I have often given long and serious thought to this question: whether the power of speaking and the highest devotion to eloquence have brought to men and to states more good or more harm. For when I weigh the disasters of our own commonwealth, and gather in my mind the ancient calamities of the greatest states, I see that no small share of the harm was brought on by men of the highest eloquence; but when I set out to recover, from the records of literature, matters too remote in age for our own memory, I recognize that many cities were founded, many wars extinguished, the strongest alliances and the most sacred friendships secured, by the use of reason indeed, but more readily still by eloquence. And as I think long upon it, reason itself leads me above all to this judgment: that wisdom without eloquence does little good to states, but that eloquence without wisdom does, in most cases, great harm, and never any good. And so, if a man neglects the truest and most honorable pursuits of reason and duty, and spends all his effort on the practice of speaking, he is reared a citizen useless to himself and ruinous to his country; but the man who so arms himself with eloquence that he can not assail the welfare of his country but defend it, he, it seems to me, will be a citizen most useful and most loyal to his own interests and the public ones alike.

Saepe et multum hoc mecum cogitavi, bonine an mali plus attulerit hominibus et civitatibus copia di- cendi ac summum eloquentiae studium. nam cum et nostrae rei publicae detrimenta considero et maxi- marum civitatum veteres animo calamitates colligo, non minimam video per disertissimos homines in- vectam partem incommodorum; cum autem res ab nostra memoria propter vetustatem remotas ex litte- rarum monumentis repetere instituo, multas urbes constitutas, plurima bella restincta, firmissimas socie- tates, sanctissimas amicitias intellego cum animi ra- tione tum facilius eloquentia comparatas. ac me quidem diu cogitantem ratio ipsa in hanc potissimum sententiam ducit, ut existimem sapientiam sine elo- quentia parum prodesse civitatibus, eloquentiam vero sine sapientia nimium obesse plerumque, prodesse numquam. quare si quis omissis rectissimis atque honestissimis studiis rationis et officii consumit omnem operam in exercitatione dicendi, is inutilis sibi, per- niciosus patriae civis alitur; qui vero ita sese armat eloquentia, ut non oppugnare commoda patriae, sed pro his propugnare possit, is mihi vir et suis et pu- blicis rationibus utilissimus atque amicissimus civis fore videtur.

And if we are willing to consider the origin of this thing called eloquence—whether an art, or a study, or a kind of practice, or a faculty arising from nature—we shall find that it was born of the most honorable causes and set out upon the best of principles. For there was once a time when men wandered scattered over the fields in the manner of beasts and sustained their lives on wild fare, doing nothing by reason of the mind but managing most things by the strength of the body. As yet no rule of divine religion, no rule of human duty, was observed; no one had seen lawful marriage, no one had looked upon children he knew to be his own, no one had grasped what advantage there is in equitable law. And so, through error and ignorance, blind and reckless desire—the mistress of the mind—abused the strength of the body, those most ruinous attendants, to glut itself. At that time a certain man, great surely and wise, recognized what material there was, and how great a capacity for the highest achievements lay in the minds of men, if anyone could draw it out and make it better by instruction. By a method of his own he herded together into one place these scattered men, hidden away in the fields and in woodland shelters; he gathered them, and leading them toward each useful and honorable thing, though at first they cried out against it through unfamiliarity, then, as they listened more eagerly for the sake of his reasoning and his speech, he made them, from wild and savage, gentle and mild.

Ac si volumus huius rei, quae vocatur eloquentia, sive artis sive studii sive exercitationis cuiusdam sive facultatis ab natura profectae considerare principium, reperiemus id ex honestissimis causis natum atque optimis rationibus profectum. nam fuit quoddam tem- pus, cum in agris homines passim bestiarum modo vagabantur et sibi victu fero vitam propagabant nec ratione animi quicquam, sed pleraque viribus corporis administrabant, nondum divinae religionis, non hu- mani officii ratio colebatur, nemo nuptias viderat legi- timas, non certos quisquam aspexerat liberos, non, ius aequabile quid utilitatis haberet, acceperat. ita propter errorem atque inscientiam caeca ac temeraria domi- natrix animi cupiditas ad se explendam viribus cor- poris abutebatur, perniciosissimis satellitibus. quo tem- pore quidam magnus videlicet vir et sapiens cognovit, quae materia esset et quanta ad maximas res opportunitas in animis inesset hominum, si quis eam posset elicere et praecipiendo meliorem reddere; qui dispersos homines in agros et in tectis silvestribus abditos ratione quadam conpulit unum in locum et congregavit et eos in unam quamque rem inducens utilem atque honestam primo propter insolentiam reclamantes, deinde propter rationem atque orationem studiosius audientes ex feris et inmanibus mites reddidit et mansuetos.

And to me it seems that wisdom could never have brought this about—to turn men suddenly from their habit and lead them over to different ways of life—had it been silent and helpless in speech. Consider too: once cities were founded, how could men ever have been brought to learn good faith and to keep justice, to grow accustomed to obeying others of their own will, and to think it right not only to take up labors for the common good but even to give up their lives, had they not been able to persuade by eloquence what they had discovered by reason? Surely no one, when he had the most power through strength, would have consented to come down to equal justice without compulsion—to let himself be made the equal of those over whom he might excel, and of his own will to withdraw from a most agreeable habit, one which by long custom had by then taken on the force of nature—unless he had been moved by weighty and persuasive speech. So at first, it seems, eloquence was thus born and thus advanced further, and afterward likewise was engaged in the greatest affairs of peace and war, to the highest advantage of mankind. But once a certain facility, a depraved imitator of virtue, had attained a flow of speech without any sense of duty, then malice, relying on talent, grew accustomed to overthrow cities and to undermine the lives of men.

ac mihi qui- dem hoc nec tacita videtur nec inops dicendi sapientia perficere potuisse, ut homines a consuetudine subito converteret et ad diversas rationes vitae traduceret. age vero urbibus constitutis, ut fidem colere et iusti- tiam retinere discerent et aliis parere sua voluntate consuescerent ac non modo labores excipiendos com- munis commodi causa, sed etiam vitam amittendam existimarent, qui tandem fieri potuit, nisi homines ea, quae ratione invenissent, eloquentia persuadere po- tuissent? profecto nemo nisi gravi ac suavi commotus oratione, cum viribus plurimum posset, ad ius voluisset sine vi descendere, ut inter quos posset excellere, cum iis se pateretur aequari et sua voluntate a iucundissi- ma consuetudine recederet, quae praesertim iam natu- rae vim optineret propter vetustatem. ac primo quidem sic et nata et progressa longius eloquentia videtur et item postea maximis in rebus pacis et belli cum sum- mis hominum utilitatibus esse versata; postquam vero commoditas quaedam, prava virtutis imitatrix, sine ra- tione officii dicendi copiam consecuta est, tum ingenio freta malitia pervertere urbes et vitas hominum labe- factare assuevit.

And let us unfold the beginning of this evil too, since we have spoken of the beginning of the good. To me it seems most likely that there was a time when ignorant and senseless men were not in the habit of taking part in public affairs, nor did great and eloquent men come forward for private cases; but while the greatest matters were managed by the highest men, I suppose there were others, not without cunning, who took up the small disputes of private persons. In these disputes, since men often grew used to standing on the side of falsehood against truth, the constant practice of speaking bred audacity, so that of necessity those better men were compelled, on account of the injuries done to citizens, to resist the audacious and to lend aid each to his own connections. And so, when in speaking the man who had abandoned the pursuit of wisdom and acquired nothing for himself beyond eloquence often seemed equal, and sometimes even superior, it came about that, in the judgment both of the crowd and of himself, he was thought worthy to govern the commonwealth. From this, no doubt and not unjustly, when rash and audacious men had come to the helm of the commonwealth, the greatest and most wretched shipwrecks occurred. By these things eloquence took on so much hatred and ill will that the most gifted men, as if from some stormy tempest into a harbor, withdrew from a seditious and turbulent life into some quiet pursuit. And so it seems to me that afterward the other right and honorable pursuits, fostered in leisure by the best men, came to shine forth, while this one was deserted by most of them and fell into disuse—at the very time when it ought to have been held onto far more strongly and built up far more eagerly.

Atque huius quoque exordium mali, quoniam princi- pium boni diximus, explicemus. veri simillimum mihi videtur quodam tempore neque in publicis rebus infantes et insipientes homines solitos esse versari nec vero ad privatas causas magnos ac disertos homines accedere, sed cum a summis viris maximae res admini- strarentur, arbitror alios fuisse non incallidos homines, qui ad parvas controversias privatorum accederent. quibus in controversiis cum saepe a mendacio contra verum stare homines consuescerent, dicendi assiduitas induit audaciam, ut necessario superiores illi propter iniurias civium resistere audacibus et opitulari suis quisque necessariis cogeretur. itaque cum in dicendo saepe par, nonnumquam etiam superior visus esset is, qui omisso studio sapientiae nihil sibi praeter eloquen- tiam comparasset, fiebat, ut et multitudinis et suo iudi- cio dignus, qui rem publicam gereret, videretur. hinc nimirum non iniuria, cum ad gubernacula rei publicae temerarii atque audaces homines accesserant, maxima ac miserrima naufragia fiebant. quibus rebus tantum odii atque invidiae suscepit eloquentia, ut homines in- geniosissimi, quasi ex aliqua turbida tempestate in por- tum, sic ex seditiosa ac tumultuosa vita se in studium aliquod traderent quietum. quare mihi videntur postea cetera studia recta atque honesta per otium concele- brata ab optimis enituisse, hoc vero a plerisque eorum desertum obsolevisse tempore, quo multo vehementius erat retinendum et studiosius adaugendum.

For the more unworthily the rashness and audacity of fools and scoundrels violated a thing most honorable and most right, to the greatest detriment of the commonwealth, the more eagerly it ought both to have been resisted and to have been provided for in the public interest. This did not escape that Cato of ours, nor Laelius, nor—to speak truly—their disciple Africanus, nor the Gracchi, the grandsons of Africanus: in these men there was the highest virtue, and authority enlarged by the highest virtue, and—what served both as an ornament to these qualities and as a safeguard to the commonwealth—eloquence. And so, to my mind, eloquence is no less to be pursued, even though certain men abuse it both privately and publicly; rather, it is to be pursued the more vehemently, lest evil men, to the great detriment of the good and the common ruin of all, prevail too far—especially since this is the one thing that bears most upon all affairs both private and public, by which life is made safe, honorable, illustrious, and likewise agreeable. For from it many advantages come to the commonwealth, if wisdom, the regulator of all things, is at hand; from it praise, honor, and dignity flow together to the very men who have attained it; from it too the surest and safest protection is secured for their friends. And to me at least it seems that men, though in many respects lowlier and weaker, surpass the beasts most of all in this one thing: that they can speak. And so it seems to me a splendid thing that a man should attain to surpass other men in the very faculty by which men surpass the beasts. And if this is perhaps brought about not by nature only, nor by practice, but is also secured by a certain art, it is not out of place to see what those say who have left us some precepts on the matter. But before we speak of the precepts of oratory, it seems we must speak of the nature of the art itself, of its function, its end, its material, and its parts. For once these things are understood, the mind of each man will be able more easily and more readily to consider the very method and path of the art.

nam quo indignius rem honestissimam et rectissimam violabat stultorum et improborum temeritas et audacia summo cum rei publicae detrimento, eo studiosius et illis re- sistendum fuit et rei publicae consulendum. quod no- strum illum non fugit Catonem neque Laelium neque eorum, ut vere dicam, discipulum Africanum neque Gracchos Africani nepotes: quibus in hominibus erat summa virtus et summa virtute amplificata auctoritas et, quae et his rebus ornamento et rei publicae prae- sidio esset, eloquentia. quare meo quidem animo nihilo minus eloquentiae studendum est, etsi ea quidam et privatim et publice abutuntur; sed eo quidem vehemen- tius, ne mali magno cum detrimento bonorum et com- muni omnium pernicie plurimum possint, cum prae- sertim hoc sit unum, quod ad omnes res et privatas et publicas maxime pertineat, hoc tuta, hoc honesta, hoc inlustris, hoc eodem vita iucunda fiat. nam hinc ad rem publicam plurima commoda veniunt, si mo- deratrix omnium rerum praesto est sapientia; hinc ad ipsos, qui eam adepti sunt, laus, honos, dignitas con- fluit; hinc amicis quoque eorum certissimum et tu- tissimum praesidium comparatur. ac mihi quidem vi- dentur homines, cum multis rebus humiliores et in- firmiores sint, hac re maxime bestiis praestare, quod loqui possunt. quare praeclarum mihi quiddam videtur adeptus is, qui, qua re homines bestiis praestent, ea in re hominibus ipsis antecellat. hoc si forte non natura modo neque exercitatione conficitur, verum etiam arti- ficio quodam comparatur, non alienum est videre, quae dicant ii, qui quaedam eius rei praecepta nobis reliquerunt. Sed antequam de praeceptis oratoriis dicimus, videtur dicendum de genere ipsius artis, de officio, de fine, de materia, de partibus. nam his rebus cognitis facilius et expeditius animus unius cuiusque ipsam ra- tionem ac viam artis considerare poterit.

There is a certain civil science, which consists of many great matters. A great and ample part of it is artful eloquence, which they call rhetoric. For we neither agree with those who think that civil science has no need of eloquence, nor do we greatly disagree with those who think it is wholly contained in the power and art of the rhetorician. And so we shall place this oratorical faculty in such a class as to call it a part of civil science. Now the function of this faculty seems to be to speak in a manner suited to producing persuasion; its end is to persuade by speech. Between function and end there is this difference: in the function we consider what ought to be done, in the end what ought to be accomplished. As we say that the function of the physician is to treat in a manner suited to healing, and his end is to heal by treatment, so we understand what we are to call the function of the orator and what his end, when we call function that which he ought to do, and name end that for the sake of which he ought to do it.

Civilis quaedam ratio est, quae multis et magnis ex rebus constat. eius quaedam magna et ampla pars est artificiosa eloquentia, quam rhetoricam vocant. nam neque cum iis sentimus, qui civilem scientiam eloquentia non putant indigere, et ab iis, qui eam pu- tant omnem rhetoris vi et artificio contineri, magnopere dissentimus. quare hanc oratoriam facultatem in eo genere ponemus, ut eam civilis scientiae partem esse dicamus. Officium autem eius facultatis videtur esse dicere adposite ad persuasionem; finis persuadere dictione. inter officium et finem hoc interest, quod in officio, quid fieri, in fine, quid effici conveniat, con- sideratur. ut medici officium dicimus esse curare ad sanandum apposite, finem sanare curatione, item, ora- toris quid officium et quid finem esse dicamus, intel- legimus, cum id, quod facere debet, officium esse di- cimus, illud, cuius causa facere debet, finem appel- lamus.

We call the material of the art that with which all the art, and the faculty that is produced by the art, is concerned. As, if we should say that the material of medicine is diseases and wounds, because all medicine is concerned with these, so the things with which the oratorical art and faculty are concerned we name the material of the art of rhetoric. But these things some have reckoned more numerous, others fewer. For Gorgias of Leontini, almost the oldest of rhetoricians, held that the orator could speak best on all subjects whatsoever; he seems to assign an infinite and boundless material to this art. Aristotle, however, who furnished this art with very many aids and ornaments, held that the function of the rhetorician was concerned with three kinds of subject: the epideictic, the deliberative, and the judicial. The epideictic kind is that which is devoted to the praise or blame of some particular person; the deliberative, which, situated in civil debate, contains within it the delivery of an opinion; the judicial, which, situated in a court, contains within it accusation and defense, or claim and rebuttal. And, as our own opinion holds, the art and faculty of the orator must be reckoned to be concerned with this threefold material.

Materiam artis eam dicimus, in qua omnis ars et ea facultas, quae conficitur ex arte, versatur. ut si medi- cinae materiam dicamus morbos ac vulnera, quod in his omnis medicina versetur, item, quibus in rebus ver- satur ars et facultas oratoria, eas res materiam artis rhetoricae nominamus. has autem res alii plures, alii pauciores existimarunt. nam Gorgias Leontinus, anti- quissimus fere rhetor, omnibus de rebus oratorem op- time posse dicere existimavit; hic infinitam et inmensam huic artificio materiam subicere videtur. Aristoteles autem, qui huic arti plurima adiumenta atque orna- menta subministravit, tribus in generibus rerum ver- sari rhetoris officium putavit, demonstrativo, delibera- tivo, iudiciali. demonstrativum est, quod tribuitur in alicuius certae personae laudem aut vituperationem; deliberativum, quod positum in disceptatione civili ha- bet in se sententiae dictionem; iudiciale, quod positum in iudicio habet in se accusationem et defensionem aut petitionem et recusationem. et, quemadmodum nostra quidem fert opinio, oratoris ars et facultas in hac ma-

For Hermagoras at least seems neither to attend to what he says nor to understand what he promises, when he divides the material of the orator into the case and the question—and says that the case is a matter that has within it a dispute set in speech, with the introduction of definite persons; which we too say is assigned to the orator (for we place under it the three parts we mentioned before, the judicial, the deliberative, the epideictic). But he calls a question that which has within it a dispute set in speech without the introduction of definite persons, after this manner: is there any good besides what is honorable? are the senses trustworthy? what is the shape of the world? what is the size of the sun? All of which questions everyone, we suppose, easily understands to be far removed from the function of the orator; for to assign to the orator, as if they were some trifling matters, those things on which we know the highest intellects of the philosophers have been spent with the greatest labor, seems sheer madness. But if Hermagoras had had in these matters a great faculty acquired by study and discipline, it would seem that, relying on his own knowledge, he had laid down something false about the orator’s art, and set forth not what the art could do, but what he himself could do. As it is, however, there is such ability in the man that one would sooner strip him of rhetoric than concede him philosophy—and not because the art he published seems to me written most faultily; for in it he seems to have arranged matters chosen, with ingenuity and care, from the ancient arts, and himself to have produced something new besides. But for the orator it is a very small thing to speak about the art, which is what he did; the very greatest is to speak from the art, which we all see he was least able to do.

teria tripertita versari existimanda est. nam Herma- goras quidem nec quid dicat attendere nec quid polli- ceatur intellegere videtur, qui oratoris materiam in cau- sam et in quaestionem dividat, causam esse dicat rem, quae habeat in se controversiam in dicendo positam cum personarum certarum interpositione; quam nos quoque oratori dicimus esse adtributam (nam tres eas partes, quas ante diximus, subponimus, iudicialem, de- liberativam, demonstrativam). quaestionem autem eam appellat, quae habeat in se controversiam in dicendo positam sine certarum personarum interpositione, ad hunc modum: ecquid sit bonum praeter honestatem? verine sint sensus? quae sit mundi forma? quae sit solis magnitudo? quas quaestiones procul ab oratoris officio remotas facile omnes intellegere existimamus; nam quibus in rebus summa ingenia philosophorum plurimo cum labore consumpta intellegimus, eas sicut aliquas parvas res oratori adtribuere magna amentia videtur. quodsi magnam in his Hermagoras habuisset facultatem studio et disciplina comparatam, videretur fretus sua scientia falsum quiddam constituisse de oratoris artificio et non quid ars, sed quid ipse posset, exposuisse. nunc vero ea vis est in homine, ut ei multo rhetoricam citius quis ademerit, quam philosophiam concesserit: neque eo, quo eius ars, quam edidit, mihi mendosissime scripta videatur; nam satis in ea videtur ex antiquis artibus ingeniose et diligenter electas res collocasse et nonnihil ipse quoque novi protulisse; ve- rum oratori minimum est de arte loqui, quod hic fecit, multo maximum ex arte dicere, quod eum minime po- tuisse omnes videmus.

And so the material of the art of rhetoric seems to us to be that which we have said seemed so to Aristotle; while its parts are those which most have stated: invention, arrangement, style, memory, and delivery. Invention is the devising of things true or plausible that may render the case probable; arrangement is the distribution into order of the things discovered; style is the fitting of suitable words and thoughts to the invention; memory is the firm grasp by the mind of matters and words for the invention; delivery is the regulation of voice and body in keeping with the dignity of matters and words. Now, having briefly established these things, we shall put off to another time the reasonings by which we might show the nature, the end, and the function of this art; for they require many words, and do not bear so greatly upon the description of the art and the handing down of precepts. But we hold that one who writes a treatise on the art of rhetoric ought to write about the two remaining matters, the material of the art and its parts. And to me it seems that material and parts must be treated together. Therefore let invention, which is first of all the parts, be considered above all—what it ought to be in every kind of case.

Quare materia quidem nobis rhetoricae videtur artis ea, quam Aristoteli visam esse diximus; partes autem eae, quas plerique dixerunt, inventio, dispositio, elo- cutio, memoria, pronuntiatio. inventio est excogitatio rerum verarum aut veri similium, quae causam proba- bilem reddant; dispositio est rerum inventarum in or- dinem distributio; elocutio est idoneorum verborum et sententiarum ad inventionem accommodatio; memoria est firma animi rerum ac verborum ad inventionem perceptio; pronuntiatio est ex rerum et verborum dignitate vocis et corporis moderatio. Nunc his rebus breviter constitutis eas rationes, qui- bus ostendere possimus genus et finem et officium huius artis, aliud in tempus differemus; nam et mul- torum verborum indigent et non tanto opere ad artis descriptionem et praecepta tradenda pertinent. eum au- tem, qui artem rhetoricam scribat, de duabus reliquis rebus, materia artis ac partibus, scribere oportere existimamus. ac mihi quidem videtur coniuncte agen- dum de materia ac partibus. quare inventio, quae prin- ceps est omnium partium, potissimum in omni causa- rum genere, qualis debeat esse, consideretur.

Every matter that has within it some dispute set in speech and debate contains a question either of fact, or of name, or of kind, or of procedure. That question, then, from which the case arises, we call the issue. The issue is the first clash of pleadings, springing from the rebuttal of the charge, in this manner: “you did it”—“I did not do it,” or “I did it lawfully.” When the dispute is one of fact, since the case is established by conjectures, the issue is called the conjectural issue. But when it is one of name, because the force of the term must be defined in words, the issue is named the definitional issue. When, however, the question is what kind of thing it is, because the dispute concerns both the force and the kind of the matter, the issue is called the qualitative issue. But when the case hangs on this—that either the one who seems to bring the action is not the one who ought to, or not against the one against whom he ought to, or not before those, at the time, by the law, on the charge, or with the penalty that he ought—it is called the issue of transference, because the action seems to need transference and alteration. And it is necessary that some one of these fall to every kind of case; for in any matter into which none of them falls, there can be nothing of dispute. And so that matter is not even fit to be thought a case.

Omnis res, quae habet in se positam in dictione ac disceptatione aliquam controversiam, aut facti aut no- minis aut generis aut actionis continet quaestionem. eam igitur quaestionem, ex qua causa nascitur, consti- tutionem appellamus. constitutio est prima conflictio causarum ex depulsione intentionis profecta, hoc modo: fecisti: non feci aut iure feci. cum facti con- troversia est, quoniam coniecturis causa firmatur, con- stitutio coniecturalis appellatur. cum autem nominis, quia vis vocabuli definienda verbis est, constitutio de- finitiva nominatur. cum vero, qualis res sit, quaeritur, quia et de vi et de genere negotii controversia est, con- stitutio generalis vocatur. at cum causa ex eo pendet, quia non aut is agere videtur, quem oportet, aut non cum eo, quicum oportet, aut non apud quos, quo tem- pore, qua lege, quo crimine, qua poena oportet, transla- tiva dicitur constitutio, quia actio translationis et com- mutationis indigere videtur. atque harum aliquam in omne causae genus incidere necesse est; nam in quam rem non inciderit, in ea nihil esse poterit controversiae. quare eam ne causam quidem convenit putari.

A dispute of fact can be assigned to all the tenses. For what has been done can be inquired into, in this manner: did Ulysses kill Ajax?—and what is being done, in this manner: are the people of Fregellae well disposed toward the Roman people?—and what will be done, in this manner: if we leave Carthage unharmed, will any harm come to the commonwealth? A dispute of name arises when there is agreement about the fact, and the inquiry is by what name the thing that was done should be called. In this kind, there is necessarily a dispute of name because there is no agreement about the matter itself—not because the fact is uncertain, but because the thing that was done seems to be one thing to one man and another to another, and therefore one calls it by one name and another by another. And so in disputes of this kind the matter must be defined in words and briefly described: as, if someone has stolen a sacred object from a private house, whether he is to be judged a thief or a temple-robber; for when this is asked, it will be necessary to define both, what a thief is and what a temple-robber, and by one’s own description to show that the matter at issue ought to be called by a different name than the adversaries say.

Ac facti quidem controversia in omnia tempora potest tribui. nam quid factum sit, potest quaeri, hoc modo: occideritne Aiacem Ulixes; et quid fiat, hoc modo: bonone animo sint erga populum Romanum Fre- gellani; et quid futurum sit, hoc modo: si Carthaginem reliquerimus incolumem, num quid sit incommodi ad rem publicam perventurum. Nominis est controversia, cum de facto convenit et quaeritur, id quod factum est quo nomine appelletur. quo in genere necesse est ideo nominis esse controver- siam, quod de re ipsa non conveniat; non quod de facto non constet, sed quod id, quod factum sit, aliud alii videatur esse et idcirco alius alio nomine id appellet. quare in eiusmodi generibus definienda res erit verbis et breviter describenda, ut, si quis sacrum ex privato subripuerit, utrum fur an sacrilegus sit iudicandus; nam id cum quaeritur, necesse erit definire utrumque, quid sit fur, quid sacrilegus, et sua descriptione ostendere alio nomine illam rem, de qua agitur, appellare opor- tere atque adversarii dicunt.

A dispute of kind arises when there is both agreement about what was done and certainty about the name by which what was done ought to be called, and yet the inquiry is how great, of what character, and in general of what quality it is—in this manner: just or unjust, useful or useless—and all those cases in which the inquiry is of what quality the thing done is, without any dispute of name. Under this kind Hermagoras placed four parts: the deliberative, the epideictic, the juridical, and the equitable. This, as we think, is no slight error of his, and seems to deserve correction—but briefly, lest, if we pass it over in silence, we be thought to have failed to follow him without reason, or, if we dwell on it too long, we seem to have brought delay and obstruction to the remaining precepts. If deliberation and epideictic display are kinds of cases, they cannot rightly be thought parts of some kind of case; for the same thing can be a kind to one man and a part to another, but to the same man it cannot be both kind and part. Now deliberation and epideictic display are kinds of cases. For either there is no kind of case, or the judicial alone, or both the judicial and the epideictic and the deliberative. To say there is no kind of case, when he says that cases are many and gives precepts for them, is madness; and how can the judicial alone be the only kind, when deliberation and epideictic are neither like each other nor much in agreement with the judicial kind, and each has its own end to which it ought to be referred? It remains, therefore, that there are three kinds of cases. Deliberation and epideictic cannot rightly be thought parts of some kind of case. He was wrong, then, to call them parts of the qualitative issue.

Generis est controversia, cum et, quid factum sit, convenit et, quo id factum nomine appellari oporteat, constat et tamen, quantum et cuiusmodi et omnino quale sit, quaeritur, hoc modo: iustum an iniustum, utile an inutile, et omnia, in quibus, quale sit id, quod factum est, quaeritur sine ulla nominis controversia. huic generi Hermagoras partes quattuor subposuit, de- liberativam, demonstrativam, iuridicialem, negotialem. quod eius, ut nos putamus, non mediocre peccatum reprehendendum videtur, verum brevi, ne aut, si taciti praeterierimus, sine causa non secuti putemur aut, si diutius in hoc constiterimus, moram atque impedimen- tum reliquis praeceptis intulisse videamur. si delibe- ratio et demonstratio genera sunt causarum, non pos- sunt recte partes alicuius generis causae putari; eadem enim res alii genus esse, alii pars potest, eidem genus esse et pars non potest. deliberatio autem et demon- stratio genera sunt causarum. nam aut nullum causae genus est aut iudiciale solum aut et iudiciale et demon- strativum et deliberativum. nullum dicere causae esse genus, cum causas esse multas dicat et in eas praecepta det, amentia est; unum iudiciale autem solum esse qui potest, cum deliberatio et demonstratio neque ipsae similes inter se sint et ab iudiciali genere plurimum dissideant et suum quaeque finem habeat, quo referri debeat? relinquitur ergo, ut omnia tria genera sint cau- sarum. deliberatio et demonstratio non possunt recte partes alicuius generis causae putari. male igitur eas generalis constitutionis partes esse dixit.

But if they cannot rightly be thought parts of a kind of case, far less rightly will they be thought parts of a part of a case. Now every issue is a part of a case; for the case is not fitted to the issue, but the issue to the case. But epideictic and deliberation cannot rightly be thought parts of a kind of case, because they are themselves kinds; far less rightly, then, will they be thought parts of that part which is here named. Again: if the issue, both itself and any part of it, is a rebuttal of the charge, then whatever is not a rebuttal of the charge is neither an issue nor a part of an issue. But if whatever is not a rebuttal of the charge is neither an issue nor a part of an issue, then deliberation and epideictic are neither an issue nor a part of an issue. If, therefore, the issue, both itself and its part, is a rebuttal of the charge, then deliberation and epideictic are neither an issue nor a part of an issue. Now he himself holds that the issue is a rebuttal of the charge; it must, then, be granted that epideictic and deliberation are not an issue nor a part of an issue. And he will be pressed by this same argument whether he calls the issue the accuser’s first confirmation of the case or the defendant’s first plea; for all the same difficulties will follow him.

Quodsi generis causae partes non possunt recte pu- tari, multo minus recte partis causae partes putabun- tur. pars autem causae est constitutio omnis; non enim causa ad constitutionem, sed constitutio ad causam adcommodatur. at demonstratio et deliberatio generis causae partes non possunt recte putari, quod ipsa sunt genera; multo igitur minus recte partis eius, quae hic dicitur, partes putabuntur. deinde si constitutio et ipsa et pars eius quaelibet intentionis depulsio est, quae intentionis depulsio non est, ea nec constitutio nec pars constitutionis est: at si, quae intentionis de- pulsio non est, ea nec constitutio nec pars constitutionis est, deliberatio et demonstratio neque constitutio nec pars constitutionis est. si igitur constitutio et ipsa et pars eius intentionis depulsio est, deliberatio et de- monstratio neque constitutio neque pars constitutionis est. placet autem ipsi constitutionem intentionis esse depulsionem; placeat igitur oportet demonstrationem et deliberationem non esse constitutionem nec partem constitutionis. atque hoc eodem urguebitur, sive con- stitutionem primam causae accusatoris confirmationem dixerit sive defensoris primam deprecationem; nam eum eadem omnia incommoda sequentur.

Again: a conjectural case cannot at one and the same time, on the same side and in the same kind, be both conjectural and definitional. Nor can a definitional case at one and the same time, on the same side and in the same kind, be both definitional and one of transference. And in general no issue, nor part of an issue, can at one and the same time both have its own force and contain within itself the force of another, for the reason that each one is considered by itself and from its own nature simply, and when another is added the number of issues is doubled, but the force of the issue is not increased. But a deliberative case is wont, at one and the same time, on the same side and in the same kind, to have a conjectural and a qualitative and a definitional and a transferential issue—some one of them, and sometimes several. Therefore deliberation itself is neither an issue nor a part of an issue. The same is wont to occur in epideictic. These, then, as we said before, are to be thought kinds of cases, not parts of any issue. This issue, then, which we name the qualitative, seems to us to have two parts: the juridical and the equitable. The juridical is that in which the nature of what is fair and right, or the principle of reward or punishment, is the question; the equitable, that in which it is considered what is just according to civil custom and equity;

Deinde coniecturalis causa non potest simul ex eadem parte eodem in genere et coniecturalis esse et definitiva. nec definitiva causa potest simul ex eadem parte eodem in genere et definitiva esse et translativa. et omnino nulla constitutio nec pars con- stitutionis potest simul et suam habere et alterius in se vim continere, ideo quod una quaeque ex se et ex sua natura simpliciter consideratur, altera assumpta numerus constitutionum duplicatur, non vis constitu- tionis augetur. at deliberativa causa simul ex eadem parte eodem in genere et coniecturalem et generalem et definitivam et translativam solet habere constitu- tionem et unam aliquam et plures nonnumquam. ergo ipsa neque constitutio est nec pars constitutionis. idem in demonstratione solet usu venire. genera igitur, ut ante diximus, haec causarum putanda sunt, non partes alicuius constitutionis. Haec ergo constitutio, quam generalem nominamus, partes videtur nobis duas habere, iuridicialem et neg- otialem. iuridicialis est, in qua aequi et recti natura aut praemii aut poenae ratio quaeritur; negotialis, in qua, quid iuris ex civili more et aequitate sit, conside- ratur;

over which careful study the experts in the law are held among us to preside. And the juridical issue is itself divided into two parts, the absolute and the assumptive. The absolute is that which contains within itself the question of right and wrong; the assumptive, that which of itself gives nothing firm toward the defense, but takes in from outside something of a defense. Its parts are four: the plea for mercy, the shifting of the charge, the retort of the charge, and the comparison of the deed with its purpose. The plea for mercy is when the defendant does not defend what was done, but asks to be pardoned. This is divided into two parts: exculpation and the plea for pardon. Exculpation is when the deed is admitted but the blame is removed. This has three parts: lack of intent, accident, and necessity. The plea for pardon is when the defendant confesses both that he did wrong and that he did wrong deliberately, and yet asks to be pardoned; a kind of case that can very rarely arise. The shifting of the charge is when the defendant tries to remove from himself, and from his own blame and power, the charge that is brought, onto another. This can be done in two ways: if either the cause or the deed is transferred to another. The cause is transferred when the deed is said to have been done by another’s force and power; the deed, when another is said to have been obliged or able to do it. The retort of the charge is when the deed is said to have been done lawfully, because someone first provoked it by an injury. The comparison is when it is contended that some other deed was right or useful, and that, in order that it might be done, the thing now charged is said to have been committed.

cui diligentiae praeesse apud nos iure consulti existimantur. ac iuridicialis quidem ipsa et in duas tribuitur partes, absolutam et adsumptivam. absoluta est, quae ipsa in se continet iuris et iniuriae quae- stionem; adsumptiva, quae ipsa ex se nihil dat firmi ad recusationem, foris autem aliquid defensionis ad- sumit. eius partes sunt quattuor, concessio, remotio criminis, relatio criminis, conparatio. concessio est, cum reus non id, quod factum est, defendit, sed ut ignoscatur, postulat. haec in duas partes dividitur, purgationem et deprecationem. purgatio est, cum fac- tum conceditur, culpa removetur. haec partes habet tres, inprudentiam, casum, necessitatem. deprecatio est, cum et peccasse et consulto peccasse reus se con- fitetur et tamen, ut ignoscatur, postulat; quod genus perraro potest accidere. remotio criminis est, cum id crimen, quod infertur, ab se et ab sua culpa et potestate in alium reus removere conatur. id dupliciter fieri pot- erit, si aut causa aut factum in alium transferetur. causa transferetur, cum aliena dicitur vi et potestate fac- tum, factum autem, cum alius aut debuisse aut potuisse facere dicitur. relatio criminis est, cum ideo iure fac- tum dicitur, quod aliquis ante iniuria lacessierit. con- paratio est, cum aliud aliquid factum rectum aut utile contenditur, quod ut fieret, illud, quod arguitur, dicitur esse commissum.

In the fourth issue, which we name the issue of transference, the dispute belongs to that issue when the inquiry is whom, or against whom, or in what manner, or before whom, or by what law, or at what time one ought to bring an action, or in general when something is done concerning the alteration or invalidation of the action. Hermagoras is held to be the discoverer of this issue—not that many earlier orators did not often use it, but because the writers on the art before him did not notice it nor enter it in the number of the issues. But after it was discovered by him, many criticized it, men whom we suppose to be hindered not so much by ignorance (for the matter is plain) as by ill will and a certain disposition to detract. And the issues and their parts we have now set forth; but the examples of each kind we shall set forth more conveniently, it seems, when, for each one of them, we provide a supply of arguments; for the method of arguing will be clearer when it can at once be fitted both to the kind and to the example of the case.

In quarta constitutione, quam translativam nomi- namus, eius constitutionis est controversia, cum aut quem aut quicum aut quomodo aut apud quos aut quo iure aut quo tempore agere oporteat, quaeritur aut omnino aliquid de commutatione aut infirmatione actionis agitur. huius constitutionis Hermagoras in- ventor esse existimatur, non quo non usi sint ea veteres oratores saepe multi, sed quia non animadverte- runt artis scriptores eam superiores nec rettulerunt in numerum constitutionum. post autem ab hoc inventam multi reprehenderunt, quos non tam inprudentia falli putamus (res enim perspicua est) quam invidia atque obtrectatione quadam inpediri. Et constitutiones quidem et earum partes exposui- mus, exempla autem cuiusque generis tum commodius exposituri videamur, cum in unum quodque eorum argumentorum copiam dabimus; nam argumentandi ratio dilucidior erit, cum et ad genus et ad exemplum causae statim poterit accommodari.

Once the issue of the case has been found, it is well at once to consider whether the case is simple or compound; and if it is compound, whether it is compounded of several questions or of some comparison. It is simple when it contains within it one absolute question, in this manner: do we declare war on the Corinthians or not? It is compounded of several questions when several things are inquired into, in this fashion: whether Carthage should be razed, or restored to the Carthaginians, or a colony settled there. It is from comparison when, by way of contrast, the inquiry is which is preferable, or what is most to be preferred, in this manner: whether an army should be sent into Macedonia against Philip, to be a help to our allies, or kept in Italy, so that there may be the greatest possible forces against Hannibal. Next it must be considered whether the dispute lies in reasoning or in a text; for a dispute turning on a text is one that arises from the character of the writing. And its kinds, which are separate from the issues, are five. For sometimes the words themselves seem to be at odds with the writer’s intent; sometimes two laws or more are at variance with one another; sometimes what is written signifies two things or more; sometimes from what is written something else, which is not written, is to be found out; sometimes the force of a word, as in the definitional issue, is inquired into, as to wherein it lies. And so the first kind we name letter and intent, the second conflicting laws, the third ambiguity, the fourth inference,

Constitutione causae reperta statim placet conside- rare, utrum causa sit simplex an iuncta; et si iuncta erit, utrum sit ex pluribus quaestionibus iuncta an ex aliqua conparatione. simplex est, quae absolutam in se continet unam quaestionem, hoc modo: Corinthiis bellum indicamus an non? coniuncta ex pluribus quaestionibus, in qua plura quaeruntur, hoc pacto: utrum Carthago diruatur an Carthaginiensibus redda- tur an eo colonia deducatur. ex conparatione, in qua per contentionem, utrum potius aut quid potissimum sit, quaeritur, ad hunc modum: utrum exercitus in Mace- doniam contra Philippum mittatur, qui sociis sit auxilio, an teneatur in Italia, ut quam maximae contra Hannibalem copiae sint. Deinde considerandum est, in ratione an in scripto sit controversia; nam scripti controversia est ea, quae ex scriptionis genere nascitur. eius autem genera, quae separata sunt a constitutionibus, quinque sunt. nam tum verba ipsa videntur cum sententia scriptoris dissidere, tum inter se duae leges aut plures discre- pare, tum id, quod scriptum est, duas aut plures res significare, tum ex eo, quod scriptum est, aliud, quod non scriptum est, inveniri, tum vis verbi quasi in de- finitiva constitutione, in quo posita sit, quaeri. quare primum genus de scripto et sententia, secundum ex contrariis legibus, tertium ambiguum, quartum ratio-

the fifth definition. And it is a matter of reasoning when the whole question rests not on a text but on some argumentation. And then, when the kind of case has been considered and the issue recognized—when you have understood whether it is simple or compound, and have seen whether it has a dispute turning on a text or on reasoning—next it will be necessary to see what is the question, what the supporting argument, what the point for decision, and what the mainstay of the case; all of which ought to spring from the issue. The question is that dispute which is produced from the clash of pleadings, in this manner: “you did not act lawfully”—“I acted lawfully.” Now the clash of pleadings is that in which the issue consists. From it, then, arises the dispute which we call the question, this: did he act lawfully? The supporting argument is that which contains the case—which, if it were taken away, would leave no dispute in the case—in this manner (to keep, for the sake of teaching, to an easy and familiar example): if Orestes is accused of matricide, unless he says “I acted lawfully, for she had killed my father,” he has no defense. And once that supporting argument is taken away, the whole dispute too is taken away. The supporting argument of his case, then, is that she had killed Agamemnon. The point for decision is the dispute that arises from the weakening and the confirming of the supporting argument. For let the supporting argument we set out a little before be set before us: “for she,” he says, “had killed my father”—“but,” the adversary will say, “it was not right for the mother to be slain by you, her son; for her deed could have been punished without crime on your part.” From this drawing-out of the supporting argument arises that highest dispute which we call the point for decision. It is of this kind: was it right that the mother should be killed by Orestes, when she had killed the father of Orestes?

cinativum, quintum definitivum nominamus. ratio est autem, cum omnis quaestio non in scriptione, sed in aliqua argumentatione consistit. Ac tum, considerato genere causae, cognita con- stitutione, cum simplexne an iuncta sit intellexeris et scripti an rationis habeat controversiam videris, dein- ceps erit videndum, quae quaestio, quae ratio, quae iudicatio, quod firmamentum causae sit; quae omnia a constitutione proficiscantur oportet. quaestio est ea, quae ex conflictione causarum gignitur controversia, hoc modo: non iure fecisti; iure feci. causarum autem est conflictio, in qua constitutio constat. ex ea igitur nascitur controversia, quam quaestionem dicimus, haec: iurene fecerit? ratio est ea, quae continet cau- sam, quae si sublata sit, nihil in causa controversiae relinquatur, hoc modo, ut docendi causa in facili et pervulgato exemplo consistamus: Orestes si accusetur matricidii, nisi hoc dicat iure feci; illa enim patrem meum occiderat, non habet defensionem. qua ratione sublata omnis controversia quoque sublata sit. ergo eius causae ratio est, quod illa Agamemnonem occi- derit. iudicatio est, quae ex infirmatione et confirma- tione rationis nascitur controversia. nam sit ea nobis exposita ratio, quam paulo ante exposuimus: illa enim meum, inquit, patrem occiderat: at non, inquiet ad- versarius, abs te filio matrem necari oportuit; potuit enim sine tuo scelere illius factum puniri. ex hac de- ductione rationis illa summa nascitur controversia, quam iudicationem appellamus. ea est huiusmodi: rec- tumne fuerit ab Oreste matrem occidi, cum illa Orestis patrem occidisset.

The mainstay is the firmest argumentation of the defender, and the one most fitted to the point for decision: as, if Orestes should wish to say that his mother’s disposition toward his father, toward himself and his sisters, toward the kingdom, toward the fame of the line and the family, was such that her own children, above all others, ought to have sought punishment from her. And in the other issues the points for decision are found in this manner; but in the conjectural issue, because there is no supporting argument—for the deed is not admitted—the point for decision cannot arise from the drawing-out of a supporting argument. And so the question and the point for decision must be the same: “it was done”—“it was not done”—“was it done?” But however many issues, or parts of issues, there are in a case, just so many questions, supporting arguments, points for decision, and mainstays will it be necessary to find. Then, once all these have been found in the case, the several parts of the whole case must at last be considered. For it does not seem that the thing to be said first is the thing to be attended to first; because those things that are said first, if you very much want them to fit and cohere with the case, you ought to draw from those things that are to be said afterward. And so, when the point for decision and the arguments that ought to be found for the point for decision have been carefully found by art, and worked through with care and reflection, then at last the remaining parts of the speech are to be set in order. These parts seem to us to be six in all: introduction, narrative, division, confirmation, refutation, and conclusion. Now, since the introduction ought to be first, we too shall first give precepts on the method of introducing.

firmamentum est firmissima argu- mentatio defensoris et appositissima ad iudicationem: ut si velit Orestes dicere eiusmodi animum matris suae fuisse in patrem suum, in se ipsum ac sorores, in regnum, in famam generis et familiae, ut ab ea poenas liberi sui potissimum petere debuerint. Et in ceteris quidem constitutionibus ad hunc modum iudicationes reperiuntur; in coniecturali autem constitutione, quia ratio non est—factum enim non conceditur—, non potest ex deductione rationis nasci iudicatio. quare ne- cesse est eandem esse quaestionem et iudicationem: factum est, non est factum, factumne sit? quot autem in causa constitutiones aut earum partes erunt, totidem necesse erit quaestiones, rationes, iudicationes, firma- menta reperire. Tum his omnibus in causa repertis denique sin- gulae partes totius causae considerandae sunt. nam non ut quidque dicendum primum est, ita primum animad- vertendum videtur; ideo quod illa, quae prima dicun- tur, si vehementer velis congruere et cohaerere cum causa, ex iis ducas oportet, quae post dicenda sunt. quare cum iudicatio et ea, quae ad iudicationem oportet argumenta inveniri, diligenter erunt artificio reperta, cura et cogitatione pertractata, tum denique ordinandae sunt ceterae partes orationis. eae partes sex esse om- nino nobis videntur: exordium, narratio, partitio, con- firmatio, reprehensio, conclusio. Nunc quoniam exordium princeps debet esse, nos quoque primum in rationem exordiendi praecepta da- bimus.

The introduction is a speech that suitably prepares the mind of the hearer for the rest of the discourse: which will come about if it makes him well disposed, attentive, and receptive. And so whoever wishes to make a good introduction to a case must first carefully understand the kind of his own case. The kinds of cases are five: the honorable, the surprising, the lowly, the doubtful, and the obscure. The honorable kind of case is that which the hearer’s mind favors at once, without any speech of ours; the surprising, that from which the minds of those who are to hear are estranged; the lowly, that which is neglected by the hearer and seems to call for no great attention; the doubtful, in which either the point for decision is in doubt, or the case shares in both honor and baseness, so that it produces both goodwill and offense; the obscure, in which either the hearers are slow or the case is entangled in matters more difficult to grasp. And so, since the kinds of cases are so diverse, the introduction too must of necessity be made by a different method in each kind. The introduction, then, is divided into two parts: the direct opening and the insinuation. The direct opening is a speech that clearly and straightway makes the hearer well disposed, or receptive, or attentive. Insinuation is a speech that, by a certain dissembling and indirection, steals obscurely into the hearer’s mind.

Exordium est oratio animum auditoris idonee com- parans ad reliquam dictionem: quod eveniet, si eum benivolum, attentum, docilem confecerit. quare qui bene exordiri causam volet, eum necesse est genus suae causae diligenter ante cognoscere. Genera causarum quinque sunt: honestum, admirabile, humile, anceps, obscurum. honestum causae genus est, cui statim sine oratione nostra favet auditoris animus; admirabile, a quo est alienatus animus eorum, qui audituri sunt; humile, quod neglegitur ab auditore et non magno opere adtendendum videtur; anceps, in quo aut iudicatio dubia est aut causa et honestatis et turpitudinis parti- ceps, ut et benivolentiam pariat et offensionem; obscu- rum, in quo aut tardi auditores sunt aut difficilioribus ad cognoscendum negotiis causa est implicata. quare cum tam diversa sint genera causarum, exordiri quo- que dispari ratione in uno quoque genere necesse est. igitur exordium in duas partes dividitur, in principium et insinuationem. principium est oratio perspicue et protinus perficiens auditorem benivolum aut docilem aut attentum. insinuatio est oratio quadam dissimu- latione et circumitione obscure subiens auditoris animum.

In the surprising kind of case, if the hearers will not be wholly hostile, it will be permitted to secure goodwill in the direct opening. But if they will be vehemently estranged, it will be necessary to take refuge in insinuation. For if peace and goodwill are sought openly from men who are angry, not only is it not obtained, but their hatred is increased and inflamed. In the lowly kind of case, however, in order to remove contempt, it is necessary to make the hearer attentive. The doubtful kind of case, if it has a doubtful point for decision, must be begun from the point for decision itself. But if it has part baseness and part honor, one must catch at goodwill, so that the case may seem transferred into the honorable kind. When, however, the kind of case is honorable, either the direct opening may be passed over, or, if it is convenient, we shall begin either from the narrative, or from a law, or from some very firm argument of our own discourse; but if it is decided to use a direct opening, the parts that secure goodwill must be employed, so that what is already there may be increased. In the obscure kind of case, one must by the direct opening make the hearers receptive. Now, since it has been said what things the introduction ought to accomplish, it remains to show by what methods each thing can be accomplished.

In admirabili genere causae, si non omnino infesti auditores erunt, principio benivolentiam conparare li- cebit. sin erunt vehementer abalienati, confugere ne- cesse erit ad insinuationem. nam ab iratis si perspicue pax et benivolentia petitur, non modo ea non inve- nitur, sed augetur atque inflammatur odium. in humili autem genere causae contemptionis tollendae causa ne- cesse est attentum efficere auditorem. anceps genus causae si dubiam iudicationem habebit, ab ipsa iudi- catione exordiendum est. sin autem partem turpitu- dinis, partem honestatis habebit, benivolentiam captare oportebit, ut in genus honestum causa translata vi- deatur. cum autem erit honestum causae genus, vel praeteriri principium poterit vel, si commodum fuerit, aut a narratione incipiemus aut a lege aut ab aliqua firmissima ratione nostrae dictionis; sin uti prin- cipio placebit, benivolentiae partibus utendum est, ut id, quod est, augeatur. in obscuro causae genere per principium dociles auditores efficere oportebit. Nunc quoniam quas res exordio conficere oporteat dictum est, reliquum est, ut ostendatur, quibus quae- que rationibus res confici possit.

Goodwill is secured from four sources: from our own person, from that of our adversaries, from that of the judges, and from the case itself. From our own person, if we speak of our own deeds and services without arrogance; if we dispel the charges brought against us and any less honorable suspicions cast upon us; if we set forth the misfortunes that have befallen us or the difficulties that press upon us; if we use entreaty and supplication, humble and suppliant. From our adversaries’, if we bring them into hatred, or ill will, or contempt. They will be brought into hatred if anything they have done foully, arrogantly, cruelly, or maliciously is set forth; into ill will, if their force, power, riches, and family connections of wealth are set forth, together with their arrogant and intolerable use of these things, so that they seem to trust in these rather than in their own case; into contempt, if their idleness, negligence, sloth, slothful pursuit, and luxurious leisure are set forth. From the person of the hearers goodwill will be caught if the things done by them bravely, wisely, and mildly are set forth—so that no excessive flattery is shown—and if it is shown how honorable an estimation there is of them, and how great an expectation of their judgment and authority. From the case itself, if we exalt our own case by praising it, and press down our adversaries’ case through contempt.

Benivolentia quattuor ex locis comparatur: ab nostra, ab adversariorum, ab iudicum persona, a causa. ab nostra, si de nostris factis et officiis sine arrogantia dicemus; si crimina inlata et aliquas minus honestas suspiciones iniectas diluemus; si, quae incommoda acci- derint aut quae instent difficultates, proferemus; si prece et obsecratione humili ac supplici utemur. ab ad- versariorum autem, si eos aut in odium aut in invidiam aut in contemptionem adducemus. in odium ducentur, si quod eorum spurce, superbe, crudeliter, malitiose factum proferetur; in invidiam, si vis eorum, potentia, divitiae, cognatio pecuniae proferentur atque eorum usus arrogans et intolerabilis, ut his rebus magis vi- deantur quam causae suae confidere; in contemp- tionem adducentur, si eorum inertia, neglegentia, igna- via, desidiosum studium et luxuriosum otium profe- retur. ab auditorum persona benivolentia captabitur, si res ab iis fortiter, sapienter, mansuete gestae profe- rentur, ut ne qua assentatio nimia significetur, si de iis quam honesta existimatio quantaque eorum iudicii et auctoritatis exspectatio sit ostendetur; ab rebus, si nostram causam laudando extollemus, adversariorum causam per contemptionem deprimemus.

We shall make the hearers attentive if we show that the things we are going to say are great, new, or incredible, or that they bear upon all men, or upon those who will hear, or upon some illustrious men, or upon the immortal gods, or upon the highest interest of the commonwealth; and if we promise that we shall briefly demonstrate our own case, and set forth the point for decision, or the points for decision if there are several. We shall make the hearers receptive if we set forth openly and briefly the sum of the case—that is, wherein the dispute consists. For also, when you wish to make the hearer receptive, you ought at the same time to make him attentive; for he is most receptive who is prepared to listen most attentively. Now it seems we must speak next of how it is fitting that insinuations be handled. Insinuation, then, must be used when the kind of case is surprising—that is, as we said before, when the mind of the hearer is hostile. And this comes about chiefly from three causes: if either there is some baseness in the case itself, or something seems already to have been persuaded into the hearer by those who spoke before, or the chance to speak is given at a time when those who ought to hear are already worn out with listening. For from this circumstance too, no less than from the first two, the hearer’s mind is sometimes set against the orator.

Attentos autem faciemus, si demonstrabimus ea, quae dicturi erimus, magna, nova, incredibilia esse, aut ad omnes aut ad eos, qui audient, aut ad aliquos inlustres ho- mines aut ad deos inmortales aut ad summam rem pu- blicam pertinere; et si pollicebimur nos brevi nostram causam demonstraturos atque exponemus iudica- tionem aut iudicationes, si plures erunt. Dociles audi- tores faciemus, si aperte et breviter summam causae exponemus, hoc est, in quo consistat controversia. nam et, cum docilem velis facere, simul attentum facias oportet. nam is est maxime docilis, qui attentissime est paratus audire. Nunc insinuationes quemadmodum tractari con- veniat, deinceps dicendum videtur. insinuatione igitur utendum est, cum admirabile genus causae est, hoc est, ut ante diximus, cum animus auditoris infestus est. id autem tribus ex causis fit maxime: si aut inest in ipsa causa quaedam turpitudo aut ab iis, qui ante dixerunt, iam quiddam auditori persuasum videtur aut eo tempore locus dicendi datur, cum iam illi, quos audire oportet, defessi sunt audiendo. nam ex hac quoque re non minus quam ex primis duabus in oratore nonnumquam animus auditoris offenditur.

If the baseness of the case draws on the offense, one ought either to put in place of the man who gives offense another man who is liked; or in place of the matter that gives offense another matter that is approved; or a man in place of a matter, or a matter in place of a man, so that the hearer’s mind may be led away from what it hates toward what it likes; and to dissemble that you are going to defend what you are thought to be defending; then, when the hearer has now been made milder, to enter step by step into the defense, and to say that the things at which the adversaries are indignant seem unworthy to you too; then, when you have soothed the one who will hear, to show that none of those things bears upon you, and to deny that you are going to say anything about the adversaries—neither this nor that—so that you neither openly wound those who are liked, and yet, doing it obscurely, so far as you can, you alienate from them the goodwill of the hearers; and to bring forward the judgment or the authority of some persons on a like matter, worthy of imitation; then to show that the same, or a similar, or a greater, or a lesser matter is now at stake in the present case.

Si causae turpitudo contrahit offensionem, aut pro eo homine, in quo offenditur, alium hominem, qui dili- gitur, interponi oportet; aut pro re, in qua offenditur, aliam rem, quae probatur; aut pro re hominem aut pro homine rem, ut ab eo, quod odit, ad id, quod diligit, auditoris animus traducatur; et dissimulare te id defensurum, quod existimeris; deinde, cum iam mi- tior factus erit auditor, ingredi pedetemptim in defen- sionem et dicere ea, quae indignentur adversarii, tibi quoque indigna videri; deinde, cum lenieris eum, qui audiet, demonstrare, nihil eorum ad te pertinere et ne- gare quicquam de adversariis esse dicturum, neque hoc neque illud, ut neque aperte laedas eos, qui diliguntur, et tamen id obscure faciens, quoad possis, alienes ab eis auditorum voluntatem; et aliquorum iudicium simili de re aut auctoritatem proferre imitatione dignam; deinde eandem aut consimilem aut maiorem aut minorem agi rem in praesenti demonstrare.

But if the speech of the adversaries seems to have won the hearers’ belief—which will be easy to recognize for one who understands by what means belief is produced—one ought either to promise that you will speak first about that which the adversaries thought their strongest point, and which those who hear especially approved; or to begin from the adversary’s statement, and above all from what he said most recently; or to use hesitation, with an air of wonder, as to what you should say first, or to which point above all you should reply. For when the hearer sees the man whom he thought thrown into confusion by the adversaries’ speech prepared to speak against them with a most steadfast mind, he generally judges that he himself rather assented rashly than that the other is confident without cause. But if weariness has alienated the hearer’s enthusiasm from the case, it is convenient to promise that you will speak more briefly than you were prepared to, and that you will not imitate your adversary. If the matter permits, it is not without use to begin from something new or amusing, either something born of the moment—of such a kind as a noise or an outcry—or something already prepared, which contains an apologue, or a fable, or some derision; or, if the dignity of the matter takes away the chance for jesting, it is not amiss to throw in at once something grim, novel, or terrible. For just as surfeit and disgust at food are relieved by something rather bitter or softened by something sweet, so the mind, worn out with listening, is renewed by wonder or refreshed by laughter. And separately, what seemed to need saying about the direct opening and about insinuation is, in the main, this; now it seems something should be prescribed briefly in common about both. The introduction ought to have the most weight of thoughts and gravity, and altogether to contain within it everything that pertains to dignity, for the reason that this above all must be done well, which most commends the orator to the hearer; but it should have the least of brilliance, festivity, and trimness, for the reason that from these arises a certain suspicion of contrivance and artful pains, which most of all takes credit from the speech and authority from the orator.

Sin oratio adversariorum fidem videbitur auditoribus fecisse—id quod ei, qui intellegit, quibus rebus fides fiat, facile erit cognitu— oportet aut de eo, quod adversarii firmissimum sibi pu- tarint et maxime ii, qui audient, probarint, primum te dicturum polliceri, aut ab adversarii dicto exordiri et ab eo potissimum, quod ille nuperrime dixerit, aut du- bitatione uti, quid primum dicas aut cui potissimum loco respondeas, cum admiratione. nam auditor cum eum, quem adversarii perturbatum putat oratione, vi- det animo firmissimo contra dicere paratum, plerum- que se potius temere assensisse quam illum sine causa confidere arbitratur. Sin auditoris studium defatigatio abalienavit a causa, te brevius, quam paratus fueris, esse dicturum commodum est polliceri; non imitaturum adversarium. sin res dabit, non inutile est ab aliqua re nova aut ridicula incipere aut ex tempore quae nata sit, quod genus strepitu, acclamatione; aut iam parata, quae vel apologum vel fabulam vel aliquam contineat inrisionem; aut si rei dignitas adimet iocandi facul- tatem, aliquid triste, novum, horribile statim non in- commodum est inicere. nam, ut cibi satietas et fasti- dium aut subamara aliqua re relevatur aut dulci miti- gatur, sic animus defessus audiendo aut admiratione integratur aut risu novatur. Ac separatim quidem, quae de principio et de insi- nuatione dicenda videbantur, haec fere sunt: nunc quiddam brevi communiter de utroque praecipiendum videtur. Exordium sententiarum et gravitatis plurimum debet habere et omnino omnia, quae pertinent ad dignitatem, in se continere, propterea quod id optime faciendum est, quod oratorem auditori maxime commendat; splendoris et festivitatis et concinnitudinis minimum, propterea quod ex his suspicio quaedam apparationis atque artificiosae diligentiae nascitur, quae maxime orationi fidem, oratori adimit auctoritatem.

These, indeed, are the surest faults of introductions, which it will be necessary to take the utmost care to avoid: the commonplace, the common, the interchangeable, the long, the detached, the transferred, and the contrary to precept. The commonplace is that which can be adapted to several cases, so as to seem to fit. The common is that which can fit no less in this part of the case than in the contrary one. The interchangeable is that which can, with slight alteration, be spoken by the adversary from the contrary side. The long is that which is drawn out, in more words or thoughts than is enough, beyond what is sufficient. The detached is that which is not drawn from the case itself, nor attached to the speech like some limb of it. The transferred is that which accomplishes something other than the kind of case requires: as if someone should make the hearer receptive, when the case calls for goodwill, or use the direct opening when the matter calls for insinuation. The contrary to precept is that which accomplishes none of those things for the sake of which the precepts about introductions are handed down—that is, which makes the one who hears neither well disposed nor attentive nor receptive, or—than which surely nothing is worse—does the opposite. And about the introduction enough has now been said.

Vitia vero haec sunt certissima exordiorum, quae summo opere vitare oportebit: vulgare, commune, com- mutabile, longum, separatum, translatum, contra prae- cepta. vulgare est, quod in plures causas potest accom- modari, ut convenire videatur. commune, quod nihilo minus in hanc quam in contrariam partem causae potest convenire. commutabile, quod ab adversario potest leviter mutatum ex contraria parte dici. longum est, quod pluribus verbis aut sententiis ultra quam satis est producitur. separatum, quod non ex ipsa causa ductum est nec sicut aliquod membrum adnexum orationi. translatum est, quod aliud conficit, quam causae genus postulat: ut si qui docilem faciat auditorem, cum beni- volentiam causa desideret, aut si principio utatur, cum insinuationem res postulet. contra praecepta est, quod nihil eorum efficit, quorum causa de exordiis praecepta traduntur; hoc est, quod eum, qui audit, neque beni- volum neque attentum neque docilem efficit, aut, quo nihil profecto peius est, ut contra sit, facit. Ac de exordio quidem satis dictum est.

The narrative is the setting-forth of things done, or of things as if done. There are three kinds of narrative. One kind is that in which the case itself and the whole reasoning of the dispute is contained. A second is that in which some digression is inserted outside the case, for the sake of accusation, or comparison, or entertainment not foreign to the business in hand, or amplification. The third kind is removed from civil cases, and is spoken and written for the sake of entertainment, not without useful practice. Its parts are two, of which one is concerned chiefly with events, the other with persons. That which is set in the exposition of events has three parts: the legend, the history, and the realistic tale. A legend is one in which things neither true nor plausible are contained, of which kind is: “Huge winged serpents, yoked together.” A history is an exploit performed, remote from the memory of our own age; of which kind is: “Appius declared war on the Carthaginians.” A realistic tale is a fictitious matter that nevertheless could have happened. Of this kind is the passage in Terence: “For he, after he had passed beyond the years of youth, Sosia…” But that narrative which is concerned with persons is of such a kind that in it, together with the events themselves, the conversations and the dispositions of the persons can be perceived, in this manner: “He came to me often, crying out: ‘What are you doing, Micio? Why do you ruin this young man for us? Why does he love? Why does he drink? Why do you supply the means for these things, and indulge him in too rich an attire? You are far too foolish.’ He himself is far too harsh, beyond what is fair and good.” In this kind of narrative there ought to be much liveliness, made up of variety of events, dissimilarity of dispositions, gravity, mildness, hope, fear, suspicion, longing, dissembling, error, pity, reversal of fortune, unhoped-for misfortune, sudden joy, and a happy outcome of affairs. But these ornaments will be taken from those things that will afterward be taught about style.

Narratio est rerum gestarum aut ut gestarum expo- sitio. narrationum genera tria sunt: unum genus est, in quo ipsa causa et omnis ratio controversiae con- tinetur; alterum, in quo digressio aliqua extra causam aut criminationis aut similitudinis aut delectationis non alienae ab eo negotio, quo de agitur, aut amplificationis causa interponitur. tertium genus est remotum a civi- libus causis, quod delectationis causa non inutili cum exercitatione dicitur et scribitur. eius partes sunt duae, quarum altera in negotiis, altera in personis maxime versatur. ea, quae in negotiorum expositione posita est, tres habet partes: fabulam, historiam, argumen- tum. fabula est, in qua nec verae nec veri similes res continentur, cuiusmodi est: Angues ingentes alites, iuncti iugo historia est gesta res, ab aetatis nostrae memoria remota; quod genus: Appius indixit Cartha- giniensibus bellum. argumentum est ficta res, quae tamen fieri potuit. huiusmodi apud Terentium: Nam is postquam excessit ex ephebis, Sosia illa autem narratio, quae versatur in personis, eiusmodi est, ut in ea simul cum rebus ipsis personarum sermones et animi perspici possint, hoc modo: Venit ad me saepe clam it ans: Quid agis, Micio? Cur perdis adulescentem nobis? cur amat? Cur potat? cur tu his rebus sumptum suggeris, Vestitu nimio indulges? nimium ineptus es. Nimium ipse est durus praeter aequumque et bonum. hoc in genere narrationis multa debet inesse festivitas, confecta ex rerum varietate, animorum dissimilitudine, gravitate, lenitate, spe, metu, suspicione, desiderio, dissimulatione, errore, misericordia, fortunae commu- tatione, insperato incommodo, subita laetitia, iucundo exitu rerum. verum haec ex iis, quae postea de elocu- tione praecipientur, ornamenta sumentur.

Now it seems right to speak of the statement of facts, the part that contains the laying out of the case. It ought, then, to have three qualities: it should be brief, it should be clear, it should be plausible. It will be brief if the beginning is taken from the point where it must be taken, and not traced back from the very start; and if, when it is enough to have stated the substance of a thing, its details are not stated—for often it is enough to say what was done, without narrating how it was done—; and if one proceeds in the telling no further than the need requires; and if there is no crossing over to some other matter; and if it is so spoken that sometimes, from what has been said, what has not been said is understood; and if not only what damages the case, but even what neither damages nor helps it, is passed over; and if each single thing is said once; and if the next part does not begin again from the point at which the last left off. And many are deceived by the imitation of brevity: thinking themselves brief, they are the most long-winded of all, since they take pains to say many things briefly, not to say few things outright and no more than necessary. For to most people that man seems to speak briefly who speaks like this: “I came up to the house. I called the boy. He answered. I asked for the master. He said he was not at home.” Here, granted that he could not have told so many things more briefly, still, because it was enough to have said “he said he was not at home,” he becomes long-winded through the sheer number of things told. And so in this respect too the imitation of brevity must be avoided, and a multitude of unnecessary facts must be dispensed with no less than a multitude of words.

Nunc de narratione ea, quae causae continet ex- positionem, dicendum videtur. oportet igitur eam tres habere res: ut brevis, ut aperta, ut probabilis sit. Brevis erit, si, unde necesse est, inde initium sumetur et non ab ultimo repetetur, et si, cuius rei satis erit summam dixisse, eius partes non dicentur—nam saepe satis est, quid factum sit, dicere, ut ne narres, quemadmo- dum sit factum—, et si non longius, quam quo opus est, in narrando procedetur, et si nullam in rem aliam transibitur; et si ita dicetur, ut nonnumquam ex eo, quod dictum est, id, quod non est dictum, intellegatur; et si non modo id, quod obest, verum etiam id, quod nec obest nec adiuvat, praeteribitur; et si semel unum quicque dicetur; et si non ab eo, quo in proxime desi- tum erit, deinceps incipietur. ac multos imitatio brevi- tatis decipit, ut, cum se breves putent esse, longissimi sint; cum dent operam, ut res multas brevi dicant, non ut omnino paucas res dicant et non plures, quam ne- cesse sit. nam plerisque breviter videtur dicere, qui ita dicit: Accessi ad aedes. puerum vocavi. respondit. quaesivi dominum. domi negavit esse. hic, tametsi tot res brevius non potuit dicere, tamen, quia satis fuit dixisse: domi negavit esse, fit rerum multitudine longus. quare hoc quoque in genere vitanda est bre- vitatis imitatio et non minus rerum non necessaria- rum quam verborum multitudine supersedendum est.

The statement of facts, again, will be clear if events are set out first in the order in which each was first done, and the sequence of events and times is preserved, so that things are narrated as they were done, or as they could be believed to have been done. Here one must take care that nothing be said in a confused or twisted way, that there be no crossing over to another matter, no tracing back from the very start, no running ahead to the end, no passing over of anything that bears on the case; and in general the precepts about brevity must be observed in this respect as well. For often a thing is too little understood through length rather than through obscurity of the statement. And clear words must be used too—a kind to be spoken of among the precepts of style. The statement of facts will be plausible if it appears to contain the things that usually show themselves in truth: if the standing of the persons is preserved; if the motives for the deeds are made plain; if the means of doing them are seen to have existed; if it is shown that the time was suitable, the room sufficient, the place convenient for the very thing that is being narrated; if the matter is fitted both to the nature of those who act, and to the common way of the world, and to the belief of those who will hear. By these methods it can be made to resemble the truth.

Aperta autem narratio poterit esse, si, ut quidque primum gestum erit, ita primum exponetur, et rerum ac temporum ordo servabitur, ut ita narrentur, ut gestae res erunt aut ut potuisse geri videbuntur. hic erit considerandum, ne quid perturbate, ne quid con- torte dicatur, ne quam in aliam rem transeatur, ne ab ultimo repetatur, ne ad extremum prodeatur, ne quid, quod ad rem pertineat, praetereatur; et omnino, quae praecepta de brevitate sunt, hoc quoque in ge- nere sunt conservanda. nam saepe res parum est in- tellecta longitudine magis quam obscuritate narra- tionis. ac verbis quoque dilucidis utendum est; quo de genere dicendum est in praeceptis elocutionis. Pro- babilis erit narratio, si in ea videbuntur inesse ea, quae solent apparere in veritate; si personarum dignitates servabuntur; si causae factorum exstabunt; si fuisse facultates faciundi videbuntur; si tempus idoneum, si spatii satis, si locus opportunus ad eandem rem, qua de re narrabitur, fuisse ostendetur; si res et ad eorum, qui agent, naturam et ad vulgi morem et ad eorum, qui audient, opinionem accommodabitur. Ac veri quidem similis ex his rationibus esse poterit:

But besides this, one will have to consider that the statement of facts not be inserted when it does harm or when it does no good at all; nor be narrated out of place, or otherwise than the case demands. It does harm when the very laying out of what was done meets with great offense, which will have to be softened by argument and by the conduct of the case. When this happens, one will have to scatter the parts of what was done piecemeal through the case, and fit each at once to its supporting argument, so that the remedy is at hand for the wound and the defense at once soothes the ill will. The statement of facts does no good when, the matter having been set out by our adversaries, it is no concern of ours to narrate it a second time or in another way; or when the business is so grasped by those who hear that it is no concern of ours to instruct them in another fashion. When this happens, the statement of facts must be dispensed with altogether. It is told out of place when it is not set in that part of the speech where the matter requires—a kind we shall treat when we speak of arrangement, for this belongs to arrangement. It is not narrated as the case demands when either what helps the adversary is set out clearly and with ornament, or what helps oneself is told obscurely and carelessly. And so, that this fault may be avoided, everything must be turned to the advantage of one’s own case: passing over the contrary points that can be passed over, touching lightly on those that must be told, narrating one’s own carefully and lucidly. And about the statement of facts enough seems to have been said; let us now pass on to the partition.

illud autem praeterea considerare oportebit, ne, aut cum obsit narratio aut cum nihil prosit, tamen inter- ponatur; aut non loco aut non, quemadmodum causa postulet, narretur. obest tum, cum ipsius rei gestae expositio magnam excipit offensionem, quam argu- mentando et causam agendo leniri oportebit. quod cum accidet, membratim oportebit partes rei gestae disper- gere in causam et ad unam quamque confestim rationem accommodare, ut vulneri praesto medica- mentum sit et odium statim defensio mitiget. nihil prodest narratio tum, cum ab adversariis re exposita nostra nihil interest iterum aut alio modo narrare; aut ab iis, qui audiunt, ita tenetur negotium, ut nostra nihil intersit eos alio pacto docere. quod cum accidit, omnino narratione supersedendum est. non loco dici- tur, cum non in ea parte orationis conlocatur, in qua res postulat; quo de genere agemus tum, cum de dispo- sitione dicemus; nam hoc ad dispositionem pertinet. non, quemadmodum causa postulat, narratur, cum aut id, quod adversario prodest, dilucide et ornate expo- nitur aut id, quod ipsum adiuvat, obscure dicitur et neglegenter. quare, ut hoc vitium vitetur, omnia tor- quenda sunt ad commodum suae causae, contraria, quae praeteriri poterunt, praetereundo, quae dicenda erunt, leviter attingendo, sua diligenter et enodate narrando. Ac de narratione quidem satis dictum videtur; dein- ceps ad partitionem transeamus.

A partition rightly handled in a case makes the whole speech clear and transparent. It has two parts, each of which bears greatly on opening up the case and establishing the dispute. One part is that which shows what is agreed with the adversaries and what is left in dispute; from this something definite is fixed for the hearer, on which he should keep his mind engaged. The other is that in which the things we are going to speak of are set out briefly and in order—from which it comes about that the hearer holds certain matters in his mind, and, once these have been stated, understands that the speech will then be brought to its conclusion. Now it seems right to speak briefly of how each kind of partition is properly used. The partition that shows what is agreed and what is not agreed ought to incline the point of agreement to the advantage of its own case, in this way: “That the mother was killed by her son is agreed between me and my adversaries.” Likewise on the other side: “That Agamemnon was killed by Clytemnestra is agreed.” For each of these has both stated what was agreed and yet looked to the advantage of his own case. Then, what is in dispute must be set down in the laying out of the point for decision;

Recte habita in causa partitio inlustrem et per- spicuam totam efficit orationem. partes eius sunt duae, quarum utraque magno opere ad aperiendam causam et constituendam pertinet controversiam. una pars est, quae, quid cum adversariis conveniat et quid in controversia relinquatur, ostendit; ex qua certum quiddam destinatur auditori, in quo animum debeat habere occupatum. altera est, in qua rerum earum, de quibus erimus dicturi, breviter expositio ponitur distributa; ex qua conficitur, ut certas animo res te- neat auditor, quibus dictis intellegat fore peroratum. Nunc utroque genere partitionis quemadmodum con- veniat uti, breviter dicendum videtur. Quae partitio, quid conveniat aut quid non conveniat, ostendit, haec debet illud, quod convenit, inclinare ad suae causae commodum, hoc modo: interfectam matrem esse a filio convenit mihi cum adversariis. item contra: interfec- tum esse a Clytaemestra Agamemnonem convenit. nam hic uterque et id posuit, quod conveniebat, et tamen suae causae commodo consuluit. deinde, quid contro- versiae sit, ponendum est in iudicationis expositione;

and how this is to be found has been told before. The partition that contains an orderly laying out of the matters ought to have these qualities: brevity, completeness, fewness. There is brevity when no word is taken up but the necessary one. This is useful in this kind because it is by the matters themselves and the parts of the case, not by words or by foreign ornaments, that the hearer’s mind is to be held. There is completeness, by which we embrace in the partition all the kinds that fall within the case and must be spoken of, so that no useful kind is left out, and none is brought in late, outside the partition—which is the most faulty and disgraceful thing of all. Fewness is preserved in the partition if the kinds of things themselves are set down and not tangled up confusedly with the parts. For a kind is what embraces several parts, such as “animal”; a part is what falls under a kind, such as “horse.” But often the same thing is to one a kind, to another a part. For “man” is a part of “animal,” but a kind in respect of “Thebans” or “Trojans.” This division is brought in the more carefully so that, the relation of kinds and parts being clearly grasped, fewness of kinds may be preserved in the partition. For the man who makes his partition like this: “I shall show that through the lust and audacity and avarice of my adversaries all the harms have come upon the commonwealth”—he has failed to understand that, having set out a kind in the partition, he has mixed in a part of that kind. For lust is, of course, the kind embracing all unbridled desires, while of that kind avarice is without doubt a part.

quae quemadmodum inveniretur, ante dictum est. Quae partitio rerum distributam continet expositionem, haec habere debet: brevitatem, absolutionem, pauci- tatem. brevitas est, cum nisi necessarium nullum assu- mitur verbum. haec in hoc genere idcirco est utilis, quod rebus ipsis et partibus causae, non verbis neque extraneis ornamentis animus auditoris tenendus est. absolutio est, per quam omnia, quae incidunt in cau- sam, genera, de quibus dicendum est, amplectimur in partitione, ne aut aliquod genus utile relinquatur aut sero extra partitionem, id quod vitiosissimum ac tur- pissimum est, inferatur. paucitas in partitione serva- tur, si genera ipsa rerum ponuntur neque permixtim cum partibus implicantur. nam genus est, quod plures partes amplectitur, ut animal. pars est, quae subest generi, ut equus. sed saepe eadem res alii genus, alii pars est. nam homo animalis pars est, Thebani aut Troiani genus. haec ideo diligentius inducitur di- scriptio, ut aperta intellecta generum et partium ra- tione paucitas generum in partitione servari possit. nam qui ita partitur: ostendam propter cupiditatem et au- daciam et avaritiam adversariorum omnia incommo- da ad rem publicam pervenisse, is non intellexit in partitione exposito genere partem se generis admiscuisse. nam genus est omnium nimirum libidinum cupiditas, eius autem generis sine dubio pars est ava-

This, then, is to be avoided: that you set down, in the same partition, what is as it were a separate and dissimilar part of the very thing whose kind you have set down. But if several parts fall within some kind, when it has been set out simply in the first partition of the case, it will be most conveniently distributed at the time when one comes to unfold the case itself in the pleading, after the partition. And this too belongs to fewness: that we not say we are going to demonstrate more than is enough, in this way: “I shall show that my adversaries, in the matter we charge, both were able to do it, and wished to do it, and did it”—for it is enough to show that they did it; or that, when there is no partition in the case, and something simple is being argued, we nonetheless use a distribution—which can very rarely happen. And there are other precepts of partition as well, which do not bear so greatly on this oratorical use, but which are at home in philosophy; from these we have transferred just those that seemed fitting, none of which we found in the other arts. And throughout the whole pleading one must keep these precepts of partition in mind, so that each first part is carried through in order, just as it was set out in the partition, and, all having been unfolded, the speech is brought to its conclusion in such a way that nothing is brought in afterward except the conclusion itself. The old man in Terence’s Andria makes a partition briefly and aptly, in telling his freedman what he wishes him to learn: “In this way you will come to know both my son’s life and my own plan, and what I would have you do in this matter.” And so, just as he proposed in the partition, so he narrates: first his son’s life—“For he, after he left off being a boy”—; then his own plan—“And now I am taking pains to this end”—; then what he wishes Sosia to do, which he had set last in the partition, he states last—“Now it is your duty.” Therefore, just as here he came first to each first part and, all being finished, made an end of speaking, so it pleases us both to come to the single parts and, all being finished, to bring the speech to its conclusion. Now it seems right to give precepts about the proof next, just as the order itself requires.

ritia. hoc igitur vitandum est, ne, cuius genus po- sueris, eius * sicuti aliquam diversam ac dissimilem partem ponas in eadem partitione. quodsi quod in genus plures incident partes, id cum in prima causae partitione erit simpliciter expositum, distribuetur tem- pore eo commodissime, cum ad ipsum ventum erit explicandum in causae dictione post partitionem. atque illud quoque pertinet ad paucitatem, ne aut plura, quam satis est, demonstraturos nos dicamus, hoc modo: ostendam adversarios, quod arguamus, et potuisse facere et voluisse et fecisse; nam fecisse satis est ostendere: aut, cum in causa partitio nulla sit, et cum simplex quiddam agatur, tamen utamur distributione, id quod perraro potest accidere. Ac sunt alia quoque praecepta partitionum, quae ad hunc usum oratorium non tanto opere pertineant, quae versantur in philosophia, ex quibus haec ipsa trans- tulimus, quae convenire viderentur, quorum nihil in ceteris artibus inveniebamus. Atque his de partitione praeceptis in omni dictione meminisse oportebit, ut et prima quaeque pars, ut expo- sita est in partitione, sic ordine transigatur et omnibus explicatis peroratum sit hoc modo, ut ne quid po- sterius praeter conclusionem inferatur. partitur apud Terentium breviter et commode senex in Andria, quae cognoscere libertum velit: Eo pacto et gnati vitam et consilium meum Cognosces et quid facere in hac re te velim. itaque quemadmodum in partitione proposuit, ita narrat, primum nati vitam: Nam is postquam excessit ex ephebis; deinde suum consilium: Et nunc id operam do deinde quid Sosiam velit facere, id quod postremum posuit in partitione, postremum di- cit: Nunc tuum est officium quemadmodum igitur hic et ad primam quamque partem primum accessit et omnibus absolutis finem dicendi fecit, sic nobis pla- cet et ad singulas partes accedere et omnibus abso- lutis perorare. Nunc de confirmatione deinceps, ita ut ordo ipse postulat, praecipiendum videtur.

The proof is that by which, through argument, the speech adds credit, authority, and a mainstay to our case. Of this part the precepts are fixed, and they will be divided among the several kinds of cases. Still, it does not seem inconvenient first to lay out a kind of woodland and a whole stock of material, mixed and undivided, of all the lines of argument, and afterward to teach how each kind of case ought to be confirmed by drawing from this all the modes of argument. All things are confirmed by argument either from what is attributed to persons, or from what is attributed to acts. To persons we hold these things to be attributed: name, nature, manner of life, fortune, condition, disposition, pursuits, designs, deeds, accidents, and speeches. The name is what is given to each person, by which each is called by its own proper and fixed term. Nature itself is hard to define;

Confirmatio est, per quam argumentando nostrae causae fidem et auctoritatem et firmamentum adiungit oratio. huius partis certa sunt praecepta, quae in singula causarum genera dividentur. verumtamen non incommodum videtur quandam silvam atque materiam universam ante permixtim et confuse exponere omnium argumentationum, post autem tradere, quemadmodum unum quodque causae genus hinc omnibus argumen- tandi rationibus tractis confirmari oporteat. Omnes res argumentando confirmantur aut ex eo, quod personis, aut ex eo, quod negotiis est adtributum. Ac personis has res adtributas putamus: nomen, na- turam, victum, fortunam, habitum, affectionem, studia, consilia, facta, casus, orationes. nomen est, quod uni cuique personae datur, quo suo quaeque proprio et certo vocabulo appellatur. naturam ipsam definire difficile est;

but it is easier to enumerate those of its parts that we need for the present teaching. They lie partly in the divine, partly in the mortal kind. Of mortals, again, some are reckoned in the human kind, some in the kind of beasts. And the human kind is considered both in sex—whether male or female—and in nation, country, kinship, and age: in nation, whether Greek or barbarian; in country, whether Athenian or Spartan; in kinship, by what ancestors, by what blood relations; in age, whether boy or youth, of greater years or old. Besides this, the advantages and disadvantages given by nature to mind or body are considered, in this way: whether one is strong or weak, tall or short, handsome or ill-favored, swift or slow, sharp or rather dull, retentive or forgetful, courteous and obliging or graceless, modest, patient or the reverse; and in general the things given by nature to mind and body will be considered, and these are to be considered under nature. For the things acquired by effort belong to condition, of which we must speak later. As to manner of life, one ought to consider in whose house, by what custom, and at whose discretion a man was reared; what teachers of the liberal arts he had, what instructors in living; what friends he keeps; in what business, trade, or craft he is engaged; how he manages his household; what his domestic habits are. Under fortune it is asked whether he is slave or free, wealthy or poor, a private man or one holding power; if holding power, whether by right or by wrong; whether prosperous, distinguished, or the reverse; what sort of children he has. And if the inquiry is about one no longer living, one will also have to consider with what sort of death he met.

partes autem eius enumerare eas, quarum indigemus ad hanc praeceptionem, facilius est. eae autem partim divino, partim mortali in genere ver- santur. mortalium autem pars in hominum, pars in bestiarum genere numerantur. atque hominum genus et in sexu consideratur, virile an muliebre sit, et in natione, patria, cognatione, aetate. natione, Graius an barbarus; patria, Atheniensis an Lacedaemonius; co- gnatione, quibus maioribus, quibus consanguineis; aetate, puer an adulescens, natu grandior an senex. praeterea commoda et incommoda considerantur ab natura data animo aut corpori, hoc modo: valens an inbecillus, longus an brevis, formonsus an deformis, velox an tardus sit, acutus an hebetior, memor an obli- viosus, comis officiosus an infacetus, pudens, patiens an contra; et omnino quae a natura dantur animo et corpori considerabuntur et haec in natura conside- randa. nam quae industria comparantur, ad habitum pertinent, de quo posterius est dicendum. in victu con- siderare oportet, apud quem et quo more et cuius arbitratu sit educatus, quos habuerit artium liberalium magistros, quos vivendi praeceptores, quibus amicis utatur, quo in negotio, quaestu, artificio sit occupatus, quo modo rem familiarem administret, qua consuetu- dine domestica sit. in fortuna quaeritur, servus sit an liber, pecuniosus an tenuis, privatus an cum potestate: si cum potestate, iure an iniuria; felix, clarus an con- tra; quales liberos habeat. ac si de non vivo quaeretur, etiam quali morte sit affectus, erit considerandum.

Condition we call that settled and complete perfection of mind or body in some respect, such as the grasp of virtue or of some art, or any kind of knowledge whatever, and likewise some advantage of body not given by nature but won by zeal and effort. Disposition is a temporary change of mind or body from some cause, such as joy, desire, fear, distress, sickness, weakness, and other things found in the same kind. A pursuit, again, is the mind’s constant and vehemently applied engagement in some matter, with great pleasure: such as in philosophy, poetry, geometry, or letters. A design is a reasoned plan, thought out, of doing or not doing something. Deeds, accidents, and speeches will be considered under three times: what a man did, or what befell him, or what he said; or what he is doing, what is befalling him, what he is saying; or what he is going to do, what is going to befall him, what speech he is going to use. And to persons, indeed, these things seem to be attributed.

habitum autem hunc appellamus animi aut corporis constantem et absolutam aliqua in re perfectionem, ut virtutis aut artis alicuius perceptionem aut quamvis scientiam et item corporis aliquam commoditatem non natura datam, sed studio et industria partam. affectio est animi aut corporis ex tempore aliqua de causa commutatio, ut laetitia, cupiditas, metus, molestia, morbus, debilitas et alia, quae in eodem genere re- periuntur. studium est autem animi assidua et vehe- menter ad aliquam rem adplicata magna cum voluptate occupatio, ut philosophiae, poe+ticae, geometricae, lit- terarum. consilium est aliquid faciendi aut non fa- ciendi excogitata ratio. facta autem et casus et ora- tiones tribus ex temporibus considerabuntur: quid fecerit aut quid ipsi acciderit aut quid dixerit; aut quid faciat, quid ipsi accidat, quid dicat; aut quid fac- turus sit, quid ipsi casurum sit, qua sit usurus oratione. Ac personis quidem haec videntur esse adtributa:

As to what is attributed to acts: some of it is bound up with the act itself, some is considered in the carrying out of the act, some is adjoined to the act, some follows upon the act. Bound up with the act itself are those things that always seem fastened to the matter and cannot be separated from it. The first of these is a brief summing-up of the whole act, which contains the substance of what was done, in this way: “the killing of a parent,” “the betrayal of one’s country”; then the cause of that substance, by which it is asked through what, and on what account, and for the sake of what the thing was done; then what was done before the act, continuously, right up to the act itself; then, in the very carrying out of the act, what was done; then what was done afterward.

negotiis autem quae sunt adtributa, partim sunt con- tinentia cum ipso negotio, partim in gestione negotii considerantur, partim adiuncta negotio sunt, partim negotium consequuntur. Continentia cum ipso negotio sunt ea, quae semper affixa esse videntur ad rem neque ab ea possunt se- parari. ex his prima est brevis conplexio totius neg- otii, quae summam continet facti, hoc modo: parentis occisio, patriae proditio; deinde causa eius summae, per quam et quam ob rem et cuius rei causa factum sit, quaeritur; deinde ante gestam rem quae facta sint continenter usque ad ipsum negotium; deinde, in ipso gerendo negotio quid actum sit; deinde, quid postea factum sit.

In the carrying out of the act, which was the second head among the things attributed to acts, one will inquire into place, time, manner, occasion, and means. The place in which the thing was done is considered from the convenience it seems to have had for carrying out the act. And that convenience is sought from greatness, distance, remoteness, nearness, solitude, busyness, and the nature of the place itself, of its neighborhood, and of the whole region; and also from these attributes: whether the place is or was sacred or profane, public or private, another’s or belonging to the very man with whom we are concerned.

In gestione autem negotii, qui locus secundus erat de iis, quae negotiis adtributa sunt, quaeretur locus, tempus, modus, occasio, facultas. locus consideratur, in quo res gesta sit, ex opportunitate, quam videatur habuisse ad negotium administrandum. ea autem op- portunitas quaeritur ex magnitudine, intervallo, longin- quitate, propinquitate, solitudine, celebritate, natura ipsius loci et vicinitatis et totius regionis; ex his etiam attributionibus: sacer profanus, publicus anne privatus, alienus an ipsius, de quo agitur, locus sit aut fuerit.

Time—I mean the kind we are now using, for to define time itself in general is hard—is a certain part of eternity, with a fixed marking-off of some yearly, monthly, daily, or nightly span. Under this are considered both the things that have passed—and, of these very things, both those that have grown obsolete through age or seem incredible, so that they are by now set down among the number of fables, and those which, though done long ago and removed from our own memory, nonetheless win belief as truly handed down, because fixed records of them exist in writing; and the things lately done, which most people can know; and likewise the things at hand in the present and being done at this very moment; and the things that are to follow, in which one can consider what will happen sooner and what later. And likewise, in surveying time generally, its length must be considered. For often one must measure the act against the time, and see whether either the magnitude of the act or the multitude of the events could have been carried through in that time. Time, moreover, is considered both of the year and of the month and of the day and of the night and of the watch and of the hour, and of some portion of any of these.

tempus autem est—id quo nunc utimur, nam ipsum quidem generaliter definire difficile est—pars quaedam aeternitatis cum alicuius annui, menstrui, diurni nocturnive spatii certa significatione. in hoc et quae praeterierint, considerantur: et eorum ipsorum, quae aut propter vetustatem obsoleverint aut incredi- bilia videantur, ut iam in fabularum numerum repo- nantur; et quae iam diu gesta et a memoria nostra re- mota tamen faciant fidem vere tradita esse, quia eorum monumenta certa in litteris exstent; et quae nuper gesta sint, quae scire plerique possint; et item quae instent in praesentia et cum maxime fiant; et quae consequan- tur, in quibus potest considerari, quid ocius et quid serius futurum sit. et item communiter in tempore per- spiciendo longinquitas eius est consideranda. nam saepe oportet commetiri cum tempore negotium et vi- dere, potueritne aut magnitudo negotii aut multitudo rerum in eo transigi tempore. consideratur autem tem- pus et anni et mensis et diei et noctis et vigiliae et horae et in aliqua parte alicuius horum.

Occasion is a part of time having in it a suitable convenience for doing or not doing some thing. It differs from time in this respect: for though both are understood to be the same in kind, yet in “time” a span is in some way set forth, which is regarded in terms of years, or of a year, or of some part of a year, while in “occasion” there is understood, joined to the span of time, a certain convenience for acting. (And so, though it is the same in kind, it becomes something else, in that it differs by some part and form, as we have said.) Occasion is divided into three kinds: public, common, and particular. Public is that which the whole community frequents for some cause, such as games, a festal day, a war. Common is that which befalls all at about the same time, such as harvest, vintage, heat, cold. Particular is that which, for some cause, usually befalls someone privately, such as a wedding,

occasio au- tem est pars temporis habens in se alicuius rei idoneam faciendi aut non faciendi opportunitatem. quare cum tempore hoc differt: nam genere quidem utrumque idem esse intellegitur, verum in tempore spatium quo- dam modo declaratur, quod in annis aut in anno aut in aliqua anni parte spectatur, in occasione ad spatium temporis faciendi quaedam opportunitas intellegitur adiuncta. (quare cum genere idem sit, fit aliud, quod parte quadam et specie, ut diximus, differat.) haec distribuitur in tria genera: publicum, commune, sin- gulare. publicum est, quod civitas universa aliqua de causa frequentat, ut ludi, dies festus, bellum. commune, quod accidit omnibus eodem fere tempore, ut messis, vindemia, calor, frigus. singulare autem est, quod ali- qua de causa privatim alicui solet accidere, ut nup-

a sacrifice, a funeral, a banquet, sleep. Manner is that in which it is asked how and in what spirit a thing was done. Its parts are deliberateness and inadvertence. The account of deliberateness is sought from whether one acted secretly, openly, by force, or by persuasion. Inadvertence is brought under exculpation, whose parts are ignorance, accident, and necessity; and under the disposition of the mind—that is, distress, anger, love, and the rest that are found in a like kind. Means are either those by which a thing is done more easily, or those without which it cannot be brought about. By what is adjoined to the act is understood what is greater, and what is less, and what is equally great, and what is like the act with which we are concerned, and what is contrary, and what is disparate; and the kind, and the part, and the result. The greater, the less, and the equally great are considered from the force, the number, and the figure of the act, just as from the stature of the body.

tiae, sacrificium, funus, convivium, somnus. modus autem est, in quo, quemadmodum et quo animo factum sit, quaeritur. eius partes sunt prudentia et inprudentia. prudentiae autem ratio quaeritur ex iis, quae clam, palam, vi, persuasione fecerit. inprudentia autem in purgationem confertur, cuius partes sunt inscientia, casus, necessitas, et in affectionem animi, hoc est molestiam, iracundiam, amorem et cetera, quae in simili genere versantur. facultates sunt, aut quibus fa- cilius fit aut sine quibus aliquid confici non potest. Adiunctum negotio autem id intellegitur, quod maius et quod minus et quod aeque magnum et quod simile erit ei negotio, quo de agitur, et quod contrarium et quod disparatum, et genus et pars et eventus. maius et minus et aeque magnum ex vi et ex numero et ex figura negotii, sicut ex statura corporis, consideratur.

The like is judged from a comparable appearance, or from a nature to be set side by side and likened. The contrary is that which, set in a kind diverse from the very thing it is called contrary to, stands furthest from it, as cold from heat, death from life. The disparate is that which is separated from some thing by the prefixing of a negation, in this way: to be wise and not to be wise. A kind is that which embraces several parts, such as desire; a part is that which falls under a kind, such as love, avarice. The result is the outcome of some act, in which it is usually asked what has come, comes, or will come from each thing. And so in this kind, in order that one may conveniently gather in the mind beforehand what is going to come about, one must consider what usually comes from each thing, in this way: from arrogance, hatred; from insolence, arrogance.

simile autem ex specie conparabili aut ex conferunda at- que assimulanda natura iudicatur. contrarium est, quod positum in genere diverso ab eodem, cui contrarium di- citur, plurimum distat, ut frigus calori, vitae mors. disparatum autem est id, quod ab aliqua re praeposi- tione negationis separatur, hoc modo: sapere et non sapere. genus est, quod partes aliquas amplectitur, ut cupiditas. pars est, quae subest generi, ut amor, ava- ritia. eventus est exitus alicuius negotii, in quo quaeri solet, quid ex quaque re evenerit, eveniat, eventurum sit. quare hoc in genere, ut commode, quid eventurum sit, ante animo colligi possit, quid quaque ex re soleat evenire, considerandum est, hoc modo: ex arrogantia odium, ex insolentia arrogantia.

The fourth head among the things we said were attributed to acts is the consequence. Under it are sought the things that follow upon the act once done: first, by what name it is fitting that what was done be called; then who are the chief authors and inventors of that deed, and finally who are the approvers and rivals of its authority and invention; then whether there is any law, custom, agreement, judgment, science, or craft concerning that matter or arising from it; then its nature, whether it usually comes about commonly or unusually and rarely; afterward whether men have been accustomed to approve it by their own authority or to take offense at such things; and the rest that usually follow upon some deed similarly, whether at once or after an interval. Then, lastly, one must attend to whether any consequences follow from the things that are placed among the parts of honor or of advantage—of which we shall have to speak more distinctly in the deliberative kind of case. And to acts, indeed, the things we have mentioned are for the most part attributed.

Quarta autem pars est ex iis rebus, quas negotiis dicebamus esse adtributas, consecutio. in hac eae res quaeruntur, quae gestum negotium consequuntur: pri- mum, quod factum est, quo id nomine appellari con- veniat; deinde eius facti qui sint principes et inven- tores, qui denique auctoritatis eius et inventionis com- probatores atque aemuli; deinde ecquae de ea re aut eius rei sit lex, consuetudo, pactio, iudicium, scientia, artificium; deinde natura eius, evenire vulgo soleat an insolenter et raro; postea homines id sua auctoritate comprobare an offendere in iis consueverint; et cetera, quae factum aliquid similiter confestim aut ex inter- vallo solent consequi. deinde postremo adtendendum est, num quae res ex iis rebus, quae positae sunt in par- tibus honestatis aut utilitatis, consequantur; de quibus in deliberativo genere causae distinctius erit dicendum. Ac negotiis quidem fere res haec, quas commemora- vimus, sunt adtributae.

Every argument that is taken from the topics we have mentioned will have to be either plausible or necessary. For, to describe it briefly, an argument seems to be something discovered from some topic, showing a thing either plausibly or demonstrating it necessarily. Those things are demonstrated necessarily which can neither happen nor be proved otherwise than as they are stated, in this way: “if she has given birth, she has lain with a man.” This kind of arguing, which turns on necessary demonstration, is chiefly handled in speaking either through the dilemma, or through the enumeration,

Omnis autem argumentatio, quae ex iis locis, quos commemoravimus, sumetur, aut probabilis aut ne- cessaria debebit esse. etenim, ut breviter describa- mus, argumentatio videtur esse inventum aliquo ex genere rem aliquam aut probabiliter ostendens aut ne- cessarie demonstrans. Necessarie demonstrantur ea, quae aliter ac dicun- tur nec fieri nec probari possunt, hoc modo: si peperit, cum viro concubuit. hoc genus argumentandi, quod in necessaria demonstratione versatur, maxime tractatur in dicendo aut per complexionem aut per enumera-

or through the simple conclusion. The dilemma is one in which, whichever you grant, you are refuted, in this manner: “If he is wicked, why do you make use of him? If he is good, why do you accuse him?” The enumeration is one in which, several things being set out and the rest disproved, the one that remains is necessarily confirmed, in this way: “He must have been killed by this man either out of enmity, or out of fear, or out of hope, or for the sake of some friend; or, if none of these is the case, he was not killed by this man—for a crime cannot be undertaken without a cause; if there was neither enmity, nor any fear, nor hope of any advantage from that man’s death, nor did that man’s death concern any friend of his: it remains, therefore, that he was not killed by this man.” The simple conclusion, again, is made up from a necessary consequence, in this way: “If you say I did that at such a time, but I at that very time was across the sea, it remains that what you say I not only did not do, but could not even have done.” And here one will have to look carefully that this kind cannot in any way be refuted—so that the proof does not merely have in it the form of an argument and a certain resemblance to a necessary conclusion, but the argument itself rests on a necessary line of reasoning.

tionem aut per simplicem conclusionem. conplexio est, in qua, utrum concesseris, reprehenditur, ad hunc mo- dum: si inprobus est, cur uteris? si probus, cur accusas? enumeratio est, in qua pluribus rebus expositis et ceteris infirmatis una reliqua necessario confirmatur, hoc pacto: necesse est aut inimicitiarum causa ab hoc esse occisum aut metus aut spei aut alicuius amici gratia aut, si horum nihil est, ab hoc non esse occisum; nam sine causa maleficium susceptum non potest esse; si neque inimicitiae fuerunt nec metus ullus nec spes ex morte illius alicuius commodi neque ad amicum huius aliquem mors illius pertinebat: relinquitur igi- tur, ut ab hoc non sit occisus. simplex autem conclusio ex necessaria consecutione conficitur, hoc modo: si vos me istuc eo tempore fecisse dicitis, ego autem eo ipso tempore trans mare fui, relinquitur, ut id, quod dicitis, non modo non fecerim, sed ne potuerim quidem facere. atque hoc diligenter oportebit videre, ne quo pacto genus hoc refelli possit, ut ne confirmatio modum in se argumentationis habeat et quandam similitudinem necessariae conclusionis, verum ipsa argumentatio ex necessaria ratione consistat.

The plausible, again, is that which usually happens, or which is placed in common belief, or which has in itself a certain resemblance to these, whether it be false or true. In the kind that usually happens, the plausible is of this sort: “if she is a mother, she loves her child”; “if he is greedy, he disregards his oath.” In the kind placed in common belief, the plausibles are of this sort: “that punishments are prepared for the impious in the world below”; “that those who devote themselves to philosophy do not think the gods exist.” Resemblance, again, is chiefly looked for in contraries, in equals, and in those things that fall under the same principle. In contraries, in this way: “for if it is fitting that those who have done harm unwittingly be pardoned, those who have done good of necessity ought not to be thanked.” From an equal, thus:

Probabile autem est id, quod fere solet fieri aut quod in opinione positum est aut quod habet in se ad haec quandam similitudinem, sive id falsum est sive verum. in eo genere, quod fere fieri solet, probabile huiusmodi est: si mater est, diligit filium; si avarus est, neglegit ius iurandum. in eo autem, quod in opinione positum est, huiusmodi sunt probabilia: impiis apud inferos poenas esse praeparatas; eos, qui philosophiae dent operam, non arbitrari deos esse. similitudo autem in contrariis et ex paribus et in iis rebus, quae sub ean- dem rationem cadunt, maxime spectatur. in contrariis, hoc modo: nam si iis, qui inprudentes laeserunt, ignosci convenit, iis, qui necessario profuerunt, haberi gratiam non oportet. ex pari, sic:

“for as a place without a harbor cannot be safe for ships, so a mind without good faith cannot be steady for friends.” In things that fall under the same principle, the plausible is considered in this way: “for if it is not disgraceful for the Rhodians to farm out the harbor-toll, neither is it disgraceful for Hermocreon to take the contract.” These are sometimes true, in this manner: “since there is a scar, there was a wound”; sometimes resembling the truth, in this way: “if there was much dust on his shoes, he must have come from a journey.” And every plausible thing that is taken up for argument—to assign it to certain fixed classes—is either a sign, or a credible thing, or a thing judged, or a comparable thing.

nam ut locus sine portu na- vibus esse non potest tutus, sic animus sine fide stabilis amicis non potest esse. in iis rebus, quae sub eandem rationem cadunt, hoc modo probabile consideratur: nam si Rhodiis turpe non est portorium locare, ne Her- mocreonti quidem turpe est conducere. haec tum vera sunt, hoc pacto: quoniam cicatrix est, fuit vulnus; tum veri similia, hoc modo: si multus erat in calceis pulvis, ex itinere eum venire oportebat. Omne autem—ut certas quasdam in partes tri- buamus—probabile, quod sumitur ad argumentationem, aut signum est aut credibile aut iudicatum aut comparabile.

A sign is that which falls under some sense and signifies something that seems to have proceeded from it—something that either preceded, or was present in the act itself, or followed afterward—and which nonetheless needs testimony and weightier confirmation, such as blood, flight, pallor, dust, and the like. A credible thing is that which, without any witness, is made firm by the hearer’s own belief, in this way: “there is no one who does not wish his own children safe and happy.” A thing judged is a matter approved by the assent, authority, or judgment of someone or of several. It is regarded in three kinds: the religious, the common, and the sanctioned. The religious is what men under oath have judged according to the laws. The common is what all have commonly approved and followed, of this sort: “that one rise for one’s elders,” “that one pity suppliants.” The sanctioned is what men, when it was doubtful how it ought to be regarded, settled by their own authority: as the deed of the elder Gracchus, which the Roman people sanctioned in that, after his censorship, it made him consul—a man who, in his censorship, had done a certain thing without his colleague’s knowledge, and on account of that deed.

signum est, quod sub sensum ali- quem cadit et quiddam significat, quod ex ipso pro- fectum videtur, quod aut ante fuerit aut in ipso neg- otio aut post sit consecutum et tamen indiget testi- monii et gravioris confirmationis, ut cruor, fuga, pallor, pulvis, et quae his sunt similia. credibile est, quod sine ullo teste auditoris opinione firmatur, hoc modo: nemo est, qui non liberos suos incolumes et beatos esse cupiat. iudicatum est res assensione aut auctori- tate aut iudicio alicuius aut aliquorum conprobata. id tribus in generibus spectatur, religioso, communi, adprobato. religiosum est, quod iurati legibus iudica- runt. commune est, quod omnes vulgo probarunt et secuti sunt, huiusmodi: ut maioribus natu assurgatur, ut supplicum misereatur. adprobatum est, quod ho- mines, cum dubium esset, quale haberi oporteret, sua constituerunt auctoritate: velut Gracchi patris factum populus Romanus, qui eum ob id factum eo quod insciente collega in censura non nihil gessit post censuram consulem fecit.

A comparable thing, again, is one that, in diverse matters, holds some like principle. Its parts are three: the image, the comparison, and the example. The image is a form of words showing the likeness of bodies or of natures. The comparison is a form of words setting thing beside thing from their likeness. The example is what confirms or weakens a matter by the authority or fortune of some man or some act. Models and descriptions of these will be learned among the precepts of style. And the source of the proof, so far as my means allowed, has been laid open, and demonstrated no less lucidly than the nature of the matter generally permitted; but how each issue, and each part of an issue, and every dispute—whether it turn on reasoning or on a text—ought to be handled, and what arguments suit each, we shall say one by one in the second book, treating each kind separately. For the present we have only scattered the numbers, modes, and parts of arguing in a confused and mingled way; afterward we shall sort them out, distinctly and selectively, into each kind of case, drawing from this store what suits each.

conparabile autem est, quod in rebus diversis similem aliquam rationem continet. eius partes sunt tres: imago, conlatio, exemplum. imago est oratio demonstrans corporum aut naturarum simi- litudinem. conlatio est oratio rem cum re ex simili- tudine conferens. exemplum est, quod rem auctoritate aut casu alicuius hominis aut negotii confirmat aut in- firmat. horum exempla et descriptiones in praeceptis elocutionis cognoscentur. Ac fons quidem confirmationis, ut facultas tulit, apertus est nec minus dilucide, quam rei natura fere- bat, demonstratus est; quemadmodum autem quaeque constitutio et pars constitutionis et omnis contro- versia, sive in ratione sive in scripto versabitur, tractari debeat et quae in quamque argumentationes conve- niant, singillatim in secundo libro de uno quoque ge- nere dicemus. in praesentia tantummodo numeros et modos et partes argumentandi confuse et permixtim dispersimus; post discripte et electe in genus quodque causae, quid cuique conveniat, ex hac copia digeremus.

And every argument, indeed, can be discovered from these topics; but to adorn the discovered argument, and to mark it off into fixed parts, is both most delightful and supremely necessary, and most neglected by the writers on the art. For this reason it has seemed right to us to speak of that teaching too in this place, so that the method of arguing may be joined to the discovery of arguments. And this whole topic must be considered with great care and diligence, because there is not only great usefulness in the matter, but also the very highest difficulty in teaching it.

Atque inveniri quidem omnis ex his locis argu- mentatio poterit: inventam exornari et certas in partes distingui et suavissimum est et summe necessarium et ab artis scriptoribus maxime neglectum. quare et de ea praeceptione nobis et in hoc loco dicendum visum est, ut ad inventionem argumentandi ratio adiun- geretur. et magna cum cura et diligentia locus hic om- nis considerandus est, quod rei non solum magna uti- litas est, sed praecipiendi quoque summa difficultas.

Every argument, then, is to be handled either by induction or by reasoning. Induction is a form of discourse which, by means of things not in doubt, wins the assent of the one with whom it has been begun; by which assents it brings it about that some doubtful matter is approved by him, on account of its resemblance to the things to which he has assented. For instance, in Aeschines the follower of Socrates, Socrates shows that Aspasia talked with the wife of Xenophon and with Xenophon himself: “Tell me, I pray you, wife of Xenophon, if your neighbor had better gold than you have, which would you prefer, hers or your own?” “Hers,” she said. “What if she had clothing and the rest of a woman’s adornment of greater price than you have—would you prefer your own or hers?” She answered, “Hers, to be sure.” “Come now,” she said, “what if she had a better husband than you have—would you prefer your own husband or hers?” Here the woman blushed.

Omnis igitur argumentatio aut per inductionem tractanda est aut per ratiocinationem. Inductio est oratio, quae rebus non dubiis captat assensionem eius, quicum instituta est; quibus assen- sionibus facit, ut illi dubia quaedam res propter si- militudinem earum rerum, quibus assensit, probetur; velut apud Socraticum Aeschinen demonstrat Socrates cum Xenophontis uxore et cum ipso Xenophonte Aspa- siam locutam: dic mihi, quaeso, Xenophontis uxor, si vicina tua melius habeat aurum, quam tu habes, utrum illudne an tuum malis? illud, inquit. quid, si vestem et ceterum ornatum muliebrem pretii maioris habeat, quam tu habes, tuumne an illius malis? respondit: illius vero. age sis, inquit, quid? si virum illa me- liorem habeat, quam tu habes, utrumne tuum virum malis an illius? hic mulier erubuit.

But Aspasia then opened a discourse with Xenophon himself. “Tell me, I pray you, Xenophon,” she said, “if your neighbor had a better horse than yours is, would you prefer your own horse or his?” “His,” he said. “What if he had a better estate than you have—which estate, after all, would you prefer to have?” “His,” he said, “the better one, of course.” “What if he had a better wife than you have—would you prefer your own or his?” And here Xenophon too himself fell silent. Then Aspasia: “Since each of you,” she said, “has failed to answer me that one thing alone which I alone had wished to hear, I myself will say what each of you is thinking. For you, woman, wish to have the best husband, and you, Xenophon, most of all wish to have the most excellent wife. And so, unless you can bring it about that there is no better man and no more excellent woman on earth, then surely you will always most of all be longing for that which you think the best—that you be the husband of as good a wife as can be, and that she be married to as good a husband as can be.” Here, when assent was given to things not in doubt, it came about, on account of the resemblance, that even the thing which would have seemed doubtful, if anyone asked it separately, was granted as certain, on account of the method of the questioning.

Aspasia autem ser- monem cum ipso Xenophonte instituit. quaeso, inquit, Xenophon, si vicinus tuus equum meliorem habeat, quam tuus est, tuumne equum malis an illius? illius, inquit. quid, si fundum meliorem habeat, quam tu ha- bes, utrum tandem fundum habere malis? illum, in- quit, meliorem scilicet. quid, si uxorem meliorem ha- beat, quam tu habes, utrum tuamne an illius malis? atque hic Xenophon quoque ipse tacuit. post Aspasia: quoniam uterque vestrum, inquit, id mihi solum non respondit, quod ego solum audire volueram, egomet dicam, quid uterque cogitet. nam et tu, mulier, optumum virum vis habere et tu, Xenophon, uxorem habere lectissimam maxime vis. quare, nisi hoc per- feceritis, ut neque vir melior neque femina lectior in terris sit, profecto semper id, quod optumum putabitis esse, multo maxime requiretis, ut et tu maritus sis quam optumae et haec quam optimo viro nupta sit. hic cum rebus non dubiis assensum est, factum est propter similitudinem, ut etiam illud, quod dubium videretur, si qui separatim quaereret, id pro certo propter rationem rogandi concederetur.

Of this manner of discourse Socrates made the greatest use, because he himself wished to bring forward nothing toward persuasion, but preferred to make something out of what the other—the one with whom he was disputing—had granted him: something which the other was bound necessarily to approve out of what he had already conceded. In this kind it seems we must give this precept first: that the thing we bring in by way of resemblance be of such a sort that it must be conceded. For the thing from which we shall demand that the doubtful point be granted to us ought not itself to be doubtful. Next, the thing for the sake of confirming which the induction is made must be seen to resemble the things which we have brought in beforehand as not doubtful; for it will profit us nothing to have had something conceded beforehand if the thing for whose sake we first wished it conceded is unlike it. Next, the other must not understand where those first inductions are tending and at what end they are going

hoc modo ser- monis plurimum Socrates usus est, propterea quod nihil ipse afferre ad persuadendum volebat, sed ex eo, quod sibi ille dederat, quicum disputabat, aliquid conficere malebat, quod ille ex eo, quod iam con- cessisset, necessario adprobare deberet. Hoc in genere praecipiendum nobis videtur primum, ut illud, quod inducimus per similitudinem, eiusmodi sit, ut sit necesse concedere. nam ex quo postulabimus nobis illud, quod dubium sit, concedi, dubium esse id ipsum non oportebit. deinde illud, cuius confirmandi causa fiet inductio, videndum est, ut simile iis rebus sit, quas res quasi non dubias ante induxerimus, nam aliquid ante concessum nobis esse nihil proderit, si ei dissimile erit id, cuius causa illud concedi primum voluerimus; deinde ne intellegat, quo spectent illae primae inductiones et ad quem sint exitum perven-

to arrive. For the man who sees that, if he has rightly assented to the thing first asked, he will also necessarily have to concede the thing that displeases him, generally either by not answering or by answering badly does not let the questioning proceed further; and so, by the method of questioning, he must, unawares, be led from what he has conceded to what he does not wish to concede. The last point, moreover, must either be passed over in silence, or conceded, or denied. If it is denied, either the resemblance to the things conceded before must be shown, or another induction must be used. If it is conceded, the argument must be concluded. If it is met with silence, an answer must be drawn out; or, since silence imitates confession, the argument must be concluded just as if the point had been conceded. Thus this kind of arguing comes to have three parts: the first consists of one resemblance or several; the second of the thing we wish conceded, for whose sake the resemblances were brought in; the third of the conclusion, which either confirms the concession or shows what is made out of it.

turae. nam qui videt, si ei rei, quam primo rogetur, recte assenserit, illam quoque rem, quae sibi displi- ceat, esse necessario concedendam, plerumque aut non respondendo aut male respondendo longius roga- tionem procedere non sinit; quare ratione rogationis inprudens ab eo, quod concessit, ad id, quod non vult concedere, deducendus est. extremum autem aut ta- ceatur oportet aut concedatur aut negetur. si negabitur, aut ostendenda similitudo est earum rerum, quae ante concessae sunt, aut alia utendum inductione. si con- cedetur, concludenda est argumentatio. si tacebitur, elicienda responsio est aut, quoniam taciturnitas imi- tatur confessionem, pro eo, ac si concessum sit, con- cludere oportebit argumentationem. ita fit hoc genus argumentandi tripertitum: prima pars ex similitudine constat una pluribusve; altera ex eo, quod concedi vo- lumus, cuius causa similitudines adhibitae sunt; tertia ex conclusione, quae aut confirmat concessionem aut quid ex ea conficiatur ostendit.

But since to some it will not seem to have been demonstrated clearly enough unless we add an example from the field of civil cases, it seems best to use an example of that sort as well—not because the precept differs, or because it must be applied otherwise in ordinary conversation than in formal speaking, but to satisfy the wish of those who cannot recognize in one place what they have seen in another, unless it is pointed out to them. Take, then, the case which is widely known among the Greeks, in which Epaminondas, the Theban general, did not hand over his army to the man who by law had succeeded him as praetor, and, after holding the army for a few days against the law, utterly defeated the Spartans. Here, in defending the letter of the law against its intent, the accuser will be able to use an argument by induction, in this manner:

Sed quia non satis alicui videbitur dilucide demon- stratum, nisi quid ex civili causarum genere exempli subiecerimus, videtur eiusmodi quoque utendum ex- emplo, non quo praeceptio differat aut aliter hoc in sermone atque in dicendo sit utendum, sed ut eorum voluntati satis fiat, qui id, quod aliquo in loco viderunt, alio in loco, nisi monstratum est, nequeunt cognoscere. ergo in hac causa, quae apud Graecos est pervagata, cum Epaminondas, Thebanorum imperator, * quod ei, qui sibi ex lege praetor successerat, exercitum non tra- didit et, cum paucos ipse dies contra legem exercitum tenuisset, Lacedaemonios funditus vicit, poterit accusator argumentatione uti per inductionem, cum scrip- tum legis contra sententiam defendat, ad hunc modum:

“If, jurors, Epaminondas were to write into the law what he claims the framer of the law intended, and were to add this exception—`except when someone does not hand over his army for the sake of the republic’—would you allow it? I think not. And what if you yourselves, for the sake of doing him this honor, were to order this same exception added to the law without the people’s command—a thing utterly remote from your scruple and your wisdom—would the Theban people allow it to be done? Surely they would not. Then shall it seem right to you to follow, as if it were written in, what it is a sacrilege to write into the law? I know your discernment: it cannot so seem, jurors. But if the framer’s intent can be set right by no addition to the text, either by him or by you, see whether it is not far more outrageous that what cannot even be altered by a word should be altered in fact and by your verdict.” And on induction enough seems for the present to have been said.

si, iudices, id, quod Epaminondas ait legis scriptorem sensisse, adscribat ad legem et addat hanc ex- ceptionem: extra quam si quis rei publicae causa exercitum non tradiderit, patiemini? non opinor. quid, si vosmet ipsi, quod a vestra religione et a sa- pientia remotissimum est, istius honoris causa hanc eandem exceptionem iniussu populi ad legem adscribi iubeatis, populus Thebanus id patieturne fieri? pro- fecto non patietur. quod ergo adscribi ad legem nefas est, id sequi, quasi adscriptum sit, rectum vobis vi- deatur? novi vestram intellegentiam; non potest ita videri, iudices. quodsi litteris corrigi neque ab illo ne- que a vobis scriptoris voluntas potest, videte, ne multo indignius sit id re et iudicio vestro mutari, quod ne verbo quidem commutari potest. Ac de inductione quidem satis in praesentia dictum videtur.

Now let us go on to consider the force and nature of deduction. Deduction is a discourse that draws something probable out of the matter itself, and, once this is set forth and grasped in its own right, confirms it by its own force and reasoning. Those who have thought this kind of argument worth examining more carefully, while in the practice of speaking they followed the same course, have differed a little in their account of the precepts. For some have said it has five parts, while others have held that it can be divided into no more than three. It seems not unprofitable to lay out their controversy along with the reasoning of each side. For it is brief, and not of a kind in which either party can be thought to have nothing to say at all, and this is a topic that, in my view, should by no means be neglected in speaking.

nunc deinceps ratiocinationis vim et naturam consideremus. Ratiocinatio est oratio ex ipsa re probabile aliquid eliciens, quod expositum et per se cognitum sua se vi et ratione confirmet. hoc de genere qui diligentius con- siderandum putaverunt, cum idem in usu dicendi se- querentur, paululum in praecipiendi ratione dissense- runt. nam partim quinque eius partes esse dixerunt, partim non plus quam in tres partes posse distribui putaverunt. eorum controversiam non incommodum vi- detur cum utrorumque ratione exponere. nam et brevis est et non eiusmodi, ut alteri prorsus nihil dicere pu- tentur, et locus hic nobis in dicendo minime neglegen- dus videtur.

Those who think it ought to be divided into five parts say that first it is fitting to set out the sum of the argument, in this manner: “Things conducted with planning are better managed than things carried on without planning.” This they count as the first part. Next they think it ought to be proved by various reasonings and by the most copious words possible, in this way: “The household that is governed by reason is better furnished and equipped in all respects than the one administered rashly and without any plan. The army that has a wise and skillful general set over it is in every part more advantageously commanded than the one administered by someone’s folly and rashness. The same reasoning holds for a ship. For the ship that has the most knowledgeable helmsman completes its course best.”

Qui putant in quinque tribui partes oportere, aiunt primum convenire exponere summam argumentatio- nis, ad hunc modum: melius accurantur, quae con- silio geruntur, quam quae sine consilio administran- tur. hanc primam partem numerant; eam deinceps rationibus variis et quam copiosissimis verbis adpro- bari putant oportere, hoc modo: domus ea, quae ra- tione regitur, omnibus est instructior rebus et appara- tior, quam ea, quae temere et nullo consilio admini- stratur. exercitus is, cui praepositus est sapiens et calli- dus imperator, omnibus partibus commodius regitur, quam is, qui stultitia et temeritate alicuius admini- stratur. eadem navigii ratio est. nam navis optime cur- sum conficit ea, quae scientissimo gubernatore utitur.

When the proposition has been proved in this fashion, and two parts of the deduction have passed, in the third part they say that what you wish to demonstrate ought to be assumed from the force of the proposition, in this way: “But nothing of all things is better administered than the whole universe.” To this assumption, in the fourth place, they next add another proof, in this manner: “For the risings and settings of the constellations keep a certain fixed order, and the yearly changes not only always come about in the same way out of a kind of necessity, but are also fitted to the advantage of all things; and the alternations of day and night, never altered in any respect, have never done any harm—all of which are a sign that the nature of the universe is administered by no ordinary planning.” In the fifth place they bring in the summing-up, which either infers only that which is forced from all the parts, in this way: “Therefore the universe is administered by planning”; or, when it has drawn the proposition and the assumption together briefly into one place, adds what is concluded from them, in this manner: “But if those things are better managed which are conducted with planning than those administered without planning, and nothing of all things is better administered than the whole universe, therefore the universe is administered by planning.” In this fashion, then, they hold the argument to be five-part.

cum propositio sit hoc pacto adprobata et duae partes transierint ratiocinationis, tertia in parte aiunt, quod ostendere velis, id ex vi propositionis oportere assu- mere, hoc pacto: nihil autem omnium rerum melius, quam omnis mundus, administratur. huius assump- tionis quarto in loco aliam porro inducunt adproba- tionem, hoc modo: nam et signorum ortus et obitus definitum quendam ordinem servant et annuae commu- tationes non modo quadam ex necessitudine semper eodem modo fiunt, verum ad utilitates quoque rerum omnium sunt accommodatae, et diurnae nocturnaeque vicissitudines nulla in re umquam mutatae quicquam nocuerunt; quae signo sunt omnia non mediocri quo- dam consilio naturam mundi administrari. quinto in- ducunt loco conplexionem eam, quae aut id infert so- lum, quod ex omnibus partibus cogitur, hoc modo: consilio igitur mundus administratur; aut unum in locum cum conduxerit breviter propositionem et ad- sumptionem, adiungit, quid ex his conficiatur, ad hunc modum: quodsi melius geruntur ea, quae consilio, quam quae sine consilio administrantur, nihil autem omnium rerum melius administratur, quam omnis mun- dus, consilio igitur mundus administratur. quinque- pertitam igitur hoc pacto putant esse argumentationem.

But those who think it three-part hold that the argument ought to be handled in no other way; they only object to the partition of the others. For they deny that the proofs ought to be separated either from the proposition or from the assumption, and they hold that neither the proposition is complete nor the assumption finished in itself unless it has been confirmed by a proof. Therefore the two parts the others count—the proposition and its proof—seem to them a single part, the proposition; for if it has not been proved, it is no proposition of an argument. Likewise, what is called by the others the assumption and the proof of the assumption seems to them the assumption alone. Thus it comes about that the same argument, handled by the same reasoning, seems to some three-part, to others five-part. And so the upshot is that the matter pertains not so much to the practice of speaking as to the theory of the precept.

Qui autem tripertitam putant esse, ii non aliter tractari putant oportere argumentationem, sed parti- tionem horum reprehendunt. negant enim neque a pro- positione neque ab adsumptione adprobationes earum separari oportere, neque propositionem absolutam ne- que adsumptionem sibi perfectam videri, quae appro- batione confirmata non sit. quare quas illi duas partes numerent, propositionem et adprobationem, sibi unam partem videri, propositionem; quae si adprobata non sit, propositio non sit argumentationis. item, quae ab illis adsumptio et adsumptionis adprobatio dicatur, eandem sibi adsumptionem solam videri. ita fit, ut eadem ratione argumentatio tractata aliis tripertita, aliis quinquepertita videatur. quare evenit, ut res non tam ad usum dicendi pertineat quam ad rationem praeceptionis.

To us, however, that partition seems the more serviceable which is divided into five parts, the one that all who set out from Aristotle and Theophrastus have for the most part followed. For just as that earlier kind of arguing, which is taken up by induction, was handled chiefly by Socrates and the Socratics, so this kind, which is brought to polish by deduction, was very largely employed by Aristotle and the Peripatetics and Theophrastus, and then by those rhetoricians who have been reckoned the most elegant and the most accomplished in their art. But why we approve that partition the more seems worth saying, lest we be thought to have followed it rashly; and it must be said briefly, lest in matters of this sort we linger longer than the theory of teaching demands.

Nobis autem commodior illa partitio videatur esse, quae in quinque partes tributa est, quam omnes ab Aristotele et Theophrasto profecti maxime secuti sunt. nam quemadmodum illud superius genus argumen- tandi, quod per inductionem sumitur, maxime Socrates et Socratici tractarunt, sic hoc, quod per ratiocina- tionem expolitur, summe est ab Aristotele atque a Peri- pateticis et Theophrasto frequentatum, deinde a rhetoribus iis, qui elegantissimi atque artificiosis- simi putati sunt. quare autem nobis illa magis partitio probetur, dicendum videtur, ne temere secuti putemur; et breviter dicendum, ne in huiusmodi rebus diutius, quam ratio praecipiendi postulat, commoremur.

If in some argument it is enough to use the proposition and there is no need to add a proof of the proposition, while in some other argument the proposition is weak unless a proof is joined to it, then the proof is something separate from the proposition. For what can be both joined to a thing and separated from it cannot be the same as that to which it is joined and from which it is separated. Now there is a certain argument in which the proposition has no need of proof, and a certain argument in which it counts for nothing without proof, as we shall show. The proof, therefore, is separate from the proposition. And what we have promised will be shown in this way: the proposition that contains in itself something plain, and something on which all must necessarily agree, this it is pointless to wish to prove and confirm. Such a one is of this sort:

Si quadam in argumentatione satis est uti pro- positione et non oportet adiungere adprobationem pro- positionis, quadam autem in argumentatione infirma est propositio, nisi adiuncta sit adprobatio, separatum est quiddam a propositione adprobatio. quod enim et adiungi et separari ab aliquo potest, id non potest idem esse, quod est id, ad quod adiungitur et a quo separatur; est autem quaedam argumentatio, in qua propositio non indiget approbationis, et quaedam, in qua nihil valet sine approbatione, ut ostendemus. sepa- rata igitur est a propositione approbatio. Ostendetur autem id, quod polliciti sumus, hoc modo: quae propo- sitio in se quiddam continet perspicuum et quod stare inter omnes necesse est, hanc velle approbare et firmare nihil attinet. ea est huiusmodi:

“If, on the day that murder was done at Rome, I was on that day at Athens, I could not have taken part in the murder.” Because this is plainly true, there is no point in proving it. And so the assumption ought to be added at once, in this way: “But I was at Athens on that day.” If this is not agreed, it needs proof; and once that is brought in, the summing-up follows. There is, then, a certain proposition that has no need of proof. For that there is a certain one that does need it—what point is there in showing what is easily plain to anyone? But if that is so, from this and from what we had set forth it is concluded that the proof is something separate from the proposition. And if that is so, it is false that the argument has no more than three parts.

si, quo die ista caedes Romae facta est, ego Athenis eo die fui, in caede in- teresse non potui. hoc quia perspicue verum est, nihil attinet approbari. quare assumi statim oportet, hoc modo: fui autem Athenis eo die. hoc si non constat, indiget approbationis; qua inducta complexio conse- quitur. est igitur quaedam propositio, quae non indiget approbatione. nam esse quidem quandam, quae indi- geat, quid attinet ostendere, quod cuivis facile perspi- cuum est? quodsi ita est, ex hoc et ex eo, quod propo- sueramus, hoc conficitur, separatum esse quiddam a propositione approbationem. sin autem ita est, falsum est non esse plus quam tripertitam argumentationem.

In like manner it is clear that the other proof too, the proof of the assumption, is separate from the assumption. If in some argument it is enough to use the assumption and there is no need to add a proof to the assumption, while in some other argument the assumption is weak unless a proof is joined to it, then the proof is something separate, lying outside the assumption. Now there is a certain argument in which the assumption has no need of proof, and a certain one in which it counts for nothing without proof, as we shall show. The proof, therefore, is separate from the assumption.

Simili modo liquet alteram quoque approbationem separatam esse ab assumptione. si quadam in argu- mentatione satis est uti assumptione et non oportet adiungere approbationem assumptioni, quadam autem in argumentatione infirma est assumptio, nisi adiuncta sit approbatio, separatum quiddam est extra assump- tionem approbatio. est autem argumentatio quaedam, in qua assumptio non indiget approbationis, quaedam autem, in qua nihil valet sine approbatione, ut osten- demus. separata igitur est ab adsumptione approbatio.

And what we have promised we shall show in this way: the assumption that contains a truth plain to all has no need of proof. Such a one is of this sort: “If one ought to wish to be wise, it is fitting to give one’s effort to philosophy.” Here the proposition needs proof; for it is not plain, nor is it agreed among all, since many think philosophy does no good, and very many think it does harm. The assumption is plain; for it is this: “But one ought to wish to be wise.” Because this is perceived of itself and understood to be true, there is no point in proving it. And so the argument must be concluded at once. There is, then, a certain assumption that has no need of proof; for that there is a certain one that does need it is plain. The proof, therefore, is separate from the assumption. It is false, then, that the argument has no more than three parts.

Ostendemus autem, quod polliciti sumus, hoc modo: quae perspicuam omnibus veritatem continet assump- tio, nihil indiget approbationis. ea est huiusmodi: si oportet velle sapere, dare operam philosophiae con- venit. hic propositio indiget approbationis; non enim perspicua est neque constat inter omnes, propterea quod multi nihil prodesse philosophiam, plerique etiam obesse arbitrantur; assumptio perspicua; est enim haec: oportet autem velle sapere. hoc quia ipsum ex se perspicitur et verum esse intellegitur, nihil attinet approbari. quare statim concludenda est argumentatio. est ergo assumptio quaedam, quae approbationis non indiget; nam quandam indigere perspicuum est. se- parata est igitur ab adsumptione approbatio. falsum ergo est non esse plus quam tripertitam argumenta-

And from these things this too is now plain, that there is a certain argument in which neither the proposition nor the assumption needs proof—of this kind, to set down something definite and brief by way of example: “If wisdom is to be sought with the utmost effort, folly is to be shunned with the utmost effort; but wisdom is to be sought with the utmost effort; therefore folly is to be shunned with the utmost effort.” Here both the proposition and the assumption are plain; and so neither of them needs proof either. From all these instances this is plain: that the proof is sometimes added and sometimes not. From which we recognize that the proof is contained neither in the proposition nor in the assumption, but that each, set in its own place, holds its own force as something certain and proper to it. And if that is so, those who divided the argument into five parts have made a fitting partition.

tionem. Atque ex his illud iam perspicuum est, esse quandam argumentationem, in qua neque propositio neque assumptio indigeat approbationis, huiusmodi, ut certum quiddam et breve exempli causa ponamus: si summopere sapientia petenda est, summo opere stul- titia vitanda est: summo autem opere sapientia pe- tenda est: summo igitur opere stultitia vitanda est. hic et propositio et assumptio perspicua est; quare neutra quoque indiget approbatione. ex hisce om- nibus illud perspicuum est approbationem tum adiungi, tum non adiungi. ex quo cognoscitur neque in pro- positione neque in assumptione contineri approba- tionem, sed utramque suo loco positam vim suam tam- quam certam et propriam obtinere. quodsi ita est, commode partiti sunt illi, qui in quinque partes tri- buerunt argumentationem.

There are, then, five parts of the argument that is handled by deduction: the proposition, by which that topic is briefly set out from which all the force of the deduction ought to flow; the proof of the proposition, by which what has been briefly set out is, when affirmed by reasonings, made more probable and more clear; the assumption, by which what bears on the demonstration is assumed from the proposition; the proof of the assumption, by which what has been assumed is confirmed by reasonings; the summing-up, by which what is concluded from the whole argument is briefly set out. The argument that has the most parts consists of these five parts; the second sort is four-part; the third, three-part; then two-part—which is in dispute.

Quinque igitur partes sunt eius argumentationis, quae per ratiocinationem tractatur: propositio, per quam locus is breviter exponitur, ex quo vis omnis oportet emanet ratiocinationis; approbatio, per quam id, quod breviter expositum est, rationibus adfirmatum probabilius et apertius fit; assumptio, per quam id, quod ex propositione ad ostendendum pertinet, assumi- tur; assumptionis approbatio, per quam id, quod assumptum est, rationibus firmatur; complexio, per quam id, quod conficitur ex omni argumentatione, bre- viter exponitur. quae plurimas habet argumentatio partes, ea constat ex his quinque partibus; secunda est quadripertita; tertia tripertita; dein bipertita; quod in controversia est.

It may even seem to someone that it can stand on a single part. Of those argument-forms, then, that are settled, we shall set down examples; for those that are doubtful, we shall bring forward our reasons. The five-part argument is of this kind: “All laws, jurors, ought to be referred to the advantage of the republic, and they ought to be interpreted from the common benefit, not from the wording that stands in the text. For our ancestors were of such virtue and wisdom that, in writing laws, they set before themselves nothing else but the safety and advantage of the republic. For they themselves did not wish to write what would do harm, and, had they written it, they understood that the law, once perceived for what it was, would be repudiated. No one wishes the laws kept safe for the laws’ own sake, but for the republic’s, since all hold that the republic is best administered by the laws. For the same reason, then, that the laws ought to be preserved, it is fitting to interpret everything written with that end in view: that is, since we serve the republic, let us interpret from the advantage and benefit of the republic. For just as one ought to think that nothing proceeds from medicine except what looks to the good of the body, since for the body’s sake medicine was established, so one should judge that nothing proceeds from the laws except what conduces to the republic, since for its sake they were framed.

de una quoque parte potest alicui videri posse consistere. eorum igitur, quae constant, exempla ponemus, horum, quae dubia sunt, rationes afferemus. Quinquepertita argumentatio est huiusmodi: “omnes leges, iudices, ad commodum rei publicae re- ferre oportet et eas ex utilitate communi, non ex scrip- tione, quae in litteris est, interpretari. ea enim virtute et sapientia maiores nostri fuerunt, ut in legibus scriben- dis nihil sibi aliud nisi salutem atque utilitatem rei publicae proponerent. neque enim ipsi, quod obesset, scribere volebant, et, si scripsissent, cum esset intellec- tum, repudiatum iri legem intellegebant. nemo enim leges legum causa salvas esse vult, sed rei publicae, quod ex legibus omnes rem publicam optime putant administrari. quam ob rem igitur leges servari oportet, ad eam causam scripta omnia interpretari convenit: hoc est, quoniam rei publicae servimus, ex rei publicae com- modo atque utilitate interpretemur. nam ut ex medicina nihil oportet putare proficisci, nisi quod ad corporis utilitatem spectet, quoniam eius causa est instituta, sic a legibus nihil convenit arbitrari, nisi quod rei publicae conducat, proficisci, quoniam eius causa sunt compara-

Therefore in this trial too cease to scrutinize the letter of the law, and consider the law, as is just, from the advantage of the republic. What was more advantageous to the Thebans than that the Spartans be crushed? Whose interest was Epaminondas, the Theban general, more bound to consult than the victory of the Thebans? What ought he to have held dearer or of higher account than such great glory for the Thebans, than a trophy so brilliant and so adorned? Plainly, then, he was bound to set the letter of the law aside and consider the framer’s intent. But this at least has been sufficiently considered: that no law has been written except for the sake of the republic. He judged it, therefore, the height of madness to interpret what had been written for the sake of the republic’s safety in a way contrary to the republic’s safety. But if it is fitting that all laws be referred to the advantage of the republic, and this man served the republic’s safety, then surely he cannot by one and the same act have both consulted the common fortunes and failed to obey the laws.”

tae. ergo in hoc quoque iudicio desinite litteras legis perscrutari et legem, ut aequum est, ex utilitate rei publicae considerate. quid magis utile fuit Thebanis quam Lacedaemonios opprimi? cui magis Epaminon- dam, Thebanorum imperatorem, quam victoriae The- banorum consulere decuit? quid hunc tanta Thebano- rum gloria, tam claro atque exornato tropaeo carius aut antiquius habere convenit? scripto videlicet legis omisso scriptoris sententiam considerare debebat. at hoc quidem satis consideratum est, nullam esse legem nisi rei publicae causa scriptam. summam igitur amen- tiam esse existimabat, quod scriptum esset rei publicae salutis causa, id non ex rei publicae salute interpretari. quodsi leges omnes ad utilitatem rei publicae referri convenit, hic autem saluti rei publicae profuit, profecto non potest eodem facto et communibus fortunis con- suluisse et legibus non optemperasse.”

The argument consists of four parts when we either propose or assume without a proof. This is to be done when either the proposition is understood of itself or the assumption is plain and needs no proof at all. When the proof of the proposition is passed over, the argument is handled in four parts, in this manner: “Jurors, you who give judgment on oath under the law, ought to obey the laws. But you cannot obey the laws unless you follow what is written in the law. For what surer testimony of his own intent could the framer of the law have left than what he himself wrote with great care and diligence? But if the text did not survive, we should greatly want it, that from it the framer’s intent might be known; nor even so would we permit Epaminondas—not even were he outside the trial—to interpret the law’s intent for us. Far less should we now allow this man, when the law is at hand, to interpret the framer’s intent not from what is written most plainly, but from what suits his own case. But if you, jurors, ought to obey the laws, and you cannot do this unless you follow what is written in the law, why do you not judge that this man has acted against the law?”

Quattuor autem partibus constat argumentatio, cum aut proponimus aut assumimus sine approbatione. id facere oportet, cum aut propositio ex se intellegitur aut assumptio perspicua est et nullius approbationis indiget. propositionis approbatione praeterita quattuor ex partibus argumentatio tractatur, ad hunc modum: iudices, qui ex lege iurati iudicatis, legibus optempe- rare debetis. optemperare autem legibus non potestis, nisi id, quod scriptum est in lege, sequimini. quod enim certius legis scriptor testimonium voluntatis suae re- linquere potuit, quam quod ipse magna cum cura atque diligentia scripsit? quodsi litterae non exstarent, magnopere eas requireremus, ut ex iis scriptoris vo- luntas cognosceretur; nec tamen Epaminondae per- mitteremus, ne si extra iudicium quidem esset, ut is nobis sententiam legis interpretaretur, nedum nunc istum patiamur, cum praesto lex sit, non ex eo, quod apertissime scriptum est, sed ex eo, quod suae causae convenit, scriptoris voluntatem interpretari. quodsi vos, iudices, legibus optemperare debetis et id facere non potestis, nisi id, quod scriptum est in lege, sequa- mini, quin istum contra legem fecisse iudicatis?

When the proof of the assumption is passed over, the four-part argument will run thus: “Those who have time and again betrayed us by trusting to their word—to their speech we ought not to give trust. For if we take any harm from their treachery, there will be no one whom we can justly accuse but ourselves. And to be deceived once is a misfortune; twice, folly; a third time, disgrace. But the Carthaginians have already very often deceived us. It is, then, the height of madness to place hope in the good faith of those by whose treachery you have so often been deceived.”

assumptionis autem approbatione praeterita quadri- pertita sic fiet argumentatio: qui saepenumero nos per fidem fefellerunt, eorum orationi fidem habere non debemus. si quid enim perfidia illorum detrimenti acceperimus, nemo erit praeter nosmet ipsos, quem iure accusare possimus. ac primo quidem decipi in- commodum est; iterum, stultum; tertio, turpe. Cartha- ginienses autem persaepe iam nos fefellerunt. summa igitur amentia est in eorum fide spem habere, quorum perfidia totiens deceptus sis.

When both proofs are passed over, it becomes three-part, in this fashion: “Either we must fear the Carthaginians, if we leave them unharmed, or we must destroy their city. But fear them we ought not. It remains, then, that we destroy the city.” There are, however, those who think that sometimes the summing-up can be dispensed with, when what is concluded from the deduction is plain; and if this is done, the argument becomes two-part as well, in this way: “If she has given birth, she is no virgin; but she has given birth.” Here, they say, it is enough to propose and to assume: since what is concluded is plain, the matter has no need of a summing-up. To us, however, it seems both that every deduction ought to be concluded and that the fault they object to ought greatly to be avoided—namely, that we should bring into the summing-up what is plain.

Utraque approbatione praeterita tripertita fit, hoc pacto: aut metuamus Carthaginienses oportet, si incolumes eos reliquerimus, aut eorum urbem diruamus. at metuere quidem non oportet. restat igitur, ut urbem diruamus. Sunt autem, qui putant nonnumquam posse com- plexione supersederi, cum id perspicuum sit, quod conficiatur ex ratiocinatione; quod si fiat, bipertitam quoque fieri argumentationem, hoc modo: si peperit, virgo non est: peperit autem. hic satis esse proponere et adsumere: quod conficiatur quoniam perspicuum sit, complexionis rem non indigere. nobis autem vi- detur et omnis ratiocinatio concludenda esse et illud vitium, quod illis displicet, magnopere vitandum, ne, quod perspicuum sit, id in complexionem inferamus.

This will be possible if the kinds of summing-up are understood. For we shall either sum up in such a way as to draw the proposition and the assumption together into one, in this way: “But if it is fitting that all laws be referred to the advantage of the republic, and this man served the republic’s safety, then surely he cannot by one and the same act have both consulted the common safety and failed to obey the laws”; or in such a way that the conclusion is formed from the contrary, in this way: “It is, then, the height of madness to place hope in the good faith of those by whose treachery you have so often been deceived”; or in such a way that only what is concluded is inferred, in this manner: “Let us, then, destroy the city”; or in such a way that one infers what must necessarily follow upon the thing concluded. That is of this kind: “If she has given birth, she has lain with a man; but she has given birth.” This is concluded: “Therefore she has lain with a man.” If you do not wish to infer this, but infer instead what follows from it—“She has, then, committed incest”—you will both have concluded the argument and escaped the plain summing-up.

hoc autem fieri poterit, si complexionum genera intelle- gentur. nam aut ita complectemur, ut in unum con- ducamus propositionem et assumptionem, hoc modo: quodsi leges omnes ad utilitatem rei publicae referri convenit, hic autem saluti rei publicae profuit, pro- fecto non potest eodem facto et saluti communi con- suluisse et legibus non optemperasse; aut ita, ut ex contrario sententia conficiatur, hoc modo: summa igitur amentia est in eorum fide spem habere, quorum perfidia totiens deceptus sis; aut ita, ut id solum, quod conficitur, inferatur, ad hunc modum: urbem igitur diruamus; aut, ut id, quod eam rem, quae con- ficitur, sequatur necesse est. id est huiusmodi: si peperit, cum viro concubuit: peperit autem. conficitur hoc: concubuit igitur cum viro. hoc si nolis inferre et inferas id, quod sequitur: fecit igitur incestum, et concluseris argumentationem et perspicuam fugeris complexionem.

And so in long arguments one ought to sum up either by drawing the parts together or from the contrary; in short ones, to set out only what is concluded; in those whose outcome is plain, to use a consequence. But if some shall think the argument can stand on a single part as well, they will be able to say that it is often enough to make an argument in this way: “Since she has given birth, she has lain with a man”; for this, they say, needs neither proof nor summing-up. But they seem to me to err through an ambiguity in the term. For “argument” in a single word signifies two things, since both the finding of something probable or necessary for a purpose is called an argument, and the artful polishing of what has been found.

quare in longis argumentationibus ex conductionibus aut ex contrario complecti oportet, in brevibus id solum, quod conficitur, exponere, in iis, in quibus exitus perspicuus est, consecutione uti. Si qui autem ex una quoque parte putabunt constare argumentationem, poterunt dicere saepe satis esse hoc modo argumentationem facere: quoniam peperit, cum viro concubuit; nam hoc nullius neque approbationis neque complexionis indigere. sed nobis ambiguitate nominis videntur errare. nam argumentatio nomine uno res duas significat, ideo quod et inventum ali- quam in rem probabile aut necessarium argumentatio vocatur et eius inventi artificiosa expolitio.

When, therefore, they bring forward something of this kind—“Since she has given birth, she has lain with a man”—they bring forward a finding, not a polishing; but we are speaking of the parts of the polishing. That reasoning, then, will have nothing to do with this matter; and by this same distinction we shall ward off other objections too that may seem to stand in the way of this partition—if anyone should think that the assumption can sometimes be removed, or the proposition. For if either has anything probable or necessary in it, it must in some way move the hearer. But if only this were regarded, and it made no difference how what had been thought out was handled, there would be reckoned to be by no means so great a difference between the highest orators and the middling ones.

cum igitur proferent aliquid huiusmodi: quoniam peperit, cum viro concubuit, inventum proferent, non expolitionem; nos autem de expolitionis partibus loquimur. Nihil igitur ad hanc rem ratio illa pertinebit; atque hac distinctione alia quoque, quae videbuntur officere huic partitioni, propulsabimus, si quis aut assumptio- nem aliquando tolli posse putet aut propositionem. quae si quid habet probabile aut necessarium, quoquo modo commoveat auditorem necesse est. quod si so- lum spectaretur ac nihil, quo pacto tractaretur id, quod esset excogitatum, referret, nequaquam tantum inter summos oratores et mediocres interesse existi-

But it will be greatly necessary to vary the speech; for in all things sameness is the mother of satiety. This will be possible if we do not always enter upon the argument in the same way. For first of all it is fitting to make distinctions by the very kinds—that is, now to use induction, now deduction; then, in the argument itself, not always to begin from the proposition, nor always to use up all five parts, nor to polish the parts by the same method, but now to begin from the assumption, now from one or the other proof, now from both, now to use this kind of summing-up, now that. And that this may be perceived, let us set it down in writing; let us practice this very thing in any example you please among those that have been proposed, so that one may put to the test how easy it is to do.

maretur. variare autem orationem magnopere oporte- bit; nam omnibus in rebus similitudo mater est satietatis. id fieri poterit, si non similiter semper ingre- diamur in argumentationem. nam primum omnium generibus ipsis distinguere convenit, hoc est, tum in- ductione uti, tum ratiocinatione, deinde in ipsa ar- gumentatione non semper a propositione incipere nec semper quinque partibus abuti neque eadem partes ratione expolire, sed tum ab assumptione incipere, tum adprobatione alterutra, tum utraque, tum hoc, tum illo genere conplexionis uti. id ut perspiciatur, scribamus * in quolibet exemplo de iis, quae proposita sunt, hoc idem exerceamus, ut quam facile factu sit, periclitari licet.

And on the parts of the argument enough seems to us to have been said. But we wish it to be understood that we are well aware that arguments are handled by other methods too, in philosophy, many of them and obscure, about which a definite art has been established. But those have seemed to us foreign to the practice of oratory. As for what we think pertains to speaking, we do not affirm that we have attended to it more aptly than others; we do promise that we have written it up more searchingly and more carefully. Now, as we have determined, we shall proceed in order to the remaining matters.

Ac de partibus quidem argumentationis satis nobis dictum videtur: illud autem volumus intellegi nos probe tenere aliis quoque rationibus tractari argumen- tationes in philosophia multis et obscuris, de quibus certum est artificium constitutum. verum illa nobis abhorrere ab usu oratorio visa sunt. quae pertinere autem ad dicendum putamus, ea nos commodius quam ceteros adtendisse non affirmamus; perquisitius et diligentius conscripsisse pollicemur. nunc, ut statui- mus, proficisci ordine ad reliqua pergemus.

The refutation is that by which, through arguing, the proof of the adversaries is dissolved, or weakened, or made to seem slight. It will use the same source of invention that the proof uses, for the reason that the topics from which a thing can be confirmed are the same from which it can be weakened. For nothing is to be considered in all these inventions except what has been assigned to persons or to circumstances. Therefore the invention and the polishing of arguments, drawn from what has been taught before, will have to be carried over into this part of the speech as well. Nonetheless, that some precept may be given for this part too, we shall set out the modes of refutation; those who observe them will more easily be able to dissolve or weaken what is said against them.

Reprehensio est, per quam argumentando adver- sariorum confirmatio diluitur aut infirmatur aut ele- vatur. haec fonte inventionis eodem utetur, quo utitur confirmatio, propterea quod, quibus ex locis ali- qua res confirmari potest, isdem potest ex locis in- firmari. nihil enim considerandum est in his omnibus inventionibus nisi id, quod personis aut negotiis adtributum est. quare inventionem et argumentationum expolitionem ex illis, quae ante praecepta sunt, hanc quoque in partem orationis transferri oportebit. verum- tamen, ut quaedam praeceptio detur huius quoque partis, exponemus modos reprehensionis; quos qui ob- servabunt, facilius ea, quae contra dicentur, diluere aut infirmare poterunt.

Every argument is refuted if either, among the things assumed, some one or more is not granted; or, these being granted, the summing-up is denied to be formed from them; or if the very kind of argument is shown to be faulty; or if against a firm argument another equally firm or firmer is set. Among the things assumed, something is not granted when either what they call credible is denied to be of that sort; or what they think comparable is shown to be unlike; or a precedent is drawn over to the other side; or the judgment is wholly disapproved; or what the adversaries said was a sign is denied to be of that sort; or the compound argument is refuted, either in one part or in both; or the enumeration is shown to be false; or the simple conclusion is demonstrated to contain something false. For everything assumed for arguing, whether as probable or as necessary, must be assumed from these topics, as we showed before.

Omnis argumentatio reprehenditur, si aut ex iis, quae sumpta sunt, non conceditur aliquid unum plu- rave aut his concessis conplexio ex his confici ne- gatur, aut si genus ipsum argumentationis vitiosum ostenditur, aut si contra firmam argumentationem alia aeque firma aut firmior ponitur. Ex iis, quae sumuntur, aliquid non conceditur, cum aut id, quod credibile dicunt, negatur esse eiusmodi, aut, quod conparabile putant, dissimile ostenditur, aut iudicatum aliam in partem traducitur, aut omnino iudicium inprobatur, aut, quod signum esse adversarii dixerunt, id eiusmodi negatur esse, aut si conprehensio aut una aut ex utraque parte reprehenditur, aut enume- ratio falsa ostenditur, aut simplex conclusio falsi ali- quid continere demonstratur. nam omne, quod su- mitur ad argumentandum sive pro probabili sive pro necessario, necesse est sumatur ex his locis, ut ante ostendimus.

What has been assumed as credible will be weakened if either it is plainly false, in this way: “There is no one who would not rather have money than wisdom”; or there is something credible from the contrary as well, in this way: “Who is there who is not more eager for duty than for money?”; or it is altogether incredible, as if someone known to be greedy should say that for the sake of some middling duty he had disregarded a very great sum; or if what happens in certain matters or with certain men is said to befall all, in this fashion: “Those who are poor hold money of more account than duty”; “A place that is deserted—in it the murder must have been done”; “In a crowded place, how could a man have been killed?”; or if what rarely happens is denied to happen at all, as Curio said for Fulvius: “No one can fall in love at a single glance, or in passing.”

Quod pro credibili sumptum erit, id infirmabitur, si aut perspicue falsum erit, hoc modo: nemo est, quin pecuniam quam sapientiam malit; aut ex contrario quoque credibile aliquid habebit, hoc modo: quis est, qui non officii cupidior quam pecuniae sit? aut erit omnino incredibile, ut si aliquis, quem constet esse avarum, dicat alicuius mediocris officii causa se maxi- mam pecuniam neglexisse, aut si, quod in quibusdam rebus aut hominibus accidit, id omnibus dicitur usu venire, hoc pacto: qui pauperes sunt, iis antiquior of- ficio pecunia est; qui locus desertus est, in eo caedem factam esse oportet; in loco celebri homo occidi qui potuit? aut si id, quod raro fit, fieri omnino negatur, ut Curio pro Fulvio: nemo potest uno aspectu neque praeteriens in amorem incidere.

What has been assumed as a sign will be weakened from the same topics by which it is confirmed. For in the case of a sign one ought first to show that it is true; then that it is a sign proper to the matter at issue, as blood is of a killing; then that what ought not to have been done was done, or what ought to have been done was not; lastly, that the man under inquiry knew the law and custom of that matter. For these are the things assigned to a sign—which we shall open up more carefully when we speak separately of the conjectural issue itself. Therefore, in refutation, each one of these will be demonstrated either not to be a sign, or to be too slight a one, or to stand on our side rather than the adversaries’, or to be alleged altogether falsely, or to be capable of being drawn into some other suspicion as well.

Quod autem pro signo sumetur, id ex isdem locis, quibus confirmatur, infirmabitur. nam in signo primum verum esse ostendi oportet; deinde esse eius rei signum proprium, qua de agitur, ut cruorem caedis; deinde factum esse, quod non oportuerit, aut non factum, quod oportuerit; postremo scisse eum, de quo quaeritur, eius rei legem et consuetudinem. nam eae res sunt signo adtributae; quas diligentius aperiemus, cum separatim de ipsa coniecturali constitutione dicemus. ergo horum unum quodque in reprehensione aut non esse signo aut parum magno esse aut a se potius quam ab ad- versariis stare aut omnino falso dici aut in aliam quo- que suspicionem duci posse demonstrabitur.

When something is brought in as comparable, since it is handled chiefly through likeness, in refuting it will be fitting to deny that the thing compared is like that with which it is compared. This will be possible if it is demonstrated to differ in kind, nature, force, magnitude, time, place, person, or repute; and if it is shown in what reckoning that which is brought in by way of likeness, and in what reckoning this, for the sake of which it is brought in, ought to be held. Then we shall demonstrate how the one matter differs from the other; from which we shall teach that one ought to judge differently of what is being compared and of that with which it is compared. We have the greatest need of this faculty when the very argument that is handled by induction has to be refuted. But if some precedent is brought in, then—since it is confirmed chiefly from these topics: the praise of those who gave the judgment; the likeness of the matter at issue to that on which judgment was given; the recalling that the judgment was not only not censured but approved by all; and the demonstration that what is brought in was harder and greater to judge than the matter now pressing—it will have to be weakened from the contrary topics, if the matter, either true or like the truth, allows. And it must be carefully observed that what was judged have some bearing on the matter at issue; and one must see that no matter be brought forward in which there was some offense, lest judgment seem to be passed on the very man who gave the judgment.

Cum autem pro conparabili aliquid inducetur, quon- iam id per similitudinem maxime tractatur, in repre- hendendo conveniet simile id negare esse, quod con- feretur, ei, quicum conferetur. id fieri poterit, si de- monstrabitur diversum esse genere, natura, vi, magni- tudine, tempore, loco, persona, opinione; ac si, quo in numero illud, quod per similitudinem afferetur, et quo in loco hoc, cuius causa afferetur, haberi con- veniat, ostendetur. deinde, quid res cum re differat, demonstrabimus: ex quo docebimus aliud de eo, quod comparabitur, et de eo, quicum comparabitur, existi- mare oportere. huius facultatis maxime indigemus, cum ea ipsa argumentatio, quae per inductionem trac- tatur, erit reprehendenda. Sin iudicatum aliquod inferetur, quoniam id ex his locis maxime firmatur: laude eorum, qui iudicarunt; similitudine eius rei, qua de agitur, ad eam rem, qua de iudicatum est; et commemorando non modo non esse reprehensum iudicium, sed ab omnibus adpro- batum; et demonstrando difficilius et maius fuisse ad iudicandum, quod afferatur, quam id, quod instet: ex contrariis locis, si res aut vera aut veri similis permittet, infirmari oportebit. atque erit observandum diligenter, ne nihil ad id, quo de agatur, pertineat id, quod iudica- tum sit; et videndum est, ne ea res proferatur, in qua sit offensum, ut de ipso, qui iudicarit, iudicium fieri videatur.

But one must be careful, when many things have been decided otherwise, not to bring forward some solitary or rare verdict; for it is precisely in this way that the authority of a precedent can most readily be undermined. The things, then, that are assumed as merely probable will have to be tested in this manner. But those that are advanced as if they were necessary, if they perhaps only imitate a necessary argument and are not of that kind, will be refuted as follows. First, the dilemma, which, whichever horn you grant, ought to do away with your position: if it is sound, it will never be refuted; if it is false, it is refuted in two ways, either by inversion or by the disabling of one of its parts. By inversion, in this manner: “For if he feels shame, why accuse a man who is honest? But if he possesses a mind incapable of shame, why accuse a man who would value the charge at nothing once he heard it?” Here, whether you say he feels shame or does not, the speaker supposes you must grant that he ought not to be accused. This is refuted by inversion thus: “On the contrary, he ought to be accused. For if he feels shame, accuse him; for he will not value the charge at nothing. But if he possesses a mind incapable of shame, accuse him all the same; for he is not honest.”

oportet autem animadvertere, ne, cum aliter sint multa iudicata, solitarium aliquid aut rarum iudicatum afferatur. nam sic his rebus auctoritas iudicati maxime potest infirmari. atque ea quidem, quae quasi probabilia sumentur, ad hunc modum temptari oportebit. Quae vero sicuti necessaria dicentur, ea si forte imitabuntur modo necessariam argumentationem ne- que erunt eiusmodi, sic reprehendentur: primum con- prehensio, quae, utrum concesseris, debet tollere: si vera est, numquam reprehendetur; sin falsa, duobus modis, aut conversione aut alterius partis infirmatione conversione, hoc modo: Nam si veretur, quid eum accuses, qui est probus? Sin inverecundum animi ingenium possidet, Quid autem eum accuses, qui id parvi auditum aestimet? hic, sive vereri dixeris sive non vereri, concedendum hoc putat, ut neges esse accusandum. quod conver- sione sic reprehendetur: immo vero accusandus est. nam si veretur, accuses; non enim parvi auditum aesti- mabit. sin inverecundum animi ingenium possidet, tamen accuses; non enim probus est.

By the disabling of one of its parts it will be refuted in this manner: “Indeed, if he feels shame, then, corrected by your accusation, he will withdraw from his error.” An enumeration is recognized as faulty if either we name something that has been passed over, which we would be willing to grant, or some weak item is reckoned in, which can either be contradicted or for which there is no reason why we cannot honorably grant it. Something is passed over in enumerations of this kind: “Since you have that horse, you must either have bought it, or hold it by inheritance, or received it as a gift, or it was born to you at home, or, if none of these is the case, you must have stolen it. But you neither bought it, nor did it come by inheritance, nor was it given, nor born at home: therefore you must have stolen it.”

alterius autem partis infirmatione hoc modo reprehendetur: verum si veretur, accusatione tua correctus ab errato recedet. Enumeratio vitiosa intellegitur, si aut praeteritum quiddam dicimus, quod velimus concedere, aut infir- mum aliquid adnumeratum, quod aut contra dici possit aut causa non sit, quare non honeste possimus concedere. praeteritur quiddam in eiusmodi enumerationi- bus: quoniam habes istum equum, aut emeris oportet aut hereditate possideas aut munere acceperis aut domi tibi natus sit aut, si eorum nihil est, subripueris ne- cesse est: si neque emisti neque hereditate venit ne- que donatus est neque domi natus est: necesse est ergo subripueris.

This is conveniently refuted if it can be said that the horse was captured from the enemy, and that no auction of that spoil was held; once this is brought in, the enumeration is disabled, since something has been introduced that was passed over in the enumeration. By the other method it will be refuted if either something is contradicted—that is, if, to keep to the same example, it can be shown that the horse did come by inheritance—or if the last item is not shameful to grant; as when, the adversaries having said, “Either you wished to lay a plot, or you indulged a friend, or you were carried away by greed,” a man should confess that he indulged a friend.

hoc commode reprehenditur, si dici possit ex hostibus equus esse captus, cuius praedae sectio non venierit; quo inlato infirmatur enumeratio, quon- iam id sit inductum, quod praeteritum sit in enume- ratione. altero autem modo reprehendetur, si aut con- tra aliquid dicetur, hoc est, si exempli causa, ut in eodem versemur, poterit ostendi hereditate venisse, aut si illud extremum non erit turpe concedere, ut si qui, cum dixerint adversarii: aut insidias facere voluisti aut amico morem gessisti aut cupiditate elatus es, amico se morem gessisse fateatur.

A simple conclusion is refuted if what follows does not appear to cohere necessarily with what came before. For this, indeed: “If he draws breath, he is alive”; “if it is day, there is light”—this is of such a kind that the latter appears to cohere necessarily with the former. But this: “If she is a mother, she loves”; “if he has sinned at some time, he will never be set right”—this it will be fitting to refute by showing that the latter does not cohere necessarily with the former. This class of argument, and the other necessary kinds, and indeed every argument and its refutation, contain a certain greater force and extend more widely than is here set forth; but the knowledge of that art is of such a kind that it cannot be attached to some part of this art, but itself requires, separately, a long stretch of time and a great and arduous study. Therefore those matters will be unfolded by us at another time and for another purpose, if the means are at hand; for now we shall have to be content with these precepts of the rhetoricians, suited to the practice of an orator. When, then, something among the things assumed is not granted, the argument will be disabled in the way described.

Simplex autem conclusio reprehenditur, si hoc, quod sequitur, non videatur necessario cum eo, quod ante- cessit, cohaerere. nam hoc quidem: Si spiritum ducit, vivit, si dies est, lucet eiusmodi est, ut cum priore necessario posterius cohaerere videatur. hoc autem: si mater est, diligit, si aliquando peccavit, numquam corrigetur sic conveniet reprehendi, ut demonstretur non necessario cum priore posterius cohaerere. hoc genus et cetera necessaria et omnino omnis argumen- tatio et eius reprehensio maiorem quandam vim con- tinet et latius patet, quam hic exponitur; sed eius artificii cognitio eiusmodi est, ut non ad huius artis partem aliquam adiungi possit, sed ipsa separatim longi temporis et magnae atque arduae cognitionis in- digeat. quare illa nobis alio tempore atque ad aliud institutum, si facultas erit, explicabuntur; nunc his praeceptionibus rhetorum ad usum oratorium conten- tos nos esse oportebit. cum igitur ex iis, quae sumentur, aliquid non concedetur, sic infirmabitur.

But when, these things being granted, the conclusion is not made out of them, the following points must be considered: whether one thing is concluded while another is stated, in this manner. Suppose someone says that he set out for the army, and another wishes to use this argument against him: “If you had come to the army, you would have been seen by the military tribunes; but you were not seen by them: therefore you did not set out for the army.” Here, when you have granted the proposition and the assumption, the conclusion is to be disabled.

Cum autem his concessis conplexio ex his non con- ficitur, haec erunt consideranda: num aliud conficiatur, aliud dicatur, hoc modo: si, cum aliquis dicat se pro- fectum esse ad exercitum, contra eum quis velit hac uti argumentatione: si venisses ad exercitum, a tri- bunis militaribus visus esses; non es autem ab his visus: non es igitur ad exercitum profectus. hic cum concesseris propositionem et assumptionem, conplexio est infirmanda.

For something different was brought in from what was demanded. And here, indeed, so that the matter might be more easily grasped, we have set down an example endowed with a conspicuous and gross fault; but often a fault more obscurely placed passes for true, when either you remember too little what you have granted, or you have granted something ambiguous as if it were certain. If you have granted something ambiguous in the sense in which you yourself understood it, and the adversary wishes to adapt that part to another sense by means of the conclusion, you will have to show that the conclusion is made not from what you yourself granted, but from what he assumed, in this manner: “If you lack money, you have no money; if you have no money, you are poor: but you lack money; for otherwise you would not be giving your effort to trade: therefore you are poor.” This is refuted thus: “When you said, ‘If you lack money, you have no money,’ I understood it as: ‘If through want you are in destitution, you have no money,’ and on that account I granted it; but when you assumed this, ‘But you lack money,’ I took it as: ‘But you wish to have more money.’ From these concessions this does not follow: ‘Therefore you are poor.’ It would follow, however, if at the very outset I had granted you this too: that whoever wishes to have more money does not have money.”

aliud enim, quam cogebatur, inlatum est. ac nunc quidem, quo facilius res cognosceretur, perspicuo et grandi vitio praeditum posuimus exem- plum; sed saepe obscurius positum vitium pro vero probatur, cum aut parum memineris, quid concesseris, aut ambiguum aliquid pro certo concesseris. ambiguum si concesseris ex ea parte, quam ipse intellexeris, eam partem adversarius ad aliam partem per conplexionem velit accommodare, demonstrare oportebit non ex eo, quod ipse concesseris, sed ex eo, quod ille sumpserit, confici conplexionem, ad hunc modum: si indigetis pecuniae, pecuniam non habetis; si pecuniam non habetis, pauperes estis: indigetis autem pecuniae; mer- caturae enim, ni ita esset, operam non daretis: pauperes igitur estis. hoc sic reprehenditur: cum dicebas: si indigetis pecuniae, pecuniam non habetis, hoc intelle- gebam: si propter inopiam in egestate estis, pecuniam non habetis, et idcirco concedebam; cum autem hoc sumebas: indigetis autem pecuniae, illud accipiebam: vultis autem pecuniae plus habere. ex quibus conces- sionibus non conficitur hoc: pauperes igitur estis; con- ficeretur autem, si tibi primo quoque hoc concessissem, qui pecuniam maiorem vellet habere, eum pecuniam non habere.

But often they think you have forgotten what you granted, and so something that is not concluded is brought into the conclusion as if it were concluded, in this manner: “If the inheritance was coming to him, it is probable that he was killed by him.” Then they prove this with very many words. Afterward they assume: “But the inheritance was coming to him.” Then it is inferred: “Therefore he killed him”—a thing which does not follow from what they had assumed. Therefore one must observe diligently both what is assumed and what is concluded from it. The very class of argument will be shown to be faulty for these reasons: if either there is a fault in itself, or it is not adapted to the matter in hand. And there will be a fault in itself if it is altogether wholly false, if it is common, if it is commonplace, if it is trivial, if it is far-fetched, if it rests on a bad definition, if it is disputable, if it is self-evident, if it is not granted, if it is shameful, if it is offensive, if it is contrary, if it is in-

saepe autem oblitum putant, quid con- cesseris, et idcirco id, quod non conficitur, quasi con- ficiatur, in conclusionem infertur, hoc modo: si ad illum hereditas veniebat, veri simile est ab illo ne- catum. deinde hoc adprobant plurimis verbis. post adsumunt: ad illum autem hereditas veniebat. de- inde infertur: ille igitur occidit; id quod ex iis, quae sumpserant, non conficitur. quare observare diligenter oportet, et quid sumatur et quid ex his conficiatur. Ipsum autem genus argumentationis vitiosum his de causis ostendetur, si aut in ipso vitium erit aut non ad id, quod instituitur, accommodabitur. atque in ipso vitium erit, si omnino totum falsum erit, si commune, si vulgare, si leve, si remotum, si mala definitione, si controversum, si perspicuum, si non concessum, si turpe, si offensum, si contrarium, si in-

consistent, if it tells against the speaker. It is false in which there is a manifest lie, in this manner: “No one can be wise who disregards money. But Socrates disregarded money: therefore he was not wise.” It is common which works no more for the adversaries than for us, in this manner: “On this account, jurors, because I had a true case, I summed up briefly.” It is commonplace which, if it were now granted, could be transferred to another matter that is not creditable, as this: “If he did not have a true case, he would not have entrusted himself to you, jurors.” It is trivial which is either said after the moment, in this manner: “If it had come into his mind, he would not have done it”; or which seeks to cover a manifestly shameful thing with a flimsy defense, in this manner: “When all men sought you out, your kingdom in fullest flower, I left you: now, deserted by all, at the height of peril, alone I make ready to restore you.”

constans, si adversarium. falsum est, in quo per- spicue mendacium est, hoc modo: non potest esse sapiens, qui pecuniam neglegit. Socrates autem pecuniam neglegebat: non igitur sapiens erat. com- mune est, quod nihilo magis ab adversariis quam a nobis facit, hoc modo: idcirco, iudices, quia veram causam habebam, brevi peroravi. vulgare est, quod in aliam quoque rem non probabilem, si nunc con- cessum sit, transferri possit, ut hoc: si causam veram non haberet, vobis se, iudices, non commisisset. leve est, quod aut post tempus dicitur, hoc modo: si in mentem venisset, non commisisset; aut perspicue tur- pem rem levi tegere vult defensione, hoc modo: Cum te expetebant omnes florentissimo Regno, reliqui: nunc desertum ab omnibus Summo periclo sola ut restituam paro.

It is far-fetched which is sought beyond what is enough, of this kind: “But if Publius Scipio had not given his daughter Cornelia in marriage to Tiberius Gracchus, and had not begotten the two Gracchi from her, such great seditions would not have arisen; therefore this misfortune appears to be charged to Scipio’s account.” Of this kind, too, is that lament: “Would that the fir-beams had not fallen, hewn by axes, to the ground in the grove of Pelion!”—for it has been traced back further than the matter required. A definition is bad when it either describes things held in common, in this manner: “A seditious man is one who is a bad and useless citizen”—for this describes the character no more of the seditious man than of the place-seeker, the slanderer, or any worthless man; or when it states something false, in this fashion: “Wisdom is the understanding of how to acquire money”; or when it contains something neither weighty nor great, thus: “Folly is an immense desire for glory.” This is indeed folly, but defined in respect of a certain part, not of the whole class. It is disputable in which, to demonstrate a doubtful thing, a doubtful ground is brought forward, in this manner: “Come, tell me: do the gods, who have the power to move the upper and the lower world, reconcile peace among themselves, and bring concord together?”

remotum est, quod ultra quam satis est petitur, huius- modi: quodsi non P. Scipio Corneliam filiam Ti. Graccho conlocasset atque ex ea duos Gracchos pro- creasset, tantae seditiones natae non essent; quare hoc incommodum Scipioni adscribendum videtur. huius- modi est illa quoque conquestio: Utinam ne in nemore Pelio securibus Caesae accidissent abiegnae ad terram trabes! longius enim repetita est, quam res postulabat. mala definitio est, cum aut communia describit, hoc modo: seditiosus est is, qui malus atque inutilis civis — nam hoc non magis seditiosi quam ambitiosi, quam calumniatoris, quam alicuius hominis improbi vim describit—; aut falsum quiddam dicit, hoc pacto: sapientia est pecuniae quaerendae intellegentia; aut aliquid non grave nec magnum continens, sic: stul- titia est inmensa gloriae cupiditas. est haec quidem stultitia, sed ex parte quadam, non ex omni genere definita. controversum est, in quo ad dubium demon- strandum dubia causa affertur, hoc modo: Eho tu, di, quibus est potestas motus superum atque inferum, Pacem inter sese conciliant, conferunt concordiam.

It is self-evident concerning which there is no dispute: as if someone, in accusing Orestes, should make it plain that his mother was killed by him. It is not granted when the very thing that is magnified is in dispute: as if someone, in accusing Ulysses, should dwell chiefly on this—that it was an unworthy thing for the bravest of men, Ajax, to have been killed by the most cowardly of men. It is shameful which, on account of an unseemly thing, appears unworthy either of the place in which it is said, or of the man who says it, or of the time at which it is said, or of those who hear it, or of the matter under discussion. It is offensive which wounds the goodwill of those who hear: as if someone, before Roman knights eager to sit in judgment, should praise the

perspicuum est, de quo non est controversia: ut si quis, cum Orestem accuset, planum faciat ab eo matrem esse occisam. non concessum est, cum id, quod au- getur, in controversia est, ut si quis, cum Ulixem ac- cuset, in hoc maxime commoretur: indignum esse ab homine ignavissimo virum fortissimum Aiacem ne- catum. turpe est, quod aut eo loco, in quo dicitur, aut eo homine, qui dicit, aut eo tempore, quo dicitur, aut iis, qui audiunt, aut ea re, qua de agitur, indignum propter inhonestam rem videtur. offensum est, quod eorum, qui audiunt, voluntatem laedit: ut, si quis apud equites Romanos cupidos iudicandi Caepionis

judiciary law of Caepio. It is contrary which is said against what those who hear have done: as if someone, speaking before Alexander of Macedon against some stormer of cities, should say that nothing is more cruel than to demolish cities, when Alexander himself had demolished Thebes. It is inconsistent which is said by the same man about the same matter in differing ways: as if someone, having said that the man who possesses virtue lacks nothing for living well, should afterward deny that one can live well without good health; or should say that he stands by his friend out of goodwill, but that he hopes some advantage will come to himself.

legem iudiciariam laudet. contrarium est, quod contra dicitur atque ii, qui audiunt, fecerunt: ut si quis apud Alexandrum Macedonem dicens contra aliquem urbis expugnatorem diceret nihil esse crudelius quam urbes diruere, cum ipse Alexander Thebas diruisset. in- constans est, quod ab eodem de eadem re diverse dicitur: ut, si qui, cum dixerit, qui virtutem habeat, eum nullius rei ad bene vivendum indigere, neget postea sine bona valetudine posse bene vivi: aut, se amico adesse propter benivolentiam, sperare autem aliquid commodi ad se perventurum.

It tells against the speaker when it works in some respect against his own case, as if someone should magnify the enemy’s force and resources and good fortune while exhorting his soldiers to fight. If some part of the argument is not adapted to the matter in hand, it will be found at fault in one of these ways: if, having promised more, he demonstrates less; or if, when he ought to show the whole, he speaks of some part, in this manner: “The race of women is greedy; for Eriphyle sold her husband’s life for gold”; or if he does not defend against the thing of which he is accused, as if someone, accused of bribery, should defend himself by saying he is brave in combat; or as Amphion in Euripides, and likewise in Pacuvius, who, having disparaged music, praises wisdom; or if a thing is censured on account of a man’s fault, as if someone should reproach learning out of the vices of some learned man; or if someone, wishing to praise a man, speaks of his good fortune rather than of his virtue; or if he so compares thing with thing that he thinks he cannot praise the one unless he has censured the other;

adversarium est, quod ipsi causae aliqua ex parte officit, ut si quis hostium vim et copias et felicitatem augeat, cum ad pugnandum milites adhortetur. Si non ad id, quod instituitur, accommodabitur ali- qua pars argumentationis, horum aliquo in vitio re- perietur: si plura pollicitus pauciora demonstrabit; aut si, cum totum debebit ostendere, de parte aliqua lo- quatur, hoc modo: Mulierum genus avarum est; nam Eriphyla auro viri vitam vendidit; aut si non id, quod accusabitur, defendet, ut, si qui, cum ambitus accusa- bitur, manu se fortem esse defendet; aut ut Amphion apud Euripidem, item apud Pacuvium, qui vituperata musica sapientiam laudat; aut si res ex hominis vitio vituperabitur, ut, si qui doctrinam ex alicuius docti vitiis reprehendat; aut si qui, cum aliquem volet lau- dare, de felicitate eius, non de virtute dicat; aut si rem cum re ita comparabit, ut alteram se non putet laudare, nisi alteram vituperarit;

or if he so praises the one that he makes no mention of the other; or if, when a definite matter is at issue, the speech is set up about a general one, as if someone, when certain men are deliberating whether to wage war or not, should praise peace altogether, instead of demonstrating that this particular war is unprofitable; or if the ground given for some thing is false, in this manner: “Money is a good, because it most of all makes life happy”; or weak, as in Plautus: “To rebuke a friend for a deserved wrong is a thankless deed; but in due season it is useful and profitable; and so today I will roundly rebuke my friend for a wrong he has earned”; or the same as the thing proved, in this manner: “Greed is an evil; for the desire of money has afflicted many with great misfortunes”; or insufficiently fitting, in this manner: “The greatest good is friendship; for there are very many delights in friendship.”

aut si alteram ita lau- det, ut alterius non faciat mentionem; aut si, cum de certa re quaeretur, de communi instituetur oratio, ut, si quis, cum aliqui deliberent, bellum gerant an non, pacem laudet omnino, non illud bellum inutile esse demonstret; aut si ratio alicuius rei reddetur falsa, hoc modo: pecunia bonum est, propterea quod ea maxime vitam beatam efficiat; aut infirma, ut Plautus: Amicum castigare ob meritam noxiam, Immune est facinus; verum in aetate utile Et conducibile; nam ego amicum hodie meum Concastigabo pro commerita noxia; aut eadem, hoc modo: malum est avaritia; multos enim magnis incommodis affecit pecuniae cupiditas; aut parum idonea, hoc modo: maximum bonum est amicitia; plurimae enim delectationes sunt in amicitia.

The fourth method of refutation was the one by which, against a firm argument, one equally firm or firmer is set down. This kind will be employed chiefly in deliberations, when we grant that something said on the other side is fair, but demonstrate that what we ourselves defend is necessary; or when we admit that what they defend is useful, but demonstrate that what we propose is honorable. And concerning refutation we have judged these things to be worth saying. Next we shall now treat of the conclusion.

Quartus modus erat reprehensionis, per quem contra firmam argumentationem aeque firma aut firmior po- nitur. hoc genus in deliberationibus maxime versa- bitur, cum aliquid, quod contra dicatur, aequum esse concedimus, sed id, quod nos defendimus, necessarium esse demonstramus; aut cum id, quod illi defendant, utile esse fateamur, quod nos dicamus, honestum esse demonstremus. Ac de reprehensione haec quidem existimavimus esse dicenda. deinceps nunc de conclusione ponemus.

Hermagoras places next a digression, and then, last of all, the conclusion. In this digression he holds that a certain passage ought to be brought in, removed from the case and from the point for decision itself, which contains either praise of oneself or censure of the adversary, or leads off into another case, from which it produces something by way of proof or refutation—not by arguing, but by enlarging, through a certain amplification. If anyone holds this to be a part of the speech, he is free to follow that view. For both the precepts of amplifying and those of praising and censuring have been given by us in part, and in part will be given in their proper place. To us, however, it has not seemed good to place this among their number, because to digress from the case, except by way of a commonplace, is something we disapprove of—a kind of which we must speak later. As for praises and censures, it does not seem good to treat them separately, but to have them woven into the arguments themselves. Now we shall speak of the conclusion.

Hermagoras digressionem deinde, tum postremam conclusionem ponit. in hac autem digressione ille putat oportere quandam inferri orationem a causa atque a iudicatione ipsa remotam, quae aut sui laudem aut ad- versarii vituperationem contineat aut in aliam causam deducat, ex qua conficiat aliquid confirmationis aut re- prehensionis, non argumentando, sed augendo per quandam amplificationem. hanc si qui partem putabit esse orationis, sequatur licebit. nam et augendi et laudandi et vituperandi praecepta a nobis partim data sunt, partim suo loco dabuntur. nobis autem non placuit hanc partem in numerum reponi, quod de causa digredi nisi per locum communem displicet: quo de genere posterius est dicendum. laudes autem et vituperationes non separatim placet tractari, sed in ipsis argumentationibus esse inplicatas. Nunc de conclusione dicemus.

The conclusion is the close and rounding-off of the whole speech. It has three parts: the recapitulation, the rousing of indignation, and the appeal for pity. The recapitulation is that by which things said in scattered and diffuse fashion are gathered into one place and, for the sake of recollection, brought together under a single view. If this is always handled in the same manner, it will be plainly understood by all to be handled by a certain artifice; but if it is done with variety, it will be able to avoid both this suspicion and tedium. Therefore at one time it will be fitting to do as most do, for the sake of ease—to touch on each single matter one by one and so pass briefly through all the arguments; at another time, the harder course, to state which parts you laid out in the partition, which you promised to speak about, and to recall to memory by what reasonings you confirmed each single part; at another time, to ask of those who hear what it is that they ought to want demonstrated to them, in this manner: “This we taught, this we made plain.” Thus the hearer will at once return to remembrance and will suppose that there is nothing further he ought to require.

Conclusio est exitus et determinatio totius orationis. haec habet partes tres: enumerationem, indignationem, conquestionem. Enumeratio est, per quam res disperse et diffuse dictae unum in locum coguntur et reminiscendi causa unum sub aspectum subiciuntur. haec si semper eodem modo tractabitur, perspicue ab omnibus artificio quo- dam tractari intellegetur; sin varie fiet, et hanc suspi- cionem et satietatem vitare poterit. quare tum oporte- bit ita facere, ut plerique faciunt propter facilitatem, singillatim unam quamque rem adtingere et ita omnes transire breviter argumentationes; tum autem, id quod difficilius est, dicere, quas partes exposueris in par- titione, de quibus te pollicitus sis dicturum, et reducere in memoriam, quibus rationibus unam quamque partem confirmaris; tum ab iis, qui audiunt, quaerere, quid sit, quod sibi velle debeant demonstrari, hoc modo: illud docuimus, illud planum fecimus. ita simul et in memoriam redibit auditor et putabit nihil esse praeterea, quod debeat desiderare.

And in these kinds, as was said before, you may at one time pass through your arguments separately, at another time—which is more artful—join your own with those opposed to them; and when you have stated your own argument, then show how you dissolved what was brought against it. Thus, by a brief comparison, the hearer’s memory will be renewed both as to the proof and as to the refutation. And it will be fitting to vary these things by other modes of delivery as well. For at one time you may recapitulate in your own person, so as to recall what you said and in what place; at another, you may introduce some person or thing and assign the whole recapitulation to it. A person, in this manner: “For if the framer of the law should rise up and ask of you thus why you hesitate: what could you say, when this and this have been demonstrated to you?” And here, just as in our own person, it will be allowed at one time to pass through all the arguments one by one, at another to refer them to the several kinds of the partition, at another to ask of the hearer what he requires, at another to do these things by comparison of one’s own arguments with those opposed.

atque in his ge- neribus, ut ante dictum est, tum tuas argumentationes transire separatim, tum, id quod artificiosius est, cum tuis contrarias coniungere; et cum tuam dixeris argu- mentationem, tum, contra eam quod adferretur, quem- admodum dilueris, ostendere. ita per brevem conpara- tionem auditoris memoria et de confirmatione et de reprehensione redintegrabitur. atque haec aliis actionis quoque modis variare oportebit. nam tum ex tua per- sona enumerare possis, ut, quid et quo quidque loco dixeris, admoneas; tum vero personam aut rem ali- quam inducere et enumerationem ei totam attribuere. personam hoc modo: nam si legis scriptor exsistat et quaerat sic id a vobis, quid dubitetis: quid possitis dicere, cum vobis hoc et hoc sit demonstratum? atque hic, item ut in nostra persona, licebit alias singillatim transire omnes argumentationes, alias ad partitionis singula genera referre, alias ab auditore, quid desideret, quaerere, alias haec facere per comparationem suarum et contrariarum argumentationum.

A thing, in turn, will be introduced if the speech is assigned, by way of recapitulation, to some such object as a law, a place, a city, a monument, in this manner: “What? If the laws could speak, would they not make this complaint before you: what more do you require, jurors, when this and this have been made plain to you?” In this kind, too, it will be allowed to use all the same modes. And this common precept is given for the recapitulation: that from each single argument, since the whole cannot be said again, that be chosen which is weightiest, and that each single point be passed over as briefly as possible, so that the memory, not the speech, may appear to be renewed. The rousing of indignation is a passage by which it is brought about that great hatred is stirred up against some man, or grave displeasure against some matter. In this kind we wish this to be understood first: that indignation can be handled from all the topics that we set down in the precepts on confirmation. For from those things that are attributed to persons or to circumstances, amplifications and rousings of indignation of every sort can arise; but nonetheless let us consider those things that can be prescribed separately concerning indignation.

res autem inducetur, si alicui rei huiusmodi, legi, loco, urbi, mo- numento oratio attribuetur per enumerationem, hoc modo: quid? si leges loqui possent, nonne haec apud vos quererentur: quidnam amplius desideratis, iudi- ces, cum vobis hoc et hoc planum factum sit? in hoc quoque genere omnibus isdem modis uti licebit. com- mune autem praeceptum hoc datur ad enumerationem, ut ex una quaque argumentatione, quoniam tota iterum dici non potest, id eligatur, quod erit gravissimum, et unum quidque quam brevissime transeatur, ut me- moria, non oratio renovata videatur. Indignatio est oratio, per quam conficitur, ut in aliquem hominem magnum odium aut in rem gravis offensio concitetur. in hoc genere illud primum in- tellegi volumus, posse omnibus ex locis iis, quos in confirmandi praeceptione posuimus, tractari indigna- tionem. nam ex iis rebus, quae personis aut quae negotiis sunt attributae, quaevis amplificationes et indignationes nasci possunt, sed tamen ea, quae se- paratim de indignatione praecipi possunt, considere-

The first topic is drawn from authority, when we relate how great a concern that matter has been to those whose authority ought to be weightiest: to the immortal gods—this topic will be drawn from lots, from oracles, soothsayers, portents, prodigies, responses, and like things; likewise to our ancestors, to kings, states, nations, the wisest of men, the Senate, the people, the framers of laws. The second topic is that by which it is shown, with amplification and with indignation, to whom that matter pertains: whether to all, or to the greater part, which is most atrocious; or to one’s superiors, such as those from whose authority the indignation is drawn, which is most unworthy; or to one’s equals in spirit, fortune, and body, which is most unjust; or to one’s inferiors, which is most arrogant. The third topic is that by which we ask what is likely to happen if others do the same; and at the same time we show that, if this be granted to him, there will be many rivals of the same audacity;

mus. primus locus sumitur ab auctoritate, cum com- memoramus, quantae curae res ea fuerit iis, quorum auctoritas gravissima debeat esse: diis inmortalibus, qui locus sumetur ex sortibus, ex oraculis, vatibus, ostentis, prodigiis, responsis, similibus rebus; item maioribus nostris, regibus, civitatibus, gentibus, hominibus sapientissimis, senatui, populo, legum scripto- ribus. secundus locus est, per quem, illa res ad quos pertineat, cum amplificatione per indignationem osten- ditur, aut ad omnes aut ad maiorem partem, quod atrocissimum est; aut ad superiores, quales sunt ii, quorum ex auctoritate indignatio sumitur, quod in- dignissimum est; aut ad pares animo, fortuna, cor- pore, quod iniquissimum est; aut ad inferiores, quod superbissimum est. tertius locus est, per quem quae- rimus, quidnam sit eventurum, si idem ceteri faciant; et simul ostendimus, huic si concessum sit, multos aemulos eiusdem audaciae futuros;

from which we shall demonstrate what evil is likely to ensue. The fourth topic is that by which we demonstrate that many are eagerly awaiting what shall be decided, so that from what has been granted to one man they may understand what is permitted to themselves too in such a matter. The fifth topic is that by which we show that other things wrongly established can, once the truth is understood, be altered and set right; but that this is a matter which, if once it be decided, can neither be altered by another verdict nor set right by any power. The sixth topic is that by which the deed is shown to have been done deliberately and of set purpose, and this is added: that pardon ought not to be given for a voluntary crime, while it is sometimes fitting that allowance be made for imprudence. The seventh topic is that by which we feel indignation, when we say that a foul, cruel, wicked, tyrannical deed has been done by violence,

ex quo, quid mali sit eventurum, demonstrabimus. quartus locus est, per quem demonstramus multos alacres exspectare, quid statuatur, ut ex eo, quod uni concessum sit, sibi quo- que tali de re quid liceat, intellegere possint. quintus locus est, per quem ostendimus ceteras res perperam constitutas intellecta veritate commutatas corrigi posse; hanc esse rem, quae si sit semel iudicata, ne- que alio commutari iudicio neque ulla potestate cor- rigi possit. sextus locus est, per quem consulto et de industria factum demonstratur et illud adiungitur, vo- luntario maleficio veniam dari non oportere, inpru- dentiae concedi nonnumquam convenire. septimus lo- cus est, per quem indignamur, quod taetrum, crudele, nefarium, tyrannicum factum esse dicamus per vim

brute force, and wealth—a thing utterly remote from the laws and from impartial justice. The eighth topic is that by which we demonstrate that the crime in question is not common, nor ever done even by the most audacious of men, and that it is foreign even to savage men, to barbarous nations, and to monstrous beasts. These will be the things said to have been cruelly done against parents, children, spouses, kinsmen, suppliants, and next, anything that may be brought forward against elders, against guests, against neighbors, against friends, against those with whom you have spent your life, against those among whom you were reared, against those by whom you were taught, against the dead, against the wretched and those worthy of pity, against men illustrious, noble, and possessed of honors, against those who could neither harm another nor defend themselves, such as children, the old, and women; from all of which an indignation keenly aroused will be able to stir up the utmost

manum opulentiam; quae res ab legibus et ab aequabili iure remotissima sit. octavus locus est, per quem de- monstramus non vulgare neque factitatum esse ne ab audacissimis quidem hominibus id maleficium, de quo agatur; atque id a feris quoque hominibus et a bar- baris gentibus et inmanibus bestiis esse remotum. haec erunt, quae in parentes, liberos, coniuges, consangui- neos, supplices crudeliter facta dicentur, et deinceps si qua proferantur in maiores natu, in hospites, in vicinos, in amicos, in eos, quibuscum vitam egeris, in eos, apud quos educatus sis, in eos, ab quibus eruditus, in mortuos, in miseros et misericordia dignos, in ho- mines claros, nobiles et honore usos, in eos, qui neque laedere alium nec se defendere potuerunt, ut in pueros, senes, mulieres; quibus ex omnibus acriter excitata in- dignatio summum in eum, qui violarit horum aliquid,

hatred against the man who has violated any of these. The ninth topic is that by which the crime under question is compared with other faults that are agreed to be faults, and so, by contrast, it is shown how much more atrocious and unworthy is the thing under discussion. The tenth topic is that by which we gather together everything that was done in carrying out the deed, and everything that followed after the deed, with indignation and accusation directed at each single point, and set the matter before the eyes of him before whom we speak as vividly as words allow, so that what is unworthy may appear to him as unworthy as if he had himself been present and seen it. The eleventh topic is that by which we show the deed to have been done by the man by whom it least ought to have been done, and by whom, if another were doing it, it would have been fitting that it be prevented. The twelfth topic is that by which we feel indignation that this has befallen us first, and has never happened to anyone before.

odium commovere poterit. nonus locus est, per quem cum aliis peccatis, quae constat esse peccata, hoc quo de quaestio est, conparatur, et ita per contentionem, quanto atrocius et indignius sit illud, de quo agitur, ostenditur. decimus locus est, per quem omnia, quae in negotio gerundo acta sunt quaeque post negotium consecuta sunt, cum unius cuiusque indignatione et criminatione colligimus et rem verbis quam maxime ante oculos eius, apud quem dicitur, ponimus, ut id, quod indignum est, proinde illi videatur indignum, ac si ipse interfuerit ac praesens viderit. undecimus locus est, per quem ostendimus ab eo factum, a quo minime oportuerit, et a quo, si alius faceret, prohiberi con- venerit. duodecimus locus est, per quem indignamur, quod nobis hoc primis acciderit neque alicui umquam usu venerit.

The thirteenth topic is when insult is shown joined to injury, a topic by which hatred is kindled against pride and arrogance. The fourteenth topic is that by which we ask of those who hear that they apply our injuries to their own affairs: if the matter concerns children, that they think of their own children; if it concerns women, of their wives; if it concerns the old, of their fathers or parents. The fifteenth topic is that by which we say that even to our personal foes and enemies the things that have befallen us are wont to seem unworthy. And indignation, indeed, will be drawn most weightily from roughly these topics.

tertius decimus locus est, si cum iniuria contumelia iuncta demonstratur, per quem locum in superbiam et arrogantiam odium concitatur. quartus decimus locus est, per quem petimus ab iis, qui audiunt, ut ad suas res nostras iniurias referant; si ad pueros pertinebit, de liberis suis cogitent; si ad mulieres, de uxoribus; si ad senes, de patribus aut parentibus. quintus decimus locus est, per quem dicimus inimicis quoque et hostibus ea, quae nobis acciderint, indigna videri solere. Et indignatio quidem his fere de locis gravissime sumetur.

The parts of the appeal for pity, in turn, will have to be sought from matters of this kind. The appeal for pity is a passage that captures the compassion of the hearers. In this we must first render the hearer’s mind gentle and merciful, so that it may the more easily be moved by the appeal. This will have to be effected by commonplaces through which the power of fortune over all men and the frailty of mankind are shown; for when such a passage is delivered with weight and sententious force, the minds of men are most of all bowed down and disposed to pity, since in another’s misfortune each will consider his own frailty.

conquestionis autem huiusmodi de rebus partes petere oportebit. Conquestio est oratio auditorum misericordiam cap- tans. in hac primum animum auditoris mitem et misericordem conficere oportet, quo facilius conque- stione commoveri possit. id locis communibus efficere oportebit, per quos fortunae vis in omnes et hominum infirmitas ostenditur; qua oratione habita graviter et sententiose maxime demittitur animus hominum et ad misericordiam conparatur, cum in alieno malo suam infirmitatem considerabit.

Then the first topic of pity is that by which it is shown in what prosperity men have been and in what miseries they now are. The second, which is assigned to times, is that by which it is demonstrated in what miseries they have been, are, and will be. The third is that by which each single misfortune is bewailed, as, in the death of a son, the delight of his boyhood, the love, the hope, the comfort, the rearing of him, and whatever in any like kind of misfortune can be said by way of appeal. The fourth is that by which shameful, lowly, and degrading things are brought forward, and things unworthy of one’s age, birth, former fortune, honor, and good services—things they have suffered or will suffer. The fifth is that by which all the misfortunes are set one by one before the eyes, so that he who hears may seem to see them and, by the very matter, as if he were present, may be led to pity not by words alone.

deinde primus locus est misericordiae, per quem, quibus in bonis fuerint et nunc per quem quibus in malis sint, ostenditur. se- cundus, qui in tempora tribuitur, per quem, quibus in malis fuerint et sint et futuri sint, demonstratur. ter- tius, per quem unum quodque deploratur incom- modum, ut in morte filii pueritiae delectatio, amor, spes, solatium, educatio et, si qua simili in genere quo- libet de incommodo per conquestionem dici poterunt. quartus, per quem res turpes et humiles et inliberales proferentur et indigna aetate, genere, fortuna pristina, honore, beneficiis, quae passi perpessurive sint. quin- tus, per quem omnia ante oculos singillatim incom- moda ponuntur, ut videatur is, qui audit, videre et re quoque ipsa, quasi assit, non verbis solum ad miseri-

The sixth is that by which it is shown that a man is in misery beyond all expectation, and that, when he was looking for something, he not only did not attain it but fell into the depths of misery. The seventh is that by which we turn to those who hear and bring them into a like case, and ask that, when they see us, they remember their own children, or parents, or someone who ought to be dear to them. The eighth is that by which something is said to have been done that ought not to have been done, or not done that ought to have been done, in this manner: “I was not present, I did not see him, I did not hear his last words, I did not catch his final breath.” Likewise: “He died in the hands of his enemies, he lay shamefully unburied on hostile soil, he was long mauled by wild beasts, and in death he was deprived even of the common honor.”

cordiam ducatur. sextus, per quem praeter spem in miseriis demonstratur esse, et, cum aliquid exspectaret, non modo id non adeptus esse, sed in summas miserias incidisse. septimus, per quem ad ipsos, qui audiunt, similem in causam convertimus et petimus, ut de suis liberis aut parentibus aut aliquo, qui illis carus debeat esse, nos cum videant, recordentur. octavus, per quem aliquid dicitur esse factum, quod non oportuerit, aut non factum, quod oportuerit, hoc modo: non affui, non vidi, non postremam vocem eius audivi, non extremum spiritum eius excepi. item: inimicorum in manibus mortuus est, hostili in terra turpiter iacuit insepultus, a feris diu vexatus, communi quoque honore in morte caruit.

The ninth is that by which the speech is turned toward mute and lifeless things, as if you should fit to a horse, a house, or a garment the words of someone—things by which the minds of those who hear and have loved someone are vehemently moved. The tenth is that by which want, frailty, and loneliness are shown. The eleventh is that by which the commending of one’s children, or parents, or one’s own body for burial, or of some such matter, is made. The twelfth is that by which separation from someone is bewailed, when you are torn from one with whom you most gladly lived—as a parent from a son, a brother from an intimate. The thirteenth is that by which with indignation we lament that we are ill-treated by those by whom it least befits—kinsmen, friends, those to whom we have done kindness, those we supposed would be our helpers, or by those from whom such treatment is unworthy, such as slaves, freedmen, clients, suppliants. The fourteenth is the one drawn through entreaty, in which those who hear are merely beseeched, in humble and suppliant speech, to take pity. The fifteenth is that by which we show that we are lamenting not our own fortunes but those of the men who ought to be dear to us. The sixteenth is that by which we show that our spirit is merciful toward others, and yet demonstrate that it is great and lofty and patient of misfortunes, and will be so if anything befalls; for often virtue and magnanimity, in which there is dignity and authority, do more to stir compassion than lowliness and entreaty. But when the feelings have been moved, it will not be fitting to linger longer in the appeal for pity. For, as the rhetorician Apollonius said, nothing dries faster than a tear. But since, as it seems to us, we have said enough about all the parts of a speech, and the size of this volume has gone on rather far, what follows next we shall say in the second book.

nonus, per quem oratio ad mutas et expertes animi res referetur, ut si ad equum, domum, vestem sermonem alicuius accommodes, quibus animus eorum, qui audiunt et aliquem dilexerunt, vehementer com- movetur. decimus, per quem inopia, infirmitas, soli- tudo demonstratur. undecimus, per quem liberorum aut parentum aut sui corporis sepeliundi aut alicuius eiusmodi rei commendatio fit. duodecimus, per quem disiunctio deploratur ab aliquo, cum diducaris ab eo, quicum libentissime vixeris, ut a parente filio, a fratre familiari. tertius decimus, per quem cum indignatione conquerimur, quod ab iis, a quibus minime conveniat, male tractemur, propinquis, amicis, quibus benigne fecerimus, quos adiutores fore putarimus, aut a qui- bis indignum est, ut servis, libertis, clientibus, sup- plicibus. quartus decimus, qui per obsecrationem sumitur; in quo orantur modo illi, qui audiunt, hu- mili et supplici oratione, ut misereantur. quintus de- cimus, per quem non nostras, sed eorum, qui cari nobis debent esse, fortunas conqueri nos demonstra- mus. sextus decimus, per quem animum nostrum in alios misericordem esse ostendimus et tamen amplum et excelsum et patientem incommodorum esse et fu- turum esse, si quid acciderit, demonstramus. nam saepe virtus et magnificentia, in quo gravitas et auctoritas est, plus proficit ad misericordiam commo- vendam quam humilitas et obsecratio. commotis au- tem animis diutius in conquestione morari non opor- tebit. quemadmodum enim dixit rhetor Apollonius, lacrima nihil citius arescit. Sed quoniam satis, ut videmur, de omnibus orationis partibus diximus et huius voluminis magnitudo lon- gius processit, quae sequuntur deinceps, in secundo libro dicemus.

The Crotoniates, once, when they flourished in every kind of wealth and were counted among the most prosperous peoples in Italy, resolved to enrich with outstanding paintings the temple of Juno, which they cultivated with the deepest reverence. And so they engaged, hired at a great price, Zeuxis of Heraclea, who at that time was held to surpass all other painters by far. He painted for them a number of pictures, some part of which has survived even to our own day on account of the sanctity of the shrine; and he said that he wished to paint a likeness of Helen, so that a silent image might hold within itself the surpassing beauty of a woman’s form. This the Crotoniates heard gladly, since they had often been told that in painting the female body he excelled all others by a wide margin. For they reckoned that, if he labored mightily in the very kind in which his power was greatest, he would leave behind an outstanding work for them in that shrine.

Crotoniatae quondam, cum florerent omnibus copiis et in Italia cum primis beati numerarentur, templum Iunonis, quod religiosissime colebant, egregiis picturis locupletare voluerunt. itaque Heracleoten Zeuxin, qui tum longe ceteris excellere pictoribus existimabatur, magno pretio conductum adhibuerunt. is et ceteras conplures tabulas pinxit, quarum nonnulla pars us- que ad nostram memoriam propter fani religionem remansit, et, ut excellentem muliebris formae pulchri- tudinem muta in se imago contineret, Helenae pingere simulacrum velle dixit; quod Crotoniatae, qui eum mu- liebri in corpore pingendo plurimum aliis praestare saepe accepissent, libenter audierunt. putaverunt enim, si, quo in genere plurimum posset, in eo magno opere elaborasset, egregium sibi opus illo in fano relicturum.

Nor were they deceived in that expectation. For Zeuxis at once asked them what beautiful young women they had. And they straightway led the man off to the wrestling-school and showed him many boys of great distinction. For there was a time when the Crotoniates far surpassed all others in bodily strength and grace, and brought home from the athletic contests the most honorable victories with the highest praise. So when he greatly admired the boys’ forms and bodies, “These boys,” they said, “have sisters among us who are unmarried girls. From these, then, you can gather what beauty those others possess.” “Provide me, then, I beg,” he said, “with the most beautiful of those girls, while I paint the thing I promised you, so that the truth may be carried over from the living model into the silent image.”

neque tum eos illa opinio fefellit. nam Zeuxis ilico quaesivit ab iis, quasnam virgines formosas haberent. illi autem statim hominem deduxerunt in palaestram atque ei pueros ostenderunt multos, magna praeditos dignitate. etenim quodam tempore Crotoniatae multum omnibus corporum viribus et dignitatibus antisteterunt atque honestissimas ex gymnico certamine victorias domum cum laude maxima rettulerunt. cum puerorum igitur formas et corpora magno hic opere miraretur: Horum, inquiunt illi, sorores sunt apud nos virgines. quare, qua sint illae dignitate, potes ex his suspicari. Praebete igitur mihi, quaeso, inquit, ex istis virgini- bus formonsissimas, dum pingo id, quod pollicitus sum vobis, ut mutum in simulacrum ex animali exemplo veritas transferatur.

Then the Crotoniates, by public decree, gathered the girls into one place and gave the painter the power to choose whichever he wished. He, however, chose five, whose names many poets have handed down to memory, because they had been approved by the judgment of one who must have had the truest judgment of beauty. For he did not think that he could find in a single body everything he sought toward loveliness, on the ground that nature has polished nothing perfect in all its parts within a single specimen. And so, as though she would have nothing left to lavish on the rest if she granted all gifts to one, she bestows on each some advantage joined to some defect.

tum Crotoniatae publico de con- silio virgines unum in locum conduxerunt et pictori quam vellet eligendi potestatem dederunt. ille autem quinque delegit; quarum nomina multi poe+tae memo- riae prodiderunt, quod eius essent iudicio probatae, qui pulchritudinis habere verissimum iudicium de- buisset. neque enim putavit omnia, quae quaereret ad venustatem, uno se in corpore reperire posse ideo, quod nihil simplici in genere omnibus ex partibus per- fectum natura expolivit. itaque, tamquam ceteris non sit habitura quod largiatur, si uni cuncta concesserit, aliud alii commodi aliquo adiuncto incommodo mu- neratur.

And since the same inclination has fallen to us as well, in setting down a complete account of the art of speaking, we have not proposed some single model, all of whose parts, of whatever kind, we would think it necessary to reproduce; but, gathering all the writers into one place, we have culled out whatever each seemed most aptly to teach, and from their various talents we have drawn off the most excellent things in each. For among those who are worthy of name and remembrance, no one seemed to us to say nothing at his best, nor everything at his most brilliant. For this reason it seemed foolish either to draw back from someone’s good discoveries, if we were put off by some fault of his, or to fall in with someone’s faults as well, just because we were guided by some good precept of his.

Quod quoniam nobis quoque voluntatis accidit, ut artem dicendi perscriberemus, non unum aliquod pro- posuimus exemplum, cuius omnes partes, quocumque essent in genere, exprimendae nobis necessarie vi- derentur; sed omnibus unum in locum coactis scripto- ribus, quod quisque commodissime praecipere vide- batur, excerpsimus et ex variis ingeniis excellentis- sima quaeque libavimus. ex iis enim, qui nomine et memoria digni sunt, nec nihil optime nec omnia prae- clarissime quisquam dicere nobis videbatur. quapropter stultitia visa est aut a bene inventis alicuius recedere, si quo in vitio eius offenderemur, aut ad vitia eius quoque accedere, cuius aliquo bene praecepto duceremur.

But if in other pursuits too men preferred to select from many whatever was most apt rather than to bind themselves wholly to some one master, they would give less offense by arrogance, persevere not so stubbornly in faults, and suffer somewhat more lightly from ignorance. And if our knowledge of this art had been equal to his of painting, perhaps this work of ours in its kind would shine forth more than his famous picture in its own. For our power of choosing was drawn from a greater store of models than his was. He could choose from one city and from the number of girls who were then alive; to us, with the resources of all who have lived from the very beginning of this body of teaching down to the present day laid out before us, there was the power to choose whatever we pleased.

quodsi in ceteris quoque studiis a multis eligere homines commodissimum quodque quam sese uni alicui certe vellent addicere, minus in arrogan- tia m offenderent; non tanto opere in vitiis perse- verarent; aliquanto levius ex inscientia laborarent. ac si par in nobis huius artis atque in illo picturae scientia fuisset, fortasse magis hoc in suo genere opus nostrum quam illius in suo pictura nobilis eniteret. ex maiore enim copia nobis quam illi fuit exemplorum eligendi potestas. ille una ex urbe et ex eo numero virginum, quae tum erant, eligere potuit; nobis omnium, quicum- que fuerunt ab ultimo principio huius praeceptionis usque ad hoc tempus, expositis copiis, quodcumque placeret, eligendi potestas fuit.

And the old writers on the art, traced back from that founder and discoverer Tisias, Aristotle gathered into one place; and the precepts of each one, by name, sought out with great care, he set down lucidly and laid out with painstaking clarity. And so far did he surpass the inventors themselves in the charm and brevity of his treatment, that no one learns their precepts from their own books, but all who wish to understand what those men teach turn back to him, as to a far more convenient

Ac veteres quidem scriptores artis usque a prin- cipe illo atque inventore Tisia repetitos unum in lo- cum conduxit Aristoteles et nominatim cuiusque prae- cepta magna conquisita cura perspicue conscripsit at- que enodata diligenter exposuit; ac tantum inventori- bus ipsis suavitate et brevitate dicendi praestitit, ut nemo illorum praecepta ex ipsorum libris cognoscat, sed omnes, qui quod illi praecipiant velint intellegere, ad hunc quasi ad quendam multo commodiorem ex-

expounder. And he indeed set both himself and those who came before him out in the open, so that we might come to know the others and himself together through him; while those who set out from him, although they spent most of their labor on the greatest parts of philosophy, as he himself, whose lead they followed, had done, nonetheless left us very many precepts of speaking. And other teachers of speaking too welled up from another source, who likewise gave very much help toward speaking, insofar as art is of any profit. For at the same time as Aristotle there lived a great and famous rhetorician, Isocrates;

plicatorem revertantur. atque hic quidem ipse et sese ipsum nobis et eos, qui ante fuerunt, in medio po- suit, ut ceteros et se ipsum per se cognosceremus; ab hoc autem qui profecti sunt, quamquam in maximis philosophiae partibus operae plurimum con- sumpserunt, sicuti ipse, cuius instituta sequebantur, fe- cerat, tamen permulta nobis praecepta dicendi relique- runt. atque alii quoque alio ex fonte praeceptores di- cendi emanaverunt, qui item permultum ad dicendum, si quid ars proficit, opitulati sunt. nam fuit tempore eodem, quo Aristoteles, magnus et nobilis rhetor Iso- crates;

of whose own art we have not found any agreed account. But of his pupils, and of those who set out directly from this school, we have found many precepts about the art. From these two divergent households, as it were—the one of which, while it was occupied with philosophy, took on itself some care for the art of rhetoric as well, while the other was wholly taken up with the study and teaching of speaking—a certain single kind has been fused together by those who came later, who carried over into their own treatises, from both schools, whatever seemed aptly said; these very men, together with their predecessors, we have all set before ourselves, so far as our means allowed, and from our own store too we have contributed something to the common stock.

cuius ipsius quam constet esse artem non in- venimus. discipulorum autem atque eorum, qui pro- tinus ab hac sunt disciplina profecti, multa de arte praecepta reperimus. ex his duabus diversis sicuti fa- miliis, quarum altera cum versaretur in philosophia, nonnullam rhetoricae quoque artis sibi curam assume- bat, altera vero omnis in dicendi erat studio et prae- ceptione occupata, unum quoddam est conflatum ge- nus a posterioribus, qui ab utrisque ea, quae com- mode dici videbantur, in suas artes contulerunt; quos ipsos simul atque illos superiores nos nobis omnes, quoad facultas tulit, proposuimus et ex nostro quoque nonnihil in commune contulimus.

But if the things set out in these books needed to be chosen with as much care as the zeal with which they have been chosen, then surely neither we nor others will repent of our industry. But if we shall seem to have rashly passed over something of someone’s, or to have followed it with too little elegance, we shall readily and gladly change our view when instructed by another. For it is no disgrace to have known too little, but to have persevered foolishly and long in what is too little known; the former is assigned to the common weakness of mankind,

quodsi ea, quae in his libris exponuntur, tanto opere eligenda fuerunt, quanto studio electa sunt, profecto neque nos neque alios industriae nostrae paenitebit. sin autem temere aliquid alicuius praeterisse aut non satis eleganter se- cuti videbimur, docti ab aliquo facile et libenter senten- tiam commutabimus. non enim parum cognosse, sed in parum cognito stulte et diu perseverasse turpe est, propterea quod alterum communi hominum infirmitati,

the latter to the particular fault of the individual. Therefore we, for our part, without any assertion, while inquiring at the same time, shall state each point with hesitation, lest, while we attain some trifle—that we may seem to have written all this aptly enough—we lose what is greatest: namely, that we should rashly and arrogantly have assented to nothing. This indeed we shall pursue zealously, both at the present time and throughout our whole life, so far as our means allow; but now, that our discourse may not seem to have gone on too long, we shall speak of the remaining matters that seem to call for treatment.

alterum singulari cuiusque vitio est adtributum. quare nos quidem sine ulla affirmatione simul quaerentes dubitanter unum quicque dicemus, ne, dum parvulum consequamur, ut satis haec commode perscripsisse vi- deamur, illud amittamus, quod maximum est, ut ne cui rei temere atque arroganter assenserimus. Verum hoc quidem nos et in hoc tempore et in omni vita studiose, quoad facultas feret, consequemur: nunc autem, ne longius oratio progressa videatur, de reliquis, quae praecipienda videntur esse, dicemus.

The first book, then, having set out the nature of this art and its function and end and material and parts, contained the kinds of disputes, and inventions, and issues, and points for decision, and then the parts of a speech, and into all of these all the precepts. And so, since in it the other matters were treated more distinctly, but the proof and the refutation only in scattered fashion, we now think that fixed topics for proving and refuting must be handed down for the several kinds of cases. And because the manner in which it is fitting that arguments be handled was set out not carelessly in the first book, here only the discoveries themselves will be set out, plainly and without any embellishment for each separate matter, so that from this book the discoveries themselves, and from the earlier one the polishing of the discoveries, may be sought. For this reason these precepts now to be given will have to be referred to the parts of proof and refutation.

Igitur primus liber, exposito genere huius artis et officio et fine et materia et partibus, genera con- troversiarum et inventiones et constitutiones et iudi- cationes continebat, deinde partes orationis et in eas omnes omnia praecepta. quare cum in eo ceteris de rebus distinctius dictum sit, disperse autem de con- firmatione et de reprehensione, nunc certos confir- mandi et reprehendendi in singula causarum genera locos tradendos arbitramur. et quia, quo pacto trac- tari conveniret argumentationes, in libro primo non indiligenter expositum est, hic tantum ipsa inventa unam quamque in rem exponentur simpliciter sine ulla exornatione, ut ex hoc inventa ipsa, ex superiore autem expolitio inventorum petatur. quare haec, quae nunc praecipientur, ad confirmationis et reprehensionis partes referre oportebit.

Every case, whether epideictic, deliberative, or judicial, must necessarily turn upon one or more of those kinds of issue that have been set out before. And although this is so, nonetheless, while certain things can be taught in common about them all, separately too there are other distinct precepts for each kind. For praise must accomplish one thing, blame another, the delivery of an opinion another, accusation or defense another. In trials, what is just is asked; in epideictic, what is honorable; in deliberation, as we judge, both what is honorable and what is expedient. For others have held that in advising and dissuading the end should be set out only in terms of expediency.

Omnis et demonstrativa et deliberativa et iudicialis causa necesse est in aliquo eorum, quae ante exposita sunt, constitutionis genere uno pluribusve versetur. hoc quamquam ita est, tamen cum communiter quaedam de omnibus praecipi possint, separatim quo- que aliae sunt cuiusque generis diversae praeceptiones. aliud enim laus, aliud vituperatio, aliud sententiae dictio, aliud accusatio aut recusatio conficere debet. in iudiciis, quid aequum sit, quaeritur, in demonstra- tionibus, quid honestum, in deliberationibus, ut nos arbitramur, quid honestum sit et quid utile. nam ceteri utilitatis modo finem in suadendo et in dissuadendo exponi oportere arbitrati sunt.

The kinds, then, whose ends and outcomes are different cannot have the same precepts. Nor do we now say that the same issues do not arise; but rather that a certain kind of discourse springs from the very end and from the kind of case, one that pertains to the display of someone’s life or to the delivery of an opinion. For this reason we shall now occupy ourselves, in setting out disputes, with the judicial kind of cases and precepts, from which most things are carried over into the other kinds of cases as well, when a like dispute is involved, with no difficulty; and afterward we shall speak separately of the rest.

quorum igitur generum fines et exitus diversi sunt, eorum praecepta eadem esse non possunt. neque nunc hoc dicimus, non easdem incidere constitutiones, verumtamen oratio quaedam ex ipso fine et ex genere causae nascitur, quae pertineat ad vitae alicuius demonstrationem aut ad sententiae dictionem. quare nunc in exponendis controversiis in iudiciali genere causarum et praeceptorum versabimur, ex quo pleraque in cetera quoque causarum genera simili implicata controversia nulla cum difficultate transferuntur; post autem separatim de reliquis di- cemus.

Now let us set out from the conjectural issue, of which let this be the example proposed. On a journey, a certain man fell in with another who was setting out for a certain market and was carrying with him a fair sum of money. With this man, as commonly happens, he exchanged talk on the road; from which it came about that they wished to make that journey more sociably together. And so, when they had put up at the same inn, they wished to dine together and to take their sleep in the same place. Having dined, they lay down there. But the innkeeper—for so the story is told, after his guilt was found out, when he was caught in another crime—when he had noticed the other man, the one, namely, who had the money, came up by night, after he perceived that they were now sleeping more soundly, as men do from weariness; and he drew from its sheath the sword of the other of them, the one who was without money, which had been laid down close by, and killed the man with the money, took the money, hid the bloodstained sword back in its sheath, and withdrew to his own bed. But the man with whose sword the killing had been done rose long before daylight and called to his companion once and again.

Nunc ab coniecturali constitutione proficiscamur; cuius exemplum sit hoc expositum: in itinere qui- dam proficiscentem ad mercatum quendam et secum aliquantum nummorum ferentem est comitatus. cum hoc, ut fere fit, in via sermonem contulit; ex quo factum est, ut illud iter familiarius facere vellent. quare cum in eandem tabernam devertissent, simul ce- nare et in eodem loco somnum capere voluerunt. cenati discubuerunt ibidem. copo autem—nam ita dicitur post inventum, cum in alio maleficio deprehensus est —cum illum alterum, videlicet qui nummos haberet, animum advertisset, noctu postquam illos artius iam ut ex lassitudine dormire sensit, accessit et alterius eorum, qui sine nummis erat, gladium propter adposi- tum e vagina eduxit et illum alterum occidit, nummos abstulit, gladium cruentum in vaginam recondidit, ipse se in suum lectum recepit. ille autem, cuius gladio occisio erat facta, multo ante lucem surrexit, comitem illum suum inclamavit semel et saepius.

He supposed that the other did not answer because he was held fast by sleep; he took up his sword and the other things he had brought with him, and set out alone. The innkeeper, not long after, raised the cry that a man had been killed, and with certain of the lodgers overtook on the road the man who had left earlier. He seized the man, drew his sword from its sheath, and found it bloodstained. The man was led off to the city by them and became a defendant. In this case the charge laid is: “You killed him.” The denial: “I did not kill him.” From which the issue arises—that is, the question, which in the conjectural issue is the same as the point for decision: “Did he kill him or not?”

illum somno inpeditum non respondere existimavit; ipse gladium et cetera, quae secum adtulerat, sustulit, solus profectus est. copo non multum post conclamat hominem esse occisum et cum quibusdam devorsoribus illum, qui ante exierat, consequitur in itinere. hominem conpre- hendit, gladium eius e vagina educit, reperit cruentum. homo in urbem ab illis deducitur ac reus fit. in hac intentio est criminis: occidisti. depulsio: non occidi. ex quibus constitutio est id est quaestio eadem in coniecturali quae iudicatio: occideritne?

Now we shall set out the topics, some part of which falls into every conjectural dispute. But both in setting out these topics and in setting out the others, it will be necessary to attend to the fact that not all of them suit every case. For just as every name is written from some, not from all, letters, so not the whole store of arguments, but necessarily some part of them, will suit each case. Every conjecture, then, must be taken from the cause, from the person, and from the deed itself.

Nunc exponemus locos, quorum pars aliqua in omnem coniecturalem incidit controversiam. hoc au- tem et in horum locorum expositione et in ceterorum oportebit attendere, non omnes in omnem causam convenire. nam ut omne nomen ex aliquibus, non ex omnibus litteris scribitur, sic omnem in causam non omnis argumentorum copia, sed eorum necessario pars aliqua conveniet. omnis igitur ex causa, ex persona, ex facto ipso coniectura capienda est.

The cause is divided into impulse and calculation. Impulse is what urges someone to do something without reflection, through some emotion of the mind: such as love, anger, grief, drunkenness, and in general all those states in which the mind seems to have been so affected that it could not perceive the matter with deliberation and care, and did what it did rather by a certain rush of feeling than by reflection.

Causa tribuitur in inpulsionem et in ratiocinationem. inpulsio est, quae sine cogitatione per quandam affec- tionem animi facere aliquid hortatur, ut amor, iracun- dia, aegritudo, vinolentia et omnino omnia, in quibus animus ita videtur affectus fuisse, ut rem perspicere cum consilio et cura non potuerit et id, quod fecit, impetu quodam animi potius quam cogitatione fecerit.

Calculation, on the other hand, is a careful and considered working-out of doing or not doing something. It is said to have been at work whenever the mind seems to have avoided or pursued doing or not doing something for a definite cause: if something is said to have been done for the sake of friendship, or of avenging an enemy, or out of fear, or for glory, or for money, or, finally—to embrace all cases by kind—for the sake of retaining, increasing, or gaining some advantage, or, on the contrary, of repelling, lessening, or escaping some disadvantage. For under one or other of these kinds will fall also those cases in which either some disadvantage is undertaken for the sake of gaining a greater advantage or escaping a greater disadvantage, or some advantage is passed over for the sake of gaining a greater advantage or escaping a greater disadvantage.

ratiocinatio est autem diligens et considerata faciendi aliquid aut non faciendi excogitatio. ea dicitur inter- fuisse tum, cum aliquid faciendi aut non faciendi certa de causa vitasse aut secutus esse animus vide- bitur: si amicitiae quid causa factum dicetur, si ini- mici ulciscendi, si metus, si gloriae, si pecuniae, si denique, ut omnia generatim amplectamur, alicuius re- tinendi, augendi adipiscendive commodi aut contra re- iciundi, deminuendi devitandive incommodi causa. nam in horum genus alterutrum illa quoque incident, in quibus aut incommodi aliquid maioris adipiscendi com- modi causa aut maioris vitandi incommodi suscipitur aut aliquod commodum maioris adipiscendi commodi aut maioris vitandi incommodi praeteritur.

This topic is, as it were, a kind of foundation of this issue. For no one is convinced that anything was done unless some reason why it was done is shown. Therefore the accuser, when he says that something was done by impulse, will have to amplify, with words and thoughts, that rush and a certain agitation and emotion of the mind, and to show how great is the force of love, how great the disturbance of mind that arises from anger or from some one of those causes by which he says the defendant was driven to do the deed. Here, both by the recalling of examples of those who under a like impulse have committed some act, and by the marshaling of comparisons, and by the unfolding of the very emotion of the mind, care must be taken that it seem no wonder if a mind, stirred by such

Hic locus sicut aliquod fundamentum est huius constitutionis. nam nihil factum esse cuiquam pro- batur, nisi aliquid, quare factum sit, ostenditur. ergo accusator, cum inpulsione aliquid factum esse dicet, illum impetum et quandam commotionem animi affectionemque verbis et sententiis amplificare debebit et ostendere, quanta vis sit amoris, quanta animi per- turbatio ex iracundia fiat aut ex aliqua causa earum, qua inpulsum aliquem id fecisse dicet. hic et exem- plorum commemoratione, qui simili inpulsu aliquid commiserint, et similitudinum conlatione et ipsius animi affectionis explicatione curandum est, ut non mirum videatur, si quod ad facinus tali pertur-

a disturbance, came to such a crime. But when he says that someone committed something not by impulse but by calculation, he will demonstrate what advantage he pursued or what disadvantage he fled, and will amplify it as much as he can, so that, as far as may be, the cause that prompted the wrongdoing may seem as fitting as possible. If for the sake of glory, how great a glory he reckoned he would attain; likewise if for the sake of mastery, if of money, if of friendship, if of enmities, and in general whatever he says was the cause, he will have to amplify it to the utmost.

batione commotus animus accesserit. Cum autem non inpulsione, verum ratiocinatione aliquem commisisse quid dicet, quid commodi sit secutus aut quid incom- modi fugerit, demonstrabit et id augebit, quam maxime poterit, ut, quod eius fieri possit, idonea quam maxime causa ad peccandum hortata videatur. si gloriae causa, quantam gloriam consecuturam existimarit; item si do- minationis, si pecuniae, si amicitiae, si inimicitiarum, et omnino quicquid erit, quod causae fuisse dicet, id summe augere debebit.

And he will have to consider this carefully—not only what was so in truth, but, more emphatically still, what was so in the opinion of the man he accuses. For it makes no difference that there was not, or is not, any advantage or disadvantage, if it can be shown to have seemed so to the man accused. For opinion deceives men in two ways: either when the matter stands otherwise than is supposed, or when the outcome is not the one they reckoned on. The matter stands otherwise when men think that what is good is bad, or, conversely, that what is bad is good, or that what is neither bad nor good is bad or good, or that what is bad or good is neither bad nor good.

et hoc eum magno opere consi- derare oportebit, non quid in veritate modo, verum etiam vehementius, quid in opinione eius, quem arguet, fuerit. nihil enim refert non fuisse aut non esse aliquid commodi aut incommodi, si ostendi potest ei visum esse, qui arguatur. nam opinio dupliciter fallit ho- mines, cum aut res alio modo est, ac putatur, aut non is eventus est, quem arbitrati sunt. res alio modo est tum, cum aut id, quod bonum est, malum putant, aut contra, quod malum est, bonum, aut, quod nec malum est nec bonum, malum aut bonum, aut, quod malum aut bonum est, nec malum nec bonum.

By this understanding, if anyone shall say that no money is older or sweeter to him than a brother’s life, or a friend’s, or, finally, than his own duty, this is not to be denied by the accuser. For the blame and the deepest hatred would be transferred onto the man who denies what is said so truly and so dutifully. But what must be said is that to that other man it did not so seem;

hoc intellectu si qui negabit esse ullam pecuniam fratris aut amici vita aut denique officio suo antiquiorem aut suaviorem, non hoc erit accusatori negandum. nam in eum culpa et summum odium transferetur, qui id, quod tam vere et pie dicetur, negabit. verum illud dicendum est, illi ita non esse visum;

which must be taken from those things that pertain to the person, of which we are to speak later. The outcome, on the other hand, deceives when it falls out otherwise than those who are accused are said to have reckoned: as, if someone is said to have killed a man other than the one he meant to, because he was deceived by resemblance, or by suspicion, or by false indication; or to have killed one by whose will he was not made heir, because he thought himself made heir by that will. For one ought not to judge the intention from the outcome, but to consider with what intention and hope the mind set out toward the crime: with what mind each man does a thing, not what chance he meets, is what bears upon the matter.

quod sumi oportet ex iis, quae ad personam pertinent, de quo post dicendum est. even- tus autem tum fallit, cum aliter accidit, atque ii, qui arguuntur, arbitrati esse dicuntur: ut, si qui dicatur alium occidisse ac voluerit, quod aut similitudine aut suspicione aut demonstratione falsa deceptus sit; aut eum necasse, cuius testamento non sit heres, quod eo testamento se heredem arbitratus sit. non enim ex eventu cogitationem spectari oportere, sed qua cogi- tatione animus et spe ad maleficium profectus sit, con- siderare; quo animo quid quisque faciat, non quo casu utatur, ad rem pertinere.

In this connection the chief point for the accuser will be if he can show that no one else had a cause for doing the deed; the secondary point, if no one else had so great or so fitting a cause. But if it shall seem that others too had a cause for doing it, then it must be shown that the others lacked either the power, or the means, or the will. The power, if they are said either not to have known of it, or not to have been present, or not to have been able to accomplish anything. The means, if it is shown that someone lacked the plan, the helpers, the aids, and the other things that bear upon the matter. The will, if the mind is said to have been empty of and untouched by such deeds. Finally, whatever supporting arguments we shall give the defendant for his defense, these the accuser will turn to account for clearing others of blame. But this must be done briefly, and many points must be drawn together into one, so that he may not seem to accuse this man for the sake of defending another, but to defend the other for the sake of accusing this man.

Hoc autem loco caput illud erit accusatoris, si de- monstrare poterit alii nemini causam fuisse faciendi; secundarium, si tantam aut tam idoneam nemini. sin fuisse aliis quoque causa faciendi videbitur, aut po- testas defuisse aliis demonstranda est aut facultas aut voluntas. potestas, si aut nescisse aut non adfuisse aut conficere aliquid non potuisse dicentur. facultas, si ratio, adiutores, adiumenta ceteraque, quae ad rem pertinebunt, defuisse alicui demonstrabuntur. volun- tas, si animus a talibus factis vacuus et integer esse dicetur. postremo, quas ad defensionem rationes reo dabimus, iis accusator ad alios ex culpa eximendos abutetur. verum id brevi faciendum est et in unum multa sunt conducenda, ut ne alterius defendendi causa hunc accusare, sed huius accusandi causa defendere alterum videatur.

And these, roughly, are the things the accuser must consider concerning the cause for doing the deed. The defender, on the contrary, will first say either that there was no impulse, or, if he concedes that there was, he will minimize it and show that it was a certain trifling one, or he will teach that deeds of this kind do not usually arise from it. At which point it will have to be shown what the force and nature is of that emotion by which the defendant is said to have been driven to commit something; and in this both examples and comparisons must be brought forward, and the very nature of that emotion carefully unfolded from its gentlest and most peaceful side, so that both the matter itself may be drawn away from a cruel and turbulent deed toward something milder and more tranquil, and the discourse may nonetheless be fitted to the mind of him who will hear it, and to a certain inmost feeling of the mind.

Atque accusatori quidem haec fere sunt in causa faciendi consideranda: defensor autem ex contrario primum inpulsionem aut nullam fuisse dicet aut, si fuisse concedet, extenuabit et parvulam quandam fuisse demonstrabit aut non ex ea solere huiusmodi facta nasci docebit. quo erit in loco demonstrandum, quae vis et natura sit eius affectionis, qua inpulsus aliquid reus commisisse dicetur; in quo et exempla et similitudines erunt proferundae et ipsa diligenter natura eius affectionis quam lenissime quietissima ab parte explicanda, ut et res ipsa a facto crudeli et tur- bulento ad quoddam mitius et tranquillius traducatur et oratio tamen ad animum eius, qui audiet, et ad animi quendam intumum sensum accommodetur.

The suspicions arising from calculation, on the other hand, he will weaken if he says that there was no advantage, or a small one, or one greater for others, or no greater for him than for others, or a disadvantage for him greater than the advantage, so that the magnitude of that advantage which is said to have been sought is by no means to be weighed against the disadvantage that has come about, or against that danger which is being undergone;

ratiocina- tionis autem suspiciones infirmabit, si aut commodum nullum esse aut parvum aut aliis maius esse aut nihilo sibi maius quam aliis aut incommodum sibi maius quam commodum dicet, ut nequaquam fuerit illius commodi, quod expetitum dicatur, magnitudo aut cum eo incom- modo, quod acciderit, aut cum illo periculo, quod subea- tur, comparanda;

all of which topics will be handled in like manner also in the avoidance of disadvantage. But if the accuser shall say that the man pursued what seemed to him an advantage, or fled what he thought a disadvantage, although he was in a false opinion, the defender will have to show that no one is of such folly as to be able to be ignorant of the truth in such a matter. But if this be conceded, the other point will not be conceded: that he did not even hesitate over what the rights of the case were, and that, without any hesitation, he approved as true what was false; since, if he hesitated, it was the height of madness, driven by a doubtful hope, to commit himself to a certain danger.

qui omnes loci similiter in incommodi quoque vitatione tractabuntur. sin accusator dixerit eum id esse secutum, quod ei visum sit commodum, aut id fugisse, quod putarit esse incommodum, quamquam in falsa fuerit opinione, demonstrandum erit defensori neminem tantae esse stultitiae, qui tali in re possit veritatem ignorare. quodsi hoc concedatur, illud non concessum iri: ne dubitasse quidem, quid eius iuris esset, et id, quod falsum fuerit, sine ulla dubitatione pro vero probasse; quia si dubitarit, summae fuisse amentiae dubia spe inpulsum certum in periculum se committere.

And just as the accuser, when he removes the blame from others, will use the topics of the defender, so the defendant will use those topics which are given to the accuser, when he wishes to transfer the charge from himself onto others. From the person, on the other hand, conjecture will be taken if those things which are assigned to persons are carefully considered, all of which we set out in the first book. For from a name too there sometimes arises some ground for suspicion—and when we say “name,” the surname too should be understood, for it is a man’s fixed and proper appellation that is in question—as if we should say that someone is called Caldus because he is of a rash and sudden temper;

quemadmodum autem accusator, cum ab aliis culpam demovebit, defensoris locis utetur, sic iis locis, qui accusatori dati sunt, utetur reus, cum in alios ab se crimen volet transferre. Ex persona autem coniectura capietur, si eae res, quae personis adtributae sunt, diligenter considera- buntur, quas omnes in primo libro exposuimus. nam et de nomine nonnumquam aliquid suspicionis na- scitur—nomen autem cum dicimus, cognomen quoque intellegatur oportet; de hominis enim certo et proprio vocabulo agitur—, ut si dicamus idcirco aliquem Cal- dum vocari, quod temerario et repentino consilio sit;

or if for that reason he played a trick on ignorant Greeks, because he was called Clodius or Caecilius or Mutius. And from nature too one may draw a fair measure of suspicion. For all these things—whether a man or a woman, of this or that city, of what ancestors, of what kinsmen, of what age, of what mind, of what body, which are the things assigned to nature—will bear upon the making of some conjecture. And from manner of life many suspicions are drawn, when it is asked how, and among whom, and by whom he was reared and educated, and with whom he lives, by what plan of life,

aut si ea re hominibus Graecis inperitis verba dederit, quod Clodius aut Caecilius aut Mutius vocaretur. et de natura licet aliquantum ducere suspicionis. omnia enim haec, vir an mulier, huius an illius civitatis sit, quibus sit maioribus, quibus consanguineis, qua aetate, quo animo, quo corpore, quae naturae sunt ad- tributa, ad aliquam coniecturam faciendam pertinebunt. et ex victu multae trahuntur suspiciones, cum, quemad- modum et apud quos et a quibus educatus et eruditus sit, quaeritur, et quibuscum vivat, qua ratione vitae,

by what domestic custom he lives. And from fortune an argument often arises, when it is considered whether he is a slave or free, moneyed or poor, noble or obscure, fortunate or unfortunate, a private man or in office, or has been, or will be; or, finally, when some one of those things is asked which are understood to be assigned to fortune. And since habitual disposition consists in some perfected and settled completeness of mind or body—a kind to which belong virtue, knowledge, and their opposites—the matter itself, once the case is laid out, will teach whether this topic too discloses any ground for suspicion. For the account of emotion is wont to present a clear conjecture, such as love, anger, vexation, because both the force of these is understood, and what result follows upon any of them is easy to recognize.

quo more domestico vivat. et ex fortuna saepe argu- mentatio nascitur, cum servus an liber, pecuniosus an pauper, nobilis an ignobilis, felix an infelix, privatus an in potestate sit aut fuerit aut futurus sit, conside- ratur; aut denique aliquid eorum quaeritur, quae for- tunae esse adtributa intelleguntur. habitus autem quon- iam in aliqua perfecta et constanti animi aut corporis absolutione consistit, quo in genere est virtus, scientia et quae contraria sunt, res ipsa causa posita docebit, ecquid hic quoque locus suspicionis ostendat. nam af- fectionis quidem ratio perspicuam solet prae se gerere coniecturam, ut amor, iracundia, molestia, propterea quod et ipsorum vis intellegitur et, quae res harum aliquam rem consequatur, facile est cognitu.

As for pursuit, which is a settled occupation applied with intensity to some object and undertaken with great pleasure, it will be easy to draw from it whatever argument the case itself demands. Likewise something of suspicion will be taken from purpose; for purpose is a calculated plan for doing or not doing something. As for deeds, accidents, and statements, all of which (as was said in the precepts on the proof) are distributed across the three divisions of time, it will be easy to see whether they bring anything to bear on confirming a conjectural suspicion.

studium autem quod est adsidua et vehementer aliquam ad rem adplicata magna cum voluptate occupatio, facile ex eo ducetur argumentatio ea, quam res ipsa desidera- bit in causa. item ex consilio sumetur aliquid suspi- cionis; nam consilium est aliquid faciendi non facien- dive excogitata ratio. iam facta et casus et orationes, quae sunt omnia, ut in confirmationis praeceptis dic- tum est, in tria tempora distributa, facile erit videre, ecquid afferant ad confirmandam coniecturam suspi- cionis.

These, then, are the matters assigned to persons; and once they have all been gathered into a single place, the accuser will use them to discredit the man. For the motive of the deed has too little force unless the mind of the one accused is brought under the suspicion of not having shrunk from such a fault. For just as it is pointless to condemn anyone’s character when no motive for wrongdoing was present, so it is a slight thing for a motive of wrongdoing to be present if the mind is shown to be a party to no dishonorable purpose. The accuser, therefore, ought to discredit the life of the man he charges on the basis of his past deeds, and to show whether he has ever been convicted of an equivalent offense before; if he cannot do that, whether he has ever fallen under a similar suspicion before; and most of all, if it can be managed, whether, moved by some motive of the same kind in a similar class of action, he has done wrong—in a matter equally great, or greater, or smaller. So, for instance, if one were to claim that the accused acted because he was led on by money, he might point to some greedy deed of his in some other affair.

Ac personis quidem res hae sunt adtributae, ex qui- bus omnibus unum in locum coactis accusatoris erit inprobatione hominis uti. nam causa facti parum fir- mitudinis habet, nisi animus eius, qui insimulatur, in eam suspicionem adducitur, uti a tali culpa non videa- tur abhorruisse. ut enim animum alicuius inprobare nihil attinet, cum causa, quare peccaret, non intercessit, sic causam peccati intercedere leve est, si animus nulli minus honestae rationi affinis ostenditur. quare vitam eius, quem arguit, ex ante factis accusator inprobare debebit et ostendere, si quo in pari ante peccato con- victus sit; si id non poterit, si quam in similem ante suspicionem venerit, ac maxime, si fieri poterit, simili quo in genere eiusdemmodi causa aliqua commotum peccasse aut in aeque magna re aut in maiore aut in minore, ut si qui, quem pecunia dicat inductum fecisse, possit demonstrare aliqua in re eius aliquod factum avarum.

Likewise, in every case, one ought to attach to the motive by which the man is said to have been moved to wrongdoing his nature, or manner of life, or pursuit, or fortune, or some one of the things assigned to persons; and one ought to discredit the adversary’s mind even from a class of faults that is unlike, if there is no opportunity to take one of like kind. If you charge that he acted because greed led him on, and you cannot show that the man you accuse is greedy, you should teach that he is given to other vices, and that on this account it is no wonder that one who was disgraceful, or grasping, or wanton in that affair should have transgressed in this one too. For just so much as is subtracted from the honor and authority of the man charged, just so much

item in omni causa naturam aut victum aut studium aut fortunam aut aliquid eorum, quae personis adtributa sunt, ad eam causam, qua commotum pec- casse dicet, adiungere atque ex dispari quoque genere culparum, si ex pari sumendi facultas non erit, inpro- bare animum adversarii oportebit: si avaritia inductum arguas fecisse et avarum eum, quem accuses, demon- strare non possis, aliis adfinem vitiis esse doceas, et ex ea re non esse mirandum, qui in illa re turpis aut cupidus aut petulans fuerit, hac quoque in re eum deliquisse. quantum enim de honestate et auctoritate eius, qui arguitur, detractum est, tantundem de facul-

is taken from the resources of his entire defense. If the defendant can be shown to be a party to no vice committed before, that commonplace will be brought in by which the jurors are to be urged to think that the man’s old reputation has nothing to do with the matter: that he concealed himself before, but is now caught in the open; that for this reason the present matter ought not to be judged from his earlier life, but rather his earlier life condemned from the present matter; and that either he had no opportunity of wrongdoing before, or no motive; or, if these things cannot be said, that last resort must be spoken—that it is no wonder if he has now transgressed for the first time, for the man who means to do wrong must at some point transgress for the first time. But if the life he has led before is unknown, this commonplace should be passed over and—once it has been shown why it is passed over—the accusation should be confirmed at once with arguments.

tate eius totius est defensionis deminutum. si nulli affinis poterit vitio reus ante admisso demonstrari, locus inducetur ille, per quem hortandi iudices erunt, ut veterem famam hominis nihil ad rem putent per- tinere. nam eum ante celasse, nunc manifesto teneri; quare non oportere hanc rem ex superiore vita spec- tari, sed superiorem vitam ex hac re inprobari, et aut potestatem ante peccandi non fuisse aut causam; aut, si haec dici non poterunt, dicendum erit illud extremum, non esse mirum, si nunc primum deliquerit: nam necesse esse eum, qui velit peccare, aliquando primum delinquere. sin vita ante acta ignorabitur, hoc loco praeterito et, cur praetereatur, demonstrato argu- mentis accusationem statim confirmare oportebit.

The defender, on the other hand, ought first, if he can, to show the life of the man accused to be as honorable as possible. He will do this if he points to some marked and ordinary services of his—of the kind owed to parents, kinsmen, friends, relations by marriage, and intimates; and also to those that are rarer and more exceptional, if he says that some act was performed by his client at great cost or peril, or both, when there was no necessity, for the sake of duty—either toward the commonwealth, or toward his parents, or toward any of those just mentioned; and finally, if he says that the man committed no wrong, and that no appetite ever drew him away from his duty. This will be the more firmly established if, when it is said that there was the power to do something less honorable with impunity, the will to do it is shown

Defensor autem primum, si poterit, debebit vitam eius, qui insimulabitur, quam honestissimam demon- strare. id faciet, si ostendet aliqua eius nota et com- munia officia; quod genus in parentes, cognatos, ami- cos, affines, necessarios; etiam quae magis rara et eximia sunt, si ab eo cum magno aliquid labore aut periculo aut utraque re, cum necesse non esset, officii causa aut in rem publicam aut in parentes aut in aliquos eorum, qui modo expositi sunt, factum esse dicet; denique si nihil deliquisse, nulla cupiditate in- peditum ab officio recessisse. quod eo confirmatius erit, si, cum potestas inpune aliquid faciendi minus honeste fuisse dicetur, voluntas a faciendo demon-

to have been absent. And this very kind of argument will be the firmer if it is shown that in the very class of conduct of which he is charged he was previously without reproach: so that, if he is charged with having acted out of greed, he may be shown to have been least of all men in his whole life desirous of money. Here that great and weighty indignation will be brought in, joined to a plea of pity, by which it will be shown that the deed is a wretched and unworthy thing—that, since his mind throughout his life was utterly remote from vices, it should be supposed that the very motive which is wont to sweep reckless men into crime could have driven even the most upright of men to wrongdoing; or else, that it is unjust, and ruinous above all to the best of men, if a life honorably lived does not avail as much as possible at such a moment, but a judgment is made from a sudden accusation, which can be fabricated however falsely, and not from a life lived before, which can neither be fashioned to suit the occasion nor in any way be altered.

strabitur afuisse. hoc autem ipsum genus erit eo firmius, si eo ipso in genere, quo arguetur, integer ante fuisse demonstrabitur: ut si, cum avaritiae causa fecisse arguatur, minime omni in vita pecuniae cupi- dus fuisse doceatur. hic illa magna cum gravitate inducetur indignatio, iuncta conquestioni, per quam miserum facinus esse et indignum demonstrabitur; ut, cum animus in vita fuerit omni a vitiis remotissimus, eam causam putare, quae homines audaces in fraudem rapere soleat, castissimum quoque hominem ad pec- candum potuisse inpellere; aut: iniquum esse et op- timo cuique perniciosissimum non vitam honeste actam tali in tempore quam plurimum prodesse, sed subita ex criminatione, quae confingi quamvis false possit, non ex ante acta vita, quae neque ad tempus fingi neque ullo modo mutari possit, facere iudicium.

But if there are some disgraceful things in his past life, either it will be said that he fell into such an estimation falsely, through the envy or detraction or mistaken opinion of certain people; or those things will be attributed to imprudence, to necessity, to persuasion, to youth, or to some not malicious disposition of mind; or to a vice of an unlike kind, so that his mind may appear not wholly without reproach, but at least remote from a fault of this sort. But if the disgrace or ill fame of his life can in no way be softened by the speech, it will be necessary to deny that the inquiry concerns his life and his character, and to say that it concerns the charge of which he is accused; and that therefore, with past deeds set aside, the matter at hand is what ought to be dealt with.

sin autem in ante acta vita aliquae turpitudines erunt: aut falso venisse in eam existimationem dicetur ex aliquorum invidia aut obtrectatione aut falsa opi- nione; aut inprudentiae, necessitudini, persuasioni, adulescentiae aut alicui non malitiosae animi af- fectioni attribuentur; aut dissimili in genere vitio- rum, ut animus non omnino integer, sed ab tali culpa remotus esse videatur. at si nullo modo vitae turpitudo aut infamia leniri poterit oratione, negare oportebit de vita eius et de moribus quaeri, sed de eo crimine, quo de arguatur; quare ante factis omissis illud, quod instet, id agi oportere.

From the deed itself suspicions will be drawn if the whole conduct of the affair is tested in all its parts; and these suspicions will arise partly from the action taken separately, and partly from persons and the action taken together. They can be drawn from the action if we carefully consider those things assigned to actions. Of these, then, all the genera, and most of the parts of the genera, seem suited to this issue.

Ex facto autem ipso suspiciones ducentur, si to- tius administratio negotii ex omnibus partibus per- temptabitur; atque eae suspiciones partim ex negotio separatim, partim communiter ex personis atque ex negotio proficiscentur. ex negotio duci poterunt, si eas res, quae negotiis adtributae sunt, diligenter con- siderabimus. ex iis igitur in hanc constitutionem convenire videntur genera earum omnia, partes gene-

It will be necessary, then, to see first what things are bound up with the action itself—that is, what things cannot be separated from the matter. On this head it will be enough to have considered carefully what was done before the deed, from which the hope of accomplishing it seems to have been born and the means of doing it sought; what was done in the very carrying out of the matter; and what followed afterward. Next, the actual conduct of the affair must be handled thoroughly. For this class of things assigned to the action was set out by us in the second place.

rum pleraeque. Videre igitur primum oportebit, quae sint continentia cum ipso negotio, hoc est, quae ab re separari non possint. quo in loco satis erit dili- genter considerasse, quid sit ante rem factum, ex quo spes perficiundi nata et faciundi facultas quaesita vi- deatur; quid in ipsa re gerenda, quid postea conse- cutum sit. Deinde ipsius est negotii gestio pertrac- tanda. nam hoc genus earum rerum, quae negotio sunt adtributae, secundo in loco nobis est expositum.

In this class, then, place, time, occasion, and means will be examined—the force of each of which has been carefully unfolded in the precepts on the proof. Therefore, so as not to seem either to have failed to give notice here or to have said the same things twice over, we shall touch briefly on what ought to be considered under each head. Under place, then, its opportuneness is to be considered; under time, its length; under occasion, the convenience suited to doing the deed; under means, the supply and command of those things by which something is done more easily, or without which it cannot be accomplished at all.

hoc ergo in genere spectabitur locus, tempus, occasio, facultas; quorum unius cuiusque vis diligenter in con- firmationis praeceptis explicata est. quare, ne aut hic non admonuisse aut ne eadem iterum dixisse videamur, breviter iniciemus, quid quaque in parte considerari oporteat. in loco igitur opportunitas, in tempore longinquitas, in occasione commoditas ad faciendum idonea, in facultate copia et potestas earum rerum, propter quas aliquid facilius fit aut quibus sine omnino confici non potest, consideranda est.

Next, one must see what is connected with the action—that is, what is greater, what smaller, what equally great, what similar; from which a certain conjecture is drawn, if it is carefully considered how greater, smaller, equally great, and similar matters are usually carried out. In this class the outcome too must be examined—that is, it must be carefully weighed what is wont to result from each thing: fear, joy, faltering, boldness.

De- inde videndum est, quid adiunctum sit negotio, hoc est, quid maius, quid minus, quid aeque magnum sit, quid simile; ex quibus coniectura quaedam ducitur, si, quemadmodum res maiores, minores, aeque magnae, similes agi soleant, diligenter considerabitur. quo in genere eventus quoque videndus erit, hoc est, quid ex quaque re soleat evenire, magno opere consi- derandum est, ut metus, laetitia, titubatio, audacia.

The fourth part, among the things we said were assigned to actions, was consequence. Under it are sought those things that follow the action carried out, either at once or after an interval. Here we shall see whether there is any custom, any statute, any agreement, any skill, use, or practice in the matter, any approval or disgust of men; from which something of suspicion is sometimes elicited. There are, besides, other suspicions that are taken jointly from the attributes of actions and of persons. For most of what derives from fortune, nature, manner of life, pursuit, deeds, accident, statements, purpose, and the disposition of mind or body bears upon those same matters which can make a thing credible

Quarta autem pars rebus erat ex iis, quas negotiis di- cebamus esse adtributas, consecutio. in ea quaeruntur ea, quae gestum negotium confestim aut intervallo con- sequuntur. in quo videbimus, ecqua consuetudo sit, ecqua lex, ecqua pactio, ecquod eius rei artificium aut usus aut exercitatio, hominum aut adprobatio aut offensio; ex quibus nonnumquam elicitur aliquid suspicionis. Sunt autem aliae suspiciones, quae communiter et ex negotiorum et ex personarum adtributionibus su- muntur. nam et ex fortuna et ex natura et ex victu, studio, factis, casu, orationibus, consilio et ex habitu animi aut corporis pleraque pertinent ad easdem res, quae rem credibilem aut incredibilem facere pos-

or incredible and are joined with the suspicion of the deed. For in this issue one ought above all to inquire, first, whether anything could have been done at all; next, whether it could have been done by any other; next, the means, of which we spoke before; next, whether it is the kind of deed that one would necessarily have repented, or that held no hope of concealment; next, the necessity under which it had to be done, or to be done in that way. Of these, one part pertains to purpose, which is assigned to persons—as in the case we set out: before the deed, that he attached himself so familiarly on the journey, that he sought occasion for conversation, that he turned aside to the same lodging, and then dined; in the deed itself, the night, sleep; after the deed, that he went out alone, that he left the other man, so familiar a companion, with so untroubled a mind,

sunt et cum facti suspicione iunguntur. maxime enim quaerere oportet in hac constitutione, primum po- tueritne aliquid fieri; deinde ecquo ab alio potuerit; deinde facultas, de qua ante diximus; deinde utrum id facinus sit, quod paenitere fuerit necesse, quod spem celandi non haberet; deinde necessitudo, in qua necesse fuerit id aut fieri aut ita fieri, quaeritur. quorum pars ad consilium pertinet, quod personis adtributum est, ut in ea causa, quam exposuimus: ante rem, quod in itinere se tam familiariter adplicaverit, quod sermonis causam quaesierit, quod simul deverterit, deinde cena- rit. in re nox, somnus. post rem, quod solus exierit, quod illum tam familiarem tam aequo animo reli-

that he carried a bloody sword. Again, whether a plan of doing the deed seems to have been carefully held and thought out, or so rashly that it is not plausible anyone should have come to such mischief so rashly. Here it is asked whether the deed could not have been done more conveniently in some other way, or managed by chance. For often, if money, aids, or accomplices are wanting, there seems to have been no means of doing it. If we attend carefully in this manner, we understand that these things assigned to actions and those assigned to persons fit together with one another. Here it is neither easy nor necessary to distinguish, as in the earlier parts, in what way each thing ought to be handled by the accuser and in what way by the defender. It is not necessary, because, once the case has been laid down, the matter itself will teach what suits each side—those, that is, who do not expect to find everything here,

querit, quod cruentum gladium habuerit. rursum, utrum videatur diligenter ratio faciendi esse habita et excogitata, an ita temere, ut non veri simile sit quem- quam tam temere ad maleficium accessisse. in quo quaeritur, num quo alio modo commodius potuerit fieri vel a fortuna administrari. nam saepe, si pecuniae, adiumenta, adiutores desint, facultas fuisse faciundi non videtur. hoc modo si diligenter attendamus, apta inter se esse intellegimus haec, quae negotiis, et illa, quae personis sunt adtributa. Hic non facile est neque necessarium est distinguere, ut in superioribus partibus, quo pacto quicque accu- satorem et quomodo defensorem tractare oporteat. non est necessarium, propterea quod causa posita, quid in quamque conveniat, res ipsa docebit eos, qui non omnia hic se inventuros putabunt,

provided only they bring some measure of ordinary intelligence to bear in common. And it is not easy, because it would be endless to set out, point by point on each single head, so many matters for both sides, and because these things are wont to suit either side of a case differently in different instances. It will therefore be necessary to consider the things we have set out. The mind will hit upon discovery more easily, however, if it handles often and carefully both its own and the adversary’s account of the affair carried out, and, drawing out whatever suspicion each part holds, considers why, with what purpose, with what hope of accomplishment each thing was done; why in this way rather than that; why by this man rather than that; why with no helper, or why with this one; why no one is privy to it, or why someone is, or why this person is; why this was done beforehand; why this was not done beforehand; why this happened in the affair itself, why this after the affair; whether it was done by design or merely followed upon the matter; whether the account is consistent with the facts or with itself; whether this is a sign of this thing or of that, or of both, and of which rather; what was done that ought not to have been, or what was not done that ought to have been.

si modo quandam in commune mediocrem intellegentiam conferent; non facile autem, quod et infinitum est tot de rebus utram- que in partem singillatim de una quaque explicare et alias aliter haec in utramque partem causae solent convenire. quare considerare haec, quae exposuimus, oportebit. facilius autem ad inventionem animus in- cidet, si gesti negotii et suam et adversarii narrationem saepe et diligenter pertractabit et, quod quaeque pars suspicionis habebit, eliciens considerabit, quare, quo consilio, qua spe perficiundi quicque factum sit; hoc cur modo potius quam illo; cur ab hoc potius quam ab illo; cur nullo adiutore aut cur hoc; cur nemo sit conscius aut cur sit aut cur hic sit; cur hoc ante fac- tum sit; cur hoc ante factum non sit; cur hoc in ipso negotio, cur hoc post negotium, an factum de industria an rem ipsam consecutum sit; constetne oratio aut cum re aut ipsa secum; hoc huiusne rei sit signum an illius, an et huius et illius et utrius potius; quid fac- tum sit, quod non oportuerit, aut non factum, quod oportuerit.

When the mind with this concentration considers all the parts of the whole affair, then those very commonplaces, heaped up into the open, will come forward, of which we spoke before; and then, from single points and from combined ones, sure arguments will be born, of which arguments part will lie in the probable kind, part in the necessary. There often come to bear upon a conjecture, besides, examinations under torture, testimonies, and rumors, all of which each side will have to twist, by a like method of precepts, to the advantage of its own case. For from an examination, suspicions, and from a testimony, and from some rumor, must be drawn by the same reasoning as from the case, the person, and the deed.

cum animus hac intentione omnes totius negotii partes considerabit, tum illi ipsi in medium coacervati loci procedent, de quibus ante dictum est; et tum ex singulis, tum ex coniunctis argumenta certa nascentur, quorum argumentorum pars probabili, pars necessario in genere versabitur. accedunt autem saepe ad coniecturam quaestiones, testimonia, rumores, quae contra omnia uterque simili via praeceptorum torquere ad suae causae commodum debebit. nam et ex quae- stione suspiciones et ex testimonio et ex rumore aliquo pari ratione ut ex causa et ex persona et ex facto duci oportebit.

For this reason those seem to us to err who think that this kind of suspicion needs no art, and those too who think that precepts must be given about this kind differently than about conjecture as a whole. For all conjecture is to be taken from the same topics. For both the motive and the truth of the man who has said something in an examination, and of the man who has done so in a testimony, and of the rumor itself, will be discovered from the same attributes. In every case, moreover, one part of the arguments is attached only to the case being pleaded, and is drawn from it in such a way that it cannot conveniently enough be transferred from that case, taken on its own, into all cases of the same kind; while another part is more widely ranging, and is adapted either to all cases of the same kind or to most of them.

Quare nobis et ii videntur errare, qui hoc genus suspicionum artificii non putant indigere, et ii, qui aliter hoc de genere ac de omni coniectura praeci- piundum putant. omnis enim iisdem ex locis con- iectura sumenda est. nam et eius, qui in quaestione aliquid dixerit, et eius, qui in testimonio, et ipsius rumoris causa et veritas ex iisdem adtributionibus re- perietur. Omni autem in causa pars argumentorum est ad- iuncta ei causae solum, quae dicitur, et ex ipsa ita ducta, ut ab ea separatim in omnes eiusdem generis causas transferri non satis commode possit; pars au- tem est pervagatior et aut in omnes eiusdem generis aut in plerasque causas adcommodata.

These arguments, then, which can be transferred into many cases, we call commonplaces. For a commonplace contains either a certain amplification of a settled point—as if someone should wish to show that a man who has killed a parent deserves the harshest penalty, a commonplace not to be used until the case has been argued through and proved—or an amplification of a doubtful point, which from the contrary side too has probable lines of argument: as that suspicions ought to be believed, and, on the contrary, that suspicions ought not to be believed. And part of the commonplaces is brought in through indignation or through a plea of pity, of which we spoke before, part through some probable line of reasoning on either side.

haec ergo argumenta, quae transferri in multas causas possunt, locos communes nominamus. nam locus communis aut certae rei quandam continet amplificationem, ut si quis hoc velit ostendere, eum, qui parentem ne- carit, maximo supplicio esse dignum; quo loco nisi perorata et probata causa non est utendum; aut dubiae, quae ex contrario quoque habeat probabiles rationes argumentandi, ut suspicionibus credi oportere, et contra, suspicionibus credi non oportere. ac pars locorum communium per indignationem aut per con- questionem inducitur, de quibus ante dictum est, pars per aliquam probabilem utraque ex parte rationem.

A speech is distinguished and illuminated above all by bringing in commonplaces sparingly, and after some point has been already confirmed with arguments more certain in the eyes of the hearers. For one is then permitted to say something general, when some topic proper to the case has been carefully handled, and the hearer’s mind is either renewed for what remains, or, now that everything has been said, roused to a height. Now all the ornaments of style, in which most of both charm and weight consists, and all the things that have any dignity in the invention of matters and of thoughts,

distinguitur autem oratio atque inlustratur maxime raro inducendis locis communibus et aliquo loco iam certioribus illis auditoribus argumentis confirmato. nam et tum conceditur commune quiddam dicere, cum diligenter aliqui proprius causae locus tractatus est et auditoris animus aut renovatur ad ea, quae restant, aut omnibus iam dictis exsuscitatur. omnia autem ornamenta elocutionis, in quibus et suavitatis et gravitatis plurimum consistit, et omnia, quae in in- ventione rerum et sententiarum aliquid habent digni-

are gathered into the commonplaces. For this reason the commonplaces, unlike those of cases, are also the commonplaces of many orators. For unless they are handled by those who, through much practice, have furnished themselves a great supply of words and thoughts, they cannot be treated as ornately and weightily as their own nature requires. And let this be said by us generally about every kind of commonplace; now we shall set out what commonplaces are wont to fall within the conjectural issue: that suspicions ought to be believed, and ought not; that rumors ought to be believed, and ought not; that witnesses ought to be believed, and ought not; that examinations under torture ought to be believed, and ought not; that the life lived before ought to be regarded, and ought not; that it belongs to the same man who transgressed in that affair to have committed this too, and that it does not belong to the same man; that the motive ought above all to be regarded, and ought not. And these commonplaces—and any of this sort that arise

tatis, in communes locos conferuntur. quare non, ut causarum, sic oratorum quoque multorum communes loci sunt. nam nisi ab iis, qui multa in exercitatione magnam sibi verborum et sententiarum copiam con- paraverint, tractari non poterunt ornate et graviter, quemadmodum natura ipsorum desiderat. Atque hoc sit nobis dictum communiter de omni genere locorum communium; nunc exponemus, in coniecturalem constitutionem qui loci communes in- cidere soleant: suspicionibus credi oportere et non oportere; rumoribus credi oportere et non oportere; testibus credi oportere et non oportere; quaestionibus credi oportere et non oportere; vitam ante actam spectari oportere et non oportere; eiusdem esse, qui in illa re peccarit, et hoc quoque admisisse et non esse eiusdem; causam maxime spectari causam oportere et non oportere. atque hi quidem et si qui eiusmodi ex proprio argumento communes loci na-

from the proper argument—are drawn out to opposite sides. There is, moreover, a sure commonplace of the accuser, by which he magnifies the atrocity of the deed, and another by which he denies that one ought to pity the wicked; and of the defender, one by which the slander of the accusers is exposed with indignation, and one by which, with a plea of pity, compassion is sought. These and all the other commonplaces are taken from the same precepts as the rest of the arguments; but those are handled more finely and subtly and sharply, these more weightily and ornately, and with words as well as with surpassing thoughts. For in those the aim is that what is said may seem to be true; in these, although this too ought to appear, nevertheless the aim is grandeur. Now let us pass to another issue.

scentur, in contrarias partes diducuntur. certus autem locus est accusatoris, per quem auget facti atrocitatem, et alter, per quem negat malorum misereri oportere: defensoris, per quem calumnia accusatorum cum in- dignatione ostenditur et per quem cum conquestione misericordia captatur. hi et ceteri loci omnes com- munes ex iisdem praeceptis sumuntur, quibus ceterae argumentationes; sed illae tenuius et subtilius et acu- tius tractantur, hi autem gravius et ornatius et cum verbis tum etiam sententiis excellentibus. in illis enim finis est, ut id, quod dicitur, verum esse videatur, in his, tametsi hoc quoque videri oportet, tamen finis est amplitudo. Nunc ad aliam constitutionem transeamus.

When the dispute is about a name, because the force of the term must be defined in words, it is called the definitional issue. As an example of this kind let this case be laid down for us: Gaius Flaminius—the one who as consul mismanaged the campaign in the Second Punic War—when he was tribune of the plebs, was carrying an agrarian law to the people, against the Senate’s will and altogether contrary to the wishes of all the aristocrats, by way of sedition. His own father led him down from the platform while he was holding an assembly of the plebs; he is brought to trial for treason. The charge is: “You diminished the majesty of the state, because you led a tribune of the plebs down from the platform.” The denial is: “I did not diminish it.” The question is: did he diminish the majesty of the state? The supporting argument: “For I used the power that I held over my son.” The rebuttal of the argument: “But the man who weakens the tribunician power—that is, the power of the people—by paternal power—that is, by a certain private power—does diminish the majesty of the state.” The point for decision is: does a man diminish the majesty of the state who, by paternal power, acts upon the tribunician power? To this point for decision all the arguments must be brought to bear.

Cum est nominis controversia, quia vis vocabuli definienda verbis est, constitutio definitiva dicitur. eius generis exemplo nobis posita sit haec causa: C. Flaminius, is qui consul rem male gessit bello Punico secundo, cum tribunus plebis esset, invito senatu et omnino contra voluntatem omnium opti- matium per seditionem ad populum legem agrariam ferebat. hunc pater suus concilium plebis habentem de templo deduxit; arcessitur maiestatis. intentio est: maiestatem minuisti, quod tribunum plebis de templo deduxisti. depulsio est: non minui maiestatem. quaestio est: maiestatemne minuerit? ratio: in filium enim quam habebam potestatem, ea sum usus. rationis infirmatio: at enim, qui patria potestate, hoc est pri- vata quadam, tribuniciam potestatem, hoc est populi potestatem, infirmat, minuit is maiestatem. iudicatio est: minuatne is maiestatem, qui in tribuniciam po- testatem patria potestate utatur? ad hanc iudicationem argumentationes omnes afferre oportebit.

And lest anyone should chance to suppose that we do not understand that another issue too falls within this case, we are taking up only that part for which precepts are to be given by us. Once all the parts have been unfolded in this book, anyone, in any case, if he attends carefully, will see all the issues and their parts and the disputes, should any happen to fall within them; for we shall lay down rules about them all. The accuser’s first commonplace, then, is a brief and clear definition, drawn from common opinion, of the name about whose force the inquiry is made—in this manner: “To diminish the majesty of the state is to take away something from the dignity, or greatness, or power of the people, or of those to whom the people has given power.” This, so briefly set out, must be confirmed with more words and reasons, and it must be shown that the matter is as you have described it. Afterward it will be necessary to attach to what you have defined the deed of the man who is accused, and from what you have shown the thing to be—for instance, a diminishing of the majesty of the state—to teach that the adversary has diminished the majesty of the state, and to confirm this whole topic with a commonplace by which the atrocity, or unworthiness, or sheer guilt of the deed itself is magnified with indignation.

Ac ne qui forte arbitretur nos non intellegere aliam quoque incidere constitutionem in hanc causam, eam nos partem solam sumimus, in quam praecepta nobis danda sunt. omnibus autem partibus hoc in libro explicatis quivis omni in causa, si diligenter adtendet, omnes videbit constitutiones et earum partes et contro- versias, si quae forte in eas incident; nam de omnibus praescribemus. Primus ergo accusatoris locus est eius nominis, cuius de vi quaeritur, brevis et aperta et ex opinione hominum definitio, hoc modo: Maiestatem minuere est de dignitate aut amplitudine aut potestate populi aut eorum, quibus populus potestatem dedit, aliquid derogare. hoc sic breviter expositum pluribus verbis est et rationibus confirmandum et ita esse, ut descrip- seris, ostendendum. postea ad id, quod definieris, factum eius, qui accusabitur, adiungere oportebit et ex eo, quod ostenderis esse, verbi causa maiestatem minuere, docere adversarium maiestatem minuisse et hunc totum locum communi loco confirmare, per quem ipsius facti atrocitas aut indignitas aut omnino culpa cum indignatione augeatur.

Afterward the adversaries’ description must be weakened. It will be weakened if it is shown to be false. This will be taken from common opinion, when it is considered in what manner and in what matters men are wont to use that word in the habit of their writing or speaking. It will likewise be weakened if it is shown that the acceptance of that description is disgraceful or harmful, and if it is shown what disadvantages would follow once it were granted—this being taken from the heads of honor and of advantage, of which we shall speak in the precepts on deliberation—and if we set our definition against the adversaries’ definition and show that ours is true, honorable, and advantageous, and theirs the

post erit infirmanda ad- versariorum descriptio. ea autem infirmabitur, si falsa demonstrabitur. hoc ex opinione hominum sumetur, cum, quemadmodum et quibus in rebus homines in consuetudine scribendi aut sermocinandi eo verbo uti soleant, considerabitur. item infirmabitur, si turpis aut inutilis esse ostenditur eius descriptionis adprobatio et, quae incommoda consecutura sint eo concesso, ostendetur—id autem ex honestatis et ex utilitatis partibus sumetur, de quibus in deliberationis praecep- tis exponemus—et si cum definitione nostra adver- sariorum definitionem conferemus et nostram veram, honestam, utilem esse demonstrabimus, illorum con-

contrary. We shall seek, moreover, things similar in a greater, or smaller, or equal affair, from which our description may be affirmed. And if there are several matters to be defined—as, if it is asked whether a man who has filched sacred vessels from private property is a thief or a temple-robber—several definitions will have to be used; then the case must be handled by a like method. The commonplace, moreover, is against the wickedness of one who tries to arrogate to himself power not only over things but even over words, both doing what he wishes and calling what he has done by whatever name he wishes. Next, the defender’s first commonplace is likewise a brief and clear description, drawn from common opinion, of the name—in this manner: “To diminish the majesty of the state is to administer something concerning the commonwealth when you do not hold the power to do so.” Then a confirmation of this with like instances and examples and reasons; afterward, the separation of his own deed from that definition.

tra. quaeremus autem res aut maiore aut minore aut pari in negotio similes, ex quibus affirmetur nostra descriptio. iam si res plures erunt definiendae: ut, si quaeratur, fur sit an sacrilegus, qui vasa ex privato sacra subripuerit, erit utendum pluribus definitionibus; deinde simili ratione causa tractanda. Locus autem communis in eius malitiam, qui non modo rerum, verum etiam verborum potestatem sibi arrogare cona- tus et faciat, quod velit, et id, quod fecerit, quo velit nomine appellet. Deinde defensoris primus locus est item nominis brevis et aperta et ex opinione hominum descriptio, hoc modo: Maiestatem minuere est aliquid de re publica, cum potestatem non habeas, administrare. deinde huius confirmatio similibus et exemplis et ra- tionibus; postea sui facti ab illa definitione separatio.

Then a commonplace by which the advantage or honor of the deed is enhanced. Then follows the refutation of the adversaries’ definition, which is accomplished from all the same topics that we prescribed to the accuser; and the rest will be brought in afterward in the same way, except for the commonplace. The defender’s commonplace, moreover, will be that by which he expresses indignation that the accuser, for the sake of his own peril, tries not only to alter the facts but even to change the words. For those commonplaces, indeed—the ones taken for the sake of demonstrating the slander of the accusers, or of seeking compassion, or of expressing indignation at the deed, or of deterring from compassion—are drawn from the magnitude of the peril, not from the kind of case. For this reason they fall not within every case, but within every kind of case. We made mention of them in the conjectural issue, and we shall use them, by way of introduction, when the case demands.

deinde locus communis, per quem facti utilitas aut honestas adaugetur. deinde sequitur adversariorum definitionis reprehensio, quae iisdem ex locis omnibus, quos accusatori praescripsimus, conficitur; et cetera post eadem praeter communem locum inducentur. Lo- cus autem communis erit defensoris is, per quem indi- gnabitur accusatorem sui periculi causa non res solum convertere, verum etiam verba commutare conari. nam illi quidem communes loci, aut qui calumniae accu- satorum demonstrandae aut misericordiae captandae aut facti indignandi aut a misericordia deterrendi causa sumuntur, ex periculi magnitudine, non ex cau- sae genere ducuntur. quare non in omnem causam, sed in omne causae genus incidunt. eorum mentionem in coniecturali constitutione fecimus, inductione autem, cum causa postulabit, utemur.

When an action seems to need transference or alteration—because either the one who brings it is not the proper person, or it is brought against the wrong party, or before the wrong judges, under the wrong law, with the wrong penalty, on the wrong charge, or at the wrong time—it is called the issue of transference. We should need very many examples of it, if we were to seek out the individual kinds of transference; but because the method of the precepts is similar, we must dispense with a multitude of examples. And in our own practice, indeed, it comes about for many reasons that transferences fall in rather rarely. For many actions are excluded by the praetor’s exceptions, and our civil law is so established that the man who has not proceeded in the proper way loses his case.

Cum autem actio translationis aut commutationis indigere videtur, quod non aut is agit, quem oportet, aut cum eo, quicum oportet, aut apud quos, qua lege, qua poena, quo crimine, quo tempore oportet, con- stitutio translativa appellatur. eius nobis exempla permulta opus sint, si singula translationum genera quaeramus; sed quia ratio praeceptorum similis est, exemplorum multitudine supersedendum est. atque in nostra quidem consuetudine multis de causis fit, ut rarius incidant translationes. nam et praetoris excep- tionibus multae excluduntur actiones et ita ius civile habemus constitutum, ut causa cadat is, qui non quem-

For this reason such matters are mostly handled in the preliminary stage before the magistrate. For it is there that exceptions are demanded, and the power of bringing an action is granted, and the whole framing of private suits is established. In the trials themselves they fall in more rarely; and yet, when they do fall in, they are of such a sort that by themselves they have less firmness, but are confirmed by taking up some other issue. So, in a certain trial, when a charge of poisoning had been brought, and, because a count of parricide had been added in the indictment, the case had been received out of the regular order; but when, in the accusation, certain other charges were confirmed with witnesses and arguments, while mention of the parricide alone was made—the defender ought to take his stand on this very point at length and at large: that, since nothing had been shown concerning the murder of a parent, it is an unworthy thing to visit the defendant with the penalty with which parricides are visited; and that this, if he were condemned, must necessarily come about, since both that count had been added to the indictment and on that account the case had been received out of the regular order.

admodum oportet egerit. quare in iure plerumque ver- santur. ibi enim et exceptiones postulantur et agendi potestas datur et omnis conceptio privatorum iudi- ciorum constituitur. in ipsis autem iudiciis rarius incidunt et tamen, si quando incidunt, eiusmodi sunt, ut per se minus habeant firmitudinis, confirmentur autem assumpta alia aliqua constitutione: ut in quodam iudicio, cum veneficii cuiusdam nomen esset de- latum et, quia parricidii causa subscripta esset, extra ordinem esset acceptum, in accusatione autem alia quaedam crimina testibus et argumentis confirmaren- tur, parricidii autem mentio solum facta esset, defensor in hoc ipso multum oportet et diu consistat: cum de nece parentis nihil demonstratum esset, indignum facinus esse ea poena afficere reum, qua parricidae afficiuntur; id autem, si damnaretur, fieri necesse esse, quoniam et id causae subscriptum et ea re nomen extra ordinem sit acceptum.

If, therefore, the defendant ought not to be visited with that penalty, he ought not to be condemned either, since that penalty necessarily follows upon condemnation. Here the defender, by bringing in from the transferential kind the alteration of the penalty, will weaken the whole accusation. Nevertheless he will also, in defending against the other charges, confirm the transference by the conjectural issue. Let an example of transference laid down in a case be of this sort for us: when certain armed men had come to commit violence, armed men were on hand against them; and one of the armed men cut off the hand of a certain Roman knight who was resisting with his sword. The man whose hand was cut off brings an action for assault. The man against whom the action is brought demands of the praetor an exception: “except insofar as it would prejudice a defendant in a capital charge.”

ea igitur poena si af- fici reum non oporteat, damnari quoque non oportere, quoniam ea poena damnationem necessario consequa- tur. hic defensor poenae commutationem ex transla- tivo genere inducendo totam infirmabit accusationem. verumtamen ceteris quoque criminibus defendendis con- iecturali constitutione translationem confirmabit. Exemplum autem translationis in causa positum no- bis sit huiusmodi: cum ad vim faciendam quidam armati venissent, armati contra praesto fuerunt et cuidam equiti Romano quidam ex armatis resistenti gladio manum praecidit. agit is, cui manus praecisa est, iniuriarum. postulat is, quicum agitur, a praetore exceptionem: extra quam in reum capitis prae-

Here the man who brings the action demands an unqualified trial; the other, against whom it is brought, says that an exception ought to be added. The question is: should an exception be made or not? The supporting argument: “For there ought not, in a recovery-suit, to be a prejudgment of that crime which is under inquiry before the murder-court.” The rebuttal of the argument: “Assaults of this kind are such that it is an unworthy thing for them not to be judged at the earliest possible time.” The point for decision: is the atrocity of the assaults a sufficient reason why, while it is being judged, there should be a prejudgment about some greater crime for which a trial has been provided? And this, indeed, is the example. In every case, moreover, it will be necessary for both sides to inquire by whom, and through whom, and in what way, and at what time it is fitting that an action be brought, or a judgment given, or anything determined about the matter.

iudicium fiat. hic is, qui agit, iudicium purum postulat; ille, quicum agitur, exceptionem addi ait oportere. quaestio est: excipiundum sit an non. ratio: non enim oportet in recuperatorio iudicio eius male- ficii, de quo inter sicarios quaeritur, praeiudicium fieri. infirmatio rationis: eiusmodi sunt iniuriae, ut de iis indignum sit non primo quoque tempore iudicari. iudicatio: atrocitas iniuriarum satisne causae sit, quare, dum de ea iudicatur, de aliquo maiore maleficio, de quo iudicium conparatum sit, praeiudicetur? atque exemplum quidem hoc est. in omni autem causa ab utroque quaeri oportebit, a quo et per quos et quo modo et quo tempore aut agi aut iudicari aut quid statui de ea re conveniat.

This will have to be drawn from those divisions of the law of which we must speak later, and one must reason out what is customarily done in similar cases, and consider whether it is through malice that one thing is done while another is pretended, or through folly, or through necessity, because there was no other way to act, or whether by an opportunity for proceeding the trial or the action has been so framed, or whether the matter is rightly conducted without any such circumstance. The commonplace against the man who introduces the transference: that he is fleeing from trial and punishment because he distrusts his case. The commonplace drawn from the transference: that there will be confusion in everything if cases are not conducted and brought to trial in the way they ought to be—that is, if proceedings are taken either against one against whom they ought not to be, or with a different penalty, a different charge, a different time; and that this consideration bears on the disordering of every trial. These three issues, then, which have no subdivisions, will be handled in this manner. Let us now consider the qualitative issue and its parts.

id ex partibus iuris, de qui- bus post dicendum est, sumi oportebit et ratiocinari, quid in similibus rebus fieri soleat, et videre, utrum malitia quid aliud agatur, aliud simuletur, an stultitia, an necessitudine, quod alio modo agere non possit, an occasione agendi sic sit iudicium aut actio constituta, an recte sine ulla re eiusmodi res agatur. Locus autem communis contra eum, qui translationem inducet: fu- gere iudicium ac poenam, quia causae diffidat. a trans- latione autem: omnium fore perturbationem, si non ita res agantur et in iudicium veniant, quo pacto oporteat; hoc est, si aut cum eo agatur, quocum non oporteat, aut alia poena, alio crimine, alio tempore; atque hanc rationem ad perturbationem iudiciorum omnium per- tinere. Tres igitur haec constitutiones, quae partes non ha- bent, ad hunc modum tractabuntur. nunc generalem constitutionem et partes eius consideremus.

When the deed and the name of the deed are both granted, and no dispute is brought to bear concerning the procedure, and what is sought is the force, the nature, and the very character of the matter, we call this the qualitative issue. We have said that in our view its primary divisions are two, the equitable and the juridical. The equitable issue is one that has, bound up within the matter itself, a dispute belonging to civil law. It is of this kind: a man made a ward his heir; the ward, however, died before he came into his own guardianship. Concerning the inheritance that fell to the ward there is a dispute between those who are the second heirs of the ward’s father and the agnates of the ward. Possession lies with the second heirs. The claim of the agnates is: the money is ours, concerning which the man whose agnates we are made no will. The rebuttal is: no, it is ours, since we are heirs under the father’s will. The question is: to which of the two does it belong? The supporting argument: for the father made a will both for himself and for his son, so long as the son should be a ward; therefore the things that were the son’s necessarily become ours by the father’s will. The weakening of the argument: no, the father made the will for himself, and ordered there to be a second heir not to his son but to himself; therefore, apart from what was in his own estate, nothing of yours can pass by his will. The point for decision: can anyone make a will concerning the property of a ward who is his son? Or are the second heirs the heirs of the head of household himself only, and not also of his son the ward?

Cum et facto et facti nomine concesso neque ulla actionis inlata controversia vis et natura et genus ipsius negotii quaeritur, constitutionem generalem ap- pellamus. huius primas esse partes duas nobis videri diximus, negotialem et iuridicialem. Negotialis est, quae in ipso negotio iuris civilis habet implicatam controversiam. ea est huiusmodi: quidam pupillum heredem fecit; pupillus autem ante mortuus est, quam in suam tutelam venit. de hereditate ea, quae pupillo venit, inter eos, qui patris pupilli heredes secundi sunt, et inter adgnatos pupilli contro- versia est. possessio heredum secundorum est. intentio est adgnatorum: nostra pecunia est, de qua is, cuius adgnati sumus, testatus non est. depulsio est: immo nostra, qui heredes testamento patris sumus. quaestio est: utrorum sit? ratio: pater enim et sibi et filio testamentum scripsit, dum is pupillus esset. quare, quae filii fuerunt, testamento patris nostra fiant ne- cesse est. infirmatio rationis: immo pater sibi scripsit et secundum heredem non filio, sed sibi iussit esse. quare, praeterquam quod in ipsius fuit, testamento il- lius vestrum esse non potest. iudicatio: possitne quis- quam de filii pupilli re testari; an heredes secundi ipsius patrisfamilias, non filii quoque eius pupilli heredes sint?

And here it is not out of place—since it bears on much—to give a warning, so that it may be said neither nowhere nor everywhere. There are cases that have several supporting arguments within a single issue; and this happens when the thing that was done, or that is being defended, can appear right or plausible for several reasons, as in this very case. For let this supporting argument be set up by the heirs: one sum of money cannot have several heirs on dissimilar grounds, nor has it ever happened that of the same sum one man should be heir by will and another by statute.

Atque hoc non alienum est, quod ad multa pertineat, ne aut nusquam aut usquequaque dicatur, hic ad- monere. sunt causae, quae plures habent rationes in simplici constitutione; quod fit, cum id, quod factum est aut quod defenditur, pluribus de causis rectum aut probabile videri potest, ut in hac ipsa causa. sub- ponatur enim ab heredibus haec ratio: unius enim pe- cuniae plures dissimilibus de causis heredes esse non possunt, nec umquam factum est, ut eiusdem pecuniae alius testamento, alius lege heres esset,

The weakening of this will be as follows: it is not one sum, because the one was already the ward’s by external acquisition, and of this no one had been named heir in that will should anything befall the ward; while of the other the wish of the father, even now dead, had the greatest force, a wish that, the ward now being dead, granted the money to his own heirs. The point for decision is: whether it was one sum. Or, if they shall have used this weakening—that of one sum there can be several heirs on dissimilar grounds, and that the dispute is about this very point—the point for decision arises: can there be of the same sum several heirs of dissimilar kinds? Thus within a single issue it has been shown how both supporting arguments, and weakenings of supporting arguments, and consequently points for decision, may come to be several.

infirmatio autem haec erit: non est una pecunia, propterea quod altera pupilli iam erat adventicia, cuius heres non illo in testamento quisquam scriptus erat, si quid pupillo accidisset; et de altera patris etiamnunc mortui vo- luntas plurimum valebat, quae iam mortuo pupillo suis heredibus concedebat. iudicatio est: unane pe- cunia fuerit; aut, si hac erunt usi infirmatione: posse plures esse unius heredes pecuniae dissimilibus de cau- sis et de eo ipso esse controversiam, iudicatio nascitur: possintne eiusdem pecuniae plures dissimilibus gene- ribus heredes esse? ergo una in constitutione intel- lectum est, quomodo et rationes et rationum infirma- tiones et propterea iudicationes plures fiant.

Now let us look at the precepts of this kind. By both parties, or indeed by all, if more than two are in dispute, it must be considered out of what elements the law is composed. Its beginning, then, seems to be drawn from nature; certain things, however, have passed into custom on a consideration of advantage, whether plain to us or obscure; afterward certain things approved by custom, or seen to be genuinely advantageous, were confirmed by statutes. The law of nature is what brings to us not opinion but a certain inborn force: such as religious scruple, devotion, gratitude, vindication, deference, truthfulness.

Nunc huius generis praecepta videamus. utrisque aut etiam omnibus, si plures ambigent, ius ex quibus rebus constet, considerandum est. initium ergo eius ab natura ductum videtur; quaedam autem ex utili- tatis ratione aut perspicua nobis aut obscura in con- suetudinem venisse; post autem adprobata quaedam a consuetudine aut vero utilia visa legibus esse fir- mata; ac naturae quidem ius esse, quod nobis non opinio, sed quaedam innata vis adferat, ut religionem, pietatem, gratiam, vindicationem, observantiam, veri-

They call religious scruple that which lies in the fear and worship of the gods; devotion, that which counsels the keeping of duty toward one’s country or parents or others joined by blood; gratitude, that which holds, in the remembrance and requital of services and honors and friendships, the observance due; vindication, by which through defense or revenge we drive force and insult away from ourselves and from those who ought to be dear to us, and by which we punish wrongs; deference, by which we revere and cultivate those who surpass us in age or wisdom or honor or some dignity; truthfulness, by which we take care that nothing be otherwise—whether already done or yet to be done—than as we have affirmed.

tatem. religionem eam, quae in metu et caerimonia deorum sit, appellant; pietatem, quae erga patriam aut parentes aut alios sanguine coniunctos officium conservare moneat; gratiam, quae in memoria et re- muneratione officiorum et honoris et amicitiarum ob- servantiam teneat; vindicationem, per quam vim et contumeliam defendendo aut ulciscendo propulsamus a nobis et nostris, qui nobis cari esse debent, et per quam peccata punimur; observantiam, per quam aetate aut sapientia aut honore aut aliqua dignitate antecedentes veremur et colimus; veritatem, per quam damus operam, ne quid aliter, quam confirmaverimus, fiat aut factum aut futurum sit.

The rights of nature themselves are less sought after for this kind of dispute, because they are not engaged in this civil law and lie rather far from common understanding; yet they must often be brought in for the sake of some comparison or to amplify the matter. By custom that is held to be law which the antiquity of usage, by the will of all, has approved without statute. Within it there are certain rights now made fixed through their very antiquity. To this class belong many things, and much the greatest part of them is what the praetors have been accustomed to set forth in their edicts. Certain kinds of law, moreover, have now been made fixed by custom;

ac naturae quidem iura minus ipsa quaeruntur ad hanc controversiam, quod neque in hoc civili iure versantur et a vulgari intellegentia remotiora sunt; ad similitudinem vero aliquam aut ad rem amplificandam saepe sunt inferenda. consuetu- dine autem ius esse putatur id, quod voluntate omnium sine lege vetustas comprobarit. In ea autem quaedam sunt iura ipsa iam certa propter vetustatem. quo in genere et alia sunt multa et eorum multo maxima pars, quae praetores edicere consuerunt. quaedam autem genera iuris iam certa consuetudine facta sunt;

of which kind are agreement, fairness, judicial precedent. An agreement is what is reckoned so just between the parties who have settled it that it is said to be guaranteed by law; fairness is what is even-handed toward all; a judicial precedent is one concerning which a verdict of someone or of several has already before been established. Statute law, then, must be learned from the statutes. From these divisions of the law, accordingly, one must attend to and draw out, by trying each single division of the law in turn, whatever shall seem to arise for any party either from the matter itself, or from a like matter, or from a greater or lesser one. And since, as was said before, there are two kinds of commonplace—one of which contains the amplification of a doubtful matter, the other of a certain one—it will be considered what the case itself affords and what may, and ought to, be enlarged through a commonplace. For fixed commonplaces, such as fall in every case, cannot be prescribed; in most cases it will perhaps be necessary to argue from the authority of the jurists and against that authority. One must take heed, moreover, both in this and in all issues, whether the matter itself reveals any commonplaces beyond those we set forth. Now let us consider the juridical kind and its parts.

quod genus pactum, par, iudicatum. pactum est, quod inter quos convenit ita iustum putatur, ut iure praestare dicatur; par, quod in omnes aequabile est; iudicatum, de quo iam ante sententia alicuius aut aliquorum con- stitutum est. iam iura legitima ex legibus cognosci oportebit. his ergo ex partibus iuris, quod cuique aut ex ipsa re aut ex simili aut maiore minoreve nasci videbitur, attendere atque elicere pertemptando unam quamque iuris partem oportebit. Locorum autem communium quoniam, ut ante dic- tum est, duo genera sunt, quorum alterum dubiae rei, alterum certae continet amplificationem, quid ipsa causa det et quid augeri per communem locum possit et oporteat, considerabitur. nam certi, qui in omnes incidant, loci praescribi non possunt; in plerisque for- tasse ab auctoritate iuris consultorum et contra auctoritatem dici oportebit. adtendendum est autem et in hac et in omnibus, num quos locos communes praeter eos, quos nos exponimus, ipsa res ostendat. Nunc iuridiciale genus et partes consideremus.

The juridical issue is one in which the nature of the fair and the unfair, and the principle of reward or punishment, is sought. Its parts are two, one of which we name absolute, the other assumptive. The absolute is one that contains in and of itself—not, as the equitable does, in an implicated and hidden way, but more openly and readily—the question of the right and the not-right. It is of this kind: when the Thebans had overcome the Lacedaemonians in war, and it was more or less the custom among the Greeks, when they had waged war among themselves, that those who had conquered should set up some trophy within the territory merely to declare the victory for the present, not so that the memory of the war should remain forever, they set up a bronze trophy. They are accused before the Amphictyons, that is, before the common council of Greece. The claim is:

Iuridicialis est, in qua aequi et iniqui natura et praemii aut poenae ratio quaeritur. huius partes sunt duae, quarum alteram absolutam, adsumptivam alteram nominamus. Absoluta est, quae ipsa in se, non ut neg- otialis implicite et abscondite, sed patentius et expedi- tius recti et non recti quaestionem continet. ea est huiuscemodi: cum Thebani Lacedaemonios bello su- peravissent et fere mos esset Graiis, cum inter se bellum gessissent, ut ii, qui vicissent, tropaeum ali- quod in finibus statuerent victoriae modo in praesen- tiam declarandae causa, non ut in perpetuum belli memoria maneret, ae+neum statuerunt tropaeum. accu- santur apud Amphictyonas id est apud commune Graeciae consilium. intentio est:

it was not proper. The rebuttal is: it was proper. The question is: was it proper? The supporting argument is: for we won such glory from the war by our valor that we wished to leave its everlasting tokens to our descendants. The weakening is: but nonetheless Greeks ought not to set up over Greeks an everlasting monument of enmity. The point for decision is: when, for the sake of celebrating the highest valor, Greeks set up over Greeks an everlasting monument of enmity, did they act rightly or the contrary? We have appended this supporting argument so that the very kind of case we are treating might be understood. For if we had set up the one they perhaps did use—“you waged the war neither justly nor with due piety”—we would slip into the retort of the charge, of which we shall speak later. That both kinds of case fall into this case is plain. For this case the arguments are to be taken from the same topics as in the equitable case, of which we have spoken before.

non oportuit. de- pulsio est: oportuit. quaestio est: oportueritne? ratio est: eam enim ex bello gloriam virtute peperimus, ut eius aeterna insignia posteris nostris relinquere velle- mus. infirmatio est: at tamen aeternum inimicitiarum monumentum Graios de Graiis statuere non oportet. iudicatio est: cum summae virtutis concelebrandae causa Graii de Graiis aeternum inimicitiarum monu- mentum statuerunt, rectene an contra fecerint? hanc ideo rationem subiecimus, ut hoc causae genus ipsum, de quo agimus, cognosceretur. nam si eam subpo- suissemus, qua fortasse usi sunt: non enim iuste neque pie bellum gessistis, in relationem criminis de- laberemur, de qua post loquemur. utrumque autem causae genus in hanc causam incidere perspicuum est. in hanc argumentationes ex isdem locis sumendae sunt atque in causam negotialem, qua de ante dictum est.

And it will be permitted and proper to take from the case itself, if there is anything in it of indignation or complaint, and from the advantage and nature of the law, many weighty commonplaces, if the dignity of the case shall seem to demand it. Now let us consider the assumptive part of the juridical issue. The assumptive, then, is so called when the deed cannot be approved of itself, but is defended by some argument adjoined from outside. Its parts are four: the comparison, the retort of the charge, the shifting of the charge, the plea for mercy.

Locos autem communes et ex causa ipsa, si quid inerit indignationis aut conquestionis, et ex iuris uti- litate et natura multos et graves sumere licebit et oportebit, si causae dignitas videbitur postulare. Nunc adsumptivam partem iuridicialis considere- mus. Adsumptiva igitur tum dicitur, cum ipsum ex se fac- tum probari non potest, aliquo autem foris adiuncto argumento defenditur. eius partes sunt quattuor: com- paratio, relatio criminis, remotio criminis, concessio.

The comparison is when something done, which is not in itself to be approved, is defended on the ground of that for the sake of which it was done. It is of this kind: a certain general, when he was being besieged by the enemy and could in no way escape, struck a bargain with them, that he would leave behind his arms and baggage and lead out his soldiers; and so he did; and, with his arms and baggage lost, he saved his soldiers beyond hope.

Comparatio est, cum aliquid factum, quod ipsum non sit probandum, ex eo, cuius id causa factum est, defenditur. ea est huiusmodi: quidam imperator, cum ab hostibus circumsederetur neque effugere ullo modo posset, depectus est cum iis, ut arma et inpedimenta relinqueret, milites educeret; itaque fecit; armis et in- pedimentis amissis praeter spem milites conservavit.

He is accused of treason. Here the definitional issue arises. But let us consider this present topic of ours. The claim is: he ought not to have left behind the arms and baggage. The rebuttal is: he ought to have. The question is: ought he to have? The supporting argument is: for all the soldiers would have perished. The weakening is either conjectural—“they would not have perished”; or the other conjectural—“you did not do it on that account” (from which the point for decision is: would they have perished? and: did he do it on that account?); or it is comparative, which is what we now need: “but it was better to lose the soldiers than to yield the arms and baggage to the enemy.” From which the point for decision arises: since all the soldiers were going to perish unless they had come to this bargain, was it better to lose the soldiers or to come to this condition?

accusatur maiestatis. incurrit huc definitio. sed nos hunc locum, de quo agimus, consideremus. intentio est: non oportuit arma et inpedimenta relinquere. de- pulsio est: oportuit. quaestio est: oportueritne? ratio est: milites enim omnes perissent. infirmatio est aut coniecturalis: non perissent; aut altera coniecturalis: non ideo fecisti ex quibus iudicatio est: perissentne? et: ideone fecerit?; aut haec comparativa, cuius nunc indigemus: at enim satius fuit amittere milites quam arma et inpedimenta concedere hostibus. ex quo iudi- catio nascitur: cum omnes perituri milites essent, nisi ad hanc pactionem venissent, utrum satius fuerit amit- tere milites, an ad hanc condicionem venire?

This kind of case must be handled from its own topics, and one must also bring to bear the method and precepts of the other issues; and most of all, in making conjectures, one must weaken that which those who are accused will set in comparison with what is laid to their charge. This will be done if either what the defenders say would have happened, had the deed in question not been done, is denied to have been going to happen; or if it is shown that the deed was done on another principle and for another cause than the defendant will allege he did it. The confirmation of this, and likewise the weakening of it on the opposing side, will be taken from the conjectural issue. But if a man is summoned to trial under a fixed name of wrongdoing, as in this case—for he is arraigned for treason—one must use definition and the precepts of definition. And these things, indeed, generally happen in this kind, that one must use both conjecture and definition. But if some other kind too shall fall in, it will be permitted to transfer the precepts of that kind here on the same principle. For the accuser must labor most of all to weaken, with as many supporting arguments as possible, that very deed on account of which the defendant thinks mercy ought to be granted him.

Hoc causae genus ex suis locis tractari oportebit et adhibere ceterarum quoque constitutionum rationem atque praecepta; ac maxime coniecturis faciendis infir- mare illud, quod cum eo, quod crimini dabitur, ii, qui accusabuntur, comparabunt. id fiet, si aut id, quod dicent defensores futurum fuisse, nisi id factum esset, de quo facto iudicium est, futurum fuisse negabi- tur; aut si alia ratione et aliam ob causam, ac dicet se reus fecisse, demonstrabitur esse factum. eius rei con- firmatio et item contraria de parte infirmatio ex con- iecturali constitutione sumetur. sin autem certo nomine maleficii vocabitur in iudicium, sicut in hac causa— nam maiestatis arcessitur—, definitione et praeceptis definitionis uti oportebit. atque haec quidem ple- rumque in hoc genere accidunt, ut et coniectura et definitione utendum sit. sin aliud quoque aliquod genus incidet, eius generis praecepta licebit huc pari ratione transferre. Nam accusatori maxime est in hoc elaborandum, ut id ipsum factum, propter quod sibi reus concedi putet oportere, quam plurimis infirmet rationibus.

This is easy if he attacks the deed, to disprove it, with as many issues as possible. The comparison itself, separated from the other kinds of dispute, will be considered out of its own force in this way: if it shall be shown that what is set in comparison was either not honorable or not advantageous or not necessary, or not so greatly advantageous or not so greatly honorable or not so greatly necessary. Next, the accuser must separate what he himself charges from what the defender sets in comparison. He will do this if he shows that it is not customary nor proper to act so, and that there is no reason why this should be done on account of that—namely, that for the safety of the soldiers the very things prepared for the sake of safety should be handed over to the enemy. Afterward he must set the misdeed against the benefit, and altogether contend the thing charged against that which is praised by the defender as done, or shown to have had to be done, and by belittling this at the same time enlarge the magnitude of the misdeed. This can be done if it is shown that what the defendant avoided was more honorable, more advantageous, more necessary than what he did.

quod facile est, si quam plurimis constitu- tionibus aggredietur id inprobare. ipsa autem compara- tio separata a ceteris generibus controversiarum sic ex sua vi considerabitur, si illud, quod comparabitur, aut non honestum aut non utile aut non necessarium fuisse aut non tantopere utile aut non tantopere honestum aut non tantopere necessarium fuisse demonstrabitur. deinde oportet accusatorem illud, quod ipse arguat, ab eo, quod defensor conparat, separare. id autem faciet, si demonstrabit non ita fieri solere neque oportere neque esse rationem, quare hoc propter hoc fiat, ut propter salutem militum ea, quae salutis causa comparata sunt, hostibus tradantur. postea com- parare oportet cum beneficio maleficium et omnino id, quod arguitur, cum eo, quod factum ab defensore laudatur aut faciendum fuisse demonstratur, conten- dere et hoc extenuando maleficii magnitudinem simul adaugere. id fieri poterit, si demonstrabitur honestius, utilius, magis necessarium fuisse illud, quod vitarit reus, quam illud, quod fecerit.

The force and nature of the honorable, the advantageous, and the necessary will be learned in the precepts of deliberation. Next one must set out that very comparative point for decision as though it were a deliberative case, and speak on it from the precepts of deliberation. For let this be the point for decision that we set out before: since all the soldiers were going to perish unless they had come to this bargain, was it better that the soldiers perish, or that they come to this bargain? This must be handled from the topics of deliberation, as if the matter were coming up for some consultation. The defender, in those topics where other issues shall have been introduced by the accuser, will himself also frame his defense from those same issues; but all the other topics that pertain to the comparison itself he will handle from the contrary side.

honesti autem et utilis et necessarii vis et natura in deliberationis praecep- tis cognoscetur. deinde oportebit ipsam illam com- parativam iudicationem exponere tamquam causam deliberativam et de ea ex deliberationis praeceptis dicere. sit enim haec iudicatio, quam ante expo- suimus: cum omnes perituri milites essent, nisi ad hanc pactionem venissent, utrum satius fuerit perire milites, an ad hanc pactionem venire? hoc ex locis deliberationis, quasi aliquam in consultationem res veniat, tractari oportebit. Defensor autem, quibus in locis ab accusatore aliae constitutiones erunt inductae, in iis ipse quoque ex isdem constitutionibus defensionem comparabit; ceteros autem omnes locos, qui ad ipsam comparationem pertinebunt, ex contrario tractabit.

The commonplaces will be: for the accuser, against one who, while he confesses to some base or unprofitable deed, or both, nonetheless seeks some defense—and to bring forth the unprofitableness or baseness of the deed with indignation. For the defender it is to argue that no deed ought to be reckoned unprofitable or base, nor likewise profitable or honorable, unless it is understood with what intention, at what time, for what cause it was done; and this topic is so general that, well handled, it will be of great weight toward persuasion in this case. And there is a second topic, by which, with great amplification, the magnitude of the benefit is shown from the advantage or honor or necessity of the deed;

Loci communes autem erunt: accusatoris in eum, qui, cum de facto turpi aliquo aut inutili aut utroque fateatur, quaerat tamen aliquam defensionem, et facti inutilitatem aut turpitudinem cum indignatione pro- ferre; defensoris est, nullum factum inutile neque turpe neque item utile neque honestum putari opor- tere, nisi, quo animo, quo tempore, qua de causa fac- tum sit, intellegatur; qui locus ita communis est, ut bene tractatus in hac causa magno ad persuadendum momento futurus sit; et alter locus, per quem magna cum amplificatione beneficii magnitudo ex utilitate aut honestate aut facti necessitudine demonstratur;

and a third, by which the thing, set forth in words, is placed before the eyes of those who hear, so that they may judge that they too would have done the same, had that situation and that cause for doing it befallen them at the same time. The retort of the charge is when the defendant, having confessed what is charged, shows that he was led by another’s wrong to do rightly what he did. It is of this kind: Horatius, when the three Curiatii were slain and two of his brothers lost, took himself home a victor. He noticed that his sister was not grieved over the death of her brothers, but kept calling, again and again, with groaning and lamentation, on the name of her betrothed, one of the Curiatii.

et tertius, per quem res expressa verbis ante oculos eorum, qui audiunt, ponitur, ut ipsi se quoque idem facturos fuisse arbitrentur, si sibi illa res atque ea faciendi causa per idem tempus accidisset. Relatio criminis est, cum reus id, quod arguitur, confessus alterius se inductum peccato iure fecisse demonstrat. ea est huiusmodi: Horatius occisis tribus Curiatiis et duobus amissis fratribus domum se victor recepit. is animadvertit sororem suam de fratrum morte non laborantem, sponsi autem nomen appellan- tem identidem Curiatii cum gemitu et lamentatione.

Bearing it ill, he killed the maiden. He is accused. The claim is: you killed your sister unlawfully. The rebuttal is: I killed her lawfully. The question is: did he kill her lawfully? The supporting argument is: for she was mourning the death of enemies, neglecting that of her brothers; she took it ill that I and the Roman people had conquered. The weakening is: nonetheless she ought not to have been put to death, uncondemned, by her brother. From which the point for decision is made: since Horatia neglected the death of her brothers, mourned that of enemies, and did not rejoice in the victory of her brother and of the Roman people, ought she to have been put to death, uncondemned, by her brother? In this kind of case, first, if anything can be drawn from the other issues, it must be taken, as was prescribed in the comparison; afterward, if there shall be any means,

indigne passus virginem occidit. accusatur. intentio est: iniuria sororem occidisti. depulsio est: iure occidi. quaestio est: iurene occiderit? ratio est: illa enim hostium mortem lugebat, fratrum neglegebat; me et populum Romanum vicisse moleste ferebat. infirmatio est: tamen a fratre indamnatam necari non oportuit. ex quo iudicatio fit: cum Horatia fra- trum mortem neglegeret, hostium lugeret, fratris et populi Romani victoria non gauderet, oportueritne eam a fratre indamnatam necari? Hoc in genere causae primum, si quid ex ceteris dabitur constitutionibus, sumi oportebit, sicuti in com- paratione praeceptum est; postea, si qua facultas erit,

one must defend, through some issue, the man onto whom the charge is transferred; next, that the thing the defendant transfers onto another’s wrongdoing is lighter than what he himself undertook; afterward one must use the parts of transference, and show by whom, and through whom, and in what manner, and at what time it had been agreed that the matter should be either pursued or judged or settled; and at the same time show that punishment ought not to have been interposed before trial. Then the statutes and the courts must be pointed out, by which that wrongdoing, which the defendant punished of his own accord, might have been avenged through established usage and through trial. Next, that one ought not to hear the charge laid against a man concerning whom the very person who lays it

per aliquam constitutionem illum, in quem crimen transferetur, defendere; deinde, levius esse illud, quod in alterum peccatum reus transferat, quam quod ipse susceperit; postea translationis partibus uti et osten- dere, a quo et per quos et quo modo et quo tem- pore aut agi aut iudicari aut statui de ea re convene- rit; ac simul ostendere non oportuisse ante supplicium quam iudicium interponere. tum leges quoque et iudi- cia demonstranda sunt, per quae potuerit id pecca- tum, quod sponte sua reus poenitus sit, moribus et iudicio vindicari. deinde negare audire oportere id, quod in eum criminis conferatur, de quo is ipse, qui conferat,

was unwilling that a trial should be held, and that what has not been judged ought to be held as not done; afterward, to show the shamelessness of those who now accuse before the jurors the man whom they themselves condemned without jurors, and hold a trial concerning one of whom they have already themselves exacted punishment; afterward we shall say that there will be confusion of trial, and that the jurors will go further than they have power to go, if they pass judgment at once both on the defendant and on the man the defendant arraigns; next, if it were established that men should avenge wrongdoings with wrongdoings and injuries with injuries, how many troubles would follow; and that, had the very man who now accuses been willing to do the same, there would have been no need even of this trial;

iudicium fieri noluerit, et id, quod iudicatum non sit, pro infecto habere oportere; postea inpuden- tiam demonstrare eorum, qui eum nunc apud iudices accusent, quem sine iudicibus ipsi condemnarint, et de eo iudicium faciant, de quo iam ipsi supplicium sump- serint; postea perturbationem iudicii futuram dice- mus et iudices longius, quam potestatem habeant, progressuros, si simul et de reo et de eo, quem reus arguat, iudicarint; deinde, si hoc constitutum sit, ut peccata homines peccatis et iniurias iniuriis ulciscantur, quan- tum incommodorum consequatur; ac si idem facere ipse, qui nunc accusat, voluisset, ne hoc quidem ipso quicquam opus fuisse iudicio;

but that if all the rest do the same as well, there will be no trial at all. Afterward it will be shown that, even had she onto whom the charge is transferred by the defendant been condemned at trial, this same man could not have exacted punishment of her himself; wherefore he is unworthy who, having not even been able himself to exact penalties of a condemned woman, exacted punishment of one who has not even been brought to trial. Then he will demand that the defendant produce the statute under which he acted. Then, as in the comparison we prescribed that what was set in comparison should be belittled by the accuser as much as possible, so in this kind it will be proper to compare the fault of the man onto whom the charge is transferred with the misdeed of the man who says he acted lawfully. Afterward it must be shown that the former is not of such a sort that on account of it the latter should have been done. The last point, as in the comparison, is the assumption of the point for decision and the speaking on it through amplification from the precepts of deliberation.

si vero ceteri quoque idem faciant, omnino iudicium nullum futurum. postea demonstrabitur, ne si iudicio quidem illa damnata esset, in quam id crimen ab reo conferatur, potuisse hunc ipsum de illa supplicium sumere; quare esse indignum eum, qui ne de damnata quidem poenas sumere ipse potuisset, de ea supplicium sumpsisse, quae ne adducta quidem sit in iudicium. deinde postu- labit, ut legem, qua lege fecerit, proferat. deinde quem- admodum in comparatione praecipiebamus, ut illud, quod compararetur, extenuaretur ab accusatore quam maxime, sic in hoc genere oportebit illius culpam, in quem crimen transferatur, cum huius maleficio, qui se iure fecisse dicat, comparare. postea demonstran- dum est non esse illud eiusmodi, ut ob id hoc fieri con- venerit. extrema est, ut in comparatione, assumptio iudicationis et de ea per amplificationem ex delibera- tionis praeceptis dictio.

The defender, on the other hand, will weaken what is introduced through the other issues by means of those topics that have been handed down; the retort itself he will establish, first by enlarging the fault and audacity of the man onto whom he retorts the charge, and—as much as possible, through indignation, if the matter allows, joined with complaint—by placing it before the eyes; afterward by showing that he punished more lightly than the other deserved, and by setting his own act of punishment against the other’s wrong. Then it will be proper to weaken with contrary arguments those topics that shall have been so handled by the accuser that they can be refuted and turned to the opposite side—of which kind are the last three.

Defensor autem, quae per alias constitutiones indu- centur, ex iis locis, qui traditi sunt, infirmabit; ipsam autem relationem comprobabit, primum augendo eius, in quem referet crimen, culpam et audaciam et quam maxime per indignationem, si res feret, iuncta con- questione ante oculos ponendo; postea levius demon- strando se poenitum, quam sit illius promeritum, et suum supplicium cum illius iniuria conferendo. deinde oportebit eos locos, qui ita erunt ab accusatore trac- tati, ut refelli et contrariam in partem converti pos- sint, quo in genere sunt tres extremi, contrariis ratio-

That sharpest accusation of accusers, however, by which they show that there will be confusion of all trials if the power of exacting punishment of an uncondemned person be granted, will be relieved: first if the wrong is shown to have been of such a sort that it must have seemed not endurable, not only to a good man, but to any free man at all; next, so plain that it could not be called into doubt even by the very one who did it; next, of such a sort that he ought above all to have given heed to it who did give heed; so that it was not so right, not so honorable, that the matter come to trial, as that it be avenged in the way and by the person by whom it was avenged;

nibus infirmare. illa autem acerrima accusatorum criminatio, per quam perturbationem fore omnium iu- diciorum demonstrant, si de indamnato supplicii su- mendi potestas data sit, levabitur, primum si eius- modi demonstrabitur iniuria, ut non modo viro bono, verum omnino homini libero videatur non fuisse tole- randa; deinde ita perspicua, ut ne ab ipso quidem, qui fecisset, in dubium vocaretur; deinde eiusmodi, ut in eam is maxime debuerit animum advertere, qui ani- mum advertit; ut non tam rectum, non tam fuerit ho- nestum in iudicium illam rem pervenire, quam eo modo atque ab eo vindicari, quo modo et ab quo sit vindicata;

afterward, that the matter was so open that it mattered nothing for a trial to be held about it. And here it must be shown, by arguments and by like cases, that very many matters are so atrocious and so plain that, concerning them, it is not only not necessary, but not even useful, to wait for a trial to be held. The accuser’s commonplace is against the man who, when he cannot deny what is charged, nonetheless contrives for himself some hope out of the confusion of trials. And here there is the demonstration of the usefulness of trials, and the complaint over the one who was made to suffer punishment uncondemned;

postea sic rem fuisse apertam, ut iudicium de ea re fieri nihil adtinuerit. atque hic demonstran- dum est rationibus et similibus rebus permultas ita atroces et perspicuas res esse, ut de his non modo non necesse sit, sed ne utile quidem, quam mox iu- dicium fiat, exspectare. Locus communis accusatoris in eum, qui, cum id, quod arguitur, negare non possit, tamen aliquid sibi spei conparet ex iudiciorum perturbatione. atque hic utilitatis iudiciorum demonstratio et de eo conquestio, qui supplicium dederit indamnatus;

but, against the man who exacted it, there is indignation at his audacity and cruelty. By the defender there is indignation at the audacity of the man on whom he took vengeance, joined with complaint of his own; and the argument that the matter ought to be considered not from the name of the deed itself, but from the intention of the man who did it, and from the cause and the time; and what evil there will be from someone’s wrong or crime, unless audacity so great and so plain be avenged by the man to whose reputation, or to whose parents, or to whose children, or to some thing that must or ought to be dear to all, it pertained. The shifting of the charge is when the claim concerning the deed brought by the adversary is removed onto another person or another thing.

in eius autem, qui sumpserit, audaciam et crudelitatem indignatio. ab defensore, in eius, quem ultus sit, audaciam cum sui conquestione; rem non ex nomine ipsius negotii, sed ex consilio eius, qui fecerit, et causa et tempore considerari oportere; quid mali futurum sit aut ex iniuria aut scelere alicuius, nisi tanta et tam perspicua audacia ab eo, ad cuius famam aut ad parentes aut ad liberos pertineret aut ad aliquam rem, quam caram esse omnibus aut necesse est aut oportet esse, vin- dicata. Remotio criminis est, cum eius intentio facti, quod ab adversario infertur, in alium aut in aliud de- movetur.

This happens in two ways; for sometimes the cause, sometimes the thing itself, is shifted. Let this example serve us for the shifting of the cause: the Rhodians sent certain men as envoys to Athens. The quaestors did not give the envoys the allowance that ought to have been given. The envoys did not set out. They are accused. The claim is: they ought to have set out. The rebuttal is: they ought not to have. The question is: ought they to have? The supporting argument is: for the allowance that is customarily given from the public funds was not given by the quaestor. The weakening is: nonetheless you ought to have carried out the business that had been given you on behalf of the state. The point for decision is: when the allowance owed from the public funds was not given to those who were envoys, ought they nonetheless to have carried out the embassy? In this kind, first, as in the others, one must see whether anything can be drawn either from the conjectural or from another issue. Next, very many things both from the comparison and from the retort of the charge will be able to suit this case too.

id fit bipertito; nam tum causa, tum res ipsa removetur. causae remotioni hoc nobis exem- plo sit: Rhodii quosdam legarunt Athenas. legatis quaestores sumptum, quem oportebat dari, non dede- runt. legati profecti non sunt. accusantur. intentio est: proficisci oportuit. depulsio est: non oportuit. quaestio est: oportueritne? ratio est: sumptus enim, qui de publico dari solet, is ab quaestore non est datus. infirmatio est: vos tamen id, quod publice vobis erat negotii datum, conficere oportebat. iudi- catio est: cum iis, qui legati erant, sumptus, qui de- bebatur de publico, non daretur, oportueritne eos con- ficere nihilo minus legationem? hoc in genere pri- mum sicut in ceteris, si quid aut ex coniecturali aut ex alia constitutione sumi possit, videri oportebit. deinde pleraque et ex comparatione et ex relatione criminis in hanc quoque causam convenire poterunt.

The accuser, on the other hand, will first defend, if he can, the man by whose fault the defendant says the deed was done; but if he cannot, he will deny that the fault belongs to that man at this trial, and assert that it belongs to this man, whom he himself accuses. Afterward he will say that each ought to attend to his own duty; and that, even if the other had done wrong, this man ought not to have done wrong; next, that, if the other has erred, the other ought to be accused separately, just as this man is, and that the accusation of the other ought not to be joined with the defense of this one. The defender, on the other hand, when he has dealt thoroughly with the other matters, if any fall in from other issues, will argue concerning the shifting itself thus:

Accusator autem illum, cuius culpa id factum reus dicet, primum defendet, si poterit; sin minus poterit, negabit ad hoc iudicium illius, sed huius, quem ipse accuset, culpam pertinere. postea dicet suo quemque officio consulere oportere; nec, si ille peccasset, hunc oportuisse peccare; deinde, si ille deliquerit, separatim illum sicut hunc accusari oportere et non cum huius defensione coniungi illius accusationem. Defensor autem cum cetera, si qua ex aliis incident constitutionibus, pertractarit, de ipsa remotione sic ar-

first, he will show by whose fault it came about; next, since it came about by another’s fault, he will show that he either could not or ought not to have done what the accuser says he ought to have done; what he could do he will show from the divisions of advantage, in which the force of necessity is involved; what he ought to have done will be considered from honor. On both, more distinctly, it will be spoken in the deliberative kind. Next, that everything was done by the defendant which was within his own power;

gumentabitur: primum, cuius acciderit culpa, demon- strabit; deinde, cum id aliena culpa accidisset, ostendet se aut non potuisse aut non debuisse id facere, quod accusator dicat oportuisse; quid potuerit, ex utilitatis partibus, in quibus est necessitudinis vis implicata, demonstrabit quid debuerit, ex honestate considera- bitur. de utroque distinctius in deliberativo genere dicetur. deinde omnia facta esse ab reo, quae in ipsius fuerint potestate;

that what was done less than had been agreed came about by another’s fault. Then, the other’s fault being set out, it must be shown how much willingness and zeal there was in the defendant himself, and this must be confirmed by signs of this kind: from his diligence in other matters, from things done or said before; and that it was useful for him himself to do this, and unprofitable not to do it, and that this was more consistent with the rest of his life than that he should fail to do it on account of another’s fault. But if the case is shifted not onto a fixed person, but onto some thing—as in this same matter, if the quaestor had died and for that reason the money had not been given to the envoys—then, with the accusation of another and the rebuttal of fault removed, one must use the other topics in like manner, and assume from the parts of the plea for mercy what shall be suitable; concerning which we must speak.

quod minus, quam convenerit, fac- tum sit, culpa id alterius accidisse. deinde alterius culpa exponenda demonstrandum est, quantum volun- tatis et studii fuerit in ipso, et id signis confirman- dum huiusmodi: ex cetera diligentia, ex ante factis aut dictis; atque hoc ipsi utile fuisse facere, inutile autem non facere, et cum cetera vita fuisse hoc magis consentaneum, quam quod propter alterius culpam non fecerit. si autem non in hominem certum, sed in rem aliquam causa demovebitur, ut in hac eadem re, si quaestor mortuus esset et idcirco legatis pe- cunia data non esset, accusatione alterius et culpae depulsione dempta ceteris similiter uti locis oportebit et ex concessionis partibus, quae convenient, assumere; de quibus nobis dicendum erit.

The commonplaces, again, are roughly the same for both sides as fell to them in the assumptive issues treated above; but these are the surest: for the accuser, indignation at the deed; for the defendant, that, when the fault lies in another, or does not lie in himself, he ought not to be made to suffer for it. The shifting of the charge itself occurs when the defendant denies that the act laid to his charge had any bearing either upon himself or upon his duty, and asserts that, even if there was some wrongdoing in it, the blame ought not to be assigned to him. This kind of case is of the following sort. In the treaty once concluded with the Samnites, a certain young nobleman held the pig at the general’s order. But when the treaty was rejected by the Senate and the general surrendered to the Samnites, someone in the Senate maintains that the man who held the pig ought likewise to be surrendered.

Loci autem communes idem utrisque fere, qui in superioribus assumptivis, incident; hi tamen certissi- me: accusatoris, facti indignatio; defensoris, cum in alio culpa sit, aut in ipso non sit, supplicio se affici non oportere. Ipsius autem rei fit remotio, cum id, quod datur crimini, negat neque ad se neque ad officium suum reus pertinuisse; nec, si quid in eo sit delictum, sibi adtribui oportere. id causae genus est huiusmodi: in eo foedere, quod factum est quondam cum Samnitibus, quidam adulescens nobilis porcum sustinuit iussu im- peratoris. foedere autem ab senatu inprobato et im- peratore Samnitibus dedito quidam in senatu eum quoque dicit, qui porcum tenuerit, dedi oportere.

The charge is: he ought to be surrendered. The denial is: he ought not. The question is: ought he? The supporting argument is: for it was neither my office nor within my power, since I was of that age and a private person, while the man whose business it was to see that a sufficiently honorable treaty was struck was a general of the highest authority and power. The rebuttal is: but since you took part, in a most shameful treaty, in a rite of the deepest solemnity, it is fitting that you be surrendered. The point for decision is: when a man who had no power of his own took part, at the general’s order, in a treaty and in so solemn a rite, ought he to be surrendered to the enemy or not? This kind of case differs from the previous one in this respect: in the former the defendant grants that he ought to have done what the accuser says ought to have been done, but assigns the cause to some thing or person that stood in the way of his own intention, without the elements of the plea for mercy; for those have a certain greater force, as will be understood a little later.

in- tentio est: dedi oportet. depulsio est: non oportet. quaestio est: oporteatne? ratio est: non enim meum fuit officium nec mea potestas, cum et id aetatis et privatus essem et esset summa cum auctoritate et potestate imperator, qui videret, ut satis honestum foedus feriretur. infirmatio est: at enim quoniam par- ticeps tu factus es in turpissimo foedere summae re- ligionis, dedi te convenit. iudicatio est: cum is, qui potestatis nihil habuerit, iussu imperatoris in foedere et in tanta religione interfuerit, dedendusne sit hosti- bus necne? hoc genus causae cum superiore hoc differt, quod in illo concedit se reus oportuisse facere id, quod fieri dicat accusator oportuisse, sed alicui rei aut homini causam attribuit, quae voluntati suae fuerit inpedimento, sine concessionis partibus; nam earum maior quaedam vis est, quod paulo post intellegetur.

But in this kind he ought neither to accuse another nor to transfer the blame onto another, but to show that the matter had no bearing, and has none, upon himself, his power, or his duty. And in this kind something new occurs: the accuser too often builds his accusation out of a shifting, as when someone accuses a man who, while praetor, summoned the people to arms for a campaign at a time when there were consuls. For just as in the earlier example the defendant moved the deed away from his own duty and power, so in this one the accuser himself, by moving the deed away from the duty and power of the man accused,

in hoc autem non accusare alterum nec culpam in alium transferre debet, sed demonstrare eam rem nihil ad se nec ad potestatem neque ad officium suum per- tinuisse aut pertinere. atque in hoc genere hoc ac- cidit novi, quod accusator quoque saepe ex remo- tione criminationem conficit, ut si quis eum accuset, qui, cum praetor esset, in expeditionem ad arma populum vocarit, cum consules essent. nam ut in su- periore exemplo reus ab suo officio et a potestate factum demovebat, sic in hoc ab eius officio ac po- testate, qui accusatur, ipse accusator factum remo-

confirms the accusation by this very argument. In this issue, on both sides, one will have to inquire from all the divisions of honor and from all the divisions of expediency, by examples, by signs, and by inference, what belongs to each man’s duty, right, and power, and whether that right, duty, and power was assigned to the man at issue or not. The commonplaces will have to be drawn from the matter itself, if it offers anything for indignation or for complaint. The plea for mercy is that by which the deed itself is not defended by the defendant, but pardon is sought instead. It has two parts: exculpation and the plea for pardon. Exculpation is that by which the accused defends not the deed itself but his own intention. It has three parts: inadvertence, accident, and necessity.

vendo hac ipsa ratione confirmat accusationem. in hac ab utroque ex omnibus partibus honestatis et ex om- nibus utilitatis partibus, exemplis, signis, ratiocinando, quid cuiusque officii, iuris, potestatis sit, quaeri opor- tebit et fueritne ei, quo de agetur, id iuris, officii, potestatis attributum necne. Locos autem communes ex ipsa re, si quid indigna- tionis aut conquestionis habebit, sumi oportebit. Concessio est, per quam non factum ipsum pro- batur ab reo, sed ut ignoscatur, id petitur. cuius partes sunt duae: purgatio et deprecatio. Purgatio est, per quam eius, qui accusatur, non factum ipsum, sed vo- luntas defenditur. ea habet partes tres: inprudentiam, casum, necessitudinem.

Inadvertence is when the man charged is said not to have known something. So among a certain people there was a law: let no one sacrifice a calf to Diana. Some sailors, when they were being tossed in deep water by a contrary storm, vowed that, if they reached the harbor they had in sight, they would sacrifice a calf to the god who dwelt there. As it happened, in that harbor there was a shrine of that very Diana to whom it was not permitted to sacrifice a calf. In ignorance of the law, when they had landed, they sacrificed a calf. They are accused. The charge is: you sacrificed a calf to a god to whom it was not permitted. The denial rests on a plea for mercy. The supporting argument is: I did not know it was not permitted. The rebuttal is: nevertheless, since you did what the law did not permit, you deserve to be punished. The point for decision is: when a man has done what he ought not, and did not know that he ought not, does he deserve to be punished?

Inprudentia est, cum scisse aliquid is, qui arguitur, negatur; ut apud quosdam lex erat: ne quis Dianae vitulum immolaret. nautae quidam, cum adversa tem- pestate in alto iactarentur, voverunt, si eo portu, quem conspiciebant, potiti essent, ei deo, qui ibi esset, se vitulum immolaturos. casu erat in eo portu fanum Dianae eius, cui vitulum immolare non licebat. in- prudentes legis, cum exissent, vitulum immolaverunt. accusantur. intentio est: vitulum immolastis ei deo, cui non licebat. depulsio est in concessione posita. ratio est: nescivi non licere. infirmatio est: tamen, quoniam fecisti, quod non licebat ex lege, supplicio dignus es. iudicatio est: cum id fecerit, quod non oportuerit, et id non oportere nescierit, sitne supplicio dignus?

Accident, in turn, is brought into the plea for mercy when it is shown that some force of fortune stood in the way of the intention, as in this case. The Lacedaemonians had a law that, unless the contractor furnished the victims for a certain sacrifice, it should be a capital offense. The man who had taken the contract, as the day of the sacrifice drew near, began to drive the victims into the city from the country. Then suddenly, with great storms stirred up, the river Eurotas, which flows past Lacedaemon, became so swollen and violent that the victims could in no way be brought across it.

Casus autem inferetur in concessionem, cum demon- stratur aliqua fortunae vis voluntati obstitisse, ut in hac: cum Lacedaemoniis lex esset, ut, hostias nisi ad sacrificium quoddam redemptor praebuisset, capital esset, hostias is, qui redemerat, cum sacrificii dies instaret, in urbem ex agro coepit agere. tum subito magnis commotis tempestatibus fluvius Eurotas, is qui praeter Lacedaemonem fluit, ita magnus et vehemens factus est, ut ea traduci victimae nullo modo possent.

The contractor, to make his good intention plain, set all the victims on the bank, so that those who were across the river could see them. Although everyone knew that the sudden swelling of the river had stood in the way of his zeal, certain men nonetheless prosecute him on a capital charge. The charge is: the victims which you owed for the sacrifice were not on hand. The denial is the plea for mercy. The supporting argument: for the river swelled suddenly, and on that account they could not be brought across. The rebuttal: nevertheless, since what the law commands was not done, you deserve to be punished. The point for decision is: when in this matter the contractor did something against the law, in a matter in which the sudden swelling of the river stood in the way of his zeal, does he deserve to be punished?

redemptor suae voluntatis ostendendae causa hostias constituit omnes in litore, ut, qui trans flumen essent, videre possent. cum omnes studio eius subitam flu- minis magnitudinem scirent fuisse inpedimento, tamen quidam capitis arcesserunt. intentio est: hostiae, quas debuisti ad sacrificium, praesto non fuerunt. depulsio concessio. ratio: flumen enim subito accrevit et ea re traduci non potuerunt. infirmatio: tamen, quon- iam, quod lex iubet, factum non est, supplicio dignus es. iudicatio est: cum in ea re contra legem redemptor aliquid fecerit, qua in re studio eius subita fluminis obstiterit magnitudo, supplicio dignusne sit?

Necessity, in turn, is brought in when the defendant is defended on the ground that he did what he did under some compulsion of force, in this manner. There is a law among the Rhodians that, if any beaked warship is caught in the harbor, it shall be confiscated. When there was a great storm in the deep, the force of the winds drove a ship into the Rhodians’ harbor against the will of the sailors. The quaestor claims the ship for the state; the ship’s owner denies that it ought to be confiscated. The charge is: a beaked ship was caught in the harbor. The denial is the plea for mercy. The supporting argument: we were driven into the harbor by force and necessity. The rebuttal is: nevertheless, by the law, the ship ought to belong to the state. The point for decision is: when the law has confiscated a beaked ship caught in the harbor, and when this ship was thrown into the harbor against the will of the sailors by the force of the storm, ought it to be confiscated?

Necessitudo autem infertur, cum vi quadam reus id, quod fecerit, fecisse defenditur, hoc modo: lex est apud Rhodios, ut, si qua rostrata in portu navis depre- hensa sit, publicetur. cum magna in alto tempestas esset, vis ventorum invitis nautis in Rhodiorum por- tum navem coe+git. quaestor navem populi vocat, na- vis dominus negat oportere publicari. intentio est: rostrata navis in portu deprehensa est. depulsio con- cessio. ratio: vi et necessario sumus in portum coacti. infirmatio est: navem ex lege tamen populi esse oportet. iudicatio est: cum rostratam navem in portu deprehensam lex publicarit cumque haec navis invitis nautis vi tempestatis in portum coniecta sit, oporteatne eam publicari?

We have gathered the examples of these three kinds into a single place because a similar precept for arguments is handed down for them. For in all of these, first, if the matter itself affords any opportunity, the accuser ought to introduce a conjecture, so that what is denied to have been done by intention may be shown, by some suspicion, to have been done deliberately; next, to introduce a definition of necessity, or of accident, or of inadvertence, and to attach to that definition examples in which inadvertence, or accident, or necessity seems to have been present, and from these to separate off the case that the defendant brings forward—that is, to show that it is dissimilar, in that it was something lighter, easier, not impossible to know, not accidental, not necessary; afterward to show that it could have been avoided—that by this means it could have been foreseen, if he had done this or that, or, had he not done it, guarded against; and to show by definitions that this ought to be called not inadvertence or accident or necessity, but laziness, negligence, and folly.

Horum trium generum idcirco in unum locum con- tulimus exempla, quod similis in ea praeceptio argu- mentorum traditur. nam in his omnibus primum, si quid res ipsa dabit facultatis, coniecturam induci ab accusatore oportebit, ut id, quod voluntate factum ne- gabitur, consulto factum suspicione aliqua demon- stretur; deinde inducere definitionem necessitudinis aut casus aut inprudentiae et exempla ad eam defini- tionem adiungere, in quibus inprudentia fuisse videatur aut casus aut necessitudo, et ab his id, quod reus in- ferat, separare, id est ostendere dissimile, quod le- vius, facilius non ignorabile, non fortuitum, non necessarium fuerit; postea demonstrare potuisse vitari: hac ratione provideri potuisse, si hoc aut illud fe- cisset, aut, nisi fecisset, praecaveri; et definitionibus ostendere non hanc inprudentiam aut casum aut ne- cessitudinem, sed inertiam, neglegentiam, fatuitatem nominari oportere.

And if any necessity seems to carry baseness with it, one will have to show, in refutation through the interweaving of commonplaces, that it would have been better to endure anything, to die in the end, than to comply with a necessity of that sort. And then, from those topics of which we spoke in the part on the equitable issue, one will have to inquire into the nature of right and equity, and, as in the absolute juridical issue, to consider this very thing in itself, apart from all other matters. And in this place, if there is opportunity, one will have to use examples in which, under a similar excuse, no pardon was granted, and by contrast, that those men deserved pardon more; and by the elements of deliberation, that it is base or unprofitable to grant a concession on a matter committed by the adversary—that it is a very great thing, and will be to great detriment, if such a matter is neglected by those who have the power to punish it.

ac si qua necessitudo turpitudi- nem videbitur habere, oportebit per locorum commu- nium inplicationem redarguentem demonstrare quid- vis perpeti, mori denique satius fuisse quam eius- modi necessitudini optemperare. atque tum ex iis locis, de quibus in negotiali parte dictum est, iuris et aequitatis naturam oportebit quaerere et quasi in absoluta iuridiciali per se hoc ipsum ab rebus omni- bus separatim considerare. atque hoc in loco, si fa- cultas erit, exemplis uti oportebit, quibus in simili excusatione non sit ignotum, et contentione, magis illis ignoscendum fuisse, et deliberationis partibus, turpe aut inutile esse concedi eam rem, quae ab ad- versario commissa sit: permagnum esse et magno fu- turum detrimento, si ea res ab iis, qui potestatem habent vindicandi, neglecta sit.

The defendant, on the other hand, will be able to use all these elements reversed. He will dwell most of all upon defending the intention and upon magnifying the thing that stood in the way of the intention; and that he could do no more than he did; and that in all matters the intention ought to be looked to; and that he cannot be convicted of what is free of fault; and that under his name the common frailty of mankind would be condemned. Then, that nothing is more shameful than that a man free of fault should not be free of punishment. The commonplaces: for the accuser, against the confession, and how great a license to do wrong is left open, once it has been established that the inquiry is not about the deed but about the cause of the deed;

Defensor autem conversis omnibus his partibus pot- erit uti; maxime autem in voluntate defendenda com- morabitur et in ea re adaugenda, quae voluntati fuerit inpedimento; et se plus, quam fecerit, facere non po- tuisse; et in omnibus rebus voluntatem spectari opor- tere; et se convinci non posse, quod absit a culpa; suo nomine communem hominum infirmitatem posse dam- nari. deinde nihil esse indignius quam eum, qui culpa careat, supplicio non carere. Loci autem communes: accusatoris in confessionem, et quanta potestas peccandi relinquatur, si semel in- stitutum sit, ut non de facto, sed de facti causa quaera-

for the defendant, a lament over a calamity that befell not through fault but through some greater force, and concerning the power of fortune and the frailty of men, and a plea that they consider his own mind, not the outcome. In all of which there will have to be a lament over his own troubles and indignation at the cruelty of his adversaries. And it should astonish no one if, either in these examples or in others, he sees a dispute turning on a text attached as well. Of that kind we shall have to speak separately later, for the reason that certain kinds of cases are considered simply by their own force, while certain others take on some additional kind of dispute as well.

tur; defensoris conquestio est calamitatis eius, quae non culpa, sed vi maiore quadam acciderit, et de for- tunae potestate et hominum infirmitate et, uti suum animum, non eventum considerent. in quibus omnibus conquestionem suarum aerumnarum et crudelitatis ad- versariorum indignationem inesse oportebit. Ac neminem mirari conveniet, si aut in his aut in aliis exemplis scripti quoque controversiam adiunctam videbit. quo de genere post erit nobis separatim di- cendum, propterea quod quaedam genera causarum simpliciter ex sua vi considerantur, quaedam autem sibi aliud quoque aliquod controversiae genus assu-

And so, once all are known, it will not be difficult to transfer to any single case whatever fits from that other kind too; just as in these examples of the plea for mercy there is, in all of them, a dispute over a text—the kind named from letter and intent—but, because we were speaking of the plea for mercy, we gave precepts bearing on it, and in another place we shall speak of letter and intent. Now we shall direct our consideration to the other part of the plea for mercy.

munt. quare omnibus cognitis non erit difficile in unam quamque causam transferre, quod ex eo quoque genere conveniet; ut in his exemplis concessionis inest omnibus scripti controversia, ea quae ex scripto et sententia nominatur; sed, quia de concessione loque- bamur, in eam praecepta dedimus, alio autem loco de scripto et de sententia dicemus. Nunc in alteram concessionis partem consideratio-

The plea for pardon is that in which there is contained not a defense of the deed, but a request to be pardoned. This kind can scarcely be approved in a trial, for the reason that, once the wrong is admitted, it is hard to obtain pardon from one whose duty it is to be the avenger of wrongs. And so it will be permissible to use a portion of this kind when you have not founded your case upon it; as, if you were speaking on behalf of some famous or brave man whose services to the state are many, you could—while seeming not to use the plea for pardon—use it nonetheless, in this fashion: But if this man, jurors, in return for his services and for the zeal he has always shown toward you, were now, at such an hour, on the strength of his many right actions, to ask you to pardon a single offense, it would still be worthy of your mildness, worthy of his own merit, jurors, that this should be obtained from you at his request. Then it will be possible to magnify the services and, by a commonplace, to lead the jurors toward a willingness to pardon.

nem iam intendemus. Deprecatio est, in qua non de- fensio facti, sed ignoscendi postulatio continetur. hoc genus vix in iudicio probari potest, ideo quod con- cesso peccato difficile est ab eo, qui peccatorum vindex esse debet, ut ignoscat, impetrare. quare parte eius generis, cum causam non in eo constitueris, uti licebit; ut si pro aliquo claro aut forti viro, cuius in rem publi- cam multa sunt beneficia, diceres, posses, cum videaris non uti deprecatione, uti tamen, ad hunc modum: quodsi, iudices, hic pro suis beneficiis, pro suo studio, quod in vos semper habuit, tali suo tempore multorum suorum recte factorum causa uni delicto ut ignosce- retis postularet, tamen dignum vestra mansuetudine, dignum virtute huius esset, iudices, a vobis hanc rem hoc postulante impetrari. deinde augere beneficia licebit et iudices per locum communem ad ignoscendi voluntatem ducere.

Therefore, although this kind is not employed in trials except to a certain extent, nevertheless, because this very part must sometimes be brought in, and because in the Senate or in a council it must often be handled in every kind of case, we shall lay down precepts for it too. For in the Senate or in a council there was long deliberation about Syphax, and before Lucius Opimius and his council there was long debate about Quintus Numitorius Pullus, and in his case, indeed, a request for pardon prevailed rather than for acquittal. For it was not so easy to prove that he had always been of good will toward the Roman people, when he employed the conjectural issue, as it was that he should be pardoned on account of his later service, when he added the elements of the plea for pardon.

quare hoc genus quamquam in iudiciis non versatur nisi quadam ex parte, tamen, quia et pars haec ipsa inducenda nonnumquam est et in senatu aut in consilio saepe omni in genere tractanda, in id quoque praecepta ponemus. nam in senatu aut in consilio de Syphace diu deliberatum est, et de Q. Numitorio Pullo apud L. Opimium et eius consilium diu dictum est, et magis in hoc qui- dem ignoscendi quam cognoscendi postulatio valuit. nam semper animo bono se in populum Romanum fuisse non tam facile probabat, cum coniecturali con- stitutione uteretur, quam ut propter posterius bene- ficium sibi ignosceretur, cum deprecationis partes ad- iungeret.

The man, then, who asks to be pardoned will have to recall any services of his own that he can, and, if he can, show that they are greater than the wrongs he has committed, so that more good than evil may be seen to have come from him; next, to bring forward the services of his forebears, if any survive; next, to show that he did what he did not out of hatred or cruelty, but either out of stupidity, or at someone’s instigation, or for some honorable or plausible cause; afterward, to promise and affirm that, schooled by this offense and strengthened by the service of those who have pardoned him, he will for all time hold himself far from such conduct; next, to hold out the hope that in some great matter he will be of use to those

Oportebit igitur eum, qui sibi ut ignoscatur, postu- labit, commemorare, si qua sua poterit beneficia et, si poterit, ostendere ea maiora esse quam haec, quae deliquerit, ut plus ab eo boni quam mali profectum esse videatur; deinde maiorum suorum beneficia, si qua exstabunt, proferre; deinde ostendere non odio neque crudelitate fecisse, quod fecerit, sed aut stultitia aut inpulsu alicuius aut aliqua honesta aut probabili causa; postea polliceri et confirmare se et hoc peccato doctum et beneficio eorum, qui sibi ignoverint, con- firmatum omni tempore a tali ratione afuturum; de- inde spem ostendere aliquo se in loco magno iis,

who have made him the concession; afterward, if there is opportunity, he will show that he is either a kinsman or, from his forebears, a friend of long standing, and he will display the greatness of his good will, the nobility of his birth, the dignity of those who wish him safe, and the other qualities that are assigned to persons as marks of honor and standing—he will show, with lamentation and without arrogance, that these are in him, so that he may seem to deserve some honor rather than any punishment; next, to bring forward others to whom greater offenses have been pardoned. And it will profit much if he shows that he himself, while in power, was merciful and inclined to pardon. And the offense itself will have to be made light of, so that it may seem to have done as little harm as possible, and it will have to be shown that to exact punishment from such a man is either base or unprofitable.

qui sibi concesserint, usui futurum; postea, si facultas erit, se aut consanguineum * aut iam a maioribus inprimis amicum esse demonstrabit et amplitudinem suae vo- luntatis, nobilitatem generis, eorum, qui se salvum velint, dignitatem ostendere, et cetera ea, quae per- sonis ad honestatem et amplitudinem sunt adtributa, cum conquestione, sine arrogantia, in se esse demon- strabit, ut honore potius aliquo quam ullo supplicio dignus esse videatur; deinde ceteros proferre, quibus maiora delicta concessa sint. ac multum proficiet, si se misericordem in potestate, propensum ad igno- scendum fuisse ostendet. atque ipsum illud pecca- tum erit extenuandum, ut quam minimum obfuisse videatur, et aut turpe aut inutile demonstrandum tali de homine supplicium sumere.

Then one will have to court pity by commonplaces, drawn from the precepts that were set out in the first book. The adversary, on the other hand, will magnify the misdeeds: he will say that nothing was done in inadvertence, but everything out of cruelty and malice; that the man himself was merciless and arrogant; and, if he can, he will show that he was always an enemy and can in no way become a friend. If the man brings forward services, the adversary will show either that they were done for some other reason, not out of goodwill, or that afterward a fierce hatred was conceived, or that all those services were canceled by misdeeds, or that the services were lighter than the misdeeds, or that, since honor has been paid for the services, punishment ought to be exacted

deinde locis commu- nibus misericordiam captare oportebit ex iis praecep- tis, quae in primo libro sunt exposita. Adversarius autem malefacta augebit: nihil impru- denter, sed omnia ex crudelitate et malitia facta dicet; ipsum inmisericordem, superbum fuisse; et, si poterit, ostendet semper inimicum fuisse et amicum fieri nullo modo posse. si beneficia proferet, aut aliqua de causa facta, non propter benivolentiam demonstrabit, aut postea odium esse acre susceptum, aut illa omnia maleficiis esse deleta, aut leviora beneficia quam male- ficia, aut, cum beneficiis honos habitus sit, pro male-

for the misdeed. Then, that it is base or unprofitable to pardon. Then, that toward the man over whom they often wished they had power, now that they have the power, not to use it is the height of folly; that they ought to consider what feeling and what hatred they bore toward him. The commonplace will be indignation at the misdeed, and, on the other side, that one ought to pity those who are in misery through fortune, not through malice. Since, then, in the qualitative issue we are delaying so long on account of the multitude of its parts, lest perhaps someone’s mind, drawn off by the variety and dissimilarity of the matters, should be carried into some error, it seems worth pointing out what still remains for us of that kind, and why it remains. We were saying that the juridical case is one in which the nature of the fair and the unfair, and the principle of reward or punishment, is in question.

ficio poenam sumi oportere. deinde turpe esse aut inutile ignosci. deinde, de quo ut potestas esset saepe optarint, in eum * ob potestatem non uti summam esse stultitiam; cogitare oportere, quem animum in eum et quod odium habuerint. Locus autem communis erit indignatio maleficii et alter eorum misereri oportere, qui propter fortunam, non propter malitiam in miseriis sint. Quoniam ergo in generali constitutione tamdiu prop- ter eius partium multitudinem commoramur, ne forte varietate et dissimilitudine rerum diductus alicuius animus in quendam errorem deferatur, quid etiam no- bis ex eo genere restet et quare restet, admonendum videtur. Iuridicialem causam esse dicebamus, in qua aequi et iniqui natura et praemii aut poenae ratio quaere- retur.

Those cases in which the fair and the unfair are in question we have set out. It now remains for us to explain reward and punishment. For there are many cases that consist in the claim of some reward. For before judges the reward of accusers is often in question, and from the Senate or from a council some reward is often sought. And no one ought to suppose that, when we set out some example that is conducted in the Senate, we are departing from the judicial kind of examples. For whatever is said about approving or disapproving a man, since the giving of opinions too is fitted to that pleading, is not, if it is conducted through the giving of an opinion, deliberative; but, because a decision is being reached about a man, it must be reckoned judicial. And altogether, whoever has carefully come to know the force and nature of all cases will understand that they differ in their kind and first shape, but will see that in their other parts they are all fitted to one another and each interwoven with another.

eas causas, in quibus de aequo et iniquo quae- ritur, exposuimus. restat nunc, ut de praemio et de poena explicemus. sunt enim multae causae, quae ex praemii alicuius petitione constant. nam et apud iudi- ces de praemio saepe accusatorum quaeritur et a se- natu aut a consilio aliquod praemium saepe petitur. ac neminem conveniet arbitrari nos, cum aliquod exemplum ponamus, quod in senatu agatur, ab iudi- ciali genere exemplorum recedere. quicquid enim de homine probando aut inprobando dicitur, cum ad eam dictionem sententiarum quoque ratio accommodetur, id non, si per sententiae dictionem agitur, delibera- tivum est; sed, quia de homine statuitur, iudiciale est habendum. omnino autem qui diligenter omnium cau- sarum vim et naturam cognoverit, genere et prima conformatione eas intelleget dissidere, ceteris autem partibus aptas inter se omnes et aliam in alia impli- catam videbit.

Now let us consider rewards. Lucius Licinius Crassus, as consul, pursued and destroyed certain men in Hither Gaul who had no distinguished or definite leader, and were furnished with neither such a name nor such numbers as to deserve to be called enemies of the Roman people, but who nonetheless rendered the province dangerous by raids and brigandage. He returns to Rome; he demands a triumph from the Senate. Here, both in the plea for pardon, it does not concern us to arrive at the point for decision by subjoining supporting arguments and rebuttals of those arguments, for the reason that, unless some other issue too, or a part of an issue, comes in, the point for decision will be simple and will be contained in the question itself: in the plea for pardon, of this sort—ought he to be visited with punishment? In this case, of this sort—ought a reward to be given?

Nunc de praemiis consideremus. L. Licinius Crassus consul quosdam in citeriore Gallia nullo inlustri neque certo duce neque eo nomine neque numero praeditos, uti digni essent, qui hostes populi Romani esse diceren- tur, qui tamen excursionibus et latrociniis infestam provinciam redderent, consectatus est et confecit. Ro- mam redit: triumphum ab senatu postulat. hic et in deprecatione nihil ad nos attinet rationibus et infir- mationibus rationum subponendis ad iudicationem pervenire, propterea quod, nisi alia quoque incidet constitutio aut pars constitutionis, simplex erit iudi- catio et in quaestione ipsa continebitur: in depreca- tione, huiusmodi: oporteatne poena affici? in hac, huiusmodi: oporteatne dari praemium?

Now we shall set out the topics suited to the question of reward. The principle of reward, then, is divided into four parts: into the services, into the man, into the kind of reward, and into the resources. Services are considered from their own force, from the occasion, from the disposition of the one who performed them, and from the element of chance. From their own force they will be examined thus: whether they are great or small, easy or difficult, exceptional or commonplace, genuine or made honorable by some embellishment; from the occasion, whether it was at a time when we were in want, when others either could not or would not help, whether at a time when hope had deserted us; from the disposition, whether he did it not for his own advantage, whether he did everything with the design of being able to accomplish this; from the element of chance, whether it will seem to have been done not by fortune but by effort, or whether fortune stood in the way of his effort.

Nunc ad praemii quaestionem appositos locos ex- ponemus. ratio igitur praemii quattuor est in partes distributa: in beneficia, in hominem, in praemii genus, in facultates. Beneficia ex sua vi, ex tempore, ex animo eius, qui fecit, ex casu considerantur. ex sua vi quaerentur hoc modo: magna an parva, facilia an difficilia, singu- laria sint an vulgaria, vera an falsa quadam exornatione honestentur; ex tempore autem, si tum, cum indigeremus, cum ceteri non possent aut nollent opi- tulari, si tum, cum spes deseruisset; ex animo, si non sui commodi causa, si eo consilio fecit omnia, ut hoc conficere posset; ex casu, si non fortuna, sed indu- stria factum videbitur aut si industriae fortuna obsti- tisse.

As to the man: by what principles he has lived, what expense or labor he has laid out on the matter; whether he ever did anything of the kind before; whether he claims for himself the reward of another’s labor or of the goodness of the gods; whether he himself ever once denied that anyone ought to be rewarded for such a cause; or whether enough honor has already been paid for what he did; or whether it was necessary for him to do what he did; or whether the deed was of such a kind that, had he not done it, he would deserve punishment—not, because he did it, a reward; or whether he is claiming a reward before its time and selling an uncertain hope for a certain price; or whether, to avoid some punishment, he demands a reward, so that a prejudgment may seem to have been made in his favor. As to the kind of reward, it will be considered what is demanded, and how much, and on what grounds, and for what and how great a reward each thing is worthy; next, it will be asked, in the time of our forebears, to what men and for what causes such an honor was paid;

In hominem autem, quibus rationibus vixerit, quid sumptus in eam rem aut laboris insumpserit; ecquid aliquando tale fecerit; num alieni laboris aut deorum bonitatis praemium sibi postulet; num aliquando ipse talem ob causam aliquem praemio affici negarit opor- tere; aut num iam satis pro eo, quod fecerit, honos habitus sit; aut num necesse fuerit ei facere id, quod fecerit; aut num eiusmodi sit factum, ut, nisi fecisset, supplicio dignus esset, non, quia fecerit, praemio; aut num ante tempus praemium petat et spem incertam certo venditet pretio; aut num, quod supplicium ali- quod vitet, eo praemium postulet, uti de se praeiudi- cium factum esse videatur. In praemii autem genere, quid et quantum et quam- obrem postuletur et quo et quanto quaeque res prae- mio digna sit, considerabitur; deinde, apud maiores quibus hominibus et quibus de causis talis honos habi- tus sit, quaeretur;

then, that this honor may not be made too common. And here will lie the commonplace for the man who speaks against someone demanding a reward: that the rewards of virtue and duty ought to be holy and pure, and ought neither to be shared with the wicked nor made common among ordinary men; and a second: that men will be less eager for virtue once the reward of virtue is made common, for things that are rare and arduous seem, when tried, beautiful and pleasant to men; and a third: if there should arise those who in the time of our forebears were deemed worthy of such honor for outstanding virtue, would they not think their own glory diminished when they see such men rewarded with an equal reward? And there will be an enumeration of those men and a comparison with the ones against whom you are speaking. On the other side, there will be the magnification of his deed by the man who seeks the reward, and the matching of his own deeds with those who have been rewarded.

deinde, ne is honos nimium pervul- getur. atque hic eius, qui contra aliquem praemium postulantem dicet, locus erit communis: praemia vir- tutis et officii sancta et casta esse oportere neque ea aut cum inprobis communicari aut in mediocribus hominibus pervulgari; et alter: minus homines vir- tutis cupidos fore virtutis praemio pervulgato; quae enim rara et ardua sint, ea experiendo pulchra et iu- cunda hominibus videri; et tertius: si exsistant, qui apud maiores nostros ob egregiam virtutem tali ho- nore dignati sunt, nonne de sua gloria, cum pari prae- mio tales homines affici videant, delibari putent? et eorum enumeratio et cum iis, quos contra dicas, com- paratio. eius autem, qui praemium petet, facti sui amplificatio, eorum, qui praemio affecti sunt, cum suis factis contentio.

Then, that the rest will be driven back from the pursuit of virtue, if he himself is not rewarded. The resources are considered when some monetary reward is demanded; in which it is considered whether there is an abundance of land, of revenues, of money, or a scarcity. The commonplaces: that resources ought to be increased, not diminished; and that the man is shameless who, in return for a service, demands not gratitude but payment; and on the other side, that it is sordid to calculate about money when the return of gratitude is under deliberation; and that he is demanding not a price for the deed, but an honor in the way it has customarily been given, in return for the service. And about the issues, indeed, enough has been said: now it seems we must speak of those disputes that turn on a text.

deinde ceteros a virtutis studio repul- sum iri, si ipse praemio non sit affectus. Facultates autem considerantur, cum aliquod pecu- niarium praemium postulatur; in quo, utrum copiane sit agri, vectigalium, pecuniae an penuria, conside- ratur. Loci communes: facultates augere, non minu- ere oportere; et, inpudentem esse, qui pro beneficio non gratiam, verum mercedem postulet; contra autem de pecunia ratiocinari sordidum esse, cum de gratia referunda deliberetur; et, se pretium non pro facto, sed honorem ita, ut factitatum sit, pro beneficio postu- lare. Ac de constitutionibus quidem satis dictum est: nunc de iis controversiis, quae in scripto versantur, dicen- dum videtur.

A dispute turns on a text when something doubtful arises from the manner of the writing. This happens from ambiguity, from letter and intent, from conflicting laws, from inference, and from definition. A dispute arises from ambiguity when what the writer meant is obscure, because what is written signifies two or more things, in this manner. A head of household, when making his son his heir, bequeathed a hundred pounds of silver vessels to his wife as follows: let my heir give to my wife a hundred pounds of silver vessels, such as she shall choose. After his death the mother claims from the son the magnificent vessels, costly in their chasing. He says that he owes those which he himself chooses. First, if it can be done, it must be shown that the writing is not ambiguous, for the reason that everyone in the habit of speech is accustomed to use that one word or several words in the sense in which the speaker

In scripto versatur controversia, cum ex scriptio- nis ratione aliquid dubii nascitur. id fit ex ambiguo, ex scripto et sententia, ex contrariis legibus, ex ratio- cinatione, ex definitione. Ex ambiguo autem nascitur controversia, cum, quid senserit scriptor, obscurum est, quod scriptum duas pluresve res significat, ad hunc modum: paterfami- lias, cum filium heredem faceret, vasorum argenteo- rum centum pondo uxori suae sic legavit: heres meus uxori meae vasorum argenteorum pondo cen- tum, quae volet, dato. post mortem eius vasa ma- gnifica et pretiose caelata petit a filio mater. ille se, quae ipse vellet, debere dicit. primum, si fieri poterit, demonstrandum est non esse ambigue scrip- tum, propterea quod omnes in consuetudine sermo- nis sic uti solent eo verbo uno pluribusve in eam sen- tentiam, in quam is, qui dicet, accipiendum esse demon-

will show it ought to be taken. Next, from the writing before and after it must be taught that the matter in question is made plain. For if the words are considered separately, in and of themselves, all or most will appear ambiguous; but those that become plain when considered from the whole writing ought not to be reckoned ambiguous. Next, the intention in which the writer stood will have to be gathered from his other writings and from his deeds, words, mind, and life, and that very writing in which the ambiguity in question lies must be tested as a whole, from every part, to see whether anything is either suited to what we interpret or opposed to what the adversary understands. For it will easily be considered, from the whole writing and from the person of the writer and from the things that are assigned to persons, what the man who wrote it probably meant.

strabit. deinde ex superiore et ex inferiore scriptura docendum id, quod quaeratur, fieri perspicuum. quare si ipsa separatim ex se verba considerentur, omnia aut pleraque ambigua visum iri; quae autem ex omni considerata scriptura perspicua fiant, haec ambigua non oportere existimare. deinde, qua in sententia scriptor fuerit, ex ceteris eius scriptis et ex factis, dic- tis, animo atque vita eius sumi oportebit et eam ipsam scripturam, in qua inerit illud ambiguum, de quo quae- retur, totam omnibus ex partibus pertemptare, si quid aut ad id appositum sit, quod nos interpretemur, aut ei, quod adversarius intellegat, adversetur. nam facile, quid veri simile sit eum voluisse, qui scripsit, ex omni scriptura et ex persona scriptoris atque iis rebus, quae personis attributae sunt, considerabitur.

Next, it will have to be shown, if the matter itself affords any opportunity, that what the adversary understands can be carried out far less conveniently than what we take it to mean, in that for his sense there exists neither any way of administering it nor any outcome, whereas what we say can be transacted easily and conveniently; as in this law—for nothing forbids setting down a fictitious one by way of example, so that the matter may be more easily understood—: let no prostitute possess a golden crown; if she possesses one, let it be public property. Against the man who says that, by the law, the prostitute ought to be confiscated, it could be said that there is no administering of a confiscated prostitute, nor any outcome of the law in confiscating a prostitute, whereas in confiscating the gold there is both an easy administering and an outcome, and no inconvenience in it.

deinde erit demonstrandum, si quid ex re ipsa dabitur facultatis, id, quod adversarius intellegat, multo minus commode fieri posse, quam id, quod nos accipimus, quod illius rei neque administratio neque exitus ullus exstet; nos quod dicamus, facile et commode transigi posse; ut in hac lege—nihil enim prohibet fictam exempli loco ponere, quo facilius res intellegatur—: meretrix coronam auream ne habeto; si habuerit, publica esto, contra eum, qui meretricem publicari dicat ex lege oportere, possit dici neque administrationem esse ullam publicae meretricis neque exitum legis in mere- trice publicanda, at in auro publicando et admini- strationem et exitum facilem esse et incommodi nihil inesse.

And one will also have to attend carefully to this: whether, if what the adversary understands is approved, some more useful, or more honorable, or more necessary thing will seem to have been neglected by the writer. This will be done if what we shall maintain we maintain to be honorable, or useful, or necessary, and if we say that what is asserted by our adversaries is by no means of that kind. Next, if in a statute the dispute is one of ambiguity, one will have to take pains to teach that, as to what the adversary understands, provision has been made by a statute in some other matter.

ac diligenter illud quoque adtendere oportebit, num illo probato, quod adversarius intellegat, res uti- lior aut honestior aut magis necessaria ab scriptore neglecta videatur. id fiet, si id, quod nos demon- strabimus, honestum aut utile aut necessarium demon- strabimus, et si id, quod ab adversariis dicetur, minime eiusmodi esse dicemus. deinde si in lege erit ex amb- iguo controversia, dare operam oportebit, ut de eo, quod adversarius intellegat, alia in re lege cautum esse doceatur.

It will profit very much to show in what manner the writer would have written, had he meant what the adversary takes it to be done or understood; as in this case, in which the inquiry is about silver vessels, the woman could say that it served no purpose to add such as she shall choose, if he was leaving it to the heir’s will. For with that not added there would be no doubt that the heir would give what he himself chose. It was therefore madness, when he wished to make provision for the heir, to add the very thing which, had it not been added, would no less have made provision for the heir.

permultum autem proficiet illud demon- strare, quemadmodum scripsisset, si id, quod adver- sarius accipiat, fieri aut intellegi voluisset, ut in hac causa, in qua de vasis argenteis quaeritur, possit mulier dicere nihil adtinuisse adscribi quae volet, si heredis voluntati permitteret. eo enim non adscripto nihil esse dubitationis, quin heres, quae ipse vellet, daret. amentiae igitur fuisse, cum heredi vellet cavere, id adscribere, quo non adscripto nihilominus heredi caveretur.

For this reason, in such cases it will be very much to the purpose to use this manner of argument: “He would have written it this way; he would not have used that word; he would not have placed that word in that position.” For from such considerations the writer’s intent is most clearly discerned. Next, we must inquire at what time the text was written, so that it may be understood what it is likely he wished at a time of that kind. After that, drawing on the parts of deliberation, we must show what was more advantageous and what more honorable, both for him in the writing and for them in giving it their approval; and from these, if any occasion for amplification is offered, we must employ the topics common to both sides. A dispute arises from letter and intent when one party relies on the very words that are written, while the other directs his entire pleading toward what he claims the writer meant.

quare hoc genere magnopere talibus in causis uti oportebit: hoc modo scripsisset, isto verbo usus non esset, non isto loco verbum istud con- locasset. nam ex his sententia scriptoris maxime perspicitur. deinde quo tempore scriptum sit, quaeren- dum est, ut, quid eum voluisse in eiusmodi tempore veri simile sit, intellegatur. post ex deliberationis partibus, quid utilius et quid honestius et illi ad scri- bendum et his ad conprobandum sit, demonstrandum; et ex his, si quid amplificationis dabitur, communi- bus utrimque locis uti oportebit. Ex scripto et sententia controversia consistit, cum alter verbis ipsis, quae scripta sunt, utitur, alter ad id, quod scriptorem sensisse dicet, omnem adiungit dictionem.

Now the writer’s intent will be shown by the man who defends himself by appeal to intent in one of two ways: either as always looking to the same thing and willing the same thing, or, on the basis of some deed or some outcome, as adapted to the occasion he has in view. “Always looking to the same thing,” in this manner: A head of a household, having no children but having a wife, wrote thus in his will: “If a son, one or more, is born to me, let him be my heir”; then the customary provisions follow. Afterward: “If the son dies before he comes into his own guardianship, then let” so-and-so “be my heir.” No son was born. The agnates dispute with the man who is heir on the supposition that the son died before coming into his guardianship.

scriptoris autem sententia ab eo, qui sen- tentia se defendet, tum semper ad idem spectare et idem velle demonstrabitur; tum ex facto aut ex eventu aliquo ad tempus id, quod instituit, accommodabitur. semper ad idem spectare, hoc modo: paterfamilias cum liberorum haberet nihil, uxorem autem haberet, in testamento ita scripsit: si mihi filius genitur unus pluresve, is mihi heres esto. deinde quae assolent. postea: si filius ante moritur, quam in tutelam suam venerit, tum mihi, * dicet, heres esto. filius natus non est. ambigunt adgnati cum eo, qui est heres, si filius ante, quam in tutelam veniat, mor-

In this kind of case it cannot be said that the writer’s intent must be adapted to a particular time and a particular outcome, since it is shown to be that one intent alone on which the man who argues against the text relies in claiming the inheritance as his own. But there is another kind, belonging to those who introduce the appeal to intent in a case where no single, simple wish of the writer is exhibited, holding good for every time and every deed, but where his intent is said to require interpretation, on the basis of some deed or outcome, with reference to the occasion. This kind is supported chiefly by the parts of the qualitative issue that admit extenuation. For sometimes comparison is brought in, as in the case of the man who, when a law forbade the opening of the gates at night, nevertheless opened them in a certain war and received certain reinforcements into the town, so that they should not be overwhelmed by the enemy

tuus sit. in hoc genere non potest hoc dici, ad tem- pus et ad eventum aliquem sententiam scriptoris opor- tere accommodari, propterea quod ea sola esse demon- stratur, qua fretus ille, qui contra scriptum dicit, suam esse hereditatem defendit. aliud autem genus est eorum, qui sententiam inducunt, in quo non simplex voluntas scriptoris ostenditur, quae in omne tempus et in omne factum idem valeat, sed ex quodam facto aut eventu ad tempus interpretanda dicitur. ea par- tibus iuridicialis assumptivae maxime sustinetur. nam tum inducitur comparatio, ut in eo, qui, cum lex ape- riri portas noctu vetaret, aperuit quodam in bello et auxilia quaedam in oppidum recepit, ne ab hostibus opprimerentur,

if they remained outside, since the enemy had pitched camp near the walls; sometimes the shifting of the charge, as in the case of the soldier who, though the common law of all mankind forbade the killing of a man, killed his own military tribune, who was attempting to do violence to him; sometimes the rejection of the charge, as in the case of the man who, when a law had fixed the days on which he was to set out on an embassy, did not set out because the quaestor failed to furnish the expense money; sometimes the plea for pardon, whether through claiming innocent error and lack of foresight, as in the case of the sacrificing of the calf, or through force, as in the case of the beaked ship, or through accident, as in the case of the flood of the Eurotas. And so the appeal to intent will be introduced either in such a way that the writer is shown to have willed some one particular thing, or in such a way that he is shown to have willed this in a matter and at a time of such a kind.

si foris essent, quod prope muros hostes castra haberent; tum relatio criminis, ut in eo milite, qui, cum communis lex omnium hominem occi- dere vetaret, tribunum militum suum, qui vim sibi afferre conaretur, occidit; tum remotio criminis, ut in eo, qui, cum lex, quibus diebus in legationem pro- ficisceretur, praestituerat, quia sumptum quaestor non dedit, profectus non est; tum concessio per purgatio- nem et per inprudentiam, ut in vituli immolatione, et per vim, ut in nave rostrata, et per casum, ut in Eurotae magnitudine. quare aut ita sententia induce- tur, ut unum quiddam voluisse scriptor demonstre- tur, aut sic, ut in eiusmodi re et tempore hoc voluisse doceatur.

The man, then, who defends the text will generally be able to use all of these topics, and the greater part of them always. First, praise of the writer, and the commonplace that those who judge ought to look to nothing but what is written—and this all the more if a statutory text is brought forward, that is, either the statute itself or something drawn from the statute. After this, what is most forceful of all, the setting of the opponents’ deed or claim against the text itself: what was written, what was done, what the juror swore. This topic must be varied in many ways: now with the speaker himself wondering aloud what could possibly be said against him; now turning back to the juror’s duty and asking him what besides he ought to hear or expect; now producing the opponent himself as if in the place of a witness—that is, by questioning him—whether he denies that the text reads as it does, or denies that he acted against it or that he is being charged contrary to it;

Ergo is, qui scriptum defendet, his locis plerumque omnibus, maiore autem parte semper poterit uti: pri- mum scriptoris conlaudatione et loco communi, nihil eos, qui iudicent, nisi id, quod scriptum, spectare oportere; et hoc eo magis, si legitimum scriptum pro- feretur, id est aut lex ipsa aut aliquid ex lege; postea, quod vehementissimum est, facti aut intentionis adver- sariorum cum ipso scripto contentione, quid scriptum sit, quid factum, quid iuratus iudex; quem locum mul- tis modis variare oportebit, tum ipsum secum admi- rantem, quidnam contra dici possit, tum ad iudicis officium revertentem et ab eo quaerentem, quid prae- terea audire aut exspectare debeat; tum ipsum ad- versarium quasi in testis loco producendo, hoc est interrogando, utrum scriptumne neget esse eo modo, an ab se contra factum esse aut contra contendi neget;

and whether, if he ventures to deny either, he will undertake to stop speaking. If he denies neither and yet argues against the text, the speaker should declare that no one supposes he will ever see a man more shameless. On this point it will be fitting to dwell as if nothing further need be said and as if nothing could be said against it: often reciting what is written, often setting the opponent’s deed against the text, and now and then turning back sharply to the juror himself. At this point it must be shown to the juror what he has sworn and what he is bound to follow: that a juror ought to be in doubt for two reasons only—either if the text is written obscurely, or if the opponent denies some fact.

utrum negare ausus sit, se dicere desiturum. si neu- trum neget et contra tamen dicat: nihil esse quo hominem inpudentiorem quisquam se visurum arbi- tretur. in hoc ita commorari conveniet, quasi nihil praeterea dicendum sit et quasi contra dici nihil possit, saepe id, quod scriptum est, recitando, saepe cum scrip- to factum adversarii confligendo atque interdum acri- ter ad iudicem ipsum revertendo. quo in loco iudici demonstrandum est, quid iuratus sit, quid sequi debeat: duabus de causis iudicem dubitare oportere, si aut scriptum sit obscure aut neget aliquid adversarius;

When both the text is plainly written and the opponent admits everything, then the juror ought to obey the statute, not to interpret it. With this point established, it will then be necessary to refute what can be said on the other side. Now the argument against the text will be made either if it is shown that the writer felt one thing and wrote quite another—as in that dispute about the will which we set out—or if a plea admitting extenuation is brought in, to show why the text could not, or ought not, to have been complied with.

cum et scriptum aperte sit et adversarius omnia con- fiteatur, tum iudicem legi parere, non interpretari legem oportere. Hoc loco confirmato tum diluere ea, quae contra dici poterunt, oportebit. contra autem dicetur, si aut pror- sus aliud sensisse scriptor et scripsisse aliud demon- strabitur, ut in illa de testamento, quam posuimus, controversia, aut causa assumptiva inferetur, quamob- rem scripto non potuerit aut non oportuerit optem- perari.

If it is claimed that the writer felt one thing and wrote another, the man who relies on the text will say this: that we ought not to construct arguments about the wish of one who, precisely so that we should not be able to do so, has left us a sign of his wish; that many inconveniences follow if a practice is established of departing from the text. For both those who write something will reckon that what they have written will not stand fast, and those who judge will have nothing certain to follow, once they have grown accustomed to departing from the text even once. But if the writer’s wish is to be preserved, it is he himself, not his opponents, who stands by that wish. For the man who interprets the writer’s wish from his very own words comes far closer to it than the man who looks to the writer’s intent not from the writer’s own text—which the writer has left, as it were, an image of his wish—but searches it out by domestic suspicions.

Si aliud sensisse scriptor, aliud scripsisse dicetur, is, qui scripto utetur, haec dicet: non oportere de eius voluntate nos argumentari, qui, ne id facere possemus, indicium nobis reliquerit suae voluntatis; multa in- commoda consequi, si instituatur, ut ab scripto rece- datur. nam et eos, qui aliquid scribant, non existi- maturos id, quod scripserint, ratum futurum, et eos, qui iudicent, certum, quod sequantur, nihil habituros, si semel ab scripto recedere consueverint. quodsi voluntas scriptoris conservanda sit, se, non adver- sarios, a voluntate eius stare. nam multo propius accedere ad scriptoris voluntatem eum, qui ex ipsius eam litteris interpretetur, quam illum, qui sententiam scriptoris non ex ipsius scripto spectet, quod ille suae voluntatis quasi imaginem reliquerit, sed domesticis suspicionibus perscrutetur.

But if the man who will stand on intent brings forward a plea, the first thing to be said against him is how absurd it is not to deny that he acted against the statute, but to invent some plea for why he acted; next, that everything has been turned upside down. Formerly accusers were accustomed to persuade the jurors that the man accused was implicated in some guilt, by bringing forward a motive that had driven him to wrongdoing;

Sin causam afferet is, qui a sententia stabit, pri- mum erit contra dicendum: quam absurdum non negare contra legem fecisse, sed, quare fecerit, cau- sam aliquam invenire; deinde conversa esse omnia: ante solitos esse accusatores iudicibus persuadere, ad- finem esse alicuius culpae eum, qui accusaretur, cau- sam proferre, quae eum ad peccandum impulisset;—

now the defendant himself brings forward a motive for why he transgressed. Then this division must be introduced, into each part of which many lines of argument will fit: first, that in no statute is it fitting that any plea against the text be admitted; next, that even if it were admitted in other statutes, this is a statute of such a kind that in it no plea ought to be admitted; finally, that even if a plea ought to be admitted in this statute too, that particular plea which is brought forward ought by no means to be admitted. The first part will be confirmed by roughly these topics: that the writer lacked neither talent nor effort nor any faculty for writing out plainly what he had in mind; that it was neither burdensome nor difficult for him to make an exception of the plea the opponents bring forward, had he thought anything ought to be excepted;

nunc ipsum reum causam afferre, quare deliquerit. deinde hanc inducere partitionem, cuius in singulas partes multae convenient argumentationes: primum, nulla in lege ullam causam contra scriptum accipi con- venire; deinde, si in ceteris legibus conveniat, hanc esse eiusmodi legem, ut in ea non oporteat; postremo, si in hac quoque lege oporteat, hanc quidem causam accipi minime oportere. Prima pars his fere locis confirmabitur: scriptori neque ingenium neque operam neque ullam faculta- tem defuisse, quo minus aperte posset perscribere id, quod cogitaret; non fuisse ei grave nec difficile eam causam excipere, quam adversarii proferant, si quic- quam excipiendum putasset:

that those who write statutes are accustomed to use exceptions. Then one ought to recite statutes written with exceptions, and above all to see whether in the very statute under discussion there is some exception in another clause, or in the work of the same lawgiver, so that it may be the more readily proved that he would have made an exception had he thought anything ought to be excepted. And one must show that to admit a plea is nothing other than to abolish the statute, since, once a plea begins to be weighed, there is no point in weighing it by the statute, seeing that it is not written in the statute. If such a practice were established, license and the power to do wrong would be granted to all, once they understood that you decide a matter on the character of the man who acted against the statute, and not on the statute by which you have been sworn; and then that the rules both by which jurors judge and by which the rest of the citizens live will be thrown into confusion,

consuesse eos, qui leges scribant, exceptionibus uti. deinde oportet recitare leges cum exceptionibus scriptas et maxime videre, ecquae in ea ipsa lege, qua de agatur, sit exceptio ali- quo in capite aut apud eundem legis scriptorem, quo magis probetur eum fuisse excepturum, si quid exci- piendum putaret; et ostendere causam accipere nihil aliud esse nisi legem tollere, ideo quod, cum semel causa consideretur, nihil attineat eam ex lege con- siderare, quippe quae in lege scripta non sit. quod si sit institutum, omnibus dari causam et potestatem peccandi, cum intellexerint vos ex ingenio eius, qui contra legem fecerit, non ex lege, in quam iurati sitis, rem iudicare; deinde et ipsis iudicibus iudicandi et ceteris civibus vivendi rationes perturbatum iri,

if departure is once made from the statutes. For jurors will have nothing to follow if they depart from what is written, nor any means of proving to others that they have judged contrary to the statute; and the rest of the citizens will not know what to do, if each man manages each affair by his own counsel and by whatever reasoning has come into his mind or his fancy, and not by the common prescription of the state. Afterward one may ask the jurors themselves why they are detained in others’ business; why they are hindered by their service to the commonwealth, so that they cannot the more attend to their own affairs and interests; why they swear in set words; why they assemble at a set time, why they depart at a set time, while no one may offer any excuse for not regularly giving his service to the commonwealth, save such an excuse as is excepted in the statute; whether they think it fair that they should be bound by the statutes amid such great burdens, while they allow our opponents to neglect the statutes;

si semel ab legibus recessum sit; nam et iudices neque, quid sequantur, habituros, si ab eo, quod scriptum sit, recedant, neque, quo pacto aliis probare possint, quod contra legem iudicarint; et ceteros cives, quid agant, ignoraturos, si ex suo quisque consilio et ex ea ratione, quae in mentem aut in libidinem venerit, non ex communi praescripto civitatis unam quamque rem administrabit; postea quaerere ab iudicibus ipsis, quare in alienis detineantur negotiis; cur rei publicae munere impediantur, quo setius suis rebus et commo- dis servire possint; cur in certa verba iurent; cur certo tempore conveniant, cur certo discedant, nihil quis- quam afferat causae, quo minus frequenter operam rei publicae det, nisi quae causa in lege excepta sit; an se legibus obstrictos in tantis molestiis esse aequum censeant, adversarios nostros leges neglegere con-

then one may likewise ask the jurors whether, if the defendant himself were to write into the statute an exception for the thing on account of which he claims to have acted against it, they would suffer it; and that what he is doing is more unworthy and more shameless than if he were to write it in. Come now, what then? If the jurors themselves wished to write it in, would the people suffer it? And that this is more unworthy still: that what they cannot change by a word and in writing,

cedant; deinde item quaerere ab iudicibus, si eius rei causa, propter quam se reus contra legem fecisse dicat, exceptionem ipse in lege adscribat, passurine sint; postea hoc, quod faciat, indignius et inpuden- tius esse, quam si adscribat; age porro, quid? si ipsi vellent iudices adscribere, passurusne sit populus? atque hoc esse indignius, quam rem verbo et litteris mutare non possint,

they should change in fact and by a momentous verdict. Then that it is unworthy that anything be repealed from a statute, or that a statute be abrogated or altered in any part, when no power of taking cognizance and of approving or disapproving is given to the people; that this will be most invidious to the jurors themselves; that this is not the place nor this the time for correcting statutes; that these matters ought to be handled before the people and through the people. But if they would now do this, the speaker should say he wishes to know who the proposer is, who are to be the supporters; that he sees the factions and wishes to speak against them. And since these proceedings are not only utterly inexpedient but also far the most disgraceful, the statute, whatever its character, ought for the present to be preserved by the jurors, and afterward, if it gives displeasure, ought to be corrected by the people. Then, that if no text existed, we should be making strenuous inquiry, and would not believe these men even if they stood beyond all danger; but now that there is a text, it is madness to take cognizance of the affair of the man who has transgressed rather than of the words of the statute itself. By these and like arguments it is shown that a plea outside the text ought not to be admitted.

eam re ipsa et iudicio maximo commutare; deinde indignum esse de lege aliquid derogari aut legem abrogari aut aliqua ex parte com- mutari, cum populo cognoscendi et probandi aut in- probandi potestas nulla fiat; hoc ipsis iudicibus in- vidiosissimum futurum; non hunc locum esse neque hoc tempus legum corrigendarum; apud populum haec et per populum agi convenire; quodsi nunc id agant, velle se scire, qui lator sit, qui sint accepturi; se f actiones videre et dissuadere velle; quodsi haec cum summe inutilia tum multo turpissima sint, legem, cuicuimodi sit, in praesentia conservari ab iudicibus, post, si displiceat, a populo corrigi convenire; deinde, si scriptum non exstaret, magnopere quaereremus ne- que isti, ne si extra periculum quidem esset, credere- mus; nunc cum scriptum sit, amentiam esse eius rei, qui peccarit, potius quam legis ipsius verba cogno- scere. his et huiusmodi rationibus ostenditur causam extra scriptum accipi non oportere.

The second part is that in which it must be shown that, even if a plea ought to be admitted in other statutes, it ought not in this one. This will be demonstrated if the statute appears to bear on matters of the greatest importance, the most advantageous, the most honorable, the most sacred; or if it is inexpedient or disgraceful or impious not to comply most scrupulously with the statute in such a matter; or if the statute is shown to have been so carefully written out, with such caution taken on every point, with whatever ought to have been excepted so excepted, that it is wholly unfitting to suppose anything overlooked in so careful a piece of writing. The third topic, most necessary for the man who will speak for the text, is the one through which he must show that, even if it were fitting for a plea against the text to be admitted, that one nonetheless ought by no means to be admitted which is brought forward by the opponents.

Secunda pars est, in qua est ostendendum, si in cete- ris legibus oporteat, in hac non oportere. hoc de- monstrabitur, si lex aut ad res maximas, utilissimas, honestissimas, religiosissimas videbitur pertinere; aut inutile aut turpe aut nefas esse tali in re non diligen- tissime legi optemperare; aut ita lex diligenter per- scripta demonstrabitur, ita cautum una quaque de re, ita, quod oportuerit, exceptum, ut minime conveniat quicquam in tam diligenti scriptura praeteritum ar- bitrari. Tertius est locus ei, qui pro scripto dicet, maxime necessarius, per quem oportet ostendat, si conveniat causam contra scriptum accipi, eam tamen minime oportere, quae ab adversariis afferatur.

This topic is necessary to him for the reason that the man who will argue against the text must always bring forward something of equity. For it would be the height of shamelessness for one who wishes to prove something contrary to what is written to attempt to do so without the protection of equity. If, therefore, the accuser strips away anything at all from this very equity, he will appear by every measure to accuse more justly and more plausibly. For the earlier part of his speech made it so that the jurors, even if they were unwilling, would be under compulsion; this part, however, makes it so that, even were there no compulsion, they would be willing to judge against the opponent.

qui locus id- circo est huic necessarius, quod semper is, qui contra scriptum dicet, aequitatis aliquid afferat oportet. nam summa inpudentia sit eum, qui contra quam scriptum sit aliquid probare velit, non aequitatis praesidio id facere conari. si quid igitur ex hac ipsa quippiam ac- cusator derogat, omnibus partibus iustius et probabi- lius accusare videatur. nam superior oratio hoc omnis faciebat, ut, iudices etiamsi nollent, necesse esset; haec autem, etiamsi necesse non esset, ut vellent contra iudicare.

This will come about if, from the topics by which guilt is shown to lie in the man who defends himself through comparison, or the rejection or the shifting of the charge, or the parts pertaining to the plea for pardon—about which we have written before, as carefully as we could—if, then, from those topics, we transfer what the matter requires to discrediting the opponents’ case; or if causes and reasons are brought forward to show why and with what intention it was written so in the statute or in the will, so that the case may seem confirmed by the intent and wish of the writer as well, and not by the writing alone; or if the deed is convicted of wrong on the strength of other issues as well.

id autem fiet, si, quibus ex locis culpa de- monstrabitur esse in eo, qui comparatione aut remotione aut relatione criminis aut concessionis partibus se defendet—de quibus ante, ut potuimus, diligenter perscripsimus—, si de iis locis, quae res postulabit, ad causam adversariorum inprobandam transferemus; aut causae et rationes afferentur, quare et quo consilio ita sit in lege aut in testamento scriptum, ut sententia quoque et voluntate scriptoris, non ipsa solum scrip- tura causa confirmata esse videatur; aut aliis quoque constitutionibus factum coarguetur.

The man, however, who will argue against the text will first introduce the topic through which the equity of his case is shown; or he will show with what mind, with what purpose, for what cause he acted; and whatever cause he takes up, he will defend himself by the parts of extenuation, of which we have spoken before. And on this topic, when he has dwelt at some length and has set off the rationale of his deed and the equity of his case, he will then argue, from roughly these topics, that pleas ought to be admitted against his opponents. He will show that there is no statute which wishes anything inexpedient or unjust to be done; that all the penalties which proceed from the statutes have been established for the punishing of guilt and malice;

Contra scriptum autem qui dicet, primum inducet eum locum, per quem aequitas causae demonstretur; aut ostendet, quo animo, quo consilio, qua de causa fecerit; et, quamcumque causam assumet, assumptio- nis partibus se defendet, de quibus ante dictum est. atque in hoc loco cum diutius commoratus sui facti rationem et aequitatem causae exornaverit, tum ex his locis fere contra adversarios dicet oportere causas accipi. demonstrabit nullam esse legem, quae aliquam rem inutilem aut iniquam fieri velit; omnia supplicia, quae ab legibus proficiscantur, culpae ac malitiae vin-

that the writer himself, were he to come back to life, would approve this deed, and would himself have done the very same had such a thing befallen him; that for this reason the writer of the statute appointed jurors of a fixed rank, endowed with a fixed age, that they might be men not to recite his text—which any boy could do—but who could attain its sense by thought and interpret the intent; then, that the writer, had he been entrusting his writings to foolish and barbarous jurors, would have written everything out with the utmost care; but as it is, because he understood what manner of men would judge the matters, he therefore did not write down what he saw to be plain:

dicandae causa constituta esse; scriptorem ipsum, si exsistat, factum hoc probaturum et idem ipsum, si ei talis res accidisset, facturum fuisse; ea re legis scriptorem certo ex ordine iudices certa aetate prae- ditos constituisse, ut essent, non qui scriptum suum recitarent, quod quivis puer facere posset, sed qui cogitatione assequi possent et voluntatem interpre- tari; deinde illum scriptorem, si scripta sua stultis hominibus et barbaris iudicibus committeret, omnia summa diligentia perscripturum fuisse; nunc vero, quod intellegeret, quales viri res iudicaturi essent, idcirco eum, quae perspicua videret esse, non adscrip- sisse:

for he supposed that you would be not the reciters of his text but the interpreters of his intent. Afterward one may ask the opponents: “What if I had done this? What if this had happened?”—some one of the cases in which either the cause is most honorable or the necessity most certain: “would you still accuse?” And yet the statute nowhere made an exception; not everything, therefore, is provided for by writing, but certain things, which are plain, by tacit exceptions. Then, that no affair can be rightly managed either by statutes or by any writing, or finally even in everyday conversation and household commands, if each man chooses to look to the words and not to approach the intent of the one who used those words.

neque enim vos scripti sui recitatores, sed vo- luntatis interpretes fore putavit; postea quaerere ab adversariis: quid, si hoc fecissem? quid, si hoc acci- disset? eorum aliquid, in quibus aut causa sit honestissima aut necessitudo certissima: tamenne ac- cusaretis? atqui lex nusquam excepit; non ergo omnia scriptis, sed quaedam, quae perspicua sint, tacitis exceptionibus caveri; deinde nullam rem ne- que legibus neque scriptura ulla, denique ne in ser- mone quidem cotidiano atque imperiis domesticis recte posse administrari, si unus quisque velit verba spectare et non ad voluntatem eius, qui ea verba habuerit,

Then, from the parts of advantage and honor, to show how inexpedient or how disgraceful is what the opponents say ought to have been done or ought to be done, and how advantageous or how honorable is what we have done or demand. Then, that the statutes are dear to us not for the sake of the letters, which are thin and obscure marks of intent, but for the sake of the advantage of the matters about which they are written, and the wisdom and care of those who wrote them. After this, to describe what a statute is, so that it may be seen to consist in intentions and not in words; and that the juror is seen to obey the statute who follows its intent and not who follows its writing. Then, how unworthy it is that the same penalty should fall upon the man who has acted against the statutes on account of some crime and audacity, and upon the man who, for an honorable or necessary cause, has departed not from the intent but from the letter of the statute. And by these and like arguments he will show that a plea ought to be admitted, and admitted in this statute, and that the very plea he brings forward ought to be admitted.

accedere; deinde ex utilitatis et honestatis partibus ostendere, quam inutile aut quam turpe sit id, quod adversarii dicant fieri oportuisse aut oportere, et id, quod nos fecerimus aut postulemus, quam utile aut quam honestum sit; deinde leges nobis caras esse non propter litteras, quae tenues et obscurae notae sint voluntatis, sed propter earum rerum, quibus de scriptum est, utilitatem et eorum, qui scripserint, sa- pientiam et diligentiam; postea, quid sit lex, descri- bere, ut ea videatur in sententiis, non in verbis con- sistere; et iudex is videatur legi optemperare, qui sen- tentiam eius, non qui scripturam sequatur; deinde, quam indignum sit eodem affici supplicio eum, qui propter aliquod scelus et audaciam contra leges fecerit, et eum, qui honesta aut necessaria de causa non ab sententia, sed ab litteris legis recesserit; atque his et huiusmodi rationibus et accipi causam et in hac lege accipi et eam causam, quam ipse afferat, opor-

And just as we were saying to the man who would speak from the text that it would be most advantageous if he stripped away something of that equity which stood with his opponent, so for this man, who will argue against the text, it will be most profitable to turn something from the writing itself to his own case, or to show that something is written ambiguously; then, out of that ambiguity, to defend the part that favors him; or to introduce a definition of a word and turn the force of the very word by which he seems to be pressed to the advantage of his case; or, from what is written, to bring in something not written, by way of inference, of which we shall speak hereafter.

tere accipi demonstrabit. et quemadmodum ei dice- bamus, qui ab scripto diceret, hoc fore utilissimum, si quid de aequitate ea, quae cum adversario staret, derogasset, sic huic, qui contra scriptum dicet, pluri- mum proderit, ex ipsa scriptura aliquid ad suam cau- sam convertere aut ambigue aliquid scriptum osten- dere; deinde ex illo ambiguo eam partem, quae sibi prosit, defendere aut verbi definitionem inducere et illius verbi vim, quo urgeri videatur, ad suae causae commodum traducere aut ex scripto non scriptum aliquid inducere per ratiocinationem, de qua post di-

But on whatever point—however slightly plausible—he defends himself by the writing itself, since his case will abound in equity, he will necessarily gain much, for the reason that, if he removes the thing on which his opponents’ case rests, he will have softened and dissolved all its force and sharpness. The commonplaces drawn from the other parts of extenuation will serve both sides. Besides these, the following belong to the man who will speak from the text: that statutes ought to be regarded for their own sake, not for the advantage of the man who has transgressed against them, and that nothing ought to be held more venerable than the statutes. Against the text: that statutes consist in the purpose of the writer and in the common advantage, not in words; how unworthy it is that equity should be pressed hard by the letter, when it is defended by the wish of the man who wrote it.

cemus. quacumque autem in re, quamvis leviter probabili, scripto ipso se defenderit, cum aequitate causa abundabit, necessario multum proficiet, ideo quod, si id, quo nititur adversariorum causa, subduxe- rit, omnem eius illam vim et acrimoniam lenierit ac diluerit. Loci autem communes ceteris ex assumptionis parti- bus in utramque partem convenient. praeterea autem eius, qui a scripto dicet: leges ex se, non ex eius, qui contra commiserit, utilitate spectari oportere et legibus antiquius haberi nihil oportere. contra scrip- tum: leges in consilio scriptoris et utilitate com- muni, non in verbis consistere; quam indignum sit aequitatem litteris urgeri, quae voluntate eius, qui scripserit, defendatur.

From conflicting laws a dispute arises when two laws, or more, appear to be at variance with one another, in this manner. One law: “Whoever kills a tyrant, let him take the rewards of an Olympic victor, and let him demand of the magistrate whatever thing he wishes for himself, and let the magistrate grant it to him.” And another law: “When a tyrant has been killed, let the magistrate put to death his five nearest in kinship.” Alexander, who had seized the tyranny among the Pheraeans in Thessaly, was killed at night by his own wife, whose name was Thebe, while she lay beside him. She demands her own son, whom she had by the tyrant, as her reward. There are those who say the boy ought, by the law, to be put to death. The matter is in court. In this kind the same topics and the same precepts will serve both sides, for the reason that each party will have to confirm his own law and weaken the contrary one.

Ex contrariis autem legibus controversia nascitur, cum inter se duae videntur leges aut plures discrepare, hoc modo: lex: qui tyrannum occiderit, olympio- nicarum praemia capito et quam volet sibi rem a magistratu deposcito et magistratus ei con- cedito. et altera lex: tyranno occiso quinque eius proximos cognatione magistratus necato. Alexan- drum, qui apud Pheraeos in Thessalia tyrannidem occu- parat, uxor sua, cui Thebe nomen fuit, noctu, cum si- mul cubaret, occidit. haec filium suum, quem ex ty- ranno habebat, sibi in praemii loco deposcit. sunt qui ex lege occidi puerum dicant oportere. res in iudicio est. In hoc genere utramque in partem idem loci atque eadem praecepta convenient, ideo quod uterque suam legem confirmare, contrariam infirmare debebit.

First, then, the laws ought to be set against each other, by considering which law bears on greater matters—that is, on more advantageous, more honorable, and more necessary ones. From this it follows that, if there are two laws, or more, or however many there are, and they cannot all be preserved because they are at variance with one another, that one is to be thought most deserving of preservation which appears to bear on the greatest matters. Next, which law was passed later; for each later one is the weightier. Next, which law commands something, which permits; for what is commanded is necessary, what is permitted is voluntary. Next, in which law, if it is not complied with,

pri- mum igitur leges oportet contendere considerando, utra lex ad maiores, hoc est ad utiliores, ad hone- stiores ac magis necessarias res pertineat; ex quo conficitur, ut, si leges duae aut si plures erunt, aut quotquot erunt, conservari non possint, quia discrepent inter se, sed ea maxime conservanda putetur, quae ad maximas res pertinere videatur; deinde, utra lex posterius lata sit; nam postrema quaeque gravissima est; deinde, utra lex iubeat aliquid, utra permittat; nam id, quod imperatur, necessarium, illud, quod per- mittitur, voluntarium est; deinde, in utra lege, si non optemperatum sit,

a penalty is attached, or in which the greater penalty is fixed; for that one is most to be preserved which is sanctioned most stringently. Next, which law commands, which forbids; for often the one that forbids seems to correct, by a kind of exception, the one that commands. Next, which law concerns a whole class, which a particular part; which appears written generally for many cases, which for some one definite matter; for the one written for a particular part and for some definite matter seems to come closer to the case and to bear more directly on the verdict. Next, whether under the law a thing must be done at once, or whether it admits some delay and postponement;

poena adiciatur aut in utra maior poena statuatur; nam maxime conservanda est ea, quae diligentissime sancta est; deinde, utra lex iubeat, utra vetet; nam saepe ea, quae vetat, quasi exceptione quadam corrigere videatur illam, quae iubet; deinde, utra lex de genere omni, utra de parte quadam; utra communiter in plures, utra in aliquam certam rem scripta videatur; nam quae in partem aliquam et quae in certam quandam rem scripta est, propius ad causam accedere videtur et ad iudicium magis pertinere; de- inde, ex lege utrum statim fieri necesse sit, utrum habeat aliquam moram et sustentationem;

for what must be done at once ought to be carried out first. Next, one must take pains that one’s own law appears to rest on the writing itself, while the contrary one is brought in through ambiguity, or through inference, or through definition, since that is held more sacred and more firmly settled which is written more plainly. Next, to one’s own law’s text one should also join the intent, and likewise lead the contrary law over to another intent, so that, if it can be managed, they may not even appear to be at variance with each other. Finally, if the case affords the opportunity, to bring it about that by our reasoning both laws appear to be preserved, while by the opponents’ reasoning one must of necessity be neglected. As for the commonplaces, one will have to look both to those which the case itself supplies and to those drawn from the fullest parts of advantage and honor, showing by amplification to which law one ought rather to incline.

nam id, quod statim faciendum sit, perfici prius oportet; de- inde operam dare, ut sua lex ipso scripto videatur niti, contraria autem aut per ambiguum aut per ratio- cinationem aut per definitionem induci, cum sanctius et firmius id videatur esse, quod apertius scriptum sit; deinde suae legis ad scriptum ipsum sententiam quoque adiungere, contrariam legem item ad aliam sententiam transducere, ut, si fieri poterit, ne discrepare quidem videantur inter se; postremo facere, si causa facultatem dabit, ut nostra ratione utraque lex con- servari videatur, adversariorum ratione altera sit ne- cessario neglegenda. Locos autem communes et, quos ipsa causa det, videre oportebit et ex utilitatis et ex honestatis amplis- simis partibus sumere demonstrantem per amplifica- tionem, ad utram potius legem accedere oporteat.

From inference a dispute arises when, from something that stands somewhere in writing, one comes to something that is nowhere written, in this fashion. A law: “If a man is mad, let the authority over him and over his property belong to his agnates and clansmen.” And a law: “As the head of a household has bequeathed concerning his household and his property, so let it be law.” And a law: “If the head of a household dies intestate, let his household and property belong to his agnates and clansmen.”

Ex ratiocinatione nascitur controversia, cum ex eo, quod uspiam est, ad id, quod nusquam scriptum est, venitur, hoc pacto: lex: si furiosus est, agna- tum gentiliumque in eo pecuniaque eius potestas esto. et lex: paterfamilias uti super familia pecu- niaque sua legassit, ita ius esto. et lex: si pater- familias intestato moritur, familia pecuniaque eius

A certain man was judged to have killed his parent, and at once, because there was no possibility of escape, wooden clogs were fitted to his feet; his mouth was muffled with a bag and bound up; then he was led off to prison, to remain there for the time it took to make ready the leather sack into which he would be thrown to be carried off into a flowing stream. Meanwhile certain of his intimates bring tablets into the prison and lead in witnesses; they write down the heirs whom he himself directs; the tablets are sealed. Afterward the penalty is exacted upon him. Between those who are written as heirs in the tablets and the agnates there is a dispute over the inheritance. Here no definite law is brought forward which takes from men in such a position the power of making a will. From the other laws—both those which subject this very man to a penalty of this kind and those which bear on the power of making a will—one must come, by way of inference, to a line of reasoning of this sort: to inquire whether he had the power of making a will.

agnatum gentiliumque esto. Quidam iudicatus est pa- rentem occidisse et statim, quod effugiendi potestas non fuit, ligneae soleae in pedes inditae sunt; os autem ob- volutum est folliculo et praeligatum; deinde est in car- cerem deductus, ut ibi esset tantisper, dum culleus, in quem coniectus in profluentem deferretur, compararetur. interea quidam eius familiares in carcerem tabulas af- ferunt et testes adducunt; heredes, quos ipse iubet, scribunt; tabulae obsignantur. de illo post suppli- cium sumitur. inter eos, qui heredes in tabulis scripti sunt, et inter agnatos de hereditate controversia est. Hic certa lex, quae testamenti faciendi iis, qui in eo loco sint, adimat potestatem, nulla profertur. ex ce- teris legibus et quae hunc ipsum supplicio eiusmodi afficiunt et quae ad testamenti faciendi potestatem pertinent, per ratiocinationem veniundum est ad eius- modi rationem, ut quaeratur, habueritne testamenti fa- ciendi potestatem.

In this kind of argument we judge the commonplaces to be these and certain others like them: first, praise and confirmation of the text you bring forward; next, a comparison of the matter under inquiry with the matter that is agreed upon, of such a sort that the matter inquired into appears similar to the one agreed upon; after this, an expression of astonishment, by way of contrast, how it can come about that one who grants this to be equitable should deny that, which is either more equitable or of the same kind; then, that for this reason nothing was written on this matter, because, when something had been written on that one, the writer judged that no one would be in doubt about this.

Locos autem communes in hoc genere argumentandi hos et huiusmodi quosdam esse arbitramur: primum eius scripti, quod proferas, laudationem et confirma- tionem; deinde eius rei, qua de quaeratur, cum eo, de quo constet, collationem eiusmodi, ut id, de quo quaeritur, ei, de quo constet, simile esse videatur; postea admirationem per contentionem, qui fieri pos- sit, ut qui hoc aequum esse concedat, illud neget, quod aut aequius aut eodem sit in genere; deinde idcirco de hac re nihil esse scriptum, quod, cum de illa esset scriptum, de hac is, qui scribebat, dubita-

Next, that many things have been left out of many laws, things which no one supposes to have been left out for any reason but that they can be understood from the other provisions that have been written down. Then equity must be set forth, as in the absolute issue under the qualitative kind. The man speaking on the other side, by contrast, will have to weaken the analogy. This he will do if he demonstrates that the thing brought in for comparison differs in kind, in nature, in force, in magnitude, in time, in place, in person, in repute; if he shows in what category that thing ought to be reckoned which is adduced by way of analogy, and in what category that thing for whose sake it is adduced; then, by demonstrating in what one matter differs from the other, so that the same judgment may not seem fit to be passed on both.

turum neminem arbitratus sit; postea multis in le- gibus multa praeterita esse, quae idcirco praeterita nemo arbitretur, quod ex ceteris, de quibus scriptum sit, intellegi possint; deinde aequitas rei demon- stranda est, ut in iuridiciali absoluta. Contra autem qui dicet, similitudinem infirmare de- bebit; quod faciet, si demonstrabit illud, quod confera- tur, diversum esse genere, natura, vi, magnitudine, tempore, loco, persona, opinione; si, quo in numero illud, quod per similitudinem afferetur, et quo in loco illud, cuius causa afferetur, haberi conveniat, ostendetur; deinde, quid res cum re differat, demon- strabitur, ut non idem videatur de utraque existimari oportere.

And if he too can avail himself of inferences, he will use the same methods set forth above; if he cannot, he will deny that anything ought to be considered except what has been written down, and will urge that there are many laws about like matters, yet a single law for each single matter, and that all things can be shown to be either like or unlike one another. The commonplaces: from inference, that one ought to arrive by conjecture from what has been written to what has not been written; and that no one can embrace all matters by his writing, but that the man writes most serviceably who takes care that certain things may be understood from certain others;

ac, si ipse quoque poterit ratiocinationibus uti, isdem rationibus, quibus ante praedictum est, ute- tur; si non poterit, negabit oportere quicquam, nisi quod scriptum sit, considerare; multas de similibus rebus et in unam quamque rem tamen singulas esse leges; omnia posse inter se vel similia vel dissimilia demonstrari. Loci communes: a ratiocinatione, oportere coniec- tura ex eo, quod scriptum sit, ad id, quod non sit scriptum, pervenire; et neminem posse omnes res per scripturam amplecti, sed eum commodissime scribere, qui curet, ut quaedam ex quibusdam intellegantur;

against inference, of this kind: that conjecture is mere divination, and that it is the mark of a foolish framer of a law to be unable to provide against all the cases he wishes. There is a definition when some word is set down in a written text, and the question concerns its force, in this manner. A law: “Those who in a storm abandon a ship shall lose everything; the ship and its cargo shall belong to those who remain aboard.” Two men, while they were now sailing the deep, of whom one owned the ship and the other its cargo, caught sight of a certain shipwrecked man swimming and stretching out his hands toward them; moved by pity, they brought their ship alongside him and took the man up to themselves.

contra ratiocinationem huiusmodi: coniecturam divinationem esse et stulti scriptoris esse non posse om- nibus de rebus cavere, quibus velit. Definitio est, cum in scripto verbum aliquod est positum, cuius de vi quaeritur, hoc modo: lex: qui in adversa tempestate navem reliquerint, omnia amittunto; eorum navis et onera sunto, qui in nave remanserint. Duo quidam, cum iam in alto navigarent, et cum eorum alterius navis, alterius onus esset, naufragum quendam natantem et manus ad se tendentem animum adverterunt; misericordia commoti navem ad eum adplicarunt, hominem ad se sustulerunt.

Afterward, somewhat later, the storm too began to toss them about more violently, to such a degree that the owner of the ship, who was also her helmsman, took refuge in the skiff, and from there, by the line which, fastened to the stern, dragged the skiff in tow, controlled the ship so far as he could; while the man whose merchandise was aboard threw himself there upon his sword on the ship. At this point that shipwrecked man came to the helm and gave the ship what help he could. But once the waves had subsided and the storm had now changed, the ship was brought safely into harbor. The man, however, who had fallen upon his sword, lightly wounded, easily recovered from his injury. Each of these three says the ship together with its cargo is his own. Here all approach the case from the written text, and the dispute arises from the force of a word. For what it is to abandon a ship, and to remain aboard, and finally what the ship itself is, will be sought through definitions. The matter, moreover, will be handled out of all the same topics as the definitional issue.

postea aliquanto ipsos quoque tempestas vehementius iactare coepit, usque adeo, ut dominus navis, cum idem gubernator esset, in scapham confugeret et inde funiculo, qui a puppi religatus scapham adnexam tra- hebat, navi, quod posset, moderaretur, ille autem, cuius merces erant, in gladium in navi ibidem in- cumberet. hic ille naufragus ad gubernaculum ac- cessit et navi, quod potuit, est opitulatus. sedatis autem fluctibus et tempestate iam commutata navis in portum pervehitur. ille autem, qui in gladium in- cubuerat, leviter saucius facile ex vulnere est recrea- tus. navem cum onere horum trium suam quisque esse dicit. Hic omnes scripto ad causam accedunt et ex nominis vi nascitur controversia. nam et relinquere navem et remanere in navi, denique navis ipsa quid sit, definitionibus quaeretur. isdem autem ex locis om- nibus, quibus definitiva constitutio, tractabitur.

Now that we have set out those modes of argument which are fitted to the judicial kind of cases, we shall next furnish topics and precepts of argumentation for the deliberative kind and the epideictic; not that every case does not always turn upon some issue, but because there are nonetheless certain topics proper to these cases, not separated from the issue, but accommodated to the ends of these kinds.

Nunc expositis iis argumentationibus, quae in iudi- ciale causarum genus adcommodantur, deinceps in deliberativum genus et demonstrativum argumentandi locos et praecepta dabimus, non quo non in aliqua constitutione omnis semper causa versetur, sed quia proprii tamen harum causarum quidam loci sunt, non a constitutione separati, sed ad fines horum generum accommodati.

For in the judicial kind the end, it is agreed, is equity, that is, a certain part of the honorable; in the deliberative, Aristotle holds the end to be advantage, while I hold it to be both the honorable and advantage; in the epideictic, the honorable. For this reason, in this kind too, certain arguments of the case will be handled in common and in like manner, while certain others will be joined more separately to the end toward which the whole speech ought to be referred. And I would not grudge to set down beneath each single issue an example, did I not see that, just as obscure matters are made clearer by speaking, so clear matters are made more obscure by speech. Now let us pass on to the precepts of deliberation.

nam placet in iudiciali genere finem esse aequitatem, hoc est partem quandam honestatis. in deliberativo autem Aristoteli placet utilitatem, nobis et honestatem et utilitatem, in demonstrativo honestatem. quare in hoc quoque genere causae quaedam argumentationes communiter ac similiter tractabuntur, quaedam separatius ad finem, quo referri omnem orationem oportet, adiungentur. atque unius cuiusque constitutionis exemplum subponere non gra- varemur, nisi illud videremus, quemadmodum res obscurae dicendo fierent apertiores, sic res apertas obscuriores fieri oratione. Nunc ad deliberationis praecepta pergamus.

There are three kinds of things to be sought, and an equal number of things to be shunned on the opposite side. For there is something which by its own force draws us to itself, catching us by no profit, but drawing us by its own worth—of which kind are virtue, knowledge, truth. There is another thing, however, to be sought not for its own force and nature, but for its yield and advantage—of which kind is money. There is, further, something compounded out of the parts of these, which both leads us, enticed by its own force and worth, and bears before it a certain advantage that it may be the more sought after—as friendship and a good name.

Rerum expetendarum tria genera sunt; par autem numerus vitandarum ex contraria parte. nam est quiddam, quod sua vi nos adliciat ad sese, non emo- lumento captans aliquo, sed trahens sua dignitate, quod genus virtus, scientia, veritas. est aliud autem non propter suam vim et naturam, sed propter fruc- tum atque utilitatem petendum; quod genus pecunia est. est porro quiddam ex horum partibus iunctum, quod et sua vi et dignitate nos inlectos ducit et prae se quandam gerit utilitatem, quo magis expetatur, ut amicitia, bona existimatio.

And from these the things contrary to them will easily be understood, though we say nothing of them. But that the account may be delivered more readily, the things we have set down will be named in brief. For those that are in the first kind will be called honorable; those in the second, advantageous. These third things, however, because they contain a part of the honorable, and because the force of the honorable is the greater, are understood to be conjoined and of a double kind altogether; but let them be assigned to the better part of the word and named honorable. From these it comes about that the parts of things to be sought are the honorable and advantage, and of things to be shunned, baseness and disadvantage. To these two things, then, two great things have been attached, necessity and circumstance; of which the one is considered from force, the other from the matter and the persons. Of each we shall write more openly hereafter; for now let us first unfold the principles of the honorable.

atque ex his horum contraria facile tacentibus nobis intellegentur. sed ut expeditius ratio tradatur, ea, quae posuimus, brevi nominabuntur. nam, in primo genere quae sunt, ho- nesta appellabuntur; quae autem in secundo, utilia. haec autem tertia, quia partem honestatis continent et quia maior est vis honestatis, iuncta esse omnino et duplici genere intelleguntur, sed in meliorem partem vocabuli conferantur et honesta nominentur. ex his illud conficitur, ut petendarum rerum partes sint ho- nestas et utilitas, vitandarum turpitudo et inutilitas. his igitur duabus rebus res duae grandes sunt adtri- butae, necessitudo et affectio; quarum altera ex vi, altera ex re et personis consideratur. de utraque post apertius perscribemus; nunc honestatis rationes pri- mum explicemus.

What is sought for its own sake, either wholly or in some part, we shall name honorable. Therefore, since it has two parts, of which one is simple, the other conjoined, let us first consider the simple. There is, then, in that kind one thing that embraces everything by one force and one name: virtue. For virtue is a habit of mind in harmony with the measure of nature and with reason. And so, when all its parts have been recognized, the whole force of the simple honorable will have been considered. It has, then, four parts: prudence, justice, courage, temperance.

Quod aut totum aut aliqua ex parte propter se pe- titur, honestum nominabimus. quare, cum eius duae partes sint, quarum altera simplex, altera iuncta sit, simplicem prius consideremus. est igitur in eo genere omnes res una vi atque uno nomine amplexa virtus. nam virtus est animi habitus naturae modo atque rationi consentaneus. quamobrem omnibus eius par- tibus cognitis tota vis erit simplicis honestatis con- siderata. habet igitur partes quattuor: prudentiam, iustitiam, fortitudinem, temperantiam.

Prudence is the knowledge of things good, things evil, and things neither. Its parts: memory, understanding, foresight. Memory is that by which the mind recalls those things which have been; understanding, that by which it perceives the things that are; foresight, that by which something to come is seen before it is done. Justice is a habit of mind, the common advantage being preserved, which assigns to each his own worth. Its origin proceeds from nature; then certain things came into custom by reason of advantage; afterward the fear of laws and religion sanctioned things both proceeding from nature and approved by custom.

Prudentia est rerum bonarum et malarum neutra- rumque scientia. partes eius: memoria, intellegentia, providentia. memoria est, per quam animus repetit illa, quae fuerunt; intellegentia, per quam ea perspicit, quae sunt; providentia, per quam futurum aliquid videtur ante quam factum est. Iustitia est habitus animi communi utilitate con- servata suam cuique tribuens dignitatem. eius initium est ab natura profectum; deinde quaedam in con- suetudinem ex utilitatis ratione venerunt; postea res et ab natura profectas et ab consuetudine probatas legum metus et religio sanxit.

The law of nature is that which no opinion has begotten, but a certain force has implanted in nature, such as scrupulousness, devotion, gratitude, requital, respect, truthfulness. Scrupulousness is that which brings care and ceremony for a certain higher nature, which men call divine; devotion, that by which kindly service and diligent worship are rendered to those joined by blood and to the fatherland; gratitude, in which is contained the remembrance of friendships and of another’s services, and the will to repay them; requital, by which violence or injury, and in general everything that will be harmful, is repelled by defending or avenging; respect, by which men preceding us in some dignity are deemed worthy of a certain reverence and honor;

naturae ius est, quod non opinio genuit, sed quaedam in natura vis insevit, ut religionem, pietatem, gratiam, vindicationem, ob- servantiam, veritatem. religio est, quae superioris cuiusdam naturae, quam divinam vocant, curam caeri- moniamque affert; pietas, per quam sanguine con- iunctis patriaeque benivolum officium et diligens tri- buitur cultus; gratia, in qua amicitiarum et officiorum alterius memoria et remunerandi voluntas continetur; vindicatio, per quam vis aut iniuria et omnino omne, quod obfuturum est, defendendo aut ulciscendo pro- pulsatur; observantia, per quam homines aliqua digni- tate antecedentes cultu quodam et honore dignantur;

truthfulness, by which the things which are, or were, or are to come are stated unaltered. The law of custom is that which either, drawn lightly from nature, use has nourished and made greater—such as scrupulousness; or, if we see any of those things we mentioned before, proceeding from nature, made greater on account of custom; or that which length of time has brought into usage with the approval of the people; of which kind are compact, fairness, the adjudged. A compact is that which is agreed upon among certain persons; fairness, that which is equable toward all; the adjudged, that concerning which something has already been established by the verdicts of someone or of several. The law of statute is that which is contained in that written text which has been set before the people for them to observe.

veritas, per quam inmutata ea, quae sunt ante aut fuerunt aut futura sunt, dicuntur. consuetudine ius est, quod aut leviter a natura tractum aluit et maius fecit usus, ut religionem, aut si quid eorum, quae ante diximus, ab natura profectum maius factum propter consuetudinem videmus, aut quod in morem vetustas vulgi adprobatione perduxit; quod genus pac- tum est, par, iudicatum. pactum est, quod inter ali- quos convenit; par, quod in omnes aequabile est; iudicatum, de quo alicuius aut aliquorum iam senten- tiis constitutum est. lege ius est, quod in eo scripto, quod populo expositum est, ut observet, continetur.

Courage is the considered undertaking of dangers and the endurance of toils. Its parts: magnanimity, confidence, endurance, perseverance. Magnanimity is the contemplation and management of great and lofty matters with a certain ample and splendid purpose of mind; confidence is that by which, in great and honorable matters, the mind has placed much trust in itself with sure hope; endurance is the voluntary and long-continued bearing of arduous and difficult things for the sake of the honorable or of advantage; perseverance is the steadfast and unbroken continuance in a well-considered plan.

Fortitudo est considerata periculorum susceptio et laborum perpessio. eius partes magnificentia, fidentia, patientia, perseverantia. magnificentia est rerum ma- gnarum et excelsarum cum animi ampla quadam et splendida propositione cogitatio atque administratio; fidentia est, per quam magnis et honestis in rebus multum ipse animus in se fiduciae certa cum spe con- locavit; patientia est honestatis aut utilitatis causa rerum arduarum ac difficilium voluntaria ac diuturna perpessio; perseverantia est in ratione bene considerata stabilis et perpetua permansio.

Temperance is the firm and measured mastery of reason over lust and over the other unruly impulses of the mind. Its parts: self-restraint, clemency, modesty. Self-restraint is that by which desire is governed by the guidance of counsel; clemency, that by which minds rashly stirred to hatred of someone are held back by kindliness; modesty, that by which a sense of shame procures concern for the honorable and a settled authority. And all these things are to be sought for their own sake alone, so that no profit is added. To demonstrate this neither pertains to our present design, and is far removed

Temperantia est rationis in libidinem atque in alios non rectos impetus animi firma et moderata domina- tio. eius partes continentia, clementia, modestia. con- tinentia est, per quam cupiditas consilii gubernatione regitur; clementia, per quam animi temere in odium alicuius * iniectionis concitati comitate retinentur; modestia, per quam pudor honesti curam et stabilem comparat auctoritatem. atque haec omnia propter se solum, ut nihil adiungatur emolumenti, petenda sunt. quod ut demonstretur, neque ad hoc nostrum institutum pertinet et a brevitate praecipiendi remo-

from brevity in precept. Moreover, the things to be shunned for their own sake are not only those that are contrary to these—as cowardice to courage and injustice to justice—but also those that seem near and bordering upon them, yet are very far off indeed; of which kind, the contrary of confidence is diffidence, and on that account it is a fault; rashness is not contrary, but adjacent and near, and is nonetheless a fault. Thus to each single virtue a bordering fault will be found, either already called by a fixed name—as rashness, which borders on confidence; obstinacy, which borders on perseverance; superstition, which is near to scrupulousness—or without any fixed name. All these likewise, like the contraries of good things, will be placed among the things to be shunned. And concerning that kind of the honorable which in every part is sought for its own sake, enough has been said.

tum est. propter se autem vitanda sunt non ea modo, quae his contraria sunt, ut fortitudini ignavia et iustitiae iniustitia, verum etiam illa, quae propinqua videntur et finitima esse, absunt autem longissume; quod genus fidentiae contrarium est diffidentia et ea re vitium est; audacia non contrarium, sed appositum est ac propinquum et tamen vitium est. sic uni cuique virtuti finitimum vitium reperietur, aut certo iam no- mine appellatum, ut audacia, quae fidentiae, pertinacia, quae perseverantiae finitima est, superstitio, quae re- ligioni propinqua est, aut sine ullo certo nomine. quae omnia item uti contraria rerum bonarum in re- bus vitandis reponentur. Ac de eo quidem genere honestatis, quod omni ex parte propter se petitur, satis dictum est.

Now it seems we must speak of that in which advantage too is joined, which we nonetheless call honorable. There are, then, many things which draw us both by their dignity and also by their yield; of which kind are glory, dignity, eminence, friendship. Glory is frequent report of someone together with praise; dignity is someone’s honorable authority, worthy of reverence and of honor and of esteem; eminence is a great abundance of power or majesty or of certain resources; friendship is goodwill toward someone in respect of good things, for the sake of the very man one holds dear, together with his equal goodwill.

nunc de eo, in quo utilitas quoque adiungitur, quod tamen honestum vocamus, dicendum videtur. sunt igitur multa, quae nos cum dignitate tum quoque fructu suo ducunt; quo in genere est gloria, dignitas, ampli- tudo, amicitia. gloria est frequens de aliquo fama cum laude; dignitas est alicuius honesta et cultu et honore et verecundia digna auctoritas; ampli- tudo potentiae aut maiestatis aut aliquarum copiarum magna abundantia; amicitia voluntas erga aliquem rerum bonarum illius ipsius causa, quem diligit, cum eius pari voluntate.

Here, because we are speaking of civil cases, we add yield to friendship, so that it may seem to be sought for the sake of these things too, lest perhaps those who suppose we are speaking of friendship in every respect should begin to find fault. And yet there are those who think friendship is to be sought only for the sake of advantage; some, for its own sake alone; some, for its own sake and for advantage. Which of these is most truly established will be a matter for another place to consider. For now let this be left thus for the orator’s use: that friendship is to be sought

hic, quia de civilibus causis lo- quimur, fructus ad amicitiam adiungimus, ut eorum quoque causa petenda videatur, ne forte, qui nos de omni amicitia dicere existimant, reprehendere inci- piant. quamquam sunt qui propter utilitatem modo petendam putant amicitiam; sunt qui propter se so- lum; sunt qui propter se et utilitatem. quorum quid verissime constituatur, alius locus erit considerandi. nunc hoc sic ad usum oratorium relinquatur, utram-

for both reasons. The reckoning of friendships, moreover, since some of them are joined to sacred ties and some are not, and since some are old, some new, some proceeding from another’s kindness, some from our own, some more useful, some less useful, will be taken from the dignities of the cases, from the opportunities of the occasions, from services, from sacred ties, from old standing. Advantage, moreover, is placed either in the body or in external things; yet much the greatest part of these things comes back to the advantage of the body, as in the commonwealth there are certain things which, so to speak, pertain to the body of the state—such as fields, harbors, money, a fleet, sailors, soldiers, allies, by which things states retain their safety and freedom—while others bring about something more ample now and less necessary, such as the distinguished adornment and grandeur of a city, such as a certain surpassing magnitude of wealth, a multitude of friendships and alliances.

que propter rem amicitiam esse expetendam. ami- citiarum autem ratio, quoniam partim sunt religioni- bus iunctae, partim non sunt, et quia partim veteres sunt, partim novae, partim ab illorum, partim ab nostro beneficio profectae, partim utiliores, partim minus utiles, ex causarum dignitatibus, ex temporum opportunitatibus, ex officiis, ex religionibus, ex vetu- statibus habebitur. Utilitas autem aut in corpore posita est aut in extrariis rebus; quarum tamen rerum multo maxima pars ad corporis commodum revertitur, ut in re pu- blica quaedam sunt, quae, ut sic dicam, ad corpus pertinent civitatis, ut agri, portus, pecunia, classis, nautae, milites, socii, quibus rebus incolumitatem ac libertatem retinent civitates, aliae vero, quae iam quid- dam magis amplum et minus necessarium conficiunt, ut urbis egregia exornatio atque amplitudo, ut quae- dam excellens pecuniae magnitudo, amicitiarum ac societatum multitudo.

By which things it is brought about not only that states are safe and unharmed, but also that they are ample and powerful. For this reason advantage seems to have two parts, safety and power. Safety is the assured and entire preservation of one’s well-being; power is the command of resources fit for preserving one’s own and weakening another’s. And in all the things that have been said before, one ought to consider both what can be done and what can be done easily. We shall call easy that which can be accomplished without great toil, or without any toil, expense, or trouble, in the shortest possible time; and able to be done, that which, although it needs toil, expense, trouble, and length of time, and has either all or most or the greatest causes of difficulty, can nonetheless, once these difficulties are undertaken, be carried through and brought to completion.

quibus rebus non illud solum conficitur, ut salvae et incolumes, verum etiam, ut amplae atque potentes sint civitates. quare utilitatis duae partes videntur esse, incolumitas et potentia. in- columitas est salutis rata atque integra conservatio; potentia est ad sua conservanda et alterius adtenuanda idonearum rerum facultas. atque in iis omnibus, quae ante dicta sunt, quid fieri et quid facile fieri possit, oportet considerare. facile id dicemus, quod sine magno aut sine ullo labore, sumptu, molestia quam brevissimo tempore confici potest; posse autem fieri, quod, quamquam laboris, sumptus, molestiae, longin- quitatis indiget atque aut omnes aut plurimas aut maximas causas habet difficultatis, tamen his suscep- tis difficultatibus confieri atque ad exitum perduci potest.

Since, then, we have spoken of the honorable and of advantage, it now remains for us to write of those things which we said were attached to these—necessity and circumstance. I take it, then, that this is necessity, which can be resisted by no force, so as to keep it from accomplishing what it is able to do, which can neither be altered nor softened. And, that this may be plainer, by an example we may recognize the force of the thing, of what sort and how great it is. It is necessary that woody material can be burned by flame. It is necessary that a living, mortal body perish at some time; and so necessary that the force of the necessity we were just describing demands it. When necessities of this kind fall within the methods of speaking, they will rightly be called necessities;

Quoniam ergo de honestate et de utilitate dixi- mus, nunc restat, ut de iis rebus, quas his adtributas esse dicebamus, necessitudine et affectione, perscriba- mus. puto igitur esse hanc necessitudinem, cui nulla vi resisti potest, quo ea setius id, quod facere pot- est, perficiat, quae neque mutari neque leniri potest. atque, ut apertius hoc sit, exemplo licet vim rei, qualis et quanta sit, cognoscamus. uri posse flamma ligneam materiam necesse est. corpus animal mortale aliquo tempore interire necesse est; atque ita necesse, ut vis postulat ea, quam modo describebamus, ne- cessitudinis. huiusmodi necessitudines cum in di- cendi rationes incident, recte necessitudines appella- buntur;

but if any difficult matters arise, we shall consider them under that earlier question, whether the thing can be done. And this too I seem to see: that there are certain necessities with a condition attached, certain ones simple and absolute. For we are accustomed to say in one way, “It is necessary that the people of Casilinum surrender themselves to Hannibal”; but in another, “It is necessary that Casilinum come into Hannibal’s power.” There, in the former, the attached condition is this: “unless they prefer to perish by famine”; for if they prefer that, it is not necessary. The latter is not so, for the reason that, whether the people of Casilinum choose to surrender themselves or to suffer famine and so perish, it is necessary that Casilinum come into Hannibal’s power. What, then, can this distribution of necessity accomplish? I should almost say a very great deal, whenever a topic of necessity seems to occur. For when the necessity is simple,

sin aliquae res accident difficiles, in illa su- periore, possitne fieri, quaestione considerabimus. at- que etiam hoc mihi videor videre, esse quasdam cum adiunctione necessitudines, quasdam simplices et ab- solutas. nam aliter dicere solemus: necesse est Casilinenses se dedere Hannibali; aliter autem: ne- cesse est Casilinum venire in Hannibalis potestatem. illic, in superiore, adiunctio est haec: nisi si malunt fame perire; si enim id malunt, non est necesse; hoc inferius non item, propterea quod, sive velint Casili- nenses se dedere sive famem perpeti atque ita perire, necesse est Casilinum venire in Hannibalis potestatem. quid igitur haec perficere potest necessitudinis distri- butio? prope dicam plurimum, cum locus necessi- tudinis videbitur incurrere. nam cum simplex erit necessitudo,

there will be no reason for us to say much, since we can in no way soften it; but when it will be necessary thus—if we wish to escape or to obtain something—then it must be considered what advantage or what honor that attached condition holds. For if you are willing to attend, yet in such a way as to seek what suits the interest of the state, you will find there is no thing which it is necessary to do except on account of some cause, which we call the attached condition; and that there are, in like manner, many things of necessity to which no such attached condition is joined—of which kind it is necessary that men, being mortal, perish, without any condition; whereas that they take food is not necessary except with that exception, “save where they prefer to perish by famine.”

nihil erit quod multa dicamus, cum eam nulla ratione lenire possimus; cum autem ita necesse erit, si aliquid effugere aut adipisci velimus, tum adiunctio illa quid habeat utilitatis aut quid honestatis, erit considerandum. nam si velis attendere, ita tamen, ut id quaeras, quod conveniat ad usum civitatis, re- perias nullam esse rem, quam facere necesse sit, nisi propter aliquam causam, quam adiunctionem nomi- namus; pariter autem esse multas res necessitatis, ad quas similis adiunctio non accedit; quod genus ut homines mortales necesse est interire, sine ad- iunctione; ut cibo utantur, non necesse est nisi cum illa exceptione extra quam si nolint fame perire.

Therefore, as I say, that which is attached must always be considered, of what sort it is. For at every turn it will be to the point that necessity be set forth either with reference to the honorable, in this manner: “It is necessary, if we wish to live honorably”; or to safety, in this manner: “It is necessary, if we wish to be safe”; or to convenience, in this manner: “It is necessary, if we wish to live without disadvantage.” And the highest necessity, indeed, seems to be that of the honorable; next to this, that of safety;

ergo, ut dico, illud, quod adiungitur, semper, cuius- modi sit, erit considerandum. nam omni tempore id pertinebit, ut aut ad honestatem hoc modo expo- nenda necessitudo sit: necesse est, si honeste volu- mus vivere; aut ad incolumitatem, hoc modo: ne- cesse est, si incolumes volumus esse; aut ad commoditatem, hoc modo: necesse est, si sine incommodo volumus vivere. ac summa quidem necessitudo vi- detur esse honestatis; huic proxima incolumitatis;

the third and slightest, that of convenience, which can never contend with these two. These, however, must often be compared with one another, so that, although the honorable surpasses safety, it is nonetheless deliberated which of the two ought chiefly to be consulted. And for this matter a certain fixed rule seems able to be given for all time. For in any case in which it can come about that, when we have consulted safety, whatever has in the present been clipped from the honorable may at some point be recovered by virtue and effort, the principle of safety will seem to be the one to hold; but when this cannot be, that of the honorable. So in a matter of this kind too, when we seem to consult safety, we shall be able truly to say that we are holding to the principle of the honorable, since without safety we can at no time attain it. In which matter it will behoove us either to yield to the other party, or to come down to the other’s terms, or for the present to keep still and await another

tertia ac levissima commoditatis; quae cum his num- quam poterit duabus contendere. hasce autem inter se saepe necesse est comparari, ut, quamquam praestet honestas incolumitati, tamen, utri potissimum consu- lendum sit, deliberetur. cuius rei certum quoddam praescriptum videtur in perpetuum dari posse. nam, qua in re fieri poterit, ut, cum incolumitati consulueri- mus, quod sit in praesentia de honestate delibatum, virtute aliquando et industria recuperetur, incolumita- tis ratio videbitur habenda; cum autem id non poterit, honestatis. ita in huiusmodi quoque re, cum inco- lumitati videbimur consulere, vere poterimus dicere nos honestatis rationem habere, quoniam sine inco- lumitate eam nullo tempore possumus adipisci. qua in re vel concedere alteri vel ad condicionem alterius descendere vel in praesentia quiescere atque aliud tem-

time—only let this be attended to: whether the cause that will pertain to advantage seems worthy enough that on its account something should be subtracted from grandeur or from the honorable. And at this point the chief thing seems to me to be this: that we ask what that is which, if we wish to obtain or to escape it, makes some other thing necessary to us—that is, what the attached condition is—so that, according as each matter shall stand, we may toil accordingly, and judge each weightiest cause to be most vehemently necessary.

pus exspectare oportebit, modo illud adtendatur, di- gnane causa videatur ea, quae ad utilitatem pertine- bit, quare de magnificentia aut de honestate quiddam derogetur. atque in hoc loco mihi caput illud vide- tur esse, ut quaeramus, quid sit illud, quod si adi- pisci aut effugere velimus, aliqua res nobis sit ne- cessaria, hoc est, quae sit adiunctio, ut proinde, uti quaeque res erit, elaboremus et gravissimam quamque causam vehementissime necessariam iudicemus.

Circumstance is a certain change in matters arising from the time, or from the outcome of affairs, or from their management, or from the zeal of men, such that they seem fit to be regarded not as they were regarded before, or are commonly wont to be regarded; as to go over to the enemy seems base, yet not in that spirit in which Ulysses went over; and to cast money into the sea is disadvantageous, yet not with that purpose with which Aristippus did it. There are, then, certain things to be considered from the time and from the purpose, not from their own nature; in all of which one must consider what the times demand, what is worthy of the persons, and one must attend not to what is done, but with what spirit, with whom, at what time, for how long it is done. From these parts, we judge, the topics for delivering an opinion ought to be taken.

Affectio est quaedam ex tempore aut ex nego- tiorum eventu aut administratione aut hominum studio commutatio rerum, ut non tales, quales ante ha- bitae sint aut plerumque haberi soleant, habendae videantur esse; ut ad hostes transire turpe videatur esse, at non illo animo, quo Ulixes transiit; et pe- cuniam in mare deicere inutile, at non eo consilio, quo Aristippus fecit. sunt igitur res quaedam ex tempore et ex consilio, non ex sua natura conside- randae; quibus in omnibus, quid tempora petant, quid personis dignum sit, considerandum est et non quid, sed quo quidque animo, quicum, quo tempore, quam- diu fiat, attendendum est. his ex partibus ad senten- tiam dicendam locos sumi oportere arbitramur.

Praise, moreover, and blame will be taken from those topics which are assigned to persons, of which we have spoken before. But if anyone wishes to handle the matter more by way of division, he may distribute it into the mind, the body, and external things. Of the mind there is virtue, of whose parts we spoke a little before; of the body, health, dignity, strength, swiftness; of external things, honor, money, kinship by marriage, birth, friends, fatherland, power, and the rest that will be understood to be of a like kind.

Laudes autem et vituperationes ex iis locis sumentur, qui loci personis sunt adtributi, de quibus ante dic- tum est. sin distributius tractare qui volet, partiatur in animum et corpus et extraneas res licebit. animi est virtus, cuius de partibus paulo ante dictum est; corporis valetudo, dignitas, vires, velocitas; extraneae honos, pecunia, adfinitas, genus, amici, patria, poten- tia, cetera, quae simili esse in genere intellegentur.

And in these the same rule that holds for all will have to hold; the contraries too, what they are and of what sort, will be understood. In praising and in blaming, however, one ought to look not so much at what a man, the subject of the speech, has had in his body or in external things, as at the way in which he has used these things. For to praise fortune is folly, and to blame it is arrogance; whereas the praise of the mind is honorable, and its blame is forceful. Now, since the method of argumentation for every kind of case has been delivered, it seems enough has been said concerning invention, the first and greatest part of rhetoric. Therefore, since one part has been carried through to its close both in this book and in the one before, and since this book contains no small amount of writing, what remains we shall set forth in the books to follow.

atque in his id, quod in omnia, valere oportebit; con- traria quoque, quae et qualia sint, intellegentur. vi- dere autem in laudando et in vituperando oportebit non tam, quae in corpore aut in extraneis rebus ha- buerit is, de quo agetur, quam quo pacto his rebus usus sit. nam fortunam quidem et laudare stultitia et vituperare superbia est, animi autem et laus ho- nesta et vituperatio vehemens est. Nunc quoniam omne in causae genus argumentan- di ratio tradita est, de inventione, prima ac maxima parte rhetoricae, satis dictum videtur. quare, quoniam et una pars ad exitum hoc ac superiore libro per- ducta est et hic liber non parum continet litterarum, quae restant, in reliquis dicemus.

C icero by Claude

On Invention

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