a philosophia semovendas putabo, primum Aristippi Cyrenaicorumque omnium, quos non est veritum in ea voluptate, quae maxima dulcedine sensum moveret, summum bonum ponere contemnentis istam vacuitatem doloris.

But suppose sense were now to come to the vine, so that it had a certain appetite and moved of its own accord — what do you think it would do? Will it not, of itself, see to the things it formerly obtained through the vinedresser? But do you not see that a care will be added to it, of tending its senses too, and their whole appetite, and any limbs that have been joined to it? Thus to the things it always had it will join those that came to it afterwards, and it will not have the same end its cultivator had, but will wish to live according to that nature which has afterwards been added to it. So its end of good will be like what it was before, yet not the same; for it will no longer seek the good of a plant, but of an animal. What, then, if not sense only had been given to it, but a man’s mind as well? Must not those former things both abide, so as to be tended, and these later additions be far dearer — and the better each part of the mind, the dearer — and the end of the highest good rest in that filling-out of nature, since mind and reason far and away excel? Thus that which is the last of all things to be sought, drawn from the first commendation of nature, climbs by many degrees until it arrives at the summit, which is built up out of soundness of body and out of the perfected reason of the intelligence.

hi non viderunt, ut ad cursum equum, ad arandum bovem, ad indagandum canem, sic hominem ad duas res, ut ait Aristoteles, ad intellegendum et agendum, esse natum quasi mortalem deum, contraque ut tardam aliquam et languidam pecudem ad pastum et ad procreandi voluptatem hoc divinum animal ortum esse voluerunt, quo nihil mihi videtur absurdius.

Since, then, such is the form of nature as I have set it out, if, as I said at the beginning, each person knew himself the moment he came to be, and could judge what the force of his whole nature and of its single parts might be, he would at once see what this is that we are inquiring into — the highest and uttermost of all the things we seek — and could go wrong in nothing. But as it is, from the first nature is marvellously hidden, and can be neither seen through nor known. As our years advance, however, little by little, or rather slowly, we come to know ourselves, as it were. And so that first commendation, which nature has made of us to ourselves, is uncertain and obscure, and that first appetite of the mind does only this much: that we may be able to be safe and sound. But when we begin to discern, and to feel what we are and how we differ from the rest of living creatures, then we begin to pursue the things for which we were born.

Atque haec contra Aristippum, qui eam voluptatem non modo summam, sed solam etiam ducit, quam omnes unam appellamus voluptatem. aliter autem vobis placet. sed ille, ut dixi, vitiose. nec enim figura corporis nec ratio excellens ingenii humani significat ad unam hanc rem natum hominem, ut frueretur voluptatibus. Nec vero audiendus Hieronymus, cui summum bonum est idem, quod vos interdum vel potius nimium saepe dicitis, nihil dolere. non enim, si malum est dolor, carere eo malo satis est ad bene vivendum. hoc dixerit potius Ennius: ’Nimium boni est, cui nihil est mali’. nos beatam vitam non depulsione mali, sed adeptione boni iudicemus, nec eam cessando, sive gaudentem, ut Aristippus, sive non dolentem, ut hic, sed agendo aliquid considerandove quaeramus.

The like of this we see in beasts, which at first do not stir from the place where they were born, then each moves by its own appetite. We see snakelings creep, ducklings swim, blackbirds fly, oxen use their horns, scorpions their stings — in short, that for each creature its own nature is its guide to living. And this likeness appears in the human kind as well. For little ones, at the first birth, lie there as if they had no mind at all. But when a little firmness has come to them, they use both mind and senses, and strive to raise themselves up, and use their hands, and recognize those by whom they are reared. Then they take delight in playmates and gladly gather with them, give themselves to play, are drawn by the hearing of stories, wish to be generous to others with what they have to spare, take notice of what goes on at home rather curiously, and begin to ponder something, and to learn, and wish not to be ignorant of the names of those they see; and in the things in which they vie with their playmates, if they have won, they lift themselves up with gladness, and, beaten, they are cast down and let their spirits fall. None of this, we must hold, comes about without a cause.

quae possunt eadem contra Carneadeum illud summum bonum dici, quod is non tam, ut probaret, protulit, quam ut Stoicis, quibuscum bellum gerebat, opponeret. id autem eius modi est, ut additum ad virtutem auctoritatem videatur habiturum et expleturum cumulate vitam beatam, de quo omnis haec quaestio est. nam qui ad virtutem adiungunt vel voluptatem, quam unam virtus minimi facit, vel vacuitatem doloris, quae etiamsi malo caret, tamen non est summum bonum, accessione utuntur non ita probabili, nec tamen, cur id tam parce tamque restricte faciant, intellego. quasi enim emendum eis sit, quod addant ad virtutem, primum vilissimas res addunt, dein singulas potius, quam omnia, quae prima natura approbavisset, ea cum honestate coniungerent.

For the force of man is so begotten by nature that he seems made for grasping every virtue; and for this reason little ones are moved, without teaching, by likenesses of the virtues whose seeds they hold within them — for these are the first elements of nature, which, once enlarged, bring about virtue’s sprouting, so to speak. For since we have been so born and made as to hold within us the beginnings both of doing something, and of loving certain people, and of generosity, and of returning a kindness, and as to have minds apt for science, prudence, fortitude, and estranged from their contraries, it is not without cause that we see in children those sparks of the virtues, as I called them, from which the philosopher’s reason must be kindled, so that, following it as a kind of god for its guide, it may arrive at the uttermost of nature. For, as I have often said by now, in the feeble years and the weak mind the force of nature is discerned as if through a fog; but when, as it advances, the mind is strengthened, it does indeed recognize the force of nature, yet in such a way that it can advance further, while in itself it has only been begun.

Quae quod Aristoni et Pyrrhoni omnino visa sunt pro nihilo, ut inter optime valere et gravissime aegrotare nihil prorsus dicerent interesse, recte iam pridem contra eos desitum est disputari. dum enim in una virtute sic omnia esse voluerunt, ut eam rerum selectione expoliarent nec ei quicquam, aut unde oriretur, darent, aut ubi niteretur, virtutem ipsam, quam amplexabantur, sustulerunt. Erillus autem ad scientiam omnia revocans unum quoddam bonum vidit, sed nec optimum nec quo vita gubernari possit. itaque hic ipse iam pridem est reiectus; post enim Chrysippum contra eum non sane est disputatum. Restatis igitur vos; nam cum Academicis incerta luctatio est, qui nihil affirmant et quasi desperata cognitione certi id sequi volunt, quodcumque veri simile videatur.

We must enter, then, into the nature of things, and see through to the very depths what she requires; for otherwise we cannot know ourselves. And because this precept was too great to seem to come from a man, it was for that reason assigned to a god. The Pythian Apollo therefore bids us know ourselves. But this knowledge of ourselves is one thing: to know the force of body and of mind, and to follow that life which has the full enjoyment of these very things. Now since this appetite of the mind was from the beginning such that we should have those things I spoke of as perfect in nature as may be, it must be confessed that, once we have attained what was sought, nature comes to rest, as it were, in that as in her uttermost, and that this is the highest good — which surely, taken whole, must of its own accord and for its own sake be sought, since it was shown before that even its single parts are to be sought for their own sakes.

cum Epicuro autem hoc plus est negotii, quod e duplici genere voluptatis coniunctus est, quodque et ipse et amici eius et multi postea defensores eius sententiae fuerunt, et nescio quo modo, is qui auctoritatem minimam habet, maximam vim, populus cum illis facit. quos nisi redarguimus, omnis virtus, omne decus, omnis vera laus deserenda est. ita ceterorum sententiis semotis relinquitur non mihi cum Torquato, sed virtuti cum voluptate certatio. quam quidem certationem homo et acutus et diligens, Chrysippus, non contemnit totumque discrimen summi boni in earum comparatione positum putat. ego autem existimo, si honestum esse aliquid ostendero, quod sit ipsum vi sua propter seque expetendum, iacere vestra omnia. itaque eo, quale sit, breviter, ut tempus postulat, constituto accedam ad omnia tua, Torquate, nisi memoria forte defecerit.

But in reckoning up the advantages of the body, if anyone shall think that pleasure has been passed over by us, let that question be deferred to another time. For whether pleasure is or is not among those things we have called first according to nature makes no difference to what we are about. For if, as it seems to me at least, pleasure does not fill out the goods of nature, it has rightly been passed over; but if it is in them, as some hold, nothing hinders this grasp of ours of the highest good. For to those things which have been established as first according to nature, if pleasure be added, some one advantage of the body will have been added, and it will not have changed that constitution of the highest good which has been set forth.

Honestum igitur id intellegimus, quod tale est, ut detracta omni utilitate sine ullis praemiis fructibusve per se ipsum possit iure laudari. quod quale sit, non tam definitione, qua sum usus, intellegi potest, quamquam aliquantum potest, quam communi omnium iudicio et optimi cuiusque studiis atque factis, qui permulta ob eam unam causam faciunt, quia decet, quia rectum, quia honestum est, etsi nullum consecuturum emolumentum vident. homines enim, etsi aliis multis, tamen hoc uno plurimum a bestiis differunt, quod rationem habent a natura datam mentemque acrem et vigentem celerrimeque multa simul agitantem et, ut ita dicam, sagacem, quae et causas rerum et consecutiones videat et similitudines transferat et disiuncta coniungat et cum praesentibus futura copulet omnemque complectatur vitae consequentis statum. eademque ratio fecit hominem hominum adpetentem cumque iis natura et sermone et usu congruentem, ut profectus a caritate domesticorum ac suorum serpat longius et se implicet primum civium, deinde omnium mortalium societate atque, ut ad Archytam scripsit Plato, non sibi se soli natum meminerit, sed patriae, sed suis, ut perexigua pars ipsi relinquatur.

And so far, indeed, our reasoning has proceeded in such a way that the whole of it was drawn from the first commendation of nature. But now let us follow another kind of argument: that not only because we love ourselves, but because each part of nature, in both body and mind, has its own force, for that reason we are moved in these matters to the highest degree of our own accord. And, to begin with the body, do you not see how, if anything in the limbs is crooked or crippled or stunted, men hide it? How they even struggle and labour, if they can bring it about, that the body’s fault either not appear or appear as little as possible? And how they endure many pains as well, for the sake of a cure, so that, even if the very use of the limbs is to be not greater but actually less, still their appearance may return to nature? For indeed, since all by nature think themselves to be sought whole, and that for no other reason but on their own account, the parts too must necessarily be sought for their own sakes, when the whole is sought for its own sake.

et quoniam eadem natura cupiditatem ingenuit homini veri videndi, quod facillime apparet, cum vacui curis etiam quid in caelo fiat scire avemus, his initiis inducti omnia vera diligimus, id est fidelia, simplicia, constantia, tum vana, falsa, fallentia odimus, ut fraudem, periurium, malitiam, iniuriam. eadem ratio habet in se quiddam amplum atque magnificum, ad imperandum magis quam ad parendum accommodatum, omnia humana non tolerabilia solum, sed etiam levia ducens, altum quiddam et excelsum, nihil timens, nemini cedens, semper invictum.

What? In the motion and posture of the body is there nothing that nature herself judges must be heeded? In what manner a man walks, sits; what the carriage of the face, what the look, may be in each? Is there nothing in these things that we account worthy or unworthy of a free man? Do we not think many men deserving of hatred who, by a certain motion or posture, seem to have scorned the law and measure of nature? And since these things are drawn from the body, what reason is there why beauty itself should not rightly be reckoned worth seeking for its own sake? For if we think the body’s crookedness and stunting are to be fled for their own sakes, why should we not also — and perhaps the more — pursue the dignity of form for its own sake? And if we flee ugliness in the posture and motion of the body, what reason is there why we should not pursue beauty? Health, too, and strength, and freedom from pain we shall seek not only for their usefulness but also for their own sakes. For since nature wishes to be filled out in all her parts, she seeks for its own sake that condition of the body which is most in keeping with nature — a nature wholly thrown into disorder if the body is sick, or in pain, or wanting in strength.

atque his tribus generibus honestorum notatis quartum sequitur et in eadem pulchritudine et aptum ex illis tribus, in quo inest ordo et moderatio. cuius similitudine perspecta in formarum specie ac dignitate transitum est ad honestatem dictorum atque factorum. nam ex his tribus laudibus, quas ante dixi, et temeritatem reformidat et non audet cuiquam aut dicto protervo aut facto nocere vereturque quicquam aut facere aut eloqui, quod parum virile videatur.

Let us look at the parts of the mind, whose view is more brilliant; and the loftier they are, the clearer the signs of nature they give. So great is the love of knowing and of knowledge bred in us that no one can doubt that the nature of man is swept toward these things lured by no profit. Do we not see how children are not deterred even by beatings from gazing at things and searching them out? How, when driven off, they run back? How they rejoice to know something? How they are eager to tell it to others? How they are held by a procession, by the games and spectacles of that kind, and for the sake of it endure even hunger and thirst? And what of those who take delight in liberal studies and arts — do we not see that they take no account of health or of household estate, but bear all things, captured by knowing and by knowledge itself, and balance against the greatest cares and labours the pleasure they take from learning?

Habes undique expletam et perfectam, Torquate, formam honestatis, quae tota quattuor his virtutibus, quae a te quoque commemoratae sunt, continetur. hanc se tuus Epicurus omnino ignorare dicit quam aut qualem esse velint qui honestate summum bonum metiantur. Si enim ad honestatem omnia referant neque in ea voluptatem dicant inesse, ait eos voce inani sonare— his enim ipsis verbis utitur—neque intellegere nec videre sub hanc vocem honestatis quae sit subicienda sententia. ut enim consuetudo loquitur, id solum dicitur honestum, quod est populari fama gloriosum. ’Quod’, inquit, quamquam voluptatibus quibusdam est saepe iucundius, tamen expetitur propter voluptatem. Videsne quam sit magna dissensio?

To me, at any rate, Homer seems to have glimpsed something of this kind in what he invented about the song of the Sirens. For it does not appear that they were in the habit of calling back those who sailed past by the sweetness of their voices, or by some novelty and variety of singing, but because they professed to know many things — so that men clung fast upon their rocks out of a desire to learn. This is how they call to Ulysses (for I have translated this very passage, as I have certain others of Homer’s): O glory of the Argives, why not turn your prow, Ulysses, that with your ears you may take in our song? For no one ever yet has sailed past these blue waters on his course without first standing still, caught by the sweetness of our voices, and then, sated in his eager breast with our manifold music, gliding onward to the shores of his fathers the wiser. We hold fast the heavy struggle of the war, and the ruin that Greece, by the will of heaven, brought upon Troy, and all the traces of things that are spread across the wide earth. Homer saw that the story could not carry conviction if so great a man were held entangled by mere little ditties; what they promise is knowledge, and it is no wonder that to a man hungry for wisdom this should be dearer than his homeland. And indeed, to wish to know everything, of whatever kind, is the mark of the merely curious; but to be drawn to a desire for knowledge by the contemplation of greater things is what we must reckon the mark of the greatest of men.

philosophus nobilis, a quo non solum Graecia et Italia, sed etiam omnis barbaria commota est, honestum quid sit, si id non sit in voluptate, negat se intellegere, nisi forte illud, quod multitudinis rumore laudetur. ego autem hoc etiam turpe esse saepe iudico et, si quando turpe non sit, tum esse non turpe, cum id a multitudine laudetur, quod sit ipsum per se rectum atque laudabile, non ob eam causam tamen illud dici esse honestum, quia laudetur a multis, sed quia tale sit, ut, vel si ignorarent id homines, vel si obmutuissent, sua tamen pulchritudine esset specieque laudabile. itaque idem natura victus, cui obsisti non potest, dicit alio loco id, quod a te etiam paulo ante dictum est, non posse iucunde vivi nisi etiam honeste.

For what burning zeal do you suppose was in Archimedes, who, while he was drawing certain figures in the dust with too close attention, did not even feel that his country had been taken? How much of Aristoxenus’ genius do we see consumed in music? With what zeal do we think Aristophanes spent his life upon letters? What of Pythagoras? What shall I say of Plato or of Democritus? Men whom we see, for the desire of learning, to have traversed the farthest lands. Those who do not see this have never loved anything great and worthy of being known. And on this point, those who say that the studies I have named are pursued for the sake of the pleasures of the mind do not understand that they are for this very reason to be sought for their own sakes — namely, because our minds delight in them with no advantage held out, and rejoice in the knowledge itself even where it is going to bring inconvenience.

quid nunc honeste dicit? idemne, quod iucunde? ergo ita: non posse honeste vivi, nisi honeste vivatur? an nisi populari fama? sine ea igitur iucunde negat posse se vivere? quid turpius quam sapientis vitam ex insipientium sermone pendere? quid ergo hoc loco intellegit honestum? certe nihil nisi quod possit ipsum propter se iure laudari. nam si propter voluptatem, quae est ista laus, quae possit e macello peti? non is vir est, ut, cum honestatem eo loco habeat, ut sine ea iucunde neget posse vivi, illud honestum, quod populare sit, sentiat et sine eo neget iucunde vivi posse, aut quicquam aliud honestum intellegat, nisi quod sit rectum ipsumque per se sua vi, sua natura, sua sponte laudabile.

But what is the use of demanding more on matters so plain? Let us rather put the question to ourselves: how the movements of the stars and the contemplation of the heavenly bodies, and the knowledge of all those things that are hidden away in the obscurity of nature, move us; and what delight there is in history, which we are accustomed to pursue to the very end, going back over what we have passed by and following up what we have begun. Nor indeed am I unaware that there is utility in history, and not pleasure only.

Itaque, Torquate, cum diceres clamare Epicurum non posse iucunde vivi, nisi honeste et sapienter et iuste viveretur, tu ipse mihi gloriari videbare. tanta vis inerat in verbis propter earum rerum, quae significabantur his verbis, dignitatem, ut altior fieres, ut interdum insisteres, ut nos intuens quasi testificarere laudari honestatem et iustitiam aliquando ab Epicuro. quam te decebat iis verbis uti, quibus si philosophi non uterentur, philosophia omnino non egeremus! istorum enim verborum amore, quae perraro appellantur ab Epicuro, sapientiae, fortitudinis, iustitiae, temperantiae, praestantissimis ingeniis homines se ad philosophiae studium contulerunt.

What, when we read invented stories, from which no utility can be drawn out, and read them with pleasure? What, when we wish the names of those who have done some deed to be known to us, and their parents, their homeland, and many things besides that are not in the least necessary? What of the fact that men of the lowest fortune, with no hope of conducting affairs — craftsmen, in short — take delight in history? And we can see that those most of all wish to hear and to read of deeds done who are far from any hope of doing them, worn out by old age. From which it must necessarily be understood that in the very things which are learned and known there are inducements present, by which we are moved to learning and to knowing.

’Oculorum’, inquit Plato, est in nobis sensus acerrimus, quibus sapientiam non cernimus. quam illa ardentis amores excitaret sui! Cur tandem? an quod ita callida est, ut optime possit architectari voluptates? Cur iustitia laudatur? aut unde est hoc contritum vetustate proverbium: ’quicum in tenebris’? hoc dictum in una re latissime patet, ut in omnibus factis re, non teste moveamur.

The old philosophers, indeed, imagine in the islands of the blessed what the life of the wise will be like: men freed from all care, requiring no necessary furnishing or provision for life, who they suppose will do nothing else than spend the whole of their time in inquiry and in learning, in the knowledge of nature. We, however, see that this is not only the delight of the happy life but also a relief from miseries. And so many men, when they were in the power of enemies or of tyrants, many in captivity, many in exile, have lightened their pain by the pursuits of learning.

sunt enim levia et perinfirma, quae dicebantur a te, animi conscientia improbos excruciari, tum etiam poenae timore, qua aut afficiantur aut semper sint in metu ne afficiantur aliquando. non oportet timidum aut inbecillo animo fingi non bonum illum virum, qui, quicquid fecerit, ipse se cruciet omniaque formidet, sed omnia callide referentem ad utilitatem, acutum, versutum, veteratorem, facile ut excogitet quo modo occulte, sine teste, sine ullo conscio fallat.

The chief man of this city, Demetrius of Phalerum, when he had been driven from his country by injustice, betook himself to king Ptolemy at Alexandria. And since he excelled in this very philosophy to which we are urging you, and had been a pupil of Theophrastus, he wrote many splendid things in that calamitous leisure — not for any use of his own, of which he had been stripped, but that cultivation of his mind was for him a kind of food of humanity. For my part, I often used to hear from Cn. Aufidius, a man of praetorian rank, learned, and blind, that he was moved by a longing for the light more than for any use of it. In a word, unless sleep brought rest to our bodies and a kind of medicine for our labour, we should reckon it given against nature, for it takes away our senses and removes all activity. And so, if either nature did not seek rest, or could obtain it in some other way, we should readily put up with it — we who even now are accustomed, for the sake of doing or learning something, to take on our vigils almost against nature.

an tu me de L. Tubulo putas dicere? qui cum praetor quaestionem inter sicarios exercuisset, ita aperte cepit pecunias ob rem iudicandam, ut anno proximo P. Scaevola tribunus plebis ferret ad plebem vellentne de ea re quaeri. quo plebiscito decreta a senatu est consuli quaestio Cn. Caepioni. profectus in exilium Tubulus statim nec respondere ausus; erat enim res aperta. Non igitur de improbo, sed de callido improbo quaerimus, qualis Q. Pompeius in foedere Numantino infitiando fuit, nec vero omnia timente, sed primum qui animi conscientiam non curet, quam scilicet comprimere nihil est negotii. is enim, qui occultus et tectus dicitur, tantum abest ut se indicet, perficiet etiam ut dolere alterius improbe facto videatur. quid est enim aliud esse versutum?

There are, moreover, still clearer, even plainly evident and not in the least doubtful signs of nature, above all in man, of course, but in every animal: that the mind craves always to be doing something, and on no terms can endure everlasting rest. This is easy to discern in the earliest little years of children. For although I fear I may seem excessive on this kind of point, still all the old philosophers, and ours above all, go back to the cradle, because they think that in childhood the will of nature can most easily be known. We see, then, how even infants cannot keep still. And when they have advanced a little, they take delight in games even if these are toilsome, so that they cannot be deterred even by beatings, and that desire of doing something grows up together with their years. And so, not even if we supposed we should enjoy the most delightful dreams would we wish the sleep of Endymion to be given us; and if it did befall us, we should reckon it the equal of death.

memini me adesse P. Sextilio Rufo, cum is rem ad amicos ita deferret, se esse heredem Q. Fadio Gallo, cuius in testamento scriptum esset se ab eo rogatum ut omnis hereditas ad filiam perveniret. id Sextilius factum negabat. poterat autem inpune; quis enim redargueret? nemo nostrum credebat, eratque veri similius hunc mentiri, cuius interesset, quam illum, qui id se rogasse scripsisset, quod debuisset rogare. addebat etiam se in legem Voconiam iuratum contra eam facere non audere, nisi aliter amicis videretur. aderamus nos quidem adolescentes, sed multi amplissimi viri, quorum nemo censuit plus Fadiae dandum, quam posset ad eam lege Voconia pervenire. tenuit permagnam Sextilius hereditatem, unde, si secutus esset eorum sententiam, qui honesta et recta emolumentis omnibus et commodis anteponerent, nummum nullum attigisset. num igitur eum postea censes anxio animo aut sollicito fuisse? nihil minus, contraque illa hereditate dives ob eamque rem laetus. magni enim aestimabat pecuniam non modo non contra leges, sed etiam legibus partam. quae quidem vel cum periculo est quaerenda vobis; est enim effectrix multarum et magnarum voluptatum.

Indeed, even the most idle of men, endowed with some singular and indescribable sluggishness, we still see to be forever moved in body and mind, and, when they are hampered by no necessary business, either to call for the dice-board, or to seek out some game, or to look for some conversation; and since they do not have the noble delights that come from learning, to chase after little gatherings and gossiping circles. Indeed, not even the beasts that we shut up for the sake of our delight, although they are fed more abundantly than if they were free, readily endure to be confined, and they long for the free and wandering movements that nature has assigned them.

ut igitur illis, qui, recta et honesta quae sunt, ea statuunt per se expetenda, adeunda sunt saepe pericula decoris honestatisque causa, sic vestris, qui omnia voluptate metiuntur, pericula adeunda sunt, ut adipiscantur magnas voluptates. si magna res, magna hereditas agetur, cum pecunia voluptates pariantur plurimae, idem erit Epicuro vestro faciendum, si suum finem bonorum sequi volet, quod Scipioni magna gloria proposita, si Hannibalem in Africam retraxisset. itaque quantum adiit periculum! ad honestatem enim illum omnem conatum suum referebat, non ad voluptatem. sic vester sapiens magno aliquo emolumento commotus cicuta, si opus erit, dimicabit.

And so the better any man is born and trained, the less he would wish to be alive at all if, stripped of affairs to conduct, he could feed on pleasures however well prepared. For men either prefer to conduct some business privately, or, if they are of a loftier mind, take up the commonwealth by winning honours and commands, or devote themselves wholly to the pursuits of learning. In which life they are so far from chasing after pleasures that they even endure cares, anxieties, sleepless nights, and enjoy the best part of a man — which in us must be reckoned divine — the keenness of genius and of mind, neither seeking pleasure nor fleeing toil. Nor indeed do they let up either their wonder at the things that have been discovered by the ancients or their search for new ones. And since they cannot be sated by this zeal, forgetful of all other things, they think nothing low, nothing base; and so great is the power in such pursuits that we see even those who have set themselves other ends of goods, ones they steer by utility or by pleasure, nevertheless wear out their lives in inquiring into things and unfolding the workings of nature.

occultum facinus esse potuerit, gaudebit; deprehensus omnem poenam contemnet. erit enim instructus ad mortem contemnendam, ad exilium, ad ipsum etiam dolorem. quem quidem vos, cum improbis poenam proponitis, inpetibilem facitis, cum sapientem semper boni plus habere vultis, tolerabilem. Sed finge non solum callidum eum, qui aliquid improbe faciat, verum etiam praepotentem, ut M. Crassus fuit, qui tamen solebat uti suo bono, ut hodie est noster Pompeius, cui recte facienti gratia est habenda; esse enim quam vellet iniquus iustus poterat inpune. quam multa vero iniuste fieri possunt, quae nemo possit reprehendere! si te amicus tuus moriens rogaverit, ut hereditatem reddas suae filiae, nec usquam id scripserit, ut scripsit Fadius, nec cuiquam dixerit, quid facies?

Therefore this much, at least, is clear: that we are born for action. Now there are several kinds of action, such that the lesser are even put in the shade by the greater; and the greatest are, first — as it seems to me, at any rate, and to those whose system we are now treating — the consideration and knowledge of the heavenly bodies and of those things which, hidden and lying concealed by nature, reason can track down; next, the administration of public affairs, or the science of administering them; then the prudent, temperate, brave, just exercise of reason and the remaining virtues, and the actions that accord with the virtues — all of which, embracing them in a single word, we call the honourable. To both the knowledge and the practice of these we are led, once we have grown strong, with nature herself going before us. For the beginnings of all things are small, but they grow by employing their own advances — and not without reason: for in the first emergence there is a certain tenderness and softness, such that one can neither see the best things nor do them. The light of virtue and of the happy life, the two things most of all to be sought, appears later, and much later still before it is understood plainly what these are. For Plato says it splendidly: Happy is the man to whom it has fallen, even in old age, to be able to attain wisdom and true opinions! Therefore, since enough has been said about the first advantages of nature, let us now look at the greater things that follow.

tu quidem reddes; ipse Epicurus fortasse redderet, ut Sextus Peducaeus, Sex. F., is qui hunc nostrum reliquit effigiem et humanitatis et probitatis suae filium, cum doctus, tum omnium vir optimus et iustissimus, cum sciret nemo eum rogatum a Caio Plotio, equite Romano splendido, Nursino, ultro ad mulierem venit eique nihil opinanti viri mandatum exposuit hereditatemque reddidit. sed ego ex te quaero, quoniam idem tu certe fecisses, nonne intellegas eo maiorem vim esse naturae, quod ipsi vos, qui omnia ad vestrum commodum et, ut ipsi dicitis, ad voluptatem referatis, tamen ea faciatis, e quibus appareat non voluptatem vos, sed officium sequi, plusque rectam naturam quam rationem pravam valere.

Nature, then, both begot and shaped the body of man in such a way that some things she perfected at the first emergence, others she fashioned as the years advanced, and she made hardly any use at all of external and adventitious aids. The mind, however, she perfected, as she did the body, by the remaining things; for she furnished it with senses fit for perceiving things, so that they needed no aid, or not much, for their own confirmation. But what is most excellent and best in man, that she left undone. And yet she gave such a mind as could receive every virtue, and implanted, without teaching, small notions of the greatest things, and, as it were, set out to teach and led us into the things that were already within — the elements, so to speak, of virtue. But virtue itself she only began; nothing more.

si scieris, inquit Carneades, aspidem occulte latere uspiam, et velle aliquem inprudentem super eam assidere, cuius mors tibi emolumentum futura sit, improbe feceris, nisi monueris ne assidat, sed inpunite tamen; scisse enim te quis coarguere possit? Sed nimis multa. perspicuum est enim, nisi aequitas, fides, iustitia proficiscantur a natura, et si omnia haec ad utilitatem referantur, virum bonum non posse reperiri; deque his rebus satis multa in nostris de re publica libris sunt dicta a Laelio.

And so it is our task — when I say ours, I mean it is the task of an art — to seek out, upon those beginnings that we have received, the consequences, until that which we want is brought to completion. And this is worth a good deal more, and far more to be sought for its own sake, than either the senses or those things of the body which we mentioned; for the surpassing perfection of the mind so far excels them that it can scarcely be conceived what the difference is. And so all honour, all admiration, all zeal is referred to virtue and to those actions that are in accord with virtue, and all the things that are either so present in our minds or so done are called by one name the honourable. What the notions of all these are — those, that is, that are signified by the names of things — and what the force and nature of each is, we shall see presently.

Transfer idem ad modestiam vel temperantiam, quae est moderatio cupiditatum rationi oboediens. satisne ergo pudori consulat, si quis sine teste libidini pareat? an est aliquid per se ipsum flagitiosum, etiamsi nulla comitetur infamia? Quid? fortes viri voluptatumne calculis subductis proelium ineunt, sanguinem pro patria profundunt, an quodam animi ardore atque impetu concitati? utrum tandem censes, Torquate, Imperiosum illum, si nostra verba audiret, tuamne de se orationem libentius auditurum fuisse an meam, cum ego dicerem nihil eum fecisse sua causa omniaque rei publicae, tu contra nihil nisi sua? si vero id etiam explanare velles apertiusque diceres nihil eum fecisse nisi voluptatis causa, quo modo eum tandem laturum fuisse existimas?

But for now let us only explain that this honourable of which I speak — apart from the fact that we love our very selves — is besides, by its own nature, to be sought for its own sake. Children give the proof, in whom, as in mirrors, nature is discerned. What great zeal there is in those who contend! What great contests in themselves! How they are carried away with joy when they have won! How ashamed the beaten are! How they refuse to be found at fault! How they long to be praised! What labours do they not endure, to be foremost among their fellows! What memory there is in them of those who have done well by them, what desire to return the favour! And these things appear most of all in every best natural disposition, in which this honourable that we have in mind is, as it were, sketched out by nature.

esto, fecerit, si ita vis, Torquatus propter suas utilitates— malo enim dicere quam voluptates, in tanto praesertim viro—, num etiam eius collega P. Decius, princeps in ea familia consulatus, cum se devoverat et equo admisso in mediam aciem Latinorum irruebat, aliquid de voluptatibus suis cogitabat? ubi ut eam caperet aut quando? cum sciret confestim esse moriendum eamque mortem ardentiore studio peteret, quam Epicurus voluptatem petendam putat. quod quidem eius factum nisi esset iure laudatum, non esset imitatus quarto consulatu suo filius, neque porro ex eo natus cum Pyrrho bellum gerens consul cecidisset in proelio seque e continenti genere tertiam victimam rei publicae praebuisset.

But these things are in children; in those ages that are now full-formed they are clearly expressed. Who is so unlike a human being as not to be moved both by offence at baseness and by approval of honour? Who is there who does not hate a lustful, shameless youth? Who, on the other hand, does not love modesty and steadiness in that age, even where his own interest is not concerned at all? Who does not hate Pullus Numitorius of Fregellae, the traitor, although he was of service to our commonwealth? Who does not praise above all Codrus, the saviour of his city, who does not praise the daughters of Erechtheus? To whom is the name of Tubulus not hateful? Who does not love Aristides, though he is dead? Or do we forget how greatly we are moved in the hearing and in the reading, when we learn of something done with piety, with friendship, with greatness of soul?

Contineo me ab exemplis. Graecis hoc modicum est: Leonidas, Epaminondas, tres aliqui aut quattuor; ego si nostros colligere coepero, perficiam illud quidem, ut se virtuti tradat constringendam voluptas, sed dies me deficiet, et, ut Aulus Varius, qui est habitus iudex durior, dicere consessori solebat, cum datis testibus alii tamen citarentur: Aut hoc testium satis est, aut nescio, quid satis sit, sic a me satis datum est testium. Quid enim? te ipsum, dignissimum maioribus tuis, voluptasne induxit, ut adolescentulus eriperes P. Sullae consulatum? quem cum ad patrem tuum rettulisses, fortissimum virum, qualis ille vel consul vel civis cum semper, tum post consulatum fuit! quo quidem auctore nos ipsi ea gessimus, ut omnibus potius quam ipsis nobis consuluerimus.

Why do I speak of ourselves, who were born, taken up, and trained for praise and for honour? What shouts of the crowd and of the unlearned are raised in the theatres when those lines are spoken: ’I am Orestes’, and against him from the other: ’No, in truth, I tell you, I am Orestes!’ And when, moreover, the way out is given by each to the king, confused and at a loss — when both, then, pray to be put to death together — how often is this acted out, and ever with anything but the greatest admiration? There is no one, then, who does not approve and praise this disposition of mind, by which not only is no advantage sought, but, against advantage, faith is even kept.

At quam pulchre dicere videbare, cum ex altera parte ponebas cumulatum aliquem plurimis et maximis voluptatibus nullo nec praesenti nec futuro dolore, ex altera autem cruciatibus maximis toto corpore nulla nec adiuncta nec sperata voluptate, et quaerebas, quis aut hoc miserior aut superiore illo beatior; deinde concludebas summum malum esse dolorem, summum bonum voluptatem! Lucius Thorius Balbus fuit, Lanuvinus, quem meminisse tu non potes. is ita vivebat, ut nulla tam exquisita posset inveniri voluptas, qua non abundaret. erat et cupidus voluptatum et eius generis intellegens et copiosus, ita non superstitiosus, ut illa plurima in sua patria sacrificia et fana contemneret, ita non timidus ad mortem, ut in acie sit ob rem publicam interfectus.

With examples of this kind not only invented stories but histories too are crammed, and ours especially. For we chose the best of men to receive the sacred objects of Ida; we sent guardians to kings; our generals vowed their own lives for the safety of their country; our consuls warned a king, a bitter enemy already drawing near our walls, to beware of poison; in our commonwealth was found a Lucretia, who atoned by a voluntary death for the violation forced upon her, and a man who killed his daughter that she might not be violated. All these things, and countless others besides — who is there who does not understand both that those who did them were drawn by the splendour of worth and were heedless of their own advantage, and that we, when we praise them, are led by nothing else than the honourable? Now that these matters have been set out briefly — for I have not pursued the abundance I might have, since there was no doubt in the case — by all this it is surely concluded that both all the virtues and that honourable which springs from them and clings within them are to be sought for their own sake.

cupiditates non Epicuri divisione finiebat, sed sua satietate. habebat tamen rationem valitudinis: utebatur iis exercitationibus, ut ad cenam et sitiens et esuriens veniret, eo cibo, qui et suavissimus esset et idem facillimus ad concoquendum, vino et ad voluptatem et ne noceret. cetera illa adhibebat, quibus demptis negat se Epicurus intellegere quid sit bonum. aberat omnis dolor, qui si adesset, nec molliter ferret et tamen medicis plus quam philosophis uteretur. color egregius, integra valitudo, summa gratia, vita denique conferta voluptatum omnium varietate.

But in all that honourable good of which we are speaking, nothing is so radiant, nothing of wider reach, than the bond between man and man, a kind of fellowship and sharing of advantages, and that very love of the human race. This love, born from the first begetting — in that children are cherished by those who begot them, and the whole household is bound together by marriage and by stock — creeps gradually outward: first to kinsfolk, then to relations by marriage, then to friends, after that to neighbours, then to fellow citizens and to those who are publicly our allies and friends, and at last to the embrace of the whole human kind. This disposition of the mind, rendering to each his own and guarding generously and fairly that fellowship of human union of which I speak, is called justice; and joined to it are dutifulness, kindness, generosity, good will, courtesy, and whatever else is of the same kind. And these things, while they are proper to justice, are at the same time shared with the rest of the virtues.

hunc vos beatum; ratio quidem vestra sic cogit. at ego quem huic anteponam non audeo dicere; dicet pro me ipsa virtus nec dubitabit isti vestro beato M. Regulum anteponere, quem quidem, cum sua voluntate, nulla vi coactus praeter fidem, quam dederat hosti, ex patria Karthaginem revertisset, tum ipsum, cum vigiliis et fame cruciaretur, clamat virtus beatiorem fuisse quam potantem in rosa Thorium. bella magna gesserat, bis consul fuerat, triumpharat nec tamen sua illa superiora tam magna neque tam praeclara ducebat quam illum ultimum casum, quem propter fidem constantiamque susceperat, qui nobis miserabilis videtur audientibus, illi perpetienti erat voluptarius. non enim hilaritate nec lascivia nec risu aut ioco, comite levitatis, saepe etiam tristes firmitate et constantia sunt beati.

For since man’s nature has been begotten in such a way that he has within him something inborn and, as it were, civic and communal, which the Greeks call politikon, whatever any virtue does will not be at odds with that community and that love and human fellowship which I have set out; and, in turn, just as justice itself will pour itself into the other virtues, so it will seek them out. For justice cannot be kept except by a brave man, except by a wise one. Such, then, as is this whole concord and consent of the virtues of which I speak, such is that honourable good itself, since the honourable is either virtue itself or a deed done by virtue; and a life that accords with these and answers to the virtues can be judged upright and honourable and steadfast and in keeping with nature.

stuprata per vim Lucretia a regis filio testata civis se ipsa interemit. hic dolor populi Romani duce et auctore Bruto causa civitati libertatis fuit, ob eiusque mulieris memoriam primo anno et vir et pater eius consul est factus. tenuis Lucius Verginius unusque de multis sexagesimo anno post libertatem receptam virginem filiam sua manu occidit potius, quam ea Ap. Claudii libidini, qui tum erat summo cum imperio, dederetur.

And yet this joining and intermingling of the virtues is nonetheless distinguished by the philosophers through a certain method of reasoning. For although they are so coupled and connected that all share in all, and none can be severed from another, still each has its own proper office: courage is discerned in toils and dangers, temperance in the foregoing of pleasures, prudence in the choice of goods and evils, justice in rendering to each his own. Since, then, there is in every virtue a certain care that looks, as it were, outward and reaches after others and embraces them, it comes about that friends, that brothers, that kinsmen, that relations by marriage, that fellow citizens, that everyone in the end — since we hold that there is one fellowship of mankind — are to be sought for their own sake. And yet none of these is of such a kind as to lie within the end and uttermost limit of goods.

Aut haec tibi, Torquate, sunt vituperanda aut patrocinium voluptatis repudiandum. quod autem patrocinium aut quae ista causa est voluptatis, quae nec testes ullos e claris viris nec laudatores poterit adhibere? ut enim nos ex annalium monimentis testes excitamus eos, quorum omnis vita consumpta est in laboribus gloriosis, qui voluptatis nomen audire non possent, sic in vestris disputationibus historia muta est. numquam audivi in Epicuri schola Lycurgum, Solonem, Miltiadem, Themistoclem, Epaminondam nominari, qui in ore sunt ceterorum omnium philosophorum. nunc vero, quoniam haec nos etiam tractare coepimus, suppeditabit nobis Atticus noster e thesauris suis quos et quantos viros! nonne melius est de his aliquid quam tantis voluminibus de Themista loqui?

So it comes about that two kinds of things to be sought for their own sake are found. One lies in those things in which that uttermost good is brought to completion — things which belong either to the mind or to the body. But those that are external — that is, those that are present neither in the mind nor in the body, such as friends, parents, children, kinsmen, the fatherland itself — these are indeed dear of their own accord, but they are not of the same class as the others. Nor indeed could anyone ever attain the highest good if all those things that lie outside us, though to be sought, were contained within the highest good.

sint ista Graecorum; quamquam ab iis philosophiam et omnes ingenuas disciplinas habemus; sed tamen est aliquid, quod nobis non liceat, liceat illis. Pugnant Stoici cum Peripateticis. alteri negant quicquam esse bonum, nisi quod honestum sit, alteri plurimum se et longe longeque plurimum tribuere honestati, sed tamen et in corpore et extra esse quaedam bona. et certamen honestum et disputatio splendida! omnis est enim de virtutis dignitate contentio. at cum tuis cum disseras, multa sunt audienda etiam de obscenis voluptatibus, de quibus ab Epicuro saepissime dicitur.

"How, then," you will say, "will it be possible for it to be true that all things are referred to the highest good, if friendships, if ties of kinship, if the remaining external things are not contained within the highest good?" By this account, surely: that we guard those things which are external by the duties that arise from each particular kind of virtue. For the cultivation of a friend and of a parent, to one who discharges his duty, profits him in this very thing, that to discharge duty thus belongs among right actions, which are sprung from the virtues. These the wise indeed pursue under nature’s guidance, as though they could see; but men who are not yet perfect, and yet endowed with outstanding natural gifts, are often roused by glory, which has the look and likeness of the honourable. But if they could see, through and through, that honourable good itself, perfect and complete on every side … the one thing most splendid of all and most worthy of praise, with what joy would they be filled, when they take such delight in the shadowy notion of it?

non potes ergo ista tueri, Torquate, mihi crede, si te ipse et tuas cogitationes et studia perspexeris; pudebit te, inquam, illius tabulae, quam Cleanthes sane commode verbis depingere solebat. iubebat eos, qui audiebant, secum ipsos cogitare pictam in tabula Voluptatem pulcherrimo vestitu et ornatu regali in solio sedentem, praesto esse Virtutes ut ancillulas, quae nihil aliud agerent, nullum suum officium ducerent, nisi ut Voluptati ministrarent et eam tantum ad aurem admonerent, si modo id pictura intellegi posset, ut caveret ne quid faceret inprudens, quod offenderet animos hominum, aut quicquam, e quo oriretur aliquis dolor. Nos quidem Virtutes sic natae sumus, ut tibi serviremus, aliud negotii nihil habemus.

For what man, given over to pleasures, what man set ablaze by the fires of his desires in laying hold of the things he had most fiercely craved, do we suppose to be flooded with so great a gladness as either the elder Africanus, when Hannibal was beaten, or the younger, when Carthage was overthrown? Whom did the descent of the Tiber on that festal day affect with so great a joy as it affected L. Paulus, when he was carried up that same river bringing King Perses captive? Come now, Lucius mine, raise up in your mind the height and excellence of the virtues:

At negat Epicurus —hoc enim vestrum lumen est— quemquam, qui honeste non vivat, iucunde posse vivere. quasi ego id curem, quid ille aiat aut neget. illud quaero, quid ei, qui in voluptate summum bonum ponat, consentaneum sit dicere. quid affers, cur Thorius, cur Caius Postumius, cur omnium horum magister, Orata, non iucundissime vixerit? ipse negat, ut ante dixi, luxuriosorum vitam reprehendendam, nisi plane fatui sint, id est nisi aut cupiant aut metuant. quarum ambarum rerum cum medicinam pollicetur, luxuriae licentiam pollicetur. his enim rebus detractis negat se reperire in asotorum vita quod reprehendat.

you will no longer doubt that men who possess them, living with a great and lofty spirit, are always happy — men who understand that all the motions of fortune and the changes of circumstance and the times will be light and feeble, if once they have entered the contest of virtue. For those things which we counted among the goods of the body do indeed fill out the happiest life, but in such a way that the happy life can exist without them. For so small and slight are those additions of goods that, just as the stars are not even seen in the rays of the sun, so these are not even discerned in the splendour of the virtues. And though it is truly said that those advantages of the body count for little toward living happily, still it is too violent to say that they count for nothing;

Non igitur potestis voluptate omnia dirigentes aut tueri aut retinere virtutem. nam nec vir bonus ac iustus haberi debet qui, ne malum habeat, abstinet se ab iniuria. nosti, credo, illud: ’Ne/mo pius est, qui/ pietatem—’; cave putes quicquam esse verius. nec enim, dum metuit, iustus est, et certe, si metuere destiterit, non erit; non metuet autem, sive celare poterit, sive opibus magnis quicquid fecerit optinere, certeque malet existimari bonus vir, ut non sit, quam esse, ut non putetur. ita, quod certissimum est, pro vera certaque iustitia simulationem nobis iustitiae traditis praecipitisque quodam modo ut nostram stabilem conscientiam contemnamus, aliorum errantem opinionem aucupemur.

for those who argue so seem to me to have forgotten the very first principles of nature which they themselves laid down. Something, then, must be granted to these things — provided you understand how much is to be granted. For it belongs to a philosopher who seeks not so much the showy as the true neither to count as nothing those things which even those showy men confessed to be in accordance with nature, and to see that there is so great a force in virtue and, so to speak, so great an authority in the honourable, that the rest, while not nothing, are yet so small as to seem to be nothing. This is the discourse of one who does not scorn all things save virtue, yet magnifies virtue itself with the praises that are its own; and, in fine, this is the explanation of the highest good, complete and perfect on every side. From here the rest, attempting to snatch up little fragments, each wished his own opinion to seem the one he had contributed.

Quae dici eadem de ceteris virtutibus possunt, quarum omnium fundamenta vos in voluptate tamquam in aqua ponitis. quid enim? fortemne possumus dicere eundem illum Torquatum?—delector enim, quamquam te non possum, ut ais, corrumpere, delector, inquam, et familia vestra et nomine. et hercule mihi vir optimus nostrique amantissimus, Aulus Torquatus, versatur ante oculos, cuius quantum studium et quam insigne fuerit erga me temporibus illis, quae nota sunt omnibus, scire necesse est utrumque vestrum. quae mihi ipsi, qui volo et esse et haberi gratus, grata non essent, nisi eum perspicerem mea causa mihi amicum fuisse, non sua, nisi hoc dicis sua, quod interest omnium recte facere. si id dicis, vicimus. id enim volumus, id contendimus, ut officii fructus sit ipsum officium.

Often, by Aristotle, by Theophrastus, the knowledge of things has been wondrously praised for its own sake; caught by this one thing, Erillus maintained that knowledge is the highest good, and that no other thing is to be sought for its own sake. Much was said by the ancients about despising and looking down upon human affairs; this one thing Aristo held to: he denied that, apart from vices and virtues, there is anything to be shunned or to be sought. It was laid down by our school that, among the things which are in accordance with nature, there is the being free from pain; this Hieronymus called the highest good. But Callipho, indeed, and after him Diodorus — the one having grown enamoured of pleasure, the other of freedom from pain — neither could do without the honourable, which has been praised most of all by our school.

hoc ille tuus non vult omnibusque ex rebus voluptatem quasi mercedem exigit. sed ad illum redeo. si voluptatis causa cum Gallo apud Anienem depugnavit provocatus et ex eius spoliis sibi et torquem et cognomen induit ullam aliam ob causam, nisi quod ei talia facta digna viro videbantur, fortem non puto. iam si pudor, si modestia, si pudicitia, si uno verbo temperantia poenae aut infamiae metu coe+rcebuntur, non sanctitate sua se tuebuntur, quod adulterium, quod stuprum, quae libido non se proripiet ac proiciet aut occultatione proposita aut inpunitate aut licentia?

Indeed, even the very devotees of pleasure seek their side-roads, and have the virtues on their lips all day long, and say that pleasure is at first sought only for its own sake, but that afterward, by habit, a kind of second nature is formed, driven by which men do many things while seeking no pleasure at all. The Stoics remain. They, to be sure, have carried over from us not some one thing or another, but our whole philosophy to their own side; and just as the rest of the thieves change the marks on the things they have stolen, so they, in order to use our opinions as their own, changed the names, like the marks upon things. Thus this teaching alone is left worthy of those zealous for the liberal arts, worthy of the learned, worthy of illustrious men, worthy of leading men, worthy of kings. When he had said this, and had paused a little, "What is it?" he said;

Quid? illud, Torquate, quale tandem videtur, te isto nomine, ingenio, gloria, quae facis, quae cogitas, quae contendis quo referas, cuius rei causa perficere quae conaris velis, quid optimum denique in vita iudices non audere in conventu dicere? quid enim mereri velis, iam cum magistratum inieris et in contionem ascenderis—est enim tibi edicendum quae sis observaturus in iure dicendo, et fortasse etiam, si tibi erit visum, aliquid de maioribus tuis et de te ipso dices more maiorum—, quid merearis igitur, ut dicas te in eo magistratu omnia voluptatis causa facturum esse, teque nihil fecisse in vita nisi voluptatis causa? ’An me’, inquis, tam amentem putas, ut apud imperitos isto modo loquar? At tu eadem ista dic in iudicio aut, si coronam times, dic in senatu. numquam facies. cur, nisi quod turpis oratio est? mene ergo et Triarium dignos existimas, apud quos turpiter loquare?

"do I seem to you to have rehearsed enough, in the use of my own right, within your hearing?" And I said, "You, Piso — as often at other times, so today — seemed to me to know these things so well that, if we could have you more often, I should not think we need do much suppliant courting of the Greeks. And this I approved the more, because I remember that Staseas of Naples, that teacher of yours, a Peripatetic of high repute indeed, used to speak of these matters somewhat otherwise, agreeing with those who put much store in fortune favourable or adverse, much in the goods or evils of the body." "It is as you say," he said; "but these things are stated by Antiochus, our friend, much better and more strongly than they used to be stated by Staseas. And yet I am not asking what has been approved by you in my account, but by this Cicero of ours, whom I am eager to carry off from you as my pupil."

Verum esto: verbum ipsum voluptatis non habet dignitatem, nec nos fortasse intellegimus. hoc enim identidem dicitis, non intellegere nos quam dicatis voluptatem. rem videlicet difficilem et obscuram! individua cum dicitis et intermundia, quae nec sunt ulla nec possunt esse, intellegimus, voluptas, quae passeribus omnibus nota est, a nobis intellegi non potest? quid, si efficio ut fateare me non modo quid sit voluptas scire—est enim iucundus motus in sensu—, sed etiam quid eam tu velis esse? tum enim eam ipsam vis, quam modo ego dixi, et nomen inponis, in motu ut sit et faciat aliquam varietatem, tum aliam quandam summam voluptatem, quo addi nihil possit; eam tum adesse, cum dolor omnis absit; eam stabilem appellas.

Then Lucius: "For my part, those things have been thoroughly approved by me, as I think they are by my brother too." Then Piso said to me: "What of it, then? Do you grant the young man your indulgence? Or would you rather have him learn those doctrines which, when he has thoroughly mastered them, leave him knowing nothing?" "I, indeed, allow it to him," I said. "But do you not remember that I am at liberty to approve those things you have said? For who can fail to approve the things that seem to him probable?" "But can anyone," he said, "approve what he does not hold to be perceived, grasped, known?" "There is no great dissension here, Piso," I said. "For there is no other reason why nothing seems to me capable of being perceived, except that the power of perceiving is so defined by the Stoics that they deny anything can be perceived unless it is true in such a way that it could not be false. And so this is my dissension with them, but with the Peripatetics none at all. But let us pass these matters by; for they make a discussion both quite long enough and quite contentious enough."

sit sane ista voluptas. dic in quovis conventu te omnia facere, ne doleas. si ne hoc quidem satis ample, satis honeste dici putas, dic te omnia et in isto magistratu et in omni vita utilitatis tuae causa facturum, nihil nisi quod expediat, nihil denique nisi tua causa: quem clamorem contionis aut quam spem consulatus eius, qui tibi paratissimus est, futuram putas? eamne rationem igitur sequere, qua tecum ipse et cum tuis utare, profiteri et in medium proferre non audeas? at vero illa, quae Peripatetici, quae Stoici dicunt, semper tibi in ore sunt in iudiciis, in senatu. officium, aequitatem, dignitatem, fidem, recta, honesta, digna imperio, digna populo Romano, omnia pericula pro re publica, mori pro patria, haec cum loqueris, nos barones stupemus, tu videlicet tecum ipse rides.

"This seems to me to have been said by you too hastily — that all the wise are always happy; somehow the discourse flew past it. And unless this is made good, I fear that what Theophrastus said about fortune, about pain, about the torment of the body — things with which he judged the happy life could in no way be joined — may be true. For this is vehemently at odds: that the same man should be happy and yet overwhelmed by many evils. How these things are consistent I do not at all understand." "Which is it, then," he said, "that does not please you — that there is so great a force in virtue that of itself it is sufficient for living happily? Or, if you approve that, do you deny that it can come about that those who possess virtue should be happy even when afflicted with certain evils?" "For my part, I want there to be in virtue the greatest force possible; but how great it is, another time; for now only this: whether it can be so great, if anything outside virtue be counted among goods."

nam inter ista tam magnifica verba tamque praeclara non habet ullum voluptas locum, non modo illa, quam in motu esse dicitis, quam omnes urbani rustici, omnes, inquam, qui Latine loquuntur, voluptatem vocant, sed ne haec quidem stabilis, quam praeter vos nemo appellat voluptatem. Vide igitur ne non debeas verbis nostris uti, sententiis tuis. quodsi vultum tibi, si incessum fingeres, quo gravior viderere, non esses tui similis; verba tu fingas et ea dicas, quae non sentias? aut etiam, ut vestitum, sic sententiam habeas aliam domesticam, aliam forensem, ut in fronte ostentatio sit, intus veritas occultetur? vide, quaeso, rectumne sit. mihi quidem eae verae videntur opiniones, quae honestae, quae laudabiles, quae gloriosae, quae in senatu, quae apud populum, quae in omni coetu concilioque profitendae sint, ne id non pudeat sentire, quod pudeat dicere. Amicitiae vero locus ubi esse potest aut quis amicus esse cuiquam, quem non ipsum amet propter ipsum?

"And yet," he said, "if you grant the Stoics that virtue alone, if it be present, makes life happy, you grant the same to the Peripatetics as well. For what they do not dare to call evils, but grant to be harsh and inconvenient and to be rejected and foreign to nature — these we call evils, but slight and well-nigh the least of all. And so, if he can be happy who is among harsh and rejectable things, so too can he who is among small evils." And I said, "Piso, if there is anyone who is wont to see sharply, in pleading cases, what the matter at issue is, that man is surely you. So attend, I beg you. For so far — by my own fault, perhaps — you do not perceive what it is I am asking." "Here I am," he said, "and I await what you will answer to the very thing I was asking."

quid autem est amare, e quo nomen ductum amicitiae est, nisi velle bonis aliquem affici quam maximis, etiamsi ad se ex iis nihil redundet? ’Prodest’, inquit, mihi eo esse animo. Immo videri fortasse. esse enim, nisi eris, non potes. qui autem esse poteris, nisi te amor ipse ceperit? quod non subducta utilitatis ratione effici solet, sed ipsum a se oritur et sua sponte nascitur. At enim sequor utilitatem. Manebit ergo amicitia tam diu, quam diu sequetur utilitas, et, si utilitas amicitiam constituet, tollet eadem.

"I will answer that I am not asking, at this time, what virtue can accomplish," I said, "but what is said consistently, what is at variance with itself." "In what way, then?" he said. "Because," I said, "when by Zeno this is delivered grandly, as though from an oracle: ’Virtue is of itself sufficient for living happily’ — and ’Why so?’ he says, the answer comes: ’Because, save what is honourable, there is no other good.’ I am no longer asking whether this be true; what I say is that the things he says hang together splendidly among themselves.

sed quid ages tandem, si utilitas ab amicitia, ut fit saepe, defecerit? relinquesne? quae ista amicitia est? retinebis? qui convenit? quid enim de amicitia statueris utilitatis causa expetenda vides. Ne in odium veniam, si amicum destitero tueri. Primum cur ista res digna odio est, nisi quod est turpis? quodsi, ne quo incommodo afficiare, non relinques amicum, tamen, ne sine fructu alligatus sis, ut moriatur optabis. Quid, si non modo utilitatem tibi nullam afferet, sed iacturae rei familiaris erunt faciendae, labores suscipiendi, adeundum vitae periculum? ne tum quidem te respicies et cogitabis sibi quemque natum esse et suis voluptatibus? vadem te ad mortem tyranno dabis pro amico, ut Pythagoreus ille Siculo fecit tyranno? aut, Pylades cum sis, dices te esse Orestem, ut moriare pro amico? aut, si esses Orestes, Pyladem refelleres, te indicares et, si id non probares, quo minus ambo una necaremini non precarere?

Let Epicurus have said this same thing — that the wise man is always happy (which indeed he is given to bubbling out now and then) — Epicurus who says that the wise man, even when he is being worn down by the highest pains, will say, ’How sweet this is! how little I care!’; I would not fight with the man as to why he should hold so much good to lie in nature; this I would press: that he does not understand what he ought to say, when he has called pain the highest evil. The same is now my discourse against you. You say all the same things, good and evil, that those men say who never, as the saying goes, set eyes on a painted philosopher: health, strength, stature, beauty, the soundness of all the little nails, goods; deformity, disease, debility, evils.

Faceres tu quidem, Torquate, haec omnia; nihil enim arbitror esse magna laude dignum, quod te praetermissurum credam aut mortis aut doloris metu. non quaeritur autem quid naturae tuae consentaneum sit, sed quid disciplinae. ratio ista, quam defendis, praecepta, quae didicisti, quae probas, funditus evertunt amicitiam, quamvis eam Epicurus, ut facit, in caelum efferat laudibus. At coluit ipse amicitias. Quis, quaeso, illum negat et bonum virum et comem et humanum fuisse? de ingenio eius in his disputationibus, non de moribus quaeritur. sit ista in Graecorum levitate perversitas, qui maledictis insectantur eos, a quibus de veritate dissentiunt. sed quamvis comis in amicis tuendis fuerit, tamen, si haec vera sunt—nihil enim affirmo—, non satis acutus fuit. At multis se probavit.

Now those external things — go gently on those, by all means; but since these are goods of the body, you will at least count among goods the things that produce them: friends, children, kinsmen, riches, honours, resources. Notice that against this I say nothing; what I do say is this: if those things are evils into which a wise man can fall, then to be wise is not enough for living happily. ‘On the contrary,’ he said, ‘for living most happily it is too little, but for living happily it is enough.’ ‘I noticed,’ I said, ‘that you put it in that way a little earlier, and I know that our friend Antiochus is in the habit of speaking so; but what could be less to be approved than that someone should be happy and yet not happy enough? For whatever is added to what is already enough is too much; and no one is too happy; and so no one is happier than the happy man.’

Et quidem iure fortasse, sed tamen non gravissimum est testimonium multitudinis. in omni enim arte vel studio vel quavis scientia vel in ipsa virtute optimum quidque rarissimum est. ac mihi quidem, quod et ipse bonus vir fuit et multi Epicurei et fuerunt et hodie sunt et in amicitiis fideles et in omni vita constantes et graves nec voluptate, sed officio consilia moderantes, hoc videtur maior vis honestatis et minor voluptatis. ita enim vivunt quidam, ut eorum vita refellatur oratio. atque ut ceteri dicere existimantur melius quam facere, sic hi mihi videntur facere melius quam dicere.

‘Then, in your view,’ he said, ‘take Q. Metellus, who saw three sons made consuls — one of them even both censor and a celebrant of a triumph, and a fourth a praetor — and who left them all living, and three daughters married, while he himself had been consul, censor, and augur too, and had triumphed: granting that he was a wise man, was he not happier than Regulus — granting that he too was a wise man — who in the power of the enemy was done to death by sleeplessness and starvation?’

Sed haec nihil sane ad rem; illa videamus, quae a te de amicitia dicta sunt. e quibus unum mihi videbar ab ipso Epicuro dictum cognoscere, amicitiam a voluptate non posse divelli ob eamque rem colendam esse, quod, quoniam sine ea tuto et sine metu vivi non posset, ne iucunde quidem posset. satis est ad hoc responsum. Attulisti aliud humanius horum recentiorum, numquam dictum ab ipso illo, quod sciam, primo utilitatis causa amicum expeti, cum autem usus accessisset, tum ipsum amari per se etiam omissa spe voluptatis. hoc etsi multimodis reprehendi potest, tamen accipio, quod dant. mihi enim satis est, ipsis non satis. nam aliquando posse recte fieri dicunt nulla expectata nec quaesita voluptate.

‘Why ask me that?’ I said. ‘Ask the Stoics.’ ‘What, then,’ he said, ‘do you suppose they will answer?’ ‘That Metellus was no whit happier than Regulus.’ ‘From there, then,’ he said, ‘is where we must begin.’ ‘Even so,’ I said, ‘we are straying from the point. For I am not asking what is true, but what each man is bound to say. Would that they did say one man was happier than another! Then you would see ruins indeed. For since the good is placed in virtue alone and in the honourable itself, and since neither virtue, on their view, nor the honourable can grow, and since this is the only good — a good which whoever possesses must of necessity be happy — then, when the one thing in which being happy is placed cannot be increased, how can anyone be happier than another? Do you see how all this hangs together? And, by Hercules — for I must confess what I think — wonderful is the interweaving of their doctrine. The last answers to the first, the middle to both, all to all. They see what follows, what conflicts. It is as in geometry: grant the first premises, and you must grant the whole. Grant that nothing is good but the honourable: it must be granted that the happy life is placed in virtue. Now look back the other way:

Posuisti etiam dicere alios foedus quoddam inter se facere sapientis, ut, quem ad modum sint in se ipsos animati, eodem modo sint erga amicos; id et fieri posse et saepe esse factum et ad voluptates percipiendas maxime pertinere. hoc foedus facere si potuerunt, faciant etiam illud, ut aequitatem, modestiam, virtutes omnes per se ipsas gratis diligant. an vero, si fructibus et emolumentis et utilitatibus amicitias colemus, si nulla caritas erit, quae faciat amicitiam ipsam sua sponte, vi sua, ex se et propter se expetendam, dubium est, quin fundos et insulas amicis anteponamus?

grant this, and that other must be granted. Your school does not do the same. “Three kinds of goods”: the discourse runs forward down the slope. It comes to the end; it sticks fast in the rut. For it wants to say that nothing can be lacking to the wise man for the happy life — an honourable claim, a Socratic one, Plato’s too. ‘I dare to say it,’ he said. ‘You cannot, unless you unweave all that. If poverty is an evil, no beggar can be happy, however wise he is. Yet Zeno dared to call such a man not merely happy but rich as well. To feel pain is an evil: the man driven onto the cross cannot be happy. Children are a good: bereavement is wretched. Country is a good: exile is wretched. Health is a good: sickness is wretched. Soundness of body is a good: maiming is wretched. Unimpaired sight is a good: blindness is wretched. If wisdom can ease each of these singly by its consolation, how will it bear them all together? Suppose one and the same man blind, maimed, gripped by the gravest sickness, exiled, bereaved, destitute, and racked on the rack: what do you call him, Zeno?’ ‘Happy,’ he says. ‘Most happy too?’ ‘Of course,’ he will say, ‘since I have taught that happiness has no degrees, no more than virtue has, in which happiness itself also resides.’

Licet hic rursus ea commemores, quae optimis verbis ab Epicuro de laude amicitiae dicta sunt. non quaero, quid dicat, sed quid convenienter possit rationi et sententiae suae dicere. Utilitatis causa amicitia est quaesita. Num igitur utiliorem tibi hunc Triarium putas esse posse, quam si tua sint Puteolis granaria? collige omnia, quae soletis: Praesidium amicorum. Satis est tibi in te, satis in legibus, satis in mediocribus amicitiis praesidii. iam contemni non poteris. odium autem et invidiam facile vitabis. ad eas enim res ab Epicuro praecepta dantur. et tamen tantis vectigalibus ad liberalitatem utens etiam sine hac Pyladea amicitia multorum te benivolentia praeclare tuebere et munies. At quicum ioca seria, ut dicitur, quicum arcana, quicum occulta omnia?

‘To you this is incredible — that he is most happy. Well? Is your own claim credible? For if you summon me to the people’s verdict, you will never convince them that a man so afflicted is happy; if to the verdict of the prudent, on the one point they will perhaps be in doubt — whether there is so much in virtue that those endowed with it are happy even in the bull of Phalaris — but on the other they will not doubt that the Stoics speak consistently with themselves and you with contradiction.’ ‘So you approve,’ he said, ‘of that book of Theophrastus on the happy life?’ ‘Still, we are straying from the point — and, not to drag it out, in a word, Piso,’ I said, ‘if those things are evils, I do approve of it.’ ‘Do they not, then,’ he said, ‘seem to you evils?’

Tecum optime, deinde etiam cum mediocri amico. sed fac ista esse non inportuna; quid ad utilitatem tantae pecuniae? vides igitur, si amicitiam sua caritate metiare, nihil esse praestantius, sin emolumento, summas familiaritates praediorum fructuosorum mercede superari. me igitur ipsum ames oportet, non mea, si veri amici futuri sumus. Sed in rebus apertissimis nimium longi sumus. perfecto enim et concluso neque virtutibus neque amicitiis usquam locum esse, si ad voluptatem omnia referantur, nihil praeterea est magnopere dicendum. ac tamen, ne cui loco non videatur esse responsum, pauca etiam nunc dicam ad reliquam orationem tuam.

‘You are asking,’ I said, ‘a question in which, whichever way I answer, you are bound to twist me this way and that.’ ‘How so, pray?’ he said. ‘Because, if they are evils, the man who is in them will not be happy; if they are not evils, the whole system of the Peripatetics collapses.’ And he, laughing: ‘I see,’ he said, ‘what you are at; you are afraid I shall carry off your pupil.’ ‘You may carry him off, by all means,’ I said, ‘if he will follow; for he will be with me, if he is with you.’ ‘Listen, then, Lucius,’ he said; ‘for it is with you that I must frame my discourse. The whole authority of philosophy, as Theophrastus says, lies in the securing of a happy life; for we are all set ablaze with the desire of living happily. On this your brother and I agree.

quoniam igitur omnis summa philosophiae ad beate vivendum refertur, idque unum expetentes homines se ad hoc studium contulerunt, beate autem vivere alii in alio, vos in voluptate ponitis, item contra miseriam omnem in dolore, id primum videamus, beate vivere vestrum quale sit. atque hoc dabitis, ut opinor, si modo sit aliquid esse beatum, id oportere totum poni in potestate sapientis. nam si amitti vita beata potest, beata esse non potest. quis enim confidit semper sibi illud stabile et firmum permansurum, quod fragile et caducum sit? qui autem diffidet perpetuitati bonorum suorum, timeat necesse est, ne aliquando amissis illis sit miser. beatus autem esse in maximarum rerum timore nemo potest. nemo igitur esse beatus potest.

And so what must be looked into is whether the reasoning of the philosophers can give us this. It certainly holds out the promise. For if it did not, why did Plato travel through Egypt to learn numbers and the lore of the heavens from the priests of the barbarians? Why, afterward, did he go to Tarentum to Archytas? Why to the other Pythagoreans — Echecrates, Timaeus, Arion — to the Locrians, so that, having reproduced Socrates, he might add the discipline of the Pythagoreans and learn besides the very things Socrates rejected? Why did Pythagoras himself both range over Egypt and go to the Magi of the Persians? Why did he traverse so many regions of the barbarians on foot, cross so many seas? Why did Democritus do the very same? Who — whether truly or falsely we forbear to ask — is said to have deprived himself of his eyes; and certainly, that his mind might be drawn off as little as possible from its meditations, he neglected his inheritance, left his fields untilled — seeking what else but the happy life? Even if he placed it in the knowledge of things, still it was from that investigation of nature that he wished to gain his end: to be of good cheer. For that highest good he calls cheerfulness euthymia, and often fearlessness athambia, that is, a mind free of dread.

neque enim in aliqua parte, sed in perpetuitate temporis vita beata dici solet, nec appellatur omnino vita, nisi confecta atque absoluta, nec potest quisquam alias beatus esse, alias miser; qui enim existimabit posse se miserum esse beatus non erit. nam cum suscepta semel est beata vita, tam permanet quam ipsa illa effectrix beatae vitae sapientia neque expectat ultimum tempus aetatis, quod Croeso scribit Herodotus praeceptum a Solone. At enim, quem ad modum tute dicebas, negat Epicurus diuturnitatem quidem temporis ad beate vivendum aliquid afferre, nec minorem voluptatem percipi in brevitate temporis, quam si illa sit sempiterna.

But these things, splendid though they are, are not yet brought to a fine finish. For of virtue, indeed, only a little was said by this man, and that not even with full precision. After his time these matters first began to be inquired into in this city by Socrates, then were carried down to this present place, and there was no longer any doubt that in virtue lay all the hope both of living well and of living happily. When Zeno had learned this from our people, he did, as the formula runs in legal pleadings, “the same thing in another manner.” This now you approve in him. So by changing the names of things he escapes the charge of inconsistency — and we cannot escape it! He says that the life of Metellus was no happier than that of Regulus, yet to be preferred — not more to be sought after, but more to be taken up, and, if there were a choice, the life of Metellus to be chosen and that of Regulus rejected. I call the life he says is to be preferred and more to be chosen the happier one, and I assign to that life not the least particle more than the Stoics do.

haec dicuntur inconstantissime. cum enim summum bonum in voluptate ponat, negat infinito tempore aetatis voluptatem fieri maiorem quam finito atque modico. qui bonum omne in virtute ponit, is potest dicere perfici beatam vitam perfectione virtutis; negat enim summo bono afferre incrementum diem. qui autem voluptate vitam effici beatam putabit, qui sibi is conveniet, si negabit voluptatem crescere longinquitate? igitur ne dolorem quidem. an dolor longissimus quisque miserrimus, voluptatem non optabiliorem diuturnitas facit? quid est igitur, cur ita semper deum appellet Epicurus beatum et aeternum? dempta enim aeternitate nihilo beatior Iuppiter quam Epicurus; uterque enim summo bono fruitur, id est voluptate. At enim hic etiam dolore. At eum nihili facit; ait enim se, si uratur, Quam hoc suave! dicturum.

What is the difference, except that I call known things by known words, while they look for new names by which to say the same thing? So, just as in the Senate there is always someone to call for an interpreter, in the same way these men must be heard by us with an interpreter at hand. I call good whatever is in keeping with nature, and bad whatever is against it — and not I alone, but you too, Chrysippus, in the Forum, at home; only in the school you leave off. What, then? Do you think men ought to speak one way, philosophers another? What value each thing has, the learned and the unlearned put differently; but once it has been settled among the learned what value each thing has — if they were men, they would speak in the customary way — let them, while the things stay the same, coin words at their own discretion.

qua igitur re ab deo vincitur, si aeternitate non vincitur? in qua quid est boni praeter summam voluptatem, et eam sempiternam? quid ergo attinet gloriose loqui, nisi constanter loquare? In voluptate corporis—addam, si vis, ’animi’, dum ea ipsa, ut vultis, sit e corpore—situm est vivere beate. Quid? istam voluptatem perpetuam quis potest praestare sapienti? nam quibus rebus efficiuntur voluptates, eae non sunt in potestate sapientis. non enim in ipsa sapientia positum est beatum esse, sed in iis rebus, quas sapientia comparat ad voluptatem. totum autem id externum est, et quod externum, id in casu est. ita fit beatae vitae domina fortuna, quam Epicurus ait exiguam intervenire sapienti.

But I come to the charge of inconsistency, lest you say too often that I am straying — the inconsistency you place in words, while I supposed it placed in the thing. If only this much be firmly grasped — and here we have the Stoics as our best helpers — that the force of virtue is so great that, if all else be set on the other side of the scale, it does not so much as appear, then take all the things they certainly call advantages, and to be taken up, and to be chosen, and preferred — which they so define that they are to be valued at a fairly high price — these things, then, which I call by goods’ name where the Stoics call them by so many names, partly new and made up, like those “promoted” and “demoted” of theirs, partly names that mean the same (for what is the difference between “seek after” and “choose”? to me, indeed, what is chosen, and toward which selection is exercised, seems even the finer term) — but, when I have called all those things goods, it matters only how great I say they are, when I have called them things to be sought after, how strongly. But if I no more declare them to be sought after than you to be chosen, and I who call them goods set no higher value on them than you who call them “promoted,” then all those things must of necessity be darkened and disappear and run into the rays of virtue as into the rays of the sun.

Age, inquies, ista parva sunt. Sapientem locupletat ipsa natura, cuius divitias Epicurus parabiles esse docuit. Haec bene dicuntur, nec ego repugno, sed inter sese ipsa pugnant. negat enim tenuissimo victu, id est contemptissimis escis et potionibus, minorem voluptatem percipi quam rebus exquisitissimis ad epulandum. huic ego, si negaret quicquam interesse ad beate vivendum quali uteretur victu, concederem, laudarem etiam; verum enim diceret, idque Socratem, qui voluptatem nullo loco numerat, audio dicentem, cibi condimentum esse famem, potionis sitim. sed qui ad voluptatem omnia referens vivit ut Gallonius, loquitur ut Frugi ille Piso, non audio nec eum, quod sentiat, dicere existimo.

‘But,’ comes the objection, ‘a life in which there is something of evil cannot be happy.’ Then neither is a cornfield happy, for all its rich and thronging ears, if you spy a wild oat anywhere; nor is a trade profitable, if amid the greatest gains it has taken on some little loss. Or is this true everywhere, but otherwise in life? And will you not judge the whole by its greatest part? Or is it in doubt that virtue holds so great a part in human affairs that it buries all the rest? I shall dare, then, to call the other things that are in keeping with nature goods, and not to cheat them of their old name nor go searching out some newer one instead; but the magnitude of virtue I shall set, as it were, in the other pan of the scale.

naturales divitias dixit parabiles esse, quod parvo esset natura contenta. Certe, nisi voluptatem tanti aestimaretis. Non minor, inquit, voluptas percipitur ex vilissimis rebus quam ex pretiosissimis. Hoc est non modo cor non habere, sed ne palatum quidem. qui enim voluptatem ipsam contemnunt, iis licet dicere se acupenserem maenae non anteponere. cui vero in voluptate summum bonum est, huic omnia sensu, non ratione sunt iudicanda, eaque dicenda optima, quae sint suavissima.

That pan, believe me, will press down both earth and sea. For a whole thing is always named from that which holds the largest parts and is spread most widely. We say someone lives in good cheer; if, then, he has once been made rather gloomy, is his cheerful life lost? Yet this did not happen even to that M. Crassus, who, Lucilius says, laughed but once in his life, so as to be on that account any the less called never-laughing agelastos, as the same poet has it. They used to call Polycrates of Samos fortunate. Nothing had befallen him that he did not wish, except that he had cast into the sea a ring he delighted in. Was he, then, unfortunate from that one vexation, and fortunate again when that very ring was found in the belly of a fish? But if he was a fool — which surely he was, since he was a tyrant — he was never happy; and if he was wise, he was not wretched even then, when he was driven onto the cross by Oroetes, the satrap of Darius. ‘But he was afflicted with many evils.’ Who denies it? But those evils were buried under the greatness of his virtue.

Verum esto; consequatur summas voluptates non modo parvo, sed per me nihilo, si potest; sit voluptas non minor in nasturcio illo, quo vesci Persas esse solitos scribit Xenophon, quam in Syracusanis mensis, quae a Platone graviter vituperantur; sit, inquam, tam facilis, quam vultis, comparatio voluptatis, quid de dolore dicemus? cuius tanta tormenta sunt, ut in iis beata vita, si modo dolor summum malum est, esse non possit. ipse enim Metrodorus, paene alter Epicurus, beatum esse describit his fere verbis: cum corpus bene constitutum sit et sit exploratum ita futurum. an id exploratum cuiquam potest esse, quo modo se hoc habiturum sit corpus, non dico ad annum, sed ad vesperum? dolor ergo, id est summum malum, metuetur semper, etiamsi non aderit; iam enim adesse poterit. qui potest igitur habitare in beata vita summi mali metus?

Or will you not grant even this to the Peripatetics, that they may say the life of all good men — that is, of the wise, men adorned with every virtue — has in all its parts always more of good than of evil? Who says this? The Stoics, of course. By no means; but those very men who measure all things by pleasure and pain — do they not cry out that the wise man always has more present that he would wish than that he would not? Since, then, men who confess that they would not so much as lift a hand for virtue’s sake, unless it produced pleasure, set so much in virtue, what ought we to do, who say that even the very smallest excellence of mind outstrips all the goods of the body, so that these are not so much as left in sight? For who is there who would dare to say that this could befall the wise man — that, if it were possible, he would cast virtue away forever to be freed from all pain? Which of us would say — we who are not ashamed to call evils the things the Stoics call “hardships” — that it is better to do something shamefully with pleasure than honourably with pain?

Traditur, inquit, ab Epicuro ratio neglegendi doloris. Iam id ipsum absurdum, maximum malum neglegi. sed quae tandem ista ratio est? Maximus dolor, inquit, brevis est. Primum quid tu dicis breve? deinde dolorem quem maximum? quid enim? summus dolor plures dies manere non potest? vide, ne etiam menses! nisi forte eum dicis, qui, simul atque arripuit, interficit. quis istum dolorem timet? illum mallem levares, quo optimum atque humanissimum virum, Cn. Octavium, Marci filium, familiarem meum, confici vidi, nec vero semel nec ad breve tempus, sed et saepe et plane diu. quos ille, di inmortales, cum omnes artus ardere viderentur, cruciatus perferebat! nec tamen miser esse, quia summum id malum non erat, tantum modo laboriosus videbatur; at miser, si in flagitiosa et vitiosa vita afflueret voluptatibus.

To us that Dionysius of Heraclea seems to have deserted the Stoics disgracefully on account of a pain in his eyes — as if he had learned from Zeno not to feel pain when he was in pain! What he had heard, but had not really learned, was that that pain is not an evil, because it is not shameful, and that it is to be borne by a man. Had he been a Peripatetic, he would have stayed, I believe, in his conviction — the Peripatetics, who, while they say that pain is an evil, give as their precepts about bearing its harshness bravely the very same as the Stoics give. And indeed your own Arcesilas, though he was rather stubborn in disputation, was nonetheless one of ours; for he was Polemo’s pupil. When he was burning with the pains of gout, and Charmides the Epicurean, a close friend, had visited him and was leaving downcast, ‘Stay, I beg you, our Charmides,’ he said; ‘nothing has come from there to here’ — and he pointed to his feet and his breast. And yet he would have preferred not to feel pain.

Quod autem magnum dolorem brevem, longinquum levem esse dicitis, id non intellego quale sit. video enim et magnos et eosdem bene longinquos dolores, quorum alia toleratio est verior, qua uti vos non potestis, qui honestatem ipsam per se non amatis. fortitudinis quaedam praecepta sunt ac paene leges, quae effeminari virum vetant in dolore. quam ob rem turpe putandum est, non dico dolere—nam id quidem est interdum necesse—, sed saxum illud Lemnium clamore Philocteteo funestare, Quod éiulatu, quéstu, gemitu, frémitibus Resonándo mutum flébiles vocés refert. Huic Epicurus praecentet, si potest, cui E víperino mórsu venae víscerum Venéno inbutae taétros cruciatús cient! Sic Epicurus: Philocteta, st! brevis dolor. At iam decimum annum in spelunca iacet. Si longus, levis; dat enim intervalla et relaxat.

This, then, is our system, which seems to you inconsistent: that, on account of a certain heavenly and divine and so surpassing excellence of virtue — such that, where virtue is and great deeds done by virtue, deeds supremely worthy of praise, there misery and tribulation cannot be, though toil can be there, vexation can be — I should not hesitate to say that all wise men are always happy, yet that it can come about that one is happier than another. ‘And yet that very point, Piso, you must establish again and again,’ I said; ‘and if you hold it firm, you will be free to carry off not only my Cicero here but me myself.’

Primum non saepe, deinde quae est ista relaxatio, cum et praeteriti doloris memoria recens est et futuri atque inpendentis torquet timor? ’Moriatur’, inquit. Fortasse id optimum, sed ubi illud: ’Plus semper voluptatis’? si enim ita est, vide ne facinus facias, cum mori suadeas. potius ergo illa dicantur: turpe esse, viri non esse debilitari dolore, frangi, succumbere. nam ista vestra: Si gravis, brevis; si longus, levis dictata sunt. virtutis, magnitudinis animi, patientiae, fortitudinis fomentis dolor mitigari solet.

Then Quintus said: ‘To me, indeed, this seems established well enough, and I rejoice that this philosophy — whose furnishings I once valued more highly than the estates of all the rest, so rich did it seem to me that I could ask of it whatever I might covet in our studies — this philosophy, I say, I rejoice has been found keener too than the others, a thing some used to say it lacked.’ ‘Keener, at any rate, than ours,’ said Pomponius, with a jest; ‘but, by Hercules, your discourse was most welcome to me. For things I did not think could be said in Latin have been said by you in fitting words, and no less plainly than they are said by the Greeks. But it is time, if you please — and straight to my house, in fact.’ When he had said this, and it seemed enough had been argued, we all went on into the town, to Pomponius’s.

Audi, ne longe abeam, moriens quid dicat Epicurus, ut intellegas facta eius cum dictis discrepare: ’Epicurus Hermarcho salutem. Cum ageremus’, inquit, vitae beatum et eundem supremum diem, scribebamus haec. tanti autem aderant vesicae et torminum morbi, ut nihil ad eorum magnitudinem posset accedere. Miserum hominem! Si dolor summum malum est, dici aliter non potest. sed audiamus ipsum: ’Compensabatur’, inquit, tamen cum his omnibus animi laetitia, quam capiebam memoria rationum inventorumque nostrorum. sed tu, ut dignum est tua erga me et philosophiam voluntate ab adolescentulo suscepta, fac ut Metrodori tueare liberos.

I will not now set the death of Epaminondas or of Leonidas above his. The former, having defeated the Lacedaemonians at Mantinea, saw that a grievous wound was killing him; as soon as he could see clearly, he asked whether his shield was safe. When his weeping men told him it was, he asked whether the enemy had been routed. When he had heard that too as he desired, he ordered the spear by which he was transfixed to be drawn out. So he died in joy and victory, with much blood flowing. Leonidas, the Lacedaemonian king, faced with the choice of shameful flight or glorious death, posted himself and the three hundred he had led out from Sparta against the enemy at Thermopylae. Those are deaths worthy of commanders; philosophers as a rule die in their own beds. Yet it matters how they die. He counts himself blessed as he dies. High praise indeed. Against my most intense pains, he says, was set the joy of my soul.

non ego iam Epaminondae, non Leonidae mortem huius morti antepono, quorum alter cum vicisset Lacedaemonios apud Mantineam atque ipse gravi vulnere exanimari se videret, ut primum dispexit, quaesivit salvusne esset clipeus. cum salvum esse flentes sui respondissent, rogavit essentne fusi hostes. cum id quoque, ut cupiebat, audivisset, evelli iussit eam, qua erat transfixus, hastam. ita multo sanguine profuso in laetitia et in victoria est mortuus. Leonidas autem, rex Lacedaemoniorum, se in Thermopylis trecentosque eos, quos eduxerat Sparta, cum esset proposita aut fuga turpis aut gloriosa mors, opposuit hostibus. praeclarae mortes sunt imperatoriae; philosophi autem in suis lectulis plerumque moriuntur. refert tamen, quo modo. beatus sibi videtur esse moriens. magna laus. ’Compensabatur’, inquit, cum summis doloribus laetitia.

I hear the voice of a philosopher, Epicurus; but you have forgotten what you are bound to say. For in the first place, if the things whose recollection you claim gives you joy are true — that is, if your writings and doctrines are sound — then you cannot feel joy at all. You have nothing left to refer to the body; and you have always maintained that no one feels joy or pain except on account of the body. I take joy, he says, in what is past. In what past things? If they are things that had to do with the body, then I observe that you are setting your doctrines against these pains as a counterweight — not the memory of bodily pleasures. But if they are things that had to do with the mind, your claim that no joy of the mind exists which is not referred to the body is false. And why, further, do you commend to Hermarchus the children of Metrodorus? What is there, in that noble act of devotion, in that great faithfulness of yours — for I judge it to be great — that you refer to the body?

Audio equidem philosophi vocem, Epicure, sed quid tibi dicendum sit oblitus es. primum enim, si vera sunt ea, quorum recordatione te gaudere dicis, hoc est, si vera sunt tua scripta et inventa, gaudere non potes. nihil enim iam habes, quod ad corpus referas; est autem a te semper dictum nec gaudere quemquam nisi propter corpus nec dolere. ’Praeteritis’, inquit, gaudeo. Quibusnam praeteritis? si ad corpus pertinentibus, rationes tuas te video compensare cum istis doloribus, non memoriam corpore perceptarum voluptatum; sin autem ad animum, falsum est, quod negas animi ullum esse gaudium, quod non referatur ad corpus. cur deinde Metrodori liberos commendas? quid in isto egregio tuo officio et tanta fide—sic enim existimo—ad corpus refers?

Turn this way and that, Torquatus — you will find nothing in that celebrated letter consistent or coherent with Epicurus’s own doctrines. Thus he is refuted by himself, and his writings are convicted by his own integrity and conduct. For that commendation of children, the remembrance and warmth of friendship, the keeping of the highest obligations in the final breath — all of this shows that probity is inborn in human beings as a thing given freely, not solicited by pleasures nor summoned by the wages of reward. What greater testimony do we need that the things that are honorable and right are desirable for their own sake, when we behold such solemn duties performed by a dying man?

Huc et illuc, Torquate, vos versetis licet, nihil in hac praeclara epistula scriptum ab Epicuro congruens et conveniens decretis eius reperietis. ita redarguitur ipse a sese, convincunturque scripta eius probitate ipsius ac moribus. nam ista commendatio puerorum, memoria et caritas amicitiae, summorum officiorum in extremo spiritu conservatio indicat innatam esse homini probitatem gratuitam, non invitatam voluptatibus nec praemiorum mercedibus evocatam. quod enim testimonium maius quaerimus, quae honesta et recta sint, ipsa esse optabilia per sese, cum videamus tanta officia morientis?

But while I judge that letter worthy of praise — and I have just rendered it almost word for word — it is in no way consistent with the whole of his philosophy; and I judge his will to be at odds not only with the dignity proper to a philosopher, but with his own stated convictions. For he wrote, often and at length, and also briefly and precisely in the book I have just mentioned, that death is nothing to us. His argument was that whatever has been dissolved is without sensation, and whatever is without sensation is nothing to us at all. The thesis could have been set out more elegantly and more neatly. As it stands — whatever has been dissolved is without sensation — the statement does not say clearly enough what is meant by dissolution. Yet I understand what he intends.

Sed ut epistulam laudandam arbitror eam, quam modo totidem fere verbis interpretatus sum, quamquam ea cum summa eius philosophia nullo modo congruebat, sic eiusdem testamentum non solum a philosophi gravitate, sed etiam ab ipsius sententia iudico discrepare. scripsit enim et multis saepe verbis et breviter arteque in eo libro, quem modo nominavi, mortem nihil ad nos pertinere. quod enim dissolutum sit, id esse sine sensu, quod autem sine sensu sit, id nihil ad nos pertinere omnino. hoc ipsum elegantius poni meliusque potuit. nam quod ita positum est, quod dissolutum sit, id esse sine sensu, id eius modi est, ut non satis plane dicat quid sit dissolutum. sed tamen intellego quid velit.

I ask, then, why it is that when, at dissolution — that is, at death — all sensation is extinguished, and when absolutely nothing remains that pertains to us, he takes such careful and precise precautions in his will: directing that Amynomachus and Timocrates, his heirs, shall provide, with the approval of Hermarchus, sufficient funds to celebrate his birthday every year in the month of Gamelion, and that every month on the twentieth day of the moon they shall likewise provide for a feast of those who have philosophized alongside him, so that his own memory and the memory of Metrodorus may be honored.

quaero autem quid sit, quod, cum dissolutione, id est morte, sensus omnis extinguatur, et cum reliqui nihil sit omnino, quod pertineat ad nos, tam accurate tamque diligenter caveat et sanciat ut Amynomachus et Timocrates, heredes sui, de Hermarchi sententia dent quod satis sit ad diem agendum natalem suum quotannis mense Gamelione itemque omnibus mensibus vicesimo die lunae dent ad eorum epulas, qui una secum philosophati sint, ut et sui et Metrodori memoria colatur.

I cannot say that these provisions are unbecoming a man of charm and warmth; but they are in no way becoming a philosopher — least of all a natural philosopher, which he claims to be — who supposes that any person has a birthday. Why? Can the same day recur that has come once? Surely it cannot. Can one of the same kind recur? Not even that, unless many thousands of years elapse so that all the heavenly bodies return at the same moment to their original positions. There is therefore no such thing as anyone’s birthday. So it is observed! Yes, and I certainly did not know that! But even if it exists — will it be observed after death? And will the man who proclaimed to us as if by oracle that nothing after death pertains to us be making provision for it in his will? These were not the thoughts of a man who had traversed in his mind unnumbered worlds and boundless regions with no shore and no boundary. Would Democritus have done anything of the sort? To pass over others, I cite him: the one man Epicurus himself followed.

haec ego non possum dicere non esse hominis quamvis et belli et humani, sapientis vero nullo modo, physici praesertim, quem se ille esse vult, putare ullum esse cuiusquam diem natalem. quid? idemne potest esse dies saepius, qui semel fuit? certe non potest. an eiusdem modi? ne id quidem, nisi multa annorum intercesserint milia, ut omnium siderum eodem, unde profecta sint, fiat ad unum tempus reversio. nullus est igitur cuiusquam dies natalis. At habetur! Et ego id scilicet nesciebam! Sed ut sit, etiamne post mortem coletur? idque testamento cavebit is, qui nobis quasi oraculum ediderit nihil post mortem ad nos pertinere? haec non erant eius, qui innumerabilis mundos infinitasque regiones, quarum nulla esset ora, nulla extremitas, mente peragravisset. num quid tale Democritus? ut alios omittam, hunc appello, quem ille unum secutus est.

And if a day was to be marked, should it not rather be the day on which he was born, but the day on which he became wise? You will say he could not have become wise had he not first been born. By that reasoning, not even had his grandmother not been born. The whole business, Torquatus, is unworthy of educated men — this wish to have the memory of one’s name celebrated at feasts after death. I will not say how you conduct those days or what ridicule you incur from people of wit and taste — there is no need for a quarrel — I will say only this: it would have been more in keeping with your character to observe Epicurus’s birthday of your own accord than to have him direct in his will that it be observed.

quodsi dies notandus fuit, eumne potius, quo natus, an eum, quo sapiens factus est? Non potuit, inquies, fieri sapiens, nisi natus esset. et Isto modo, ne si avia quidem eius nata non esset. res tota, Torquate, non doctorum hominum, velle post mortem epulis celebrari memoriam sui nominis. quos quidem dies quem ad modum agatis et in quantam hominum facetorum urbanitatem incurratis, non dico— nihil opus est litibus—; tantum dico, magis fuisse vestrum agere Epicuri diem natalem, quam illius testamento cavere ut ageretur.

But to return to our subject — we had been speaking about pain when we were drawn off to that letter — the whole argument may now be closed as follows: the man who is in the grip of the highest evil is not happy at the time he is in its grip; the wise man, however, is always happy and is at some times in pain; pain, therefore, is not the highest evil. Now what is to be made of the claim that the wise man’s past goods do not slip away from him and that he ought not to dwell on past misfortunes? First, is memory of what we choose to remember within our power? When someone promised Themistocles the art of memory, or whatever man it was, Themistocles replied: I would rather have the art of forgetting. For, he said, I remember even what I wish to forget, and cannot forget what I wish to forget.

Sed ut ad propositum —de dolore enim cum diceremus, ad istam epistulam delati sumus—, nunc totum illud concludi sic licet: qui in summo malo est, is tum, cum in eo est, non est beatus; sapiens autem semper beatus est et est aliquando in dolore; non est igitur summum malum dolor. Iam illud quale tandem est, bona praeterita non effluere sapienti, mala meminisse non oportere? primum in nostrane potestate est, quid meminerimus? Themistocles quidem, cum ei Simonides an quis alius artem memoriae polliceretur, ’Oblivionis’, inquit, mallem. Nam memini etiam quae nolo, oblivisci non possum quae volo.

A man of great genius — yet the truth of the matter is that it is the act of a philosopher too imperious to forbid remembering. Take care lest these commands of yours be like the Manlian orders, or more severe still, if you command what I have no power to perform. And what if the memory of past misfortunes is itself pleasant? So that certain proverbs prove truer than your doctrines. For the common saying runs: labors once past are sweet to recall, and Euripides put it well — I shall render it in Latin if I can; you all know the Greek verse: Sweet is the memory of labors past. hēdeia mnēmē ponōn parelthontōn But let us return to past goods. If such goods were of the kind that Gaius Marius could call upon — so that, driven into exile, destitute, sunk in a marsh, he might lighten his suffering by the recollection of his trophies — I would listen and approve unreservedly. For the blessed life of the wise man can neither be completed nor brought to its conclusion if each good decision and each good action is buried under the oblivion of the man who performed them.

Magno hic ingenio, sed res se tamen sic habet, ut nimis imperiosi philosophi sit vetare meminisse. vide ne ista sint Manliana vestra aut maiora etiam, si imperes quod facere non possim. quid, si etiam iucunda memoria est praeteritorum malorum? ut proverbia non nulla veriora sint quam vestra dogmata. vulgo enim dicitur: ’Iucundi acti labores’, nec male Euripides— concludam, si potero, Latine; Graecum enim hunc versum nostis omnes—: Suavi/s laborum est praeteritorum me/moria. Sed ad bona praeterita redeamus. quae si a vobis talia dicerentur, qualibus Caius Marius uti poterat, ut expulsus, egens, in palude demersus tropaeorum recordatione levaret dolorem suum, audirem et plane probarem. nec enim absolvi beata vita sapientis neque ad exitum perduci poterit, si prima quaeque bene ab eo consulta atque facta ipsius oblivione obruentur.

But it is the recollection of pleasures already enjoyed, you say, that makes a life happy — and specifically pleasures enjoyed through the body. For if there are any others, then it is simply false that all pleasures of the mind derive from their partnership with the body. Now if the pleasure of the body delights us even in retrospect, I cannot understand why Aristotle ridicules so sharply the epitaph of Sardanapallus — that king of Syria who boasted in it that he had carried away with him into death every gratification of his lusts. For what, Aristotle asks, could he have gone on feeling even while alive for any longer than the moment of his enjoyment — and how then could it have persisted after he was dead? Bodily pleasure, then, flows away; every instance of it takes flight almost as it arrives, and more often it leaves behind a cause for regret than for fond recollection. Hence Africanus is far happier, addressing his country in those famous words: Cease, Rome, your enemies to fear — and the rest, spoken so magnificently: For my labours have won you monuments of glory. He rejoices in past labours; you command men to rejoice in past pleasures. He calls himself back to deeds from which he never drew any return to his body; you are absorbed entirely in the body. And further: how is the claim you advance even coherent — that all pleasures and all pains of the mind relate to the pleasures and pains of the body?

sed vobis voluptatum perceptarum recordatio vitam beatam facit, et quidem corpore perceptarum. nam si quae sunt aliae, falsum est omnis animi voluptates esse e corporis societate. corporis autem voluptas si etiam praeterita delectat, non intellego, cur Aristoteles Sardanapalli epigramma tantopere derideat, in quo ille rex Syriae glorietur se omnis secum libidinum voluptates abstulisse. Quod enim ne vivus quidem, inquit, diutius sentire poterat, quam dum fruebatur, quo modo id potuit mortuo permanere? effluit igitur voluptas corporis et prima quaeque avolat saepiusque relinquit causam paenitendi quam recordandi. itaque beatior Africanus cum patria illo modo loquens: Desine, Roma, tuos hostes reliquaque praeclare: Nam tibi moenimenta mei peperere labores. Laboribus hic praeteritis gaudet, tu iubes voluptatibus, et hic se ad ea revocat, e quibus nihil umquam rettulerit ad corpus, tu totus haeres in corpore. Illud autem ipsum qui optineri potest, quod dicitis, omnis animi et voluptates et dolores ad corporis voluptates ac dolores pertinere?

Is there nothing, then, that ever gives you pleasure in itself alone? I see who I am speaking to — you, Torquatus: does nothing give you pleasure purely on its own account? I pass over dignity, moral worth, the very beauty of the virtues, which have been discussed already. Let me put forward things of less weight: a poem, a speech in prose, whether in writing or in reading; the history of all great deeds, of all the regions of the earth, which you are forever pursuing; a work of sculpture, a painting, a pleasant landscape; the games; the hunt; the villa of Lucullus — for if I named yours, you would have a way out and would say it relates to the body — but do you refer the things I have listed back to the body? Is there nothing that gives you pleasure for its own sake? Either you will be most obstinate if you persist in referring what I named to the body, or you will have abandoned the whole of Epicurus’s account of pleasure if you deny it. And as for your argument that the pleasures and pains of the mind are greater than those of the body, because the mind participates in all three tenses of time while the body feels only the present — how can it be demonstrated that someone who is glad on my account rejoices more than I do myself?

nihilne te delectat umquam —video, quicum loquar—, te igitur, Torquate, ipsum per se nihil delectat? omitto dignitatem, honestatem, speciem ipsam virtutum, de quibus ante dictum est, haec leviora ponam: poe+ma, orationem cum aut scribis aut legis, cum omnium factorum, cum regionum conquiris historiam, signum, tabula, locus amoenus, ludi, venatio, villa Luculli —nam si tuam dicerem, latebram haberes; ad corpus diceres pertinere—, sed ea, quae dixi, ad corpusne refers? an est aliquid, quod te sua sponte delectet? aut pertinacissimus fueris, si in eo perstiteris ad corpus ea, quae dixi, referri, aut deserueris totam Epicuri voluptatem, si negaveris. Quod vero a te disputatum est maiores esse voluptates et dolores animi quam corporis, quia trium temporum particeps animus sit, corpore autem praesentia solum sentiantur, qui id probari potest, ut is, qui propter me aliquid gaudeat, plus quam ego ipse gaudeat?

The pleasure of the mind arises because of the pleasure of the body, and the pleasure of the mind is greater than that of the body. It follows that the one who offers congratulations is more joyful than the one being congratulated. But while you are trying to show that the wise man is happy — since he receives the greatest pleasures of the mind, greater in every dimension than those of the body — you do not see what difficulty stands in your way. For he will also receive pains of the mind greater in every dimension than those of the body. And so the man whom you insist must always be happy will necessarily be wretched on occasion — and you will never achieve that result, not for so long as you refer everything to pleasure and pain.

animo voluptas oritur propter voluptatem corporis, et maior est animi voluptas quam corporis. ita fit, ut gratulator laetior sit quam is, cui gratulatur. Sed dum efficere vultis beatum sapientem, cum maximas animo voluptates percipiat omnibusque partibus maiores quam corpore, quid occurrat non videtis. animi enim quoque dolores percipiet omnibus partibus maiores quam corporis. ita miser sit aliquando necesse est is, quem vos beatum semper vultis esse, nec vero id, dum omnia ad voluptatem doloremque referetis, efficietis umquam.

Therefore, Torquatus, some other highest good for man must be found. Let us concede pleasure to the animals — the same animals whose testimony you habitually invoke on the question of the highest good. But what of the fact that even animals do many things, each guided by its own nature, partly with a kind of tenderness and partly with effort — in giving birth, in rearing their young — so that it is perfectly apparent that something quite different from pleasure is what they have in view? Others again take delight in running and in wide-ranging movement; others imitate in their flocking something resembling the fellowship of a civic community.

Quare aliud aliquod, Torquate, hominis summum bonum reperiendum est, voluptatem bestiis concedamus, quibus vos de summo bono testibus uti soletis. quid, si etiam bestiae multa faciunt duce sua quaeque natura partim indulgenter vel cum labore, ut in gignendo, in educando, perfacile ut appareat aliud quiddam iis propositum, non voluptatem? partim cursu et peragratione laetantur, congregatione aliae coetum quodam modo civitatis imitantur;

We observe in certain kinds of birds unmistakable signs of dutiful affection, of recognition, of memory; and in many creatures we observe longing and attachment. Can it be, then, that in animals there will be found certain counterparts of human virtues, distinct from pleasure, while in human beings themselves there will be no virtue except for the sake of pleasure? And shall we say that man, who surpasses all other living creatures by so wide a margin, has been given by nature no particular prerogative of his own?

videmus in quodam volucrium genere non nulla indicia pietatis, cognitionem, memoriam, in multis etiam desideria videmus. ergo in bestiis erunt secreta e voluptate humanarum quaedam simulacra virtutum, in ipsis hominibus virtus nisi voluptatis causa nulla erit? et homini, qui ceteris animantibus plurimum praestat, praecipue a natura nihil datum esse dicemus?

If indeed everything comes down to pleasure, we are far and away surpassed by the animals, for whom the earth herself spontaneously pours forth from her own substance varied and abundant pasture without any labour on their part, while for us such nourishment is scarcely or barely sufficient even when we seek it with great toil. Nor can I in any way accept that the highest good of a beast and of a man is the same. Why is there need for such elaborate equipment in the acquisition of the finest arts? Why for such a confluence of the most honourable studies, such an accompanying retinue of virtues — if all of these are being gathered for no other end than pleasure?

Nos vero, siquidem in voluptate sunt omnia, longe multumque superamur a bestiis, quibus ipsa terra fundit ex sese pastus varios atque abundantes nihil laborantibus, nobis autem aut vix aut ne vix quidem suppetunt multo labore quaerentibus. nec tamen ullo modo summum pecudis bonum et hominis idem mihi videri potest. quid enim tanto opus est instrumento in optimis artibus comparandis? quid tanto concursu honestissimorum studiorum, tanto virtutum comitatu, si ea nullam ad aliam rem nisi ad voluptatem conquiruntur?

Consider: if Xerxes, having bridged the Hellespont and tunnelled through Athos, having marched over the sea and sailed across the land with such fleets and such cavalry and infantry forces, had come into Greece with such an impetuous advance — and if someone were to ask him the cause of so great an armament and so great a war, and he were to answer that he had wanted to carry off honey from Mount Hymettus — he would clearly seem to have undertaken such vast efforts without sufficient cause. In the same way, if we say that the wise man, equipped and adorned with the most numerous and most weighty arts and virtues — a man who encompasses not, like Xerxes, the seas on foot and the mountains by fleet, but the whole sky and the entire earth together with the sea in his understanding — is pursuing pleasure, we shall be saying that he has undertaken his great enterprise for the sake of honey.

ut, si Xerxes, cum tantis classibus tantisque equestribus et pedestribus copiis Hellesponto iuncto Athone perfosso mari ambulavisset terra navigavisset, si, cum tanto impetu in Graeciam venisset, causam quis ex eo quaereret tantarum copiarum tantique belli, mel se auferre ex Hymetto voluisse diceret, certe sine causa videretur tanta conatus, sic nos sapientem plurimis et gravissimis artibus atque virtutibus instructum et ornatum non, ut illum, maria pedibus peragrantem, classibus montes, sed omne caelum totamque cum universo mari terram mente complexum voluptatem petere si dicemus, mellis causa dicemus tanta molitum.

We are born for something loftier and more magnificent than that, believe me, Torquatus — and this is plain not only from the capacities of the mind: in your mind there dwells memory for things without number (in yours, indeed, without limit), there dwells the power of conjecture about what follows, differing little from divination, there dwells a sense of shame as the governor of desire, there dwells a faithful guardianship of justice for human society, there dwells a firm and steadfast contempt for pain and death in the endurance of hardships and the confronting of dangers — these things dwell in the mind; but consider also the limbs themselves and the senses, which will seem to you, like the rest of the parts of the body, not merely companions of the virtues but their very ministers and servants.

ad altiora quaedam et magnificentiora, mihi crede, Torquate, nati sumus, nec id ex animi solum partibus, in quibus inest memoria rerum innumerabilium, in te quidem infinita, inest coniectura consequentium non multum a divinatione differens, inest moderator cupiditatis pudor, inest ad humanam societatem iustitiae fida custodia, inest in perpetiendis laboribus adeundisque periculis firma et stabilis doloris mortisque contemptio—ergo haec in animis, tu autem etiam membra ipsa sensusque considera, qui tibi, ut reliquae corporis partes, non comites solum virtutum, sed ministri etiam videbuntur.

Consider further: if in the body itself many things are to be ranked above pleasure — strength, health, swiftness, beauty — what, pray, do you suppose is the case with the mind? Those ancient masters of the highest learning believed that something celestial and divine resides within it. Now if the highest good were pleasure, as you claim, it would be desirable to spend one’s days and nights absorbed in the greatest possible pleasure, without interruption, with all the senses suffused and stirred by every sweetness. Yet who is there, worthy of the name of man, who would wish to spend even a single day wholly in that kind of pleasure? The Cyrenaics make no scruple of wishing it; your own school expresses this more modestly — the Cyrenaics, perhaps, with greater consistency.

Quid? si in ipso corpore multa voluptati praeponenda sunt, ut vires, valitudo, velocitas, pulchritudo, quid tandem in animis censes? in quibus doctissimi illi veteres inesse quiddam caeleste et divinum putaverunt. Quodsi esset in voluptate summum bonum, ut dicitis, optabile esset maxima in voluptate nullo intervallo interiecto dies noctesque versari, cum omnes sensus dulcedine omni quasi perfusi moverentur. quis est autem dignus nomine hominis, qui unum diem totum velit esse in genere isto voluptatis? Cyrenaici quidem non recusant; vestri haec verecundius, illi fortasse constantius.

But let us pass in review not those supreme arts, the absence of which caused men to be called idle and inert by our ancestors, but let me ask you this: do you suppose that Homer, Archilochus, Pindar — to say nothing of them — or Phidias, Polyclitus, Zeuxis directed their arts toward pleasure? Shall a craftsman set more before himself in the way of beauty of form than an outstanding citizen in the beauty of his actions? And what other cause is there for an error so great, spread so far and wide, if not that the man who pronounces pleasure the highest good deliberates not with that part of the mind in which reason and judgment reside, but with appetite — that is, with the most frivolous part of the mind? I ask you plainly: if the gods exist, as you yourselves believe, and if they can be happy without receiving bodily pleasures, or if without that kind of pleasure they are happy — then why do you refuse to allow that the wise man can enjoy the same use of his mind?

sed lustremus animo non has maximas artis, quibus qui carebant inertes a maioribus nominabantur, sed quaero num existimes, non dico Homerum, Archilochum, Pindarum, sed Phidian, Polyclitum, Zeuxim ad voluptatem artes suas direxisse. ergo opifex plus sibi proponet ad formarum quam civis excellens ad factorum pulchritudinem? quae autem est alia causa erroris tanti tam longe lateque diffusi, nisi quod is, qui voluptatem summum bonum esse decernit, non cum ea parte animi, in qua inest ratio atque consilium, sed cum cupiditate, id est cum animi levissima parte, deliberat? Quaero enim de te, si sunt di, ut vos etiam putatis, qui possint esse beati, cum voluptates corpore percipere non possint, aut, si sine eo genere voluptatis beati sint, cur similem animi usum in sapiente esse nolitis.

Read the funeral eulogies, Torquatus — not those of men praised by Homer, not that of Cyrus, not those of Agesilaus, Aristides, or Themistocles, not those of Philip or Alexander; read those of our own people, read those of your own family. You will find no one praised in such terms as to be called a skilled contriver of pleasures. That is not what the inscriptions on monuments declare — as, for instance, this one, near the city gate: This one man the most numerous peoples agree to have been the foremost man of his people.

Lege laudationes, Torquate, non eorum, qui sunt ab Homero laudati, non Cyri, non Agesilai, non Aristidi aut Themistocli, non Philippi aut Alexandri, lege nostrorum hominum, lege vestrae familiae; neminem videbis ita laudatum, ut artifex callidus comparandarum voluptatum diceretur. non elogia monimentorum id significant, velut hoc ad portam: Hunc unum plurimae consentiunt gentes populi primarium fuisse virum.

Do we suppose that the most numerous peoples agreed that Calatinus was the foremost man among the people because he had been supremely excellent at assembling pleasures? And shall we say that young men show good promise and great natural ability when we expect them to serve their own convenience and do whatever suits their own interest? Do we not see what vast disorder of all things follows, what a sweeping confusion? Beneficence is destroyed; gratitude is destroyed — and these are the bonds of harmony. For when you oblige someone for your own benefit, that cannot be counted a benefit but a loan put out at interest; and gratitude does not seem to be owed to one who has done a favor purely for his own sake. The greatest virtues without exception are of necessity laid low when pleasure holds the mastery. There are also many base actions which, unless honorable conduct carried the greatest weight by its own nature, it would not be easy to defend as things a wise man could not fall into.

Idne consensisse de Calatino plurimas gentis arbitramur, primarium populi fuisse, quod praestantissimus fuisset in conficiendis voluptatibus? ergo in iis adolescentibus bonam spem esse dicemus et magnam indolem, quos suis commodis inservituros et quicquid ipsis expediat facturos arbitrabimur? nonne videmus quanta perturbatio rerum omnium consequatur, quanta confusio? tollitur beneficium, tollitur gratia, quae sunt vincla concordiae. nec enim, cum tua causa cui commodes, beneficium illud habendum est, sed faeneratio, nec gratia deberi videtur ei, qui sua causa commodaverit. maximas vero virtutes iacere omnis necesse est voluptate dominante. sunt etiam turpitudines plurimae, quae, nisi honestas natura plurimum valeat, cur non cadant in sapientem non est facile defendere.

And so as not to range more widely — for the instances are without number — virtue, once it is properly praised, must of necessity bar all approaches to pleasure. Do not wait any longer for me to demonstrate this. Look into your own mind yourself; turning it over in every direction of thought, ask yourself whether you would rather spend your whole life in uninterrupted pleasures, in that tranquility you were so fond of invoking, free from pain — and with the addition, which you on your side are in the habit of appending, though it is in fact impossible, of freedom from any fear of pain — or whether you would prefer, while serving all peoples with the greatest possible benefit, while carrying relief and salvation to those in need, to endure even the labors of Hercules. For that is precisely how our ancestors described burdensome toil as something not to be fled: they even applied the word aerumnae — a word of the bleakest cast — to what a god endured.

Ac ne plura complectar—sunt enim innumerabilia—, bene laudata virtus voluptatis aditus intercludat necesse est. quod iam a me expectare noli. tute introspice in mentem tuam ipse eamque omni cogitatione pertractans percontare ipse te perpetuisne malis voluptatibus perfruens in ea, quam saepe usurpabas, tranquillitate degere omnem aetatem sine dolore, adsumpto etiam illo, quod vos quidem adiungere soletis, sed fieri non potest, sine doloris metu, an, cum de omnibus gentibus optime mererere, cum opem indigentibus salutemque ferres, vel Herculis perpeti aerumnas. sic enim maiores nostri labores non fugiendos tristissimo tamen verbo aerumnas etiam in deo nominaverunt.

I would draw this answer out of you and compel you to reply, were it not that I feared you would say that Hercules himself performed, for the salvation of mankind, his mighty labors — for the sake of pleasure. When I had said this, Torquatus replied: "I have people to whom I can refer all of that — and though I could answer something myself, I would rather find them better prepared." "You mean our mutual friends Siro and Philodemus," I said, "men as excellent in character as they are supremely learned." "You understand me exactly," he said. "Very well," I said; "but it would have been more fitting for Triarius to arbitrate our disagreement." "I recuse myself," said Triarius with a smile, "as an improper judge on this question at least; for you press us gently, while this man here harries us in the Stoic fashion." Then Triarius said: "From now on I shall engage more boldly; for I shall have close at hand the very arguments I have just heard, and I will not come to grips with you until I have seen you instructed by the men you mention." When this had been said, we brought both our walk and our discussion to an end.

elicerem ex te cogeremque, ut responderes, nisi vererer ne Herculem ipsum ea, quae pro salute gentium summo labore gessisset, voluptatis causa gessisse diceres. Quae cum dixissem, Habeo, inquit Torquatus, ad quos ista referam, et, quamquam aliquid ipse poteram, tamen invenire malo paratiores. Familiares nostros, credo, Sironem dicis et Philodemum, cum optimos viros, tum homines doctissimos. Recte, inquit, intellegis. Age sane, inquam. sed erat aequius Triarium aliquid de dissensione nostra iudicare. Eiuro, inquit adridens, iniquum, hac quidem de re; tu enim ista lenius, hic Stoicorum more nos vexat. Tum Triarius: Posthac quidem, inquit, audacius. nam haec ipsa mihi erunt in promptu, quae modo audivi, nec ante aggrediar, quam te ab istis, quos dicis, instructum videro. Quae cum essent dicta, finem fecimus et ambulandi et disputandi.

After I had heard Antiochus, Brutus, as was my habit, in the company of M. Piso, in the gymnasium that is called the Ptolemaeum, and with us my brother Quintus and T. Pomponius and Lucius Cicero — my cousin by blood, but a brother in affection — we agreed among ourselves to spend the afternoon walking in the Academy, chiefly because at that hour the place would be free of every crowd. And so at the appointed time we all went to Piso. From there, with talk of this and that, we covered those six stades from the Dipylon. When we had come into the spaces of the Academy, which are not without reason famous, we found the solitude we had wanted.

Voluptatem quidem, Brute, si ipsa pro se loquatur nec tam pertinaces habeat patronos, concessuram arbitror convictam superiore libro dignitati. etenim sit inpudens, si virtuti diutius repugnet, aut si honestis iucunda anteponat aut pluris esse contendat dulcedinem corporis ex eave natam laetitiam quam gravitatem animi atque constantiam. quare illam quidem dimittamus et suis se finibus tenere iubeamus, ne blanditiis eius inlecebrisque impediatur disputandi severitas.

Then Piso said: ’Should I call it something given us by nature, or some kind of illusion, that when we see the very places in which we have learned that men worthy of remembrance spent much of their time, we are moved more deeply than when we hear of the deeds of those same men, or read some piece of their writing? Just so I am moved now. For Plato comes into my mind, who we are told was the first to make a practice of holding discussions here; and those little gardens of his close by do not merely bring him to my memory but seem to set the man himself before my eyes. Here was Speusippus, here Xenocrates, here his pupil Polemo — whose very seat that was, the one we see. And for my own part, when I would look upon our own Senate-house — the Hostilian, I mean, not this new one, which seems to me smaller now that it has been made larger — I used to call to mind Scipio, Cato, Laelius, and above all my own grandfather; so great is the power of suggestion that lies in places; with good reason, then, has the art of memory been derived from them.’

quaerendum est enim, ubi sit illud summum bonum, quod reperire volumus, quoniam et voluptas ab eo remota est, et eadem fere contra eos dici possunt, qui vacuitatem doloris finem bonorum esse voluerunt, nec vero ullum probetur oportet summum bonum, quod virtute careat, qua nihil potest esse praestantius. itaque quamquam in eo sermone, qui cum Torquato est habitus, non remissi fuimus, tamen haec acrior est cum Stoicis parata contentio. quae enim de voluptate dicuntur, ea nec acutissime nec abscondite disseruntur; neque enim qui defendunt eam versuti in disserendo sunt nec qui contra dicunt causam difficilem repellunt.

Then Quintus said: ’It is exactly as you say, Piso. For just now, as I was coming here, that spot of Colonus turned my own thoughts toward itself, where its inhabitant Sophocles came before my eyes — Sophocles, whom you know how I admire and how I delight in him. Indeed, a kind of vision stirred me toward an older memory still, of Oedipus coming to this place and asking, in that most tender song, what these very spots might be — to no purpose, of course, yet it stirred me all the same.’ Then Pomponius said: ’But as for me, whom you are all in the habit of attacking as a devotee of Epicurus, I spend much time, as you know, with Phaedrus — whom I love beyond all others — in the gardens of Epicurus, which we passed by just now; yet, warned by the old proverb, I bear the living in mind, and still I cannot forget Epicurus, even were I to wish it, since my friends keep his likeness not only on their tablets but even on their cups and on their rings.’

ipse etiam dicit Epicurus ne argumentandum quidem esse de voluptate, quod sit positum iudicium eius in sensibus, ut commoneri nos satis sit, nihil attineat doceri. quare illa nobis simplex fuit in utramque partem disputatio. nec enim in Torquati sermone quicquam implicatum aut tortuosum fuit, nostraque, ut mihi videtur, dilucida oratio. Stoicorum autem non ignoras quam sit subtile vel spinosum potius disserendi genus, idque cum Graecis tum magis nobis, quibus etiam verba parienda sunt inponendaque nova rebus novis nomina. quod quidem nemo mediocriter doctus mirabitur cogitans in omni arte, cuius usus vulgaris communisque non sit, multam novitatem nominum esse, cum constituantur earum rerum vocabula, quae in quaque arte versentur.

Here I said: ’Our friend Pomponius is plainly making a joke, and perhaps within his rights. For he has so settled himself at Athens that he is all but one of the Attics, and looks likely to earn that very surname. But I agree with you, Piso, that this is what happens in practice: that at the prompting of places we think rather more keenly and attentively about famous men. For you know that once I came with you to Metapontum, and would not turn aside to my host before I had seen that very place where Pythagoras ended his life, and his seat. But at this present time, though there are throughout every quarter of Athens, in the very places themselves, many tokens of men of the highest greatness, still it is that recess that moves me. For only a little while ago it belonged to Carneades, whom I seem to see — for his likeness is well known — and I think that the very seat, robbed of so great a greatness of genius, longs for that voice of his.’

itaque et dialectici et physici verbis utuntur iis, quae ipsi Graeciae nota non sint, geometrae vero et musici, grammatici etiam more quodam loquuntur suo. ipsae rhetorum artes, quae sunt totae forenses atque populares, verbis tamen in docendo quasi privatis utuntur ac suis. atque ut omittam has artis elegantes et ingenuas, ne opifices quidem tueri sua artificia possent, nisi vocabulis uterentur nobis incognitis, usitatis sibi. quin etiam agri cultura, quae abhorret ab omni politiore elegantia, tamen eas res, in quibus versatur, nominibus notavit novis. quo magis hoc philosopho faciendum est. ars est enim philosophia vitae, de qua disserens arripere verba de foro non potest.

Then Piso said: ’Since, then, each of us has something to say, what of our friend Lucius? Does he gladly visit the spot where Demosthenes and Aeschines used to fight it out against each other? For each man is drawn most by his own pursuit.’ And he, blushing, said: ’Do not ask it of me — I, who have even gone down to the Phaleric shore, to the place where they say Demosthenes used to declaim against the surf, to train himself to master the roar with his voice. And only just now I turned a little to the right off the road, to approach the tomb of Pericles. Though indeed there is no end of that in this city; for wherever we set foot, we set it down on some piece of history.’

Quamquam ex omnibus philosophis Stoici plurima novaverunt, Zenoque, eorum princeps, non tam rerum inventor fuit quam verborum novorum. quodsi in ea lingua, quam plerique uberiorem putant, concessum a Graecia est ut doctissimi homines de rebus non pervagatis inusitatis verbis uterentur, quanto id nobis magis est concedendum, qui ea nunc primum audemus attingere? et quoniam saepe diximus, et quidem cum aliqua querela non Graecorum modo, sed eorum etiam, qui se Graecos magis quam nostros haberi volunt, nos non modo non vinci a Graecis verborum copia, sed esse in ea etiam superiores, elaborandum est ut hoc non in nostris solum artibus, sed etiam in illorum ipsorum adsequamur. quamquam ea verba, quibus instituto veterum utimur pro Latinis, ut ipsa philosophia, ut rhetorica, dialectica, grammatica, geometria, musica, quamquam Latine ea dici poterant, tamen, quoniam usu percepta sunt, nostra ducamus.

Then Piso said: ’And yet, Cicero, those pursuits of yours, if they look to the imitation of great men, are the mark of men of talent; but if only to the learning of the tokens of ancient memory, of the merely curious. We all urge you — already at a run, I hope — not only to wish to know the men you wish to know, but to wish to imitate them too.’ Here I said: ’Although this young man, as you see, Piso, is doing what you prescribe, still your encouragement is welcome to me.’ Then he, in the most friendly way, as was his habit, said: ’Let us all, indeed, bring everything we can to bear upon this young man’s coming of age, and above all that he impart something of his own studies to philosophy as well — whether to imitate you, whom he loves, or to be able to do that very thing he pursues with more grace. But are you to be urged by us, Lucius, or are you already inclined of your own accord? To me, at least, you seem to attend to Antiochus, whom you hear, well enough.’ Then he, shyly, or rather modestly, said: ’I do indeed; but did you hear, just now, about Carneades? I am carried off that way — yet Antiochus calls me back, and there is no one else for us to hear besides.’

Atque haec quidem de rerum nominibus. de ipsis rebus autem saepenumero, Brute, vereor ne reprehendar, cum haec ad te scribam, qui cum in philosophia, tum in optimo genere philosophiae tantum processeris. quod si facerem quasi te erudiens, iure reprehenderer. sed ab eo plurimum absum neque, ut ea cognoscas, quae tibi notissima sunt, ad te mitto, sed quia facillime in nomine tuo adquiesco, et quia te habeo aequissimum eorum studiorum, quae mihi communia tecum sunt, existimatorem et iudicem. attendes igitur, ut soles, diligenter eamque controversiam diiudicabis, quae mihi fuit cum avunculo tuo, divino ac singulari viro.

Then Piso said: ’Although this, perhaps, will not be allowed to pass off so easily, since he is here’ — he meant me — ’still I shall make bold to call you back from this New Academy to that old one, in which, as you used to hear Antiochus say, there are reckoned not only those who are called Academics — Speusippus, Xenocrates, Polemo, Crantor, and the rest — but also the old Peripatetics, whose chief was Aristotle, whom, excepting Plato, I should perhaps not be wrong to call the chief of philosophers. Turn yourself, then, to them, I beg you. For from their writings and their teachings one may draw not only all liberal learning, all history, all elegant discourse, but there is besides such a variety of arts in them that no one, without that equipment, can come properly furnished to any of the more distinguished tasks. From these men have arisen orators, from these generals and leaders of commonwealths. To come to lesser matters: mathematicians, poets, musicians, and physicians too have set out, in the end, from this workshop, as it were, of every craftsman.’ And I said:

nam in Tusculano cum essem vellemque e bibliotheca pueri Luculli quibusdam libris uti, veni in eius villam, ut eos ipse, ut solebam, depromerem. quo cum venissem, M. Catonem, quem ibi esse nescieram, vidi in bibliotheca sedentem multis circumfusum Stoicorum libris. erat enim, ut scis, in eo aviditas legendi, nec satiari poterat, quippe qui ne reprehensionem quidem vulgi inanem reformidans in ipsa curia soleret legere saepe, dum senatus cogeretur, nihil operae rei publicae detrahens. quo magis tum in summo otio maximaque copia quasi helluari libris, si hoc verbo in tam clara re utendum est, videbatur.

’You know I feel the very same, Piso; but you have made mention of the matter at a good moment. For my friend Cicero here is eager to hear what the view is, regarding the ends of goods, of that old Academy you speak of, and of the Peripatetics. And we think you can explain it most easily, since you had Staseas of Naples with you for many years, and since for several months now we have seen you inquiring into these very things at Athens from Antiochus.’ And he, laughing, said: ’Come, come’ — for you wished, cleverly enough, to make me the starting-point of our discussion — ’let us set it out for the young man, if by chance we are able. For this solitude grants us what, were some god to promise it, I should never have thought possible: that I should hold a discussion in the Academy, like a philosopher. But let me not, while I oblige him, be a burden to you.’ ’A burden to me,’ I said, ’who asked you for this very thing?’ Then, when Quintus and Pomponius had said that they wished the same, Piso began. And do attend, I beg you, Brutus, to his discourse, and judge whether it seems to have embraced sufficiently the view of Antiochus — a view I take to be the one you most approve, since you have often heard his brother Aristus.

quod cum accidisset ut alter alterum necopinato videremus, surrexit statim. deinde prima illa, quae in congressu solemus: Quid tu, inquit, huc? a villa enim, credo, et: Si ibi te esse scissem, ad te ipse venissem. Heri, inquam, ludis commissis ex urbe profectus veni ad vesperum. causa autem fuit huc veniendi ut quosdam hinc libros promerem. et quidem, Cato, hanc totam copiam iam Lucullo nostro notam esse oportebit; nam his libris eum malo quam reliquo ornatu villae delectari. est enim mihi magnae curae—quamquam hoc quidem proprium tuum munus est—, ut ita erudiatur, ut et patri et Caepioni nostro et tibi tam propinquo respondeat. laboro autem non sine causa; nam et avi eius memoria moveor—nec enim ignoras, quanti fecerim Caepionem, qui, ut opinio mea fert, in principibus iam esset, si viveret—, et Lucullus mihi versatur ante oculos, vir cum virtutibus omnibus excellens, tum mecum et amicitia et omni voluntate sententiaque coniunctus.

He spoke, then, thus: ’How much ornament there is in the discipline of the Peripatetics has been said by me, as briefly as I could, a little while ago. But the form of that discipline, as of nearly all the rest, is threefold: one part is of nature, a second of reasoning, a third of living. Nature was investigated by them in such a way that no part of sky, sea, or land — to speak in the poet’s manner — was passed over; indeed, when they had spoken of the first beginnings of things and of the whole world, so as to draw their conclusions not only by probable argument but even by the necessary reasoning of the mathematicians, they brought the greatest store of material, from things investigated for their own sake, to the knowledge of hidden things.

Praeclare, inquit, facis, cum et eorum memoriam tenes, quorum uterque tibi testamento liberos suos commendavit, et puerum diligis. quod autem meum munus dicis non equidem recuso, sed te adiungo socium. addo etiam illud, multa iam mihi dare signa puerum et pudoris et ingenii, sed aetatem vides. Video equidem, inquam, sed tamen iam infici debet iis artibus, quas si, dum est tener, conbiberit, ad maiora veniet paratior. Sic, et quidem diligentius saepiusque ista loquemur inter nos agemusque communiter. sed residamus, inquit, si placet. Itaque fecimus.

Aristotle pursued the origins, the ways of life, and the forms of all living creatures; Theophrastus, for his part, the natures of plants and the causes and accounts of nearly all the things brought forth from the earth; and from this knowledge the investigation of the most hidden things was made easier. By the same men were handed down precepts of reasoning, not by dialectic alone but by oratory too; and by Aristotle, as its chief author, the exercise of speaking on both sides of single questions was established — not so as always to argue against everything, in the manner of Arcesilas, and yet so as, in all matters, to bring out whatever could be said on either side.

Tum ille: Tu autem cum ipse tantum librorum habeas, quos hic tandem requiris? Commentarios quosdam, inquam, Aristotelios, quos hic sciebam esse, veni ut auferrem, quos legerem, dum essem otiosus; quod quidem nobis non saepe contingit. Quam vellem, inquit, te ad Stoicos inclinavisses! erat enim, si cuiusquam, certe tuum nihil praeter virtutem in bonis ducere. Vide, ne magis, inquam, tuum fuerit, cum re idem tibi, quod mihi, videretur, non nova te rebus nomina inponere. ratio enim nostra consentit, pugnat oratio. Minime vero, inquit ille, consentit. quicquid enim praeter id, quod honestum sit, expetendum esse dixeris in bonisque numeraveris, et honestum ipsum quasi virtutis lumen extinxeris et virtutem penitus everteris. Dicuntur ista, Cato, magnifice, inquam, sed videsne verborum gloriam tibi cum Pyrrhone et cum Aristone, qui omnia exaequant, esse communem?

And when the third part sought the precepts of living well, that too was applied by them not only to the conduct of private life but also to the governing of commonwealths. From Aristotle we have learned the customs, institutions, and disciplines of nearly all the states not of Greece only but of the barbarian world as well; from Theophrastus, even their laws. And whereas each of them had taught what kind of leader it befits a man to be in a commonwealth, and had written besides, at greater length, what the best condition of a commonwealth might be, Theophrastus did this further: he showed what tendencies there are in a commonwealth, and what shifts of circumstance, by which one must steer as the situation may require. But as for the manner of passing one’s life, the one that most pleased them was indeed the quiet one, set in the contemplation and the knowledge of things; and because this was most like to the life of the gods, it seemed most worthy of the wise man. And on these matters their discourse is splendid and illustrious.

de quibus cupio scire quid sentias. Egone quaeris, inquit, quid sentiam? quos bonos viros, fortes, iustos, moderatos aut audivimus in re publica fuisse aut ipsi vidimus, qui sine ulla doctrina naturam ipsam secuti multa laudabilia fecerunt, eos melius a natura institutos fuisse, quam institui potuissent a philosophia, si ullam aliam probavissent praeter eam, quae nihil aliud in bonis haberet nisi honestum, nihil nisi turpe in malis; ceterae philosophorum disciplinae, omnino alia magis alia, sed tamen omnes, quae rem ullam virtutis expertem aut in bonis aut in malis numerent, eas non modo nihil adiuvare arbitror neque firmare, quo meliores simus, sed ipsam depravare naturam. nam nisi hoc optineatur, id solum bonum esse, quod honestum sit, nullo modo probari possit beatam vitam virtute effici. quod si ita sit, cur opera philosophiae sit danda nescio. si enim sapiens aliquis miser esse possit, ne ego istam gloriosam memorabilemque virtutem non magno aestimandam putem.

As to the highest good, however — since there are two kinds of their books, one written for the public, which they called exoterikon, the other more finely worked, which they left in their notebooks — they do not always seem to say the same thing; and yet on the substance itself there is no inconsistency, at least among those I have named, nor any disagreement among them. But when the happy life is the question, and this is the one thing that philosophy ought to look to and to follow, whether it lies wholly within the power of the wise man or can be either shaken or torn away by adverse circumstances — on this they do at times seem to differ among themselves and to be in doubt. This is brought out most of all by Theophrastus’ book on the happy life, in which a great deal is granted to fortune. And if this is so, wisdom could not guarantee a happy life. This account seems to me too delicate, so to speak, and too soft, for what the force and gravity of virtue demands. Let us hold, then, to Aristotle and to his son Nicomachus, whose carefully written books on ethics are said indeed to be Aristotle’s own — though I do not see why the son could not have been like the father. As for Theophrastus, let us call upon him for most things, provided only that we hold to more firmness and strength in virtue than he held to. Let us be content, then, with these men.

Quae adhuc, Cato, a te dicta sunt, eadem, inquam, dicere posses, si sequerere Pyrrhonem aut Aristonem. nec enim ignoras his istud honestum non summum modo, sed etiam, ut tu vis, solum bonum videri. quod si ita est, sequitur id ipsum, quod te velle video, omnes semper beatos esse sapientes. hosne igitur laudas et hanc eorum, inquam, sententiam sequi nos censes oportere? Minime vero istorum quidem, inquit. cum enim virtutis hoc proprium sit, earum rerum, quae secundum naturam sint, habere delectum, qui omnia sic exaequaverunt, ut in utramque partem ita paria redderent, uti nulla selectione uterentur, hi virtutem ipsam sustulerunt.

For their successors are, in my view, better than the philosophers of the other schools, but they so degenerate that they seem to have been born of their own selves. First, Theophrastus’ pupil Strato wished to be a natural philosopher; and in that, though he is great, still most of his work is novel, and very little of it concerns ethics. His pupil Lyco is rich in language, but rather thin in matters themselves. Lyco’s pupil Aristo is then neat and elegant, but that gravity which is looked for in a great philosopher was not in him; his writings are indeed many and polished, but somehow his discourse has no authority.

Istud quidem, inquam, optime dicis, sed quaero nonne tibi faciendum idem sit nihil dicenti bonum, quod non rectum honestumque sit, reliquarum rerum discrimen omne tollenti. Si quidem, inquit, tollerem, sed relinquo. Quonam modo?

I pass over many, among them a learned and agreeable man, Hieronymus — whom I no longer know why I should call a Peripatetic. For he set out freedom from pain as the highest good; and whoever disagrees about the highest good disagrees about the whole scheme of philosophy. Critolaus wished to imitate the ancients, and is indeed nearest to them in gravity, and his discourse runs full; and yet not even he stays within the institutions of his fathers. Diodorus, his pupil, adds freedom from pain to honour. He too is his own man, and, disagreeing about the highest good, cannot truly be called a Peripatetic. But the view of the ancients our friend Antiochus seems to me to follow most carefully, and he teaches that this same view was Aristotle’s and Polemo’s.

inquam. si una virtus, unum istud, quod honestum appellas, rectum, laudabile, decorum— erit enim notius quale sit pluribus notatum vocabulis idem declarantibus—, id ergo, inquam, si solum est bonum, quid habebis praeterea, quod sequare? aut, si nihil malum, nisi quod turpe, inhonestum, indecorum, pravum, flagitiosum, foedum—ut hoc quoque pluribus nominibus insigne faciamus—, quid praeterea dices esse fugiendum? Non ignoranti tibi, inquit, quid sim dicturus, sed aliquid, ut ego suspicor, ex mea brevi responsione arripere cupienti non respondebo ad singula, explicabo potius, quoniam otiosi sumus, nisi alienum putas, totam Zenonis Stoicorumque sententiam. Minime id quidem, inquam, alienum, multumque ad ea, quae quaerimus, explicatio tua ista profecerit.

Our friend Lucius does wisely, then, in wishing above all to hear about the highest good; for once this is settled, everything in philosophy is settled. For in other matters, if anything has been passed over or left unknown, there is no more inconvenience than the worth of whichever of those things it is in which something has been neglected. But if the highest good is unknown, the plan of living must of necessity be unknown too; and from this there follows so great an error that men cannot know to what harbour they should make their way. But once the ends of things are known, when it is understood what is the limit both of goods and of evils, the road of life has been found, and the shaping of all our duties, since it is then asked to what each thing is to be referred;

Experiamur igitur, inquit, etsi habet haec Stoicorum ratio difficilius quiddam et obscurius. nam cum in Graeco sermone haec ipsa quondam rerum nomina novarum * * non videbantur, quae nunc consuetudo diuturna trivit; quid censes in Latino fore? Facillimum id quidem est, inquam. si enim Zenoni licuit, cum rem aliquam invenisset inusitatam, inauditum quoque ei rei nomen inponere, cur non liceat Catoni? nec tamen exprimi verbum e verbo necesse erit, ut interpretes indiserti solent, cum sit verbum, quod idem declaret, magis usitatum. equidem soleo etiam quod uno Graeci, si aliter non possum, idem pluribus verbis exponere. et tamen puto concedi nobis oportere ut Graeco verbo utamur, si quando minus occurret Latinum, ne hoc ephippiis et acratophoris potius quam proe+gmenis et apoproe+gmenis concedatur; quamquam haec quidem praeposita recte et reiecta dicere licebit.

from which the plan of living happily — the thing all men long for — can be found and procured. And since there is great disagreement as to wherein this lies, we must call in that division of Carneades which our friend Antiochus is glad to use. For he saw not only how many views of the highest good there had been among philosophers up to now, but how many altogether there could possibly be. He used to deny, then, that there is any art that proceeds from itself; for the thing grasped by an art is always external to it. There is no need to make this longer with examples. For it is plain that no art turns upon itself, but that the art is one thing and the object set before the art another. Since, therefore, just as medicine is the art of health and steering the art of navigation, so prudence is the art of living, it follows of necessity that this too has been established and set going from some thing outside itself.

Bene facis, inquit, quod me adiuvas, et istis quidem, quae modo dixisti, utar potius Latinis, in ceteris subvenies, si me haerentem videbis. Sedulo, inquam, faciam. sed ’fortuna fortis’; quare conare, quaeso. quid enim possumus hoc agere divinius? Placet his, inquit, quorum ratio mihi probatur, simulatque natum sit animal—hinc enim est ordiendum —, ipsum sibi conciliari et commendari ad se conservandum et ad suum statum eaque, quae conservantia sint eius status, diligenda, alienari autem ab interitu iisque rebus, quae interitum videantur adferre. id ita esse sic probant, quod ante, quam voluptas aut dolor attigerit, salutaria appetant parvi aspernenturque contraria, quod non fieret, nisi statum suum diligerent, interitum timerent. fieri autem non posset ut appeterent aliquid, nisi sensum haberent sui eoque se diligerent. ex quo intellegi debet principium ductum esse a se diligendo.

On one point, however, nearly all are agreed: that the thing with which wisdom is concerned, and which it aims to attain, must be suited and adapted to nature, and of such a kind that it invites and draws on the mind’s appetite of its own accord — what the Greeks call hormē. But what that thing is which moves us in this way and is sought by nature at the very first dawning of life — on this there is no agreement, and it is here, when the highest good is investigated, that the whole disagreement among the philosophers lies. For the whole of that inquiry which concerns the ends of good and evil — when we ask what among these is the furthest and the ultimate — has its source to be found in the question of where the first promptings of nature lie; once that is discovered, the entire discussion of the highest good and evil is drawn from it as from a head. Some hold that the first appetite is for pleasure and the first recoil from pain. Others judge that freedom from pain is what is first taken up, and pain what is first turned away from.

in principiis autem naturalibus diligendi sui plerique Stoici non putant voluptatem esse ponendam. quibus ego vehementer adsentior, ne, si voluptatem natura posuisse in iis rebus videatur, quae primae appetuntur, multa turpia sequantur. satis esse autem argumenti videtur quam ob rem illa, quae prima sunt adscita natura, diligamus, quod est nemo, quin, cum utrumvis liceat, aptas malit et integras omnis partis corporis quam, eodem usu, inminutas aut detortas habere. rerum autem cognitiones, quas vel comprehensiones vel perceptiones vel, si haec verba aut minus placent aut minus intelleguntur, katalh/yeis appellemus licet, eas igitur ipsas propter se adsciscendas arbitramur, quod habeant quiddam in se quasi complexum et continens veritatem. id autem in parvis intellegi potest, quos delectari videamus, etiamsi eorum nihil intersit, si quid ratione per se ipsi invenerint.

From these others again set out — those who name what they call the primary things in accordance with nature, among which they count the soundness and preservation of all the parts, health, unimpaired senses, freedom from pain, strength, beauty, and the rest of the same kind, of which there are likenesses in our minds, as it were the first sparks and seeds of the virtues. Now since it is some one of these three by which nature is first moved, whether toward seeking or toward repelling, and since there can be nothing at all besides these three, it necessarily follows that the whole duty of avoiding or of pursuing is referred to one of them, so that the wisdom we have called the art of living is concerned with one of those three things, and from it draws the starting-point of the whole of life.

artis etiam ipsas propter se adsumendas putamus, cum quia sit in iis aliquid dignum adsumptione, tum quod constent ex cognitionibus et contineant quiddam in se ratione constitutum et via. a falsa autem adsensione magis nos alienatos esse quam a ceteris rebus, quae sint contra naturam, arbitrantur. iam membrorum, id est partium corporis, alia videntur propter eorum usum a natura esse donata, ut manus, crura, pedes, ut ea, quae sunt intus in corpore, quorum utilitas quanta sit a medicis etiam disputatur, alia autem nullam ob utilitatem quasi ad quendam ornatum, ut cauda pavoni, plumae versicolores columbis, viris mammae atque barba.

And from whatever it has settled upon as the thing by which nature is first moved, there will also arise an account of the right and the honourable, which can square with some one of those three, so that it is honourable either to do everything for the sake of pleasure, even if you do not attain it, or for the sake of not feeling pain, even if you cannot reach that, or for the sake of obtaining the things that are in accordance with nature, even if you achieve nothing. So it comes about that, as great as the difference is in the natural beginnings, so great is the unlikeness in the ends of good and evil. Others again, from the same beginnings, will refer every duty either to pleasure, or to not feeling pain, or to securing those primary things in accordance with nature.

Haec dicuntur fortasse ieiunius; sunt enim quasi prima elementa naturae, quibus ubertas orationis adhiberi vix potest, nec equidem eam cogito consectari. verum tamen cum de rebus grandioribus dicas, ipsae res verba rapiunt; ita fit cum gravior, tum etiam splendidior oratio. Est, ut dicis, inquam. sed tamen omne, quod de re bona dilucide dicitur, mihi praeclare dici videtur. istius modi autem res dicere ornate velle puerile est, plane autem et perspicue expedire posse docti et intellegentis viri.

Now that six views about the highest good have been set out, of the three nearest these are the champions: of pleasure, Aristippus; of not feeling pain, Hieronymus; of the enjoyment of those things we have called the primary ones in accordance with nature, Carneades — not, to be sure, as their author, but as their defender for the sake of argument. The earlier three were possible positions, of which one alone has been defended, and that vigorously. For that one should do everything for the sake of pleasure — granted that, even if we attain nothing, still that very purpose of so acting is in itself worth seeking, and honourable, and the sole good — no one has maintained. Nor has anyone thought the mere avoidance of pain to be in itself among the things worth seeking, unless one could actually escape it. But that one should do everything in order to obtain what is in accordance with nature, even if one does not attain it, and that this is both honourable and the sole thing worth seeking for its own sake and the sole good — this the Stoics do say.

Progrediamur igitur, quoniam, inquit, ab his principiis naturae discessimus, quibus congruere debent quae sequuntur. sequitur autem haec prima divisio: Aestimabile esse dicunt—sic enim, ut opinor, appellemus — id, quod aut ipsum secundum naturam sit aut tale quid efficiat, ut selectione dignum propterea sit, quod aliquod pondus habeat dignum aestimatione, quam illi a)ci/an vocant, contraque inaestimabile, quod sit superiori contrarium. initiis igitur ita constitutis, ut ea, quae secundum naturam sunt, ipsa propter se sumenda sint contrariaque item reicienda, primum est officium—id enim appello kaqh=kon —, ut se conservet in naturae statu, deinceps ut ea teneat, quae secundum naturam sint, pellatque contraria. qua inventa selectione et item reiectione sequitur deinceps cum officio selectio, deinde ea perpetua, tum ad extremum constans consentaneaque naturae, in qua primum inesse incipit et intellegi, quid sit, quod vere bonum possit dici.

These, then, are the six simple views about the ends of good and evil: two without a patron, four defended. But of joined and twofold expositions of the highest good there have been in all three, and indeed there could be no more, if you look deep into the nature of things. For either pleasure can be joined to honour, as Calliphon and Dinomachus held, or freedom from pain, as Diodorus held, or the primary things of nature, as the ancients held — the same men we have named Academics and Peripatetics. But since all things cannot be said at once, for the present this much will need to be noted: that pleasure is to be set aside, since we are born for certain greater things, as will soon appear. About freedom from pain much the same is generally said as about pleasure. Since, therefore, both about pleasure with Torquatus and about honour, in which alone all good was placed, with Cato, the argument has been carried on, in the first place what was said against pleasure falls in much the same way against freedom from pain.

prima est enim conciliatio hominis ad ea, quae sunt secundum naturam. simul autem cepit intellegentiam vel notionem potius, quam appellant e)/nnoian illi, viditque rerum agendarum ordinem et, ut ita dicam, concordiam, multo eam pluris aestimavit quam omnia illa, quae prima dilexerat, atque ita cognitione et ratione collegit, ut statueret in eo collocatum summum illud hominis per se laudandum et expetendum bonum, quod cum positum sit in eo, quod o(mologi/an Stoici, nos appellemus convenientiam, si placet,—cum igitur in eo sit id bonum, quo omnia referenda sint, honeste facta ipsumque honestum, quod solum in bonis ducitur, quamquam post oritur, tamen id solum vi sua et dignitate expetendum est; eorum autem, quae sunt prima naturae, propter se nihil est expetendum.

Nor in fact need anything else be sought against that view of Carneades. For in whatever way the highest good is so set out that it is empty of honour, neither duties nor virtues nor friendships can stand on that reckoning. And the joining to honour of either pleasure or the absence of pain makes that very honour, which it wishes to embrace, base. For to refer the things you do to ends, one of which — if a man be free of evil — one would call his being in the highest good, while the other is concerned with the lowest part of nature, is to darken all the splendour of honour, not to say to defile it. There remain the Stoics, who, when they had taken over everything from the Peripatetics and the Academics, pursued the same matters under other names. These it is better to refute one by one. But for now, to what we are about;

cum vero illa, quae officia esse dixi, proficiscantur ab initiis naturae, necesse est ea ad haec referri, ut recte dici possit omnia officia eo referri, ut adipiscamur principia naturae, nec tamen ut hoc sit bonorum ultimum, propterea quod non inest in primis naturae conciliationibus honesta actio; consequens enim est et post oritur, ut dixi. est tamen ea secundum naturam multoque nos ad se expetendam magis hortatur quam superiora omnia. Sed ex hoc primum error tollendus est, ne quis sequi existimet, ut duo sint ultima bonorum. etenim, si cui propositum sit conliniare hastam aliquo aut sagittam, sicut nos ultimum in bonis dicimus, sic illi facere omnia, quae possit, ut conliniet huic in eius modi similitudine omnia sint facienda, ut conliniet, et tamen, ut omnia faciat, quo propositum adsequatur, sit hoc quasi ultimum, quale nos summum in vita bonum dicimus, illud autem, ut feriat, quasi seligendum, non expetendum.

of those men, when we please. But the freedom from care of Democritus, which is, as it were, a tranquillity of mind — what they call euthumia — had to be set apart from this discussion, because that tranquillity of mind is itself the happy life; and we are inquiring not what it is, but whence it comes. Now the views of Pyrrho, Aristo, and Erillus, already hissed off and cast out, since they cannot fall within the circle we have drawn, were not to be brought in at all. For since this whole inquiry about the ends, and as it were the furthest bounds, of good and evil sets out from what we have said is suited and adapted to nature and is itself sought first for its own sake, this whole foundation is overturned both by those who, in matters in which there is nothing that is not either honourable or base, deny that there is any reason why one thing should be preferred to another, and think there is no difference at all among such things; and by Erillus, who, if he really held that nothing is good except knowledge, did away with every ground for taking counsel and with the very discovery of duty. With the views of the rest thus shut out, and since besides them there can be none, this view of the ancients must necessarily prevail. By the practice of the ancients, then, which the Stoics too employ, let us take our start from here.

Cum autem omnia officia a principiis naturae proficiscantur, ab isdem necesse est proficisci ipsam sapientiam. sed quem ad modum saepe fit, ut is, qui commendatus sit alicui, pluris eum faciat, cui commendatus sit, quam illum, a quo, sic minime mirum est primo nos sapientiae commendari ab initiis naturae, post autem ipsam sapientiam nobis cariorem fieri, quam illa sint, a quibus ad hanc venerimus. atque ut membra nobis ita data sunt, ut ad quandam rationem vivendi data esse appareant, sic appetitio animi, quae o(rmh/ Graece vocatur, non ad quodvis genus vitae, sed ad quandam formam vivendi videtur data, itemque et ratio et perfecta ratio.

Every living creature loves itself and, the moment it has come into being, sets about preserving itself, because this first appetite for guarding its whole life is given to it by nature — to preserve itself and to be so constituted as to be in the best condition in accordance with nature. At the outset it holds this constitution in a confused and uncertain way, so far only as to protect itself, whatever it may be, but it understands neither what it is nor what it can do nor what its own nature is. But when it has advanced a little and has begun to perceive how far each thing touches it and pertains to it, then it gradually begins to go forward and to recognize itself and to understand the reason why it has the appetite of mind we spoke of, and it begins both to seek the things it feels to be suited to its nature and to repel their opposites. Therefore for every living creature the object of its appetite lies in what is adapted to its nature. And so the end of goods turns out to be to live in accordance with nature, so constituted as to be in the best condition and most perfectly adapted to nature.

ut enim histrioni actio, saltatori motus non quivis, sed certus quidam est datus, sic vita agenda est certo genere quodam, non quolibet; quod genus conveniens consentaneumque dicimus. nec enim gubernationi aut medicinae similem sapientiam esse arbitramur, sed actioni illi potius, quam modo dixi, et saltationi, ut in ipsa insit, non foris petatur extremum, id est artis effectio. et tamen est etiam aliqua cum his ipsis artibus sapientiae dissimilitudo, propterea quod in illis quae recte facta sunt non continent tamen omnes partes, e quibus constant; quae autem nos aut recta aut recte facta dicamus, si placet, illi autem appellant katorqw/mata, omnes numeros virtutis continent. sola enim sapientia in se tota conversa est, quod idem in ceteris artibus non fit.

But since each living creature has its own nature, it necessarily follows that the end too is, for all of them, this: that nature be fulfilled — for nothing prevents some things from being common both among the rest of the animals and between man and the beasts, since the nature of all is shared — yet those furthest and highest things which we are seeking are marked off and distributed among the kinds of living creatures, each proper to its own and suited to what the nature of each requires.

Inscite autem medicinae et gubernationis ultimum cum ultimo sapientiae comparatur. sapientia enim et animi magnitudinem complectitur et iustitiam, et ut omnia, quae homini accidant, infra se esse iudicet, quod idem ceteris artibus non contingit. tenere autem virtutes eas ipsas, quarum modo feci mentionem, nemo poterit, nisi statuerit nihil esse, quod intersit aut differat aliud ab alio, praeter honesta et turpia.

And so when we say that for all living creatures the furthest end is to live in accordance with nature, this is not to be taken as if we were saying that there is one single end for all; rather, just as it can rightly be said to be common to all the arts that they are concerned with some body of knowledge, while the knowledge proper to each art is its own, so to live in accordance with nature is common to all living creatures, but their natures are diverse, so that one thing is natural for a horse, another for an ox, another for a man. And yet in all there is a common highest end — and that not only among living creatures, but also among all those things which nature nourishes, increases, and protects, in which we see that the things produced from the earth do many things in a way themselves of their own accord that avail toward living and growing, so that within their own kind they may arrive at their furthest end; so that it is now permitted to embrace all things in a single comprehension and to say without hesitation that every nature is the preserver of itself and has this set before it as its end and furthest goal: to keep itself in the best state of its own kind; so that the end of all things which thrive by nature must necessarily be similar, not the same. From which it ought to be understood that for man the ultimate good is to live in accordance with nature, which we interpret thus: to live by the nature of man, complete on every side and wanting nothing.

Videamus nunc, quam sint praeclare illa his, quae iam posui, consequentia. cum enim hoc sit extremum —sentis enim, credo, me iam diu, quod te/los Graeci dicant, id dicere tum extremum, tum ultimum, tum summum; licebit etiam finem pro extremo aut ultimo dicere—, cum igitur hoc sit extremum, congruenter naturae convenienterque vivere, necessario sequitur omnes sapientes semper feliciter, absolute, fortunate vivere, nulla re impediri, nulla prohiberi, nulla egere. quod autem continet non magis eam disciplinam, de qua loquor, quam vitam fortunasque nostras, id est ut, quod honestum sit, id solum bonum iudicemus, potest id quidem fuse et copiose et omnibus electissimis verbis gravissimisque sententiis rhetorice et augeri et ornari, sed consectaria me Stoicorum brevia et acuta delectant. concluduntur igitur eorum argumenta sic:

These things, then, must be unfolded by us — but if rather minutely, you will forgive it; for we owe a service to this young man’s age, and to one perhaps now hearing these matters for the first time. ’Quite so,’ I said, ’though even what you have said up to now was rightly said in that manner, however much it was suited to a young man.’ ’The end of things worth seeking having now been defined,’ he said, ’why this matter stands as I have said must next be demonstrated. For that reason let us begin from what I set down first, which is also in fact first, so that we may understand that every living creature loves itself. And although this admits of no doubt — for it is fixed in nature itself and grasped by each one’s own senses, so that if anyone wished to say the contrary he would not be heard — still, that we may pass over nothing, I think the reasons too should be brought forward why this is so.

Quod est bonum, omne laudabile est; quod autem laudabile est, omne est honestum; bonum igitur quod est, honestum est. satisne hoc conclusum videtur? certe; quod enim efficiebatur ex iis duobus, quae erant sumpta, in eo vides esse conclusum. duorum autem, e quibus effecta conclusio est, contra superius dici solet non omne bonum esse laudabile. nam quod laudabile sit honestum esse conceditur. illud autem perabsurdum, bonum esse aliquid, quod non expetendum sit, aut expetendum, quod non placens, aut, si id, non etiam diligendum; ergo et probandum; ita etiam laudabile; id autem honestum. ita fit, ut, quod bonum sit, id etiam honestum sit.

And yet how can it be understood or even conceived that there should be any living creature that hates itself? For contrary facts would clash. For when that appetite of mind has begun deliberately to draw to itself something that harms it, because it is hostile to itself, then, since it will do this for its own sake, it will both hate itself and at the same time love itself, which cannot be. And it necessarily follows that, if a man is an enemy to himself, he will think the things that are good to be evil, and on the contrary the evil to be good, and will flee what should be sought and seek what should be fled — which is, beyond doubt, the overturning of life. Nor, if some are found who seek out either nooses or other means of destruction, or like that man in Terence who ’resolved that for so long he would do his own son the less wrong’ — as he himself says — ’until he himself should be made wretched’ — is such a man on that account to be thought an enemy to himself.

Deinde quaero, quis aut de misera vita possit gloriari aut de non beata. de sola igitur beata. ex quo efficitur gloriatione, ut ita dicam, dignam esse beatam vitam, quod non possit nisi honestae vitae iure contingere. ita fit, ut honesta vita beata vita sit. Et quoniam is, cui contingit ut iure laudetur, habet insigne quiddam ad decus et ad gloriam, ut ob ea, quae tanta sint, beatus dici iure possit, idem de vita talis viri rectissime dicetur. ita, si beata vita honestate cernitur, quod honestum est, id bonum solum habendum est. Quid vero?

But some are moved by grief, some by desire, and many too are carried away by anger, and when they knowingly rush into evils, they then think they are taking the best counsel for themselves. And so they say, and do not hesitate: ’Such is my way; do you do as you need to do.’ And those who had declared war upon themselves would wish to be racked by day and tortured by night, and yet they would not accuse themselves on the ground that they had counselled badly in their own affairs. For that complaint belongs to those who are dear to themselves and love themselves. Therefore, whenever it is said that a man deserves ill of himself and is to himself an enemy and a foe, and in the end flees from life, let it be understood that there underlies some cause of this kind, so that from that very fact it can be understood that each man is dear to himself.

negarine ullo modo possit numquam quemquam stabili et firmo et magno animo, quem fortem virum dicimus, effici posse, nisi constitutum sit non esse malum dolorem? ut enim qui mortem in malis ponit non potest eam non timere, sic nemo ulla in re potest id, quod malum esse decreverit, non curare idque contemnere. quo posito et omnium adsensu adprobato illud adsumitur, eum, qui magno sit animo atque forti, omnia, quae cadere in hominem possint, despicere ac pro nihilo putare. quae cum ita sint, effectum est nihil esse malum, quod turpe non sit. Atque iste vir altus et excellens, magno animo, vere fortis, infra se omnia humana ducens, is, inquam, quem efficere volumus, quem quaerimus, certe et confidere sibi debet ac suae vitae et actae et consequenti et bene de sese iudicare statuens nihil posse mali incidere sapienti. ex quo intellegitur idem illud, solum bonum esse, quod honestum sit, idque esse beate vivere: honeste, id est cum virtute, vivere.

Nor indeed is it enough that there is no one who hates himself; this too must be understood, that there is no one who thinks it makes no difference to him how he himself fares. For the appetite of mind will be done away with if, just as in those matters between which there is no difference we are inclined to neither side, so in our own selves we shall judge that it makes no difference to us in what state we are. And further, if anyone should wish to say this too, it would be utterly absurd — that each man loves himself in such a way that this force of loving is referred to some other thing, and not to the very man who loves himself. When this is said of friendships, of duties, of virtues, however it is said, what is meant can still be understood; but in our own selves it cannot even be understood that we should love ourselves on account of some other thing — for example, on account of pleasure; for it is on our own account that we love pleasure, not on its account that we love ourselves.

Nec vero ignoro varias philosophorum fuisse sententias, eorum dico, qui summum bonum, quod ultimum appello, in animo ponerent. quae quamquam vitiose quidam secuti sunt, tamen non modo iis tribus, qui virtutem a summo bono segregaverunt, cum aut voluptatem aut vacuitatem doloris aut prima naturae in summis bonis ponerent, sed etiam alteris tribus, qui mancam fore putaverunt sine aliqua accessione virtutem ob eamque rem trium earum rerum, quas supra dixi, singuli singulas addiderunt,—his tamen omnibus eos antepono, cuicuimodi sunt, qui summum bonum in animo atque in virtute posuerunt.

And yet what is there more plainly evident than that each man is not only dear to himself, but vehemently dear? For who is there, or how few are there, in whom, when death draws near, the ’blood does not flee back in timid fright and the man go pale with fear’? It is, to be sure, a fault to shudder so violently at the dissolution of nature — which is likewise to be censured in the case of pain — but because nearly all are affected in this way, it is argument enough that nature shrinks from destruction; and the more certain men do this in a way that they are even justly censured for it, the more must it be understood that these very excesses would not have arisen in some, had there not been a certain measure set by nature. Nor do I mean the fear of death in those who flee death because they think they are being deprived of the good things of life, or because they dread certain terrors after death, or because they fear they may die in pain; for in little children, who think of none of these things, if ever in play we threaten them that we will throw them down from somewhere, they are seized with terror. Indeed even ’the wild beasts,’ says Pacuvius, ’which lack the cunning of understanding for taking precaution,’ when the terror of death is thrown upon them, ’shudder.’ And who thinks otherwise of the wise man himself, but that, even when he has resolved that he must die, he is still moved by the parting from his own and by the very leaving of the light?

sed sunt tamen perabsurdi et ii, qui cum scientia vivere ultimum bonorum, et qui nullam rerum differentiam esse dixerunt, atque ita sapientem beatum fore, nihil aliud alii momento ullo anteponentem, et qui, ut quidam Academici constituisse dicuntur, extremum bonorum et summum munus esse sapientis obsistere visis adsensusque suos firme sustinere. his singulis copiose responderi solet, sed quae perspicua sunt longa esse non debent. quid autem apertius quam, si selectio nulla sit ab iis rebus, quae contra naturam sint, earum rerum, quae sint secundum naturam, fore ut tollatur omnis ea, quae quaeratur laudeturque, prudentia? Circumscriptis igitur iis sententiis, quas posui, et iis, si quae similes earum sunt, relinquitur ut summum bonum sit vivere scientiam adhibentem earum rerum, quae natura eveniant, seligentem quae secundum naturam et quae contra naturam sint reicientem, id est convenienter congruenterque naturae vivere.

But most of all in this kind of case the force of nature is plainly visible, since many endure even beggary in order to live, and men worn out by old age are tormented by the approach of death and bear those sufferings which we see Philoctetes bearing in the plays. He, though racked by pains not to be borne, nevertheless prolonged his life by fowling, and ’slow, he transfixed the swift with the stroke of his arrows; standing, he transfixed those in flight,’ as it stands in Accius, and from the weaving of their feathers made coverings for his body.

Sed in ceteris artibus cum dicitur artificiose, posterum quodam modo et consequens putandum est, quod illi e)pigennhmatiko/n appellant; cum autem in quo sapienter dicimus, id a primo rectissime dicitur. quicquid enim a sapientia proficiscitur, id continuo debet expletum esse omnibus suis partibus; in eo enim positum est id, quod dicimus esse expetendum. nam ut peccatum est patriam prodere, parentes violare, fana depeculari, quae sunt in effectu, sic timere, sic maerere, sic in libidine esse peccatum est etiam sine effectu. verum ut haec non in posteris et in consequentibus, sed in primis continuo peccata sunt, sic ea, quae proficiscuntur a virtute, susceptione prima, non perfectione recta sunt iudicanda.

Am I speaking of the human kind, or of animals at large, when the nature of trees and plants is nearly the same? For whether, as the most learned men have held, some greater and more divine cause has engendered this force, or whether it comes about thus by chance, we see that the things the earth brings forth are kept sound by their bark and roots — which falls to animals through the distribution of the senses and a certain framing of the limbs. On this matter, indeed, though I side with those who hold that all these things are governed by nature, and that nature, were she to neglect them, could not herself exist, still I grant that those who differ on this point may think what they please; and, if they like, let them understand that whenever I say “the nature of man” I mean man — for it makes no difference here. For a person could sooner part from himself than lose the appetite for the things that serve his interest. With good reason, then, the weightiest philosophers sought the starting-point of the highest good in nature, and held that this appetite for the things suited to nature is bred into all, because they are held fast by that commendation of nature whereby they love themselves.

Bonum autem, quod in hoc sermone totiens usurpatum est, id etiam definitione explicatur. sed eorum definitiones paulum oppido inter se differunt et tamen eodem spectant. ego adsentior Diogeni, qui bonum definierit id, quod esset natura absolutum. id autem sequens illud etiam, quod prodesset— w)fe/lhma enim sic appellemus—, motum aut statum esse dixit e natura absoluto. cumque rerum notiones in animis fiant, si aut usu aliquid cognitum sit aut coniunctione aut similitudine aut collatione rationis, hoc quarto, quod extremum posui, boni notitia facta est. cum enim ab iis rebus, quae sunt secundum naturam, ascendit animus collatione rationis, tum ad notionem boni pervenit.

Next we must consider — since it is plain enough that each is dear to himself by nature — what the nature of man is. For that is what we are inquiring into. Now it is evident that man is composed of body and mind, the parts of the mind being first, those of the body second. Then we see this too: that the body is so shaped as to surpass others, and the mind so constituted as to be both furnished with senses and possessed of a commanding intelligence, to which the whole nature of man is subject, and in which there is a certain marvellous power of reason and of knowing and of science and of all the virtues. As for the things that belong to the body, they have no authority to be compared with the parts of the mind, and they are easier to come to know. And so let us begin with these.

hoc autem ipsum bonum non accessione neque crescendo aut cum ceteris comparando, sed propria vi sua et sentimus et appellamus bonum. ut enim mel, etsi dulcissimum est, suo tamen proprio genere saporis, non comparatione cum aliis dulce esse sentitur, sic bonum hoc, de quo agimus, est illud quidem plurimi aestimandum, sed ea aestimatio genere valet, non magnitudine. nam cum aestimatio, quae a)ci/a dicitur, neque in bonis numerata sit nec rursus in malis, quantumcumque eo addideris, in suo genere manebit. alia est igitur propria aestimatio virtutis, quae genere, non crescendo valet.

How well suited to nature, then, are the parts of our body, and its whole figure and form and stature, is plain; nor is there any doubt that one understands which the forehead, the eyes, the ears, and the remaining parts are that are proper to man. But surely these need to be sound and vigorous and to have their natural motions and uses, so that none of them is wanting, nor sick nor crippled; for this is what nature requires. There is, moreover, also a certain bearing of the body that keeps to the motions and postures agreeing with nature; and if in these there is some fault — a twisting and distortion, or a deformed motion or posture — as if a man should walk on his hands, or backwards rather than forwards, he would plainly seem to be fleeing from himself, and, stripping the man out of the man, to hate nature. For this reason, too, certain ways of sitting, and bent and broken movements such as belong to wanton or effeminate men, are contrary to nature; so that, even if it come about through a fault of the mind, still the nature of man seems to be altered in the body.

Nec vero perturbationes animorum, quae vitam insipientium miseram acerbamque reddunt, quas Graeci pa/- qh appellant—poteram ego verbum ipsum interpretans morbos appellare, sed non conveniret ad omnia; quis enim misericordiam aut ipsam iracundiam morbum solet dicere? at illi dicunt pa/qos. sit igitur perturbatio, quae nomine ipso vitiosa declarari videtur nec eae perturbationes vi aliqua naturali moventur. omnesque eae sunt genere quattuor, partibus plures, aegritudo, formido, libido, quamque Stoici communi nomine corporis et animi h(donh/n appellant, ego malo laetitiam appellare, quasi gestientis animi elationem voluptariam. perturbationes autem nulla naturae vi commoventur, omniaque ea sunt opiniones ac iudicia levitatis. itaque his sapiens semper vacabit.

And so, on the other hand, the moderate and even conditions, affections, and uses of the body seem to be suited to nature. Now the mind, too, ought not merely to be, but to be of a certain quality, so that it both has all its parts unimpaired and lacks none of the virtues. And in the senses each has its own virtue, namely that nothing should hinder each sense from discharging its own office in perceiving swiftly and readily those things that lie subject to the senses. But of the mind, and of that part of the mind which is sovereign and is named the intelligence, the virtues are many; yet there are two primary kinds: the one of those that are bred in by their own nature and are called involuntary, the other of those that, resting in the will, are wont to be called by a more proper name — and the surpassing excellence in the praise of minds belongs to these. To the former kind belong aptness in learning and memory, which are nearly all called by the one name of natural endowment; and those who have these virtues are called gifted. The other kind is that of the great and true virtues, which we call voluntary, such as prudence, temperance, fortitude, justice, and the rest of the same kind. And in sum these were the things to be said about body and mind, by which there is sketched out, as it were, what the nature of man requires.

Omne autem, quod honestum sit, id esse propter se expetendum commune nobis est cum multorum aliorum philosophorum sententiis. praeter enim tres disciplinas, quae virtutem a summo bono excludunt, ceteris omnibus philosophis haec est tuenda sententia, maxime tamen his Stoicis, qui nihil aliud in bonorum numero nisi honestum esse voluerunt. sed haec quidem est perfacilis et perexpedita defensio. quis est enim, aut quis umquam fuit aut avaritia tam ardenti aut tam effrenatis cupiditatibus, ut eandem illam rem, quam adipisci scelere quovis velit, non multis partibus malit ad sese etiam omni inpunitate proposita sine facinore quam illo modo pervenire?

From which it is plain that, since we are dear to ourselves and wish all things in mind and in body to be perfect, these very things are dear to us for their own sakes and hold within them the greatest weight toward living well. For one who has set before himself the preservation of himself must hold his own parts dear as well, and the dearer the more perfect they are and the more praiseworthy in their kind. For the life that is sought is one filled out with the virtues of mind and body, and in this the highest good must necessarily be placed, since it must be such as to be the limit of the things to be desired. Once this is grasped, it cannot be doubted that, since men themselves are dear to themselves in their own right and of their own accord, the parts too of both body and mind, and of those things that lie in the motion and posture of each, are cherished with their own dearness and are sought for their own sakes.

quam vero utilitatem aut quem fructum petentes scire cupimus illa, quae occulta nobis sunt, quo modo moveantur quibusque de causis ea quae versantur in caelo? quis autem tam agrestibus institutis vivit, aut quis se contra studia naturae tam vehementer obduravit, ut a rebus cognitione dignis abhorreat easque sine voluptate aut utilitate aliqua non requirat et pro nihilo putet? aut quis est, qui maiorum, aut Africanorum aut eius, quem tu in ore semper habes, proavi mei, ceterorumque virorum fortium atque omni virtute praestantium facta, dicta, consilia cognoscens nulla animo afficiatur voluptate?

These things being set out, it is an easy inference that those things among our own are most to be sought which have the most worth — so that, of each best part which is sought for its own sake, the virtue is to be sought most of all. Thus it will come about that the virtue of the mind is set before the virtue of the body, and that the voluntary virtues of the mind overcome the involuntary ones — the voluntary, which are properly called virtues and far excel, because they are begotten of reason, than which there is nothing in man more divine. For of all the things that nature both creates and watches over, those that are either without mind or not far otherwise have their highest good in the body; so that the saying about the pig does not seem inept — that a mind was given to that beast in place of salt, to keep it from rotting. There are, moreover, certain beasts in which there is something resembling virtue, as in lions, as in dogs, in horses, in which we see certain movements not of bodies alone, as in pigs, but in some measure of minds as well. In man, however, the whole sum lies in the mind, and in the mind in reason, out of which springs virtue, which is defined as the perfecting of reason — a thing they hold must be expounded again and again.

quis autem honesta in familia institutus et educatus ingenue non ipsa turpitudine, etiamsi eum laesura non sit, offenditur? quis animo aequo videt eum, quem inpure ac flagitiose putet vivere? quis non odit sordidos, vanos, leves, futtiles? quid autem dici poterit, si turpitudinem non ipsam per se fugiendam esse statuemus, quo minus homines tenebras et solitudinem nacti nullo dedecore se abstineant, nisi eos per se foeditate sua turpitudo ipsa deterreat? Innumerabilia dici possunt in hanc sententiam, sed non necesse est. Nihil est enim, de quo minus dubitari possit, quam et honesta expetenda per se et eodem modo turpia per se esse fugienda.

Of the things, too, that the earth brings forth, there is a certain rearing and perfecting not unlike that of living creatures. And so we say that a vine both lives and dies, and a tree both young and old, and that it flourishes and “grows old.” From which it is not amiss to suppose that, as with living creatures, so with these there are certain things suited to their nature and others alien to it, and that there is a kind of tender of their growth and nourishment — namely the science and art of the farmer, which prunes, lops, raises up, lifts, and props, so that they can go where nature carries them; so that the vines themselves, could they speak, would confess that they ought to be so handled and tended. And now indeed — to speak of the vine above all — that which tends it is something external; for in the vine itself there is too little force present for it to thrive as well as it might, if no cultivation be applied.

Constituto autem illo, de quo ante diximus, quod honestum esset, id esse solum bonum, intellegi necesse est pluris id, quod honestum sit, aestimandum esse quam illa media, quae ex eo comparentur. stultitiam autem et timiditatem et iniustitiam et intemperantiam cum dicimus esse fugiendas propter eas res, quae ex ipsis eveniant, non ita dicimus, ut cum illo, quod positum est, solum id esse malum, quod turpe sit, haec pugnare videatur oratio, propterea quod ea non ad corporis incommodum referuntur, sed ad turpes actiones, quae oriuntur e vitiis. quas enim kaki/as Graeci appellant, vitia malo quam malitias nominare.

But suppose sense were now to come to the vine, so that it had a certain appetite and moved of its own accord — what do you think it would do? Will it not, of itself, see to the things it formerly obtained through the vinedresser? But do you not see that a care will be added to it, of tending its senses too, and their whole appetite, and any limbs that have been joined to it? Thus to the things it always had it will join those that came to it afterwards, and it will not have the same end its cultivator had, but will wish to live according to that nature which has afterwards been added to it. So its end of good will be like what it was before, yet not the same; for it will no longer seek the good of a plant, but of an animal. What, then, if not sense only had been given to it, but a man’s mind as well? Must not those former things both abide, so as to be tended, and these later additions be far dearer — and the better each part of the mind, the dearer — and the end of the highest good rest in that filling-out of nature, since mind and reason far and away excel? Thus that which is the last of all things to be sought, drawn from the first commendation of nature, climbs by many degrees until it arrives at the summit, which is built up out of soundness of body and out of the perfected reason of the intelligence.

Ne tu, inquam, Cato, verbis illustribus et id, quod vis, declarantibus! itaque mihi videris Latine docere philosophiam et ei quasi civitatem dare. quae quidem adhuc peregrinari Romae videbatur nec offerre sese nostris sermonibus, et ista maxime propter limatam quandam et rerum et verborum tenuitatem. scio enim esse quosdam, qui quavis lingua philosophari possint; nullis enim partitionibus, nullis definitionibus utuntur ipsique dicunt ea se modo probare, quibus natura tacita adsentiatur. itaque in rebus minime obscuris non multus est apud eos disserendi labor. quare attendo te studiose et, quaecumque rebus iis, de quibus hic sermo est, nomina inponis, memoriae mando; mihi enim erit isdem istis fortasse iam utendum. Virtutibus igitur rectissime mihi videris et ad consuetudinem nostrae orationis vitia posuisse contraria. quod enim vituperabile est per se ipsum, id eo ipso vitium nominatum puto, vel etiam a vitio dictum vituperari. sin kaki/an malitiam dixisses, ad aliud nos unum certum vitium consuetudo Latina traduceret. nunc omni virtuti vitium contrario nomine opponitur.

Since, then, such is the form of nature as I have set it out, if, as I said at the beginning, each person knew himself the moment he came to be, and could judge what the force of his whole nature and of its single parts might be, he would at once see what this is that we are inquiring into — the highest and uttermost of all the things we seek — and could go wrong in nothing. But as it is, from the first nature is marvellously hidden, and can be neither seen through nor known. As our years advance, however, little by little, or rather slowly, we come to know ourselves, as it were. And so that first commendation, which nature has made of us to ourselves, is uncertain and obscure, and that first appetite of the mind does only this much: that we may be able to be safe and sound. But when we begin to discern, and to feel what we are and how we differ from the rest of living creatures, then we begin to pursue the things for which we were born.

Tum ille: His igitur ita positis, inquit, sequitur magna contentio, quam tractatam a Peripateticis mollius—est enim eorum consuetudo dicendi non satis acuta propter ignorationem dialecticae—Carneades tuus egregia quadam exercitatione in dialecticis summaque eloquentia rem in summum discrimen adduxit, propterea quod pugnare non destitit in omni hac quaestione, quae de bonis et malis appelletur, non esse rerum Stoicis cum Peripateticis controversiam, sed nominum. mihi autem nihil tam perspicuum videtur, quam has sententias eorum philosophorum re inter se magis quam verbis dissidere; maiorem multo inter Stoicos et Peripateticos rerum esse aio discrepantiam quam verborum, quippe cum Peripatetici omnia, quae ipsi bona appellant, pertinere dicant ad beate vivendum, nostri non ex omni, quod aestimatione aliqua dignum sit, compleri vitam beatam putent.

The like of this we see in beasts, which at first do not stir from the place where they were born, then each moves by its own appetite. We see snakelings creep, ducklings swim, blackbirds fly, oxen use their horns, scorpions their stings — in short, that for each creature its own nature is its guide to living. And this likeness appears in the human kind as well. For little ones, at the first birth, lie there as if they had no mind at all. But when a little firmness has come to them, they use both mind and senses, and strive to raise themselves up, and use their hands, and recognize those by whom they are reared. Then they take delight in playmates and gladly gather with them, give themselves to play, are drawn by the hearing of stories, wish to be generous to others with what they have to spare, take notice of what goes on at home rather curiously, and begin to ponder something, and to learn, and wish not to be ignorant of the names of those they see; and in the things in which they vie with their playmates, if they have won, they lift themselves up with gladness, and, beaten, they are cast down and let their spirits fall. None of this, we must hold, comes about without a cause.

An vero certius quicquam potest esse quam illorum ratione, qui dolorem in malis ponunt, non posse sapientem beatum esse, cum eculeo torqueatur? eorum autem, qui dolorem in malis non habent, ratio certe cogit ut in omnibus tormentis conservetur beata vita sapienti. etenim si dolores eosdem tolerabilius patiuntur qui excipiunt eos pro patria quam qui leviore de causa, opinio facit, non natura, vim doloris aut maiorem aut minorem.

For the force of man is so begotten by nature that he seems made for grasping every virtue; and for this reason little ones are moved, without teaching, by likenesses of the virtues whose seeds they hold within them — for these are the first elements of nature, which, once enlarged, bring about virtue’s sprouting, so to speak. For since we have been so born and made as to hold within us the beginnings both of doing something, and of loving certain people, and of generosity, and of returning a kindness, and as to have minds apt for science, prudence, fortitude, and estranged from their contraries, it is not without cause that we see in children those sparks of the virtues, as I called them, from which the philosopher’s reason must be kindled, so that, following it as a kind of god for its guide, it may arrive at the uttermost of nature. For, as I have often said by now, in the feeble years and the weak mind the force of nature is discerned as if through a fog; but when, as it advances, the mind is strengthened, it does indeed recognize the force of nature, yet in such a way that it can advance further, while in itself it has only been begun.

Ne illud quidem est consentaneum, ut, si, cum tria genera bonorum sint, quae sententia est Peripateticorum, eo beatior quisque sit, quo sit corporis aut externis bonis plenior, ut hoc idem adprobandum sit nobis, ut, qui plura habeat ea, quae in corpore magni aestimantur, sit beatior. illi enim corporis commodis compleri vitam beatam putant, nostri nihil minus. nam cum ita placeat, ne eorum quidem bonorum, quae nos bona vere appellemus, frequentia beatiorem vitam fieri aut magis expetendam aut pluris aestimandam, certe minus ad beatam vitam pertinet multitudo corporis commodorum.

We must enter, then, into the nature of things, and see through to the very depths what she requires; for otherwise we cannot know ourselves. And because this precept was too great to seem to come from a man, it was for that reason assigned to a god. The Pythian Apollo therefore bids us know ourselves. But this knowledge of ourselves is one thing: to know the force of body and of mind, and to follow that life which has the full enjoyment of these very things. Now since this appetite of the mind was from the beginning such that we should have those things I spoke of as perfect in nature as may be, it must be confessed that, once we have attained what was sought, nature comes to rest, as it were, in that as in her uttermost, and that this is the highest good — which surely, taken whole, must of its own accord and for its own sake be sought, since it was shown before that even its single parts are to be sought for their own sakes.

etenim, si et sapere expetendum sit et valere, coniunctum utrumque magis expetendum sit quam sapere solum, neque tamen, si utrumque sit aestimatione dignum, pluris sit coniunctum quam sapere ipsum separatim. nam qui valitudinem aestimatione aliqua dignam iudicamus neque eam tamen in bonis ponimus, idem censemus nullam esse tantam aestimationem, ut ea virtuti anteponatur. quod idem Peripatetici non tenent, quibus dicendum est, quae et honesta actio sit et sine dolore, eam magis esse expetendam, quam si esset eadem actio cum dolore. nobis aliter videtur, recte secusne, postea; sed potestne rerum maior esse dissensio?

But in reckoning up the advantages of the body, if anyone shall think that pleasure has been passed over by us, let that question be deferred to another time. For whether pleasure is or is not among those things we have called first according to nature makes no difference to what we are about. For if, as it seems to me at least, pleasure does not fill out the goods of nature, it has rightly been passed over; but if it is in them, as some hold, nothing hinders this grasp of ours of the highest good. For to those things which have been established as first according to nature, if pleasure be added, some one advantage of the body will have been added, and it will not have changed that constitution of the highest good which has been set forth.

Ut enim obscuratur et offunditur luce solis lumen lucernae, et ut interit in magnitudine maris Aegaei stilla mellis, et ut in divitiis Croesi teruncii accessio et gradus unus in ea via, quae est hinc in Indiam, sic, cum sit is bonorum finis, quem Stoici dicunt, omnis ista rerum corporearum aestimatio splendore virtutis et magnitudine obscuretur et obruatur atque intereat necesse est. et quem ad modum oportunitas—sic enim appellemus eu)kairi/an —non fit maior productione temporis—habent enim suum modum, quae oportuna dicuntur—, sic recta effectio— kato/rqwsin enim ita appello, quoniam rectum factum kato/rqwma —, recta igitur effectio, item convenientia, denique ipsum bonum, quod in eo positum est, ut naturae consentiat, crescendi accessionem nullam habet.

And so far, indeed, our reasoning has proceeded in such a way that the whole of it was drawn from the first commendation of nature. But now let us follow another kind of argument: that not only because we love ourselves, but because each part of nature, in both body and mind, has its own force, for that reason we are moved in these matters to the highest degree of our own accord. And, to begin with the body, do you not see how, if anything in the limbs is crooked or crippled or stunted, men hide it? How they even struggle and labour, if they can bring it about, that the body’s fault either not appear or appear as little as possible? And how they endure many pains as well, for the sake of a cure, so that, even if the very use of the limbs is to be not greater but actually less, still their appearance may return to nature? For indeed, since all by nature think themselves to be sought whole, and that for no other reason but on their own account, the parts too must necessarily be sought for their own sakes, when the whole is sought for its own sake.

ut enim oportunitas illa, sic haec, de quibus dixi, non fiunt temporis productione maiora, ob eamque causam Stoicis non videtur optabilior nec magis expetenda beata vita, si sit longa, quam si brevis, utunturque simili: ut, si cothurni laus illa esset, ad pedem apte convenire, neque multi cothurni paucis anteponerentur nec maiores minoribus, sic, quorum omne bonum convenientia atque oportunitate finitur, nec plura paucioribus nec longinquiora brevioribus anteponent. Nec vero satis acute dicunt:

What? In the motion and posture of the body is there nothing that nature herself judges must be heeded? In what manner a man walks, sits; what the carriage of the face, what the look, may be in each? Is there nothing in these things that we account worthy or unworthy of a free man? Do we not think many men deserving of hatred who, by a certain motion or posture, seem to have scorned the law and measure of nature? And since these things are drawn from the body, what reason is there why beauty itself should not rightly be reckoned worth seeking for its own sake? For if we think the body’s crookedness and stunting are to be fled for their own sakes, why should we not also — and perhaps the more — pursue the dignity of form for its own sake? And if we flee ugliness in the posture and motion of the body, what reason is there why we should not pursue beauty? Health, too, and strength, and freedom from pain we shall seek not only for their usefulness but also for their own sakes. For since nature wishes to be filled out in all her parts, she seeks for its own sake that condition of the body which is most in keeping with nature — a nature wholly thrown into disorder if the body is sick, or in pain, or wanting in strength.

si bona valitudo pluris aestimanda sit longa quam brevis, sapientiae quoque usus longissimus quisque sit plurimi. non intellegunt valitudinis aestimationem spatio iudicari, virtutis oportunitate, ut videantur qui illud dicant idem hoc esse dicturi, bonam mortem et bonum partum meliorem longum esse quam brevem. non vident alia brevitate pluris aestimari, alia diuturnitate.

Let us look at the parts of the mind, whose view is more brilliant; and the loftier they are, the clearer the signs of nature they give. So great is the love of knowing and of knowledge bred in us that no one can doubt that the nature of man is swept toward these things lured by no profit. Do we not see how children are not deterred even by beatings from gazing at things and searching them out? How, when driven off, they run back? How they rejoice to know something? How they are eager to tell it to others? How they are held by a procession, by the games and spectacles of that kind, and for the sake of it endure even hunger and thirst? And what of those who take delight in liberal studies and arts — do we not see that they take no account of health or of household estate, but bear all things, captured by knowing and by knowledge itself, and balance against the greatest cares and labours the pleasure they take from learning?

itaque consentaneum est his, quae dicta sunt, ratione illorum, qui illum bonorum finem, quod appellamus extremum, quod ultimum, crescere putent posse—isdem placere esse alium alio et sapientiorem itemque alium magis alio vel peccare vel recte facere, quod nobis non licet dicere, qui crescere bonorum finem non putamus. ut enim qui demersi sunt in aqua nihilo magis respirare possunt, si non longe absunt a summo, ut iam iamque possint emergere, quam si etiam tum essent in profundo, nec catulus ille, qui iam adpropinquat ut videat, plus cernit quam is, qui modo est natus, item qui processit aliquantum ad virtutis habitum nihilo minus in miseria est quam ille, qui nihil processit. Haec mirabilia videri intellego, sed cum certe superiora firma ac vera sint, his autem ea consentanea et consequentia, ne de horum quidem est veritate dubitandum. sed quamquam negant nec virtutes nec vitia crescere, tamen utrumque eorum fundi quodam modo et quasi dilatari putant. Divitias autem Diogenes censet eam modo vim habere, ut quasi duces sint ad voluptatem et ad valitudinem bonam;

To me, at any rate, Homer seems to have glimpsed something of this kind in what he invented about the song of the Sirens. For it does not appear that they were in the habit of calling back those who sailed past by the sweetness of their voices, or by some novelty and variety of singing, but because they professed to know many things — so that men clung fast upon their rocks out of a desire to learn. This is how they call to Ulysses (for I have translated this very passage, as I have certain others of Homer’s): O glory of the Argives, why not turn your prow, Ulysses, that with your ears you may take in our song? For no one ever yet has sailed past these blue waters on his course without first standing still, caught by the sweetness of our voices, and then, sated in his eager breast with our manifold music, gliding onward to the shores of his fathers the wiser. We hold fast the heavy struggle of the war, and the ruin that Greece, by the will of heaven, brought upon Troy, and all the traces of things that are spread across the wide earth. Homer saw that the story could not carry conviction if so great a man were held entangled by mere little ditties; what they promise is knowledge, and it is no wonder that to a man hungry for wisdom this should be dearer than his homeland. And indeed, to wish to know everything, of whatever kind, is the mark of the merely curious; but to be drawn to a desire for knowledge by the contemplation of greater things is what we must reckon the mark of the greatest of men.

sed, etiam uti ea contineant, non idem facere eas in virtute neque in ceteris artibus, ad quas esse dux pecunia potest, continere autem non potest, itaque, si voluptas aut si bona valitudo sit in bonis, divitias quoque in bonis esse ponendas, at, si sapientia bonum sit, non sequi ut etiam divitias bonum esse dicamus. neque ab ulla re, quae non sit in bonis, id, quod sit in bonis, contineri potest, ob eamque causam, quia cognitiones comprehensionesque rerum, e quibus efficiuntur artes, adpetitionem movent, cum divitiae non sint in bonis, nulla ars divitiis contineri potest.

For what burning zeal do you suppose was in Archimedes, who, while he was drawing certain figures in the dust with too close attention, did not even feel that his country had been taken? How much of Aristoxenus’ genius do we see consumed in music? With what zeal do we think Aristophanes spent his life upon letters? What of Pythagoras? What shall I say of Plato or of Democritus? Men whom we see, for the desire of learning, to have traversed the farthest lands. Those who do not see this have never loved anything great and worthy of being known. And on this point, those who say that the studies I have named are pursued for the sake of the pleasures of the mind do not understand that they are for this very reason to be sought for their own sakes — namely, because our minds delight in them with no advantage held out, and rejoice in the knowledge itself even where it is going to bring inconvenience.

quod si de artibus concedamus, virtutis tamen non sit eadem ratio, propterea quod haec plurimae commentationis et exercitationis indigeat, quod idem in artibus non sit, et quod virtus stabilitatem, firmitatem, constantiam totius vitae complectatur, nec haec eadem in artibus esse videamus. Deinceps explicatur differentia rerum, quam si non ullam esse diceremus, confunderetur omnis vita, ut ab Aristone, neque ullum sapientiae munus aut opus inveniretur, cum inter res eas, quae ad vitam degendam pertinerent, nihil omnino interesset, neque ullum dilectum adhiberi oporteret. itaque cum esset satis constitutum id solum esse bonum, quod esset honestum, et id malum solum, quod turpe, tum inter illa, quae nihil valerent ad beate misereve vivendum, aliquid tamen, quod differret, esse voluerunt, ut essent eorum alia aestimabilia, alia contra, alia neutrum.

But what is the use of demanding more on matters so plain? Let us rather put the question to ourselves: how the movements of the stars and the contemplation of the heavenly bodies, and the knowledge of all those things that are hidden away in the obscurity of nature, move us; and what delight there is in history, which we are accustomed to pursue to the very end, going back over what we have passed by and following up what we have begun. Nor indeed am I unaware that there is utility in history, and not pleasure only.

quae autem aestimanda essent, eorum in aliis satis esse causae, quam ob rem quibusdam anteponerentur, ut in valitudine, ut in integritate sensuum, ut in doloris vacuitate, ut gloriae, divitiarum, similium rerum, alia autem non esse eius modi, itemque eorum, quae nulla aestimatione digna essent, partim satis habere causae, quam ob rem reicerentur, ut dolorem, morbum, sensuum amissionem, paupertatem, ignominiam, similia horum, partim non item. hinc est illud exortum, quod Zeno prohgme/non, contraque quod a)poprohgme/non nominavit, cum uteretur in lingua copiosa factis tamen nominibus ac novis, quod nobis in hac inopi lingua non conceditur; quamquam tu hanc copiosiorem etiam soles dicere. Sed non alienum est, quo facilius vis verbi intellegatur, rationem huius verbi faciendi Zenonis exponere.

What, when we read invented stories, from which no utility can be drawn out, and read them with pleasure? What, when we wish the names of those who have done some deed to be known to us, and their parents, their homeland, and many things besides that are not in the least necessary? What of the fact that men of the lowest fortune, with no hope of conducting affairs — craftsmen, in short — take delight in history? And we can see that those most of all wish to hear and to read of deeds done who are far from any hope of doing them, worn out by old age. From which it must necessarily be understood that in the very things which are learned and known there are inducements present, by which we are moved to learning and to knowing.

Ut enim, inquit, nemo dicit in regia regem ipsum quasi productum esse ad dignitatem (id est enim prohgme/non ), sed eos, qui in aliquo honore sunt, quorum ordo proxime accedit, ut secundus sit, ad regium principatum, sic in vita non ea, quae primo loco sunt, sed ea, quae secundum locum optinent, prohgme/na, id est producta, nominentur; quae vel ita appellemus—id erit verbum e verbo—vel promota et remota vel, ut dudum diximus, praeposita vel praecipua, et illa reiecta. re enim intellecta in verborum usu faciles esse debemus.

The old philosophers, indeed, imagine in the islands of the blessed what the life of the wise will be like: men freed from all care, requiring no necessary furnishing or provision for life, who they suppose will do nothing else than spend the whole of their time in inquiry and in learning, in the knowledge of nature. We, however, see that this is not only the delight of the happy life but also a relief from miseries. And so many men, when they were in the power of enemies or of tyrants, many in captivity, many in exile, have lightened their pain by the pursuits of learning.

quoniam autem omne, quod est bonum, primum locum tenere dicimus, necesse est nec bonum esse nec malum hoc, quod praepositum vel praecipuum nominamus. idque ita definimus; quod sit indifferens cum aestimatione mediocri; quod enim illi a)dia/foron dicunt, id mihi ita occurrit, ut indifferens dicerem. neque enim illud fieri poterat ullo modo, ut nihil relinqueretur in mediis, quod aut secundum naturam esset aut contra, nec, cum id relinqueretur, nihil in his poni, quod satis aestimabile esset, nec hoc posito non aliqua esse praeposita. recte igitur haec facta distinctio est, atque etiam ab iis, quo facilius res perspici possit, hoc simile ponitur:

The chief man of this city, Demetrius of Phalerum, when he had been driven from his country by injustice, betook himself to king Ptolemy at Alexandria. And since he excelled in this very philosophy to which we are urging you, and had been a pupil of Theophrastus, he wrote many splendid things in that calamitous leisure — not for any use of his own, of which he had been stripped, but that cultivation of his mind was for him a kind of food of humanity. For my part, I often used to hear from Cn. Aufidius, a man of praetorian rank, learned, and blind, that he was moved by a longing for the light more than for any use of it. In a word, unless sleep brought rest to our bodies and a kind of medicine for our labour, we should reckon it given against nature, for it takes away our senses and removes all activity. And so, if either nature did not seek rest, or could obtain it in some other way, we should readily put up with it — we who even now are accustomed, for the sake of doing or learning something, to take on our vigils almost against nature.

Ut enim, inquiunt, si hoc fingamus esse quasi finem et ultimum, ita iacere talum, ut rectus adsistat, qui ita talus erit iactus, ut cadat rectus, praepositum quiddam habebit ad finem, qui aliter, contra, neque tamen illa praepositio tali ad eum, quem dixi, finem pertinebit, sic ea, quae sunt praeposita, referuntur illa quidem ad finem, sed ad eius vim naturamque nihil pertinent.

There are, moreover, still clearer, even plainly evident and not in the least doubtful signs of nature, above all in man, of course, but in every animal: that the mind craves always to be doing something, and on no terms can endure everlasting rest. This is easy to discern in the earliest little years of children. For although I fear I may seem excessive on this kind of point, still all the old philosophers, and ours above all, go back to the cradle, because they think that in childhood the will of nature can most easily be known. We see, then, how even infants cannot keep still. And when they have advanced a little, they take delight in games even if these are toilsome, so that they cannot be deterred even by beatings, and that desire of doing something grows up together with their years. And so, not even if we supposed we should enjoy the most delightful dreams would we wish the sleep of Endymion to be given us; and if it did befall us, we should reckon it the equal of death.

Sequitur illa divisio, ut bonorum alia sint ad illud ultimum pertinentia (sic enim appello, quae telika/ dicuntur; nam hoc ipsum instituamus, ut placuit, pluribus verbis dicere, quod uno non poterimus, ut res intellegatur), alia autem efficientia, quae Graeci poihtika/, alia utrumque. de pertinentibus nihil est bonum praeter actiones honestas, de efficientibus nihil praeter amicum, sed et pertinentem et efficientem sapientiam volunt esse. nam quia sapientia est conveniens actio, est in illo pertinenti genere, quod dixi; quod autem honestas actiones adfert et efficit, id efficiens dici potest.

Indeed, even the most idle of men, endowed with some singular and indescribable sluggishness, we still see to be forever moved in body and mind, and, when they are hampered by no necessary business, either to call for the dice-board, or to seek out some game, or to look for some conversation; and since they do not have the noble delights that come from learning, to chase after little gatherings and gossiping circles. Indeed, not even the beasts that we shut up for the sake of our delight, although they are fed more abundantly than if they were free, readily endure to be confined, and they long for the free and wandering movements that nature has assigned them.

Haec, quae praeposita dicimus, partim sunt per se ipsa praeposita, partim quod aliquid efficiunt, partim utrumque, per se, ut quidam habitus oris et vultus, ut status, ut motus, in quibus sunt et praeponenda quaedam et reicienda; alia ob eam rem praeposita dicentur, quod ex se aliquid efficiant, ut pecunia, alia autem ob utramque rem, ut integri sensus, ut bona valitudo.

And so the better any man is born and trained, the less he would wish to be alive at all if, stripped of affairs to conduct, he could feed on pleasures however well prepared. For men either prefer to conduct some business privately, or, if they are of a loftier mind, take up the commonwealth by winning honours and commands, or devote themselves wholly to the pursuits of learning. In which life they are so far from chasing after pleasures that they even endure cares, anxieties, sleepless nights, and enjoy the best part of a man — which in us must be reckoned divine — the keenness of genius and of mind, neither seeking pleasure nor fleeing toil. Nor indeed do they let up either their wonder at the things that have been discovered by the ancients or their search for new ones. And since they cannot be sated by this zeal, forgetful of all other things, they think nothing low, nothing base; and so great is the power in such pursuits that we see even those who have set themselves other ends of goods, ones they steer by utility or by pleasure, nevertheless wear out their lives in inquiring into things and unfolding the workings of nature.

De bona autem fama—quam enim appellant eu)doci/an, aptius est bonam famam hoc loco appellare quam gloriam—Chrysippus quidem et Diogenes detracta utilitate ne digitum quidem eius causa porrigendum esse dicebant; quibus ego vehementer assentior. qui autem post eos fuerunt, cum Carneadem sustinere non possent, hanc, quam dixi, bonam famam ipsam propter se praepositam et sumendam esse dixerunt, esseque hominis ingenui et liberaliter educati velle bene audire a parentibus, a propinquis, a bonis etiam viris, idque propter rem ipsam, non propter usum, dicuntque, ut liberis consultum velimus, etiamsi postumi futuri sint, propter ipsos, sic futurae post mortem famae tamen esse propter rem, etiam detracto usu, consulendum.

Therefore this much, at least, is clear: that we are born for action. Now there are several kinds of action, such that the lesser are even put in the shade by the greater; and the greatest are, first — as it seems to me, at any rate, and to those whose system we are now treating — the consideration and knowledge of the heavenly bodies and of those things which, hidden and lying concealed by nature, reason can track down; next, the administration of public affairs, or the science of administering them; then the prudent, temperate, brave, just exercise of reason and the remaining virtues, and the actions that accord with the virtues — all of which, embracing them in a single word, we call the honourable. To both the knowledge and the practice of these we are led, once we have grown strong, with nature herself going before us. For the beginnings of all things are small, but they grow by employing their own advances — and not without reason: for in the first emergence there is a certain tenderness and softness, such that one can neither see the best things nor do them. The light of virtue and of the happy life, the two things most of all to be sought, appears later, and much later still before it is understood plainly what these are. For Plato says it splendidly: Happy is the man to whom it has fallen, even in old age, to be able to attain wisdom and true opinions! Therefore, since enough has been said about the first advantages of nature, let us now look at the greater things that follow.

Sed cum, quod honestum sit, id solum bonum esse dicamus, consentaneum tamen est fungi officio, cum id officium nec in bonis ponamus nec in malis. est enim aliquid in his rebus probabile, et quidem ita, ut eius ratio reddi possit, ergo ut etiam probabiliter acti ratio reddi possit. est autem officium, quod ita factum est, ut eius facti probabilis ratio reddi possit. ex quo intellegitur officium medium quiddam esse, quod neque in bonis ponatur neque in contrariis. quoniamque in iis rebus, quae neque in virtutibus sunt neque in vitiis, est tamen quiddam, quod usui possit esse, tollendum id non est. est autem eius generis actio quoque quaedam, et quidem talis, ut ratio postulet agere aliquid et facere eorum. quod autem ratione actum est, id officium appellamus. est igitur officium eius generis, quod nec in bonis ponatur nec in contrariis.

Nature, then, both begot and shaped the body of man in such a way that some things she perfected at the first emergence, others she fashioned as the years advanced, and she made hardly any use at all of external and adventitious aids. The mind, however, she perfected, as she did the body, by the remaining things; for she furnished it with senses fit for perceiving things, so that they needed no aid, or not much, for their own confirmation. But what is most excellent and best in man, that she left undone. And yet she gave such a mind as could receive every virtue, and implanted, without teaching, small notions of the greatest things, and, as it were, set out to teach and led us into the things that were already within — the elements, so to speak, of virtue. But virtue itself she only began; nothing more.

Atque perspicuum etiam illud est, in istis rebus mediis aliquid agere sapientem. iudicat igitur, cum agit, officium illud esse. quod quoniam numquam fallitur in iudicando, erit in mediis rebus officium. quod efficitur hac etiam conclusione rationis: Quoniam enim videmus esse quiddam, quod recte factum appellemus, id autem est perfectum officium, erit autem etiam inchoatum, ut, si iuste depositum reddere in recte factis sit, in officiis ponatur depositum reddere; illo enim addito iuste fit recte factum, per se autem hoc ipsum reddere in officio ponitur. quoniamque non dubium est quin in iis, quae media dicimus, sit aliud sumendum, aliud reiciendum, quicquid ita fit aut dicitur, omne officio continetur. ex quo intellegitur, quoniam se ipsi omnes natura diligant, tam insipientem quam sapientem sumpturum, quae secundum naturam sint, reiecturumque contraria. ita est quoddam commune officium sapientis et insipientis, ex quo efficitur versari in iis, quae media dicamus.

And so it is our task — when I say ours, I mean it is the task of an art — to seek out, upon those beginnings that we have received, the consequences, until that which we want is brought to completion. And this is worth a good deal more, and far more to be sought for its own sake, than either the senses or those things of the body which we mentioned; for the surpassing perfection of the mind so far excels them that it can scarcely be conceived what the difference is. And so all honour, all admiration, all zeal is referred to virtue and to those actions that are in accord with virtue, and all the things that are either so present in our minds or so done are called by one name the honourable. What the notions of all these are — those, that is, that are signified by the names of things — and what the force and nature of each is, we shall see presently.

Sed cum ab his omnia proficiscantur officia, non sine causa dicitur ad ea referri omnes nostras cogitationes, in his et excessum e vita et in vita mansionem. in quo enim plura sunt quae secundum naturam sunt, huius officium est in vita manere; in quo autem aut sunt plura contraria aut fore videntur, huius officium est de vita excedere. ex quo apparet et sapientis esse aliquando officium excedere e vita, cum beatus sit, et stulti manere in vita, cum sit miser.

But for now let us only explain that this honourable of which I speak — apart from the fact that we love our very selves — is besides, by its own nature, to be sought for its own sake. Children give the proof, in whom, as in mirrors, nature is discerned. What great zeal there is in those who contend! What great contests in themselves! How they are carried away with joy when they have won! How ashamed the beaten are! How they refuse to be found at fault! How they long to be praised! What labours do they not endure, to be foremost among their fellows! What memory there is in them of those who have done well by them, what desire to return the favour! And these things appear most of all in every best natural disposition, in which this honourable that we have in mind is, as it were, sketched out by nature.

nam bonum illud et malum, quod saepe iam dictum est, postea consequitur, prima autem illa naturae sive secunda sive contraria sub iudicium sapientis et dilectum cadunt, estque illa subiecta quasi materia sapientiae. itaque et manendi in vita et migrandi ratio omnis iis rebus, quas supra dixi, metienda. nam neque virtute retinetur ille in vita, nec iis, qui sine virtute sunt, mors est oppetenda. et saepe officium est sapientis desciscere a vita, cum sit beatissimus, si id oportune facere possit, quod est convenienter naturae. sic enim censent, oportunitatis esse beate vivere. itaque a sapientia praecipitur se ipsam, si usus sit, sapiens ut relinquat. quam ob rem cum vitiorum ista vis non sit, ut causam afferant mortis voluntariae, perspicuum est etiam stultorum, qui idem miseri sint, officium esse manere in vita, si sint in maiore parte rerum earum, quas secundum naturam esse dicimus. et quoniam excedens e vita et manens aeque miser est nec diuturnitas magis ei vitam fugiendam facit, non sine causa dicitur iis, qui pluribus naturalibus frui possint, esse in vita manendum.

But these things are in children; in those ages that are now full-formed they are clearly expressed. Who is so unlike a human being as not to be moved both by offence at baseness and by approval of honour? Who is there who does not hate a lustful, shameless youth? Who, on the other hand, does not love modesty and steadiness in that age, even where his own interest is not concerned at all? Who does not hate Pullus Numitorius of Fregellae, the traitor, although he was of service to our commonwealth? Who does not praise above all Codrus, the saviour of his city, who does not praise the daughters of Erechtheus? To whom is the name of Tubulus not hateful? Who does not love Aristides, though he is dead? Or do we forget how greatly we are moved in the hearing and in the reading, when we learn of something done with piety, with friendship, with greatness of soul?

Pertinere autem ad rem arbitrantur intellegi natura fieri ut liberi a parentibus amentur. a quo initio profectam communem humani generis societatem persequimur. quod primum intellegi debet figura membrisque corporum, quae ipsa declarant procreandi a natura habitam esse rationem. neque vero haec inter se congruere possent, ut natura et procreari vellet et diligi procreatos non curaret. atque etiam in bestiis vis naturae perspici potest; quarum in fetu et in educatione laborem cum cernimus, naturae ipsius vocem videmur audire. quare ut perspicuum est natura nos a dolore abhorrere, sic apparet a natura ipsa, ut eos, quos genuerimus, amemus, inpelli.

Why do I speak of ourselves, who were born, taken up, and trained for praise and for honour? What shouts of the crowd and of the unlearned are raised in the theatres when those lines are spoken: ’I am Orestes’, and against him from the other: ’No, in truth, I tell you, I am Orestes!’ And when, moreover, the way out is given by each to the king, confused and at a loss — when both, then, pray to be put to death together — how often is this acted out, and ever with anything but the greatest admiration? There is no one, then, who does not approve and praise this disposition of mind, by which not only is no advantage sought, but, against advantage, faith is even kept.

ex hoc nascitur ut etiam communis hominum inter homines naturalis sit commendatio, ut oporteat hominem ab homine ob id ipsum, quod homo sit, non alienum videri. ut enim in membris alia sunt tamquam sibi nata, ut oculi, ut aures, alia etiam ceterorum membrorum usum adiuvant, ut crura, ut manus, sic inmanes quaedam bestiae sibi solum natae sunt, at illa, quae in concha patula pina dicitur, isque, qui enat e concha, qui, quod eam custodit, pinoteres vocatur in eandemque cum se recepit includitur, ut videatur monuisse ut caveret, itemque formicae, apes, ciconiae aliorum etiam causa quaedam faciunt. multo haec coniunctius homines. itaque natura sumus apti ad coetus, concilia, civitates.

With examples of this kind not only invented stories but histories too are crammed, and ours especially. For we chose the best of men to receive the sacred objects of Ida; we sent guardians to kings; our generals vowed their own lives for the safety of their country; our consuls warned a king, a bitter enemy already drawing near our walls, to beware of poison; in our commonwealth was found a Lucretia, who atoned by a voluntary death for the violation forced upon her, and a man who killed his daughter that she might not be violated. All these things, and countless others besides — who is there who does not understand both that those who did them were drawn by the splendour of worth and were heedless of their own advantage, and that we, when we praise them, are led by nothing else than the honourable? Now that these matters have been set out briefly — for I have not pursued the abundance I might have, since there was no doubt in the case — by all this it is surely concluded that both all the virtues and that honourable which springs from them and clings within them are to be sought for their own sake.

mundum autem censent regi numine deorum, eumque esse quasi communem urbem et civitatem hominum et deorum, et unum quemque nostrum eius mundi esse partem; ex quo illud natura consequi, ut communem utilitatem nostrae anteponamus. ut enim leges omnium salutem singulorum saluti anteponunt, sic vir bonus et sapiens et legibus parens et civilis officii non ignarus utilitati omnium plus quam unius alicuius aut suae consulit. nec magis est vituperandus proditor patriae quam communis utilitatis aut salutis desertor propter suam utilitatem aut salutem. ex quo fit, ut laudandus is sit, qui mortem oppetat pro re publica, quod deceat cariorem nobis esse patriam quam nosmet ipsos. quoniamque illa vox inhumana et scelerata ducitur eorum, qui negant se recusare quo minus ipsis mortuis terrarum omnium deflagratio consequatur—quod vulgari quodam versu Graeco pronuntiari solet—, certe verum est etiam iis, qui aliquando futuri sint, esse propter ipsos consulendum.

But in all that honourable good of which we are speaking, nothing is so radiant, nothing of wider reach, than the bond between man and man, a kind of fellowship and sharing of advantages, and that very love of the human race. This love, born from the first begetting — in that children are cherished by those who begot them, and the whole household is bound together by marriage and by stock — creeps gradually outward: first to kinsfolk, then to relations by marriage, then to friends, after that to neighbours, then to fellow citizens and to those who are publicly our allies and friends, and at last to the embrace of the whole human kind. This disposition of the mind, rendering to each his own and guarding generously and fairly that fellowship of human union of which I speak, is called justice; and joined to it are dutifulness, kindness, generosity, good will, courtesy, and whatever else is of the same kind. And these things, while they are proper to justice, are at the same time shared with the rest of the virtues.

ex hac animorum affectione testamenta commendationesque morientium natae sunt. quodque nemo in summa solitudine vitam agere velit ne cum infinita quidem voluptatum abundantia, facile intellegitur nos ad coniunctionem congregationemque hominum et ad naturalem communitatem esse natos. Inpellimur autem natura, ut prodesse velimus quam plurimis in primisque docendo rationibusque prudentiae tradendis.

For since man’s nature has been begotten in such a way that he has within him something inborn and, as it were, civic and communal, which the Greeks call politikon, whatever any virtue does will not be at odds with that community and that love and human fellowship which I have set out; and, in turn, just as justice itself will pour itself into the other virtues, so it will seek them out. For justice cannot be kept except by a brave man, except by a wise one. Such, then, as is this whole concord and consent of the virtues of which I speak, such is that honourable good itself, since the honourable is either virtue itself or a deed done by virtue; and a life that accords with these and answers to the virtues can be judged upright and honourable and steadfast and in keeping with nature.

itaque non facile est invenire qui quod sciat ipse non tradat alteri; ita non solum ad discendum propensi sumus, verum etiam ad docendum. Atque ut tauris natura datum est ut pro vitulis contra leones summa vi impetuque contendant, sic ii, qui valent opibus atque id facere possunt, ut de Hercule et de Libero accepimus, ad servandum genus hominum natura incitantur. Atque etiam Iovem cum Optimum et Maximum dicimus cumque eundem Salutarem, Hospitalem, Statorem, hoc intellegi volumus, salutem hominum in eius esse tutela. minime autem convenit, cum ipsi inter nos viles neglectique simus, postulare ut diis inmortalibus cari simus et ab iis diligamur. Quem ad modum igitur membris utimur prius, quam didicimus, cuius ea causa utilitatis habeamus, sic inter nos natura ad civilem communitatem coniuncti et consociati sumus. quod ni ita se haberet, nec iustitiae ullus esset nec bonitati locus.

And yet this joining and intermingling of the virtues is nonetheless distinguished by the philosophers through a certain method of reasoning. For although they are so coupled and connected that all share in all, and none can be severed from another, still each has its own proper office: courage is discerned in toils and dangers, temperance in the foregoing of pleasures, prudence in the choice of goods and evils, justice in rendering to each his own. Since, then, there is in every virtue a certain care that looks, as it were, outward and reaches after others and embraces them, it comes about that friends, that brothers, that kinsmen, that relations by marriage, that fellow citizens, that everyone in the end — since we hold that there is one fellowship of mankind — are to be sought for their own sake. And yet none of these is of such a kind as to lie within the end and uttermost limit of goods.

Et quo modo hominum inter homines iuris esse vincula putant, sic homini nihil iuris esse cum bestiis. praeclare enim Chrysippus, cetera nata esse hominum causa et deorum, eos autem communitatis et societatis suae, ut bestiis homines uti ad utilitatem suam possint sine iniuria. Quoniamque ea natura esset hominis, ut ei cum genere humano quasi civile ius intercederet, qui id conservaret, eum iustum, qui migraret, iniustum fore. sed quem ad modum, theatrum cum commune sit, recte tamen dici potest eius esse eum locum, quem quisque occuparit, sic in urbe mundove communi non adversatur ius, quo minus suum quidque cuiusque sit.

So it comes about that two kinds of things to be sought for their own sake are found. One lies in those things in which that uttermost good is brought to completion — things which belong either to the mind or to the body. But those that are external — that is, those that are present neither in the mind nor in the body, such as friends, parents, children, kinsmen, the fatherland itself — these are indeed dear of their own accord, but they are not of the same class as the others. Nor indeed could anyone ever attain the highest good if all those things that lie outside us, though to be sought, were contained within the highest good.

Cum autem ad tuendos conservandosque homines hominem natum esse videamus, consentaneum est huic naturae, ut sapiens velit gerere et administrare rem publicam atque, ut e natura vivat, uxorem adiungere et velle ex ea liberos. ne amores quidem sanctos a sapiente alienos esse arbitrantur. Cynicorum autem rationem atque vitam alii cadere in sapientem dicunt, si qui eius modi forte casus inciderit, ut id faciendum sit, alii nullo modo.

"How, then," you will say, "will it be possible for it to be true that all things are referred to the highest good, if friendships, if ties of kinship, if the remaining external things are not contained within the highest good?" By this account, surely: that we guard those things which are external by the duties that arise from each particular kind of virtue. For the cultivation of a friend and of a parent, to one who discharges his duty, profits him in this very thing, that to discharge duty thus belongs among right actions, which are sprung from the virtues. These the wise indeed pursue under nature’s guidance, as though they could see; but men who are not yet perfect, and yet endowed with outstanding natural gifts, are often roused by glory, which has the look and likeness of the honourable. But if they could see, through and through, that honourable good itself, perfect and complete on every side … the one thing most splendid of all and most worthy of praise, with what joy would they be filled, when they take such delight in the shadowy notion of it?

Ut vero conservetur omnis homini erga hominem societas, coniunctio, caritas, et emolumenta et detrimenta, quae w)felh/mata et bla/mmata appellant, communia esse voluerunt; quorum altera prosunt, nocent altera. neque solum ea communia, verum etiam paria esse dixerunt. incommoda autem et commoda—ita enim eu)xrhsth/mata et dusxrhsth/mata appello—communia esse voluerunt, paria noluerunt. illa enim, quae prosunt aut quae nocent, aut bona sunt aut mala, quae sint paria necesse est. commoda autem et incommoda in eo genere sunt, quae praeposita et reiecta diximus; ea possunt paria non esse. sed emolumenta communia esse dicuntur, recte autem facta et peccata non habentur communia.

For what man, given over to pleasures, what man set ablaze by the fires of his desires in laying hold of the things he had most fiercely craved, do we suppose to be flooded with so great a gladness as either the elder Africanus, when Hannibal was beaten, or the younger, when Carthage was overthrown? Whom did the descent of the Tiber on that festal day affect with so great a joy as it affected L. Paulus, when he was carried up that same river bringing King Perses captive? Come now, Lucius mine, raise up in your mind the height and excellence of the virtues:

Amicitiam autem adhibendam esse censent, quia sit ex eo genere, quae prosunt. quamquam autem in amicitia alii dicant aeque caram esse sapienti rationem amici ac suam, alii autem sibi cuique cariorem suam, tamen hi quoque posteriores fatentur alienum esse a iustitia, ad quam nati esse videamur, detrahere quid de aliquo, quod sibi adsumat. minime vero probatur huic disciplinae, de qua loquor, aut iustitiam aut amicitiam propter utilitates adscisci aut probari. eaedem enim utilitates poterunt eas labefactare atque pervertere. etenim nec iustitia nec amicitia esse omnino poterunt, nisi ipsae per se expetuntur.

you will no longer doubt that men who possess them, living with a great and lofty spirit, are always happy — men who understand that all the motions of fortune and the changes of circumstance and the times will be light and feeble, if once they have entered the contest of virtue. For those things which we counted among the goods of the body do indeed fill out the happiest life, but in such a way that the happy life can exist without them. For so small and slight are those additions of goods that, just as the stars are not even seen in the rays of the sun, so these are not even discerned in the splendour of the virtues. And though it is truly said that those advantages of the body count for little toward living happily, still it is too violent to say that they count for nothing;

Ius autem, quod ita dici appellarique possit, id esse natura, alienumque esse a sapiente non modo iniuriam cui facere, verum etiam nocere. nec vero rectum est cum amicis aut bene meritis consociare aut coniungere iniuriam, gravissimeque et verissime defenditur numquam aequitatem ab utilitate posse seiungi, et quicquid aequum iustumque esset, id etiam honestum vicissimque, quicquid esset honestum, id iustum etiam atque aequum fore.

for those who argue so seem to me to have forgotten the very first principles of nature which they themselves laid down. Something, then, must be granted to these things — provided you understand how much is to be granted. For it belongs to a philosopher who seeks not so much the showy as the true neither to count as nothing those things which even those showy men confessed to be in accordance with nature, and to see that there is so great a force in virtue and, so to speak, so great an authority in the honourable, that the rest, while not nothing, are yet so small as to seem to be nothing. This is the discourse of one who does not scorn all things save virtue, yet magnifies virtue itself with the praises that are its own; and, in fine, this is the explanation of the highest good, complete and perfect on every side. From here the rest, attempting to snatch up little fragments, each wished his own opinion to seem the one he had contributed.

Ad easque virtutes, de quibus disputatum est, dialecticam etiam adiungunt et physicam, easque ambas virtutum nomine appellant, alteram, quod habeat rationem, ne cui falso adsentiamur neve umquam captiosa probabilitate fallamur, eaque, quae de bonis et malis didicerimus, ut tenere tuerique possimus. nam sine hac arte quemvis arbitrantur a vero abduci fallique posse. recte igitur, si omnibus in rebus temeritas ignoratioque vitiosa est, ars ea, quae tollit haec, virtus nominata est.

Often, by Aristotle, by Theophrastus, the knowledge of things has been wondrously praised for its own sake; caught by this one thing, Erillus maintained that knowledge is the highest good, and that no other thing is to be sought for its own sake. Much was said by the ancients about despising and looking down upon human affairs; this one thing Aristo held to: he denied that, apart from vices and virtues, there is anything to be shunned or to be sought. It was laid down by our school that, among the things which are in accordance with nature, there is the being free from pain; this Hieronymus called the highest good. But Callipho, indeed, and after him Diodorus — the one having grown enamoured of pleasure, the other of freedom from pain — neither could do without the honourable, which has been praised most of all by our school.

physicae quoque non sine causa tributus idem est honos, propterea quod, qui convenienter naturae victurus sit, ei proficiscendum est ab omni mundo atque ab eius procuratione. nec vero potest quisquam de bonis et malis vere iudicare nisi omni cognita ratione naturae et vitae etiam deorum, et utrum conveniat necne natura hominis cum universa. quaeque sunt vetera praecepta sapientium, qui iubent tempori parere et sequi deum et se noscere et nihil nimis, haec sine physicis quam vim habeant—et habent maximam— videre nemo potest. atque etiam ad iustitiam colendam, ad tuendas amicitias et reliquas caritates quid natura valeat haec una cognitio potest tradere. nec vero pietas adversus deos nec quanta iis gratia debeatur sine explicatione naturae intellegi potest.

Indeed, even the very devotees of pleasure seek their side-roads, and have the virtues on their lips all day long, and say that pleasure is at first sought only for its own sake, but that afterward, by habit, a kind of second nature is formed, driven by which men do many things while seeking no pleasure at all. The Stoics remain. They, to be sure, have carried over from us not some one thing or another, but our whole philosophy to their own side; and just as the rest of the thieves change the marks on the things they have stolen, so they, in order to use our opinions as their own, changed the names, like the marks upon things. Thus this teaching alone is left worthy of those zealous for the liberal arts, worthy of the learned, worthy of illustrious men, worthy of leading men, worthy of kings. When he had said this, and had paused a little, "What is it?" he said;

Sed iam sentio me esse longius provectum, quam proposita ratio postularet. verum admirabilis compositio disciplinae incredibilisque rerum me traxit ordo; quem, per deos inmortales! nonne miraris? quid enim aut in natura, qua nihil est aptius, nihil descriptius, aut in operibus manu factis tam compositum tamque compactum et coagmentatum inveniri potest? quid posterius priori non convenit? quid sequitur, quod non respondeat superiori? quid non sic aliud ex alio nectitur, ut, si ullam litteram moveris, labent omnia? nec tamen quicquam est, quod moveri possit.

"do I seem to you to have rehearsed enough, in the use of my own right, within your hearing?" And I said, "You, Piso — as often at other times, so today — seemed to me to know these things so well that, if we could have you more often, I should not think we need do much suppliant courting of the Greeks. And this I approved the more, because I remember that Staseas of Naples, that teacher of yours, a Peripatetic of high repute indeed, used to speak of these matters somewhat otherwise, agreeing with those who put much store in fortune favourable or adverse, much in the goods or evils of the body." "It is as you say," he said; "but these things are stated by Antiochus, our friend, much better and more strongly than they used to be stated by Staseas. And yet I am not asking what has been approved by you in my account, but by this Cicero of ours, whom I am eager to carry off from you as my pupil."

quam gravis vero, quam magnifica, quam constans conficitur persona sapientis! qui, cum ratio docuerit, quod honestum esset, id esse solum bonum, semper sit necesse est beatus vereque omnia ista nomina possideat, quae irrideri ab inperitis solent. rectius enim appellabitur rex quam Tarquinius, qui nec se nec suos regere potuit, rectius magister populi—is enim est dictator —quam Sulla, qui trium pestiferorum vitiorum, luxuriae, avaritiae, crudelitatis, magister fuit, rectius dives quam Crassus, qui nisi eguisset, numquam Euphraten nulla belli causa transire voluisset. recte eius omnia dicentur, qui scit uti solus omnibus, recte etiam pulcher appellabitur— animi enim liniamenta sunt pulchriora quam corporis —, recte solus liber nec dominationi cuiusquam parens nec oboediens cupiditati, recte invictus, cuius etiamsi corpus constringatur, animo tamen vincula inici nulla possint, nec expectet ullum tempus aetatis, uti tum denique iudicetur beatusne fuerit, cum extremum vitae diem morte confecerit, quod ille unus e septem sapientibus non sapienter Croesum monuit;

Then Lucius: "For my part, those things have been thoroughly approved by me, as I think they are by my brother too." Then Piso said to me: "What of it, then? Do you grant the young man your indulgence? Or would you rather have him learn those doctrines which, when he has thoroughly mastered them, leave him knowing nothing?" "I, indeed, allow it to him," I said. "But do you not remember that I am at liberty to approve those things you have said? For who can fail to approve the things that seem to him probable?" "But can anyone," he said, "approve what he does not hold to be perceived, grasped, known?" "There is no great dissension here, Piso," I said. "For there is no other reason why nothing seems to me capable of being perceived, except that the power of perceiving is so defined by the Stoics that they deny anything can be perceived unless it is true in such a way that it could not be false. And so this is my dissension with them, but with the Peripatetics none at all. But let us pass these matters by; for they make a discussion both quite long enough and quite contentious enough."

nam si beatus umquam fuisset, beatam vitam usque ad illum a Cyro extructum rogum pertulisset. quod si ita est, ut neque quisquam nisi bonus vir et omnes boni beati sint, quid philosophia magis colendum aut quid est virtute divinius?

After I had heard Antiochus, Brutus, as was my habit, in the company of M. Piso, in the gymnasium that is called the Ptolemaeum, and with us my brother Quintus and T. Pomponius and Lucius Cicero — my cousin by blood, but a brother in affection — we agreed among ourselves to spend the afternoon walking in the Academy, chiefly because at that hour the place would be free of every crowd. And so at the appointed time we all went to Piso. From there, with talk of this and that, we covered those six stades from the Dipylon. When we had come into the spaces of the Academy, which are not without reason famous, we found the solitude we had wanted.

Quae cum dixisset, finem ille. ego autem: Ne tu, inquam, Cato, ista exposuisti, ut tam multa memoriter, ut tam obscura, dilucide. itaque aut omittamus contra omnino velle aliquid aut spatium sumamus ad cogitandum; tam enim diligenter, etiam si minus vere— nam nondum id quidem audeo dicere—, sed tamen accurate non modo fundatam, verum etiam extructam disciplinam non est facile perdiscere. Tum ille: Ain tandem? inquit, cum ego te hac nova lege videam eodem die accusatori respondere et tribus horis perorare, in hac me causa tempus dilaturum putas? quae tamen a te agetur non melior, quam illae sunt, quas interdum optines. quare istam quoque aggredere tractatam praesertim et ab aliis et a te ipso saepe, ut tibi deesse non possit oratio.

Then Piso said: ’Should I call it something given us by nature, or some kind of illusion, that when we see the very places in which we have learned that men worthy of remembrance spent much of their time, we are moved more deeply than when we hear of the deeds of those same men, or read some piece of their writing? Just so I am moved now. For Plato comes into my mind, who we are told was the first to make a practice of holding discussions here; and those little gardens of his close by do not merely bring him to my memory but seem to set the man himself before my eyes. Here was Speusippus, here Xenocrates, here his pupil Polemo — whose very seat that was, the one we see. And for my own part, when I would look upon our own Senate-house — the Hostilian, I mean, not this new one, which seems to me smaller now that it has been made larger — I used to call to mind Scipio, Cato, Laelius, and above all my own grandfather; so great is the power of suggestion that lies in places; with good reason, then, has the art of memory been derived from them.’

Tum ego: Non mehercule, inquam, soleo temere contra Stoicos, non quo illis admodum assentiar, sed pudore impedior; ita multa dicunt, quae vix intellegam. Obscura, inquit, quaedam esse confiteor, nec tamen ab illis ita dicuntur de industria, sed inest in rebus ipsis obscuritas. Cur igitur easdem res, inquam, Peripateticis dicentibus verbum nullum est, quod non intellegatur? Easdemne res? inquit, an parum disserui non verbis Stoicos a Peripateticis, sed universa re et tota sententia dissidere? Atqui, inquam, Cato, si istud optinueris, traducas me ad te totum licebit. Putabam equidem satis, inquit, me dixisse. quare ad ea primum, si videtur; sin aliud quid voles, postea. Immo istud quidem, inquam, quo loco quidque, nisi iniquum postulo, arbitratu meo. Ut placet, inquit. etsi enim illud erat aptius, aequum cuique concedere.

Then Quintus said: ’It is exactly as you say, Piso. For just now, as I was coming here, that spot of Colonus turned my own thoughts toward itself, where its inhabitant Sophocles came before my eyes — Sophocles, whom you know how I admire and how I delight in him. Indeed, a kind of vision stirred me toward an older memory still, of Oedipus coming to this place and asking, in that most tender song, what these very spots might be — to no purpose, of course, yet it stirred me all the same.’ Then Pomponius said: ’But as for me, whom you are all in the habit of attacking as a devotee of Epicurus, I spend much time, as you know, with Phaedrus — whom I love beyond all others — in the gardens of Epicurus, which we passed by just now; yet, warned by the old proverb, I bear the living in mind, and still I cannot forget Epicurus, even were I to wish it, since my friends keep his likeness not only on their tablets but even on their cups and on their rings.’

Existimo igitur, inquam, Cato, veteres illos Platonis auditores, Speusippum, Aristotelem, Xenocratem, deinde eorum, Polemonem, Theophrastum, satis et copiose et eleganter habuisse constitutam disciplinam, ut non esset causa Zenoni, cum Polemonem audisset, cur et ab eo ipso et a superioribus dissideret. quorum fuit haec institutio, in qua animadvertas velim quid mutandum putes nec expectes, dum ad omnia dicam, quae a te dicta sunt; universa enim illorum ratione cum tota vestra confligendum puto.

Here I said: ’Our friend Pomponius is plainly making a joke, and perhaps within his rights. For he has so settled himself at Athens that he is all but one of the Attics, and looks likely to earn that very surname. But I agree with you, Piso, that this is what happens in practice: that at the prompting of places we think rather more keenly and attentively about famous men. For you know that once I came with you to Metapontum, and would not turn aside to my host before I had seen that very place where Pythagoras ended his life, and his seat. But at this present time, though there are throughout every quarter of Athens, in the very places themselves, many tokens of men of the highest greatness, still it is that recess that moves me. For only a little while ago it belonged to Carneades, whom I seem to see — for his likeness is well known — and I think that the very seat, robbed of so great a greatness of genius, longs for that voice of his.’

qui cum viderent ita nos esse natos, ut et communiter ad eas virtutes apti essemus, quae notae illustresque sunt, iustitiam dico, temperantiam, ceteras generis eiusdem—quae omnes similes artium reliquarum materia tantum ad meliorem partem et tractatione differunt—, easque ipsas virtutes viderent nos magnificentius appetere et ardentius, habere etiam insitam quandam vel potius innatam cupiditatem scientiae natosque esse ad congregationem hominum et ad societatem communitatemque generis humani, eaque in maximis ingeniis maxime elucere, totam philosophiam tris in partis diviserunt, quam partitionem a Zenone esse retentam videmus.

Then Piso said: ’Since, then, each of us has something to say, what of our friend Lucius? Does he gladly visit the spot where Demosthenes and Aeschines used to fight it out against each other? For each man is drawn most by his own pursuit.’ And he, blushing, said: ’Do not ask it of me — I, who have even gone down to the Phaleric shore, to the place where they say Demosthenes used to declaim against the surf, to train himself to master the roar with his voice. And only just now I turned a little to the right off the road, to approach the tomb of Pericles. Though indeed there is no end of that in this city; for wherever we set foot, we set it down on some piece of history.’

quarum cum una sit, qua mores conformari putantur, differo eam partem, quae quasi stirps est huius quaestionis. qui sit enim finis bonorum, mox, hoc loco tantum dico, a veteribus Peripateticis Academicisque, qui re consentientes vocabulis differebant, eum locum, quem civilem recte appellaturi videmur, Graeci politiko/n, graviter et copiose esse tractatum. Quam multa illi de re publica scripserunt, quam multa de legibus! quam multa non solum praecepta in artibus, sed etiam exempla in orationibus bene dicendi reliquerunt! primum enim ipsa illa, quae subtiliter disserenda erant, polite apteque dixerunt tum definientes, tum partientes, ut vestri etiam; sed vos squalidius, illorum vides quam niteat oratio.

Then Piso said: ’And yet, Cicero, those pursuits of yours, if they look to the imitation of great men, are the mark of men of talent; but if only to the learning of the tokens of ancient memory, of the merely curious. We all urge you — already at a run, I hope — not only to wish to know the men you wish to know, but to wish to imitate them too.’ Here I said: ’Although this young man, as you see, Piso, is doing what you prescribe, still your encouragement is welcome to me.’ Then he, in the most friendly way, as was his habit, said: ’Let us all, indeed, bring everything we can to bear upon this young man’s coming of age, and above all that he impart something of his own studies to philosophy as well — whether to imitate you, whom he loves, or to be able to do that very thing he pursues with more grace. But are you to be urged by us, Lucius, or are you already inclined of your own accord? To me, at least, you seem to attend to Antiochus, whom you hear, well enough.’ Then he, shyly, or rather modestly, said: ’I do indeed; but did you hear, just now, about Carneades? I am carried off that way — yet Antiochus calls me back, and there is no one else for us to hear besides.’

deinde ea, quae requirebant orationem ornatam et gravem, quam magnifice sunt dicta ab illis, quam splendide! de iustitia, de temperantia, de fortitudine, de amicitia, de aetate degenda, de philosophia, de capessenda re publica, de temperantia de fortitudine hominum non spinas vellentium, ut Stoici, nec ossa nudantium, sed eorum, qui grandia ornate vellent, enucleate minora dicere. itaque quae sunt eorum consolationes, quae cohortationes, quae etiam monita et consilia scripta ad summos viros! erat enim apud eos, ut est rerum ipsarum natura, sic dicendi exercitatio duplex. nam, quicquid quaeritur, id habet aut generis ipsius sine personis temporibusque aut his adiunctis facti aut iuris aut nominis controversiam. ergo in utroque exercebantur, eaque disciplina effecit tantam illorum utroque in genere dicendi copiam.

Then Piso said: ’Although this, perhaps, will not be allowed to pass off so easily, since he is here’ — he meant me — ’still I shall make bold to call you back from this New Academy to that old one, in which, as you used to hear Antiochus say, there are reckoned not only those who are called Academics — Speusippus, Xenocrates, Polemo, Crantor, and the rest — but also the old Peripatetics, whose chief was Aristotle, whom, excepting Plato, I should perhaps not be wrong to call the chief of philosophers. Turn yourself, then, to them, I beg you. For from their writings and their teachings one may draw not only all liberal learning, all history, all elegant discourse, but there is besides such a variety of arts in them that no one, without that equipment, can come properly furnished to any of the more distinguished tasks. From these men have arisen orators, from these generals and leaders of commonwealths. To come to lesser matters: mathematicians, poets, musicians, and physicians too have set out, in the end, from this workshop, as it were, of every craftsman.’ And I said:

Totum genus hoc Zeno et qui ab eo sunt aut non potuerunt tueri aut noluerunt, certe reliquerunt. quamquam scripsit artem rhetoricam Cleanthes, Chrysippus etiam, sed sic, ut, si quis obmutescere concupierit, nihil aliud legere debeat. itaque vides, quo modo loquantur. nova verba fingunt, deserunt usitata. At quanta conantur! mundum hunc omnem oppidum esse nostrum! incendi igitur eos, qui audiunt, vides. quantam rem agas, ut Circeiis qui habitet totum hunc mundum suum municipium esse existimet? Quid? ille incendat? restinguet citius, si ardentem acceperit. Ista ipsa, quae tu breviter: regem, dictatorem, divitem solum esse sapientem, a te quidem apte ac rotunde; quippe; habes enim a rhetoribus; illorum vero ista ipsa quam exilia de virtutis vi! quam tantam volunt esse, ut beatum per se efficere possit. pungunt quasi aculeis interrogatiunculis angustis, quibus etiam qui assentiuntur nihil commutantur animo et idem abeunt, qui venerant. res enim fortasse verae, certe graves, non ita tractantur, ut debent, sed aliquanto minutius.

’You know I feel the very same, Piso; but you have made mention of the matter at a good moment. For my friend Cicero here is eager to hear what the view is, regarding the ends of goods, of that old Academy you speak of, and of the Peripatetics. And we think you can explain it most easily, since you had Staseas of Naples with you for many years, and since for several months now we have seen you inquiring into these very things at Athens from Antiochus.’ And he, laughing, said: ’Come, come’ — for you wished, cleverly enough, to make me the starting-point of our discussion — ’let us set it out for the young man, if by chance we are able. For this solitude grants us what, were some god to promise it, I should never have thought possible: that I should hold a discussion in the Academy, like a philosopher. But let me not, while I oblige him, be a burden to you.’ ’A burden to me,’ I said, ’who asked you for this very thing?’ Then, when Quintus and Pomponius had said that they wished the same, Piso began. And do attend, I beg you, Brutus, to his discourse, and judge whether it seems to have embraced sufficiently the view of Antiochus — a view I take to be the one you most approve, since you have often heard his brother Aristus.

Sequitur disserendi ratio cognitioque naturae; nam de summo bono mox, ut dixi, videbimus et ad id explicandum disputationem omnem conferemus. in his igitur partibus duabus nihil erat, quod Zeno commutare gestiret. res enim se praeclare habebat, et quidem in utraque parte. quid enim ab antiquis ex eo genere, quod ad disserendum valet, praetermissum est? qui et definierunt plurima et definiendi artes reliquerunt, quodque est definitioni adiunctum, ut res in partes dividatur, id et fit ab illis et quem ad modum fieri oporteat traditur; item de contrariis, a quibus ad genera formasque generum venerunt. Iam argumenti ratione conclusi caput esse faciunt ea, quae perspicua dicunt, deinde ordinem sequuntur, tum, quid verum sit in singulis, extrema conclusio est.

He spoke, then, thus: ’How much ornament there is in the discipline of the Peripatetics has been said by me, as briefly as I could, a little while ago. But the form of that discipline, as of nearly all the rest, is threefold: one part is of nature, a second of reasoning, a third of living. Nature was investigated by them in such a way that no part of sky, sea, or land — to speak in the poet’s manner — was passed over; indeed, when they had spoken of the first beginnings of things and of the whole world, so as to draw their conclusions not only by probable argument but even by the necessary reasoning of the mathematicians, they brought the greatest store of material, from things investigated for their own sake, to the knowledge of hidden things.

quanta autem ab illis varietas argumentorum ratione concludentium eorumque cum captiosis interrogationibus dissimilitudo! Quid, quod plurimis locis quasi denuntiant, ut neque sensuum fidem sine ratione nec rationis sine sensibus exquiramus, atque ut eorum alterum ab altero ne separemus? Quid? ea, quae dialectici nunc tradunt et docent, nonne ab illis instituta aut inventa sunt? de quibus etsi a Chrysippo maxime est elaboratum, tamen a Zenone minus multo quam ab antiquis; ab hoc autem quaedam non melius quam veteres, quaedam omnino relicta.

Aristotle pursued the origins, the ways of life, and the forms of all living creatures; Theophrastus, for his part, the natures of plants and the causes and accounts of nearly all the things brought forth from the earth; and from this knowledge the investigation of the most hidden things was made easier. By the same men were handed down precepts of reasoning, not by dialectic alone but by oratory too; and by Aristotle, as its chief author, the exercise of speaking on both sides of single questions was established — not so as always to argue against everything, in the manner of Arcesilas, and yet so as, in all matters, to bring out whatever could be said on either side.

Cumque duae sint artes, quibus perfecte ratio et oratio compleatur, una inveniendi, altera disserendi, hanc posteriorem et Stoici et Peripatetici, priorem autem illi egregie tradiderunt, hi omnino ne attigerunt quidem. nam e quibus locis quasi thesauris argumenta depromerentur, vestri ne suspicati quidem sunt, superiores autem artificio et via tradiderunt. quae quidem res efficit, ne necesse sit isdem de rebus semper quasi dictata decantare neque a commentariolis suis discedere. nam qui sciet ubi quidque positum sit quaque eo veniat, is, etiamsi quid obrutum erit, poterit eruere semperque esse in disputando suus. quod etsi ingeniis magnis praediti quidam dicendi copiam sine ratione consequuntur, ars tamen est dux certior quam natura. aliud est enim poe+tarum more verba fundere, aliud ea, quae dicas, ratione et arte distinguere.

And when the third part sought the precepts of living well, that too was applied by them not only to the conduct of private life but also to the governing of commonwealths. From Aristotle we have learned the customs, institutions, and disciplines of nearly all the states not of Greece only but of the barbarian world as well; from Theophrastus, even their laws. And whereas each of them had taught what kind of leader it befits a man to be in a commonwealth, and had written besides, at greater length, what the best condition of a commonwealth might be, Theophrastus did this further: he showed what tendencies there are in a commonwealth, and what shifts of circumstance, by which one must steer as the situation may require. But as for the manner of passing one’s life, the one that most pleased them was indeed the quiet one, set in the contemplation and the knowledge of things; and because this was most like to the life of the gods, it seemed most worthy of the wise man. And on these matters their discourse is splendid and illustrious.

Similia dici possunt de explicatione naturae, qua et hi utuntur et vestri, neque vero ob duas modo causas, quo modo Epicuro videtur, ut pellatur mortis et religionis metus, sed etiam modestiam quandam cognitio rerum caelestium affert iis, qui videant quanta sit etiam apud deos moderatio, quantus ordo, et magnitudinem animi deorum opera et facta cernentibus, iustitiam etiam, cum cognitum habeas quod sit summi rectoris ac domini numen, quod consilium, quae voluntas; cuius ad naturam apta ratio vera illa et summa lex a philosophis dicitur.

As to the highest good, however — since there are two kinds of their books, one written for the public, which they called exoterikon, the other more finely worked, which they left in their notebooks — they do not always seem to say the same thing; and yet on the substance itself there is no inconsistency, at least among those I have named, nor any disagreement among them. But when the happy life is the question, and this is the one thing that philosophy ought to look to and to follow, whether it lies wholly within the power of the wise man or can be either shaken or torn away by adverse circumstances — on this they do at times seem to differ among themselves and to be in doubt. This is brought out most of all by Theophrastus’ book on the happy life, in which a great deal is granted to fortune. And if this is so, wisdom could not guarantee a happy life. This account seems to me too delicate, so to speak, and too soft, for what the force and gravity of virtue demands. Let us hold, then, to Aristotle and to his son Nicomachus, whose carefully written books on ethics are said indeed to be Aristotle’s own — though I do not see why the son could not have been like the father. As for Theophrastus, let us call upon him for most things, provided only that we hold to more firmness and strength in virtue than he held to. Let us be content, then, with these men.

inest in eadem explicatione naturae insatiabilis quaedam e cognoscendis rebus voluptas, in qua una confectis rebus necessariis vacui negotiis honeste ac liberaliter possimus vivere. Ergo in hac ratione tota de maximis fere rebus Stoici illos secuti sunt, ut et deos esse et quattuor ex rebus omnia constare dicerent. cum autem quaereretur res admodum difficilis, num quinta quaedam natura videretur esse, ex qua ratio et intellegentia oriretur, in quo etiam de animis cuius generis essent quaereretur, Zeno id dixit esse ignem, non nulla deinde aliter, sed ea pauca; de maxima autem re eodem modo, divina mente atque natura mundum universum et eius maximas partis administrari. Materiam vero rerum et copiam apud hos exilem, apud illos uberrimam reperiemus.

For their successors are, in my view, better than the philosophers of the other schools, but they so degenerate that they seem to have been born of their own selves. First, Theophrastus’ pupil Strato wished to be a natural philosopher; and in that, though he is great, still most of his work is novel, and very little of it concerns ethics. His pupil Lyco is rich in language, but rather thin in matters themselves. Lyco’s pupil Aristo is then neat and elegant, but that gravity which is looked for in a great philosopher was not in him; his writings are indeed many and polished, but somehow his discourse has no authority.

quam multa ab iis conquisita et collecta sunt de omnium animantium genere, ortu, membris, aetatibus! quam multa de rebus iis, quae gignuntur e terra! quam multae quamque de variis rebus et causae, cur quidque fiat, et demonstrationes, quem ad modum quidque fiat! qua ex omni copia plurima et certissima argumenta sumuntur ad cuiusque rei naturam explicandam. Ergo adhuc, quantum equidem intellego, causa non videtur fuisse mutandi nominis. non enim, si omnia non sequebatur, idcirco non erat ortus illinc. equidem etiam Epicurum, in physicis quidem, Democriteum puto. pauca mutat vel plura sane; at cum de plurimis eadem dicit, tum certe de maximis. quod idem cum vestri faciant, non satis magnam tribuunt inventoribus gratiam.

I pass over many, among them a learned and agreeable man, Hieronymus — whom I no longer know why I should call a Peripatetic. For he set out freedom from pain as the highest good; and whoever disagrees about the highest good disagrees about the whole scheme of philosophy. Critolaus wished to imitate the ancients, and is indeed nearest to them in gravity, and his discourse runs full; and yet not even he stays within the institutions of his fathers. Diodorus, his pupil, adds freedom from pain to honour. He too is his own man, and, disagreeing about the highest good, cannot truly be called a Peripatetic. But the view of the ancients our friend Antiochus seems to me to follow most carefully, and he teaches that this same view was Aristotle’s and Polemo’s.

Sed haec hactenus. nunc videamus, quaeso, de summo bono, quod continet philosophiam, quid tandem attulerit, quam ob rem ab inventoribus tamquam a parentibus dissentiret. hoc igitur loco, quamquam a te, Cato, diligenter est explicatum, finis hic bonorum qui continet philosophiam et quis a Stoicis et quem ad modum diceretur, tamen ego quoque exponam, ut perspiciamus, si potuerimus, quidnam a Zenone novi sit allatum. cum enim superiores, e quibus planissime Polemo, secundum naturam vivere summum bonum esse dixissent, his verbis tria significari Stoici dicunt, unum eius modi, vivere adhibentem scientiam earum rerum, quae natura evenirent. hunc ipsum Zenonis aiunt esse finem declarantem illud, quod a te dictum est, convenienter naturae vivere.

Our friend Lucius does wisely, then, in wishing above all to hear about the highest good; for once this is settled, everything in philosophy is settled. For in other matters, if anything has been passed over or left unknown, there is no more inconvenience than the worth of whichever of those things it is in which something has been neglected. But if the highest good is unknown, the plan of living must of necessity be unknown too; and from this there follows so great an error that men cannot know to what harbour they should make their way. But once the ends of things are known, when it is understood what is the limit both of goods and of evils, the road of life has been found, and the shaping of all our duties, since it is then asked to what each thing is to be referred;

alterum significari idem, ut si diceretur, officia media omnia aut pleraque servantem vivere. hoc sic expositum dissimile est superiori. illud enim rectum est—quod kato/rqwma dicebas—contingitque sapienti soli, hoc autem inchoati cuiusdam officii est, non perfecti, quod cadere in non nullos insipientes potest. tertium autem omnibus aut maximis rebus iis, quae secundum naturam sint, fruentem vivere. hoc non est positum in nostra actione. completur enim et ex eo genere vitae, quod virtute fruitur, et ex iis rebus, quae sunt secundum naturam neque sunt in nostra potestate. sed hoc summum bonum, quod tertia significatione intellegitur, eaque vita, quae ex summo bono degitur, quia coniuncta ei virtus est, in sapientem solum cadit, isque finis bonorum, ut ab ipsis Stoicis scriptum videmus, a Xenocrate atque ab Aristotele constitutus est. itaque ab iis constitutio illa prima naturae, a qua tu quoque ordiebare, his prope verbis exponitur:

from which the plan of living happily — the thing all men long for — can be found and procured. And since there is great disagreement as to wherein this lies, we must call in that division of Carneades which our friend Antiochus is glad to use. For he saw not only how many views of the highest good there had been among philosophers up to now, but how many altogether there could possibly be. He used to deny, then, that there is any art that proceeds from itself; for the thing grasped by an art is always external to it. There is no need to make this longer with examples. For it is plain that no art turns upon itself, but that the art is one thing and the object set before the art another. Since, therefore, just as medicine is the art of health and steering the art of navigation, so prudence is the art of living, it follows of necessity that this too has been established and set going from some thing outside itself.

Omnis natura vult esse conservatrix sui, ut et salva sit et in genere conservetur suo. ad hanc rem aiunt artis quoque requisitas, quae naturam adiuvarent in quibus ea numeretur in primis, quae est vivendi ars, ut tueatur, quod a natura datum sit, quod desit, adquirat. idemque diviserunt naturam hominis in animum et corpus. cumque eorum utrumque per se expetendum esse dixissent, virtutes quoque utriusque eorum per se expetendas esse dicebant, et cum animum infinita quadam laude anteponerent corpori, virtutes quoque animi bonis corporis anteponebant.

On one point, however, nearly all are agreed: that the thing with which wisdom is concerned, and which it aims to attain, must be suited and adapted to nature, and of such a kind that it invites and draws on the mind’s appetite of its own accord — what the Greeks call hormē. But what that thing is which moves us in this way and is sought by nature at the very first dawning of life — on this there is no agreement, and it is here, when the highest good is investigated, that the whole disagreement among the philosophers lies. For the whole of that inquiry which concerns the ends of good and evil — when we ask what among these is the furthest and the ultimate — has its source to be found in the question of where the first promptings of nature lie; once that is discovered, the entire discussion of the highest good and evil is drawn from it as from a head. Some hold that the first appetite is for pleasure and the first recoil from pain. Others judge that freedom from pain is what is first taken up, and pain what is first turned away from.

Sed cum sapientiam totius hominis custodem et procuratricem esse vellent, quae esset naturae comes et adiutrix, hoc sapientiae munus esse dicebant, ut, cum eum tueretur, qui constaret ex animo et corpore, in utroque iuvaret eum ac contineret. atque ita re simpliciter primo collocata reliqua subtilius persequentes corporis bona facilem quandam rationem habere censebant; de animi bonis accuratius exquirebant in primisque reperiebant inesse in iis iustitiae semina primique ex omnibus philosophis natura tributum esse docuerunt, ut ii, qui procreati essent, a procreatoribus amarentur, et, id quod temporum ordine antiquius est, ut coniugia virorum et uxorum natura coniuncta esse dicerent, qua ex stirpe orirentur amicitiae cognationum. Atque ab his initiis profecti omnium virtutum et originem et progressionem persecuti sunt. ex quo magnitudo quoque animi existebat, qua facile posset repugnari obsistique fortunae, quod maximae res essent in potestate sapientis. varietates autem iniuriasque fortunae facile veterum philosophorum praeceptis instituta vita superabat.

From these others again set out — those who name what they call the primary things in accordance with nature, among which they count the soundness and preservation of all the parts, health, unimpaired senses, freedom from pain, strength, beauty, and the rest of the same kind, of which there are likenesses in our minds, as it were the first sparks and seeds of the virtues. Now since it is some one of these three by which nature is first moved, whether toward seeking or toward repelling, and since there can be nothing at all besides these three, it necessarily follows that the whole duty of avoiding or of pursuing is referred to one of them, so that the wisdom we have called the art of living is concerned with one of those three things, and from it draws the starting-point of the whole of life.

Principiis autem a natura datis amplitudines quaedam bonorum excitabantur partim profectae a contemplatione rerum occultiorum, quod erat insitus menti cognitionis amor, e quo etiam rationis explicandae disserendique cupiditas consequebatur; quodque hoc solum animal natum est pudoris ac verecundiae particeps appetensque coniunctionum hominum ad societatem animadvertensque in omnibus rebus, quas ageret aut diceret, ut ne quid ab eo fieret nisi honeste ac decore, his initiis, ut ante dixi, et seminibus a natura datis temperantia, modestia, iustitia et omnis honestas perfecte absoluta est.

And from whatever it has settled upon as the thing by which nature is first moved, there will also arise an account of the right and the honourable, which can square with some one of those three, so that it is honourable either to do everything for the sake of pleasure, even if you do not attain it, or for the sake of not feeling pain, even if you cannot reach that, or for the sake of obtaining the things that are in accordance with nature, even if you achieve nothing. So it comes about that, as great as the difference is in the natural beginnings, so great is the unlikeness in the ends of good and evil. Others again, from the same beginnings, will refer every duty either to pleasure, or to not feeling pain, or to securing those primary things in accordance with nature.

Habes, inquam, Cato, formam eorum, de quibus loquor, philosophorum. qua exposita scire cupio quae causa sit, cur Zeno ab hac antiqua constitutione desciverit, quidnam horum ab eo non sit probatum; quodne omnem naturam conservatricem sui dixerint, an quod omne animal ipsum sibi commendatum, ut se et salvum in suo genere et incolume vellet, an quod, cum omnium artium finis is esset, quem natura maxime quaereret, idem statui debere de totius arte vitae, an quod, cum ex animo constaremus et corpore, et haec ipsa et eorum virtutes per se esse sumendas. an vero displicuit ea, quae tributa est animi virtutibus tanta praestantia? an quae de prudentia, de cognitione rerum, de coniunctione generis humani, quaeque ab eisdem de temperantia, de modestia, de magnitudine animi, de omni honestate dicuntur? fatebuntur Stoici haec omnia dicta esse praeclare, neque eam causam Zenoni desciscendi fuisse.

Now that six views about the highest good have been set out, of the three nearest these are the champions: of pleasure, Aristippus; of not feeling pain, Hieronymus; of the enjoyment of those things we have called the primary ones in accordance with nature, Carneades — not, to be sure, as their author, but as their defender for the sake of argument. The earlier three were possible positions, of which one alone has been defended, and that vigorously. For that one should do everything for the sake of pleasure — granted that, even if we attain nothing, still that very purpose of so acting is in itself worth seeking, and honourable, and the sole good — no one has maintained. Nor has anyone thought the mere avoidance of pain to be in itself among the things worth seeking, unless one could actually escape it. But that one should do everything in order to obtain what is in accordance with nature, even if one does not attain it, and that this is both honourable and the sole thing worth seeking for its own sake and the sole good — this the Stoics do say.

Alia quaedam dicent, credo, magna antiquorum esse peccata, quae ille veri investigandi cupidus nullo modo ferre potuerit. quid enim perversius, quid intolerabilius, quid stultius quam bonam valitudinem, quam dolorum omnium vacuitatem, quam integritatem oculorum reliquorumque sensuum ponere in bonis potius, quam dicerent nihil omnino inter eas res iisque contrarias interesse? ea enim omnia, quae illi bona dicerent, praeposita esse, non bona, itemque illa, quae in corpore excellerent, stulte antiquos dixisse per se esse expetenda; sumenda potius quam expetenda. ea denique omni vita, quae in una virtute consisteret, illam vitam, quae etiam ceteris rebus, quae essent secundum naturam, abundaret, magis expetendam non esse. sed magis sumendam. cumque ipsa virtus efficiat ita beatam vitam, ut beatior esse non possit, tamen quaedam deesse sapientibus tum, cum sint beatissimi; itaque eos id agere, ut a se dolores, morbos, debilitates repellant.

These, then, are the six simple views about the ends of good and evil: two without a patron, four defended. But of joined and twofold expositions of the highest good there have been in all three, and indeed there could be no more, if you look deep into the nature of things. For either pleasure can be joined to honour, as Calliphon and Dinomachus held, or freedom from pain, as Diodorus held, or the primary things of nature, as the ancients held — the same men we have named Academics and Peripatetics. But since all things cannot be said at once, for the present this much will need to be noted: that pleasure is to be set aside, since we are born for certain greater things, as will soon appear. About freedom from pain much the same is generally said as about pleasure. Since, therefore, both about pleasure with Torquatus and about honour, in which alone all good was placed, with Cato, the argument has been carried on, in the first place what was said against pleasure falls in much the same way against freedom from pain.

O magnam vim ingenii causamque iustam, cur nova existeret disciplina! Perge porro. sequuntur enim ea, quae tu scientissime complexus es, omnium insipientiam, iniustitiam, alia vitia similia esse, omniaque peccata esse paria, eosque, qui natura doctrinaque longe ad virtutem processissent, nisi eam plane consecuti essent, summe esse miseros, neque inter eorum vitam et improbissimorum quicquam omnino interesse, ut Plato, tantus ille vir, si sapiens non fuerit, nihilo melius quam quivis improbissimus nec beatius vixerit. haec videlicet est correctio philosophiae veteris et emendatio, quae omnino aditum habere nullum potest in urbem, in forum, in curiam. quis enim ferre posset ita loquentem eum, qui se auctorem vitae graviter et sapienter agendae profiteretur, nomina rerum commutantem, cumque idem sentiret quod omnes, quibus rebus eandem vim tribueret, alia nomina inponentem, verba modo mutantem, de opinionibus nihil detrahentem?

Nor in fact need anything else be sought against that view of Carneades. For in whatever way the highest good is so set out that it is empty of honour, neither duties nor virtues nor friendships can stand on that reckoning. And the joining to honour of either pleasure or the absence of pain makes that very honour, which it wishes to embrace, base. For to refer the things you do to ends, one of which — if a man be free of evil — one would call his being in the highest good, while the other is concerned with the lowest part of nature, is to darken all the splendour of honour, not to say to defile it. There remain the Stoics, who, when they had taken over everything from the Peripatetics and the Academics, pursued the same matters under other names. These it is better to refute one by one. But for now, to what we are about;

patronusne causae in epilogo pro reo dicens negaret esse malum exilium, publicationem bonorum? haec reicienda esse, non fugienda? nec misericordem iudicem esse oportere? in contione autem si loqueretur, si Hannibal ad portas venisset murumque iaculo traiecisset, negaret esse in malis capi, venire, interfici, patriam amittere? an senatus, cum triumphum Africano decerneret, quod eius virtute aut felicitate posset dicere, si neque virtus in ullo nisi in sapiente nec felicitas vere dici potest? quae est igitur ista philosophia, quae communi more in foro loquitur, in libellis suo? praesertim cum, quod illi suis verbis significent, in eo nihil novetur, de ipsis rebus nihil mutetur eaedem res maneant alio modo.

of those men, when we please. But the freedom from care of Democritus, which is, as it were, a tranquillity of mind — what they call euthumia — had to be set apart from this discussion, because that tranquillity of mind is itself the happy life; and we are inquiring not what it is, but whence it comes. Now the views of Pyrrho, Aristo, and Erillus, already hissed off and cast out, since they cannot fall within the circle we have drawn, were not to be brought in at all. For since this whole inquiry about the ends, and as it were the furthest bounds, of good and evil sets out from what we have said is suited and adapted to nature and is itself sought first for its own sake, this whole foundation is overturned both by those who, in matters in which there is nothing that is not either honourable or base, deny that there is any reason why one thing should be preferred to another, and think there is no difference at all among such things; and by Erillus, who, if he really held that nothing is good except knowledge, did away with every ground for taking counsel and with the very discovery of duty. With the views of the rest thus shut out, and since besides them there can be none, this view of the ancients must necessarily prevail. By the practice of the ancients, then, which the Stoics too employ, let us take our start from here.

quid enim interest, divitias, opes, valitudinem bona dicas anne praeposita, cum ille, qui ista bona dicit, nihilo plus iis tribuat quam tu, qui eadem illa praeposita nominas? itaque homo in primis ingenuus et gravis, dignus illa familiaritate Scipionis et Laelii, Panaetius, cum ad Q. Tuberonem de dolore patiendo scriberet, quod esse caput debebat, si probari posset, nusquam posuit, non esse malum dolorem, sed quid esset et quale, quantumque in eo inesset alieni, deinde quae ratio esset perferendi; cuius quidem, quoniam Stoicus fuit, sententia condemnata mihi videtur esse inanitas ista verborum.

Every living creature loves itself and, the moment it has come into being, sets about preserving itself, because this first appetite for guarding its whole life is given to it by nature — to preserve itself and to be so constituted as to be in the best condition in accordance with nature. At the outset it holds this constitution in a confused and uncertain way, so far only as to protect itself, whatever it may be, but it understands neither what it is nor what it can do nor what its own nature is. But when it has advanced a little and has begun to perceive how far each thing touches it and pertains to it, then it gradually begins to go forward and to recognize itself and to understand the reason why it has the appetite of mind we spoke of, and it begins both to seek the things it feels to be suited to its nature and to repel their opposites. Therefore for every living creature the object of its appetite lies in what is adapted to its nature. And so the end of goods turns out to be to live in accordance with nature, so constituted as to be in the best condition and most perfectly adapted to nature.

Sed ut propius ad ea, Cato, accedam, quae a te dicta sunt, pressius agamus eaque, quae modo dixisti, cum iis conferamus, quae tuis antepono. quae sunt igitur communia vobis cum antiquis, iis sic utamur quasi concessis; quae in controversiam veniunt, de iis, si placet, disseramus. Mihi vero, inquit, placet agi subtilius et, ut ipse dixisti, pressius. quae enim adhuc protulisti, popularia sunt, ego autem a te elegantiora desidero. A mene tu? inquam. sed tamen enitar et, si minus multa mihi occurrent, non fugiam ista popularia.

But since each living creature has its own nature, it necessarily follows that the end too is, for all of them, this: that nature be fulfilled — for nothing prevents some things from being common both among the rest of the animals and between man and the beasts, since the nature of all is shared — yet those furthest and highest things which we are seeking are marked off and distributed among the kinds of living creatures, each proper to its own and suited to what the nature of each requires.

sed primum positum sit nosmet ipsos commendatos esse nobis primamque ex natura hanc habere appetitionem, ut conservemus nosmet ipsos. hoc convenit; sequitur illud, ut animadvertamus qui simus ipsi, ut nos, quales oportet esse, servemus. sumus igitur homines. ex animo constamus et corpore, quae sunt cuiusdam modi, nosque oportet, ut prima appetitio naturalis postulat, haec diligere constituereque ex his finem illum summi boni atque ultimi. quem, si prima vera sunt, ita constitui necesse est: earum rerum, quae sint secundum naturam, quam plurima et quam maxima adipisci.

And so when we say that for all living creatures the furthest end is to live in accordance with nature, this is not to be taken as if we were saying that there is one single end for all; rather, just as it can rightly be said to be common to all the arts that they are concerned with some body of knowledge, while the knowledge proper to each art is its own, so to live in accordance with nature is common to all living creatures, but their natures are diverse, so that one thing is natural for a horse, another for an ox, another for a man. And yet in all there is a common highest end — and that not only among living creatures, but also among all those things which nature nourishes, increases, and protects, in which we see that the things produced from the earth do many things in a way themselves of their own accord that avail toward living and growing, so that within their own kind they may arrive at their furthest end; so that it is now permitted to embrace all things in a single comprehension and to say without hesitation that every nature is the preserver of itself and has this set before it as its end and furthest goal: to keep itself in the best state of its own kind; so that the end of all things which thrive by nature must necessarily be similar, not the same. From which it ought to be understood that for man the ultimate good is to live in accordance with nature, which we interpret thus: to live by the nature of man, complete on every side and wanting nothing.

hunc igitur finem illi tenuerunt, quodque ego pluribus verbis, illi brevius secundum naturam vivere, hoc iis bonorum videbatur extremum. Age nunc isti doceant, vel tu potius—quis enim ista melius?—, quonam modo ab isdem principiis profecti efficiatis, ut honeste vivere—id est enim vel e virtute vel naturae congruenter vivere—summum bonum sit, et quonam modo aut quo loco corpus subito deserueritis omniaque ea, quae, secundum naturam cum sint, absint a nostra potestate, ipsum denique officium. quaero igitur, quo modo hae tantae commendationes a natura profectae subito a sapientia relictae sint.

These things, then, must be unfolded by us — but if rather minutely, you will forgive it; for we owe a service to this young man’s age, and to one perhaps now hearing these matters for the first time. ’Quite so,’ I said, ’though even what you have said up to now was rightly said in that manner, however much it was suited to a young man.’ ’The end of things worth seeking having now been defined,’ he said, ’why this matter stands as I have said must next be demonstrated. For that reason let us begin from what I set down first, which is also in fact first, so that we may understand that every living creature loves itself. And although this admits of no doubt — for it is fixed in nature itself and grasped by each one’s own senses, so that if anyone wished to say the contrary he would not be heard — still, that we may pass over nothing, I think the reasons too should be brought forward why this is so.

quodsi non hominis summum bonum quaereremus, sed cuiusdam animantis, is autem esset nihil nisi animus —liceat enim fingere aliquid eius modi, quo verum facilius reperiamus—, tamen illi animo non esset hic vester finis. desideraret enim valitudinem, vacuitatem doloris, appeteret etiam conservationem sui earumque rerum custodiam finemque sibi constitueret secundum naturam vivere, quod est, ut dixi, habere ea, quae secundum naturam sint, vel omnia vel plurima et maxima.

And yet how can it be understood or even conceived that there should be any living creature that hates itself? For contrary facts would clash. For when that appetite of mind has begun deliberately to draw to itself something that harms it, because it is hostile to itself, then, since it will do this for its own sake, it will both hate itself and at the same time love itself, which cannot be. And it necessarily follows that, if a man is an enemy to himself, he will think the things that are good to be evil, and on the contrary the evil to be good, and will flee what should be sought and seek what should be fled — which is, beyond doubt, the overturning of life. Nor, if some are found who seek out either nooses or other means of destruction, or like that man in Terence who ’resolved that for so long he would do his own son the less wrong’ — as he himself says — ’until he himself should be made wretched’ — is such a man on that account to be thought an enemy to himself.

cuiuscumque enim modi animal constitueris, necesse est, etiamsi id sine corpore sit, ut fingimus, tamen esse in animo quaedam similia eorum, quae sunt in corpore, ut nullo modo, nisi ut exposui, constitui possit finis bonorum. Chrysippus autem exponens differentias animantium ait alias earum corpore excellere, alias autem animo, non nullas valere utraque re; deinde disputat, quod cuiusque generis animantium statui deceat extremum. cum autem hominem in eo genere posuisset, ut ei tribueret animi excellentiam, summum bonum id constituit, non ut excellere animus, sed ut nihil esse praeter animum videretur. uno autem modo in virtute sola summum bonum recte poneretur, si quod esset animal, quod totum ex mente constaret, id ipsum tamen sic, ut ea mens nihil haberet in se, quod esset secundum naturam, ut valitudo est.

But some are moved by grief, some by desire, and many too are carried away by anger, and when they knowingly rush into evils, they then think they are taking the best counsel for themselves. And so they say, and do not hesitate: ’Such is my way; do you do as you need to do.’ And those who had declared war upon themselves would wish to be racked by day and tortured by night, and yet they would not accuse themselves on the ground that they had counselled badly in their own affairs. For that complaint belongs to those who are dear to themselves and love themselves. Therefore, whenever it is said that a man deserves ill of himself and is to himself an enemy and a foe, and in the end flees from life, let it be understood that there underlies some cause of this kind, so that from that very fact it can be understood that each man is dear to himself.

sed id ne cogitari quidem potest quale sit, ut non repugnet ipsum sibi. Sin dicit obscurari quaedam nec apparere, quia valde parva sint, nos quoque concedimus; quod dicit Epicurus etiam de voluptate, quae minimae sint voluptates, eas obscurari saepe et obrui. sed non sunt in eo genere tantae commoditates corporis tamque productae temporibus tamque multae. itaque in quibus propter eorum exiguitatem obscuratio consequitur, saepe accidit, ut nihil interesse nostra fateamur, sint illa necne sint, ut in sole, quod a te dicebatur, lucernam adhibere nihil interest aut teruncium adicere Croesi pecuniae.

Nor indeed is it enough that there is no one who hates himself; this too must be understood, that there is no one who thinks it makes no difference to him how he himself fares. For the appetite of mind will be done away with if, just as in those matters between which there is no difference we are inclined to neither side, so in our own selves we shall judge that it makes no difference to us in what state we are. And further, if anyone should wish to say this too, it would be utterly absurd — that each man loves himself in such a way that this force of loving is referred to some other thing, and not to the very man who loves himself. When this is said of friendships, of duties, of virtues, however it is said, what is meant can still be understood; but in our own selves it cannot even be understood that we should love ourselves on account of some other thing — for example, on account of pleasure; for it is on our own account that we love pleasure, not on its account that we love ourselves.

quibus autem in rebus tanta obscuratio non fit, fieri tamen potest, ut id ipsum, quod interest, non sit magnum. ut ei, qui iucunde vixerit annos decem, si aeque vita iucunda menstrua addatur, quia momentum aliquod habeat ad iucundum accessio, bonum sit; si autem id non concedatur, non continuo vita beata tollitur. bona autem corporis huic sunt, quod posterius posui, similiora. habent enim accessionem dignam, in qua elaboretur, ut mihi in hoc Stoici iocari videantur interdum, cum ita dicant, si ad illam vitam, quae cum virtute degatur, ampulla aut strigilis accedat, sumpturum sapientem eam vitam potius, quo haec adiecta sint, nec beatiorem tamen ob eam causam fore.

And yet what is there more plainly evident than that each man is not only dear to himself, but vehemently dear? For who is there, or how few are there, in whom, when death draws near, the ’blood does not flee back in timid fright and the man go pale with fear’? It is, to be sure, a fault to shudder so violently at the dissolution of nature — which is likewise to be censured in the case of pain — but because nearly all are affected in this way, it is argument enough that nature shrinks from destruction; and the more certain men do this in a way that they are even justly censured for it, the more must it be understood that these very excesses would not have arisen in some, had there not been a certain measure set by nature. Nor do I mean the fear of death in those who flee death because they think they are being deprived of the good things of life, or because they dread certain terrors after death, or because they fear they may die in pain; for in little children, who think of none of these things, if ever in play we threaten them that we will throw them down from somewhere, they are seized with terror. Indeed even ’the wild beasts,’ says Pacuvius, ’which lack the cunning of understanding for taking precaution,’ when the terror of death is thrown upon them, ’shudder.’ And who thinks otherwise of the wise man himself, but that, even when he has resolved that he must die, he is still moved by the parting from his own and by the very leaving of the light?

hoc simile tandem est? non risu potius quam oratione eiciendum? ampulla enim sit necne sit, quis non iure optimo irrideatur, si laboret? at vero pravitate membrorum et cruciatu dolorum si quis quem levet, magnam ineat gratiam, nec si ille sapiens ad tortoris eculeum a tyranno ire cogatur, similem habeat vultum et si ampullam perdidisset, sed ut magnum et difficile certamen iniens, cum sibi cum capitali adversario, dolore, depugnandum videret, excitaret omnes rationes fortitudinis ac patientiae, quarum praesidio iniret illud difficile, ut dixi, magnumque proelium. deinde non quaerimus, quid obscuretur aut intereat, quia sit admodum parvum, sed quid tale sit, ut expleat summam. una voluptas e multis obscuratur in illa vita voluptaria, sed tamen ea, quamvis parva sit, pars est eius vitae, quae posita est in voluptate. nummus in Croesi divitiis obscuratur, pars est tamen divitiarum. quare obscurentur etiam haec, quae secundum naturam esse dicimus, in vita beata; sint modo partes vitae beatae.

But most of all in this kind of case the force of nature is plainly visible, since many endure even beggary in order to live, and men worn out by old age are tormented by the approach of death and bear those sufferings which we see Philoctetes bearing in the plays. He, though racked by pains not to be borne, nevertheless prolonged his life by fowling, and ’slow, he transfixed the swift with the stroke of his arrows; standing, he transfixed those in flight,’ as it stands in Accius, and from the weaving of their feathers made coverings for his body.

Atqui si, ut convenire debet inter nos, est quaedam appetitio naturalis ea, quae secundum naturam sunt, appetens, eorum omnium est aliquae summa facienda. quo constituto tum licebit otiose ista quaerere, de magnitudine rerum, de excellentia, quanta in quoque sit ad beate vivendum, de istis ipsis obscurationibus, quae propter exiguitatem vix aut ne vix quidem appareant. quid, de quo nulla dissensio est? nemo enim est, qui aliter dixerit quin omnium naturarum simile esset id, ad quod omnia referrentur, quod est ultimum rerum appetendarum. omnis enim est natura diligens sui. quae est enim, quae se umquam deserat aut partem aliquam sui aut eius partis habitum aut vim aut ullius earum rerum, quae secundum naturam sunt, aut motum aut statum? quae autem natura suae primae institutionis oblita est? nulla profecto est, quin suam vim retineat a primo ad extremum. quo modo igitur evenit, ut hominis natura sola esset, quae hominem relinqueret, quae oblivisceretur corporis, quae summum bonum non in toto homine, sed in parte hominis poneret?

Am I speaking of the human kind, or of animals at large, when the nature of trees and plants is nearly the same? For whether, as the most learned men have held, some greater and more divine cause has engendered this force, or whether it comes about thus by chance, we see that the things the earth brings forth are kept sound by their bark and roots — which falls to animals through the distribution of the senses and a certain framing of the limbs. On this matter, indeed, though I side with those who hold that all these things are governed by nature, and that nature, were she to neglect them, could not herself exist, still I grant that those who differ on this point may think what they please; and, if they like, let them understand that whenever I say “the nature of man” I mean man — for it makes no difference here. For a person could sooner part from himself than lose the appetite for the things that serve his interest. With good reason, then, the weightiest philosophers sought the starting-point of the highest good in nature, and held that this appetite for the things suited to nature is bred into all, because they are held fast by that commendation of nature whereby they love themselves.

quo modo autem, quod ipsi etiam fatentur constatque inter omnis, conservabitur ut simile sit omnium naturarum illud ultimum, de quo quaeritur? tum enim esset simile, si in ceteris quoque naturis id cuique esset ultimum, quod in quaque excelleret. tale enim visum est ultimum Stoicorum.

Next we must consider — since it is plain enough that each is dear to himself by nature — what the nature of man is. For that is what we are inquiring into. Now it is evident that man is composed of body and mind, the parts of the mind being first, those of the body second. Then we see this too: that the body is so shaped as to surpass others, and the mind so constituted as to be both furnished with senses and possessed of a commanding intelligence, to which the whole nature of man is subject, and in which there is a certain marvellous power of reason and of knowing and of science and of all the virtues. As for the things that belong to the body, they have no authority to be compared with the parts of the mind, and they are easier to come to know. And so let us begin with these.

Quid dubitas igitur mutare principia naturae? quid enim dicis omne animal, simul atque sit ortum, applicatum esse ad se diligendum esseque in se conservando occupatum? quin potius ita dicis, omne animal applicatum esse ad id, quod in eo sit optimum, et in eius unius occupatum esse custodia, reliquasque naturas nihil aliud agere, nisi ut id conservent, quod in quaque optimum sit? quo modo autem optimum, si bonum praeterea nullum est? sin autem reliqua appetenda sunt, cur, quod est ultimum rerum appetendarum, id non aut ex omnium earum aut ex plurimarum et maximarum appetitione concluditur? ut Phidias potest a primo instituere signum idque perficere, potest ab alio inchoatum accipere et absolvere, huic est sapientia similis; non enim ipsa genuit hominem, sed accepit a natura inchoatum. hanc ergo intuens debet institutum illud quasi signum absolvere. Qualem igitur hominem natura inchoavit?

How well suited to nature, then, are the parts of our body, and its whole figure and form and stature, is plain; nor is there any doubt that one understands which the forehead, the eyes, the ears, and the remaining parts are that are proper to man. But surely these need to be sound and vigorous and to have their natural motions and uses, so that none of them is wanting, nor sick nor crippled; for this is what nature requires. There is, moreover, also a certain bearing of the body that keeps to the motions and postures agreeing with nature; and if in these there is some fault — a twisting and distortion, or a deformed motion or posture — as if a man should walk on his hands, or backwards rather than forwards, he would plainly seem to be fleeing from himself, and, stripping the man out of the man, to hate nature. For this reason, too, certain ways of sitting, and bent and broken movements such as belong to wanton or effeminate men, are contrary to nature; so that, even if it come about through a fault of the mind, still the nature of man seems to be altered in the body.

et quod est munus, quod opus sapientiae? quid est, quod ab ea absolvi et perfici debeat? si est nihil in eo, quod perficiendum est, praeter motum ingenii quendam, id est rationem, necesse est huic ultimum esse ex virtute agere; rationis enim perfectio est virtus; si est nihil nisi corpus, summa erunt illa: valitudo, vacuitas doloris, pulchritudo, cetera.

And so, on the other hand, the moderate and even conditions, affections, and uses of the body seem to be suited to nature. Now the mind, too, ought not merely to be, but to be of a certain quality, so that it both has all its parts unimpaired and lacks none of the virtues. And in the senses each has its own virtue, namely that nothing should hinder each sense from discharging its own office in perceiving swiftly and readily those things that lie subject to the senses. But of the mind, and of that part of the mind which is sovereign and is named the intelligence, the virtues are many; yet there are two primary kinds: the one of those that are bred in by their own nature and are called involuntary, the other of those that, resting in the will, are wont to be called by a more proper name — and the surpassing excellence in the praise of minds belongs to these. To the former kind belong aptness in learning and memory, which are nearly all called by the one name of natural endowment; and those who have these virtues are called gifted. The other kind is that of the great and true virtues, which we call voluntary, such as prudence, temperance, fortitude, justice, and the rest of the same kind. And in sum these were the things to be said about body and mind, by which there is sketched out, as it were, what the nature of man requires.

nunc de hominis summo bono quaeritur; quid igitur dubitamus in tota eius natura quaerere quid sit effectum? cum enim constet inter omnes omne officium munusque sapientiae in hominis cultu esse occupatum, alii—ne me existimes contra Stoicos solum dicere—eas sententias afferunt, ut summum bonum in eo genere ponant, quod sit extra nostram potestatem, tamquam de inanimo aliquo loquantur, alii contra, quasi corpus nullum sit hominis, ita praeter animum nihil curant, cum praesertim ipse quoque animus non inane nescio quid sit—neque enim id possum intellegere—, sed in quodam genere corporis, ut ne is quidem virtute una contentus sit, sed appetat vacuitatem doloris. quam ob rem utrique idem faciunt, ut si laevam partem neglegerent, dexteram tuerentur, aut ipsius animi, ut fecit Erillus, cognitionem amplexarentur, actionem relinquerent. eorum enim omnium multa praetermittentium, dum eligant aliquid, quod sequantur, quasi curta sententia; at vero illa perfecta atque plena eorum, qui cum de hominis summo bono quaererent, nullam in eo neque animi neque corporis partem vacuam tutela reliquerunt.

From which it is plain that, since we are dear to ourselves and wish all things in mind and in body to be perfect, these very things are dear to us for their own sakes and hold within them the greatest weight toward living well. For one who has set before himself the preservation of himself must hold his own parts dear as well, and the dearer the more perfect they are and the more praiseworthy in their kind. For the life that is sought is one filled out with the virtues of mind and body, and in this the highest good must necessarily be placed, since it must be such as to be the limit of the things to be desired. Once this is grasped, it cannot be doubted that, since men themselves are dear to themselves in their own right and of their own accord, the parts too of both body and mind, and of those things that lie in the motion and posture of each, are cherished with their own dearness and are sought for their own sakes.

Vos autem, Cato, quia virtus, ut omnes fatemur, altissimum locum in homine et maxime excellentem tenet, et quod eos, qui sapientes sunt, absolutos et perfectos putamus, aciem animorum nostrorum virtutis splendore praestringitis. in omni enim animante est summum aliquid atque optimum, ut in equis, in canibus, quibus tamen et dolore vacare opus est et valere; sic igitur in homine perfectio ista in eo potissimum, quod est optimum, id est in virtute, laudatur. itaque mihi non satis videmini considerare quod iter sit naturae quaeque progressio. non enim, quod facit in frugibus, ut, cum ad spicam perduxerit ab herba, relinquat et pro nihilo habeat herbam, idem facit in homine, cum eum ad rationis habitum perduxit. semper enim ita adsumit aliquid, ut ea, quae prima dederit, non deserat.

These things being set out, it is an easy inference that those things among our own are most to be sought which have the most worth — so that, of each best part which is sought for its own sake, the virtue is to be sought most of all. Thus it will come about that the virtue of the mind is set before the virtue of the body, and that the voluntary virtues of the mind overcome the involuntary ones — the voluntary, which are properly called virtues and far excel, because they are begotten of reason, than which there is nothing in man more divine. For of all the things that nature both creates and watches over, those that are either without mind or not far otherwise have their highest good in the body; so that the saying about the pig does not seem inept — that a mind was given to that beast in place of salt, to keep it from rotting. There are, moreover, certain beasts in which there is something resembling virtue, as in lions, as in dogs, in horses, in which we see certain movements not of bodies alone, as in pigs, but in some measure of minds as well. In man, however, the whole sum lies in the mind, and in the mind in reason, out of which springs virtue, which is defined as the perfecting of reason — a thing they hold must be expounded again and again.

itaque sensibus rationem adiunxit et ratione effecta sensus non reliquit. Ut si cultura vitium, cuius hoc munus est, ut efficiat, ut vitis cum partibus suis omnibus quam optime se habeat—, sed sic intellegamus—licet enim, ut vos quoque soletis, fingere aliquid docendi causa—: si igitur illa cultura vitium in vite insit ipsa, cetera, credo, velit, quae ad colendam vitem attinebunt, sicut antea, se autem omnibus vitis partibus praeferat statuatque nihil esse melius in vite quam se. similiter sensus, cum accessit ad naturam, tuetur illam quidem, sed etiam se tuetur; cum autem assumpta ratio est, tanto in dominatu locatur, ut omnia illa prima naturae huius tutelae subiciantur.

Of the things, too, that the earth brings forth, there is a certain rearing and perfecting not unlike that of living creatures. And so we say that a vine both lives and dies, and a tree both young and old, and that it flourishes and “grows old.” From which it is not amiss to suppose that, as with living creatures, so with these there are certain things suited to their nature and others alien to it, and that there is a kind of tender of their growth and nourishment — namely the science and art of the farmer, which prunes, lops, raises up, lifts, and props, so that they can go where nature carries them; so that the vines themselves, could they speak, would confess that they ought to be so handled and tended. And now indeed — to speak of the vine above all — that which tends it is something external; for in the vine itself there is too little force present for it to thrive as well as it might, if no cultivation be applied.

itaque non discedit ab eorum curatione, quibus praeposita vitam omnem debet gubernare, ut mirari satis istorum inconstantiam non possim. naturalem enim appetitionem, quam vocant o(rmh/n, itemque officium, ipsam etiam virtutem tuentem volunt esse earum rerum, quae secundum naturam sunt. cum autem ad summum bonum volunt pervenire, transiliunt omnia et duo nobis opera pro uno relinquunt, ut alia sumamus, alia expetamus, potius quam uno fine utrumque concluderent.

But suppose sense were now to come to the vine, so that it had a certain appetite and moved of its own accord — what do you think it would do? Will it not, of itself, see to the things it formerly obtained through the vinedresser? But do you not see that a care will be added to it, of tending its senses too, and their whole appetite, and any limbs that have been joined to it? Thus to the things it always had it will join those that came to it afterwards, and it will not have the same end its cultivator had, but will wish to live according to that nature which has afterwards been added to it. So its end of good will be like what it was before, yet not the same; for it will no longer seek the good of a plant, but of an animal. What, then, if not sense only had been given to it, but a man’s mind as well? Must not those former things both abide, so as to be tended, and these later additions be far dearer — and the better each part of the mind, the dearer — and the end of the highest good rest in that filling-out of nature, since mind and reason far and away excel? Thus that which is the last of all things to be sought, drawn from the first commendation of nature, climbs by many degrees until it arrives at the summit, which is built up out of soundness of body and out of the perfected reason of the intelligence.

At enim iam dicitis virtutem non posse constitui, si ea, quae extra virtutem sint, ad beate vivendum pertineant. quod totum contra est. introduci enim virtus nullo modo potest, nisi omnia, quae leget quaeque reiciet, unam referentur ad summam. nam si †omnino nos† neglegemus, in Aristonea vitia incidemus et peccata obliviscemurque quae virtuti ipsi principia dederimus; sin ea non neglegemus neque tamen ad finem summi boni referemus, non multum ab Erilli levitate aberrabimus. duarum enim vitarum nobis erunt instituta capienda. facit enim ille duo seiuncta ultima bonorum, quae ut essent vera, coniungi debuerunt; nunc ita separantur, ut disiuncta sint, quo nihil potest esse perversius.

Since, then, such is the form of nature as I have set it out, if, as I said at the beginning, each person knew himself the moment he came to be, and could judge what the force of his whole nature and of its single parts might be, he would at once see what this is that we are inquiring into — the highest and uttermost of all the things we seek — and could go wrong in nothing. But as it is, from the first nature is marvellously hidden, and can be neither seen through nor known. As our years advance, however, little by little, or rather slowly, we come to know ourselves, as it were. And so that first commendation, which nature has made of us to ourselves, is uncertain and obscure, and that first appetite of the mind does only this much: that we may be able to be safe and sound. But when we begin to discern, and to feel what we are and how we differ from the rest of living creatures, then we begin to pursue the things for which we were born.

Itaque contra est, ac dicitis; nam constitui virtus nullo modo potest, nisi ea, quae sunt prima naturae, ut ad summam pertinentia tenebit. quaesita enim virtus est, non quae relinqueret naturam, sed quae tueretur. at illa, ut vobis placet, partem quandam tuetur, reliquam deserit. Atque ipsa hominis institutio si loqueretur, hoc diceret, primos suos quasi coeptus appetendi fuisse, ut se conservaret in ea natura, in qua ortus esset. nondum autem explanatum satis erat, quid maxime natura vellet. explanetur igitur. quid ergo aliud intellegetur nisi uti ne quae pars naturae neglegatur? in qua si nihil est praeter rationem, sit in una virtute finis bonorum; sin est etiam corpus, ista explanatio naturae nempe hoc effecerit, ut ea, quae ante explanationem tenebamus, relinquamus. ergo id est convenienter naturae vivere, a natura discedere.

The like of this we see in beasts, which at first do not stir from the place where they were born, then each moves by its own appetite. We see snakelings creep, ducklings swim, blackbirds fly, oxen use their horns, scorpions their stings — in short, that for each creature its own nature is its guide to living. And this likeness appears in the human kind as well. For little ones, at the first birth, lie there as if they had no mind at all. But when a little firmness has come to them, they use both mind and senses, and strive to raise themselves up, and use their hands, and recognize those by whom they are reared. Then they take delight in playmates and gladly gather with them, give themselves to play, are drawn by the hearing of stories, wish to be generous to others with what they have to spare, take notice of what goes on at home rather curiously, and begin to ponder something, and to learn, and wish not to be ignorant of the names of those they see; and in the things in which they vie with their playmates, if they have won, they lift themselves up with gladness, and, beaten, they are cast down and let their spirits fall. None of this, we must hold, comes about without a cause.

ut quidam philosophi, cum a sensibus profecti maiora quaedam et diviniora vidissent, sensus reliquerunt, sic isti, cum ex appetitione rerum virtutis pulchritudinem aspexissent, omnia, quae praeter virtutem ipsam viderant, abiecerunt obliti naturam omnem appetendarum rerum ita late patere, ut a principiis permanaret ad fines, neque intellegunt se rerum illarum pulchrarum atque admirabilium fundamenta subducere.

For the force of man is so begotten by nature that he seems made for grasping every virtue; and for this reason little ones are moved, without teaching, by likenesses of the virtues whose seeds they hold within them — for these are the first elements of nature, which, once enlarged, bring about virtue’s sprouting, so to speak. For since we have been so born and made as to hold within us the beginnings both of doing something, and of loving certain people, and of generosity, and of returning a kindness, and as to have minds apt for science, prudence, fortitude, and estranged from their contraries, it is not without cause that we see in children those sparks of the virtues, as I called them, from which the philosopher’s reason must be kindled, so that, following it as a kind of god for its guide, it may arrive at the uttermost of nature. For, as I have often said by now, in the feeble years and the weak mind the force of nature is discerned as if through a fog; but when, as it advances, the mind is strengthened, it does indeed recognize the force of nature, yet in such a way that it can advance further, while in itself it has only been begun.

Itaque mihi videntur omnes quidem illi errasse, qui finem bonorum esse dixerunt honeste vivere, sed alius alio magis, Pyrrho scilicet maxime, qui virtute constituta nihil omnino, quod appetendum sit, relinquat, deinde Aristo, qui nihil relinquere non est ausus, introduxit autem, quibus commotus sapiens appeteret aliquid, quodcumque in mentem incideret, et quodcumque tamquam occurreret. is hoc melior quam Pyrrho, quod aliquod genus appetendi dedit, deterior quam ceteri, quod penitus a natura recessit. Stoici autem, quod finem bonorum in una virtute ponunt, similes sunt illorum; quod autem principium officii quaerunt, melius quam Pyrrho; quod ea non occurrentia fingunt, vincunt Aristonem; quod autem ea, quae ad naturam accommodata et per se assumenda esse dicunt, non adiungunt ad finem bonorum, desciscunt a natura et quodam modo sunt non dissimiles Aristonis. ille enim occurrentia nescio quae comminiscebatur; hi autem ponunt illi quidem prima naturae, sed ea seiungunt a finibus et a summa bonorum; quae cum praeponunt, ut sit aliqua rerum selectio, naturam videntur sequi; cum autem negant ea quicquam ad beatam vitam pertinere, rursus naturam relinquunt.

We must enter, then, into the nature of things, and see through to the very depths what she requires; for otherwise we cannot know ourselves. And because this precept was too great to seem to come from a man, it was for that reason assigned to a god. The Pythian Apollo therefore bids us know ourselves. But this knowledge of ourselves is one thing: to know the force of body and of mind, and to follow that life which has the full enjoyment of these very things. Now since this appetite of the mind was from the beginning such that we should have those things I spoke of as perfect in nature as may be, it must be confessed that, once we have attained what was sought, nature comes to rest, as it were, in that as in her uttermost, and that this is the highest good — which surely, taken whole, must of its own accord and for its own sake be sought, since it was shown before that even its single parts are to be sought for their own sakes.

Atque adhuc ea dixi, causa cur Zenoni non fuisset, quam ob rem a superiorum auctoritate discederet. nunc reliqua videamus, nisi aut ad haec, Cato, dicere aliquid vis aut nos iam longiores sumus. Neutrum vero, inquit ille. nam et a te perfici istam disputationem volo, nec tua mihi oratio longa videri potest. Optime, inquam. quid enim mihi potest esse optatius quam cum Catone, omnium virtutum auctore, de virtutibus disputare?

But in reckoning up the advantages of the body, if anyone shall think that pleasure has been passed over by us, let that question be deferred to another time. For whether pleasure is or is not among those things we have called first according to nature makes no difference to what we are about. For if, as it seems to me at least, pleasure does not fill out the goods of nature, it has rightly been passed over; but if it is in them, as some hold, nothing hinders this grasp of ours of the highest good. For to those things which have been established as first according to nature, if pleasure be added, some one advantage of the body will have been added, and it will not have changed that constitution of the highest good which has been set forth.

sed primum illud vide, gravissimam illam vestram sententiam, quae familiam ducit, honestum quod sit, id esse bonum solum honesteque vivere bonorum finem, communem fore vobis cum omnibus, qui in una virtute constituunt finem bonorum, quodque dicitis, informari non posse virtutem, si quicquam, nisi quod honestum sit, numeretur, idem dicetur ab illis, modo quos nominavi. mihi autem aequius videbatur Zenonem cum Polemone disceptantem, a quo quae essent principia naturae acceperat, a communibus initiis progredientem videre ubi primum insisteret et unde causa controversiae nasceretur, non stantem cum iis, qui ne dicerent quidem sua summa bona esse a natura profecta, uti isdem argumentis, quibus illi uterentur, isdemque sententiis.

And so far, indeed, our reasoning has proceeded in such a way that the whole of it was drawn from the first commendation of nature. But now let us follow another kind of argument: that not only because we love ourselves, but because each part of nature, in both body and mind, has its own force, for that reason we are moved in these matters to the highest degree of our own accord. And, to begin with the body, do you not see how, if anything in the limbs is crooked or crippled or stunted, men hide it? How they even struggle and labour, if they can bring it about, that the body’s fault either not appear or appear as little as possible? And how they endure many pains as well, for the sake of a cure, so that, even if the very use of the limbs is to be not greater but actually less, still their appearance may return to nature? For indeed, since all by nature think themselves to be sought whole, and that for no other reason but on their own account, the parts too must necessarily be sought for their own sakes, when the whole is sought for its own sake.

Minime vero illud probo, quod, cum docuistis, ut vobis videmini, bonum solum esse, quod honestum sit, tum rursum dicitis initia proponi necesse esse apta et accommodata naturae, quorum ex selectione virtus possit existere. non enim in selectione virtus ponenda erat, ut id ipsum, quod erat bonorum ultimum, aliud aliquid adquireret. nam omnia, quae sumenda quaeque legenda aut optanda sunt, inesse debent in summa bonorum, ut is, qui eam adeptus sit, nihil praeterea desideret. videsne ut, quibus summa est in voluptate, perspicuum sit quid iis faciendum sit aut non faciendum? ut nemo dubitet, eorum omnia officia quo spectare, quid sequi, quid fugere debeant? sit hoc ultimum bonorum, quod nunc a me defenditur; apparet statim, quae sint officia, quae actiones. vobis autem, quibus nihil est aliud propositum nisi rectum atque honestum, unde officii, unde agendi principium nascatur non reperietis.

What? In the motion and posture of the body is there nothing that nature herself judges must be heeded? In what manner a man walks, sits; what the carriage of the face, what the look, may be in each? Is there nothing in these things that we account worthy or unworthy of a free man? Do we not think many men deserving of hatred who, by a certain motion or posture, seem to have scorned the law and measure of nature? And since these things are drawn from the body, what reason is there why beauty itself should not rightly be reckoned worth seeking for its own sake? For if we think the body’s crookedness and stunting are to be fled for their own sakes, why should we not also — and perhaps the more — pursue the dignity of form for its own sake? And if we flee ugliness in the posture and motion of the body, what reason is there why we should not pursue beauty? Health, too, and strength, and freedom from pain we shall seek not only for their usefulness but also for their own sakes. For since nature wishes to be filled out in all her parts, she seeks for its own sake that condition of the body which is most in keeping with nature — a nature wholly thrown into disorder if the body is sick, or in pain, or wanting in strength.

Hoc igitur quaerentes omnes, et ii, qui quodcumque in mentem veniat aut quodcumque occurrat se sequi dicent, et vos ad naturam revertemini. quibus natura iure responderit non esse verum aliunde finem beate vivendi, a se principia rei gerendae peti; esse enim unam rationem, qua et principia rerum agendarum et ultima bonorum continerentur, atque ut Aristonis esset explosa sententia dicentis nihil differre aliud ab alio, nec esse res ullas praeter virtutes et vitia, inter quas quicquam omnino interesset, sic errare Zenonem, qui nulla in re nisi in virtute aut vitio propensionem ne minimi quidem momenti ad summum bonum adipiscendum esse diceret et, cum ad beatam vitam nullum momentum cetera haberent, ad appetitionem tamen rerum esse in iis momenta diceret; quasi vero haec appetitio non ad summi boni adeptionem pertineret! Quid autem minus consentaneum est quam quod aiunt cognito summo bono reverti se ad naturam, ut ex ea petant agendi principium, id est officii?

Let us look at the parts of the mind, whose view is more brilliant; and the loftier they are, the clearer the signs of nature they give. So great is the love of knowing and of knowledge bred in us that no one can doubt that the nature of man is swept toward these things lured by no profit. Do we not see how children are not deterred even by beatings from gazing at things and searching them out? How, when driven off, they run back? How they rejoice to know something? How they are eager to tell it to others? How they are held by a procession, by the games and spectacles of that kind, and for the sake of it endure even hunger and thirst? And what of those who take delight in liberal studies and arts — do we not see that they take no account of health or of household estate, but bear all things, captured by knowing and by knowledge itself, and balance against the greatest cares and labours the pleasure they take from learning?

non enim actionis aut officii ratio impellit ad ea, quae secundum naturam sunt, petenda, sed ab iis et appetitio et actio commovetur. Nunc venio ad tua illa brevia, quae consectaria esse dicebas, et primum illud, quo nihil potest brevius: Bonum omne laudabile, laudabile autem honestum, bonum igitur omne honestum. O plumbeum pugionem! quis enim tibi primum illud concesserit?—quo quidem concesso nihil opus est secundo; si enim omne bonum laudabile est,

To me, at any rate, Homer seems to have glimpsed something of this kind in what he invented about the song of the Sirens. For it does not appear that they were in the habit of calling back those who sailed past by the sweetness of their voices, or by some novelty and variety of singing, but because they professed to know many things — so that men clung fast upon their rocks out of a desire to learn. This is how they call to Ulysses (for I have translated this very passage, as I have certain others of Homer’s): O glory of the Argives, why not turn your prow, Ulysses, that with your ears you may take in our song? For no one ever yet has sailed past these blue waters on his course without first standing still, caught by the sweetness of our voices, and then, sated in his eager breast with our manifold music, gliding onward to the shores of his fathers the wiser. We hold fast the heavy struggle of the war, and the ruin that Greece, by the will of heaven, brought upon Troy, and all the traces of things that are spread across the wide earth. Homer saw that the story could not carry conviction if so great a man were held entangled by mere little ditties; what they promise is knowledge, and it is no wonder that to a man hungry for wisdom this should be dearer than his homeland. And indeed, to wish to know everything, of whatever kind, is the mark of the merely curious; but to be drawn to a desire for knowledge by the contemplation of greater things is what we must reckon the mark of the greatest of men.

omne honestum est—quis tibi ergo istud dabit praeter Pyrrhonem, Aristonem eorumve similes, quos tu non probas? Aristoteles, Xenocrates, tota illa familia non dabit, quippe qui valitudinem, vires, divitias, gloriam, multa alia bona esse dicant, laudabilia non dicant. et hi quidem ita non sola virtute finem bonorum contineri putant, ut rebus tamen omnibus virtutem anteponant; quid censes eos esse facturos, qui omnino virtutem a bonorum fine segregaverunt, Epicurum, Hieronymum, illos etiam, si qui Carneadeum finem tueri volunt?

For what burning zeal do you suppose was in Archimedes, who, while he was drawing certain figures in the dust with too close attention, did not even feel that his country had been taken? How much of Aristoxenus’ genius do we see consumed in music? With what zeal do we think Aristophanes spent his life upon letters? What of Pythagoras? What shall I say of Plato or of Democritus? Men whom we see, for the desire of learning, to have traversed the farthest lands. Those who do not see this have never loved anything great and worthy of being known. And on this point, those who say that the studies I have named are pursued for the sake of the pleasures of the mind do not understand that they are for this very reason to be sought for their own sakes — namely, because our minds delight in them with no advantage held out, and rejoice in the knowledge itself even where it is going to bring inconvenience.

iam aut Callipho aut Diodorus quo modo poterunt tibi istud concedere, qui ad honestatem aliud adiungant, quod ex eodem genere non sit? placet igitur tibi, Cato, cum res sumpseris non concessas, ex illis efficere, quod velis? Iam ille sorites est, quo nihil putatis esse vitiosius: quod bonum sit, id esse optabile, quod optabile, id expetendum, quod expetendum, id laudabile, deinde reliqui gradus. sed ego in hoc resisto; eodem modo enim tibi nemo dabit, quod expetendum sit, id esse laudabile. Illud vero minime consectarium, sed in primis hebes, illorum scilicet, non tuum, gloriatione dignam esse beatam vitam, quod non possit sine honestate contingere, ut iure quisquam glorietur.

But what is the use of demanding more on matters so plain? Let us rather put the question to ourselves: how the movements of the stars and the contemplation of the heavenly bodies, and the knowledge of all those things that are hidden away in the obscurity of nature, move us; and what delight there is in history, which we are accustomed to pursue to the very end, going back over what we have passed by and following up what we have begun. Nor indeed am I unaware that there is utility in history, and not pleasure only.

dabit hoc Zenoni Polemo, etiam magister eius et tota illa gens et reliqui, qui virtutem omnibus rebus multo anteponentes adiungunt ei tamen aliquid summo in bono finiendo. si enim virtus digna est gloriatione, ut est, tantumque praestat reliquis rebus, ut dici vix possit, et beatus esse poterit virtute una praeditus carens ceteris, nec tamen illud tibi concedetur, praeter virtutem nihil in bonis esse ducendum. illi autem, quibus summum bonum sine virtute est, non dabunt fortasse vitam beatam habere, in quo iure possit gloriari, etsi illi quidem etiam voluptates faciunt interdum gloriosas.

What, when we read invented stories, from which no utility can be drawn out, and read them with pleasure? What, when we wish the names of those who have done some deed to be known to us, and their parents, their homeland, and many things besides that are not in the least necessary? What of the fact that men of the lowest fortune, with no hope of conducting affairs — craftsmen, in short — take delight in history? And we can see that those most of all wish to hear and to read of deeds done who are far from any hope of doing them, worn out by old age. From which it must necessarily be understood that in the very things which are learned and known there are inducements present, by which we are moved to learning and to knowing.

vides igitur te aut ea sumere, quae non concedantur, aut ea, quae etiam concessa te nihil iuvent. Equidem in omnibus istis conclusionibus hoc putarem philosophia nobisque dignum, et maxime, cum summum bonum quaereremus, vitam nostram, consilia, voluntates, non verba corrigi. quis enim potest istis, quae te, ut ais, delectant, brevibus et acutis auditis de sententia decedere? nam cum expectant et avent audire cur dolor malum non sit, dicunt illi asperum esse dolere, molestum, odiosum, contra naturam, difficile toleratu, sed, quia nulla sit in dolore nec fraus nec improbitas nec malitia nec culpa nec turpitudo, non esse illud malum. haec qui audierit, ut ridere non curet, discedet tamen nihilo firmior ad dolorem ferendum, quam venerat.

The old philosophers, indeed, imagine in the islands of the blessed what the life of the wise will be like: men freed from all care, requiring no necessary furnishing or provision for life, who they suppose will do nothing else than spend the whole of their time in inquiry and in learning, in the knowledge of nature. We, however, see that this is not only the delight of the happy life but also a relief from miseries. And so many men, when they were in the power of enemies or of tyrants, many in captivity, many in exile, have lightened their pain by the pursuits of learning.

tu autem negas fortem esse quemquam posse, qui dolorem malum putet. cur fortior sit, si illud, quod tute concedis, asperum et vix ferendum putabit? ex rebus enim timiditas, non ex vocabulis nascitur. Et ais, si una littera commota sit, fore tota ut labet disciplina. utrum igitur tibi litteram videor an totas paginas commovere? ut enim sit apud illos, id quod est a te laudatum, ordo rerum conservatus et omnia inter se apta et conexa—sic enim aiebas—, tamen persequi non debemus, si a falsis principiis profecta congruunt ipsa sibi et a proposito non aberrant.

The chief man of this city, Demetrius of Phalerum, when he had been driven from his country by injustice, betook himself to king Ptolemy at Alexandria. And since he excelled in this very philosophy to which we are urging you, and had been a pupil of Theophrastus, he wrote many splendid things in that calamitous leisure — not for any use of his own, of which he had been stripped, but that cultivation of his mind was for him a kind of food of humanity. For my part, I often used to hear from Cn. Aufidius, a man of praetorian rank, learned, and blind, that he was moved by a longing for the light more than for any use of it. In a word, unless sleep brought rest to our bodies and a kind of medicine for our labour, we should reckon it given against nature, for it takes away our senses and removes all activity. And so, if either nature did not seek rest, or could obtain it in some other way, we should readily put up with it — we who even now are accustomed, for the sake of doing or learning something, to take on our vigils almost against nature.

in prima igitur constitutione Zeno tuus a natura recessit, cumque summum bonum posuisset in ingenii praestantia, quam virtutem vocamus, nec quicquam aliud bonum esse dixisset, nisi quod esset honestum, nec virtutem posse constare, si in ceteris rebus esset quicquam, quod aliud alio melius esset aut peius, his propositis tenuit prorsus consequentia. recte dicis; negare non possum. sed ita falsa sunt ea, quae consequuntur, ut illa, e quibus haec nata sunt, vera esse non possint.

There are, moreover, still clearer, even plainly evident and not in the least doubtful signs of nature, above all in man, of course, but in every animal: that the mind craves always to be doing something, and on no terms can endure everlasting rest. This is easy to discern in the earliest little years of children. For although I fear I may seem excessive on this kind of point, still all the old philosophers, and ours above all, go back to the cradle, because they think that in childhood the will of nature can most easily be known. We see, then, how even infants cannot keep still. And when they have advanced a little, they take delight in games even if these are toilsome, so that they cannot be deterred even by beatings, and that desire of doing something grows up together with their years. And so, not even if we supposed we should enjoy the most delightful dreams would we wish the sleep of Endymion to be given us; and if it did befall us, we should reckon it the equal of death.

docent enim nos, ut scis, dialectici, si ea, quae rem aliquam sequantur, falsa sint, falsam illam ipsam esse, quam sequantur. ita fit illa conclusio non solum vera, sed ita perspicua, ut dialectici ne rationem quidem reddi putent oportere: si illud, hoc; non autem hoc; igitur ne illud quidem. sic consequentibus vestris sublatis prima tolluntur. quae sequuntur igitur? omnes, qui non sint sapientes, aeque miseros esse, sapientes omnes summe beatos, recte facta omnia aequalia, omnia peccata paria; quae cum magnifice primo dici viderentur, considerata minus probabantur. sensus enim cuiusque et natura rerum atque ipsa veritas clamabat quodam modo non posse se adduci, ut inter eas res, quas Zeno exaequaret, nihil interesset.

Indeed, even the most idle of men, endowed with some singular and indescribable sluggishness, we still see to be forever moved in body and mind, and, when they are hampered by no necessary business, either to call for the dice-board, or to seek out some game, or to look for some conversation; and since they do not have the noble delights that come from learning, to chase after little gatherings and gossiping circles. Indeed, not even the beasts that we shut up for the sake of our delight, although they are fed more abundantly than if they were free, readily endure to be confined, and they long for the free and wandering movements that nature has assigned them.

Postea tuus ille Poenulus—scis enim Citieos, clientes tuos, e Phoenica profectos—, homo igitur acutus, causam non optinens repugnante natura verba versare coepit et primum rebus iis, quas nos bonas ducimus, concessit, ut haberentur aestimabiles et ad naturam accommodatae, faterique coepit sapienti, hoc est summe beato, commodius tamen esse si ea quoque habeat, quae bona non audet appellare, naturae accommodata esse concedit, negatque Platonem, si sapiens non sit, eadem esse in causa, qua tyrannum Dionysium; huic mori optimum esse propter desperationem sapientiae, illi propter spem vivere. peccata autem partim esse tolerabilia, partim nullo modo, propterea quod alia peccata plures, alia pauciores quasi numeros officii praeterirent. iam insipientes alios ita esse, ut nullo modo ad sapientiam possent pervenire, alios, qui possent, si id egissent, sapientiam consequi.

And so the better any man is born and trained, the less he would wish to be alive at all if, stripped of affairs to conduct, he could feed on pleasures however well prepared. For men either prefer to conduct some business privately, or, if they are of a loftier mind, take up the commonwealth by winning honours and commands, or devote themselves wholly to the pursuits of learning. In which life they are so far from chasing after pleasures that they even endure cares, anxieties, sleepless nights, and enjoy the best part of a man — which in us must be reckoned divine — the keenness of genius and of mind, neither seeking pleasure nor fleeing toil. Nor indeed do they let up either their wonder at the things that have been discovered by the ancients or their search for new ones. And since they cannot be sated by this zeal, forgetful of all other things, they think nothing low, nothing base; and so great is the power in such pursuits that we see even those who have set themselves other ends of goods, ones they steer by utility or by pleasure, nevertheless wear out their lives in inquiring into things and unfolding the workings of nature.

hic loquebatur aliter atque omnes, sentiebat idem, quod ceteri. nec vero minoris aestimanda ducebat ea, quae ipse bona negaret esse, quam illi, qui ea bona esse dicebant. quid igitur voluit sibi, qui illa mutaverit? saltem aliquid de pondere detraxisset et paulo minoris aestimavisset ea quam Peripatetici, ut sentire quoque aliud, non solum dicere videretur. Quid? de ipsa beata vita, ad quam omnia referuntur, quae dicitis? negatis eam esse, quae expleta sit omnibus iis rebus, quas natura desideret, totamque eam in una virtute ponitis; cumque omnis controversia aut de re soleat aut de nomine esse, utraque earum nascitur, si aut res ignoratur aut erratur in nomine. quorum si neutrum est, opera danda est, ut verbis utamur quam usitatissimis et quam maxime aptis, id est rem declarantibus.

Therefore this much, at least, is clear: that we are born for action. Now there are several kinds of action, such that the lesser are even put in the shade by the greater; and the greatest are, first — as it seems to me, at any rate, and to those whose system we are now treating — the consideration and knowledge of the heavenly bodies and of those things which, hidden and lying concealed by nature, reason can track down; next, the administration of public affairs, or the science of administering them; then the prudent, temperate, brave, just exercise of reason and the remaining virtues, and the actions that accord with the virtues — all of which, embracing them in a single word, we call the honourable. To both the knowledge and the practice of these we are led, once we have grown strong, with nature herself going before us. For the beginnings of all things are small, but they grow by employing their own advances — and not without reason: for in the first emergence there is a certain tenderness and softness, such that one can neither see the best things nor do them. The light of virtue and of the happy life, the two things most of all to be sought, appears later, and much later still before it is understood plainly what these are. For Plato says it splendidly: Happy is the man to whom it has fallen, even in old age, to be able to attain wisdom and true opinions! Therefore, since enough has been said about the first advantages of nature, let us now look at the greater things that follow.

num igitur dubium est, quin, si in re ipsa nihil peccatur a superioribus, verbis illi commodius utantur? videamus igitur sententias eorum, tum ad verba redeamus. Dicunt appetitionem animi moveri, cum aliquid ei secundum naturam esse videatur, omniaque, quae secundum naturam sint, aestimatione aliqua digna eaque pro eo, quantum in quoque sit ponderis, esse aestimanda, quaeque secundum naturam sint, partim nihil habere in sese eius appetitionis, de qua saepe iam diximus, quae nec honesta nec laudabilia dicantur, partim, quae voluptatem habeant in omni animante, sed in homine rationem etiam. ex ea quae sint apta, ea honesta, ea pulchra, ea laudabilia, illa autem superiora naturalia nominantur, quae coniuncta cum honestis vitam beatam perficiunt et absolvunt.

Nature, then, both begot and shaped the body of man in such a way that some things she perfected at the first emergence, others she fashioned as the years advanced, and she made hardly any use at all of external and adventitious aids. The mind, however, she perfected, as she did the body, by the remaining things; for she furnished it with senses fit for perceiving things, so that they needed no aid, or not much, for their own confirmation. But what is most excellent and best in man, that she left undone. And yet she gave such a mind as could receive every virtue, and implanted, without teaching, small notions of the greatest things, and, as it were, set out to teach and led us into the things that were already within — the elements, so to speak, of virtue. But virtue itself she only began; nothing more.

omnium autem eorum commodorum, quibus non illi plus tribuunt, qui illa bona esse dicunt, quam Zeno, qui negat, longe praestantissimum esse, quod honestum esset atque laudabile. sed si duo honesta proposita sint, alterum cum valitudine, alterum cum morbo, non esse dubium, ad utrum eorum natura nos ipsa deductura sit. sed tamen tantam vim esse honestatis, tantumque eam rebus omnibus praestare et excellere, ut nullis nec suppliciis nec praemiis demoveri possit ex eo, quod rectum esse decreverit, omniaque, quae dura, difficilia, adversa videantur, ea virtutibus iis, quibus a natura essemus ornati, opteri posse, non faciles illas quidem res nec contemnendas —quid enim esset in virtute tantum?—, sed ut hoc iudicaremus, non esse in iis partem maximam positam beate aut secus vivendi.

And so it is our task — when I say ours, I mean it is the task of an art — to seek out, upon those beginnings that we have received, the consequences, until that which we want is brought to completion. And this is worth a good deal more, and far more to be sought for its own sake, than either the senses or those things of the body which we mentioned; for the surpassing perfection of the mind so far excels them that it can scarcely be conceived what the difference is. And so all honour, all admiration, all zeal is referred to virtue and to those actions that are in accord with virtue, and all the things that are either so present in our minds or so done are called by one name the honourable. What the notions of all these are — those, that is, that are signified by the names of things — and what the force and nature of each is, we shall see presently.

Ad summam ea, quae Zeno aestimanda et sumenda et apta naturae esse dixit, eadem illi bona appellant, vitam autem beatam illi eam, quae constaret ex iis rebus, quas dixi, aut plurimis aut gravissimis. Zeno autem, quod suam, quod propriam speciem habeat, cur appetendum sit, id solum bonum appellat, beatam autem vitam eam solam, quae cum virtute degatur. Si de re disceptari oportet, nulla mihi tecum, Cato, potest esse dissensio. nihil est enim, de quo aliter tu sentias atque ego, modo commutatis verbis ipsas res conferamus. nec hoc ille non vidit, sed verborum magnificentia est et gloria delectatus. qui si ea, quae dicit, ita sentiret, ut verba significant, quid inter eum et vel Pyrrhonem vel Aristonem interesset? sin autem eos non probabat, quid attinuit cum iis, quibuscum re concinebat, verbis discrepare?

But for now let us only explain that this honourable of which I speak — apart from the fact that we love our very selves — is besides, by its own nature, to be sought for its own sake. Children give the proof, in whom, as in mirrors, nature is discerned. What great zeal there is in those who contend! What great contests in themselves! How they are carried away with joy when they have won! How ashamed the beaten are! How they refuse to be found at fault! How they long to be praised! What labours do they not endure, to be foremost among their fellows! What memory there is in them of those who have done well by them, what desire to return the favour! And these things appear most of all in every best natural disposition, in which this honourable that we have in mind is, as it were, sketched out by nature.

quid, si reviviscant Platonis illi et deinceps qui eorum auditores fuerunt, et tecum ita loquantur? Nos cum te, M. Cato, studiosissimum philosophiae, iustissimum virum, optimum iudicem, religiosissimum testem, audiremus, admirati sumus, quid esset cur nobis Stoicos anteferres, qui de rebus bonis et malis sentirent ea, quae ab hoc Polemone Zeno cognoverat, nominibus uterentur iis, quae prima specie admirationem, re explicata risum moverent. tu autem, si tibi illa probabantur, cur non propriis verbis ea tenebas? sin te auctoritas commovebat, nobisne omnibus et Platoni ipsi nescio quem illum anteponebas? praesertim cum in re publica princeps esse velles ad eamque tuendam cum summa tua dignitate maxime a nobis ornari atque instrui posses. a nobis enim ista quaesita, a nobis descripta, notata, praecepta sunt, omniumque rerum publicarum rectionis genera, status, mutationes, leges etiam et instituta ac mores civitatum perscripsimus. eloquentiae vero, quae et principibus maximo ornamento est, et qua te audimus valere plurimum, quantum tibi ex monumentis nostris addidisses! Ea cum dixissent, quid tandem talibus viris responderes?

But these things are in children; in those ages that are now full-formed they are clearly expressed. Who is so unlike a human being as not to be moved both by offence at baseness and by approval of honour? Who is there who does not hate a lustful, shameless youth? Who, on the other hand, does not love modesty and steadiness in that age, even where his own interest is not concerned at all? Who does not hate Pullus Numitorius of Fregellae, the traitor, although he was of service to our commonwealth? Who does not praise above all Codrus, the saviour of his city, who does not praise the daughters of Erechtheus? To whom is the name of Tubulus not hateful? Who does not love Aristides, though he is dead? Or do we forget how greatly we are moved in the hearing and in the reading, when we learn of something done with piety, with friendship, with greatness of soul?

Rogarem te, inquit, ut diceres pro me tu idem, qui illis orationem dictavisses, vel potius paulum loci mihi, ut iis responderem, dares, nisi et te audire nunc mallem et istis tamen alio tempore responsurus essem, tum scilicet, cum tibi. Atque, si verum respondere velles, Cato, haec erant dicenda, non eos tibi non probatos, tantis ingeniis homines tantaque auctoritate, sed te animadvertisse, quas res illi propter antiquitatem parum vidissent, eas a Stoicis esse perspectas, eisdemque de rebus hos cum acutius disseruisse, tum sensisse gravius et fortius, quippe qui primum valitudinem bonam expetendam negent esse, eligendam dicant, nec quia bonum sit valere, sed quia sit non nihilo aestimandum—neque tamen pluris quam illis videtur, qui illud non dubitant bonum dicere—; hoc vero te ferre non potuisse, quod antiqui illi quasi barbati, ut nos de nostris solemus dicere, crediderint, eius, qui honeste viveret, si idem etiam bene valeret, bene audiret, copiosus esset, optabiliorem fore vitam melioremque et magis expetendam quam illius, qui aeque vir bonus multis modis esset, ut Ennii Alcmaeo, ’ci/rcumventus mo/rbo,

Why do I speak of ourselves, who were born, taken up, and trained for praise and for honour? What shouts of the crowd and of the unlearned are raised in the theatres when those lines are spoken: ’I am Orestes’, and against him from the other: ’No, in truth, I tell you, I am Orestes!’ And when, moreover, the way out is given by each to the king, confused and at a loss — when both, then, pray to be put to death together — how often is this acted out, and ever with anything but the greatest admiration? There is no one, then, who does not approve and praise this disposition of mind, by which not only is no advantage sought, but, against advantage, faith is even kept.

exilio atque i/nopia’. illi igitur antiqui non tam acute optabiliorem illam vitam putant, praestantiorem, beatiorem, Stoici autem tantum modo praeponendam in seligendo, non quo beatior ea vita sit, sed quod ad naturam accommodatior. Et, qui sapientes non sint, omnes aeque esse miseros, Stoici hoc videlicet viderunt, illos autem id fugerat superiores, qui non arbitrabantur homines sceleribus et parricidiis inquinatos nihilo miseriores esse quam eos, qui, cum caste et integre viverent, nondum perfectam illam sapientiam essent consecuti.

With examples of this kind not only invented stories but histories too are crammed, and ours especially. For we chose the best of men to receive the sacred objects of Ida; we sent guardians to kings; our generals vowed their own lives for the safety of their country; our consuls warned a king, a bitter enemy already drawing near our walls, to beware of poison; in our commonwealth was found a Lucretia, who atoned by a voluntary death for the violation forced upon her, and a man who killed his daughter that she might not be violated. All these things, and countless others besides — who is there who does not understand both that those who did them were drawn by the splendour of worth and were heedless of their own advantage, and that we, when we praise them, are led by nothing else than the honourable? Now that these matters have been set out briefly — for I have not pursued the abundance I might have, since there was no doubt in the case — by all this it is surely concluded that both all the virtues and that honourable which springs from them and clings within them are to be sought for their own sake.

atque hoc loco similitudines eas, quibus illi uti solent, dissimillimas proferebas. quis enim ignorat, si plures ex alto emergere velint, propius fore eos quidem ad respirandum, qui ad summam iam aquam adpropinquent, sed nihilo magis respirare posse quam eos, qui sint in profundo? nihil igitur adiuvat procedere et progredi in virtute, quo minus miserrimus sit, ante quam ad eam pervenerit, quoniam in aqua nihil adiuvat, et, quoniam catuli, qui iam dispecturi sunt, caeci aeque et ii, qui modo nati, Platonem quoque necesse est, quoniam nondum videbat sapientiam, aeque caecum animo ac Phalarim fuisse?

But in all that honourable good of which we are speaking, nothing is so radiant, nothing of wider reach, than the bond between man and man, a kind of fellowship and sharing of advantages, and that very love of the human race. This love, born from the first begetting — in that children are cherished by those who begot them, and the whole household is bound together by marriage and by stock — creeps gradually outward: first to kinsfolk, then to relations by marriage, then to friends, after that to neighbours, then to fellow citizens and to those who are publicly our allies and friends, and at last to the embrace of the whole human kind. This disposition of the mind, rendering to each his own and guarding generously and fairly that fellowship of human union of which I speak, is called justice; and joined to it are dutifulness, kindness, generosity, good will, courtesy, and whatever else is of the same kind. And these things, while they are proper to justice, are at the same time shared with the rest of the virtues.

ista similia non sunt, Cato, in quibus quamvis multum processeris tamen illud in eadem causa est, a quo abesse velis, donec evaseris; nec enim ille respirat, ante quam emersit, et catuli aeque caeci, prius quam dispexerunt, ac si ita futuri semper essent. illa sunt similia: hebes acies est cuipiam oculorum, corpore alius senescit; hi curatione adhibita levantur in dies, valet alter plus cotidie, alter videt. his similes sunt omnes, qui virtuti student; levantur vitiis, levantur erroribus, nisi forte censes Ti. Gracchum patrem non beatiorem fuisse quam filium, cum alter stabilire rem publicam studuerit, alter evertere. nec tamen ille erat sapiens— quis enim hoc aut quando aut ubi aut unde?—; sed quia studebat laudi et dignitati, multum in virtute processerat.

For since man’s nature has been begotten in such a way that he has within him something inborn and, as it were, civic and communal, which the Greeks call politikon, whatever any virtue does will not be at odds with that community and that love and human fellowship which I have set out; and, in turn, just as justice itself will pour itself into the other virtues, so it will seek them out. For justice cannot be kept except by a brave man, except by a wise one. Such, then, as is this whole concord and consent of the virtues of which I speak, such is that honourable good itself, since the honourable is either virtue itself or a deed done by virtue; and a life that accords with these and answers to the virtues can be judged upright and honourable and steadfast and in keeping with nature.

conferam avum tuum Drusum cum C. Graccho, eius fere aequali? quae hic rei publicae vulnera inponebat, eadem ille sanabat. si nihil est, quod tam miseros faciat quam inpietas et scelus, ut iam omnes insipientes sint miseri, quod profecto sunt, non est tamen aeque miser, qui patriae consulit, et is, qui illam extinctam cupit. Levatio igitur vitiorum magna fit in iis, qui habent ad virtutem progressionis aliquantum.

And yet this joining and intermingling of the virtues is nonetheless distinguished by the philosophers through a certain method of reasoning. For although they are so coupled and connected that all share in all, and none can be severed from another, still each has its own proper office: courage is discerned in toils and dangers, temperance in the foregoing of pleasures, prudence in the choice of goods and evils, justice in rendering to each his own. Since, then, there is in every virtue a certain care that looks, as it were, outward and reaches after others and embraces them, it comes about that friends, that brothers, that kinsmen, that relations by marriage, that fellow citizens, that everyone in the end — since we hold that there is one fellowship of mankind — are to be sought for their own sake. And yet none of these is of such a kind as to lie within the end and uttermost limit of goods.

vestri autem progressionem ad virtutem fieri aiunt, levationem vitiorum fieri negant. at quo utantur homines acuti argumento ad probandum, operae pretium est considerare. quarum, inquit, artium summae crescere possunt, earum etiam contrariorum summa poterit augeri; ad virtutis autem summam accedere nihil potest; ne vitia quidem igitur crescere poterunt, quae sunt virtutum contraria. utrum igitur tandem perspicuisne dubia aperiuntur, an dubiis perspicua tolluntur? atqui hoc perspicuum est, vitia alia in aliis esse maiora, illud dubium, ad id, quod summum bonum dicitis, ecquaenam possit fieri accessio. vos autem cum perspicuis dubia debeatis illustrare, dubiis perspicua conamini tollere.

So it comes about that two kinds of things to be sought for their own sake are found. One lies in those things in which that uttermost good is brought to completion — things which belong either to the mind or to the body. But those that are external — that is, those that are present neither in the mind nor in the body, such as friends, parents, children, kinsmen, the fatherland itself — these are indeed dear of their own accord, but they are not of the same class as the others. Nor indeed could anyone ever attain the highest good if all those things that lie outside us, though to be sought, were contained within the highest good.

itaque rursus eadem ratione, qua sum paulo ante usus, haerebitis. si enim propterea vitia alia aliis maiora non sunt, quia ne ad finem quidem bonorum eum, quem vos facitis, quicquam potest accedere, quoniam perspicuum est vitia non esse omnium paria, finis bonorum vobis mutandus est. teneamus enim illud necesse est, cum consequens aliquod falsum sit, illud, cuius id consequens sit, non posse esse verum. Quae est igitur causa istarum angustiarum? gloriosa ostentatio in constituendo summo bono. cum enim, quod honestum sit, id solum bonum esse confirmatur, tollitur cura valitudinis, diligentia rei familiaris, administratio rei publicae, ordo gerendorum negotiorum, officia vitae, ipsum denique illud honestum, in quo uno vultis esse omnia, deserendum est. quae diligentissime contra Aristonem dicuntur a Chrysippo. ex ea difficultate illae ’fallaciloquae’, ut ait Accius, malitiae natae sunt.

"How, then," you will say, "will it be possible for it to be true that all things are referred to the highest good, if friendships, if ties of kinship, if the remaining external things are not contained within the highest good?" By this account, surely: that we guard those things which are external by the duties that arise from each particular kind of virtue. For the cultivation of a friend and of a parent, to one who discharges his duty, profits him in this very thing, that to discharge duty thus belongs among right actions, which are sprung from the virtues. These the wise indeed pursue under nature’s guidance, as though they could see; but men who are not yet perfect, and yet endowed with outstanding natural gifts, are often roused by glory, which has the look and likeness of the honourable. But if they could see, through and through, that honourable good itself, perfect and complete on every side … the one thing most splendid of all and most worthy of praise, with what joy would they be filled, when they take such delight in the shadowy notion of it?

quod enim sapientia, pedem ubi poneret, non habebat sublatis officiis omnibus, officia autem tollebantur dilectu omni et discrimine remoto, quae esse non poterant rebus omnibus sic exaequatis, ut inter eas nihil interesset, ex his angustiis ista evaserunt deteriora quam Aristonis. illa tamen simplicia, vestra versuta. roges enim Aristonem, bonane ei videantur haec: vacuitas doloris, divitiae, valitudo; neget. quid? quae contraria sunt his, malane? nihilo magis. Zenonem roges; respondeat totidem verbis. admirantes quaeramus ab utroque, quonam modo vitam agere possimus, si nihil interesse nostra putemus, valeamus aegrine simus, vacemus an cruciemur dolore, frigus, famem propulsare possimus necne possimus. Vives, inquit Aristo, magnifice atque praeclare, quod erit cumque visum ages, numquam angere, numquam cupies, numquam timebis.

For what man, given over to pleasures, what man set ablaze by the fires of his desires in laying hold of the things he had most fiercely craved, do we suppose to be flooded with so great a gladness as either the elder Africanus, when Hannibal was beaten, or the younger, when Carthage was overthrown? Whom did the descent of the Tiber on that festal day affect with so great a joy as it affected L. Paulus, when he was carried up that same river bringing King Perses captive? Come now, Lucius mine, raise up in your mind the height and excellence of the virtues:

Quid Zeno? Portenta haec esse dicit, neque ea ratione ullo modo posse vivi; se dicere inter honestum et turpe nimium quantum, nescio quid inmensum, inter ceteras res nihil omnino interesse. idem adhuc;

you will no longer doubt that men who possess them, living with a great and lofty spirit, are always happy — men who understand that all the motions of fortune and the changes of circumstance and the times will be light and feeble, if once they have entered the contest of virtue. For those things which we counted among the goods of the body do indeed fill out the happiest life, but in such a way that the happy life can exist without them. For so small and slight are those additions of goods that, just as the stars are not even seen in the rays of the sun, so these are not even discerned in the splendour of the virtues. And though it is truly said that those advantages of the body count for little toward living happily, still it is too violent to say that they count for nothing;

audi reliqua et risum contine, si potes: Media illa, inquit, inter quae nihil interest, tamen eius modi sunt, ut eorum alia eligenda sint, alia reicienda, alia omnino neglegenda, hoc est, ut eorum alia velis, alia nolis, alia non cures.—At modo dixeras nihil in istis rebus esse, quod interesset.—Et nunc idem dico, inquiet, sed ad virtutes et ad vitia nihil interesse. —

for those who argue so seem to me to have forgotten the very first principles of nature which they themselves laid down. Something, then, must be granted to these things — provided you understand how much is to be granted. For it belongs to a philosopher who seeks not so much the showy as the true neither to count as nothing those things which even those showy men confessed to be in accordance with nature, and to see that there is so great a force in virtue and, so to speak, so great an authority in the honourable, that the rest, while not nothing, are yet so small as to seem to be nothing. This is the discourse of one who does not scorn all things save virtue, yet magnifies virtue itself with the praises that are its own; and, in fine, this is the explanation of the highest good, complete and perfect on every side. From here the rest, attempting to snatch up little fragments, each wished his own opinion to seem the one he had contributed.

Quis istud, quaeso, nesciebat? verum audiamus.— Ista, inquit, quae dixisti, valere, locupletem esse, non dolere, bona non dico, sed dicam Graece prohgme/na, Latine autem producta—sed praeposita aut praecipua malo, sit tolerabilius et mollius—; illa autem, morbum, egestatem, dolorem, non appello mala, sed, si libet, reiectanea. itaque illa non dico me expetere, sed legere, nec optare, sed sumere, contraria autem non fugere, sed quasi secernere. Quid ait Aristoteles reliquique Platonis alumni? Se omnia, quae secundum naturam sint, bona appellare, quae autem contra, mala. Videsne igitur Zenonem tuum cum Aristone verbis concinere, re dissidere, cum Aristotele et illis re consentire, verbis discrepare? cur igitur, cum de re conveniat, non malumus usitate loqui? aut doceat paratiorem me ad contemnendam pecuniam fore, si illam in rebus praepositis quam si in bonis duxero, fortioremque in patiendo dolore, si eum asperum et difficilem perpessu et contra naturam esse quam si malum dixero.

Often, by Aristotle, by Theophrastus, the knowledge of things has been wondrously praised for its own sake; caught by this one thing, Erillus maintained that knowledge is the highest good, and that no other thing is to be sought for its own sake. Much was said by the ancients about despising and looking down upon human affairs; this one thing Aristo held to: he denied that, apart from vices and virtues, there is anything to be shunned or to be sought. It was laid down by our school that, among the things which are in accordance with nature, there is the being free from pain; this Hieronymus called the highest good. But Callipho, indeed, and after him Diodorus — the one having grown enamoured of pleasure, the other of freedom from pain — neither could do without the honourable, which has been praised most of all by our school.

Facete M. Piso, familiaris noster, et alia multa et hoc loco Stoicos irridebat: Quid enim? aiebat. ’Bonum negas esse divitias, praepositum esse dicis? quid adiuvas? avaritiamne minuis? quo modo? si verbum sequimur, primum longius verbum praepositum quam bonum’.—Nihil ad rem!—’Ne sit sane; at certe gravius. nam bonum ex quo appellatum sit, nescio, praepositum ex eo credo, quod praeponatur aliis. id mihi magnum videtur.’ itaque dicebat plus tribui divitiis a Zenone, qui eas in praepositis poneret, quam ab Aristotele, qui bonum esse divitias fateretur, sed neque magnum bonum et prae rectis honestisque contemnendum ac despiciendum nec magnopere expetendum, omninoque de istis omnibus verbis a Zenone mutatis ita disputabat, et, quae bona negarentur ab eo esse et quae mala, illa laetioribus nominibus appellari ab eo quam a nobis, haec tristioribus. Piso igitur hoc modo, vir optimus tuique, ut scis, amantissimus. nos paucis ad haec additis finem faciamus aliquando; longum est enim ad omnia respondere, quae a te dicta sunt.

Indeed, even the very devotees of pleasure seek their side-roads, and have the virtues on their lips all day long, and say that pleasure is at first sought only for its own sake, but that afterward, by habit, a kind of second nature is formed, driven by which men do many things while seeking no pleasure at all. The Stoics remain. They, to be sure, have carried over from us not some one thing or another, but our whole philosophy to their own side; and just as the rest of the thieves change the marks on the things they have stolen, so they, in order to use our opinions as their own, changed the names, like the marks upon things. Thus this teaching alone is left worthy of those zealous for the liberal arts, worthy of the learned, worthy of illustrious men, worthy of leading men, worthy of kings. When he had said this, and had paused a little, "What is it?" he said;

Nam ex eisdem verborum praestrigiis et regna nata vobis sunt et imperia et divitiae, et tantae quidem, ut omnia, quae ubique sint, sapientis esse dicatis. solum praeterea formosum, solum liberum, solum civem, stultos omnia contraria, quos etiam insanos esse vultis. haec para/doca illi, nos admirabilia dicamus. quid autem habent admirationis, cum prope accesseris? conferam tecum, quam cuique verbo rem subicias; nulla erit controversia. Omnia peccata paria dicitis. non ego tecum iam ita iocabor, ut isdem his de rebus, cum L. Murenam te accusante defenderem. apud imperitos tum illa dicta sunt, aliquid etiam coronae datum; nunc agendum est subtilius. Peccata paria.

"do I seem to you to have rehearsed enough, in the use of my own right, within your hearing?" And I said, "You, Piso — as often at other times, so today — seemed to me to know these things so well that, if we could have you more often, I should not think we need do much suppliant courting of the Greeks. And this I approved the more, because I remember that Staseas of Naples, that teacher of yours, a Peripatetic of high repute indeed, used to speak of these matters somewhat otherwise, agreeing with those who put much store in fortune favourable or adverse, much in the goods or evils of the body." "It is as you say," he said; "but these things are stated by Antiochus, our friend, much better and more strongly than they used to be stated by Staseas. And yet I am not asking what has been approved by you in my account, but by this Cicero of ours, whom I am eager to carry off from you as my pupil."

—Quonam modo?—Quia nec honesto quicquam honestius nec turpi turpius.—Perge porro; nam de isto magna dissensio est. illa argumenta propria videamus, cur omnia sint paria peccata.—Ut, inquit, in fidibus pluribus, nisi nulla earum non ita contenta nervis sit, ut concentum servare possit, omnes aeque incontentae sint, sic peccata, quia discrepant, aeque discrepant; paria sunt igitur.—Hic ambiguo ludimur. aeque enim contingit omnibus fidibus, ut incontentae sint, illud non continuo, ut aeque incontentae. collatio igitur ista te nihil iuvat. nec enim, omnes avaritias si aeque avaritias esse dixerimus, sequetur, ut etiam aequas esse dicamus. Ecce aliud simile dissimile.

Then Lucius: "For my part, those things have been thoroughly approved by me, as I think they are by my brother too." Then Piso said to me: "What of it, then? Do you grant the young man your indulgence? Or would you rather have him learn those doctrines which, when he has thoroughly mastered them, leave him knowing nothing?" "I, indeed, allow it to him," I said. "But do you not remember that I am at liberty to approve those things you have said? For who can fail to approve the things that seem to him probable?" "But can anyone," he said, "approve what he does not hold to be perceived, grasped, known?" "There is no great dissension here, Piso," I said. "For there is no other reason why nothing seems to me capable of being perceived, except that the power of perceiving is so defined by the Stoics that they deny anything can be perceived unless it is true in such a way that it could not be false. And so this is my dissension with them, but with the Peripatetics none at all. But let us pass these matters by; for they make a discussion both quite long enough and quite contentious enough."

Ut enim, inquit, gubernator aeque peccat, si palearum navem evertit et si auri, item aeque peccat, qui parentem et qui servum iniuria verberat.—Hoc non videre, cuius generis onus navis vehat, id ad gubernatoris artem nil pertinere! itaque aurum paleamne portet, ad bene aut ad male gubernandum nihil interesse! at quid inter parentem et servulum intersit, intellegi et potest et debet. ergo in gubernando nihil, in officio plurimum interest, quo in genere peccetur. et si in ipsa gubernatione neglegentia est navis eversa, maius est peccatum in auro quam in palea. omnibus enim artibus volumus attributam esse eam, quae communis appellatur prudentia, quam omnes, qui cuique artificio praesunt, debent habere. ita ne hoc quidem modo paria peccata sunt.

"This seems to me to have been said by you too hastily — that all the wise are always happy; somehow the discourse flew past it. And unless this is made good, I fear that what Theophrastus said about fortune, about pain, about the torment of the body — things with which he judged the happy life could in no way be joined — may be true. For this is vehemently at odds: that the same man should be happy and yet overwhelmed by many evils. How these things are consistent I do not at all understand." "Which is it, then," he said, "that does not please you — that there is so great a force in virtue that of itself it is sufficient for living happily? Or, if you approve that, do you deny that it can come about that those who possess virtue should be happy even when afflicted with certain evils?" "For my part, I want there to be in virtue the greatest force possible; but how great it is, another time; for now only this: whether it can be so great, if anything outside virtue be counted among goods."

Urgent tamen et nihil remittunt. Quoniam, inquiunt, omne peccatum inbecillitatis et inconstantiae est, haec autem vitia in omnibus stultis aeque magna sunt, necesse est paria esse peccata. Quasi vero aut concedatur in omnibus stultis aeque magna esse vitia, et eadem inbecillitate et inconstantia L. Tubulum fuisse, qua illum, cuius is condemnatus est rogatione, P. Scaevolam, et quasi nihil inter res quoque ipsas, in quibus peccatur, intersit, ut, quo hae maiores minoresve sint, eo, quae peccentur in his rebus, aut

"And yet," he said, "if you grant the Stoics that virtue alone, if it be present, makes life happy, you grant the same to the Peripatetics as well. For what they do not dare to call evils, but grant to be harsh and inconvenient and to be rejected and foreign to nature — these we call evils, but slight and well-nigh the least of all. And so, if he can be happy who is among harsh and rejectable things, so too can he who is among small evils." And I said, "Piso, if there is anyone who is wont to see sharply, in pleading cases, what the matter at issue is, that man is surely you. So attend, I beg you. For so far — by my own fault, perhaps — you do not perceive what it is I am asking." "Here I am," he said, "and I await what you will answer to the very thing I was asking."

maiora sint aut minora! Itaque—iam enim concludatur oratio—hoc uno vitio maxime mihi premi videntur tui Stoici, quod se posse putant duas contrarias sententias optinere. quid enim est tam repugnans quam eundem dicere, quod honestum sit, solum id bonum esse, qui dicat appetitionem rerum ad vivendum accommodatarum a natura profectam? ita cum ea volunt retinere, quae superiori sententiae conveniunt, in Aristonem incidunt; cum id fugiunt, re eadem defendunt, quae Peripatetici, verba tenent mordicus. quae rursus dum sibi evelli ex ordine nolunt, horridiores evadunt, asperiores, duriores et oratione et moribus.

"I will answer that I am not asking, at this time, what virtue can accomplish," I said, "but what is said consistently, what is at variance with itself." "In what way, then?" he said. "Because," I said, "when by Zeno this is delivered grandly, as though from an oracle: ’Virtue is of itself sufficient for living happily’ — and ’Why so?’ he says, the answer comes: ’Because, save what is honourable, there is no other good.’ I am no longer asking whether this be true; what I say is that the things he says hang together splendidly among themselves.

quam illorum tristitiam atque asperitatem fugiens Panaetius nec acerbitatem sententiarum nec disserendi spinas probavit fuitque in altero genere mitior, in altero illustrior semperque habuit in ore Platonem, Aristotelem, Xenocratem, Theophrastum, Dicaearchum, ut ipsius scripta declarant. quos quidem tibi studiose et diligenter tractandos magnopere censeo. Sed quoniam et advesperascit et mihi ad villam revertendum est, nunc quidem hactenus;

Let Epicurus have said this same thing — that the wise man is always happy (which indeed he is given to bubbling out now and then) — Epicurus who says that the wise man, even when he is being worn down by the highest pains, will say, ’How sweet this is! how little I care!’; I would not fight with the man as to why he should hold so much good to lie in nature; this I would press: that he does not understand what he ought to say, when he has called pain the highest evil. The same is now my discourse against you. You say all the same things, good and evil, that those men say who never, as the saying goes, set eyes on a painted philosopher: health, strength, stature, beauty, the soundness of all the little nails, goods; deformity, disease, debility, evils.

verum hoc idem saepe faciamus. Nos vero, inquit ille; nam quid possumus facere melius? et hanc quidem primam exigam a te operam, ut audias me quae a te dicta sunt refellentem. sed memento te, quae nos sentiamus, omnia probare, nisi quod verbis aliter utamur, mihi autem vestrorum nihil probari. Scrupulum, inquam, abeunti; sed videbimus. Quae cum essent dicta, discessimus.

After I had heard Antiochus, Brutus, as was my habit, in the company of M. Piso, in the gymnasium that is called the Ptolemaeum, and with us my brother Quintus and T. Pomponius and Lucius Cicero — my cousin by blood, but a brother in affection — we agreed among ourselves to spend the afternoon walking in the Academy, chiefly because at that hour the place would be free of every crowd. And so at the appointed time we all went to Piso. From there, with talk of this and that, we covered those six stades from the Dipylon. When we had come into the spaces of the Academy, which are not without reason famous, we found the solitude we had wanted.

Cum audissem Antiochum, Brute, ut solebam, cum M. Pisone in eo gymnasio, quod Ptolomaeum vocatur, unaque nobiscum Q. frater et T. Pomponius Luciusque Cicero, frater noster cognatione patruelis, amore germanus, constituimus inter nos ut ambulationem postmeridianam conficeremus in Academia, maxime quod is locus ab omni turba id temporis vacuus esset. itaque ad tempus ad Pisonem omnes. inde sermone vario sex illa a Dipylo stadia confecimus. cum autem venissemus in Academiae non sine causa nobilitata spatia, solitudo erat ea, quam volueramus.

Then Piso said: ’Should I call it something given us by nature, or some kind of illusion, that when we see the very places in which we have learned that men worthy of remembrance spent much of their time, we are moved more deeply than when we hear of the deeds of those same men, or read some piece of their writing? Just so I am moved now. For Plato comes into my mind, who we are told was the first to make a practice of holding discussions here; and those little gardens of his close by do not merely bring him to my memory but seem to set the man himself before my eyes. Here was Speusippus, here Xenocrates, here his pupil Polemo — whose very seat that was, the one we see. And for my own part, when I would look upon our own Senate-house — the Hostilian, I mean, not this new one, which seems to me smaller now that it has been made larger — I used to call to mind Scipio, Cato, Laelius, and above all my own grandfather; so great is the power of suggestion that lies in places; with good reason, then, has the art of memory been derived from them.’

tum Piso: Naturane nobis hoc, inquit, datum dicam an errore quodam, ut, cum ea loca videamus, in quibus memoria dignos viros acceperimus multum esse versatos, magis moveamur, quam si quando eorum ipsorum aut facta audiamus aut scriptum aliquod legamus? velut ego nunc moveor. venit enim mihi Platonis in mentem, quem accepimus primum hic disputare solitum; cuius etiam illi hortuli propinqui non memoriam solum mihi afferunt, sed ipsum videntur in conspectu meo ponere. hic Speusippus, hic Xenocrates, hic eius auditor Polemo, cuius illa ipsa sessio fuit, quam videmus. Equidem etiam curiam nostram—Hostiliam dico, non hanc novam, quae minor mihi esse videtur, posteaquam est maior—solebam intuens Scipionem, Catonem, Laelium, nostrum vero in primis avum cogitare; tanta vis admonitionis inest in locis; ut non sine causa ex iis memoriae ducta sit disciplina.

Then Quintus said: ’It is exactly as you say, Piso. For just now, as I was coming here, that spot of Colonus turned my own thoughts toward itself, where its inhabitant Sophocles came before my eyes — Sophocles, whom you know how I admire and how I delight in him. Indeed, a kind of vision stirred me toward an older memory still, of Oedipus coming to this place and asking, in that most tender song, what these very spots might be — to no purpose, of course, yet it stirred me all the same.’ Then Pomponius said: ’But as for me, whom you are all in the habit of attacking as a devotee of Epicurus, I spend much time, as you know, with Phaedrus — whom I love beyond all others — in the gardens of Epicurus, which we passed by just now; yet, warned by the old proverb, I bear the living in mind, and still I cannot forget Epicurus, even were I to wish it, since my friends keep his likeness not only on their tablets but even on their cups and on their rings.’

Tum Quintus: Est plane, Piso, ut dicis, inquit. nam me ipsum huc modo venientem convertebat ad sese Coloneus ille locus, cuius incola Sophocles ob oculos versabatur, quem scis quam admirer quamque eo delecter. me quidem ad altiorem memoriam Oedipodis huc venientis et illo mollissimo carmine quaenam essent ipsa haec loca requirentis species quaedam commovit, inaniter scilicet, sed commovit tamen. Tum Pomponius: At ego, quem vos ut deditum Epicuro insectari soletis, sum multum equidem cum Phaedro, quem unice diligo, ut scitis, in Epicuri hortis, quos modo praeteribamus, sed veteris proverbii admonitu vivorum memini, nec tamen Epicuri licet oblivisci, si cupiam, cuius imaginem non modo in tabulis nostri familiares, sed etiam in poculis et in anulis habent.

Here I said: ’Our friend Pomponius is plainly making a joke, and perhaps within his rights. For he has so settled himself at Athens that he is all but one of the Attics, and looks likely to earn that very surname. But I agree with you, Piso, that this is what happens in practice: that at the prompting of places we think rather more keenly and attentively about famous men. For you know that once I came with you to Metapontum, and would not turn aside to my host before I had seen that very place where Pythagoras ended his life, and his seat. But at this present time, though there are throughout every quarter of Athens, in the very places themselves, many tokens of men of the highest greatness, still it is that recess that moves me. For only a little while ago it belonged to Carneades, whom I seem to see — for his likeness is well known — and I think that the very seat, robbed of so great a greatness of genius, longs for that voice of his.’

Hic ego: Pomponius quidem, inquam, noster iocari videtur, et fortasse suo iure. ita enim se Athenis collocavit, ut sit paene unus ex Atticis, ut id etiam cognomen videatur habiturus. Ego autem tibi, Piso, assentior usu hoc venire, ut acrius aliquanto et attentius de claris viris locorum admonitu cogitemus. scis enim me quodam tempore Metapontum venisse tecum neque ad hospitem ante devertisse, quam Pythagorae ipsum illum locum, ubi vitam ediderat, sedemque viderim. hoc autem tempore, etsi multa in omni parte Athenarum sunt in ipsis locis indicia summorum virorum, tamen ego illa moveor exhedra. modo enim fuit Carneadis, quem videre videor—est enim nota imago—, a sedeque ipsa tanta ingenii magnitudine orbata desiderari illam vocem puto.

Then Piso said: ’Since, then, each of us has something to say, what of our friend Lucius? Does he gladly visit the spot where Demosthenes and Aeschines used to fight it out against each other? For each man is drawn most by his own pursuit.’ And he, blushing, said: ’Do not ask it of me — I, who have even gone down to the Phaleric shore, to the place where they say Demosthenes used to declaim against the surf, to train himself to master the roar with his voice. And only just now I turned a little to the right off the road, to approach the tomb of Pericles. Though indeed there is no end of that in this city; for wherever we set foot, we set it down on some piece of history.’

Tum Piso: Quoniam igitur aliquid omnes, quid Lucius noster? inquit. an eum locum libenter invisit, ubi Demosthenes et Aeschines inter se decertare soliti sunt? suo enim quisque studio maxime ducitur. Et ille, cum erubuisset: Noli, inquit, ex me quaerere, qui in Phalericum etiam descenderim, quo in loco ad fluctum aiunt declamare solitum Demosthenem, ut fremitum assuesceret voce vincere. modo etiam paulum ad dexteram de via declinavi, ut ad Pericli sepulcrum accederem. quamquam id quidem infinitum est in hac urbe; quacumque enim ingredimur, in aliqua historia vestigium ponimus.

Then Piso said: ’And yet, Cicero, those pursuits of yours, if they look to the imitation of great men, are the mark of men of talent; but if only to the learning of the tokens of ancient memory, of the merely curious. We all urge you — already at a run, I hope — not only to wish to know the men you wish to know, but to wish to imitate them too.’ Here I said: ’Although this young man, as you see, Piso, is doing what you prescribe, still your encouragement is welcome to me.’ Then he, in the most friendly way, as was his habit, said: ’Let us all, indeed, bring everything we can to bear upon this young man’s coming of age, and above all that he impart something of his own studies to philosophy as well — whether to imitate you, whom he loves, or to be able to do that very thing he pursues with more grace. But are you to be urged by us, Lucius, or are you already inclined of your own accord? To me, at least, you seem to attend to Antiochus, whom you hear, well enough.’ Then he, shyly, or rather modestly, said: ’I do indeed; but did you hear, just now, about Carneades? I am carried off that way — yet Antiochus calls me back, and there is no one else for us to hear besides.’

Tum Piso: Atqui, Cicero, inquit, ista studia, si ad imitandos summos viros spectant, ingeniosorum sunt; sin tantum modo ad indicia veteris memoriae cognoscenda, curiosorum. te autem hortamur omnes, currentem quidem, ut spero, ut eos, quos novisse vis, imitari etiam velis. Hic ego: Etsi facit hic quidem, inquam, Piso, ut vides, ea, quae praecipis, tamen mihi grata hortatio tua est. Tum ille amicissime, ut solebat: Nos vero, inquit, omnes omnia ad huius adolescentiam conferamus, in primisque ut aliquid suorum studiorum philosophiae quoque impertiat, vel ut te imitetur, quem amat, vel ut illud ipsum, quod studet, facere possit ornatius. sed utrum hortandus es nobis, Luci, inquit, an etiam tua sponte propensus es? mihi quidem Antiochum, quem audis, satis belle videris attendere. Tum ille timide vel potius verecunde: Facio, inquit, equidem, sed audistine modo de Carneade? rapior illuc, revocat autem Antiochus, nec est praeterea, quem audiamus.

Then Piso said: ’Although this, perhaps, will not be allowed to pass off so easily, since he is here’ — he meant me — ’still I shall make bold to call you back from this New Academy to that old one, in which, as you used to hear Antiochus say, there are reckoned not only those who are called Academics — Speusippus, Xenocrates, Polemo, Crantor, and the rest — but also the old Peripatetics, whose chief was Aristotle, whom, excepting Plato, I should perhaps not be wrong to call the chief of philosophers. Turn yourself, then, to them, I beg you. For from their writings and their teachings one may draw not only all liberal learning, all history, all elegant discourse, but there is besides such a variety of arts in them that no one, without that equipment, can come properly furnished to any of the more distinguished tasks. From these men have arisen orators, from these generals and leaders of commonwealths. To come to lesser matters: mathematicians, poets, musicians, and physicians too have set out, in the end, from this workshop, as it were, of every craftsman.’ And I said:

Tum Piso: Etsi hoc, inquit, fortasse non poterit sic abire, cum hic assit—me autem dicebat—, tamen audebo te ab hac Academia nova ad veterem illam vocare, in qua, ut dicere Antiochum audiebas, non ii soli numerantur, qui Academici vocantur, Speusippus, Xenocrates, Polemo, Crantor ceterique, sed etiam Peripatetici veteres, quorum princeps Aristoteles, quem excepto Platone haud scio an recte dixerim principem philosophorum. ad eos igitur converte te, quaeso. ex eorum enim scriptis et institutis cum omnis doctrina liberalis, omnis historia, omnis sermo elegans sumi potest, tum varietas est tanta artium, ut nemo sine eo instrumento ad ullam rem illustriorem satis ornatus possit accedere. ab his oratores, ab his imperatores ac rerum publicarum principes extiterunt. ut ad minora veniam, mathematici, poe+tae, musici, medici denique ex hac tamquam omnium artificum officina profecti sunt. Atque ego:

’You know I feel the very same, Piso; but you have made mention of the matter at a good moment. For my friend Cicero here is eager to hear what the view is, regarding the ends of goods, of that old Academy you speak of, and of the Peripatetics. And we think you can explain it most easily, since you had Staseas of Naples with you for many years, and since for several months now we have seen you inquiring into these very things at Athens from Antiochus.’ And he, laughing, said: ’Come, come’ — for you wished, cleverly enough, to make me the starting-point of our discussion — ’let us set it out for the young man, if by chance we are able. For this solitude grants us what, were some god to promise it, I should never have thought possible: that I should hold a discussion in the Academy, like a philosopher. But let me not, while I oblige him, be a burden to you.’ ’A burden to me,’ I said, ’who asked you for this very thing?’ Then, when Quintus and Pomponius had said that they wished the same, Piso began. And do attend, I beg you, Brutus, to his discourse, and judge whether it seems to have embraced sufficiently the view of Antiochus — a view I take to be the one you most approve, since you have often heard his brother Aristus.

Scis me, inquam, istud idem sentire, Piso, sed a te oportune facta mentio est. studet enim meus audire Cicero quaenam sit istius veteris, quam commemoras, Academiae de finibus bonorum Peripateticorumque sententia. censemus autem facillime te id explanare posse, quod et Staseam Neapolitanum multos annos habueris apud te et complures iam menses Athenis haec ipsa te ex Antiocho videamus exquirere. Et ille ridens: Age, age, inquit,—satis enim scite me nostri sermonis principium esse voluisti—exponamus adolescenti, si quae forte possumus. dat enim id nobis solitudo, quod si qui deus diceret, numquam putarem me in Academia tamquam philosophum disputaturum. sed ne, dum huic obsequor, vobis molestus sim. Mihi, inquam, qui te id ipsum rogavi? Tum, Quintus et Pomponius cum idem se velle dixissent, Piso exorsus est. cuius oratio attende, quaeso, Brute, satisne videatur Antiochi complexa esse sententiam, quam tibi, qui fratrem eius Aristum frequenter audieris, maxime probatam existimo.

He spoke, then, thus: ’How much ornament there is in the discipline of the Peripatetics has been said by me, as briefly as I could, a little while ago. But the form of that discipline, as of nearly all the rest, is threefold: one part is of nature, a second of reasoning, a third of living. Nature was investigated by them in such a way that no part of sky, sea, or land — to speak in the poet’s manner — was passed over; indeed, when they had spoken of the first beginnings of things and of the whole world, so as to draw their conclusions not only by probable argument but even by the necessary reasoning of the mathematicians, they brought the greatest store of material, from things investigated for their own sake, to the knowledge of hidden things.

Sic est igitur locutus: Quantus ornatus in Peripateticorum disciplina sit satis est a me, ut brevissime potuit, paulo ante dictum. sed est forma eius disciplinae, sicut fere ceterarum, triplex: una pars est naturae, disserendi altera, vivendi tertia. Natura sic ab iis investigata est, ut nulla pars caelo, mari, terra, ut poe+tice loquar, praetermissa sit; quin etiam, cum de rerum initiis omnique mundo locuti essent, ut multa non modo probabili argumentatione, sed etiam necessaria mathematicorum ratione concluderent, maximam materiam ex rebus per se investigatis ad rerum occultarum cognitionem attulerunt.

Aristotle pursued the origins, the ways of life, and the forms of all living creatures; Theophrastus, for his part, the natures of plants and the causes and accounts of nearly all the things brought forth from the earth; and from this knowledge the investigation of the most hidden things was made easier. By the same men were handed down precepts of reasoning, not by dialectic alone but by oratory too; and by Aristotle, as its chief author, the exercise of speaking on both sides of single questions was established — not so as always to argue against everything, in the manner of Arcesilas, and yet so as, in all matters, to bring out whatever could be said on either side.

persecutus est Aristoteles animantium omnium ortus, victus, figuras, Theophrastus autem stirpium naturas omniumque fere rerum, quae e terra gignerentur, causas atque rationes; qua ex cognitione facilior facta est investigatio rerum occultissimarum. Disserendique ab isdem non dialectice solum, sed etiam oratorie praecepta sunt tradita, ab Aristoteleque principe de singulis rebus in utramque partem dicendi exercitatio est instituta, ut non contra omnia semper, sicut Arcesilas, diceret, et tamen ut in omnibus rebus, quicquid ex utraque parte dici posset, expromeret.

And when the third part sought the precepts of living well, that too was applied by them not only to the conduct of private life but also to the governing of commonwealths. From Aristotle we have learned the customs, institutions, and disciplines of nearly all the states not of Greece only but of the barbarian world as well; from Theophrastus, even their laws. And whereas each of them had taught what kind of leader it befits a man to be in a commonwealth, and had written besides, at greater length, what the best condition of a commonwealth might be, Theophrastus did this further: he showed what tendencies there are in a commonwealth, and what shifts of circumstance, by which one must steer as the situation may require. But as for the manner of passing one’s life, the one that most pleased them was indeed the quiet one, set in the contemplation and the knowledge of things; and because this was most like to the life of the gods, it seemed most worthy of the wise man. And on these matters their discourse is splendid and illustrious.

Cum autem tertia pars bene vivendi praecepta quaereret, ea quoque est ab isdem non solum ad privatae vitae rationem, sed etiam ad rerum publicarum rectionem relata. omnium fere civitatum non Graeciae solum, sed etiam barbariae ab Aristotele mores, instituta, disciplinas, a Theophrasto leges etiam cognovimus. cumque uterque eorum docuisset qualem in re publica principem esse conveniret, pluribus praeterea conscripsisset qui esset optimus rei publicae status, hoc amplius Theophrastus: quae essent in re publica rerum inclinationes et momenta temporum, quibus esset moderandum, utcumque res postularet. vitae autem degendae ratio maxime quidem illis placuit quieta, in contemplatione et cognitione posita rerum, quae quia deorum erat vitae simillima, sapiente visa est dignissima. atque his de rebus et splendida est eorum et illustris oratio.

As to the highest good, however — since there are two kinds of their books, one written for the public, which they called exoterikon, the other more finely worked, which they left in their notebooks — they do not always seem to say the same thing; and yet on the substance itself there is no inconsistency, at least among those I have named, nor any disagreement among them. But when the happy life is the question, and this is the one thing that philosophy ought to look to and to follow, whether it lies wholly within the power of the wise man or can be either shaken or torn away by adverse circumstances — on this they do at times seem to differ among themselves and to be in doubt. This is brought out most of all by Theophrastus’ book on the happy life, in which a great deal is granted to fortune. And if this is so, wisdom could not guarantee a happy life. This account seems to me too delicate, so to speak, and too soft, for what the force and gravity of virtue demands. Let us hold, then, to Aristotle and to his son Nicomachus, whose carefully written books on ethics are said indeed to be Aristotle’s own — though I do not see why the son could not have been like the father. As for Theophrastus, let us call upon him for most things, provided only that we hold to more firmness and strength in virtue than he held to. Let us be content, then, with these men.

De summo autem bono, quia duo genera librorum sunt, unum populariter scriptum, quod e)cwteriko/n appellabant, alterum limatius, quod in commentariis reliquerunt, non semper idem dicere videntur, nec in summa tamen ipsa aut varietas est ulla apud hos quidem, quos nominavi, aut inter ipsos dissensio. sed cum beata vita quaeratur idque sit unum, quod philosophia spectare et sequi debeat, sitne ea tota sita in potestate sapientis an possit aut labefactari aut eripi rebus adversis, in eo non numquam variari inter eos et dubitari videtur. quod maxime efficit Theophrasti de beata vita liber, in quo multum admodum fortunae datur. quod si ita se habeat, non possit beatam praestare vitam sapientia. Haec mihi videtur delicatior, ut ita dicam, molliorque ratio, quam virtutis vis gravitasque postulat. quare teneamus Aristotelem et eius filium Nicomachum, cuius accurate scripti de moribus libri dicuntur illi quidem esse Aristoteli, sed non video, cur non potuerit patri similis esse filius. Theophrastum tamen adhibeamus ad pleraque, dum modo plus in virtute teneamus, quam ille tenuit, firmitatis et roboris. Simus igitur contenti his.

For their successors are, in my view, better than the philosophers of the other schools, but they so degenerate that they seem to have been born of their own selves. First, Theophrastus’ pupil Strato wished to be a natural philosopher; and in that, though he is great, still most of his work is novel, and very little of it concerns ethics. His pupil Lyco is rich in language, but rather thin in matters themselves. Lyco’s pupil Aristo is then neat and elegant, but that gravity which is looked for in a great philosopher was not in him; his writings are indeed many and polished, but somehow his discourse has no authority.

namque horum posteri meliores illi quidem mea sententia quam reliquarum philosophi disciplinarum, sed ita degenerant, ut ipsi ex se nati esse videantur. primum Theophrasti, Strato, physicum se voluit; in quo etsi est magnus, tamen nova pleraque et perpauca de moribus. huius, Lyco, oratione locuples, rebus ipsis ieiunior. concinnus deinde et elegans huius, Aristo, sed ea, quae desideratur a magno philosopho, gravitas, in eo non fuit; scripta sane et multa et polita, sed nescio quo pacto auctoritatem oratio non habet.

I pass over many, among them a learned and agreeable man, Hieronymus — whom I no longer know why I should call a Peripatetic. For he set out freedom from pain as the highest good; and whoever disagrees about the highest good disagrees about the whole scheme of philosophy. Critolaus wished to imitate the ancients, and is indeed nearest to them in gravity, and his discourse runs full; and yet not even he stays within the institutions of his fathers. Diodorus, his pupil, adds freedom from pain to honour. He too is his own man, and, disagreeing about the highest good, cannot truly be called a Peripatetic. But the view of the ancients our friend Antiochus seems to me to follow most carefully, and he teaches that this same view was Aristotle’s and Polemo’s.

praetereo multos, in his doctum hominem et suavem, Hieronymum, quem iam cur Peripateticum appellem nescio. summum enim bonum exposuit vacuitatem doloris; qui autem de summo bono dissentit de tota philosophiae ratione dissentit. Critolaus imitari voluit antiquos, et quidem est gravitate proximus, et redundat oratio, ac tamen ne is quidem in patriis institutis manet. Diodorus, eius auditor, adiungit ad honestatem vacuitatem doloris. hic quoque suus est de summoque bono dissentiens dici vere Peripateticus non potest. antiquorum autem sententiam Antiochus noster mihi videtur persequi diligentissime, quam eandem Aristoteli fuisse et Polemonis docet.

Our friend Lucius does wisely, then, in wishing above all to hear about the highest good; for once this is settled, everything in philosophy is settled. For in other matters, if anything has been passed over or left unknown, there is no more inconvenience than the worth of whichever of those things it is in which something has been neglected. But if the highest good is unknown, the plan of living must of necessity be unknown too; and from this there follows so great an error that men cannot know to what harbour they should make their way. But once the ends of things are known, when it is understood what is the limit both of goods and of evils, the road of life has been found, and the shaping of all our duties, since it is then asked to what each thing is to be referred;

Facit igitur Lucius noster prudenter, qui audire de summo bono potissimum velit; hoc enim constituto in philosophia constituta sunt omnia. nam ceteris in rebus sive praetermissum sive ignoratum est quippiam, non plus incommodi est, quam quanti quaeque earum rerum est, in quibus neglectum est aliquid. summum autem bonum si ignoretur, vivendi rationem ignorari necesse est, ex quo tantus error consequitur, ut quem in portum se recipiant scire non possint. cognitis autem rerum finibus, cum intellegitur, quid sit et bonorum extremum et malorum, inventa vitae via est conformatioque omnium officiorum, cum quaeritur, quo quodque referatur;

from which the plan of living happily — the thing all men long for — can be found and procured. And since there is great disagreement as to wherein this lies, we must call in that division of Carneades which our friend Antiochus is glad to use. For he saw not only how many views of the highest good there had been among philosophers up to now, but how many altogether there could possibly be. He used to deny, then, that there is any art that proceeds from itself; for the thing grasped by an art is always external to it. There is no need to make this longer with examples. For it is plain that no art turns upon itself, but that the art is one thing and the object set before the art another. Since, therefore, just as medicine is the art of health and steering the art of navigation, so prudence is the art of living, it follows of necessity that this too has been established and set going from some thing outside itself.

ex quo, id quod omnes expetunt, beate vivendi ratio inveniri et comparari potest. quod quoniam in quo sit magna dissensio est, Carneadea nobis adhibenda divisio est, qua noster Antiochus libenter uti solet. ille igitur vidit, non modo quot fuissent adhuc philosophorum de summo bono, sed quot omnino esse possent sententiae. negabat igitur ullam esse artem, quae ipsa a se proficisceretur; etenim semper illud extra est, quod arte comprehenditur. nihil opus est exemplis hoc facere longius. est enim perspicuum nullam artem ipsam in se versari, sed esse aliud artem ipsam, aliud quod propositum sit arti. quoniam igitur, ut medicina valitudinis, navigationis gubernatio, sic vivendi ars est prudentia, necesse est eam quoque ab aliqua re esse constitutam et profectam.

On one point, however, nearly all are agreed: that the thing with which wisdom is concerned, and which it aims to attain, must be suited and adapted to nature, and of such a kind that it invites and draws on the mind’s appetite of its own accord — what the Greeks call hormē. But what that thing is which moves us in this way and is sought by nature at the very first dawning of life — on this there is no agreement, and it is here, when the highest good is investigated, that the whole disagreement among the philosophers lies. For the whole of that inquiry which concerns the ends of good and evil — when we ask what among these is the furthest and the ultimate — has its source to be found in the question of where the first promptings of nature lie; once that is discovered, the entire discussion of the highest good and evil is drawn from it as from a head. Some hold that the first appetite is for pleasure and the first recoil from pain. Others judge that freedom from pain is what is first taken up, and pain what is first turned away from.

constitit autem fere inter omnes id, in quo prudentia versaretur et quod assequi vellet, aptum et accommodatum naturae esse oportere et tale, ut ipsum per se invitaret et alliceret appetitum animi, quem o(rmh Graeci vocant. quid autem sit, quod ita moveat itaque a natura in primo ortu appetatur, non constat, deque eo est inter philosophos, cum summum bonum exquiritur, omnis dissensio. totius enim quaestionis eius, quae habetur de finibus bonorum et malorum, cum quaeritur, in his quid sit extremum et ultimum, fons reperiendus est, in quo sint prima invitamenta naturae; quo invento omnis ab eo quasi capite de summo bono et malo disputatio ducitur. Voluptatis alii primum appetitum putant et primam depulsionem doloris. vacuitatem doloris alii censent primum ascitam et primum declinatum dolorem.

From these others again set out — those who name what they call the primary things in accordance with nature, among which they count the soundness and preservation of all the parts, health, unimpaired senses, freedom from pain, strength, beauty, and the rest of the same kind, of which there are likenesses in our minds, as it were the first sparks and seeds of the virtues. Now since it is some one of these three by which nature is first moved, whether toward seeking or toward repelling, and since there can be nothing at all besides these three, it necessarily follows that the whole duty of avoiding or of pursuing is referred to one of them, so that the wisdom we have called the art of living is concerned with one of those three things, and from it draws the starting-point of the whole of life.

ab iis alii, quae prima secundum naturam nominant, proficiscuntur, in quibus numerant incolumitatem conservationemque omnium partium, valitudinem, sensus integros, doloris vacuitatem, viris, pulchritudinem, cetera generis eiusdem, quorum similia sunt prima in animis quasi virtutum igniculi et semina. Ex his tribus cum unum aliquid sit, quo primum natura moveatur vel ad appetendum vel ad repellendum, nec quicquam omnino praeter haec tria possit esse, necesse est omnino officium aut fugiendi aut sequendi ad eorum aliquid referri, ut illa prudentia, quam artem vitae esse diximus, in earum trium rerum aliqua versetur, a qua totius vitae ducat exordium.

And from whatever it has settled upon as the thing by which nature is first moved, there will also arise an account of the right and the honourable, which can square with some one of those three, so that it is honourable either to do everything for the sake of pleasure, even if you do not attain it, or for the sake of not feeling pain, even if you cannot reach that, or for the sake of obtaining the things that are in accordance with nature, even if you achieve nothing. So it comes about that, as great as the difference is in the natural beginnings, so great is the unlikeness in the ends of good and evil. Others again, from the same beginnings, will refer every duty either to pleasure, or to not feeling pain, or to securing those primary things in accordance with nature.

ex eo autem, quod statuerit esse, quo primum natura moveatur, existet recti etiam ratio atque honesti, quae cum uno aliquo ex tribus illis congruere possit, ut aut id honestum sit, facere omnia aut voluptatis causa, etiam si eam non consequare, aut non dolendi, etiam si id assequi nequeas, aut eorum, quae secundum naturam sunt, adipiscendi, etiam si nihil consequare. ita fit ut, quanta differentia est in principiis naturalibus, tanta sit in finibus bonorum malorumque dissimilitudo. alii rursum isdem a principiis omne officium referent aut ad voluptatem aut ad non dolendum aut ad prima illa secundum naturam optinenda.

Now that six views about the highest good have been set out, of the three nearest these are the champions: of pleasure, Aristippus; of not feeling pain, Hieronymus; of the enjoyment of those things we have called the primary ones in accordance with nature, Carneades — not, to be sure, as their author, but as their defender for the sake of argument. The earlier three were possible positions, of which one alone has been defended, and that vigorously. For that one should do everything for the sake of pleasure — granted that, even if we attain nothing, still that very purpose of so acting is in itself worth seeking, and honourable, and the sole good — no one has maintained. Nor has anyone thought the mere avoidance of pain to be in itself among the things worth seeking, unless one could actually escape it. But that one should do everything in order to obtain what is in accordance with nature, even if one does not attain it, and that this is both honourable and the sole thing worth seeking for its own sake and the sole good — this the Stoics do say.

expositis iam igitur sex de summo bono sententiis trium proximarum hi principes: voluptatis Aristippus, non dolendi Hieronymus, fruendi rebus iis, quas primas secundum naturam esse diximus, Carneades non ille quidem auctor, sed defensor disserendi causa fuit. superiores tres erant, quae esse possent, quarum est una sola defensa, eaque vehementer. nam voluptatis causa facere omnia, cum, etiamsi nihil consequamur, tamen ipsum illud consilium ita faciendi per se expetendum et honestum et solum bonum sit, nemo dixit. ne vitationem quidem doloris ipsam per se quisquam in rebus expetendis putavit, nisi etiam evitare posset. at vero facere omnia, ut adipiscamur, quae secundum naturam sint, etiam si ea non assequamur, id esse et honestum et solum per se expetendum et solum bonum Stoici dicunt.

These, then, are the six simple views about the ends of good and evil: two without a patron, four defended. But of joined and twofold expositions of the highest good there have been in all three, and indeed there could be no more, if you look deep into the nature of things. For either pleasure can be joined to honour, as Calliphon and Dinomachus held, or freedom from pain, as Diodorus held, or the primary things of nature, as the ancients held — the same men we have named Academics and Peripatetics. But since all things cannot be said at once, for the present this much will need to be noted: that pleasure is to be set aside, since we are born for certain greater things, as will soon appear. About freedom from pain much the same is generally said as about pleasure. Since, therefore, both about pleasure with Torquatus and about honour, in which alone all good was placed, with Cato, the argument has been carried on, in the first place what was said against pleasure falls in much the same way against freedom from pain.

Sex igitur hae sunt simplices de summo bonorum malorumque sententiae, duae sine patrono, quattuor defensae. iunctae autem et duplices expositiones summi boni tres omnino fuerunt, nec vero plures, si penitus rerum naturam videas, esse potuerunt. nam aut voluptas adiungi potest ad honestatem, ut Calliphonti Dinomachoque placuit, aut doloris vacuitas, ut Diodoro, aut prima naturae, ut antiquis, quos eosdem Academicos et Peripateticos nominavimus. sed quoniam non possunt omnia simul dici, haec in praesentia nota esse debebunt, voluptatem semovendam esse, quando ad maiora quaedam, ut iam apparebit, nati sumus. de vacuitate doloris eadem fere dici solent, quae de voluptate. Quando igitur et de voluptate cum Torquato et de honestate, in qua una omne bonum poneretur, cum Catone est disputatum, primum, quae contra voluptatem dicta sunt, eadem fere cadunt contra vacuitatem doloris.

Nor in fact need anything else be sought against that view of Carneades. For in whatever way the highest good is so set out that it is empty of honour, neither duties nor virtues nor friendships can stand on that reckoning. And the joining to honour of either pleasure or the absence of pain makes that very honour, which it wishes to embrace, base. For to refer the things you do to ends, one of which — if a man be free of evil — one would call his being in the highest good, while the other is concerned with the lowest part of nature, is to darken all the splendour of honour, not to say to defile it. There remain the Stoics, who, when they had taken over everything from the Peripatetics and the Academics, pursued the same matters under other names. These it is better to refute one by one. But for now, to what we are about;

nec vero alia sunt quaerenda contra Carneadeam illam sententiam. quocumque enim modo summum bonum sic exponitur, ut id vacet honestate, nec officia nec virtutes in ea ratione nec amicitiae constare possunt. coniunctio autem cum honestate vel voluptatis vel non dolendi id ipsum honestum, quod amplecti vult, id efficit turpe. ad eas enim res referre, quae agas, quarum una, si quis malo careat, in summo eum bono dicat esse, altera versetur in levissima parte naturae, obscurantis est omnem splendorem honestatis, ne dicam inquinantis. Restant Stoici, qui cum a Peripateticis et Academicis omnia transtulissent, nominibus aliis easdem res secuti sunt. hos contra singulos dici est melius. sed nunc, quod agimus;

of those men, when we please. But the freedom from care of Democritus, which is, as it were, a tranquillity of mind — what they call euthumia — had to be set apart from this discussion, because that tranquillity of mind is itself the happy life; and we are inquiring not what it is, but whence it comes. Now the views of Pyrrho, Aristo, and Erillus, already hissed off and cast out, since they cannot fall within the circle we have drawn, were not to be brought in at all. For since this whole inquiry about the ends, and as it were the furthest bounds, of good and evil sets out from what we have said is suited and adapted to nature and is itself sought first for its own sake, this whole foundation is overturned both by those who, in matters in which there is nothing that is not either honourable or base, deny that there is any reason why one thing should be preferred to another, and think there is no difference at all among such things; and by Erillus, who, if he really held that nothing is good except knowledge, did away with every ground for taking counsel and with the very discovery of duty. With the views of the rest thus shut out, and since besides them there can be none, this view of the ancients must necessarily prevail. By the practice of the ancients, then, which the Stoics too employ, let us take our start from here.

de illis, cum volemus. Democriti autem securitas, quae est animi tamquam tranquillitas, quam appellant eu)qumi/an, eo separanda fuit ab hac disputatione, quia ista animi tranquillitas ea ipsa est beata vita; quaerimus autem, non quae sit, sed unde sit. Iam explosae eiectaeque sententiae Pyrrhonis, Aristonis, Erilli quod in hunc orbem, quem circumscripsimus, incidere non possunt, adhibendae omnino non fuerunt. nam cum omnis haec quaestio de finibus et quasi de extremis bonorum et malorum ab eo proficiscatur, quod diximus naturae esse aptum et accommodatum, quodque ipsum per se primum appetatur, hoc totum et ii tollunt, qui in rebus iis, in quibus nihil quod non aut honestum aut turpe sit, negant esse ullam causam, cur aliud alii anteponatur, nec inter eas res quicquam omnino putant interesse, et Erillus, si ita sensit, nihil esse bonum praeter scientiam, omnem consilii capiendi causam inventionemque officii sustulit. Sic exclusis sententiis reliquorum cum praeterea nulla esse possit, haec antiquorum valeat necesse est. ergo instituto veterum, quo etiam Stoici utuntur, hinc capiamus exordium.

Every living creature loves itself and, the moment it has come into being, sets about preserving itself, because this first appetite for guarding its whole life is given to it by nature — to preserve itself and to be so constituted as to be in the best condition in accordance with nature. At the outset it holds this constitution in a confused and uncertain way, so far only as to protect itself, whatever it may be, but it understands neither what it is nor what it can do nor what its own nature is. But when it has advanced a little and has begun to perceive how far each thing touches it and pertains to it, then it gradually begins to go forward and to recognize itself and to understand the reason why it has the appetite of mind we spoke of, and it begins both to seek the things it feels to be suited to its nature and to repel their opposites. Therefore for every living creature the object of its appetite lies in what is adapted to its nature. And so the end of goods turns out to be to live in accordance with nature, so constituted as to be in the best condition and most perfectly adapted to nature.

Omne animal se ipsum diligit ac, simul et ortum est, id agit, se ut conservet, quod hic ei primus ad omnem vitam tuendam appetitus a natura datur, se ut conservet atque ita sit affectum, ut optime secundum naturam affectum esse possit. hanc initio institutionem confusam habet et incertam, ut tantum modo se tueatur, qualecumque sit, sed nec quid sit nec quid possit nec quid ipsius natura sit intellegit. cum autem processit paulum et quatenus quicquid se attingat ad seque pertineat perspicere coepit, tum sensim incipit progredi seseque agnoscere et intellegere quam ob causam habeat eum, quem diximus, animi appetitum coeptatque et ea, quae naturae sentit apta, appetere et propulsare contraria. ergo omni animali illud, quod appetit, positum est in eo, quod naturae est accommodatum. ita finis bonorum existit secundum naturam vivere sic affectum, ut optime affici possit ad naturamque accommodatissime.

But since each living creature has its own nature, it necessarily follows that the end too is, for all of them, this: that nature be fulfilled — for nothing prevents some things from being common both among the rest of the animals and between man and the beasts, since the nature of all is shared — yet those furthest and highest things which we are seeking are marked off and distributed among the kinds of living creatures, each proper to its own and suited to what the nature of each requires.

Quoniam autem sua cuiusque animantis natura est, necesse est finem quoque omnium hunc esse, ut natura expleatur—nihil enim prohibet quaedam esse et inter se animalibus reliquis et cum bestiis homini communia, quoniam omnium est natura communis—, sed extrema illa et summa, quae quaerimus, inter animalium genera distincta et dispertita sint et sua cuique propria et ad id apta, quod cuiusque natura desideret.

And so when we say that for all living creatures the furthest end is to live in accordance with nature, this is not to be taken as if we were saying that there is one single end for all; rather, just as it can rightly be said to be common to all the arts that they are concerned with some body of knowledge, while the knowledge proper to each art is its own, so to live in accordance with nature is common to all living creatures, but their natures are diverse, so that one thing is natural for a horse, another for an ox, another for a man. And yet in all there is a common highest end — and that not only among living creatures, but also among all those things which nature nourishes, increases, and protects, in which we see that the things produced from the earth do many things in a way themselves of their own accord that avail toward living and growing, so that within their own kind they may arrive at their furthest end; so that it is now permitted to embrace all things in a single comprehension and to say without hesitation that every nature is the preserver of itself and has this set before it as its end and furthest goal: to keep itself in the best state of its own kind; so that the end of all things which thrive by nature must necessarily be similar, not the same. From which it ought to be understood that for man the ultimate good is to live in accordance with nature, which we interpret thus: to live by the nature of man, complete on every side and wanting nothing.

quare cum dicimus omnibus animalibus extremum esse secundum naturam vivere, non ita accipiendum est, quasi dicamus unum esse omnium extremum, sed ut omnium artium recte dici potest commune esse, ut in aliqua scientia versentur, scientiam autem suam cuiusque artis esse, sic commune animalium omnium secundum naturam vivere, sed naturas esse diversas, ut aliud equo sit e natura, aliud bovi, aliud homini. et tamen in omnibus est summa communis, et quidem non solum in animalibus, sed etiam in rebus omnibus iis, quas natura alit, auget, tuetur, in quibus videmus ea, quae gignuntur e terra, multa quodam modo efficere ipsa sibi per se, quae ad vivendum crescendumque valeant, ut in suo genere perveniant ad extremum; ut iam liceat una comprehensione omnia complecti non dubitantemque dicere omnem naturam esse servatricem sui idque habere propositum quasi finem et extremum, se ut custodiat quam in optimo sui generis statu; ut necesse sit omnium rerum, quae natura vigeant, similem esse finem, non eundem. ex quo intellegi debet homini id esse in bonis ultimum, secundum naturam vivere, quod ita interpretemur: vivere ex hominis natura undique perfecta et nihil requirente.

These things, then, must be unfolded by us — but if rather minutely, you will forgive it; for we owe a service to this young man’s age, and to one perhaps now hearing these matters for the first time. ’Quite so,’ I said, ’though even what you have said up to now was rightly said in that manner, however much it was suited to a young man.’ ’The end of things worth seeking having now been defined,’ he said, ’why this matter stands as I have said must next be demonstrated. For that reason let us begin from what I set down first, which is also in fact first, so that we may understand that every living creature loves itself. And although this admits of no doubt — for it is fixed in nature itself and grasped by each one’s own senses, so that if anyone wished to say the contrary he would not be heard — still, that we may pass over nothing, I think the reasons too should be brought forward why this is so.

haec igitur nobis explicanda sunt, sed si enodatius, vos ignoscetis. huius enim aetati et huic nunc haec primum fortasse audientis servire debemus. Ita prorsus, inquam; etsi ea quidem, quae adhuc dixisti, quamvis ad aetatem recte isto modo dicerentur. Exposita igitur, inquit, terminatione rerum expetendarum cur ista se res ita habeat, ut dixi, deinceps demonstrandum est. quam ob rem ordiamur ab eo, quod primum posui, quod idem reapse primum est, ut intellegamus omne animal se ipsum diligere. quod quamquam dubitationem non habet—est enim infixum in ipsa natura comprehenditur que suis cuiusque sensibus sic, ut, contra si quis dicere velit, non audiatur—, tamen, ne quid praetermittamus, rationes quoque, cur hoc ita sit, afferendas puto.

And yet how can it be understood or even conceived that there should be any living creature that hates itself? For contrary facts would clash. For when that appetite of mind has begun deliberately to draw to itself something that harms it, because it is hostile to itself, then, since it will do this for its own sake, it will both hate itself and at the same time love itself, which cannot be. And it necessarily follows that, if a man is an enemy to himself, he will think the things that are good to be evil, and on the contrary the evil to be good, and will flee what should be sought and seek what should be fled — which is, beyond doubt, the overturning of life. Nor, if some are found who seek out either nooses or other means of destruction, or like that man in Terence who ’resolved that for so long he would do his own son the less wrong’ — as he himself says — ’until he himself should be made wretched’ — is such a man on that account to be thought an enemy to himself.

etsi qui potest intellegi aut cogitari esse aliquod animal, quod se oderit? res enim concurrent contrariae. nam cum appetitus ille animi aliquid ad se trahere coeperit consulto, quod sibi obsit, quia sit sibi inimicus, cum id sua causa faciet, et oderit se et simul diliget, quod fieri non potest. necesseque est, si quis sibi ipsi inimicus est, eum quae bona sunt mala putare, bona contra quae mala, et quae appetenda fugere, quae fugienda appetere, quae sine dubio vitae est eversio. neque enim, si non nulli reperiuntur, qui aut laqueos aut alia exitia quaerant aut ut ille apud Terentium, qui ’decrevit tantisper se minus iniuriae suo nato facere’, ut ait ipse, ’dum fiat miser’, inimicus ipse sibi putandus est.

But some are moved by grief, some by desire, and many too are carried away by anger, and when they knowingly rush into evils, they then think they are taking the best counsel for themselves. And so they say, and do not hesitate: ’Such is my way; do you do as you need to do.’ And those who had declared war upon themselves would wish to be racked by day and tortured by night, and yet they would not accuse themselves on the ground that they had counselled badly in their own affairs. For that complaint belongs to those who are dear to themselves and love themselves. Therefore, whenever it is said that a man deserves ill of himself and is to himself an enemy and a foe, and in the end flees from life, let it be understood that there underlies some cause of this kind, so that from that very fact it can be understood that each man is dear to himself.

sed alii dolore moventur, alii cupiditate, iracundia etiam multi efferuntur et, cum in mala scientes inruunt, tum se optime sibi consulere arbitrantur. itaque dicunt nec dubitant: ’mihi sic usus est, tibi ut opus est facto, fac’. et qui ipsi sibi bellum indixissent, cruciari dies, noctes torqueri vellent, nec vero sese ipsi accusarent ob eam causam, quod se male suis rebus consuluisse dicerent. eorum enim est haec querela, qui sibi cari sunt seseque diligunt. quare, quotienscumque dicetur male quis de se mereri sibique esse inimicus atque hostis, vitam denique fugere, intellegatur aliquam subesse eius modi causam, ut ex eo ipso intellegi possit sibi quemque esse carum.

Nor indeed is it enough that there is no one who hates himself; this too must be understood, that there is no one who thinks it makes no difference to him how he himself fares. For the appetite of mind will be done away with if, just as in those matters between which there is no difference we are inclined to neither side, so in our own selves we shall judge that it makes no difference to us in what state we are. And further, if anyone should wish to say this too, it would be utterly absurd — that each man loves himself in such a way that this force of loving is referred to some other thing, and not to the very man who loves himself. When this is said of friendships, of duties, of virtues, however it is said, what is meant can still be understood; but in our own selves it cannot even be understood that we should love ourselves on account of some other thing — for example, on account of pleasure; for it is on our own account that we love pleasure, not on its account that we love ourselves.

Nec vero id satis est, neminem esse, qui ipse se oderit, sed illud quoque intellegendum est, neminem esse, qui, quo modo se habeat, nihil sua censeat interesse. tolletur enim appetitus animi, si, ut in iis rebus, inter quas nihil interest, neutram in partem propensiores sumus, item in nobismet ipsis quem ad modum affecti simus nihil nostra arbitrabimur interesse. Atque etiam illud si qui dicere velit, perabsurdum sit, ita diligi a sese quemque, ut ea vis diligendi ad aliam rem quampiam referatur, non ad eum ipsum, qui sese diligat. hoc cum in amicitiis, cum in officiis, cum in virtutibus dicitur, quomodocumque dicitur, intellegi tamen quid dicatur potest, in nobismet autem ipsis ne intellegi quidem, ut propter aliam quampiam rem, verbi gratia propter voluptatem, nos amemus; propter nos enim illam, non propter eam nosmet ipsos diligimus.

And yet what is there more plainly evident than that each man is not only dear to himself, but vehemently dear? For who is there, or how few are there, in whom, when death draws near, the ’blood does not flee back in timid fright and the man go pale with fear’? It is, to be sure, a fault to shudder so violently at the dissolution of nature — which is likewise to be censured in the case of pain — but because nearly all are affected in this way, it is argument enough that nature shrinks from destruction; and the more certain men do this in a way that they are even justly censured for it, the more must it be understood that these very excesses would not have arisen in some, had there not been a certain measure set by nature. Nor do I mean the fear of death in those who flee death because they think they are being deprived of the good things of life, or because they dread certain terrors after death, or because they fear they may die in pain; for in little children, who think of none of these things, if ever in play we threaten them that we will throw them down from somewhere, they are seized with terror. Indeed even ’the wild beasts,’ says Pacuvius, ’which lack the cunning of understanding for taking precaution,’ when the terror of death is thrown upon them, ’shudder.’ And who thinks otherwise of the wise man himself, but that, even when he has resolved that he must die, he is still moved by the parting from his own and by the very leaving of the light?

Quamquam quid est, quod magis perspicuum sit, quam non modo carum sibi quemque, verum etiam vehementer carum esse? quis est enim aut quotus quisque, cui, mors cum adpropinquet, non ’refugiat ti/mido sanguen a/tque exalbesca/t metu’? etsi hoc quidem est in vitio, dissolutionem naturae tam valde perhorrescere—quod item est reprehendendum in dolore—, sed quia fere sic afficiuntur omnes, satis argumenti est ab interitu naturam abhorrere; idque quo magis quidam ita faciunt, ut iure etiam reprehendantur, hoc magis intellegendum est haec ipsa nimia in quibusdam futura non fuisse, nisi quaedam essent modica natura. nec vero dico eorum metum mortis, qui, quia privari se vitae bonis arbitrentur, aut quia quasdam post mortem formidines extimescant, aut si metuant, ne cum dolore moriantur, idcirco mortem fugiant; in parvis enim saepe, qui nihil eorum cogitant, si quando iis ludentes minamur praecipitaturos alicunde, extimescunt. quin etiam ’ferae’, inquit Pacuvius, ’qui/bus abest ad prae/cavendum inte/llegendi astu/tia’, iniecto terrore mortis ’horrescunt’. quis autem de ipso sapiente aliter existimat, quin, etiam cum decreverit esse moriendum, tamen discessu a suis atque ipsa relinquenda luce moveatur?

But most of all in this kind of case the force of nature is plainly visible, since many endure even beggary in order to live, and men worn out by old age are tormented by the approach of death and bear those sufferings which we see Philoctetes bearing in the plays. He, though racked by pains not to be borne, nevertheless prolonged his life by fowling, and ’slow, he transfixed the swift with the stroke of his arrows; standing, he transfixed those in flight,’ as it stands in Accius, and from the weaving of their feathers made coverings for his body.

maxime autem in hoc quidem genere vis est perspicua naturae, cum et mendicitatem multi perpetiantur, ut vivant, et angantur adpropinquatione mortis confecti homines senectute et ea perferant, quae Philoctetam videmus in fabulis. qui cum cruciaretur non ferendis doloribus, propagabat tamen vitam aucupio, ’sagittarum ictu configebat tardus celeres, stans volantis’, ut apud Accium est, pennarumque contextu corpori tegumenta faciebat.

Am I speaking of the human kind, or of animals at large, when the nature of trees and plants is nearly the same? For whether, as the most learned men have held, some greater and more divine cause has engendered this force, or whether it comes about thus by chance, we see that the things the earth brings forth are kept sound by their bark and roots — which falls to animals through the distribution of the senses and a certain framing of the limbs. On this matter, indeed, though I side with those who hold that all these things are governed by nature, and that nature, were she to neglect them, could not herself exist, still I grant that those who differ on this point may think what they please; and, if they like, let them understand that whenever I say “the nature of man” I mean man — for it makes no difference here. For a person could sooner part from himself than lose the appetite for the things that serve his interest. With good reason, then, the weightiest philosophers sought the starting-point of the highest good in nature, and held that this appetite for the things suited to nature is bred into all, because they are held fast by that commendation of nature whereby they love themselves.

De hominum genere aut omnino de animalium loquor, cum arborum et stirpium eadem paene natura sit? sive enim, ut doctissimis viris visum est, maior aliqua causa atque divinior hanc vim ingenuit, sive hoc ita fit fortuito, videmus ea, quae terra gignit, corticibus et radicibus valida servari, quod contingit animalibus sensuum distributione et quadam compactione membrorum. Qua quidem de re quamquam assentior iis, qui haec omnia regi natura putant, quae si natura neglegat, ipsa esse non possit, tamen concedo, ut, qui de hoc dissentiunt, existiment, quod velint, ac vel hoc intellegant, si quando naturam hominis dicam, hominem dicere me; nihil enim hoc differt. nam prius a se poterit quisque discedere quam appetitum earum rerum, quae sibi conducant, amittere. iure igitur gravissimi philosophi initium summi boni a natura petiverunt et illum appetitum rerum ad naturam accommodatarum ingeneratum putaverunt omnibus, quia continentur ea commendatione naturae, qua se ipsi diligunt.

Next we must consider — since it is plain enough that each is dear to himself by nature — what the nature of man is. For that is what we are inquiring into. Now it is evident that man is composed of body and mind, the parts of the mind being first, those of the body second. Then we see this too: that the body is so shaped as to surpass others, and the mind so constituted as to be both furnished with senses and possessed of a commanding intelligence, to which the whole nature of man is subject, and in which there is a certain marvellous power of reason and of knowing and of science and of all the virtues. As for the things that belong to the body, they have no authority to be compared with the parts of the mind, and they are easier to come to know. And so let us begin with these.

Deinceps videndum est, quoniam satis apertum est sibi quemque natura esse carum, quae sit hominis natura. id est enim, de quo quaerimus. atqui perspicuum est hominem e corpore animoque constare, cum primae sint animi partes, secundae corporis. deinde id quoque videmus, et ita figuratum corpus, ut excellat aliis, animumque ita constitutum, ut et sensibus instructus sit et habeat praestantiam mentis, cui tota hominis natura pareat, in qua sit mirabilis quaedam vis rationis et cognitionis et scientiae virtutumque omnium. iam quae corporis sunt, ea nec auctoritatem cum animi partibus comparandam et cognitionem habent faciliorem. itaque ab his ordiamur.

How well suited to nature, then, are the parts of our body, and its whole figure and form and stature, is plain; nor is there any doubt that one understands which the forehead, the eyes, the ears, and the remaining parts are that are proper to man. But surely these need to be sound and vigorous and to have their natural motions and uses, so that none of them is wanting, nor sick nor crippled; for this is what nature requires. There is, moreover, also a certain bearing of the body that keeps to the motions and postures agreeing with nature; and if in these there is some fault — a twisting and distortion, or a deformed motion or posture — as if a man should walk on his hands, or backwards rather than forwards, he would plainly seem to be fleeing from himself, and, stripping the man out of the man, to hate nature. For this reason, too, certain ways of sitting, and bent and broken movements such as belong to wanton or effeminate men, are contrary to nature; so that, even if it come about through a fault of the mind, still the nature of man seems to be altered in the body.

Corporis igitur nostri partes totaque figura et forma et statura quam apta ad naturam sit, apparet, neque est dubium, quin frons, oculi, aures et reliquae partes quales propriae sint hominis intellegatur. sed certe opus est ea valere et vigere et naturales motus ususque habere, ut nec absit quid eorum nec aegrum debilitatumve sit; id enim natura desiderat. est autem etiam actio quaedam corporis, quae motus et status naturae congruentis tenet; in quibus si peccetur distortione et depravatione quadam aut motu statuve deformi, ut si aut manibus ingrediatur quis aut non ante, sed retro, fugere plane se ipse et hominem ex homine exuens naturam odisse videatur. quam ob rem etiam sessiones quaedam et flexi fractique motus, quales protervorum hominum aut mollium esse solent, contra naturam sunt, ut, etiamsi animi vitio id eveniat, tamen in corpore immutari hominis natura videatur.

And so, on the other hand, the moderate and even conditions, affections, and uses of the body seem to be suited to nature. Now the mind, too, ought not merely to be, but to be of a certain quality, so that it both has all its parts unimpaired and lacks none of the virtues. And in the senses each has its own virtue, namely that nothing should hinder each sense from discharging its own office in perceiving swiftly and readily those things that lie subject to the senses. But of the mind, and of that part of the mind which is sovereign and is named the intelligence, the virtues are many; yet there are two primary kinds: the one of those that are bred in by their own nature and are called involuntary, the other of those that, resting in the will, are wont to be called by a more proper name — and the surpassing excellence in the praise of minds belongs to these. To the former kind belong aptness in learning and memory, which are nearly all called by the one name of natural endowment; and those who have these virtues are called gifted. The other kind is that of the great and true virtues, which we call voluntary, such as prudence, temperance, fortitude, justice, and the rest of the same kind. And in sum these were the things to be said about body and mind, by which there is sketched out, as it were, what the nature of man requires.

itaque e contrario moderati aequabilesque habitus, affectiones ususque corporis apti esse ad naturam videntur. Iam vero animus non esse solum, sed etiam cuiusdam modi debet esse, ut et omnis partis suas habeat incolumis et de virtutibus nulla desit. atque in sensibus est sua cuiusque virtus, ut ne quid impediat quo minus suo sensus quisque munere fungatur in iis rebus celeriter expediteque percipiendis, quae subiectae sunt sensibus. animi autem et eius animi partis, quae princeps est, quaeque mens nominatur, plures sunt virtutes, sed duo prima genera, unum earum, quae ingenerantur suapte natura appellanturque non voluntariae, alterum autem earum, quae in voluntate positae magis proprio nomine appellari solent, quarum est excellens in animorum laude praestantia. prioris generis est docilitas, memoria; quae fere omnia appellantur uno ingenii nomine, easque virtutes qui habent, ingeniosi vocantur. alterum autem genus est magnarum verarumque virtutum, quas appellamus voluntarias, ut prudentiam, temperantiam, fortitudinem, iustitiam et reliquas eiusdem generis. Et summatim quidem haec erant de corpore animoque dicenda, quibus quasi informatum est quid hominis natura postulet.

From which it is plain that, since we are dear to ourselves and wish all things in mind and in body to be perfect, these very things are dear to us for their own sakes and hold within them the greatest weight toward living well. For one who has set before himself the preservation of himself must hold his own parts dear as well, and the dearer the more perfect they are and the more praiseworthy in their kind. For the life that is sought is one filled out with the virtues of mind and body, and in this the highest good must necessarily be placed, since it must be such as to be the limit of the things to be desired. Once this is grasped, it cannot be doubted that, since men themselves are dear to themselves in their own right and of their own accord, the parts too of both body and mind, and of those things that lie in the motion and posture of each, are cherished with their own dearness and are sought for their own sakes.

ex quo perspicuum est, quoniam ipsi a nobis diligamur omniaque et in animo et in corpore perfecta velimus esse, ea nobis ipsa cara esse propter se et in iis esse ad bene vivendum momenta maxima. nam cui proposita sit conservatio sui, necesse est huic partes quoque sui caras esse carioresque, quo perfectiores sint et magis in suo genere laudabiles. ea enim vita expetitur, quae sit animi corporisque expleta virtutibus, in eoque summum bonum poni necesse est, quandoquidem id tale esse debet, ut rerum expetendarum sit extremum. quo cognito dubitari non potest, quin, cum ipsi homines sibi sint per se et sua sponte cari, partes quoque et corporis et animi et earum rerum, quae sunt in utriusque motu et statu, sua caritate colantur et per se ipsae appetantur.

These things being set out, it is an easy inference that those things among our own are most to be sought which have the most worth — so that, of each best part which is sought for its own sake, the virtue is to be sought most of all. Thus it will come about that the virtue of the mind is set before the virtue of the body, and that the voluntary virtues of the mind overcome the involuntary ones — the voluntary, which are properly called virtues and far excel, because they are begotten of reason, than which there is nothing in man more divine. For of all the things that nature both creates and watches over, those that are either without mind or not far otherwise have their highest good in the body; so that the saying about the pig does not seem inept — that a mind was given to that beast in place of salt, to keep it from rotting. There are, moreover, certain beasts in which there is something resembling virtue, as in lions, as in dogs, in horses, in which we see certain movements not of bodies alone, as in pigs, but in some measure of minds as well. In man, however, the whole sum lies in the mind, and in the mind in reason, out of which springs virtue, which is defined as the perfecting of reason — a thing they hold must be expounded again and again.

Quibus expositis facilis est coniectura ea maxime esse expetenda ex nostris, quae plurimum habent dignitatis, ut optimae cuiusque partis, quae per se expetatur, virtus sit expetenda maxime. ita fiet, ut animi virtus corporis virtuti anteponatur animique virtutes non voluntarias vincant virtutes voluntariae, quae quidem proprie virtutes appellantur multumque excellunt, propterea quod ex ratione gignuntur, qua nihil est in homine divinius. etenim omnium rerum, quas et creat natura et tuetur, quae aut sine animo sunt aut non multo secus, earum summum bonum in corpore est, ut non inscite illud dictum videatur in sue, animum illi pecudi datum pro sale, ne putisceret. sunt autem bestiae quaedam, in quibus inest aliquid simile virtutis, ut in leonibus, ut in canibus, in equis, in quibus non corporum solum, ut in suibus, sed etiam animorum aliqua ex parte motus quosdam videmus. in homine autem summa omnis animi est et in animo rationis, ex qua virtus est, quae rationis absolutio definitur, quam etiam atque etiam explicandam putant.

Of the things, too, that the earth brings forth, there is a certain rearing and perfecting not unlike that of living creatures. And so we say that a vine both lives and dies, and a tree both young and old, and that it flourishes and “grows old.” From which it is not amiss to suppose that, as with living creatures, so with these there are certain things suited to their nature and others alien to it, and that there is a kind of tender of their growth and nourishment — namely the science and art of the farmer, which prunes, lops, raises up, lifts, and props, so that they can go where nature carries them; so that the vines themselves, could they speak, would confess that they ought to be so handled and tended. And now indeed — to speak of the vine above all — that which tends it is something external; for in the vine itself there is too little force present for it to thrive as well as it might, if no cultivation be applied.

Earum etiam rerum, quas terra gignit, educatio quaedam et perfectio est non dissimilis animantium. itaque et vivere vitem et mori dicimus arboremque et novellam et vetulam et vigere et ’senescere’. ex quo non est alienum, ut animantibus, sic illis et apta quaedam ad naturam putare et aliena earumque augendarum et alendarum quandam cultricem esse, quae sit scientia atque ars agricolarum, quae circumcidat, amputet, erigat, extollat, adminiculet, ut, quo natura ferat, eo possint ire, ut ipsae vites, si loqui possint, ita se tractandas tuendasque esse fateantur. et nunc quidem quod eam tuetur, ut de vite potissimum loquar, est id extrinsecus; in ipsa enim parum magna vis inest, ut quam optime se habere possit, si nulla cultura adhibeatur.

But suppose sense were now to come to the vine, so that it had a certain appetite and moved of its own accord — what do you think it would do? Will it not, of itself, see to the things it formerly obtained through the vinedresser? But do you not see that a care will be added to it, of tending its senses too, and their whole appetite, and any limbs that have been joined to it? Thus to the things it always had it will join those that came to it afterwards, and it will not have the same end its cultivator had, but will wish to live according to that nature which has afterwards been added to it. So its end of good will be like what it was before, yet not the same; for it will no longer seek the good of a plant, but of an animal. What, then, if not sense only had been given to it, but a man’s mind as well? Must not those former things both abide, so as to be tended, and these later additions be far dearer — and the better each part of the mind, the dearer — and the end of the highest good rest in that filling-out of nature, since mind and reason far and away excel? Thus that which is the last of all things to be sought, drawn from the first commendation of nature, climbs by many degrees until it arrives at the summit, which is built up out of soundness of body and out of the perfected reason of the intelligence.

at vero si ad vitem sensus accesserit, ut appetitum quendam habeat et per se ipsa moveatur, quid facturam putas? an ea, quae per vinitorem antea consequebatur, per se ipsa curabit? sed videsne accessuram ei curam, ut sensus quoque suos eorumque omnem appetitum et si qua sint adiuncta ei membra tueatur? sic ad illa, quae semper habuit, iunget ea, quae postea accesserint, nec eundem finem habebit, quem cultor eius habebat, sed volet secundum eam naturam, quae postea ei adiuncta erit, vivere. ita similis erit ei finis boni, atque antea fuerat, neque idem tamen; non enim iam stirpis bonum quaeret, sed animalis. quid, si non sensus modo ei sit datus, verum etiam animus hominis? non necesse est et illa pristina manere, ut tuenda sint, et haec multo esse cariora, quae accesserint, animique optimam quamque partem carissimam, in eaque expletione naturae summi boni finem consistere, cum longe multumque praestet mens atque ratio? sic, quod est extremum omnium appetendorum atque ductum a prima commendatione naturae, multis gradibus adscendit, ut ad summum perveniret, quod cumulatur ex integritate corporis et ex mentis ratione perfecta.

Since, then, such is the form of nature as I have set it out, if, as I said at the beginning, each person knew himself the moment he came to be, and could judge what the force of his whole nature and of its single parts might be, he would at once see what this is that we are inquiring into — the highest and uttermost of all the things we seek — and could go wrong in nothing. But as it is, from the first nature is marvellously hidden, and can be neither seen through nor known. As our years advance, however, little by little, or rather slowly, we come to know ourselves, as it were. And so that first commendation, which nature has made of us to ourselves, is uncertain and obscure, and that first appetite of the mind does only this much: that we may be able to be safe and sound. But when we begin to discern, and to feel what we are and how we differ from the rest of living creatures, then we begin to pursue the things for which we were born.

Cum igitur ea sit, quam exposui, forma naturae, si, ut initio dixi, simul atque ortus esset, se quisque cognosceret iudicareque posset quae vis et totius esset naturae et partium singularum, continuo videret quid esset hoc, quod quaerimus, omnium rerum, quas expetimus, summum et ultimum nec ulla in re peccare posset. nunc vero a primo quidem mirabiliter occulta natura est nec perspici nec cognosci potest. progredientibus autem aetatibus sensim tardeve potius quasi nosmet ipsos cognoscimus. itaque prima illa commendatio, quae a natura nostri facta est nobis, incerta et obscura est, primusque appetitus ille animi tantum agit, ut salvi atque integri esse possimus. cum autem dispicere coepimus et sentire quid simus et quid ab animantibus ceteris differamus, tum ea sequi incipimus, ad quae nati sumus.

The like of this we see in beasts, which at first do not stir from the place where they were born, then each moves by its own appetite. We see snakelings creep, ducklings swim, blackbirds fly, oxen use their horns, scorpions their stings — in short, that for each creature its own nature is its guide to living. And this likeness appears in the human kind as well. For little ones, at the first birth, lie there as if they had no mind at all. But when a little firmness has come to them, they use both mind and senses, and strive to raise themselves up, and use their hands, and recognize those by whom they are reared. Then they take delight in playmates and gladly gather with them, give themselves to play, are drawn by the hearing of stories, wish to be generous to others with what they have to spare, take notice of what goes on at home rather curiously, and begin to ponder something, and to learn, and wish not to be ignorant of the names of those they see; and in the things in which they vie with their playmates, if they have won, they lift themselves up with gladness, and, beaten, they are cast down and let their spirits fall. None of this, we must hold, comes about without a cause.

quam similitudinem videmus in bestiis, quae primo, in quo loco natae sunt, ex eo se non commovent, deinde suo quaeque appetitu movetur. serpere anguiculos, nare anaticulas, evolare merulas, cornibus uti videmus boves, nepas aculeis, suam denique cuique naturam esse ad vivendum ducem. quae similitudo in genere etiam humano apparet. parvi enim primo ortu sic iacent, tamquam omnino sine animo sint. cum autem paulum firmitatis accessit, et animo utuntur et sensibus conitunturque, ut sese erigant, et manibus utuntur et eos agnoscunt, a quibus educantur. deinde aequalibus delectantur libenterque se cum iis congregant dantque se ad ludendum fabellarumque auditione ducuntur deque eo, quod ipsis superat, aliis gratificari volunt animadvertuntque ea, quae domi fiunt, curiosius incipiuntque commentari aliquid et discere et eorum, quos vident, volunt non ignorare nomina, quibusque rebus cum aequalibus decertant, si vicerunt, efferunt se laetitia, victi debilitantur animosque demittunt. quorum sine causa fieri nihil putandum est.

For the force of man is so begotten by nature that he seems made for grasping every virtue; and for this reason little ones are moved, without teaching, by likenesses of the virtues whose seeds they hold within them — for these are the first elements of nature, which, once enlarged, bring about virtue’s sprouting, so to speak. For since we have been so born and made as to hold within us the beginnings both of doing something, and of loving certain people, and of generosity, and of returning a kindness, and as to have minds apt for science, prudence, fortitude, and estranged from their contraries, it is not without cause that we see in children those sparks of the virtues, as I called them, from which the philosopher’s reason must be kindled, so that, following it as a kind of god for its guide, it may arrive at the uttermost of nature. For, as I have often said by now, in the feeble years and the weak mind the force of nature is discerned as if through a fog; but when, as it advances, the mind is strengthened, it does indeed recognize the force of nature, yet in such a way that it can advance further, while in itself it has only been begun.

est enim natura sic generata vis hominis, ut ad omnem virtutem percipiendam facta videatur, ob eamque causam parvi virtutum simulacris, quarum in se habent semina, sine doctrina moventur; sunt enim prima elementa naturae, quibus auctis virtutis quasi germen efficitur. nam cum ita nati factique simus, ut et agendi aliquid et diligendi aliquos et liberalitatis et referendae gratiae principia in nobis contineremus atque ad scientiam, prudentiam, fortitudinem aptos animos haberemus a contrariisque rebus alienos, non sine causa eas, quas dixi, in pueris virtutum quasi scintillas videmus, e quibus accendi philosophi ratio debet, ut eam quasi deum ducem subsequens ad naturae perveniat extremum. nam, ut saepe iam dixi, in infirma aetate inbecillaque mente vis naturae quasi per caliginem cernitur; cum autem progrediens confirmatur animus, agnoscit ille quidem naturae vim, sed ita, ut progredi possit longius, per se sit tantum inchoata.

We must enter, then, into the nature of things, and see through to the very depths what she requires; for otherwise we cannot know ourselves. And because this precept was too great to seem to come from a man, it was for that reason assigned to a god. The Pythian Apollo therefore bids us know ourselves. But this knowledge of ourselves is one thing: to know the force of body and of mind, and to follow that life which has the full enjoyment of these very things. Now since this appetite of the mind was from the beginning such that we should have those things I spoke of as perfect in nature as may be, it must be confessed that, once we have attained what was sought, nature comes to rest, as it were, in that as in her uttermost, and that this is the highest good — which surely, taken whole, must of its own accord and for its own sake be sought, since it was shown before that even its single parts are to be sought for their own sakes.

Intrandum est igitur in rerum naturam et penitus quid ea postulet pervidendum; aliter enim nosmet ipsos nosse non possumus. quod praeceptum quia maius erat, quam ut ab homine videretur, idcirco assignatum est deo. iubet igitur nos Pythius Apollo noscere nosmet ipsos. cognitio autem haec est una nostri, ut vim corporis animique norimus sequamurque eam vitam, quae rebus iis ipsis perfruatur. quoniam autem is animi appetitus a principio fuit, ut ea, quae dixi, quam perfectissima natura haberemus, confitendum est, cum id adepti simus, quod appetitum sit, in eo quasi in ultimo consistere naturam, atque id esse summum bonum; quod certe universum sua sponte ipsum expeti et propter se necesse est, quoniam ante demonstratum est etiam singulas eius partes esse per se expetendas.

But in reckoning up the advantages of the body, if anyone shall think that pleasure has been passed over by us, let that question be deferred to another time. For whether pleasure is or is not among those things we have called first according to nature makes no difference to what we are about. For if, as it seems to me at least, pleasure does not fill out the goods of nature, it has rightly been passed over; but if it is in them, as some hold, nothing hinders this grasp of ours of the highest good. For to those things which have been established as first according to nature, if pleasure be added, some one advantage of the body will have been added, and it will not have changed that constitution of the highest good which has been set forth.

In enumerandis autem corporis commodis si quis praetermissam a nobis voluptatem putabit, in aliud tempus ea quaestio differatur. utrum enim sit voluptas in iis rebus, quas primas secundum naturam esse diximus, necne sit ad id, quod agimus, nihil interest. si enim, ut mihi quidem videtur, non explet bona naturae voluptas, iure praetermissa est; sin autem est in ea, quod quidam volunt, nihil impedit hanc nostram comprehensionem summi boni. quae enim constituta sunt prima naturae, ad ea si voluptas accesserit, unum aliquod accesserit commodum corporis neque eam constitutionem summi boni, quae est proposita, mutaverit.

And so far, indeed, our reasoning has proceeded in such a way that the whole of it was drawn from the first commendation of nature. But now let us follow another kind of argument: that not only because we love ourselves, but because each part of nature, in both body and mind, has its own force, for that reason we are moved in these matters to the highest degree of our own accord. And, to begin with the body, do you not see how, if anything in the limbs is crooked or crippled or stunted, men hide it? How they even struggle and labour, if they can bring it about, that the body’s fault either not appear or appear as little as possible? And how they endure many pains as well, for the sake of a cure, so that, even if the very use of the limbs is to be not greater but actually less, still their appearance may return to nature? For indeed, since all by nature think themselves to be sought whole, and that for no other reason but on their own account, the parts too must necessarily be sought for their own sakes, when the whole is sought for its own sake.

Et adhuc quidem ita nobis progressa ratio est, ut ea duceretur omnis a prima commendatione naturae. nunc autem aliud iam argumentandi sequamur genus, ut non solum quia nos diligamus, sed quia cuiusque partis naturae et in corpore et in animo sua quaeque vis sit, idcirco in his rebus summe nostra sponte moveamur. atque ut a corpore ordiar, videsne ut, si quae in membris prava aut debilitata aut inminuta sint, occultent homines? ut etiam contendant et elaborent, si efficere possint, ut aut non appareat corporis vitium aut quam minimum appareat? multosque etiam dolores curationis causa perferant, ut, si ipse usus membrorum non modo non maior, verum etiam minor futurus sit, eorum tamen species ad naturam revertatur? etenim, cum omnes natura totos se expetendos putent, nec id ob aliam rem, sed propter ipsos, necesse est eius etiam partis propter se expeti, quod universum propter se expetatur.

What? In the motion and posture of the body is there nothing that nature herself judges must be heeded? In what manner a man walks, sits; what the carriage of the face, what the look, may be in each? Is there nothing in these things that we account worthy or unworthy of a free man? Do we not think many men deserving of hatred who, by a certain motion or posture, seem to have scorned the law and measure of nature? And since these things are drawn from the body, what reason is there why beauty itself should not rightly be reckoned worth seeking for its own sake? For if we think the body’s crookedness and stunting are to be fled for their own sakes, why should we not also — and perhaps the more — pursue the dignity of form for its own sake? And if we flee ugliness in the posture and motion of the body, what reason is there why we should not pursue beauty? Health, too, and strength, and freedom from pain we shall seek not only for their usefulness but also for their own sakes. For since nature wishes to be filled out in all her parts, she seeks for its own sake that condition of the body which is most in keeping with nature — a nature wholly thrown into disorder if the body is sick, or in pain, or wanting in strength.

Quid? in motu et in statu corporis nihil inest, quod animadvertendum esse ipsa natura iudicet? quem ad modum quis ambulet, sedeat, qui ductus oris, qui vultus in quoque sit? nihilne est in his rebus, quod dignum libero aut indignum esse ducamus? nonne odio multos dignos putamus, qui quodam motu aut statu videntur naturae legem et modum contempsisse? et quoniam haec deducuntur de corpore, quid est cur non recte pulchritudo etiam ipsa propter se expetenda ducatur? nam si pravitatem inminutionemque corporis propter se fugiendam putamus, cur non etiam, ac fortasse magis, propter se formae dignitatem sequamur? et si turpitudinem fugimus in statu et motu corporis, quid est cur pulchritudinem non sequamur? atque etiam valitudinem, vires, vacuitatem doloris non propter utilitatem solum, sed etiam ipsas propter se expetemus. quoniam enim natura suis omnibus expleri partibus vult, hunc statum corporis per se ipsum expetit, qui est maxime e natura, quae tota perturbatur, si aut aegrum corpus est aut dolet aut caret viribus.

Let us look at the parts of the mind, whose view is more brilliant; and the loftier they are, the clearer the signs of nature they give. So great is the love of knowing and of knowledge bred in us that no one can doubt that the nature of man is swept toward these things lured by no profit. Do we not see how children are not deterred even by beatings from gazing at things and searching them out? How, when driven off, they run back? How they rejoice to know something? How they are eager to tell it to others? How they are held by a procession, by the games and spectacles of that kind, and for the sake of it endure even hunger and thirst? And what of those who take delight in liberal studies and arts — do we not see that they take no account of health or of household estate, but bear all things, captured by knowing and by knowledge itself, and balance against the greatest cares and labours the pleasure they take from learning?

Videamus animi partes, quarum est conspectus illustrior; quae quo sunt excelsiores, eo dant clariora indicia naturae. tantus est igitur innatus in nobis cognitionis amor et scientiae, ut nemo dubitare possit quin ad eas res hominum natura nullo emolumento invitata rapiatur. videmusne ut pueri ne verberibus quidem a contemplandis rebus perquirendisque deterreantur? ut pulsi recurrant? ut aliquid scire se gaudeant? ut id aliis narrare gestiant? ut pompa, ludis atque eius modi spectaculis teneantur ob eamque rem vel famem et sitim perferant? quid vero? qui ingenuis studiis atque artibus delectantur, nonne videmus eos nec valitudinis nec rei familiaris habere rationem omniaque perpeti ipsa cognitione et scientia captos et cum maximis curis et laboribus compensare eam, quam ex discendo capiant, voluptatem?

To me, at any rate, Homer seems to have glimpsed something of this kind in what he invented about the song of the Sirens. For it does not appear that they were in the habit of calling back those who sailed past by the sweetness of their voices, or by some novelty and variety of singing, but because they professed to know many things — so that men clung fast upon their rocks out of a desire to learn. This is how they call to Ulysses (for I have translated this very passage, as I have certain others of Homer’s): O glory of the Argives, why not turn your prow, Ulysses, that with your ears you may take in our song? For no one ever yet has sailed past these blue waters on his course without first standing still, caught by the sweetness of our voices, and then, sated in his eager breast with our manifold music, gliding onward to the shores of his fathers the wiser. We hold fast the heavy struggle of the war, and the ruin that Greece, by the will of heaven, brought upon Troy, and all the traces of things that are spread across the wide earth. Homer saw that the story could not carry conviction if so great a man were held entangled by mere little ditties; what they promise is knowledge, and it is no wonder that to a man hungry for wisdom this should be dearer than his homeland. And indeed, to wish to know everything, of whatever kind, is the mark of the merely curious; but to be drawn to a desire for knowledge by the contemplation of greater things is what we must reckon the mark of the greatest of men.

ut mihi quidem Homerus huius modi quiddam vidisse videatur in iis, quae de Sirenum cantibus finxerit. neque enim vocum suavitate videntur aut novitate quadam et varietate cantandi revocare eos solitae, qui praetervehebantur, sed quia multa se scire profitebantur, ut homines ad earum saxa discendi cupiditate adhaerescerent. ita enim invitant Ulixem—nam verti, ut quaedam Homeri, sic istum ipsum locum—: O decus Argolicum, quin puppim flectis, Ulixes, Auribus ut nostros possis agnoscere cantus! Nam nemo haec umquam est transvectus caerula cursu, Quin prius adstiterit vocum dulcedine captus, Post variis avido satiatus pectore musis Doctior ad patrias lapsus pervenerit oras. Nos grave certamen belli clademque tenemus, Graecia quam Troiae divino numine vexit, Omniaque e latis rerum vestigia terris. Vidit Homerus probari fabulam non posse, si cantiunculis tantus irretitus vir teneretur; scientiam pollicentur, quam non erat mirum sapientiae cupido patria esse cariorem. Atque omnia quidem scire, cuiuscumque modi sint, cupere curiosorum, duci vero maiorum rerum contemplatione ad cupiditatem scientiae summorum virorum est putandum.

For what burning zeal do you suppose was in Archimedes, who, while he was drawing certain figures in the dust with too close attention, did not even feel that his country had been taken? How much of Aristoxenus’ genius do we see consumed in music? With what zeal do we think Aristophanes spent his life upon letters? What of Pythagoras? What shall I say of Plato or of Democritus? Men whom we see, for the desire of learning, to have traversed the farthest lands. Those who do not see this have never loved anything great and worthy of being known. And on this point, those who say that the studies I have named are pursued for the sake of the pleasures of the mind do not understand that they are for this very reason to be sought for their own sakes — namely, because our minds delight in them with no advantage held out, and rejoice in the knowledge itself even where it is going to bring inconvenience.

quem enim ardorem studii censetis fuisse in Archimede, qui dum in pulvere quaedam describit attentius, ne patriam quidem captam esse senserit? quantum Aristoxeni ingenium consumptum videmus in musicis? quo studio Aristophanem putamus aetatem in litteris duxisse? quid de Pythagora? quid de Platone aut de Democrito loquar? a quibus propter discendi cupiditatem videmus ultimas terras esse peragratas. quae qui non vident, nihil umquam magnum ac cognitione dignum amaverunt. Atque hoc loco, qui propter animi voluptates coli dicunt ea studia, quae dixi, non intellegunt idcirco esse ea propter se expetenda, quod nulla utilitate obiecta delectentur animi atque ipsa scientia, etiamsi incommodatura sit, gaudeant.

But what is the use of demanding more on matters so plain? Let us rather put the question to ourselves: how the movements of the stars and the contemplation of the heavenly bodies, and the knowledge of all those things that are hidden away in the obscurity of nature, move us; and what delight there is in history, which we are accustomed to pursue to the very end, going back over what we have passed by and following up what we have begun. Nor indeed am I unaware that there is utility in history, and not pleasure only.

Sed quid attinet de rebus tam apertis plura requirere? ipsi enim quaeramus a nobis stellarum motus contemplationesque rerum caelestium eorumque omnium, quae naturae obscuritate occultantur, cognitiones quem ad modum nos moveant, et quid historia delectet, quam solemus persequi usque ad extremum, cum praetermissa repetimus, inchoata persequimur. nec vero sum nescius esse utilitatem in historia, non modo voluptatem.

What, when we read invented stories, from which no utility can be drawn out, and read them with pleasure? What, when we wish the names of those who have done some deed to be known to us, and their parents, their homeland, and many things besides that are not in the least necessary? What of the fact that men of the lowest fortune, with no hope of conducting affairs — craftsmen, in short — take delight in history? And we can see that those most of all wish to hear and to read of deeds done who are far from any hope of doing them, worn out by old age. From which it must necessarily be understood that in the very things which are learned and known there are inducements present, by which we are moved to learning and to knowing.

quid, cum fictas fabulas, e quibus utilitas nulla elici potest, cum voluptate legimus? quid, cum volumus nomina eorum, qui quid gesserint, nota nobis esse, parentes, patriam, multa praeterea minime necessaria? quid, quod homines infima fortuna, nulla spe rerum gerendarum, opifices denique delectantur historia? maximeque eos videre possumus res gestas audire et legere velle, qui a spe gerendi absunt confecti senectute. quocirca intellegi necesse est in ipsis rebus, quae discuntur et cognoscuntur, invitamenta inesse, quibus ad discendum cognoscendumque moveamur.

The old philosophers, indeed, imagine in the islands of the blessed what the life of the wise will be like: men freed from all care, requiring no necessary furnishing or provision for life, who they suppose will do nothing else than spend the whole of their time in inquiry and in learning, in the knowledge of nature. We, however, see that this is not only the delight of the happy life but also a relief from miseries. And so many men, when they were in the power of enemies or of tyrants, many in captivity, many in exile, have lightened their pain by the pursuits of learning.

Ac veteres quidem philosophi in beatorum insulis fingunt qualis futura sit vita sapientium, quos cura omni liberatos, nullum necessarium vitae cultum aut paratum requirentis, nihil aliud esse acturos putant, nisi ut omne tempus inquirendo ac discendo in naturae cognitione consumant. Nos autem non solum beatae vitae istam esse oblectationem videmus, sed etiam levamentum miseriarum. itaque multi, cum in potestate essent hostium aut tyrannorum, multi in custodia, multi in exilio dolorem suum doctrinae studiis levaverunt.

The chief man of this city, Demetrius of Phalerum, when he had been driven from his country by injustice, betook himself to king Ptolemy at Alexandria. And since he excelled in this very philosophy to which we are urging you, and had been a pupil of Theophrastus, he wrote many splendid things in that calamitous leisure — not for any use of his own, of which he had been stripped, but that cultivation of his mind was for him a kind of food of humanity. For my part, I often used to hear from Cn. Aufidius, a man of praetorian rank, learned, and blind, that he was moved by a longing for the light more than for any use of it. In a word, unless sleep brought rest to our bodies and a kind of medicine for our labour, we should reckon it given against nature, for it takes away our senses and removes all activity. And so, if either nature did not seek rest, or could obtain it in some other way, we should readily put up with it — we who even now are accustomed, for the sake of doing or learning something, to take on our vigils almost against nature.

princeps huius civitatis Phalereus Demetrius cum patria pulsus esset iniuria, ad Ptolomaeum se regem Alexandream contulit. qui cum in hac ipsa philosophia, ad quam te hortamur, excelleret Theophrastique esset auditor, multa praeclara in illo calamitoso otio scripsit non ad usum aliquem suum, quo erat orbatus, sed animi cultus ille erat ei quasi quidam humanitatis cibus. equidem e Cn. Aufidio, praetorio, erudito homine, oculis capto, saepe audiebam, cum se lucis magis quam utilitatis desiderio moveri diceret. somnum denique nobis, nisi requietem corporibus et medicinam quandam laboris afferret, contra naturam putaremus datum; aufert enim sensus actionemque tollit omnem. itaque si aut requietem natura non quaereret aut eam posset alia quadam ratione consequi, facile pateremur, qui etiam nunc agendi aliquid discendique causa prope contra naturam vigilias suscipere soleamus.

There are, moreover, still clearer, even plainly evident and not in the least doubtful signs of nature, above all in man, of course, but in every animal: that the mind craves always to be doing something, and on no terms can endure everlasting rest. This is easy to discern in the earliest little years of children. For although I fear I may seem excessive on this kind of point, still all the old philosophers, and ours above all, go back to the cradle, because they think that in childhood the will of nature can most easily be known. We see, then, how even infants cannot keep still. And when they have advanced a little, they take delight in games even if these are toilsome, so that they cannot be deterred even by beatings, and that desire of doing something grows up together with their years. And so, not even if we supposed we should enjoy the most delightful dreams would we wish the sleep of Endymion to be given us; and if it did befall us, we should reckon it the equal of death.

Sunt autem etiam clariora vel plane perspicua minimeque dubitanda indicia naturae, maxime scilicet in homine, sed in omni animali, ut appetat animus aliquid agere semper neque ulla condicione quietem sempiternam possit pati. facile est hoc cernere in primis puerorum aetatulis. quamquam enim vereor, ne nimius in hoc genere videar, tamen omnes veteres philosophi, maxime nostri, ad incunabula accedunt, quod in pueritia facillime se arbitrantur naturae voluntatem posse cognoscere. videmus igitur ut conquiescere ne infantes quidem possint. cum vero paulum processerunt, lusionibus vel laboriosis delectantur, ut ne verberibus quidem deterreri possint, eaque cupiditas agendi aliquid adolescit una cum aetatibus. itaque, ne si iucundissimis quidem nos somniis usuros putemus, Endymionis somnum nobis velimus dari, idque si accidat, mortis instar putemus.

Indeed, even the most idle of men, endowed with some singular and indescribable sluggishness, we still see to be forever moved in body and mind, and, when they are hampered by no necessary business, either to call for the dice-board, or to seek out some game, or to look for some conversation; and since they do not have the noble delights that come from learning, to chase after little gatherings and gossiping circles. Indeed, not even the beasts that we shut up for the sake of our delight, although they are fed more abundantly than if they were free, readily endure to be confined, and they long for the free and wandering movements that nature has assigned them.

quin etiam inertissimos homines nescio qua singulari segnitia praeditos videmus tamen et corpore et animo moveri semper et, cum re nulla impediantur necessaria, aut alveolum poscere aut quaerere quempiam ludum aut sermonem aliquem requirere, cumque non habeant ingenuas ex doctrina oblectationes, circulos aliquos et sessiunculas consectari. quin ne bestiae quidem, quas delectationis causa concludimus, cum copiosius alantur, quam si essent liberae, facile patiuntur sese contineri motusque solutos et vagos a natura sibi tributos requirunt.

And so the better any man is born and trained, the less he would wish to be alive at all if, stripped of affairs to conduct, he could feed on pleasures however well prepared. For men either prefer to conduct some business privately, or, if they are of a loftier mind, take up the commonwealth by winning honours and commands, or devote themselves wholly to the pursuits of learning. In which life they are so far from chasing after pleasures that they even endure cares, anxieties, sleepless nights, and enjoy the best part of a man — which in us must be reckoned divine — the keenness of genius and of mind, neither seeking pleasure nor fleeing toil. Nor indeed do they let up either their wonder at the things that have been discovered by the ancients or their search for new ones. And since they cannot be sated by this zeal, forgetful of all other things, they think nothing low, nothing base; and so great is the power in such pursuits that we see even those who have set themselves other ends of goods, ones they steer by utility or by pleasure, nevertheless wear out their lives in inquiring into things and unfolding the workings of nature.

itaque ut quisque optime natus institutusque est, esse omnino nolit in vita, si gerendis negotiis orbatus possit paratissimis vesci voluptatibus. nam aut privatim aliquid gerere malunt aut, qui altiore animo sunt, capessunt rem publicam honoribus imperiisque adipiscendis aut totos se ad studia doctrinae conferunt. qua in vita tantum abest ut voluptates consectentur, etiam curas, sollicitudines, vigilias perferunt optimaque parte hominis, quae in nobis divina ducenda est, ingenii et mentis acie fruuntur nec voluptatem requirentes nec fugientes laborem. nec vero intermittunt aut admirationem earum rerum, quae sunt ab antiquis repertae, aut investigationem novarum. quo studio cum satiari non possint, omnium ceterarum rerum obliti nihil abiectum, nihil humile cogitant; tantaque est vis talibus in studiis, ut eos etiam, qui sibi alios proposuerunt fines bonorum, quos utilitate aut voluptate dirigunt, tamen in rebus quaerendis explicandisque naturis aetates conterere videamus.

Therefore this much, at least, is clear: that we are born for action. Now there are several kinds of action, such that the lesser are even put in the shade by the greater; and the greatest are, first — as it seems to me, at any rate, and to those whose system we are now treating — the consideration and knowledge of the heavenly bodies and of those things which, hidden and lying concealed by nature, reason can track down; next, the administration of public affairs, or the science of administering them; then the prudent, temperate, brave, just exercise of reason and the remaining virtues, and the actions that accord with the virtues — all of which, embracing them in a single word, we call the honourable. To both the knowledge and the practice of these we are led, once we have grown strong, with nature herself going before us. For the beginnings of all things are small, but they grow by employing their own advances — and not without reason: for in the first emergence there is a certain tenderness and softness, such that one can neither see the best things nor do them. The light of virtue and of the happy life, the two things most of all to be sought, appears later, and much later still before it is understood plainly what these are. For Plato says it splendidly: Happy is the man to whom it has fallen, even in old age, to be able to attain wisdom and true opinions! Therefore, since enough has been said about the first advantages of nature, let us now look at the greater things that follow.

Ergo hoc quidem apparet, nos ad agendum esse natos. actionum autem genera plura, ut obscurentur etiam minora maioribus, maximae autem sunt primum, ut mihi quidem videtur et iis, quorum nunc in ratione versamur, consideratio cognitioque rerum caelestium et earum, quas a natura occultatas et latentes indagare ratio potest, deinde rerum publicarum administratio aut administrandi scientia, tum prudens, temperata, fortis, iusta ratio reliquaeque virtutes et actiones virtutibus congruentes, quae uno verbo complexi omnia honesta dicimus; ad quorum et cognitionem et usum iam corroborati natura ipsa praeeunte deducimur. omnium enim rerum principia parva sunt, sed suis progressionibus usa augentur, nec sine causa; in primo enim ortu inest teneritas ac mollitia quaedam, ut nec res videre optimas nec agere possint. virtutis enim beataeque vitae, quae duo maxime expetenda sunt, serius lumen apparet, multo etiam serius, ut plane qualia sint intellegantur. praeclare enim Plato: Beatum, cui etiam in senectute contigerit, ut sapientiam verasque opiniones assequi possit! Quare, quoniam de primis naturae commodis satis dictum est, nunc de maioribus consequentibusque videamus.

Nature, then, both begot and shaped the body of man in such a way that some things she perfected at the first emergence, others she fashioned as the years advanced, and she made hardly any use at all of external and adventitious aids. The mind, however, she perfected, as she did the body, by the remaining things; for she furnished it with senses fit for perceiving things, so that they needed no aid, or not much, for their own confirmation. But what is most excellent and best in man, that she left undone. And yet she gave such a mind as could receive every virtue, and implanted, without teaching, small notions of the greatest things, and, as it were, set out to teach and led us into the things that were already within — the elements, so to speak, of virtue. But virtue itself she only began; nothing more.

Natura igitur corpus quidem hominis sic et genuit et formavit, ut alia in primo ortu perficeret, alia progrediente aetate fingeret neque sane multum adiumentis externis et adventiciis uteretur. animum autem reliquis rebus ita perfecit, ut corpus; sensibus enim ornavit ad res percipiendas idoneis, ut nihil aut non multum adiumento ullo ad suam confirmationem indigerent; quod autem in homine praestantissimum atque optimum est, id deseruit. etsi dedit talem mentem, quae omnem virtutem accipere posset, ingenuitque sine doctrina notitias parvas rerum maximarum et quasi instituit docere et induxit in ea, quae inerant, tamquam elementa virtutis. sed virtutem ipsam inchoavit, nihil amplius.

And so it is our task — when I say ours, I mean it is the task of an art — to seek out, upon those beginnings that we have received, the consequences, until that which we want is brought to completion. And this is worth a good deal more, and far more to be sought for its own sake, than either the senses or those things of the body which we mentioned; for the surpassing perfection of the mind so far excels them that it can scarcely be conceived what the difference is. And so all honour, all admiration, all zeal is referred to virtue and to those actions that are in accord with virtue, and all the things that are either so present in our minds or so done are called by one name the honourable. What the notions of all these are — those, that is, that are signified by the names of things — and what the force and nature of each is, we shall see presently.

itaque nostrum est—quod nostrum dico, artis est—ad ea principia, quae accepimus, consequentia exquirere, quoad sit id, quod volumus, effectum. quod quidem pluris est haud paulo magisque ipsum propter se expetendum quam aut sensus aut corporis ea, quae diximus, quibus tantum praestat mentis excellens perfectio, ut vix cogitari possit quid intersit. itaque omnis honos, omnis admiratio, omne studium ad virtutem et ad eas actiones, quae virtuti sunt consentaneae, refertur, eaque omnia, quae aut ita in animis sunt aut ita geruntur, uno nomine honesta dicuntur. quorum omnium quae sint notitiae, quae quidem significentur rerum vocabulis, quaeque cuiusque vis et natura sit mox videbimus.

But for now let us only explain that this honourable of which I speak — apart from the fact that we love our very selves — is besides, by its own nature, to be sought for its own sake. Children give the proof, in whom, as in mirrors, nature is discerned. What great zeal there is in those who contend! What great contests in themselves! How they are carried away with joy when they have won! How ashamed the beaten are! How they refuse to be found at fault! How they long to be praised! What labours do they not endure, to be foremost among their fellows! What memory there is in them of those who have done well by them, what desire to return the favour! And these things appear most of all in every best natural disposition, in which this honourable that we have in mind is, as it were, sketched out by nature.

Hoc autem loco tantum explicemus haec honesta, quae dico, praeterquam quod nosmet ipsos diligamus, praeterea suapte natura per se esse expetenda. indicant pueri, in quibus ut in speculis natura cernitur. quanta studia decertantium sunt! quanta ipsa certamina! ut illi efferuntur laetitia, cum vicerunt! ut pudet victos! ut se accusari nolunt! quam cupiunt laudari! quos illi labores non perferunt, ut aequalium principes sint! quae memoria est in iis bene merentium, quae referendae gratiae cupiditas! atque ea in optima quaque indole maxime apparent, in qua haec honesta, quae intellegimus, a natura tamquam adumbrantur.

But these things are in children; in those ages that are now full-formed they are clearly expressed. Who is so unlike a human being as not to be moved both by offence at baseness and by approval of honour? Who is there who does not hate a lustful, shameless youth? Who, on the other hand, does not love modesty and steadiness in that age, even where his own interest is not concerned at all? Who does not hate Pullus Numitorius of Fregellae, the traitor, although he was of service to our commonwealth? Who does not praise above all Codrus, the saviour of his city, who does not praise the daughters of Erechtheus? To whom is the name of Tubulus not hateful? Who does not love Aristides, though he is dead? Or do we forget how greatly we are moved in the hearing and in the reading, when we learn of something done with piety, with friendship, with greatness of soul?

Sed haec in pueris; expressa vero in iis aetatibus, quae iam confirmatae sunt. quis est tam dissimilis homini, qui non moveatur et offensione turpitudinis et comprobatione honestatis? quis est, qui non oderit libidinosam, protervam adolescentiam? quis contra in illa aetate pudorem, constantiam, etiamsi sua nihil intersit, non tamen diligat? quis Pullum Numitorium Fregellanum, proditorem, quamquam rei publicae nostrae profuit, non odit? quis suae urbis conservatorem Codrum, quis Erechthei filias non maxime laudat? cui Tubuli nomen odio non est? quis Aristidem non mortuum diligit? an obliviscimur, quantopere in audiendo in legendoque moveamur, cum pie, cum amice, cum magno animo aliquid factum cognoscimus?

Why do I speak of ourselves, who were born, taken up, and trained for praise and for honour? What shouts of the crowd and of the unlearned are raised in the theatres when those lines are spoken: ’I am Orestes’, and against him from the other: ’No, in truth, I tell you, I am Orestes!’ And when, moreover, the way out is given by each to the king, confused and at a loss — when both, then, pray to be put to death together — how often is this acted out, and ever with anything but the greatest admiration? There is no one, then, who does not approve and praise this disposition of mind, by which not only is no advantage sought, but, against advantage, faith is even kept.

Quid loquor de nobis, qui ad laudem et ad decus nati, suscepti, instituti sumus? qui clamores vulgi atque imperitorum excitantur in theatris, cum illa dicuntur: ’Ego sum Orestes’, contraque ab altero: Immo enimvero ego sum, inquam, Orestes! cum autem etiam exitus ab utroque datur conturbato errantique regi, ambo ergo se una necari cum precantur, quotiens hoc agitur, ecquandone nisi admirationibus maximis? nemo est igitur, quin hanc affectionem animi probet atque laudet, qua non modo utilitas nulla quaeritur, sed contra utilitatem etiam conservatur fides.

With examples of this kind not only invented stories but histories too are crammed, and ours especially. For we chose the best of men to receive the sacred objects of Ida; we sent guardians to kings; our generals vowed their own lives for the safety of their country; our consuls warned a king, a bitter enemy already drawing near our walls, to beware of poison; in our commonwealth was found a Lucretia, who atoned by a voluntary death for the violation forced upon her, and a man who killed his daughter that she might not be violated. All these things, and countless others besides — who is there who does not understand both that those who did them were drawn by the splendour of worth and were heedless of their own advantage, and that we, when we praise them, are led by nothing else than the honourable? Now that these matters have been set out briefly — for I have not pursued the abundance I might have, since there was no doubt in the case — by all this it is surely concluded that both all the virtues and that honourable which springs from them and clings within them are to be sought for their own sake.

Talibus exemplis non fictae solum fabulae, verum etiam historiae refertae sunt, et quidem maxime nostrae. nos enim ad sacra Idaea accipienda optimum virum delegimus, nos tutores misimus regibus, nostri imperatores pro salute patriae sua capita voverunt, nostri consules regem inimicissimum moenibus iam adpropinquantem monuerunt, a veneno ut caveret, nostra in re publica Lucretia et quae per vim oblatum stuprum voluntaria morte lueret inventa est et qui interficeret filiam, ne stupraretur. quae quidem omnia et innumerabilia praeterea quis est quin intellegat et eos qui fecerint dignitatis splendore ductos inmemores fuisse utilitatum suarum nosque, cum ea laudemus, nulla alia re nisi honestate duci? Quibus rebus expositis breviter —nec enim sum copiam, quam potui, quia dubitatio in re nulla erat, persecutus—sed his rebus concluditur profecto et virtutes omnes et honestum illud, quod ex iis oritur et in iis haeret, per se esse expetendum.

But in all that honourable good of which we are speaking, nothing is so radiant, nothing of wider reach, than the bond between man and man, a kind of fellowship and sharing of advantages, and that very love of the human race. This love, born from the first begetting — in that children are cherished by those who begot them, and the whole household is bound together by marriage and by stock — creeps gradually outward: first to kinsfolk, then to relations by marriage, then to friends, after that to neighbours, then to fellow citizens and to those who are publicly our allies and friends, and at last to the embrace of the whole human kind. This disposition of the mind, rendering to each his own and guarding generously and fairly that fellowship of human union of which I speak, is called justice; and joined to it are dutifulness, kindness, generosity, good will, courtesy, and whatever else is of the same kind. And these things, while they are proper to justice, are at the same time shared with the rest of the virtues.

in omni autem honesto, de quo loquimur, nihil est tam illustre nec quod latius pateat quam coniunctio inter homines hominum et quasi quaedam societas et communicatio utilitatum et ipsa caritas generis humani. quae nata a primo satu, quod a procreatoribus nati diliguntur et tota domus coniugio et stirpe coniungitur, serpit sensim foras, cognationibus primum, tum affinitatibus, deinde amicitiis, post vicinitatibus, tum civibus et iis, qui publice socii atque amici sunt, deinde totius complexu gentis humanae. quae animi affectio suum cuique tribuens atque hanc, quam dico, societatem coniunctionis humanae munifice et aeque tuens iustitia dicitur, cui sunt adiunctae pietas, bonitas, liberalitas, benignitas, comitas, quaeque sunt generis eiusdem. atque haec ita iustitiae propria sunt, ut sint virtutum reliquarum communia.

For since man’s nature has been begotten in such a way that he has within him something inborn and, as it were, civic and communal, which the Greeks call politikon, whatever any virtue does will not be at odds with that community and that love and human fellowship which I have set out; and, in turn, just as justice itself will pour itself into the other virtues, so it will seek them out. For justice cannot be kept except by a brave man, except by a wise one. Such, then, as is this whole concord and consent of the virtues of which I speak, such is that honourable good itself, since the honourable is either virtue itself or a deed done by virtue; and a life that accords with these and answers to the virtues can be judged upright and honourable and steadfast and in keeping with nature.

nam cum sic hominis natura generata sit, ut habeat quiddam ingenitum quasi civile atque populare, quod Graeci politiko/n vocant, quicquid aget quaeque virtus, id a communitate et ea, quam exposui, caritate ac societate humana non abhorrebit, vicissimque iustitia, ut ipsa se fundet in ceteras virtutes, sic illas expetet. servari enim iustitia nisi a forti viro, nisi a sapiente non potest. qualis est igitur omnis haec, quam dico, conspiratio consensusque virtutum, tale est illud ipsum honestum, quandoquidem honestum aut ipsa virtus est aut res gesta virtute; quibus rebus vita consentiens virtutibusque respondens recta et honesta et constans et naturae congruens existimari potest.

And yet this joining and intermingling of the virtues is nonetheless distinguished by the philosophers through a certain method of reasoning. For although they are so coupled and connected that all share in all, and none can be severed from another, still each has its own proper office: courage is discerned in toils and dangers, temperance in the foregoing of pleasures, prudence in the choice of goods and evils, justice in rendering to each his own. Since, then, there is in every virtue a certain care that looks, as it were, outward and reaches after others and embraces them, it comes about that friends, that brothers, that kinsmen, that relations by marriage, that fellow citizens, that everyone in the end — since we hold that there is one fellowship of mankind — are to be sought for their own sake. And yet none of these is of such a kind as to lie within the end and uttermost limit of goods.

atque haec coniunctio confusioque virtutum tamen a philosophis ratione quadam distinguitur. nam cum ita copulatae conexaeque sint, ut omnes omnium participes sint nec alia ab alia possit separari, tamen proprium suum cuiusque munus est, ut fortitudo in laboribus periculisque cernatur, temperantia in praetermittendis voluptatibus, prudentia in dilectu bonorum et malorum, iustitia in suo cuique tribuendo. quando igitur inest in omni virtute cura quaedam quasi foras spectans aliosque appetens atque complectens, existit illud, ut amici, ut fratres, ut propinqui, ut affines, ut cives, ut omnes denique—quoniam unam societatem hominum esse volumus—propter se expetendi sint. atqui eorum nihil est eius generis, ut sit in fine atque extremo bonorum.

So it comes about that two kinds of things to be sought for their own sake are found. One lies in those things in which that uttermost good is brought to completion — things which belong either to the mind or to the body. But those that are external — that is, those that are present neither in the mind nor in the body, such as friends, parents, children, kinsmen, the fatherland itself — these are indeed dear of their own accord, but they are not of the same class as the others. Nor indeed could anyone ever attain the highest good if all those things that lie outside us, though to be sought, were contained within the highest good.

ita fit, ut duo genera propter se expetendorum reperiantur, unum, quod est in iis, in quibus completur illud extremum, quae sunt aut animi aut corporis; haec autem, quae sunt extrinsecus, id est quae neque in animo insunt neque in corpore, ut amici, ut parentes, ut liberi, ut propinqui, ut ipsa patria, sunt illa quidem sua sponte cara, sed eodem in genere, quo illa, non sunt. nec vero umquam summum bonum assequi quisquam posset, si omnia illa, quae sunt extra, quamquam expetenda, summo bono continerentur.

"How, then," you will say, "will it be possible for it to be true that all things are referred to the highest good, if friendships, if ties of kinship, if the remaining external things are not contained within the highest good?" By this account, surely: that we guard those things which are external by the duties that arise from each particular kind of virtue. For the cultivation of a friend and of a parent, to one who discharges his duty, profits him in this very thing, that to discharge duty thus belongs among right actions, which are sprung from the virtues. These the wise indeed pursue under nature’s guidance, as though they could see; but men who are not yet perfect, and yet endowed with outstanding natural gifts, are often roused by glory, which has the look and likeness of the honourable. But if they could see, through and through, that honourable good itself, perfect and complete on every side … the one thing most splendid of all and most worthy of praise, with what joy would they be filled, when they take such delight in the shadowy notion of it?

Quo modo igitur, inquies, verum esse poterit omnia referri ad summum bonum, si amicitiae, si propinquitates, si reliqua externa summo bono non continentur? Hac videlicet ratione, quod ea, quae externa sunt, iis tuemur officiis, quae oriuntur a suo cuiusque genere virtutis. nam et amici cultus et parentis ei, qui officio fungitur, in eo ipso prodest, quod ita fungi officio in recte factis est, quae sunt orta a virtutibus. quae quidem sapientes sequuntur duce natura tanquam videntes; non perfecti autem homines et tamen ingeniis excellentibus praediti excitantur saepe gloria, quae habet speciem honestatis et similitudinem. quodsi ipsam honestatem undique perfectam atque absolutam. rem unam praeclarissimam omnium maximeque laudandam, penitus viderent, quonam gaudio complerentur, cum tantopere eius adumbrata opinione laetentur?

For what man, given over to pleasures, what man set ablaze by the fires of his desires in laying hold of the things he had most fiercely craved, do we suppose to be flooded with so great a gladness as either the elder Africanus, when Hannibal was beaten, or the younger, when Carthage was overthrown? Whom did the descent of the Tiber on that festal day affect with so great a joy as it affected L. Paulus, when he was carried up that same river bringing King Perses captive? Come now, Lucius mine, raise up in your mind the height and excellence of the virtues:

quem enim deditum voluptatibus, quem cupiditatum incendiis inflammatum in iis potiendis, quae acerrime concupivisset, tanta laetitia perfundi arbitramur, quanta aut superiorem Africanum Hannibale victo aut posteriorem Karthagine eversa? quem Tiberina descensio festo illo die tanto gaudio affecit, quanto L. Paulum, cum regem Persem captum adduceret, eodem flumine invectio? Age nunc, Luci noster, extrue animo altitudinem excellentiamque virtutum:

you will no longer doubt that men who possess them, living with a great and lofty spirit, are always happy — men who understand that all the motions of fortune and the changes of circumstance and the times will be light and feeble, if once they have entered the contest of virtue. For those things which we counted among the goods of the body do indeed fill out the happiest life, but in such a way that the happy life can exist without them. For so small and slight are those additions of goods that, just as the stars are not even seen in the rays of the sun, so these are not even discerned in the splendour of the virtues. And though it is truly said that those advantages of the body count for little toward living happily, still it is too violent to say that they count for nothing;

iam non dubitabis, quin earum compotes homines magno animo erectoque viventes semper sint beati, qui omnis motus fortunae mutationesque rerum et temporum levis et inbecillos fore intellegant, si in virtutis certamen venerint. illa enim, quae sunt a nobis bona corporis numerata, complent ea quidem beatissimam vitam, sed ita, ut sine illis possit beata vita existere. ita enim parvae et exiguae sunt istae accessiones bonorum, ut, quem ad modum stellae in radiis solis, sic istae in virtutum splendore ne cernantur quidem. Atque hoc ut vere dicitur, parva esse ad beate vivendum momenta ista corporis commodorum, sic nimis violentum est nulla esse dicere;

for those who argue so seem to me to have forgotten the very first principles of nature which they themselves laid down. Something, then, must be granted to these things — provided you understand how much is to be granted. For it belongs to a philosopher who seeks not so much the showy as the true neither to count as nothing those things which even those showy men confessed to be in accordance with nature, and to see that there is so great a force in virtue and, so to speak, so great an authority in the honourable, that the rest, while not nothing, are yet so small as to seem to be nothing. This is the discourse of one who does not scorn all things save virtue, yet magnifies virtue itself with the praises that are its own; and, in fine, this is the explanation of the highest good, complete and perfect on every side. From here the rest, attempting to snatch up little fragments, each wished his own opinion to seem the one he had contributed.

qui enim sic disputant, obliti mihi videntur, quae ipsi fecerint principia naturae. tribuendum est igitur his aliquid, dum modo quantum tribuendum sit intellegas. est enim philosophi non tam gloriosa quam vera quaerentis nec pro nihilo putare ea, quae secundum naturam illi ipsi gloriosi esse fatebantur, et videre esse tantam vim virtutis tantamque, ut ita dicam, auctoritatem honestatis, ut reliqua non illa quidem nulla, sed ita parva sint, ut nulla esse videantur. haec est nec omnia spernentis praeter virtutem et virtutem ipsam suis laudibus amplificantis oratio, denique haec est undique completa et perfecta explicatio summi boni. hinc ceteri particulas arripere conati suam quisque videri voluit afferre sententiam.

Often, by Aristotle, by Theophrastus, the knowledge of things has been wondrously praised for its own sake; caught by this one thing, Erillus maintained that knowledge is the highest good, and that no other thing is to be sought for its own sake. Much was said by the ancients about despising and looking down upon human affairs; this one thing Aristo held to: he denied that, apart from vices and virtues, there is anything to be shunned or to be sought. It was laid down by our school that, among the things which are in accordance with nature, there is the being free from pain; this Hieronymus called the highest good. But Callipho, indeed, and after him Diodorus — the one having grown enamoured of pleasure, the other of freedom from pain — neither could do without the honourable, which has been praised most of all by our school.

saepe ab Aristotele, a Theophrasto mirabiliter est laudata per se ipsa rerum scientia; hoc uno captus Erillus scientiam summum bonum esse defendit nec rem ullam aliam per se expetendam. multa sunt dicta ab antiquis de contemnendis ac despiciendis rebus humanis; hoc unum Aristo tenuit: praeter vitia atque virtutes negavit rem esse ullam aut fugiendam aut expetendam. positum est a nostris in iis esse rebus, quae secundum naturam essent, non dolere; hoc Hieronymus summum bonum esse dixit. at vero Callipho et post eum Diodorus, cum alter voluptatem adamavisset, alter vacuitatem doloris, neuter honestate carere potuit, quae est a nostris laudata maxime.

Indeed, even the very devotees of pleasure seek their side-roads, and have the virtues on their lips all day long, and say that pleasure is at first sought only for its own sake, but that afterward, by habit, a kind of second nature is formed, driven by which men do many things while seeking no pleasure at all. The Stoics remain. They, to be sure, have carried over from us not some one thing or another, but our whole philosophy to their own side; and just as the rest of the thieves change the marks on the things they have stolen, so they, in order to use our opinions as their own, changed the names, like the marks upon things. Thus this teaching alone is left worthy of those zealous for the liberal arts, worthy of the learned, worthy of illustrious men, worthy of leading men, worthy of kings. When he had said this, and had paused a little, "What is it?" he said;

quin etiam ipsi voluptarii deverticula quaerunt et virtutes habent in ore totos dies voluptatemque primo dumtaxat expeti dicunt, deinde consuetudine quasi alteram quandam naturam effici, qua inpulsi multa faciant nullam quaerentes voluptatem. Stoici restant. ei quidem non unam aliquam aut alteram rem a nobis, sed totam ad se nostram philosophiam transtulerunt; atque ut reliqui fures earum rerum, quas ceperunt, signa commutant, sic illi, ut sententiis nostris pro suis uterentur, nomina tamquam rerum notas mutaverunt. ita relinquitur sola haec disciplina digna studiosis ingenuarum artium, digna eruditis, digna claris viris, digna principibus, digna regibus. Quae cum dixisset paulumque institisset, Quid est?

"do I seem to you to have rehearsed enough, in the use of my own right, within your hearing?" And I said, "You, Piso — as often at other times, so today — seemed to me to know these things so well that, if we could have you more often, I should not think we need do much suppliant courting of the Greeks. And this I approved the more, because I remember that Staseas of Naples, that teacher of yours, a Peripatetic of high repute indeed, used to speak of these matters somewhat otherwise, agreeing with those who put much store in fortune favourable or adverse, much in the goods or evils of the body." "It is as you say," he said; "but these things are stated by Antiochus, our friend, much better and more strongly than they used to be stated by Staseas. And yet I am not asking what has been approved by you in my account, but by this Cicero of ours, whom I am eager to carry off from you as my pupil."

inquit; satisne vobis videor pro meo iure in vestris auribus commentatus? Et ego: Tu vero, inquam, Piso, ut saepe alias, sic hodie ita nosse ista visus es, ut, si tui nobis potestas saepius fieret, non multum Graecis supplicandum putarem. quod quidem eo probavi magis, quia memini Staseam Neapolitanum, doctorem illum tuum, nobilem sane Peripateticum, aliquanto ista secus dicere solitum, assentientem iis, qui multum in fortuna secunda aut adversa, multum in bonis aut malis corporis ponerent. Est, ut dicis, inquit; sed haec ab Antiocho, familiari nostro, dicuntur multo melius et fortius, quam a Stasea dicebantur. quamquam ego non quaero, quid tibi a me probatum sit, sed huic Ciceroni nostro, quem discipulum cupio a te abducere.

Then Lucius: "For my part, those things have been thoroughly approved by me, as I think they are by my brother too." Then Piso said to me: "What of it, then? Do you grant the young man your indulgence? Or would you rather have him learn those doctrines which, when he has thoroughly mastered them, leave him knowing nothing?" "I, indeed, allow it to him," I said. "But do you not remember that I am at liberty to approve those things you have said? For who can fail to approve the things that seem to him probable?" "But can anyone," he said, "approve what he does not hold to be perceived, grasped, known?" "There is no great dissension here, Piso," I said. "For there is no other reason why nothing seems to me capable of being perceived, except that the power of perceiving is so defined by the Stoics that they deny anything can be perceived unless it is true in such a way that it could not be false. And so this is my dissension with them, but with the Peripatetics none at all. But let us pass these matters by; for they make a discussion both quite long enough and quite contentious enough."

Tum Lucius: Mihi vero ista valde probata sunt, quod item fratri puto. Tum mihi Piso: Quid ergo? inquit, dasne adolescenti veniam? an eum discere ea mavis, quae cum plane perdidicerit, nihil sciat? Ego vero isti, inquam, permitto. sed nonne meministi licere mihi ista probare, quae sunt a te dicta? quis enim potest ea, quae probabilia videantur ei, non probare? An vero, inquit, quisquam potest probare, quod perceptum, quod comprehensum, quod cognitum non habet? Non est ista, inquam, Piso, magna dissensio. nihil enim est aliud, quam ob rem mihi percipi nihil posse videatur, nisi quod percipiendi vis ita definitur a Stoicis, ut negent quicquam posse percipi nisi tale verum, quale falsum esse non possit. itaque haec cum illis est dissensio, cum Peripateticis nulla sane. sed haec omittamus; habent enim et bene longam et satis litigiosam disputationem.

"This seems to me to have been said by you too hastily — that all the wise are always happy; somehow the discourse flew past it. And unless this is made good, I fear that what Theophrastus said about fortune, about pain, about the torment of the body — things with which he judged the happy life could in no way be joined — may be true. For this is vehemently at odds: that the same man should be happy and yet overwhelmed by many evils. How these things are consistent I do not at all understand." "Which is it, then," he said, "that does not please you — that there is so great a force in virtue that of itself it is sufficient for living happily? Or, if you approve that, do you deny that it can come about that those who possess virtue should be happy even when afflicted with certain evils?" "For my part, I want there to be in virtue the greatest force possible; but how great it is, another time; for now only this: whether it can be so great, if anything outside virtue be counted among goods."

illud mihi a te nimium festinanter dictum videtur, sapientis omnis esse semper beatos; nescio quo modo praetervolavit oratio. quod nisi ita efficitur, quae Theophrastus de fortuna, de dolore, de cruciatu corporis dixit, cum quibus coniungi vitam beatam nullo modo posse putavit, vereor, ne vera sint. nam illud vehementer repugnat, eundem beatum esse et multis malis oppressum. haec quo modo conveniant, non sane intellego. Utrum igitur tibi non placet, inquit, virtutisne tantam esse vim, ut ad beate vivendum se ipsa contenta sit? an, si id probas, fieri ita posse negas, ut ii, qui virtutis compotes sint, etiam malis quibusdam affecti beati sint? Ego vero volo in virtute vim esse quam maximam; sed quanta sit alias; nunc tantum possitne esse tanta, si quicquam extra virtutem habeatur in bonis.

"And yet," he said, "if you grant the Stoics that virtue alone, if it be present, makes life happy, you grant the same to the Peripatetics as well. For what they do not dare to call evils, but grant to be harsh and inconvenient and to be rejected and foreign to nature — these we call evils, but slight and well-nigh the least of all. And so, if he can be happy who is among harsh and rejectable things, so too can he who is among small evils." And I said, "Piso, if there is anyone who is wont to see sharply, in pleading cases, what the matter at issue is, that man is surely you. So attend, I beg you. For so far — by my own fault, perhaps — you do not perceive what it is I am asking." "Here I am," he said, "and I await what you will answer to the very thing I was asking."

Atqui, inquit, si Stoicis concedis ut virtus sola, si adsit, vitam efficiat beatam, concedis etiam Peripateticis. quae enim mala illi non audent appellare, aspera autem et incommoda et reicienda et aliena naturae esse concedunt, ea nos mala dicimus, sed exigua et paene minima. quare si potest esse beatus is, qui est in asperis reiciendisque rebus, potest is quoque esse, qui est in parvis malis. Et ego: Piso, inquam, si est quisquam, qui acute in causis videre soleat quae res agatur, is es profecto tu. quare attende, quaeso. nam adhuc, meo fortasse vitio, quid ego quaeram non perspicis. Istic sum, inquit, expectoque quid ad id, quod quaerebam, respondeas.

"I will answer that I am not asking, at this time, what virtue can accomplish," I said, "but what is said consistently, what is at variance with itself." "In what way, then?" he said. "Because," I said, "when by Zeno this is delivered grandly, as though from an oracle: ’Virtue is of itself sufficient for living happily’ — and ’Why so?’ he says, the answer comes: ’Because, save what is honourable, there is no other good.’ I am no longer asking whether this be true; what I say is that the things he says hang together splendidly among themselves.

Respondebo me non quaerere, inquam, hoc tempore quid virtus efficere possit, sed quid constanter dicatur, quid ipsum a se dissentiat. Quo igitur, inquit, modo? Quia, cum a Zenone, inquam, hoc magnifice tamquam ex oraculo editur: ’Virtus ad beate vivendum se ipsa contenta est’, et Quare? inquit, respondet: Quia, nisi quod honestum est, nullum est aliud bonum. Non quaero iam verumne sit; illud dico, ea, quae dicat, praeclare inter se cohaerere.

Let Epicurus have said this same thing — that the wise man is always happy (which indeed he is given to bubbling out now and then) — Epicurus who says that the wise man, even when he is being worn down by the highest pains, will say, ’How sweet this is! how little I care!’; I would not fight with the man as to why he should hold so much good to lie in nature; this I would press: that he does not understand what he ought to say, when he has called pain the highest evil. The same is now my discourse against you. You say all the same things, good and evil, that those men say who never, as the saying goes, set eyes on a painted philosopher: health, strength, stature, beauty, the soundness of all the little nails, goods; deformity, disease, debility, evils.

dixerit hoc idem Epicurus, semper beatum esse sapientem—quod quidem solet ebullire non numquam—, quem quidem, cum summis doloribus conficiatur, ait dicturum: ’Quam suave est! quam nihil curo!’; non pugnem cum homine, cur tantum habeat in natura boni; illud urgueam, non intellegere eum quid sibi dicendum sit, cum dolorem summum malum esse dixerit. Eadem nunc mea adversum te oratio est. dicis eadem omnia et bona et mala, quae quidem dicunt ii, qui numquam philosophum pictum, ut dicitur, viderunt: valitudinem, vires, staturam, formam, integritatem unguiculorum omnium bona, deformitatem, morbum, debilitatem mala.

Now those external things — go gently on those, by all means; but since these are goods of the body, you will at least count among goods the things that produce them: friends, children, kinsmen, riches, honours, resources. Notice that against this I say nothing; what I do say is this: if those things are evils into which a wise man can fall, then to be wise is not enough for living happily. ‘On the contrary,’ he said, ‘for living most happily it is too little, but for living happily it is enough.’ ‘I noticed,’ I said, ‘that you put it in that way a little earlier, and I know that our friend Antiochus is in the habit of speaking so; but what could be less to be approved than that someone should be happy and yet not happy enough? For whatever is added to what is already enough is too much; and no one is too happy; and so no one is happier than the happy man.’

iam illa externa parce tu quidem; sed haec cum corporis bona sint, eorum conficientia certe in bonis numerabis, amicos, liberos, propinquos, divitias, honores, opes. contra hoc attende me nihil dicere, illud dicere, si ista mala sunt, in quae potest incidere sapiens, sapientem esse non esse ad beate vivendum satis. Immo vero, inquit, ad beatissime vivendum parum est, ad beate vero satis. Animadverti, inquam, te isto modo paulo ante ponere, et scio ab Antiocho nostro dici sic solere; sed quid minus probandum quam esse aliquem beatum nec satis beatum? quod autem satis est, eo quicquid accessit, nimium est; et nemo nimium beatus est; ita nemo beato beatior.

‘Then, in your view,’ he said, ‘take Q. Metellus, who saw three sons made consuls — one of them even both censor and a celebrant of a triumph, and a fourth a praetor — and who left them all living, and three daughters married, while he himself had been consul, censor, and augur too, and had triumphed: granting that he was a wise man, was he not happier than Regulus — granting that he too was a wise man — who in the power of the enemy was done to death by sleeplessness and starvation?’

Ergo, inquit, tibi Q. Metellus, qui tris filios consules vidit, e quibus unum etiam et censorem et triumphantem, quartum autem praetorem, eosque salvos reliquit et tris filias nuptas, cum ipse consul, censor, etiam augur fuisset et triumphasset, ut sapiens fuerit, nonne beatior quam, ut item sapiens fuerit, qui in potestate hostium vigiliis et inedia necatus est, Regulus?

‘Why ask me that?’ I said. ‘Ask the Stoics.’ ‘What, then,’ he said, ‘do you suppose they will answer?’ ‘That Metellus was no whit happier than Regulus.’ ‘From there, then,’ he said, ‘is where we must begin.’ ‘Even so,’ I said, ‘we are straying from the point. For I am not asking what is true, but what each man is bound to say. Would that they did say one man was happier than another! Then you would see ruins indeed. For since the good is placed in virtue alone and in the honourable itself, and since neither virtue, on their view, nor the honourable can grow, and since this is the only good — a good which whoever possesses must of necessity be happy — then, when the one thing in which being happy is placed cannot be increased, how can anyone be happier than another? Do you see how all this hangs together? And, by Hercules — for I must confess what I think — wonderful is the interweaving of their doctrine. The last answers to the first, the middle to both, all to all. They see what follows, what conflicts. It is as in geometry: grant the first premises, and you must grant the whole. Grant that nothing is good but the honourable: it must be granted that the happy life is placed in virtue. Now look back the other way:

Quid me istud rogas? inquam. Stoicos roga. Quid igitur, inquit, eos responsuros putas? Nihilo beatiorem esse Metellum quam Regulum. Inde igitur, inquit, ordiendum est. Tamen a proposito, inquam, aberramus. non enim quaero quid verum, sed quid cuique dicendum sit. utinam quidem dicerent alium alio beatiorem! iam ruinas videres. in virtute enim sola et in ipso honesto cum sit bonum positum, cumque nec virtus, ut placet illis, nec honestum crescat, idque bonum solum sit, quo qui potiatur, necesse est beatus sit, cum id augeri non possit, in quo uno positum est beatum esse, qui potest esse quisquam alius alio beatior? videsne, ut haec concinant? et hercule—fatendum est enim, quod sentio—mirabilis est apud illos contextus rerum. respondent extrema primis, media utrisque, omnia omnibus. quid sequatur, quid repugnet, vident. ut in geometria, prima si dederis, danda sunt omnia. concede nihil esse bonum, nisi quod honestum sit: concedendum est in virtute esse positam beatam vitam. vide rursus retro:

grant this, and that other must be granted. Your school does not do the same. “Three kinds of goods”: the discourse runs forward down the slope. It comes to the end; it sticks fast in the rut. For it wants to say that nothing can be lacking to the wise man for the happy life — an honourable claim, a Socratic one, Plato’s too. ‘I dare to say it,’ he said. ‘You cannot, unless you unweave all that. If poverty is an evil, no beggar can be happy, however wise he is. Yet Zeno dared to call such a man not merely happy but rich as well. To feel pain is an evil: the man driven onto the cross cannot be happy. Children are a good: bereavement is wretched. Country is a good: exile is wretched. Health is a good: sickness is wretched. Soundness of body is a good: maiming is wretched. Unimpaired sight is a good: blindness is wretched. If wisdom can ease each of these singly by its consolation, how will it bear them all together? Suppose one and the same man blind, maimed, gripped by the gravest sickness, exiled, bereaved, destitute, and racked on the rack: what do you call him, Zeno?’ ‘Happy,’ he says. ‘Most happy too?’ ‘Of course,’ he will say, ‘since I have taught that happiness has no degrees, no more than virtue has, in which happiness itself also resides.’

dato hoc dandum erit illud. Quod vestri non item. ’Tria genera bonorum’; proclivi currit oratio. venit ad extremum; haeret in salebra. cupit enim dicere nihil posse ad beatam vitam deesse sapienti. honesta oratio, Socratica, Platonis etiam. Audeo dicere, inquit. Non potes, nisi retexueris illa. paupertas si malum est, mendicus beatus esse nemo potest, quamvis sit sapiens. at Zeno eum non beatum modo, sed etiam divitem dicere ausus est. dolere malum est: in crucem qui agitur, beatus esse non potest. bonum liberi: misera orbitas. bonum patria: miserum exilium. bonum valitudo: miser morbus. bonum integritas corporis: misera debilitas. bonum incolumis acies: misera caecitas. quae si potest singula consolando levare, universa quo modo sustinebit? sit enim idem caecus, debilis, morbo gravissimo affectus, exul, orbus, egens, torqueatur eculeo: quem hunc appellas, Zeno? Beatum, inquit. Etiam beatissimum? Quippe, inquiet, cum tam docuerim gradus istam rem non habere quam virtutem, in qua sit ipsum etiam beatum.

‘To you this is incredible — that he is most happy. Well? Is your own claim credible? For if you summon me to the people’s verdict, you will never convince them that a man so afflicted is happy; if to the verdict of the prudent, on the one point they will perhaps be in doubt — whether there is so much in virtue that those endowed with it are happy even in the bull of Phalaris — but on the other they will not doubt that the Stoics speak consistently with themselves and you with contradiction.’ ‘So you approve,’ he said, ‘of that book of Theophrastus on the happy life?’ ‘Still, we are straying from the point — and, not to drag it out, in a word, Piso,’ I said, ‘if those things are evils, I do approve of it.’ ‘Do they not, then,’ he said, ‘seem to you evils?’

Tibi hoc incredibile, quod beatissimum. quid? tuum credibile? si enim ad populum me vocas, eum, qui ita sit affectus, beatum esse numquam probabis; si ad prudentes, alterum fortasse dubitabunt, sitne tantum in virtute, ut ea praediti vel in Phalaridis tauro beati sint, alterum non dubitabunt, quin et Stoici convenientia sibi dicant et vos repugnantia. Theophrasti igitur, inquit, tibi liber ille placet de beata vita? Tamen aberramus a proposito, et, ne longius, prorsus, inquam, Piso, si ista mala sunt, placet. Nonne igitur tibi videntur, inquit, mala?

‘You are asking,’ I said, ‘a question in which, whichever way I answer, you are bound to twist me this way and that.’ ‘How so, pray?’ he said. ‘Because, if they are evils, the man who is in them will not be happy; if they are not evils, the whole system of the Peripatetics collapses.’ And he, laughing: ‘I see,’ he said, ‘what you are at; you are afraid I shall carry off your pupil.’ ‘You may carry him off, by all means,’ I said, ‘if he will follow; for he will be with me, if he is with you.’ ‘Listen, then, Lucius,’ he said; ‘for it is with you that I must frame my discourse. The whole authority of philosophy, as Theophrastus says, lies in the securing of a happy life; for we are all set ablaze with the desire of living happily. On this your brother and I agree.

Id quaeris, inquam, in quo, utrum respondero, verses te huc atque illuc necesse est. Quo tandem modo? inquit. Quia, si mala sunt, is, qui erit in iis, beatus non erit; si mala non sunt, iacet omnis ratio Peripateticorum. Et ille ridens: Video, inquit, quid agas; ne discipulum abducam, times. Tu vero, inquam, ducas licet, si sequetur; erit enim mecum, si tecum erit. Audi igitur, inquit, Luci; tecum enim mihi instituenda oratio est. Omnis auctoritas philosophiae, ut ait Theophrastus, consistit in beata vita comparanda; beate enim vivendi cupiditate incensi omnes sumus. hoc mihi cum tuo fratre convenit.

And so what must be looked into is whether the reasoning of the philosophers can give us this. It certainly holds out the promise. For if it did not, why did Plato travel through Egypt to learn numbers and the lore of the heavens from the priests of the barbarians? Why, afterward, did he go to Tarentum to Archytas? Why to the other Pythagoreans — Echecrates, Timaeus, Arion — to the Locrians, so that, having reproduced Socrates, he might add the discipline of the Pythagoreans and learn besides the very things Socrates rejected? Why did Pythagoras himself both range over Egypt and go to the Magi of the Persians? Why did he traverse so many regions of the barbarians on foot, cross so many seas? Why did Democritus do the very same? Who — whether truly or falsely we forbear to ask — is said to have deprived himself of his eyes; and certainly, that his mind might be drawn off as little as possible from its meditations, he neglected his inheritance, left his fields untilled — seeking what else but the happy life? Even if he placed it in the knowledge of things, still it was from that investigation of nature that he wished to gain his end: to be of good cheer. For that highest good he calls cheerfulness euthymia, and often fearlessness athambia, that is, a mind free of dread.

quare hoc videndum est, possitne nobis hoc ratio philosophorum dare. pollicetur certe. nisi enim id faceret, cur Plato Aegyptum peragravit, ut a sacerdotibus barbaris numeros et caelestia acciperet? cur post Tarentum ad Archytam? cur ad reliquos Pythagoreos, Echecratem, Timaeum, Arionem, Locros, ut, cum Socratem expressisset, adiungeret Pythagoreorum disciplinam eaque, quae Socrates repudiabat, addisceret? cur ipse Pythagoras et Aegyptum lustravit et Persarum magos adiit? cur tantas regiones barbarorum pedibus obiit, tot maria transmisit? cur haec eadem Democritus? qui —vere falsone, quaerere mittimus —dicitur oculis se privasse; certe, ut quam minime animus a cogitationibus abduceretur, patrimonium neglexit, agros deseruit incultos, quid quaerens aliud nisi vitam beatam? quam si etiam in rerum cognitione ponebat, tamen ex illa investigatione naturae consequi volebat, bono ut esset animo. id enim ille summum bonum eu)qumi/an et saepe a)qambi/an appellat, id est animum terrore liberum.

But these things, splendid though they are, are not yet brought to a fine finish. For of virtue, indeed, only a little was said by this man, and that not even with full precision. After his time these matters first began to be inquired into in this city by Socrates, then were carried down to this present place, and there was no longer any doubt that in virtue lay all the hope both of living well and of living happily. When Zeno had learned this from our people, he did, as the formula runs in legal pleadings, “the same thing in another manner.” This now you approve in him. So by changing the names of things he escapes the charge of inconsistency — and we cannot escape it! He says that the life of Metellus was no happier than that of Regulus, yet to be preferred — not more to be sought after, but more to be taken up, and, if there were a choice, the life of Metellus to be chosen and that of Regulus rejected. I call the life he says is to be preferred and more to be chosen the happier one, and I assign to that life not the least particle more than the Stoics do.

sed haec etsi praeclare, nondum tamen perpolita. pauca enim, neque ea ipsa enucleate, ab hoc de virtute quidem dicta. post enim haec in hac urbe primum a Socrate quaeri coepta, deinde in hunc locum delata sunt, nec dubitatum, quin in virtute omnis ut bene, sic etiam beate vivendi spes poneretur. quae cum Zeno didicisset a nostris, ut in actionibus praescribi solet, ’ de eadem re fecit alio modo ’. hoc tu nunc in illo probas. scilicet vocabulis rerum mutatis inconstantiae crimen ille effugit, nos effugere non possumus! ille Metelli vitam negat beatiorem quam Reguli, praeponendam tamen, nec magis expetendam, sed magis sumendam et, si optio esset, eligendam Metelli, Reguli reiciendam; ego, quam ille praeponendam et magis eligendam, beatiorem hanc appello nec ullo minimo momento plus ei vitae tribuo quam Stoici.

What is the difference, except that I call known things by known words, while they look for new names by which to say the same thing? So, just as in the Senate there is always someone to call for an interpreter, in the same way these men must be heard by us with an interpreter at hand. I call good whatever is in keeping with nature, and bad whatever is against it — and not I alone, but you too, Chrysippus, in the Forum, at home; only in the school you leave off. What, then? Do you think men ought to speak one way, philosophers another? What value each thing has, the learned and the unlearned put differently; but once it has been settled among the learned what value each thing has — if they were men, they would speak in the customary way — let them, while the things stay the same, coin words at their own discretion.

quid interest, nisi quod ego res notas notis verbis appello, illi nomina nova quaerunt, quibus idem dicant? ita, quem ad modum in senatu semper est aliquis, qui interpretem postulet, sic isti nobis cum interprete audiendi sunt. bonum appello quicquid secundum naturam est, quod contra malum, nec ego solus, sed tu etiam, Chrysippe, in foro, domi; in schola desinis. quid ergo? aliter homines, aliter philosophos loqui putas oportere? quanti quidque sit aliter docti et indocti, sed cum constiterit inter doctos quanti res quaeque sit—si homines essent, usitate loquerentur—, dum res maneant, verba fingant arbitratu suo.

But I come to the charge of inconsistency, lest you say too often that I am straying — the inconsistency you place in words, while I supposed it placed in the thing. If only this much be firmly grasped — and here we have the Stoics as our best helpers — that the force of virtue is so great that, if all else be set on the other side of the scale, it does not so much as appear, then take all the things they certainly call advantages, and to be taken up, and to be chosen, and preferred — which they so define that they are to be valued at a fairly high price — these things, then, which I call by goods’ name where the Stoics call them by so many names, partly new and made up, like those “promoted” and “demoted” of theirs, partly names that mean the same (for what is the difference between “seek after” and “choose”? to me, indeed, what is chosen, and toward which selection is exercised, seems even the finer term) — but, when I have called all those things goods, it matters only how great I say they are, when I have called them things to be sought after, how strongly. But if I no more declare them to be sought after than you to be chosen, and I who call them goods set no higher value on them than you who call them “promoted,” then all those things must of necessity be darkened and disappear and run into the rays of virtue as into the rays of the sun.

Sed venio ad inconstantiae crimen, ne saepius dicas me aberrare; quam tu ponis in verbis, ego positam in re putabam. si satis erit hoc perceptum, in quo adiutores Stoicos optimos habemus, tantam vim esse virtutis, ut omnia, si ex altera parte ponantur, ne appareant quidem, cum omnia, quae illi commoda certe dicunt esse et sumenda et eligenda et praeposita —quae ita definiunt, ut satis magno aestimanda sint—, haec igitur cum ego tot nominibus a Stoicis appellata, partim novis et commenticiis, ut ista producta et ’reducta’, partim idem significantibus—quid enim interest, expetas an eligas? mihi quidem etiam lautius videtur, quod eligitur, et ad quod dilectus adhibetur—, sed, cum ego ista omnia bona dixero, tantum refert quam magna dicam, cum expetenda, quam valde. sin autem nec expetenda ego magis quam tu eligenda, nec illa pluris aestimanda ego, qui bona, quam tu, producta qui appellas, omnia ista necesse est obscurari nec apparere et in virtutis tamquam in solis radios incurrere.

‘But,’ comes the objection, ‘a life in which there is something of evil cannot be happy.’ Then neither is a cornfield happy, for all its rich and thronging ears, if you spy a wild oat anywhere; nor is a trade profitable, if amid the greatest gains it has taken on some little loss. Or is this true everywhere, but otherwise in life? And will you not judge the whole by its greatest part? Or is it in doubt that virtue holds so great a part in human affairs that it buries all the rest? I shall dare, then, to call the other things that are in keeping with nature goods, and not to cheat them of their old name nor go searching out some newer one instead; but the magnitude of virtue I shall set, as it were, in the other pan of the scale.

At enim, qua in vita est aliquid mali, ea beata esse non potest. ne seges quidem igitur spicis uberibus et crebris, si avenam uspiam videris, nec mercatura quaestuosa, si in maximis lucris paulum aliquid damni contraxerit. an hoc usque quaque, aliter in vita? et non ex maxima parte de tota iudicabis? an dubium est, quin virtus ita maximam partem optineat in rebus humanis, ut reliquas obruat? Audebo igitur cetera, quae secundum naturam sint, bona appellare nec fraudare suo vetere nomine neque iam aliquod potius novum exquirere, virtutis autem amplitudinem quasi in altera librae lance ponere.

That pan, believe me, will press down both earth and sea. For a whole thing is always named from that which holds the largest parts and is spread most widely. We say someone lives in good cheer; if, then, he has once been made rather gloomy, is his cheerful life lost? Yet this did not happen even to that M. Crassus, who, Lucilius says, laughed but once in his life, so as to be on that account any the less called never-laughing agelastos, as the same poet has it. They used to call Polycrates of Samos fortunate. Nothing had befallen him that he did not wish, except that he had cast into the sea a ring he delighted in. Was he, then, unfortunate from that one vexation, and fortunate again when that very ring was found in the belly of a fish? But if he was a fool — which surely he was, since he was a tyrant — he was never happy; and if he was wise, he was not wretched even then, when he was driven onto the cross by Oroetes, the satrap of Darius. ‘But he was afflicted with many evils.’ Who denies it? But those evils were buried under the greatness of his virtue.

terram, mihi crede, ea lanx et maria deprimet. semper enim ex eo, quod maximas partes continet latissimeque funditur, tota res appellatur. dicimus aliquem hilare vivere; ergo, si semel tristior effectus est, hilara vita amissa est? at hoc in eo M. Crasso, quem semel ait in vita risisse Lucilius, non contigit, ut ea re minus a)ge/lastos, ut ait idem, vocaretur. Polycratem Samium felicem appellabant. nihil acciderat ei, quod nollet, nisi quod anulum, quo delectabatur, in mari abiecerat. ergo infelix una molestia, felix rursus, cum is ipse anulus in praecordiis piscis inventus est? ille vero, si insipiens—quod certe, quoniam tyrannus—, numquam beatus; si sapiens, ne tum quidem miser, cum ab Oroete, praetore Darei, in crucem actus est. At multis malis affectus. Quis negat? sed ea mala virtutis magnitudine obruebantur.

Or will you not grant even this to the Peripatetics, that they may say the life of all good men — that is, of the wise, men adorned with every virtue — has in all its parts always more of good than of evil? Who says this? The Stoics, of course. By no means; but those very men who measure all things by pleasure and pain — do they not cry out that the wise man always has more present that he would wish than that he would not? Since, then, men who confess that they would not so much as lift a hand for virtue’s sake, unless it produced pleasure, set so much in virtue, what ought we to do, who say that even the very smallest excellence of mind outstrips all the goods of the body, so that these are not so much as left in sight? For who is there who would dare to say that this could befall the wise man — that, if it were possible, he would cast virtue away forever to be freed from all pain? Which of us would say — we who are not ashamed to call evils the things the Stoics call “hardships” — that it is better to do something shamefully with pleasure than honourably with pain?

An ne hoc quidem Peripateticis concedis, ut dicant omnium bonorum virorum, id est sapientium omnibusque virtutibus ornatorum, vitam omnibus partibus plus habere semper boni quam mali? Quis hoc dicit? Stoici scilicet. Minime; sed isti ipsi, qui voluptate et dolore omnia metiuntur, nonne clamant sapienti plus semper adesse quod velit quam quod nolit? cum tantum igitur in virtute ponant ii, qui fatentur se virtutis causa, nisi ea voluptatem faceret, ne manum quidem versuros fuisse, quid facere nos oportet, qui quamvis minimam animi praestantiam omnibus bonis corporis anteire dicamus, ut ea ne in conspectu quidem relinquantur? quis est enim, qui hoc cadere in sapientem dicere audeat, ut, si fieri possit, virtutem in perpetuum abiciat, ut dolore omni liberetur? quis nostrum dixerit, quos non pudet ea, quae Stoici aspera dicunt, mala dicere, melius esse turpiter aliquid facere cum voluptate quam honeste cum dolore?

To us that Dionysius of Heraclea seems to have deserted the Stoics disgracefully on account of a pain in his eyes — as if he had learned from Zeno not to feel pain when he was in pain! What he had heard, but had not really learned, was that that pain is not an evil, because it is not shameful, and that it is to be borne by a man. Had he been a Peripatetic, he would have stayed, I believe, in his conviction — the Peripatetics, who, while they say that pain is an evil, give as their precepts about bearing its harshness bravely the very same as the Stoics give. And indeed your own Arcesilas, though he was rather stubborn in disputation, was nonetheless one of ours; for he was Polemo’s pupil. When he was burning with the pains of gout, and Charmides the Epicurean, a close friend, had visited him and was leaving downcast, ‘Stay, I beg you, our Charmides,’ he said; ‘nothing has come from there to here’ — and he pointed to his feet and his breast. And yet he would have preferred not to feel pain.

nobis Heracleotes ille Dionysius flagitiose descivisse videtur a Stoicis propter oculorum dolorem. quasi vero hoc didicisset a Zenone, non dolere, cum doleret! illud audierat nec tamen didicerat, malum illud non esse, quia turpe non esset, et esse ferendum viro. hic si Peripateticus fuisset, permansisset, credo, in sententia, qui dolorem malum dicunt esse, de asperitate autem eius fortiter ferenda praecipiunt eadem, quae Stoici. Et quidem Arcesilas tuus, etsi fuit in disserendo pertinacior, tamen noster fuit; erat enim Polemonis. is cum arderet podagrae doloribus visitassetque hominem Charmides Epicureus perfamiliaris et tristis exiret, Mane, quaeso, inquit, Charmide noster; nihil illinc huc pervenit. ostendit pedes et pectus. ac tamen hic mallet non dolere.

This, then, is our system, which seems to you inconsistent: that, on account of a certain heavenly and divine and so surpassing excellence of virtue — such that, where virtue is and great deeds done by virtue, deeds supremely worthy of praise, there misery and tribulation cannot be, though toil can be there, vexation can be — I should not hesitate to say that all wise men are always happy, yet that it can come about that one is happier than another. ‘And yet that very point, Piso, you must establish again and again,’ I said; ‘and if you hold it firm, you will be free to carry off not only my Cicero here but me myself.’

Haec igitur est nostra ratio, quae tibi videtur inconstans, cum propter virtutis caelestem quandam et divinam tantamque praestantiam, ut, ubi virtus sit resque magnae et summe laudabiles virtute gestae, ibi esse miseria et aerumna non possit, tamen labor possit, possit molestia, non dubitem dicere omnes sapientes esse semper beatos, sed tamen fieri posse, ut sit alius alio beatior. atqui iste locus est, Piso, tibi etiam atque etiam confirmandus, inquam; quem si tenueris, non modo meum Ciceronem, sed etiam me ipsum abducas licebit.

Then Quintus said: ‘To me, indeed, this seems established well enough, and I rejoice that this philosophy — whose furnishings I once valued more highly than the estates of all the rest, so rich did it seem to me that I could ask of it whatever I might covet in our studies — this philosophy, I say, I rejoice has been found keener too than the others, a thing some used to say it lacked.’ ‘Keener, at any rate, than ours,’ said Pomponius, with a jest; ‘but, by Hercules, your discourse was most welcome to me. For things I did not think could be said in Latin have been said by you in fitting words, and no less plainly than they are said by the Greeks. But it is time, if you please — and straight to my house, in fact.’ When he had said this, and it seemed enough had been argued, we all went on into the town, to Pomponius’s.

Tum Quintus: Mihi quidem, inquit, satis hoc confirmatum videtur, laetorque eam philosophiam, cuius antea supellectilem pluris aestimabam quam possessiones reliquarum —ita mihi dives videbatur, ut ab ea petere possem, quicquid in studiis nostris concupissem—, hanc igitur laetor etiam acutiorem repertam quam ceteras, quod quidam ei deesse dicebant. Non quam nostram quidem, inquit Pomponius iocans; sed mehercule pergrata mihi oratio tua. quae enim dici Latine posse non arbitrabar, ea dicta sunt a te verbis aptis nec minus plane quam dicuntur a Graecis. Sed tempus est, si videtur, et recta quidem ad me. Quod cum ille dixisset et satis disputatum videretur, in oppidum ad Pomponium perreximus omnes.

C icero by Claude

On the Ends of Good and Evil

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