I have noticed, gentlemen, that all the prosecutor’s speech is divided into two parts, of which the one seemed to me to lean and to trust greatly on the now grown-old hatred of the Junian trial; the other only for the sake of custom, timidly and distrustfully, to touch the reasoning of the charges of poisoning, on which matter this inquiry has been set up by the law. So I am resolved to keep this same division of hatred and charges in my defence in such a way that all may understand that I have neither wished to escape by being silent nor to obscure by speaking.

animum adverti, iudices, omnem accusatoris orationem in duas divisam esse partis, quarum altera mihi niti et magno opere confidere videbatur invidia iam inveterata iudici Iuniani, altera tantum modo consuetudinis causa timide et diffidenter attingere rationem venefici criminum, qua de re lege est haec quaestio constituta. itaque mihi certum est hanc eandem distributionem invidiae et criminum sic in defensione servare ut omnes intellegant nihil me nec subterfugere voluisse reticendo nec obscurare dicendo.

But when I consider in what manner I must labour in each, the one part — which is proper to your trial and to the lawful inquiry on poisoning — seems to me to be very brief and not to require great contention in speaking. The other, however, which is far removed from the trial, which is more fitted to seditiously roused public meetings than to calm and moderate trials — I see how much difficulty in pleading and how much labour it will have.

sed cum considero quo modo mihi in utraque re sit elaborandum, altera pars et ea quae propria est iudici vestri et legitimae venefici quaestionis per mihi brevis et non magnae in dicendo contentionis fore videtur, altera autem quae procul ab iudicio remota est, quae contionibus seditiose concitatis accommodatior est quam tranquillis moderatisque iudiciis, perspicio quantum in agendo difficultatis et quantum laboris sit habitura.

But in this difficulty this thing, gentlemen, comforts me: that you are wont to hear charges so as to seek of the speaker the dissolving of all of them; that you reckon that you ought not to grant the defendant more for safety than the defender has been able by purging the charges and proving by speaking. About hatred, however, you ought so to debate among yourselves that you should consider not what is said by us but what ought to be said. For in the charges Aulus Cluentius’s own peril is at issue; in hatred the common cause. Wherefore the one part of the case we shall plead so that we should teach you; the other so that we should beg. In the one your diligence is to be joined to us; in the other your faith is to be implored. For there is no one who can withstand hatred without your aid and that of such men.

sed in hac difficultate illa me res tamen, iudices, consolatur quod vos de criminibus sic audire consuestis ut eorum omnium dissolutionem ab oratore quaeratis, ut non existimetis plus vos ad salutem reo largiri oportere quam quantum defensor purgandis criminibus consequi et dicendo probare potuerit. de invidia autem sic inter nos disceptare debetis ut non quid dicatur a nobis sed quid oporteat dici consideretis. agitur enim in criminibus A. Auli Cluenti proprium periculum, in invidia causa communis. quam ob rem alteram partem causae sic agemus ut vos doceamus, alteram sic ut oremus; in altera diligentia vestra nobis adiungenda est, in altera fides imploranda. nemo est enim qui invidiae sine vestro ac sine talium virorum subsidio possit resistere.

Indeed, as far as it concerns me, I do not know whither to turn. Shall I deny that there was that infamy of a corrupted trial? Shall I deny that this matter was agitated in public meetings, tossed about in trials, recalled in the senate? Shall I tear from men’s minds so great an opinion, so deeply set, so old? It is not of our wit; it is, gentlemen, of your help, in this calamitous fame, as if in some most ruinous flame and in a common fire, to come to the help of this innocence.

equidem quod ad me attinet, quo me vertam nescio. negem fuisse illam infamiam iudici corrupti? negem esse illam rem agitatam in contionibus, iactatam in iudiciis, commemoratam in senatu? evellam ex animis hominum tantam opinionem, tam penitus insitam, tam vetustam? non est nostri ingeni, vestri auxili est, iudices, huius innocentiae sic in hac calamitosa fama quasi in aliqua perniciosissima flamma atque in communi incendio subvenire.

For just as in other places truth has too little of stay and too little of strength, so in this place false hatred ought to be weak. Let it lord it in public meetings; let it lie low in trials. Let it have weight in the opinions and talk of the unskilled; let it be rejected by the wits of the prudent. Let it have vehement sudden onsets; let it grow old with the interval of space and the case learned. Finally let that definition of fair trials which has been handed to us by our ancestors be kept: that in trials both fault should be punished without hatred and hatred set down without fault.

etenim sicut aliis in locis parum firmamenti et parum virium veritas habet, sic in hoc loco falsa invidia imbecilla esse debet. dominetur in contionibus, iaceat in iudiciis; valeat in opinionibus ac sermonibus imperitorum, ab ingeniis prudentium repudietur; vehementis habeat repentinos impetus, spatio interposito et causa cognita consenescat; denique illa definitio iudiciorum aequorum quae nobis a maioribus tradita est retineatur, ut in iudiciis et sine invidia culpa plectatur et sine culpa invidia ponatur.

Wherefore I ask of you, gentlemen, before I begin to speak about the case itself, these things: first, that which is most fair — that you should bring no prejudgement here. For we shall lose not only the authority but even the name of judges, if we shall not judge here from the cases themselves — if we shall bring our judgements ready-made from home to the cases. Next, if you have already taken any opinion in your minds, if reasoning shall pluck it out, if speech shall shake it, if at last truth shall wrest it free, do not resist; let it go from your minds either willingly or with calm. But when I shall speak and dissolve about each thing, do not yourselves silently set against your thought what is contrary, but await the end and suffer me to keep my own order of speaking. When I shall have closed, then if anything shall have been passed over, ask of it in your minds.

quam ob rem a vobis, iudices, ante quam de ipsa causa dicere incipio, haec postulo, primum id quod aequissimum est ut ne quid huc praeiudicati adferatis — etenim non modo auctoritatem sed etiam nomen iudicum amittemus, nisi hic ex ipsis causis iudicabimus, si ad causas iudicia iam facta domo deferemus; — deinde si quam opinionem iam vestris mentibus comprehendistis, si eam ratio convellet, si oratio labefactabit, si denique veritas extorquebit, ne repugnetis eamque animis vestris aut libentibus aut aequis remittatis; tum autem cum ego una quaque de re dicam et diluam, ne ipsi quae contraria sint taciti cogitationi vestrae subiciatis sed ad extremum exspectetis meque meum dicendi ordinem servare patiamini; cum peroraro, tum si quid erit praeteritum animo requiratis.

I, gentlemen, easily understand that I am coming to that case which has now for eight continuous years been heard from the contrary side, and is by men’s own opinion silently almost convicted and condemned. But if some god shall have won me your goodwill for hearing me, I shall surely bring it to pass that you understand that nothing is so to be feared by a man as hatred; that nothing is so to be desired by an innocent man, with hatred undertaken, as a fair trial, in which alone at last some end and outcome of false infamy is found. Wherefore great hope holds me, that, if I shall be able to set forth what is in the case and to attain all things by speaking, this place and your seating, which they thought would be dreadful and fearful for Aulus Cluentius, shall at last be the harbour and refuge of his wretched and much-tossed fortune.

ego me, iudices, ad eam causam accedere quae iam per annos octo continuos ex contraria parte audiatur atque ipsa opinione hominum tacita prope convicta atque damnata sit facile intellego; sed si qui mihi deus vestram ad me audiendum benivolentiam conciliarit, efficiam profecto ut intellegatis nihil esse homini tam timendum quam invidiam, nihil innocenti suscepta invidia tam optandum quam aequum iudicium, quod in hoc uno denique falsae infamiae finis aliqui atque exitus reperiatur. quam ob rem magna me spes tenet, si quae sunt in causa explicare atque omnia dicendo consequi potuero, hunc locum consessumque vestrum, quem illi horribilem A. Aulo Cluentio ac formidolosum fore putaverunt, eum tandem eius fortunae miserae multumque iactatae portum ac perfugium futurum.

Although there are very many things which seem to me ought to be said, before I speak about the case, of the common perils of hatred, yet, lest your expectation be longer held in suspense by my speech, I shall come to the charge with that prayer, gentlemen, which I see I must use the more often: that you should hear me as if at this time this case were spoken first, as it is spoken — not as if it had often been spoken and never proved. For on this day for the first time the means of dissolving that old charge has been given. Before this time error in this case and hatred has been at large. Wherefore, while I answer briefly and clearly to the prosecution of many years, I ask, gentlemen, that you should hear me, as you have set yourselves to do, kindly and attentively.

tametsi permulta sunt quae mihi, ante quam de causa dico, de communibus invidiae periculis dicenda esse videantur, tamen ne diutius oratione mea suspensa exspectatio vestra teneatur adgrediar ad crimen cum illa deprecatione, iudices, qua mihi saepius utendum esse intellego, sic ut me audiatis, quasi hoc tempore haec causa primum dicatur, sicuti dicitur, non quasi saepe iam dicta et numquam probata sit. hodierno enim die primum veteris istius criminis diluendi potestas est data, ante hoc tempus error in hac causa atque invidia versata est. quam ob rem, dum multorum annorum accusationi breviter dilucideque respondeo, quaeso ut me, iudices, sicut facere instituistis, benigne attenteque audiatis.

Aulus Cluentius is said to have corrupted by money the trial, that he might condemn his innocent enemy, Statius Albius. I shall show, gentlemen, first, since the head of that atrocity and hatred was that an innocent man was caught by money, that no one was ever called into court on greater charges, by graver witnesses; next, that such prejudgements have been made about him by the very judges by whom he was condemned that not only by the same but not even by any others could he in any way be acquitted. When I have shown these things, then I shall show what I see is most asked: that that trial was tried by money not by Cluentius, but against Cluentius. And I shall make you understand in that whole case what the matter itself bore, what error feigned, what hatred forged.

corrupisse dicitur A. Aulus Cluentius iudicium pecunia, quo inimicum innocentem, Statium Albium, condemnaret. ostendam, iudices, primum, quoniam caput illius atrocitatis atque invidiae fuit innocentem pecunia circumventum, neminem umquam maioribus criminibus gravioribus testibus esse in iudicium vocatum; deinde ea de eo praeiudicia esse facta ab ipsis iudicibus a quibus condemnatus est ut non modo ab isdem sed ne ab aliis quidem ullis absolvi ullo modo posset. cum haec docuero, tum illud ostendam quod maxime requiri intellego iudicium illud pecunia esse temptatum non a Cluentio sed contra Cluentium, faciamque ut intellegatis in tota illa causa quid res ipsa tulerit, quid error adfinxerit, quid invidia conflarit.

First then this is, from which it can be understood that Cluentius ought greatly to have trusted the case: that, trusting in the surest charges and witnesses, he came down to accuse. Here, gentlemen, I must briefly set forth those charges by which Albius was condemned. I ask of you, Oppianicus, to think that I am unwilling speaking of your father’s case, drawn on by faith and the duty of defence. For if to you in the present I shall not be able, yet many means of giving satisfaction shall be given me at the time remaining; if I do not now satisfy Cluentius, the means of satisfying afterward shall not be given me. At the same time, who is there who ought to doubt to speak against the condemned and the dead for the unhurt and the living? When against him against whom it is said the condemnation has now taken away every danger of disgrace, and death even of grief; while he for whom we are speaking can take in nothing of offence without the bitterest sense of mind and trouble and the highest disgrace and foulness of life.

primum igitur illud est ex quo intellegi possit debuisse Cluentium magno opere causae confidere, quod certissimis criminibus et testibus fretus ad accusandum descenderit. hoc loco faciendum mihi, iudices, est ut vobis breviter illa quibus Albius est condemnatus crimina exponam. abs te peto, Oppianice, ut me invitum de patris tui causa dicere existimes adductum fide atque officio defensionis. etenim tibi si in praesentia non potuero, tamen multae mihi ad satis faciendum reliquo tempore facultates dabuntur; Cluentio nisi nunc satis fecero, postea mihi satis faciendi potestas non erit. simul et illud quis est qui dubitare debeat contra damnatum et mortuum pro incolumi et pro vivo dicere? cum illi in quem dicitur damnatio omne ignominiae periculum iam abstulerit, mors vero etiam doloris; hic autem pro quo dicimus nihil possit offensionis accipere sine acerbissimo animi sensu ac molestia et sine summo dedecore vitae et turpitudine.

And that you may understand that Cluentius brought the name of Oppianicus into court not by a prosecutor’s mind, not led on by any display or glory, but by unspeakable wrongs, by daily plots, with the peril of life set before his eyes — I shall seek a beginning a little further off for showing the matter; which I ask, gentlemen, that you should not bear heavily. For with the beginnings learned, you will much more easily understand the ends. Aulus Cluentius Habitus, the father of this man, gentlemen, was not only of the town of Larinum (from which he was), but also of that region and neighbourhood, in virtue, standing, nobility, the chief. He, when he had died in the consulship of Sulla and Pompeius, left this man fifteen years of age, and a daughter, grown and marriageable, who in a short time after her father’s death married Aulus Aurius Melinus, her cousin, a young man among the chief (as he was then reckoned) honourable and noble among his own. When this marriage was full of dignity,

atque ut intellegatis Cluentium non accusatorio animo, non ostentatione aliqua aut gloria adductum, sed nefariis iniuriis, cotidianis insidiis, proposito ante oculos vitae periculo nomen Oppianici detulisse, paulo longius exordium rei demonstrandae petam; quod quaeso, iudices, ne moleste patiamini; principiis enim cognitis multo facilius extrema intellegetis. A. Aulus Cluentius habitus fuit, pater huiusce, iudices, homo non solum municipi Larinatis ex quo erat sed etiam regionis illius et vicinitatis virtute, existimatione, nobilitate princeps. is cum esset mortuus Sulla et Pompeio consulibus, reliquit hunc annos xv natum, grandem autem et nubilem filiam quae brevi tempore post patris mortem nupsit A. Aulo Aurio Melino, consobrino suo, adulescenti in primis, ut tum habebatur, inter suos et honesto et nobili. cum essent eae nuptiae plenae dignitatis,

full of concord, suddenly the unspeakable lust of a fierce woman arose, joined not only with disgrace but with crime. For Sassia, the mother of this Habitus — for "mother" by me in all the case (although she shows hostile hatred and cruelty against him), "mother," I say, she shall be called; nor shall she ever so hear from me of her own crime and monstrousness as to lose the name of nature; for the more loving and more indulgent the very name of mother is, the more by greater hatred shall you reckon worthy the singular crime of that mother who for many years now, and now most of all, has wished her son killed — this Habitus’s mother, then, was caught with love (against what was right) for that young Melinus, her son-in-law. And not even that for long. In whatever way she could, she held herself in that lust. Then she began so to blaze with frenzy, was so kindled, was so carried by lust, that neither shame nor piety, nor the family’s stain, nor men’s standing, nor her son’s grief, nor her daughter’s mourning could call her back from that desire.

plenae concordiae, repente est exorta mulieris importunae nefaria libido non solum dedecore verum etiam scelere coniuncta. nam Sassia, mater huius habiti — mater enim a me in omni causa, tametsi in hunc hostili odio et crudelitate est, mater, inquam, appellabitur, neque umquam illa ita de suo scelere et immanitate audiet ut naturae nomen amittat; quo enim est ipsum nomen amantius indulgentiusque maternum, hoc illius matris quae multos iam annos et nunc cum maxime filium interfectum cupit singulare scelus maiore odio dignum esse ducetis. ea igitur mater habiti, Melini illius adulescentis, generi sui, contra quam fas erat amore capta primo, neque id ipsum diu, quoquo modo poterat in illa cupiditate continebatur; deinde ita flagrare coepit amentia, sic inflammata ferri libidine ut eam non pudor, non pietas, non macula familiae, non hominum fama, non fili dolor, non filiae maeror a cupiditate revocaret.

The young man’s mind, not yet firm in counsel and reasoning, she lured by all those things by which that age can be caught and softened. The daughter, who was not only afflicted by that common feminine grief at such a husband’s wrongs, but could not bear her mother’s unspeakable taking-of-her-husband (about which she reckoned she could not even complain without crime), wished the rest to be ignorant of so great an ill of hers. In the hands and lap of this most loving brother of hers she was wasting away with mourning and tears.

animum adulescentis nondum consilio ac ratione firmatum pellexit eis omnibus rebus quibus illa aetas capi ac deleniri potest. filia, quae non solum illo communi dolore muliebri in eius modi viri iniuriis angeretur sed nefarium matris paelicatum ferre non posset de quo ne queri quidem se sine scelere posse arbitraretur, ceteros sui tanti mali ignaros esse cupiebat; in huius amantissimi sui fratris manibus et gremio maerore et lacrimis consenescebat.

But behold, a sudden divorce, which seemed to be the comfort of all ills! Cluentia leaves Melinus — not unwilling, given such great wrongs; not gladly, given that he was her husband. Then indeed that distinguished and famous mother began openly to leap with joy, to triumph with gladness — the conqueror of her daughter, not of her lust. She was unwilling that her standing should longer be hurt by hidden suspicions. The bridal bed which two years before she had spread for her own daughter as bride, in the same house, with her daughter cast out and driven away, she ordered to be adorned and spread for herself. The mother-in-law marries her son-in-law, with no auspices, no witnesses, with the dreadful omens of all.

ecce autem subitum divortium quod solacium malorum omnium fore videbatur! discedit a Melino Cluentia ut in tantis iniuriis non invita, ut a viro non libenter. tum vero illa egregia ac praeclara mater palam exsultare laetitia, triumphare gaudio coepit, victrix filiae non libidinis; diutius suspicionibus obscuris laedi famam suam noluit; lectum illum genialem quem biennio ante filiae suae nubenti straverat, in eadem domo sibi ornari et sterni expulsa atque exturbata filia iubet. nubit genero socrus nullis auspicibus, nullis auctoribus, funestis ominibus omnium.

O incredible crime of a woman, and (save this one) unheard in all life! O unbridled and untamed lust! O singular audacity! Did she not fear, if not the power of the gods and the fame of men, then that very night and those wedding torches, not the threshold of the chamber, not her daughter’s bed, finally not the very walls, witnesses of the earlier marriage? She broke through and laid prostrate all things by greed and frenzy. Lust overcame shame, audacity fear, frenzy reason.

O mulieris scelus incredibile et praeter hanc unam in omni vita inauditum! o libidinem effrenatam et indomitam! o audaciam singularem! nonne timuisse, si minus vim deorum hominumque famam, at illam ipsam noctem facesque illas nuptialis, non limen cubiculi, non cubile filiae, non parietes denique ipsos superiorum testis nuptiarum? perfregit ac prostravit omnia cupiditate ac furore; vicit pudorem libido, timorem audacia, rationem amentia.

The son bore this common disgrace of family, kinship, and name heavily. But his trouble was being increased by the daily complaints and ceaseless weeping of his sister. He resolved nevertheless that nothing graver in such great wrongs and so great a crime of his mother had to be done by him than that he should not deal with her, lest those things which he could not see without the highest grief of mind, by his dealing with his mother, he should be reckoned not only to see but even to approve by his own judgement.

tulit hoc commune dedecus familiae, cognationis, nominis graviter filius; augebatur autem eius molestia cotidianis querimoniis et adsiduo fletu sororis; statuit tamen nihil sibi in tantis iniuriis ac tanto scelere matris gravius esse faciendum quam ut illa ne uteretur, ne quae videre sine summo animi dolore non poterat, ea, si matre uteretur, non solum videre verum etiam probare suo iudicio putaretur.

What was the beginning to him of the strife with his mother, you have heard. That this had to do with the case, when you have learned the rest, you will understand. For it does not escape me that, of whatever sort a mother be, yet in the trial of her son it is scarcely fitting that the foulness of a parent should be spoken. I should not be a fit man for any case, gentlemen, if this — which is set and fixed in the common feelings of men and in nature itself — I, who am drawn to defending men’s perils, did not see. I easily understand that men ought not only to be silent about the wrongs of parents but even to bear them with calm mind. But I think those things which can be borne must be borne; those which can be silent, must be silent.

initium quod huic cum matre fuerit simultatis audistis. pertinuisse hoc ad causam tum cum reliqua cognoveritis intellegetis. nam illud me non praeterit, cuiuscumque modi sit mater, tamen in iudicio fili de turpitudine parentis dici vix oportere. non essem ad ullam causam idoneus, iudices, si hoc quod in communibus hominum sensibus atque in ipsa natura positum atque infixum est, id ego, qui ad hominum pericula defendenda adiungerer, non viderem; facile intellego non modo reticere homines parentum iniurias sed etiam animo aequo ferre oportere. sed ego ea quae ferri possunt ferenda, quae taceri tacenda esse arbitror.

Aulus Cluentius has seen no calamity in his life, has come to no peril of death, has feared no ill, that has not all been forged and put forth from his mother. Who at this time would be silent about all things, and would suffer those things, if she could not by forgetfulness, yet by her own silence to be covered. But indeed it is so done that she can in no way at all be silent. For this very trial, this peril, that prosecution, all that supply of witnesses which is to be, was at the start adorned by his mother; by his mother at this time it is being arrayed and prepared with all her resources and supplies. She herself lately flew from Larinum to Rome for the sake of crushing him. The audacious, wealthy, cruel woman is at hand. She sets up the prosecutors, she arrays the witnesses; she rejoices in his squalor and filth; she desires his ruin; she longs to pour out all her own blood, provided only that she sees his poured out before. Unless you shall see all these things plainly in the case, reckon her named by us rashly. But if they shall be both open and unspeakable, you ought to forgive Cluentius for suffering these things to be said by me; you ought not forgive me, if I were silent.

nihil in vita vidit calamitatis A. Aulus Cluentius, nullum periculum mortis adiit, nihil mali timuit quod non totum a matre esset conflatum et profectum. quae hoc tempore sileret omnia atque ea, si oblivione non posset, tamen taciturnitate sua tecta esse pateretur; sed vero sic agitur ut prorsus reticere nullo modo possit. hoc enim ipsum iudicium, hoc periculum, illa accusatio, illa omnis testium copia quae futura est a matre initio est adornata, a matre hoc tempore instruitur atque omnibus eius opibus et copiis comparatur. ipsa denique nuper Larino huius opprimendi causa Romam advolavit; praesto est mulier audax, pecuniosa, crudelis, instituit accusatores, instruit testis, squalore huius et sordibus laetatur, exitium exoptat, sanguinem suum profundere omnem cupit, dum modo profusum huius ante videat. haec nisi omnia perspexeritis in causa, temere a nobis illam appellari putatote; sin erunt et aperta et nefaria, Cluentio ignoscere debebitis, quod haec a me dici patiatur; mihi ignoscere non deberetis, si tacerem.

Now I shall set out summarily on what charges Oppianicus was condemned, that you may see through both Aulus Cluentius’s constancy and the reasoning of the prosecution. And first I shall show what was the cause of accusing, that you may see Aulus Cluentius did this very thing compelled by force and necessity.

nunc iam summatim exponam quibus criminibus Oppianicus damnatus sit ut et constantiam A. Auli Cluenti et rationem accusationis perspicere possitis. ac primum causa accusandi quae fuerit ostendam ut id ipsum A. Aulum Cluentium vi ac necessitate coactum fecisse videatis.

When he had caught manifestly the poison which Oppianicus, his mother’s husband, had prepared for him, and the matter was held not by guess but by eyes and hands, and there could be no doubt at all in the case, he accused Oppianicus. With what constancy and with what diligence I shall say afterwards. Now I have wished you to know this: that there was for him no other cause of accusing save that he should shun the peril of life set before him and the daily snares laid for his head, by this one method. And that you may understand Oppianicus was prosecuted on such charges that neither the prosecutor ought to have feared nor the defendant to have hoped, I shall set forth a few of the charges of that trial. Which learned, none of you will wonder that he, distrusting his affairs, fled to Staienus and to money.

cum manifesto venenum deprehendisset quod vir matris Oppianicus ei paravisset, et res non coniectura sed oculis et manibus teneretur, neque in causa ulla dubitatio posset esse, accusavit Oppianicum; quam constanter et quam diligenter postea dicam; nunc hoc scire vos volui, nullam huic aliam accusandi causam fuisse nisi uti propositum vitae periculum et cotidianas capitis insidias hac una ratione vitaret. atque ut intellegatis eis accusatum esse criminibus Oppianicum ut neque accusator timere neque reus sperare debuerit, pauca vobis illius iudici crimina exponam; quibus cognitis nemo vestrum mirabitur illum diffidentem rebus suis ad Staienum atque ad pecuniam confugisse.

There was a certain Dinaea, of Larinum, mother-in-law of Oppianicus, who had three sons — Marcus and Numerius Aurius and Gnaeus Magius — and a daughter Magia married to Oppianicus. Marcus Aurius, a young man, was captured at Asculum in the Italic war, fell into the hands of Quintus Sergius the senator (he who was condemned among the assassins), and was at his house in the slave-prison. But Numerius Aurius, his brother, died and left Gnaeus Magius his brother as heir. Afterwards Magia, the wife of Oppianicus, died. Last, the only son left of Dinaea, Gnaeus Magius, died. He made heir that young Oppianicus, his sister’s son, and ordered him to share with Dinaea his mother. Meanwhile an informer came to Dinaea — not obscure or uncertain — to tell her that her son Marcus Aurius was alive and was in the Gallic field in slavery.

Larinas quaedam fuit Dinaea, socrus Oppianici, quae filios habuit M. Marcum et N. Numerium Aurios et Cn. Gnaeum Magium et filiam magiam nuptam Oppianico. M. Marcus Aurius adulescentulus bello Italico captus apud Asculum in Q. Quinti Sergi senatoris, eius qui inter sicarios damnatus est, manus incidit et apud eum fuit in ergastulo. N. autem Aurius, frater eius, mortuus est heredemque Cn. Gnaeum Magium fratrem reliquit. postea magia, uxor Oppianici, mortua est. postremo unus qui reliquus erat Dinaeae filius Cn. Gnaeus Magius est mortuus. is heredem fecit illum adulescentulum Oppianicum, sororis suae filium, eumque partiri cum Dinaea matre iussit. interim venit index ad Dinaeam neque obscurus neque incertus qui nuntiaret ei filium eius, M. Marcum Aurium, vivere et in agro Gallico esse in servitute.

The woman, with her children lost, when the hope of recovering one son was shown to her, called together all her kinsmen and her son’s connections, and weeping asked of them that they should take up the business, track down the young man, restore to her the son whom yet alone of many fortune had wished to leave her. When she had begun to do these things, she was overcome by disease. So she made a will of such kind, that to that son she bequeathed 400,000 sesterces, and instituted as heir that same Oppianicus, her grandson. And in those few days she died. Yet her kinsmen, as they had set themselves while Dinaea lived, so when she had died, set out to track down Marcus Aurius into the Gallic field with that same informer.

mulier amissis liberis, cum unius reciperandi fili spes esset ostentata, omnis suos propinquos filique sui necessarios convocavit et ab eis flens petivit ut negotium susciperent, adulescentem investigarent, sibi restituerent eum filium quem tamen unum ex multis fortuna reliquum esse voluisset. haec cum agere instituisset, oppressa morbo est. itaque testamentum fecit eius modi ut illi filio HS cccc milia legaret, heredem institueret eundem illum Oppianicum, nepotem suum; atque eis diebus paucis est mortua. propinqui tamen illi, quem ad modum viva Dinaea instituerant, ita mortua illa ad investigandum M. Marcum Aurium cum eodem illo indice in agrum Gallicum profecti sunt.

Meanwhile Oppianicus, as he was — as you will find from many things — of singular crime and audacity, through a certain Gallicanus, his familiar, first corrupted that informer with money. Then he saw to the taking off and killing of Marcus Aurius himself, with no great loss made. But those who had set out to track down and recover the kinsman send letters to Larinum to the Aurii, the kinsmen of that young man and his connections: that the method of tracking him down was hard for them, because they understood that the informer had been corrupted by Oppianicus. Which letters Aulus Aurius, a brave and resourceful man, noble at home and the very near kinsman of that Marcus Aurius, openly in the forum, with many hearing, with Oppianicus present, reads out; and with the clearest voice testifies that he will lodge the name of Oppianicus, if he should learn that Marcus Aurius had been killed.

interim Oppianicus ut erat, sicuti multis ex rebus reperietis, singulari scelere et audacia, per quendam Gallicanum, familiarem suum, primum illum indicem pecunia corrupit, deinde ipsum M. Aurium non magna iactura facta tollendum interficiendumque curavit. illi autem qui erant ad propinquum investigandum et reciperandum profecti litteras Larinum ad Aurios, illius adulescentis suosque necessarios, mittunt sibi difficilem esse investigandi rationem, quod intellegerent indicem ab Oppianico esse corruptum. quas litteras A. Aulus Aurius, vir fortis et experiens et domi nobilis et M. illius Auri perpropinquus, in foro palam multis audientibus, cum adesset Oppianicus, recitat et clarissima voce se nomen Oppianici, si interfectum M. Marcum Aurium esse comperisset, delaturum esse testatur.

Meanwhile in a short time those who had set out to the Gallic field return to Larinum. They announce that Marcus Aurius has been killed. The minds not only of the kinsmen but even of all the Larinates are moved, by hatred of Oppianicus and by pity of that young man. And so when Aulus Aurius, who before had given notice, had begun to pursue the man with cries and threats, he fled from Larinum and betook himself to the camp of the most distinguished man, Quintus Metellus.

interim brevi tempore illi qui erant in agrum Gallicum profecti Larinum revertuntur; interfectum esse M. Marcum Aurium nuntiant. animi non solum propinquorum sed etiam omnium Larinatium odio Oppianici et illius adulescentis misericordia commoventur. itaque cum A. Aulus Aurius is qui antea denuntiarat clamore hominem ac minis insequi coepisset, Larino profugit et se in castra clarissimi viri, Q. Quinti Metelli, contulit.

But after that flight, the witness of crime and conscience, he never dared to commit himself to trials, never to laws, never unarmed to his enemies. But through that force and victory of Lucius Sulla, with armed men he flew up to Larinum in the highest fear of all. He took away the four-men whom the townsmen had made; he said that he had been made by Sulla, and three others besides, and that by the same it had been ordered him that Aulus Aurius (who had shown to him the lodging of his name and the peril of his life), and the second Aulus Aurius and his son Lucius, and Sextus Vibius (whom he was said to have used as go-between in corrupting that informer) should be proscribed and killed. So with these most cruelly killed, the rest were terrified by no middling fear of proscription and death from him. With these things made plain in the case and trial, who is there who could think that he could have been acquitted? And these are small things; learn the rest, that you may wonder that Oppianicus was not at any time condemned, but was unhurt for some time.

post illam autem fugam sceleris et conscientiae testem numquam se iudiciis, numquam legibus, numquam inermem inimicis committere ausus est sed per illam L. Lucii Sullae vim atque victoriam Larinum in summo timore omnium cum armatis advolavit; quattuorviros quos municipes fecerant sustulit; se a Sulla et alios praeterea tris factos esse dixit et ab eodem sibi esse imperatum ut A. Aurium illum qui sibi delationem nominis et capitis periculum ostentarat, et alterum A. Aurium et eius L. filium et Sex. Vibium quo sequestre in illo indice corrumpendo dicebatur esse usus, proscribendos interficiendosque curaret. itaque illis crudelissime interfectis non mediocri ab eo ceteri proscriptionis et mortis metu terrebantur. his rebus in causa iudicioque patefactis quis est qui illum absolvi potuisse arbitretur? atque haec parva sunt; cognoscite reliqua ut non aliquando condemnatum esse Oppianicum sed aliquam diu incolumem fuisse miremini.

First see the audacity of the man. He longed to take Sassia in marriage, the mother of Habitus — her, whose husband, Aulus Aurius, he had killed. Whether is he the more shameless who asked it, or she the more cruel, if she should marry, is hard to say. But yet learn the humanity and constancy of each.

primum videte hominis audaciam. Sassiam in matrimonium ducere, habiti matrem — illam cuius virum A. Aurium occiderat — concupivit. Vtrum impudentior hic qui postulet, an crudelior illa, si nubat, difficile dictu est; sed tamen utriusque humanitatem constantiamque cognoscite.

Oppianicus asks that Sassia marry him, and contends greatly. But she does not wonder at his audacity, does not despise his shamelessness, finally does not dread that house of Oppianicus dripping with the blood of her husband. But because he had three sons, she answered that on this account she shrank from that marriage. Oppianicus, who had longed for Sassia’s money, thought a remedy must be sought at home for that delay which was being brought to the marriage. For when he had by Novia an infant son, but his other son (born by Papia at Teanum, which is eighteen miles from Larinum) was being brought up at his mother’s, he sent for the boy from Teanum suddenly without cause, which he had not been wont to do save on public games or festal days. The wretched mother, suspecting nothing of ill, sends him. He, when he had pretended that he was setting out for Tarentum, on that very day the boy — when at the eleventh hour he had been seen in public well — before night was dead, and the next day before it was light was burned.

petit Oppianicus ut sibi Sassia nubat et id magno opere contendit. illa autem non admiratur audaciam, non impudentiam aspernatur, non denique illam Oppianici domum viri sui sanguine redundantem reformidat, sed quod haberet ille tris filios, idcirco se ab eis nuptiis abhorrere respondit. Oppianicus, qui pecuniam Sassiae concupivisset, domo sibi quaerendum remedium existimavit ad eam moram quae nuptiis adferebatur. nam cum haberet ex Novia infantem filium, alter autem eius filius Papia natus Teani, quod abest ab Larino xviii milia passuum, apud matrem educaretur, arcessit subito sine causa puerum Teano, quod facere nisi ludis publicis aut festis diebus antea non solebat. mater misera nihil mali suspicans mittit. ille se Tarentum proficisci cum simulasset, eo ipso die puer, cum hora undecima in publico valens visus esset, ante noctem mortuus et postridie ante quam luceret combustus est.

And to the mother this great mourning was reported by the rumour of men sooner than by any one out of Oppianicus’s household. She, when she had heard at one time that not only her son but also the office of the funeral was snatched from her, came at once to Larinum unconscious, and there held the funeral over from the start, with her son already buried. Ten days had not yet passed when that other infant son is killed. So Sassia at once marries Oppianicus, with mind glad now and hope most well-confirmed; nor wonder, who saw herself softened not by wedding gifts but by the funerals of his sons. So, what others on account of children are wont to be more eager for money, he reckoned it pleasant to lose his children on account of money.

atque hunc tantum maerorem matri prius hominum rumor quam quisquam ex Oppianici familia nuntiavit. illa cum uno tempore audisset sibi non solum filium sed etiam exsequiarum munus ereptum, Larinum confestim exanimata venit et ibi de integro funus iam sepulto filio fecit. dies nondum decem intercesserant cum ille alter filius infans necatur. itaque nubit Oppianico continuo Sassia laetanti iam animo et spe optime confirmato, nec mirum quae se non nuptialibus donis sed filiorum funeribus esse delenitam videret. ita, quod ceteri propter liberos pecuniae cupidiores solent esse, ille propter pecuniam liberos amittere iucundum esse duxit.

I see, gentlemen, that, by your humanity, with these so great crimes briefly shown by me, you are vehemently moved. With what spirit then do you suppose those men were, who about these matters not only had to hear but also to judge? You hear about him over whom you are not judges, about him whom you do not see, about him whom you can no longer hate, about him who has satisfied both nature and the laws — whom the laws have punished with exile, nature with death. You hear not from an enemy, you hear without witnesses, you hear when those things which can be most copiously said are spoken briefly and in passing. Those men were hearing about him over whom they were sworn to give their votes, about him whose unspeakable and crime-laden face, present, they were looking at, about him whom all hated on account of his audacity, about him whom they reckoned worthy of every punishment. They were hearing from prosecutors; they were hearing the words of many witnesses; they were hearing about each thing while it was being spoken gravely and at length by Publius Cannutius, a most eloquent man.

Sentio, iudices, vos pro vestra humanitate his tantis sceleribus breviter a me demonstratis vehementer esse commotos. quo tandem igitur animo fuisse illos arbitramini quibus his de rebus non modo audiendum fuit verum etiam iudicandum? vos auditis de eo in quem iudices non estis, de eo quem non videtis, de eo quem odisse iam non potestis, de eo qui et naturae et legibus satis fecit, quem leges exsilio, natura morte multavit, auditis non ab inimico, auditis sine testibus, auditis cum ea quae copiosissime dici possunt breviter strictimque dicuntur. illi audiebant de eo de quo iurati sententias ferre debebant, de eo cuius praesentis nefarium et consceleratum voltum intuebantur, de eo quem omnes oderant propter audaciam, de eo quem omni supplicio dignum esse ducebant; audiebant ab accusatoribus, audiebant verba multorum testium, audiebant cum una quaque de re a P. Publio Cannutio, homine eloquentissimo, graviter et diu diceretur.

And is there anyone who, when he has learned these things, can suspect that Oppianicus was crushed in trial and circumvented as innocent? In a heap, gentlemen, I shall now set out the rest, that I may come to those things which are nearer to this case and more closely joined. Hold, please, in memory that this is not set forth by me — that I should accuse the dead Oppianicus — but, since I wish to persuade you that the trial was not corrupted by him, that I should use this as the start and foundation of the defence: that Oppianicus, a most criminal and most guilty man, was condemned. Who when he himself had given the cup to his wife Cluentia, the aunt of this Habitus, suddenly she in the middle of the drinking cried out that she was dying with the greatest pain, nor did she live longer than she spoke. For in that very speech and shout she died. And to this sudden death and the voice of the dying, all besides which are wont to be the signs and traces of poison were on the body of the dead woman. And by the same poison he killed his brother Gaius Oppianicus.

et est quisquam qui, cum haec cognoverit, suspicari possit Oppianicum iudicio oppressum et circumventum esse innocentem? acervatim reliqua iam, iudices, dicam ut ad ea quae propiora huiusce causae et adiunctiora sunt perveniam. vos, quaeso, memoria teneatis non mihi hoc esse propositum ut accusem Oppianicum mortuum sed, cum hoc persuadere vobis velim, iudicium ab hoc non esse corruptum, hoc uti initio ac fundamento defensionis, Oppianicum, hominem sceleratissimum et nocentissimum, esse damnatum. qui uxori suae Cluentiae, quae amita huius habiti fuit, cum ipse poculum dedisset, subito illa in media potione exclamavit se maximo cum dolore emori nec diutius vixit quam locuta est; nam in ipso sermone hoc et vociferatione mortua est. et ad hanc mortem repentinam vocemque morientis omnia praeterea quae solent esse indicia et vestigia veneni in illius mortuae corpore fuerunt. eodemque veneno C. Gaium Oppianicum fratrem necavit.

Nor is this enough. Although in the very fratricide no crime seems to be passed over, yet, that he might come to this unspeakable deed, he prepared his approach by other crimes before. For when his brother’s wife Auria was pregnant, and the birth was now thought to be near, he killed the woman with poison, that at the same time what had been conceived from his brother might be killed. After he attacked his brother, who, late, with that cup of death now drained, when he was crying out about his own and his wife’s destruction and longed to change his will, in the very signifying of this will died. So he killed the woman, lest by her birth he should be shut out from his brother’s inheritance. But his brother’s children he deprived of life before they could receive this light from nature — that all might understand that nothing could be closed, nothing sacred, against him from whose audacity the children of his brother not even the guarding of the mother’s body could keep safe.

neque est hoc satis; tametsi in ipso fraterno parricidio nullum scelus praetermissum videtur, tamen ut ad hoc nefarium facinus accederet aditum sibi aliis sceleribus ante munivit. nam cum esset gravida Auria, fratris uxor, et iam appropinquare partus putaretur, mulierem veneno interfecit ut una illud quod erat ex fratre conceptum necaretur. post fratrem adgressus est; qui sero iam exhausto illo poculo mortis, cum et de suo et de uxoris interitu clamaret testamentumque mutare cuperet, in ipsa significatione huius voluntatis est mortuus. ita mulierem ne partu eius ab hereditate fraterna excluderetur necavit; fratris autem liberos prius vita privavit quam illi hanc a natura lucem accipere potuerunt; ut omnes intellegerent nihil ei clausum, nihil sanctum esse posse a cuius audacia fratris liberos ne materni quidem corporis custodiae tegere potuissent.

I hold in memory a Milesian woman, when I was in Asia, who, because she had taken money from the second heirs and procured an abortion for herself by drugs, was condemned of a capital matter; nor unjustly, who had taken away the hope of a parent, the memory of a name, the help of a line, the heir of a household, a destined citizen of the commonwealth. By how much is Oppianicus, in the same wrong, worthy of greater punishment! If indeed she, when she had brought force on her own body, tortured herself; but he brought about the same through another’s body’s death and torture. Others do not seem able to undertake many parricides in single men; Oppianicus has been found to kill more in one body.

memoria teneo Milesiam quandam mulierem, cum essem in Asia, quod ab heredibus secundis accepta pecunia partum sibi ipsa medicamentis abegisset, rei capitalis esse damnatam; nec iniuria quae spem parentis, memoriam nominis, subsidium generis, heredem familiae, designatum rei publicae civem sustulisset. quanto est Oppianicus in eadem iniuria maiore supplicio dignus! si quidem illa, cum suo corpori vim attulisset, se ipsa cruciavit, hic autem idem illud effecit per alieni corporis mortem atque cruciatum. ceteri non videntur in singulis hominibus multa parricidia suscipere posse, Oppianicus inventus est qui in uno corpore pluris necaret.

So when his uncle had learned this custom and audacity of his — the uncle of that young man Oppianicus, Gnaeus Magius — and he, when he was afflicted with a grave disease and was making that man, his sister’s son, his heir, with friends called in and his mother Dinaea present, asked his wife if she was pregnant. When she answered that she was, he asked of her that, when he was dead, at Dinaea’s house — who was then her mother-in-law — until she should give birth, she should live, and bring diligence that what she had conceived she might be able to keep and to bring forth safe. So he bequeathed her by will a great sum of money from his son if any should be born; from the second heir nothing he bequeathed. What he suspected of Oppianicus you see;

itaque cum hanc eius consuetudinem audaciamque cognosset avunculus illius adulescentis Oppianici, Cn. Gnaeus Magius, isque, cum gravi morbo adfectus esset, heredem illum sororis suae filium faceret, amicis adhibitis praesente matre sua Dinaea uxorem suam interrogavit essetne praegnas. quae cum se esse respondisset, ab ea petivit ut se mortuo apud Dinaeam — quae tum ei mulieri socrus erat — quoad pareret habitaret diligentiamque adhiberet ut id quod conceperat servare et salvum parere posset. itaque ei testamento legat grandem pecuniam a filio si qui natus esset; ab secundo herede nil legat. quid de Oppianico suspicatus sit videtis;

what he judged is not obscure. For whose son he made his heir, him he did not name as guardian for his children. What Oppianicus did, learn, that you may understand that Magius did not look far ahead in mind as he was dying. The money which had been bequeathed to the woman from her son if any should be born, that, ready, Oppianicus paid the woman not owed — if this is to be called payment of a legacy and not the wage of an abortion. By which price taken and by many gifts besides (which then were being read out from Oppianicus’s tablets), the hope which she had in her belly entrusted by her husband, conquered by greed, she sold to the crime of Oppianicus. Nothing now seems able to be added to this wickedness;

quid iudicarit obscurum non est. nam cuius filium faceret heredem, eum tutorem liberis non adscripsit. quid Oppianicus fecerit cognoscite ut illum Magium intellegatis non longe animo prospexisse morientem. quae pecunia mulieri legata erat a filio, si qui natus esset, eam praesentem Oppianicus non debitam mulieri solvit, si haec solutio legatorum et non merces abortionis appellanda est. quo illa pretio accepto multisque praeterea muneribus quae tum ex tabulis Oppianici recitabantur spem illam quam in alvo commendatam a viro continebat victa avaritia sceleri Oppianici vendidit. nihil posse iam ad hanc improbitatem addi videtur;

mark the outcome. The woman who, by her husband’s adjuration, in those ten months ought not to know any house save her mother-in-law’s, in the fifth month after her husband’s death married Oppianicus himself. Which marriage was not long-lasting; for they had been joined not by the dignity of marriage but by the partnership of crime.

attendite exitum. quae mulier obtestatione viri decem illis mensibus ne domum quidem ullam nisi socrus suae nosse debuit, haec quinto mense post viri mortem ipsi Oppianico nupsit. quae nuptiae non diuturnae fuerunt; erant enim non matrimoni dignitate sed sceleris societate coniunctae.

What? That slaughter of Asuvius of Larinum, a wealthy young man — how famous it was then, the matter recent; how celebrated by the talk of all! There was a certain Avillius of Larinum, of ruined wickedness and the highest want, endowed with a kind of art fitted to rousing the lusts of young men. Who, when he had plunged himself by flatteries and assents deeply into Asuvius’s company, Oppianicus at once began to hope that, by Avillius as if by some engine moved up, he could capture Asuvius’s youth and storm his ancestral fortunes. The plan was thought up at Larinum; the matter was carried to Rome. For they reckoned it could be more easily entered upon in solitude, and more conveniently finished in a crowd. Asuvius set out with Avillius for Rome. Oppianicus followed them on their tracks. How they lived at Rome, in what banquets, in what disgraces, with how great and how lavish expenses — with not only Oppianicus aware but a fellow-banqueter and helper — it is long for me to say, especially as I hasten to other things. Learn the outcome of this feigned familiarity.

quid? illa caedes Asuvi Larinatis, adulescentis pecuniosi, quam clara tum recenti re fuit et quam omnium sermone celebrata! fuit Avillius quidam Larino perdita nequitia et summa egestate, arte quadam praeditus ad libidines adulescentulorum excitandas accommodata. qui ut se blanditiis et adsentationibus in Asuvi consuetudinem penitus immersit, Oppianicus continuo sperare coepit hoc se Avillio tamquam aliqua machina admota capere Asuvi adulescentiam et fortunas eius patrias expugnare posse. ratio excogitata Larini est, res translata Romam; inire enim consilium facilius in solitudine, perficere rem eius modi commodius in turba posse arbitrati sunt. Asuvius cum Avillio Romam est profectus. hos vestigiis Oppianicus consecutus est. iam ut Romae vixerint, quibus conviviis, quibus flagitiis, quantis et quam profusis sumptibus non modo conscio sed etiam conviva et adiutore Oppianico longum est dicere mihi, praesertim ad alia properanti; exitum huius adsimulatae familiaritatis cognoscite.

When the young man was at the house of a certain little woman, and where he had spent the night was tarrying for the next day — Avillius, as had been arranged, pretends to be sick and to wish to make his will. Oppianicus brings to him sealers who knew neither Asuvius nor Avillius, and calls that man Asuvius himself; with the will sealed in Asuvius’s name they depart. Avillius at once recovers; but Asuvius in that short time, as if he were going to a little garden, was led out to certain sand-pits beyond the Esquiline gate and killed.

cum esset adulescens apud mulierculam quandam atque ubi pernoctarat ibi diem posterum commoraretur, Avillius, ut erat constitutum, simulat se aegrotare et testamentum facere velle. Oppianicus obsignatores ad eum qui neque Asuvium neque Avillium nossent adducit et illum Asuvium appellat ipse; testamento Asuvi nomine obsignato disceditur. Avillius ilico convalescit; Asuvius autem brevi illo tempore, quasi in hortulos iret, in harenarias quasdam extra portam Esquilinam perductus occiditur.

When he was already missed for one and a second day and was not being found in those places where by custom he was being looked for, and Oppianicus in the forum of the Larinates was repeatedly saying that lately he and his friends had sealed his will, the freedmen of Asuvius and not a few friends, because it was agreed that Avillius had been with him on the day on which Asuvius had last been seen, and had been seen by many, attack the man and set him before the feet of Quintus Manlius, who was then triumvir. And there at once, with no witness, no informer, terrified by the consciousness of the recent evil deed, he sets out everything (as it was said by me a little before) and confesses that Asuvius had been killed by him at the counsel of Oppianicus. Oppianicus is dragged out from the house where he was hiding by Manlius;

qui cum unum iam et alterum diem desideraretur neque in eis locis ubi ex consuetudine quaerebatur inveniretur, et Oppianicus in foro Larinatium dictitaret nuper se et suos amicos testamentum eius obsignasse, liberti Asuvi et non nulli amici, quod eo die quo postremum Asuvius visus erat Avillium cum eo fuisse et a multis visum esse constabat, in eum invadunt et hominem ante pedes Q. Manli qui tum erat triumvir constituunt. atque illic continuo nullo teste, nullo indice recentis malefici conscientia perterritus omnia, ut a me paulo ante dicta sunt, exponit Asuviumque a sese consilio Oppianici interfectum fatetur. extrahitur domo latitans Oppianicus a Manlio;

the informer Avillius is held openly on the other side. What now do you ask of the rest? Most of you knew Manlius. He had never thought of honour from boyhood, of the pursuits of virtue, of any fruit of good standing; but, from a petulant and dishonest buffoon, in the discords of the state had now come by the votes of the people to that column at which by the abuse of many he had often been carried. So then he settles with Oppianicus, takes money from him, leaves the case — both undertaken and so plain. And then in Oppianicus’s case this Asuvian charge was confirmed both by many witnesses and indeed by his very will, in which it was agreed that Oppianicus’s name was first — the man whom you say was wretched and innocent, circumvented by a false trial.

index Avillius ex altera parte coram tenetur. hic quid iam reliqua quaeritis? Manlium plerique noratis; non ille honorem a pueritia, non studia virtutis, non ullum existimationis bonae fructum umquam cogitarat, sed ex petulanti atque improbo scurra in discordiis civitatis ad eam columnam ad quam multorum saepe conviciis perductus erat tum suffragiis populi pervenerat. itaque tum cum Oppianico transigit, pecuniam ab eo accipit, causam et susceptam et tam manifestam relinquit. ac tum in Oppianici causa crimen hoc Asuvianum cum testibus multis tum vero illius testamento comprobabatur; in quo Oppianici nomen primum esse constabat, eius quem vos miserum atque innocentem falso iudicio circumventum esse dicitis.

What? Your grandmother, Oppianicus, Dinaea, of whom you are heir — did your father not manifestly kill? To whom, when he had brought that famous doctor of his, now well known and often victorious, through whom he had killed very many, the woman cries out that she does not at all wish to be cured by him by whose curing she had lost all her own. Then he suddenly attacks a certain Anconitan man, Lucius Clodius, a circuit pharmacist, who by chance had then come to Larinum, and settles with him at 2,000 sesterces (which is shown from his very tablets). Lucius Clodius, since he was hurrying, who had many circuits remaining, as soon as he was brought in, finished the matter; with the first dose he took the woman off and afterwards stayed not a moment of time at Larinum. The same Dinaea making her will,

quid? aviam tuam, Oppianice, Dinaeam cui tu es heres pater tuus non manifesto necavit? ad quam cum adduxisset medicum illum suum iam cognitum et saepe victorem per quem interfecerat plurimos mulier exclamat se ab eo nullo modo velle curari quo curante omnis suos perdidisset. tum repente Anconitanum quendam, L. Lucium Clodium, pharmacopolam circumforaneum qui casu tum Larinum venisset adgreditur et cum eo HS duobus milibus, id quod ipsius tabulis est demonstratum, transigit. L. Lucius Clodius, cum properaret, cui fora multa restarent, simul atque introductus est rem confecit; prima potione mulierem sustulit neque postea Larini punctum est temporis commoratus. eadem hac Dinaea testamentum faciente,

when Oppianicus, who had been her son-in-law, had taken the tablets, with his finger he wiped out the legacies; and, when he had done this in many places, after her death, lest he be convicted by the erasures, he had the will copied onto other tablets and sealed it with adulterated seals. Many things I pass over on purpose; for I fear that these very things may seem too many. Yet you ought to reckon that he was like himself in the rest of the parts of his life. The decurions all judged that he had corrupted the public records of Larinum, the censorial ones. With him no one now had business, no one transacted any matter; no one out of so many kinsmen and connections ever wrote him as guardian for his children; no one judged him worthy of approach, no one of meeting, no one of speech, no one of banquet. All shrank away, all turned aside, all fled him as if some monstrous and ruinous beast and pestilence.

cum tabulas prehendisset Oppianicus, qui gener eius fuisset, digito legata delevit et, cum id multis locis fecisset, post mortem eius ne lituris coargui posset testamentum in alias tabulas transcriptum signis adulterinis obsignavit. multa praetereo consulto; etenim vereor ne haec ipsa nimium multa esse videantur. vos tamen similem sui eum fuisse in ceteris quoque vitae partibus existimare debetis. illum tabulas publicas Larini censorias corrupisse decuriones universi iudicaverunt; cum illo nemo iam rationem, nemo rem ullam contrahebat; nemo illum ex tam multis cognatis et adfinibus tutorem umquam liberis suis scripsit, nemo illum aditu, nemo congressione, nemo sermone, nemo convivio dignum iudicabat; omnes aspernabantur, omnes abhorrebant, omnes ut aliquam immanem ac perniciosam bestiam pestemque fugiebant.

Yet this man so audacious, so unspeakable, so guilty Habitus would never have prosecuted, gentlemen, if he could have passed it over with his life safe. Oppianicus was an enemy to him, was so. But yet he was his stepfather. Cruel and hostile to him was his mother, but his mother. Finally nothing was so far from accusation as Cluentius, both by nature and by will and by the ordered reasoning of his life. But when this condition was set before him — that either he should justly and dutifully accuse, or bitterly and unworthily die — he preferred to accuse in whatever way he could, than to die in that manner.

hunc tamen hominem tam audacem, tam nefarium, tam nocentem numquam accusasset habitus, iudices, si id praetermittere suo salvo capite potuisset. erat huic inimicus Oppianicus, erat, sed tamen erat vitricus; crudelis et huic infesta mater, at mater; postremo nihil tam remotum ab accusatione quam Cluentius et natura et voluntate et instituta ratione vitae. sed cum esset haec ei proposita condicio ut aut iuste pieque accusaret aut acerbe indigneque moreretur, accusare quoquo modo posset quam illo modo emori maluit.

And that you may see this is so, I shall set out for you Oppianicus’s deed manifestly learned and caught — from which at the same time you will understand that both for him to accuse and for him to be condemned was necessary. There were certain Martiales at Larinum, public ministers of Mars, consecrated to that god by the old institutions and religious sanctities of the Larinates. Of whom, since there was a great enough number, and likewise (as in Sicily there are very many Venusians) so they at Larinum were reckoned in Mars’s household, suddenly Oppianicus began to defend that they were all free and Roman citizens. Heavily the decurions of Larinum and all the townsmen took it. So they asked Habitus that he should take up that case and defend it publicly. Habitus, although he had removed himself from every business of that kind, yet for the sake of his place, for the antiquity of his line, for that — because he reckoned himself born not for his own advantages but also for those of his townsmen and other connections — did not wish to fail the will of all the Larinates so great.

atque ut hoc ita esse perspicere possitis exponam vobis Oppianici facinus manifesto compertum atque deprensum; ex quo simul utrumque, et huic accusare et illi condemnari, necesse fuisse intellegetis. Martiales quidam Larini appellabantur, ministri publici Martis atque ei deo veteribus institutis religionibusque Larinatium consecrati. quorum cum satis magnus numerus esset, cumque item ut in Sicilia permulti Venerii sunt, sic illi Larini in Martis familia numerarentur, repente Oppianicus eos omnis liberos esse civisque Romanos coepit defendere. graviter id decuriones Larinatium cunctique municipes tulerunt. itaque ab habito petiverunt ut eam causam susciperet publiceque defenderet. habitus cum se ab omni eius modi negotio removisset, tamen pro loco, pro antiquitate generis sui, pro eo quod se non suis commodis sed etiam suorum municipum ceterorumque necessariorum natum esse arbitrabatur, tantae voluntati universorum Larinatium deesse noluit.

With the case undertaken and brought to Rome, daily great contentions between Habitus and Oppianicus were stirred up out of the zeal of each for the defence. Oppianicus himself was of monstrous and bitter nature; his frenzy was kindled by the mother of Habitus, hostile and inimical to her son. The Magni, however, thought it of their interest that he should be moved away from the Martiales’ case. There lay underneath also another greater cause which moved most the mind of Oppianicus, a most greedy and most audacious man.

suscepta causa Romamque delata magnae cotidie contentiones inter habitum et Oppianicum ex utriusque studio defensionis excitabantur. erat ipse immani acerbaque natura Oppianicus; incendebat eius amentiam infesta atque inimica filio mater habiti. Magni autem illi sua interesse arbitrabantur hunc a causa Martialium demoveri. suberat etiam alia causa maior quae Oppianici, hominis avarissimi atque audacissimi, mentem maxime commovebat.

For Habitus up to the time of that trial had never made any will. For he could not bring it into his mind to leave anything of that sort to his mother, nor by will to pass over altogether the name of his parent. When Oppianicus knew this — for it was not obscure — he understood that, with Habitus dead, all his goods would come to his mother; who, with money increased by him, with greater gain, deprived of her son, with less peril could be killed. So, set on fire by these things, by what reasoning he tried to take away Habitus by poison, learn.

nam habitus usque ad illius iudici tempus nullum testamentum umquam fecerat; neque enim legare quicquam eius modi matri poterat in animum inducere neque testamento nomen omnino praetermittere parentis. id cum Oppianicus sciret — neque enim erat obscurum — intellegebat habito mortuo bona eius omnia ad matrem esse ventura; quae ab sese postea aucta pecunia maiore praemio, orbata filio minore periculo necaretur. itaque his rebus incensus qua ratione habitum veneno tollere conatus sit cognoscite.

Gaius and Lucius Fabricius were twin brothers, of the town of Aletrium, men like one another both in form and in morals, but most unlike their townsmen — of whom what splendour, how almost equal, how almost in all constant and moderate the reasoning of life is, none of you (in my opinion) is ignorant. With these Fabricii Oppianicus had always most familiarly used. Now you almost all know how great force the likeness of pursuits and nature has for joining friendships. When they so lived as to think no gain shameful, when from them every fraud, all snares and circumventions of young men were born, and they were known to all by vices and dishonesty — zealously, as I said, Oppianicus had attached himself to their familiarity many years before. So then he resolved through Gaius

C. et L. Lucii Fabricii fratres gemini fuerunt ex municipio Aletrinati, homines inter se cum forma tum moribus similes, municipum autem suorum dissimillimi; in quibus quantus splendor sit, quam prope aequabilis, quam fere omnium constans et moderata ratio vitae nemo vestrum, ut mea fert opinio, ignorat. his Fabriciis semper est usus Oppianicus familiarissime. iam hoc fere scitis omnes quantam vim habeat ad coniungendas amicitias studiorum ac naturae similitudo. cum illi ita viverent ut nullum quaestum esse turpem arbitrarentur, cum omnis ab eis fraus, omnes insidiae circumscriptionesque adulescentium nascerentur, cumque essent vitiis atque improbitate omnibus noti, studiose, ut dixi, ad eorum se familiaritatem multis iam ante annis Oppianicus applicarat. itaque tum sic statuit, per C.

Fabricius (for Lucius had died) to prepare snares for Habitus. At that time Habitus was of weak health. He was using a not ignoble but a respected man as doctor, Cleophantus, whose slave Diogenes Fabricius began to solicit by hope and price for giving poison to Habitus. The slave, not uncunning and (as the matter itself made plain) thrifty and upright, did not despise Fabricius’s speech; he took the matter to his master. Cleophantus then conferred with Habitus. Habitus at once shared it with Marcus Baebius, a senator, his most familiar friend; of whom, of what faith, of what prudence, of what diligence he was, I think you remember. It pleased him that Habitus should buy Diogenes from Cleophantus, that the matter could the more easily either be caught by his information or shown to be false. To be brief: Diogenes is bought; in a few days the poison is procured. Many good men, when they had come up secretly, the money sealed which was being given for that thing was caught in the hands of Scamander, freedman of the Fabricii.

Fabricium — nam L. erat mortuus — insidias habito comparare. erat illo tempore infirma valetudine habitus. Vtebatur autem medico non ignobili sed spectato homine, Cleophanto; cuius servum Diogenem Fabricius ad venenum habito dandum spe et pretio sollicitare coepit. servus non incallidus et, ut res ipsa declaravit, frugi atque integer sermonem Fabrici non est aspernatus; rem ad dominum detulit; Cleophantus autem cum habito est conlocutus. habitus statim cum M. Marco Baebio senatore, familiarissimo suo, communicavit; qui qua fide, qua prudentia, qua diligentia fuerit meminisse vos arbitror. ei placuit ut Diogenem habitus emeret a Cleophanto, quo facilius aut comprehenderetur res eius indicio aut falsa esse cognosceretur. ne multa, Diogenes emitur, venenum diebus paucis comparatur; multi viri boni cum ex occulto intervenissent, pecunia obsignata quae ob eam rem dabatur in manibus Scamandri, liberti Fabriciorum, deprehenditur.

By the immortal gods! Will anyone, with these things known, say that Oppianicus was circumvented? Who was ever brought into court more audacious, who more guilty, who more open? What talent, what ability of speaking, what defence devised by anyone could withstand this one charge? At the same time, who is there who could doubt that, with this thing learned and manifestly caught, either death had to be met by Cluentius or accusation undertaken?

pro di immortales! Oppianicum quisquam his rebus cognitis circumventum esse dicet? quis umquam audacior, quis nocentior, quis apertior in iudicium adductus est? quod ingenium, quae facultas dicendi, quae a quoquam excogitata defensio huic uni crimini potuit obsistere? simul et illud quis est qui dubitet quin hac re comperta manifestoque deprehensa aut obeunda mors Cluentio aut suscipienda accusatio fuerit?

I think it is shown enough, gentlemen, that Oppianicus was accused on such charges that he could in no honourable manner be acquitted. Learn now that the defendant was so summoned that, with the matter once and again prejudged, he came into court already condemned. For Cluentius, gentlemen, first lodged the name of him in whose hands he had caught the poison. He was the freedman of the Fabricii, Scamander. The council was untouched, no suspicion of corrupted trial; the case in court was simple, the matter sure, one charge brought. Then Gaius Fabricius (he of whom I spoke before), who, when the freedman had been condemned, saw that the same peril was hanging over himself, who knew that I had a neighbourly bond with the Aletrines and great use with most of them, brought them in numbers to me at home. Who, although they thought of the man as it was necessary, yet, because he was of the same town, reckoned it was of their dignity to defend him in what ways they could; and they asked of me that I should do this and undertake Scamander’s case — in which case the whole peril of the patron was contained.

satis esse arbitror demonstratum, iudices, eis criminibus accusatum esse Oppianicum uti honeste absolvi nullo modo potuerit. cognoscite nunc ita reum citatum esse illum ut re semel atque iterum praeiudicata condemnatus in iudicium venerit. nam Cluentius, iudices, primum nomen eius detulit cuius in manibus venenum deprenderat. is erat libertus Fabriciorum, Scamander. integrum consilium, iudici corrupti nulla suspicio; simplex in iudicium causa, certa res, unum crimen adlatum est. hic tum C. Gaius Fabricius, is de quo ante dixi, qui liberto damnato sibi illud impendere periculum videret, quod mihi cum Aletrinatibus vicinitatem et cum plerisque eorum magnum usum esse sciebat, frequentis eos ad me domum adduxit. qui quamquam de homine sic ut necesse erat existimabant, tamen quod erat ex eodem municipio, suae dignitatis esse arbitrabantur eum quibus rebus possent defendere, idque a me ut facerem et ut causam Scamandri susciperem petebant, in qua causa patroni omne periculum continebatur.

I, who could neither refuse anything to such men so loving me, nor reckoned that charge so great and so manifest — as not even those very men did who were then commending the case to me — promised them that I would do all that they wished. The matter began to be conducted; Scamander was summoned as defendant. The accuser was Publius Cannutius, a most ingenious man and practised in speaking. He accused Scamander indeed in three words: that the poison had been caught. All the weapons of the whole prosecution were thrown at Oppianicus. The cause of the snares was opened; the familiarity of the Fabricii was recalled; the man’s life and audacity were brought forth; finally the whole prosecution, handled variously and gravely, was at the end concluded by the manifest catching of the poison. Here I then rose to answer — with what care, immortal gods!

ego, qui neque illis talibus viris ac tam amantibus mei rem possem ullam negare neque illud crimen tantum ac tam manifestum esse arbitrarer, sicut ne illi ipsi quidem qui mihi tum illam causam commendabant arbitrabantur, pollicitus eis sum me omnia quae vellent esse facturum. res agi coepta est; citatus est Scamander reus. accusabat P. Publius Cannutius, homo in primis ingeniosus et in dicendo exercitatus; accusabat autem ille quidem Scamandrum verbis tribus, venenum esse deprensum. omnia tela totius accusationis in Oppianicum coniciebantur, aperiebatur causa insidiarum, Fabriciorum familiaritas commemorabatur, hominis vita et audacia proferebatur, denique omnis accusatio varie graviterque tractata ad extremum manifesta veneni deprehensione conclusa est. hic ego tum ad respondendum surrexi qua cura, di immortales!

With what trouble of mind, with what fear! For my part, I always begin to speak with great fear; as often as I speak, so often do I seem to come to a trial not only of talent but also of virtue and duty, lest I should seem either to profess what I cannot (which is shamelessness), or not to bring about what I can (which is either treachery or carelessness). Then indeed I was so disturbed that I feared all things: if I should say nothing, lest I be reckoned the most childish; if I should say much in such a case, lest I be reckoned the most shameless. I gathered myself at length and so resolved: that I must act bravely. To that age which I then was it was wont to be reckoned to my praise, even if in less firm cases I had not failed men’s perils. So I did. So I fought, so by every method I contended, so to all things I fled, as far as I was able, the remedies and refuges of cases, that I might attain — this I shall say timidly — that no one should think a patron had been wanting to that case.

qua sollicitudine animi, quo timore! semper equidem magno cum metu incipio dicere; quotienscumque dico, totiens mihi videor in iudicium venire non ingeni solum sed etiam virtutis atque offici, ne aut id profiteri videar quod non possim, quod est impudentiae, aut non id efficere quod possim, quod est aut perfidiae aut neglegentiae. tum vero ita sum perturbatus ut omnia timerem, si nihil dixissem ne infantissimus, si multa in eius modi causa dixissem ne impudentissimus existimarer. conlegi me aliquando et ita constitui, fortiter esse agendum; illi aetati qua tum eram solere laudi dari, etiam si in minus firmis causis hominum periculis non defuissem. itaque feci; sic pugnavi, sic omni ratione contendi, sic ad omnia confugi, quantum ego adsequi potui, remedia ac perfugia causarum ut hoc quod timide dicam consecutus sim, ne quis illi causae patronum defuisse arbitraretur.

But whatever I had grasped, the prosecutor at once wrenched out of my hands. If I had asked what enmities Scamander had with Habitus, he confessed that there were none; but said that Oppianicus, whose minister he had been, was and is most hostile to him. But if I had managed this — that no profit was going to come to Scamander out of the death of Habitus — he granted; but he said that to the wife of Oppianicus, a man practised in killing wives, all the goods of Habitus would come. When I had used that defence which in the cases of freedmen has always been reckoned most honourable — that Scamander was approved by his patron — he confessed; but asked by whom the patron himself was approved.

sed ut quidquid ego apprehenderam, statim accusator extorquebat e manibus. si quaesiveram quae inimicitiae Scamandro cum habito, fatebatur nullas fuisse, sed Oppianicum cuius ille minister fuisset huic inimicissimum fuisse atque esse dicebat. sin autem illud egeram, nullum ad Scamandrum morte habiti venturum emolumentum fuisse, concedebat, sed ad uxorem Oppianici, hominis in uxoribus necandis exercitati, omnia bona habiti ventura fuisse dicebat. cum illa defensione usus essem quae in libertinorum causis honestissima semper existimata est, Scamandrum patrono esse probatum, fatebatur, sed quaerebat cui probatus esset ipse patronus.

When I had dwelt in this in many words — that snares had been laid for Scamander through Diogenes, and it had been arranged between them in another matter that Diogenes should bring a medicine, not poison; that this could happen to anyone — he asked why he had come into such a hidden place, why alone, why with sealed money. Finally in this place the case was pressed by witnesses, by most honourable men. Marcus Baebius said that Diogenes had been bought by his counsel, and that with him present Scamander had been caught with the poison and the money. Publius Quintilius Varus, a man endowed with the highest religious obligation and the highest authority, said that, of the snares which were being laid for Habitus and of the soliciting of Diogenes, Cleophantus had spoken with him, the matter recent.

cum ego pluribus verbis in eo commoratus essem, Scamandro insidias factas esse per Diogenem constitutumque inter eos alia de re fuisse ut medicamentum, non venenum Diogenes adferret; hoc cuivis usu venire posse: quaerebat cur in eius modi locum tam abditum, cur solus, cur cum obsignata pecunia venisset. denique hoc loco causa testibus honestissimis hominibus premebatur. M. Marcus Baebius de suo consilio Diogenem emptum, se praesente Scamandrum cum veneno pecuniaque deprehensum esse dicebat. P. Publius Quintilius Varus, homo summa religione et summa auctoritate praeditus, de insidiis quae fierent habito et de sollicitatione Diogenis recenti re secum Cleophantum locutum esse dicebat.

And in that trial, although we seemed to defend Scamander, in word he was the defendant, but in fact and in peril, by the whole prosecution, Oppianicus was. Nor was he bearing it obscurely, nor could he in any way pretend. He was present in numbers; he kept calling supporters; he fought with all zeal and favour. Finally — which was the greatest harm to that case — in this very place, as if he himself were the defendant, he sat. The eyes of all the judges were turned not on Scamander but on Oppianicus. His fear, his disturbance, his suspended and uncertain face, his frequent change of colour, which were before suspicious, made these things open and manifest.

atque in illo iudicio cum Scamandrum nos defendere videremur, verbo ille reus erat, re quidem vera et periculo tota accusatione Oppianicus. neque id obscure ferebat nec dissimulare ullo modo poterat; aderat frequens, advocabat, omni studio gratiaque pugnabat; postremo — id quod maximo malo illi causae fuit — hoc ipso in loco, quasi reus ipse esset, sedebat. oculi omnium iudicum non in Scamandrum sed in Oppianicum coniciebantur; timor eius, perturbatio, suspensus incertusque voltus, crebra coloris mutatio, quae erant antea suspiciosa, haec aperta et manifesta faciebant.

When it was right to go to the council, Gaius Junius the inquisitor asked of the defendant, by that Cornelian law which then was, whether he wished the vote on himself to be cast in secret or openly. By Oppianicus’s vote it was answered (since he was saying that Junius was a familiar of Habitus) that he wished it cast in secret. They went to council. By all the votes save one (which Staienus said was his) Scamander was condemned in the first hearing. Who then of all was there who, with Scamander condemned, did not reckon that judgement was made about Oppianicus? What is judged by that condemnation, save that it was poison which was being sought to be given to Habitus? What slighter suspicion was thrown on Scamander, or could be thrown, that he should be reckoned of his own will to have wished to kill Habitus?

cum in consilium iri oporteret, quaesivit ab reo C. Gaius Iunius quaesitor ex lege illa Cornelia quae tum erat clam an palam de se sententiam ferri vellet. de Oppianici sententia responsum est, quod is habiti familiarem Iunium esse dicebat, clam velle ferri. itum est in consilium. omnibus sententiis praeter unam quam suam Staienus esse dicebat Scamander prima actione condemnatus est. quis tum erat omnium qui Scamandro condemnato non iudicium de Oppianico factum esse arbitraretur? quid est illa damnatione iudicatum, nisi venenum id quod habito daretur esse quaesitum? quae porro tenuissima suspicio conlata in Scamandrum est aut conferri potuit ut is sua sponte necare voluisse habitum putaretur?

And with this trial then made, and Oppianicus by fact and standing now (by law and pronouncement not yet) condemned, yet Habitus did not at once make Oppianicus defendant. He wished to learn whether the judges were strict only against those whom they had found to have had the poison themselves, or even judged the counsels and consciousnesses of such crimes worthy of punishment. So Gaius Fabricius, whom he reckoned to have been an accomplice in that deed on account of his familiarity with Oppianicus, he at once made defendant; and he obtained that the first place be set up for him on account of the connection of the case. Then Fabricius not only did not bring to me his neighbours and friends the Aletrines, but himself could afterwards use them neither as defenders nor as praisers.

atque hoc tum iudicio facto et Oppianico re et existimatione iam, lege et pronuntiatione nondum condemnato tamen habitus Oppianicum reum statim non fecit. voluit cognoscere utrum iudices in eos solos essent severi quos venenum habuisse ipsos comperissent, an etiam consilia conscientiasque eius modi facinorum supplicio dignas iudicarent. itaque C. Gaium Fabricium quem propter familiaritatem Oppianici conscium illi facinori fuisse arbitrabatur reum statim fecit, utique ei locus primus constitueretur propter causae coniunctionem impetravit. hic tum Fabricius non modo ad me meos vicinos et amicos Aletrinatis non adduxit sed ipse eis neque defensoribus uti postea neque laudatoribus potuit.

For we thought it was the part of humanity to defend a matter (untouched) of a man not foreign, however suspicious; the part of shamelessness to try to shake what had been judged. So then he, by want and necessity compelled, in such a case fled to the brothers Caepasius, busy men and of such mind that whatever power of speaking was given they would set in honour and benefit. Now this is set up almost most unfairly: that, in diseases of the body, as each man is the most difficult, so the most noble and the best doctor is sought; in capital perils, as each cause is the most difficult, so the worst and most obscure patron is brought in. Unless perhaps this is the cause: that doctors must furnish nothing besides art, but speakers must furnish authority too.

rem enim integram hominis non alieni quamvis suspiciosam defendere humanitatis esse putabamus, iudicatam labefactare conari impudentiae. itaque tum ille inopia et necessitate coactus in causa eius modi ad Caepasios fratres confugit, homines industrios atque eo animo ut quaecumque dicendi potestas esset data in honore atque in beneficio ponerent. iam hoc prope iniquissime comparatum est quod in morbis corporis, ut quisque est difficillimus, ita medicus nobilissimus atque optimus quaeritur, in periculis capitis, ut quaeque causa difficillima est, ita deterrimus obscurissimusque patronus adhibetur. Nisi forte hoc causae est quod medici nihil praeter artificium, oratores etiam auctoritatem praestare debent.

The defendant is summoned, the case is conducted. In few words Cannutius accuses, as a matter already judged. The elder Caepasius begins to answer with a long and far-fetched preface. At first his speech is heard attentively. Oppianicus was raising his now downcast and pressed-down spirit; Fabricius himself was rejoicing. He did not understand that the spirits of the judges were being moved not by his eloquence but by the shamelessness of the defence. After he began to speak about the matter, to those things which were in the case he himself even added certain new wounds; so that, although he was doing it on purpose, he yet sometimes seemed not to be defending but to be playing the false ally. So when he thought he was speaking most cunningly, and had brought forth those most grave words from the inmost art: "Look back, gentlemen, on the fortunes of men, look back on doubtful and varying chances, look back on the old age of Gaius Fabricius" — when he had said this "look back" often for the sake of adorning his speech, he himself looked back. But Gaius Fabricius, with head cast down, had departed from the benches.

citatur reus, agitur causa; paucis verbis accusat ut de re iudicata Cannutius; incipit longo et alte petito prooemio respondere maior Caepasius. primo attente auditur eius oratio. erigebat animum iam demissum et oppressum Oppianicus; gaudebat ipse Fabricius; non intellegebat animos iudicum non illius eloquentia sed defensionis impudentia commoveri. postea quam de re coepit dicere, ad ea quae erant in causa addebat etiam ipse nova quaedam volnera ut, quamquam sedulo faciebat, tamen interdum non defendere sed praevaricari videretur. itaque cum callidissime se dicere putaret et cum illa verba gravissima ex intimo artificio deprompsisset: ’ respicite, iudices, hominum fortunas, respicite dubios variosque casus, respicite C. Gaii Fabrici senectutem’ — cum hoc ’respicite’ ornandae orationis causa saepe dixisset, respexit ipse. at C. Gaius Fabricius a subselliis demisso capite discesserat.

Here the judges laugh; the patron grows angry and bears it bitterly that the case is snatched from him, and that he cannot say the rest from that "Look back, gentlemen" passage. And nothing was nearer happening than that he should pursue the man and with twisted neck bring him back to the benches, that he might close the rest. So then Fabricius was condemned, first by his own judgement (which is the gravest), then by the force of the law and the votes of the judges. What is there now that we should say more about Oppianicus’s person and case? Before the same judges he was made defendant, when he was now condemned by these two prejudgements; but by the same judges who, by the condemnation of the Fabricii, had judged about Oppianicus, the first place was set up for him. He was accused on the gravest charges — both those which have been briefly said by me, and many others besides which I now leave aside; he was accused before those who had condemned Scamander as Oppianicus’s minister, and Gaius Fabricius as accomplice of the evil deed.

hic iudices ridere, stomachari atque acerbe ferre patronus causam sibi eripi et se cetera de illo loco ’ respicite, iudices’ non posse dicere; nec quicquam propius est factum quam ut illum persequeretur et collo obtorto ad subsellia reduceret ut reliqua posset perorare. ita tum Fabricius primum suo iudicio, quod est gravissimum, deinde legis vi et sententiis iudicum est condemnatus. quid est quod iam de Oppianici persona causaque plura dicamus? apud eosdem iudices reus est factus, cum his duobus praeiudiciis iam damnatus esset; ab isdem autem iudicibus qui Fabriciorum damnatione de Oppianico iudicarant locus ei primus est constitutus. accusatus est criminibus gravissimis, et eis quae a me breviter dicta sunt et praeterea multis quae ego omnia nunc omitto; accusatus est apud eos qui Scamandrum ministrum Oppianici, C. Fabricium conscium malefici condemnarant.

Whether, by the immortal gods! is it more wonderful that he was condemned, or that he at all dared to answer? For what could those judges do? Who, if they had condemned the innocent Fabricii, ought yet to be consistent with themselves and to agree with their previous judgements in Oppianicus’s case. Or could they themselves have rescinded their own judgements, when others are wont in judging to provide that they should not differ from the judgements of others? And could those who had condemned Fabricius’s freedman because he had been the minister in the evil deed, the patron because he was an accomplice — acquit the very chief and architect of the crime? And could those who had condemned the rest, with no prejudgement made, yet on the case itself, free this man whom they had received as already twice condemned?

Vtrum per deos immortalis! magis est mirandum quod is condemnatus est, an quod omnino respondere ausus est? quid enim illi iudices facere potuerunt? qui si innocentis Fabricios condemnassent, tamen in Oppianico sibi constare et superioribus consentire iudiciis debuerunt. an vero illi sua per se ipsi iudicia rescinderent, cum ceteri soleant in iudicando ne ab aliorum iudiciis discrepent providere? et illi qui Fabrici libertum, quia minister in maleficio fuerat, patronum, quia conscius, condemnassent, ipsum principem atque architectum sceleris absolverent? et qui ceteros nullo praeiudicio facto tamen ex ipsa causa condemnassent, hunc quem bis iam condemnatum acceperant liberarent?

Then indeed those senatorial trials, marked not by false hatred but by true and notable foulness, and covered with disgrace and infamy, would have left no place for defence. For what then would those judges answer, if anyone should ask of them: "You condemned Scamander; on what charge?" "Surely because he had wished to kill Habitus through the doctor’s slave by poison." "What did Scamander gain by Habitus’s death?" "Nothing; but he was the minister of Oppianicus." "And you condemned Gaius Fabricius; why so?" "Because, when he himself most familiarly used Oppianicus, but his freedman had been caught in the evil deed, it was not made probable that he was without share of that counsel." If, then, they had acquitted Oppianicus himself, twice condemned by their own judgements, who could have borne so great a foulness of judgements, who so great an inconsistency of judged matters, who so great a lust of the judges?

tum vero illa iudicia senatoria non falsa invidia sed vera atque insigni turpitudine notata atque operta dedecore et infamia defensioni locum nullum reliquissent. quid enim tandem illi iudices responderent, si qui ab eis quaereret: ’Condemnastis Scamandrum, quo crimine?’ ’ nempe quod habitum per servum medici veneno necare voluisset. ’ ’ quid habiti morte Scamander consequebatur?’ ’ nihil, sed administer erat Oppianici.’ ’ et condemnastis C. Gaium Fabricium, quid ita? ’ ’ quia, cum ipse familiarissime Oppianico usus, libertus autem eius in maleficio deprensus esset, illum expertem eius consili fuisse non probabatur.’ si igitur ipsum Oppianicum bis suis iudiciis condemnatum absolvissent, quis tantam turpitudinem iudiciorum, quis tantam inconstantiam rerum iudicatarum, quis tantam libidinem iudicum ferre potuisset?

But if you see this — which now by all this speech has been made plain — that in that trial it was necessary that the defendant be condemned, especially by the same judges who had made the two prejudgements, at the same time you must necessarily see this: that the prosecutor could have had no cause to wish to corrupt the trial. For I ask of you, Titus Attius, with all the rest of the proofs now left aside, whether you reckon the Fabricii also were innocent and condemned; whether you say those trials too were corrupted by money — in which trials the one was acquitted by Staienus alone, the other condemned even himself. Come: if guilty, of what evil deed? Was anything besides the poison sought for, by which Habitus was to be killed, thrown at them? Was anything else handled in those trials save these snares laid for Habitus by Oppianicus through Fabricius? Nothing, nothing, I say, else, gentlemen, will you find. The memory stands; there are public records. Convict me if I lie. Read out the words of the witnesses; teach what besides this poison of Oppianicus was thrown at them in those trials, not only as a charge but even as an evil saying.

quod si hoc videtis quod iam hac omni oratione patefactum est, illo iudicio reum condemnari, praesertim ab isdem iudicibus qui duo praeiudicia fecissent, necesse fuisse, simul illud videatis necesse est, nullam accusatori causam esse potuisse cur iudicium vellet corrumpere. quaero enim de te, T. Tite Atti, relictis iam ceteris argumentis omnibus, num Fabricios quoque innocentis condemnatos existimes, num etiam illa iudicia pecunia corrupta esse dicas, quibus in iudiciis alter a Staieno solo absolutus est, alter etiam ipse se condemnavit. age, si nocentes, cuius malefici? num quid praeter venenum quaesitum quo habitus necaretur obiectum est? num quid aliud in illis iudiciis versatum est praeter hasce insidias habito ab Oppianico per Fabricium factas? nihil, nihil, inquam, aliud, iudices, reperietis. exstat memoria, sunt tabulae publicae; redargue me, si mentior; testium dicta recita, doce in illorum iudiciis quid praeter hoc venenum Oppianici non modo in criminis sed in male dicti loco sit obiectum.

Many things can be said why it had necessarily been so judged; but I will meet your expectation, gentlemen. For although I am so heard by you that I do not think anyone has ever been more kindly or more attentively heard, yet your silent expectation has long called me elsewhere, which seems to speak against me: "What then? Do you deny that that trial was corrupted?" I do not deny; but I confirm that it was not corrupted by him. "By whom then was it corrupted?" I think first: if it had been uncertain what the outcome of that trial would be, it would yet be more like the truth that he had corrupted who had feared lest he himself be condemned, than that other who had feared lest the other be acquitted. Next, since it was not in doubt what had to be judged, surely rather he who in some way distrusted himself than he who in every reasoning was confident. Finally, surely rather he who twice had offended before those judges, than he who twice had had his case approved.

multa dici possunt qua re ita necesse fuerit iudicari, sed ego occurram exspectationi vestrae, iudices. nam etsi a vobis sic audior ut numquam benignius neque attentius quemquam auditum putem, tamen vocat me alio iam dudum tacita vestra exspectatio quae mihi obloqui videtur: ’ quid ergo? negasne illud iudicium esse corruptum? ’ non nego, sed ab hoc corruptum non esse confirmo. ’A quo igitur est corruptum?’ opinor, primum, si incertum fuisset quisnam exitus illius iudici futurus esset, veri similius tamen esset eum potius corrupisse qui metuisset ne ipse condemnaretur quam illum qui veritus esset ne alter absolveretur; deinde, cum esset non dubium quid iudicari necesse esset, eum certe potius qui sibi aliqua ratione diffideret quam eum qui omni ratione confideret; postremo certe potius illum qui bis apud eos iudices offendisset quam eum qui bis causam probavisset.

One thing surely no one will be so hostile to Cluentius as not to grant me: that, if it stand fixed that that trial was corrupted, it was corrupted either by Habitus or by Oppianicus. If I show that it was not by Habitus, I prove by Oppianicus; if I show by Oppianicus, I clear Habitus. Wherefore, although I have shown enough that there was no reason for him to corrupt this trial (from which it is understood that it was corrupted by Oppianicus), yet learn separately about him himself. And I shall not argue those things which are vehemently grave: that he had corrupted who had been in danger, who had feared, who had no hope of safety in another reckoning, who had always been of singular audacity. Many such things there are. But, since I have a thing not doubtful but open and manifest, the enumeration of single proofs is not necessary.

Vnum quidem certe nemo erit tam inimicus Cluentio qui mihi non concedat, si constet corruptum illud esse iudicium, aut ab habito aut ab Oppianico esse corruptum; si doceo non ab habito, vinco ab Oppianico; si ostendo ab Oppianico, purgo habitum. qua re, etsi satis docui rationem nullam huic corrumpendi iudici fuisse, ex quo intellegitur ab Oppianico esse corruptum, tamen de illo ipso separatim cognoscite. atque ego illa non argumentabor quae sunt gravia vehementer, eum corrupisse qui in periculo fuerit, eum qui metuerit, eum qui spem salutis in alia ratione non habuerit, eum qui semper singulari fuerit audacia. multa sunt eius modi; verum cum habeam rem non dubiam sed apertam atque manifestam, enumeratio singulorum argumentorum non est necessaria.

I say that to Gaius Aelius Staienus the judge Statius Albius gave a great sum of money for corrupting the trial. Does anyone deny it? You I call upon, Oppianicus; you, Titus Attius, of whom the one by eloquence, the other by silent piety laments that condemnation. Dare to deny that money was given by Oppianicus to Staienus the judge. Deny it; deny it, I say, in my place. Why are you silent? Or can you not deny what you have demanded back, what you have confessed, what you have carried off? With what face, then, do you make mention of a corrupted trial, when you confess that money was given by your own side to a judge before the trial, and was wrenched away after the trial?

dico C. Gaio Aelio Staieno iudici pecuniam grandem Statium Albium ad corrumpendum iudicium dedisse. num quis negat? te, Oppianice, appello, te, T. Tite Atti, quorum alter eloquentia damnationem illam, alter tacita pietate deplorat; audete negare ab Oppianico Staieno iudici pecuniam datam, negate, negate, inquam, meo loco. quid tacetis? an negare non potestis quod repetistis, quod confessi estis, quod abstulistis? quo tandem igitur ore mentionem corrupti iudici facitis, cum ab ista parte iudici pecuniam ante iudicium datam, post iudicium ereptam esse fateamini?

In what manner, then, were these things done? I shall recall a little further off, gentlemen, and shall so open all the things which have lain hidden in long-lasting obscurity that you may seem to look upon them with your eyes. I ask of you that, as you have up to now attentively heard me, you should likewise hear what remains. Surely nothing shall be said by me which shall not seem worthy of this gathering and silence, worthy of your zeal and your ears. For as soon as Oppianicus, from the fact that Scamander had been made defendant, began to suspect what was hanging over him, he at once attached himself to the familiarity of a needy and audacious man, practised in corrupting trials, and at that time a judge: Staienus. And first, with Scamander as defendant, he had so far brought it about by gifts and presents that he used him as a more eager partisan than the faith of a judge demanded.

quonam igitur haec modo gesta sunt? repetam paulo altius, iudices, et omnia quae in diuturna obscuritate latuerunt sic aperiam ut ea cernere oculis videamini. vos quaeso, ut adhuc me attente audistis, item quae reliqua sunt audiatis; profecto nihil a me dicetur quod non dignum hoc conventu et silentio, dignum vestris studiis atque auribus esse videatur. nam ut primum Oppianicus ex eo quod Scamander reus erat factus quid sibi impenderet coepit suspicari, statim se ad hominis egentis, audacis, in iudiciis corrumpendis exercitati, tum autem iudicis, Staieni familiaritatem applicavit. ac primum Scamandro reo tantum donis muneribusque perfecerat ut eo fautore uteretur cupidiore quam fides iudicis postulabat.

But afterwards, when Scamander had been acquitted by Staienus’s vote alone, while the patron of Scamander had not been freed even by his own vote, he thought that sharper remedies must be brought to his own safety. Then from Staienus — as from a man most acute in devising, most shameless in daring, most fierce in bringing about (for those things he both partly had and partly pretended he had) — he began to seek help for his life and fortunes. Now you are not ignorant, gentlemen, that even beasts, warned by hunger, often return to the place where they have at any time been fed.

post autem cum esset Scamander unius Staieni sententia absolutus, patronus autem Scamandri ne sua quidem sententia liberatus, acrioribus saluti suae remediis subveniendum putavit. tum ab Staieno, sicut ab homine ad excogitandum acutissimo, ad audendum impudentissimo, ad efficiendum acerrimo — haec enim ille et aliqua ex parte habebat et maiore ex parte se habere simulabat — auxilium capiti ac fortunis suis petere coepit. iam hoc non ignoratis, iudices, ut etiam bestiae fame monitae plerumque ad eum locum ubi pastae sunt aliquando revertantur.

That Staienus had two years before, when he had taken on the case of the goods of Safinius Atella, said that for 600,000 sesterces he would corrupt the trial. Which, when he had taken from the orphan, he kept hidden, and, the trial held, gave back neither to Safinius nor to the buyers of the goods. Which money, when he had spent it and had left himself nothing not only for his desires but not even for his necessity, he resolved that he must return to the same plunders and trial-suppressions. So when he saw Oppianicus already ruined and slain by the two prejudgements, by his promises he raised him up cast down, and at the same time forbade him to despair of safety. Oppianicus then began to ask the man to show him the way of corrupting the trial.

Staienus ille biennio ante cum causam bonorum Safini Atellae recepisset, sescentis milibus nummum se iudicium corrupturum esse dixerat. quae cum accepisset a pupillo, suppressit iudicioque facto nec Safinio nec bonorum emptoribus reddidit. quam cum pecuniam profudisset et sibi nihil non modo ad cupiditates suas sed ne ad necessitatem quidem reliquisset, statuit ad easdem esse sibi praedas ac suppressiones iudicialis revertendum. itaque cum Oppianicum iam perditum et duobus iugulatum praeiudiciis videret, promissis suis eum excitavit abiectum et simul saluti desperare vetuit. Oppianicus autem orare hominem coepit ut sibi rationem ostenderet iudici corrumpendi.

And he, as was afterwards heard from Oppianicus himself, denied that there was anyone in the state save him who could bring this about. But at first he began to be heavy, because he was saying that he was seeking the aedileship with most noble men and feared envy and offence. Afterwards, won over, he first asked a very great sum, then came down to that which could be brought about: 640,000 sesterces he ordered to be brought home to him. Which money, as soon as it had been brought to him, the most impure man at once began to turn in such mind and thought: that nothing was more useful for his reckonings than that Oppianicus should be condemned; for, with him acquitted, that money would have either to be apportioned to the judges or given back to the man himself; with him condemned, no one would demand it back.

ille autem, quem ad modum ex ipso Oppianico postea est auditum, negavit quemquam esse in civitate praeter se qui id efficere posset. sed primo gravari coepit, quod aedilitatem se petere cum hominibus nobilissimis et invidiam atque offensionem timere dicebat. post exoratus initio permagnam pecuniam poposcit, deinde ad id pervenit quod confici potuit; HS dcxl deferri ad se domum iussit. quae pecunia simul atque ad eum delata est, homo impurissimus statim coepit in eius modi mente et cogitatione versari, nihil esse suis rationibus utilius quam Oppianicum condemnari; illo absoluto pecuniam illam aut iudicibus dispertiendam aut ipsi esse reddendam; damnato repetiturum esse neminem.

So he devises a singular thing. And these things, gentlemen, which are truly said by us, you will the more easily believe if you wish in your minds, after a long interval, to recall the life and nature of Gaius Staienus. For just as the opinion is of each man’s morals, so it can be reckoned what was done or not done by him. Since he was needy, expensive, audacious, cunning, treacherous, and at his own house, most wretched in most empty places, he saw such great a sum of money set down, he began to turn his mind to every malice and fraud. "Should I give it to the judges? For myself then, save peril and infamy, what shall be sought? Shall I devise nothing wherefore Oppianicus must be condemned? What then? — for there is nothing which cannot happen — if some chance has perhaps snatched him from peril, must it not be given back? Let us push him as he is going down headlong," he says, "and lay him low ruined."

itaque rem excogitat singularem. atque haec, iudices, quae vera dicuntur a nobis facilius credetis, si cum animis vestris longo intervallo recordari C. Gaii Staieni vitam et naturam volueritis; nam perinde ut opinio est de cuiusque moribus, ita quid ab eo factum aut non factum sit existimari potest. cum esset egens, sumptuosus, audax, callidus, perfidiosus, et cum domi suae miserrimus in locis inanissimis tantum nummorum positum videret, ad omnem malitiam et fraudem versare mentem suam coepit. ’ ego dem iudicibus? mihi ipsi igitur praeter periculum et infamiam quid quaeretur? nihil excogitem quam ob rem Oppianicum damnari necesse sit? quid tandem? — nihil enim est quod non fieri possit — si quis eum forte casus ex periculo eripuerit, nonne reddendum est? praecipitantem igitur impellamus’ inquit ’et perditum prosternamus.’

He takes this counsel: that he should promise money to certain very light judges; then keep it back afterwards, so that — since he reckoned grave men of their own accord were going to judge strictly — he should make those who were lighter, in their disappointment, angry with Oppianicus. So, as he was always preposterous and perverse, he begins from Bulbus and lightly nudges him — now for some time having sought nothing, sad and yawning. "What of you?" he says. "Will you help me, Bulbus, that we should not serve the commonwealth gratis?" He, as soon as he had heard this "not gratis": "I shall follow whither you wish," he says; "but what do you bring?" Then he promises him 40,000, if Oppianicus should be acquitted; and he asks him to address the rest with whom he was wont to speak; and the framer of the whole business himself sprinkles his Gutta on this Bulbus.

capit hoc consili ut pecuniam quibusdam iudicibus levissimis polliceatur, deinde eam postea supprimat ut, quoniam gravis homines sua sponte severe iudicaturos putabat, eos qui leviores erant destitutione iratos Oppianico redderet. itaque, ut erat semper praeposterus atque perversus, initium facit a Bulbo et eum, quod iam diu nihil quaesierat, tristem atque oscitantem leviter impellit. ’ quid tu?’ inquit ’ecquid me adiuvas, Bulbe, ne gratiis rei publicae serviamus?’ ille vero simul atque hoc audivit ’ne gratiis’: ’ quo voles ’ inquit ’sequar; sed quid adfers?’ tum ei quadraginta milia, si esset absolutus Oppianicus, pollicetur et eum ut ceteros appellet quibuscum loqui consuesset rogat atque etiam ipse conditor totius negoti Guttam aspergit huic Bulbo.

So he seemed by no means bitter to those who had tasted some little hope from his speech. One and another day had passed when the matter seemed too little sure. The depository and confirmer of the money was being looked for. Then with cheerful face Bulbus addresses the man as flatteringly as he can: "What of you," he says, "Paetus?" — for this surname Staienus had chosen for himself out of the images of the Aelii, lest, if he had made himself a Ligur, he should seem to use the surname rather of his nation than of his line — "concerning the matter you spoke of with me, they are asking of me where the money is." Here that most dishonest deceiver, fed by trial-gain, who was now in spirit and mind brooding over that money which he had stored up, knits his brow — recall his face and those feigned and pretended looks of his — and he, who was wholly made out of fraud and lying, and who had even by zeal and a kind of artistry of malice seasoned the vices he had from nature, beautifully maintains that he had been let down by Oppianicus; and he adds this as testimony: that, by his vote, since all were openly going to give theirs, he would be condemned.

itaque minime amarus eis visus est qui aliquid ex eius sermone speculae degustarant. Vnus et alter dies intercesserat cum res parum certa videbatur; sequester et confirmator pecuniae desiderabatur. tum appellat hilari voltu hominem Bulbus ut blandissime potest: ’ quid tu’ inquit ’Paete? ’ — hoc enim sibi Staienus cognomen ex imaginibus Aeliorum delegerat ne, si se Ligurem fecisset, nationis magis suae quam generis uti cognomine videretur — ’qua de re mecum locutus es, quaerunt a me ubi sit pecunia.’ hic ille planus improbissimus quaestu iudiciario pastus, qui illi pecuniae quam condiderat spe iam atque animo incubaret, contrahit frontem — recordamini faciem atque illos eius fictos simulatosque voltus — et, qui esset totus ex fraude et mendacio factus quique ea vitia quae ab natura habebat etiam studio atque artificio quodam malitiae condivisset, pulchre adseverat sese ab Oppianico destitutum atque hoc addit testimoni, sua illum sententia, cum palam omnes laturi essent, condemnatum iri.

Talk had spread in the council that some mention of money had been at large among the judges. The matter was neither so hidden as it was being hidden, nor so open as it ought to be opened for the sake of the commonwealth. In that obscurity and doubt of all, it pleased Cannutius, an experienced man, who by a kind of scent of suspicion had felt that Staienus had been corrupted, and yet did not think the matter was finished, suddenly to pronounce: "They have spoken." Here then Oppianicus did not greatly fear; he reckoned the matter had been finished by Staienus.

manarat sermo in consilio pecuniae quandam mentionem inter iudices esse versatam. res neque tam fuerat occulta quam erat occultanda, neque tam erat aperta quam rei publicae causa aperienda. in ea obscuritate ac dubitatione omnium Cannutio, perito homini, qui quodam odore suspicionis Staienum corruptum esse sensisset neque dum rem perfectam arbitraretur, placuit repente pronuntiare: Dixerunt. hic tum Oppianicus non magno opere pertimuit; rem a Staieno perfectam esse arbitrabatur.

They were going to council: thirty-two judges. By sixteen votes acquittal could be brought about. 40,000 sesterces distributed among single judges should bring about that number of votes, so that on top, in hope of greater rewards, Staienus’s own seventeenth vote should be added. And by chance then — because that had been done suddenly — Staienus himself was not present. He was defending I know not what case before a judge. Habitus easily suffered this; Cannutius easily; but Oppianicus did not, nor his patron Lucius Quinctius. Who, since he was at that time tribune of the plebs, made the greatest disturbance against Gaius Junius the inquisitor of the trial, that they should not go to council without him; and when this seemed to him to be done too carelessly on purpose by the runners, he himself set out from the public trial to Staienus’s private trial and ordered that to be dismissed by his power; he himself led Staienus to the benches.

in consilium erant ituri iudices xxxii. sententiis xvi absolutio confici poterat. HS xl milia in singulos iudices distributa eum numerum sententiarum conficere debebant ut ad cumulum spe maiorum praemiorum ipsius Staieni sententia septima decima accederet. atque etiam casu tum, quod illud repente erat factum, Staienus ipse non aderat; causam nescio quam apud iudicem defendebat. facile hoc habitus patiebatur, facile Cannutius, at non Oppianicus neque patronus eius L. Lucius Quinctius; qui, cum esset illo tempore tribunus plebis, convicium C. Gaio Iunio iudici quaestionis maximum fecit ut ne sine illo in consilium iretur; cumque id ei per viatores consulto neglegentius agi videretur, ipse e publico iudicio ad privatum Staieni iudicium profectus est et illud pro potestate dimitti iussit; Staienum ipse ad subsellia adduxit.

They rise to council, when Oppianicus had said he wished the votes to be cast openly — which was then the power — so that Staienus could know what he owed to each. Various kinds of judges. The money-takers were few, but all angry. As those who in the field have been wont to take are wont to be most hostile to those candidates whose money they think has been kept back, so judges of that kind had then come hostile to the defendant. The rest reckoned him most guilty; but they were waiting for the votes of those whom they thought had been corrupted, that out of these they might decide by whom the trial seemed to be corrupted. And lo, such a drawing of lots that among the first Bulbus and Staienus and Gutta had to judge! There was the highest expectation of all what those light and money-taking judges would vote. And they all, without any doubt, condemn.

consurgitur in consilium, cum sententias Oppianicus, quae tum erat potestas, palam ferri velle dixisset ut Staienus scire posset quid cuique deberet. Varia iudicum genera; nummarii pauci sed omnes irati. Vt qui accipere in campo consuerunt eis candidatis quorum nummos suppressos esse putant inimicissimi solent esse, sic eius modi iudices infesti tum reo venerant; ceteri nocentissimum esse arbitrabantur, sed exspectabant sententias eorum quos corruptos esse putabant ut ex eis constituerent a quo iudicium corruptum videretur. ecce tibi eius modi sortitio ut in primis Bulbo et Staieno et Guttae esset iudicandum! summa omnium exspectatio quidnam sententiae ferrent leves ac nummarii iudices. atque illi omnes sine ulla dubitatione condemnant.

Here then a stumbling-block was thrown into men, and a certain doubt as to what had been done. Then wise men, of that old discipline of trials, who could neither acquit a most guilty man, nor (about him about whom suspicion had arisen that he had been assailed by money) wish, with that matter unknown, to be the first to condemn, said that it was not clear. But some strict men who had laid down this — that what each man should do was to be regarded by the spirit with which he did it — although others, with money taken, were judging the truth, yet none the less reckoned that they ought to be consistent with their previous judgements; so they condemned. Five there were in all who acquitted that innocent Oppianicus of yours — led on either by imprudence or by pity or by some suspicion or by canvassing.

hic tum iniectus est hominibus scrupulus et quaedam dubitatio quidnam esset actum. deinde homines sapientes et ex vetere illa disciplina iudiciorum, qui neque absolvere hominem nocentissimum possent neque eum de quo esset orta suspicio pecunia oppugnatum re illa incognita primo condemnare vellent, non liquere dixerunt. non nulli autem severi homines qui hoc statuerunt, quo quisque animo quid faceret spectari oportere, etsi alii pecunia accepta verum iudicabant, tamen nihilo minus se superioribus suis iudiciis constare putabant oportere; itaque damnarunt. quinque omnino fuerunt qui illum vestrum innocentem Oppianicum sive imprudentia sive misericordia sive aliqua suspicione sive ambitione adducti absolverunt.

With Oppianicus condemned, at once Lucius Quinctius, a man most popular, who was wont to gather all the winds of rumours and meetings, reckoned that the means had been offered him to grow out of senatorial hatred — because he reckoned that the trials of that order were now less approved by the people. One and a second public meeting, vehement and grave, is held. The tribune of the plebs kept crying that the judges had taken money to condemn an innocent defendant; he was saying that the fortunes of all were at stake; that there were no trials; that whoever had a wealthy enemy could not be safe. Men ignorant of the whole business, who had never seen Oppianicus, thinking that an excellent and most modest man had been pressed down by money, kindled by suspicion, began to call the matter into the open and to demand that whole case.

condemnato Oppianico statim L. Lucius Quinctius, homo maxime popularis, qui omnis rumorum et contionum ventos conligere consuesset, oblatam sibi facultatem putavit ut ex invidia senatoria posset crescere, quod eius ordinis iudicia minus iam probari populo arbitrabatur. habetur una atque altera contio vehemens et gravis; accepisse pecuniam iudices ut innocentem reum condemnarent tribunus plebis clamitabat; agi fortunas omnium dicebat; nulla esse iudicia; qui pecuniosum inimicum haberet, incolumem esse neminem posse. homines totius ignari negoti, qui Oppianicum numquam vidissent, virum optimum et hominem pudentissimum pecunia oppressum esse arbitrarentur, incensi suspicione rem in medium vocare coeperunt et causam illam totam deposcere.

And at that very time, in the house of Titus Annius, a most honourable man, my connection and friend, by night Staienus came summoned by Oppianicus. The rest is now known to all: how Oppianicus dealt with him about the money, how he said he would give it back, how this whole speech was heard by good men who had then on purpose stood near in concealment, how the matter was made plain and brought into the forum, and all the money was wrenched and snatched from Staienus. The character of this Staienus was now known to the people and clearly seen, was free of no foul suspicion. That money had been kept back by him which he had vouched for the defendant, those who were in the meeting did not understand. For neither were they being taught. They felt that mention of money had been at large in the trial; they heard an innocent defendant had been condemned; they saw he had been condemned by Staienus’s vote. That this had not been done by him gratis, knowing the man, they judged. A like suspicion stuck on Bulbus, on Gutta, on certain others.

atque illo ipso tempore in aedis T. Titi Anni, hominis honestissimi, necessarii et amici mei, noctu Staienus arcessitus ab Oppianico venit. iam cetera nota sunt omnibus, ut cum illo Oppianicus egerit de pecunia, ut ille se redditurum esse dixerit, ut eum sermonem audierint omnem viri boni qui tum consulto propter in occulto stetissent, ut res patefacta et in forum prolata et pecunia omnis Staieno extorta atque erepta sit. huius Staieni persona populo iam nota atque perspecta ab nulla turpi suspicione abhorrebat; suppressam esse ab eo pecuniam quam pro reo pronuntiasset qui erant in contione non intellegebant; neque enim docebantur. versatam esse in iudicio mentionem pecuniae sentiebant, innocentem reum condemnatum audiebant, Staieni sententia condemnatum videbant; non gratiis id ab eo factum esse, quod hominem norant, iudicabant. Similis in Bulbo, in Gutta, in aliis non nullis suspicio consistebat.

So I confess — for now I can without punishment confess this, especially in this place — since not only the life but even the name of Oppianicus had before that time been unknown to the people, and it then most unworthily seemed that an innocent man had been circumvented by money — this suspicion the wickedness of Staienus and the foulness of certain like judges of his afterwards increased — and Lucius Quinctius pleaded the case, a man both endowed with the highest power and fitted for inflaming the spirits of the multitude — the highest hatred and infamy was forged at that trial. And into this fresh flame I remember that Gaius Junius, who had been in charge of that inquiry, was thrown; and that man (of aedile rank, by all opinions now set up as praetor) was taken away not by debate of speaking but by the cry of men, from the forum and even from the state.

itaque confiteor — licet enim iam impune hoc praesertim in loco confiteri — quod Oppianici non modo vita sed etiam nomen ante illud tempus populo ignotum fuisset, indignissimum porro videretur circumventum esse innocentem pecunia, hanc deinde suspicionem augeret Staieni improbitas et non nullorum eius similium iudicum turpitudo, causam autem ageret L. Lucius Quinctius, homo cum summa potestate praeditus tum ad inflammandos animos multitudinis accommodatus, summam illi iudicio invidiam infamiamque esse conflatam. atque in hanc flammam recentem tum C. Iunium qui illi quaestioni praefuerat iniectum esse memini, et illum hominem aedilicium iam praetorem opinionibus omnium constitutum non disceptatione dicendi sed clamore hominum de foro atque adeo de civitate esse sublatum.

And I do not regret that I am defending the case of Aulus Cluentius at this time rather than then. For the case stays the same, which can in no way be changed. The unfairness of the time and hatred has gone back, so that what was of evil in the time hinders nothing, what was of good in the case helps. So now in what manner I am heard I feel, not only by those whose judgement and power it is, but even by those whose only standing it is. But then if I had spoken, I would not have been heard — not because the matter was different (indeed it was the same), but the time was different. Learn it thus. Who would then dare to say that Oppianicus had been condemned guilty? Who now dares to deny it? Who then could prove that the trial had been tried by money by Oppianicus? Who at this time can deny it? To whom would it then be allowed to teach that Oppianicus had been made defendant only when he had been condemned by two recent prejudgements? Who is there who at this time would try to weaken it?

neque me paenitet hoc tempore potius quam illo causam A. Auli Cluenti defendere. causa enim manet eadem, quae mutari nullo modo potest, temporis iniquitas atque invidia recessit, ut quod in tempore mali fuit nihil obsit, quod in causa boni fuit prosit. itaque nunc quem ad modum audiar sentio, non modo ab eis quorum iudicium ac potestas est sed etiam ab illis quorum tantum est existimatio. at tum si dicerem, non audirer, non quod alia res esset, immo eadem, sed tempus aliud. id adeo sic cognoscite. quis tum auderet dicere nocentem condemnatum esse Oppianicum? quis nunc audet negare? quis tum posset arguere ab Oppianico temptatum esse iudicium pecunia? quis id hoc tempore infitiari potest? cui tum liceret docere Oppianicum reum factum esse tum denique cum duobus proximis praeiudiciis condemnatus esset? quis est qui id hoc tempore infirmare conetur?

Wherefore, with hatred removed (which day has softened, my speech has pleaded off, your faith and equity has thrown back from the debate of truth), what is left further in the case? It stands fixed that money was at large in the trial. It is asked from where it set out: from the prosecutor or from the defendant. The prosecutor says these things: "First I was prosecuting on the gravest charges, so that there was no need of money. Then I was bringing a man condemned, so that even by money he could not be snatched. Last, even if he had been acquitted, the standing of all my fortunes would yet have remained whole." What against the defendant? "First, I was greatly fearing the very multitude and atrocity of the charges. Then, with the Fabricii condemned on account of consciousness of my own crime, I felt that I had been condemned. Last, I had come into such a chance that the whole standing of my fortunes was contained in the peril of one trial."

qua re invidia remota quam dies mitigavit, oratio mea deprecata est, vestra fides atque aequitas a veritatis disceptatione reiecit, quid est praeterea quod in causa relinquatur? versatam esse in iudicio pecuniam constat; ea quaeritur unde profecta sit, ab accusatore an ab reo. dicit accusator haec: ’ primum gravissimis criminibus accusabam, ut nihil opus esset pecunia; deinde condemnatum adducebam, ut ne eripi quidem pecunia posset; postremo, etiam si absolutus fuisset, mearum tamen omnium fortunarum status incolumis maneret.’ quid contra reus? ’ primum ipsam multitudinem criminum et atrocitatem pertimescebam; deinde Fabriciis propter conscientiam mei sceleris condemnatis me esse condemnatum sentiebam: postremo in eum casum veneram ut omnis mearum fortunarum status unius iudici periculo contineretur. ’

Come: since he had many and grave causes for corrupting the trial, this man none, let the very setting-out of the money be looked for. Cluentius made up the records most diligently. But this matter has surely this property: that nothing can either be added to or taken from one’s estate without leaving traces. There are eight years now since this case has been turned in this preparation, when all things which have to do with this matter you have agitated, handled, sought out from his and from others’ tablets. While meanwhile of Cluentian money you find no trace. What? Must Albian money be tracked by us by traces, or can we come even to the very lair, with you as guides? In one place are held 640,000 sesterces, are held with a most audacious man, are held with a judge. What more do you wish?

age, quoniam corrumpendi iudici causas ille multas et gravis habuit, hic nullam, profectio ipsius pecuniae requiratur. confecit tabulas diligentissime Cluentius. haec autem res habet hoc certe ut nihil possit neque additum neque detractum de re familiari latere. Anni sunt octo cum ista causa in ista meditatione versatur, cum omnia quae ad eam rem pertinent et ex huius et ex aliorum tabulis agitatis, tractatis, inquiritis, cum interea Cluentianae pecuniae vestigium nullum invenitis. quid? Albiana pecunia vestigiisne nobis odoranda est an ad ipsum cubile vobis ducibus venire possumus? tenentur uno in loco HS dcxl, tenentur apud hominem audacissimum, tenentur apud iudicem; quid voltis amplius?

But Staienus was set up not by Oppianicus but by Cluentius for corrupting the trial. Why, when they were going to council, did Cluentius and Cannutius suffer him to be absent? Why, when they were sending to council, did they not look for Staienus the judge to whom they had given money? Oppianicus complained, Quinctius pressed; that the council should not be held without Staienus was brought about by tribunician power. But he condemned. For he had given this condemnation as a hostage to Bulbus and the rest, that he might seem let down by Oppianicus. Wherefore, if from that side the cause of corrupting the trial, if from that side the money, from that side Staienus, from that side finally all fraud and audacity is, but on this side modesty, an honourable life, no suspicion of money, no cause of corrupting the trial — suffer, with truth made plain and every error taken away, the infamy of that foulness to pass over to where the rest of the evil deeds stand; let the hatred at last depart from him to whom you see fault has never come.

at enim Staienus non fuit ab Oppianico sed a Cluentio ad iudicium corrumpendum constitutus. cur eum, cum in consilium iretur, Cluentius et Cannutius abesse patiebantur? cur, cum in consilium mittebant, Staienum iudicem cui pecuniam dederant non requirebant? Oppianicus querebatur, Quinctius flagitabat; sine Staieno ne in consilium iretur tribunicia potestate effectum est. at condemnavit. hanc enim condemnationem dederat obsidem Bulbo et ceteris ut destitutus ab Oppianico videretur. qua re si istinc causa corrumpendi iudici, si istinc pecunia, istinc Staienus, istinc denique omnis fraus et audacia est, hinc pudor, honesta vita, nulla suspicio pecuniae, nulla corrumpendi iudici causa, patimini veritate patefacta atque omni errore sublato eo transire illius turpitudinis infamiam ubi cetera maleficia consistunt, ab eo invidiam discedere aliquando ad quem numquam accessisse culpam videtis.

But, you will say, Oppianicus gave the money to Staienus not for corrupting the trial but for the winning of favour. Do you say this, Attius, endowed with such prudence, with so much use and practice! They say he is most wise to whom what is needed comes of itself into mind; that nearest comes that man who follows another’s good devisings. In stupidity it is the contrary. He is less stupid into whose mind nothing comes than he who approves what stupidly comes into another’s mind. So Staienus then, the matter recent, when he was being pressed in the throat — whether he himself thought it up, or (as men were then saying) was warned by Publius Cethegus — gave that fable of conciliation and favour.

at enim pecuniam Staieno dedit Oppianicus non ad corrumpendum iudicium sed ad conciliationem gratiae. Tene hoc, Atti, dicere, tali prudentia, etiam usu atque exercitatione praeditum! sapientissimum esse dicunt eum cui quod opus sit ipsi veniat in mentem; proxime accedere illum qui alterius bene inventis obtemperet. in stultitia contra est. minus enim stultus est is cui nihil in mentem venit quam ille qui quod stulte alteri venit in mentem comprobat. ita Staienus tum recenti re, cum faucibus premeretur — sive ultro excogitavit sive, ut homines tum loquebantur, a P. Publio Cethego admonitus est — istam dedit conciliationis et gratiae fabulam.

For you can recall that this was then the talk of men: that Cethegus, because he hated the man and would not have his wickedness at large in the commonwealth, and because he saw that he who had confessed that he had taken money from a defendant secretly and out of order when he was a judge could not be safe — gave him counsel less faithful. In this if Cethegus was dishonest, he seems to me to have wished to remove an adversary; but if the case was such that Staienus could not deny he had taken coins, while nothing was more perilous nor more foul than to confess for what thing he had taken — the counsel of Cethegus is not to be reproached.

nam fuisse hunc tum hominum sermonem recordari potestis, Cethegum, quod hominem odisset et quod eius improbitatem versari in re publica nollet et quod videret eum qui se ab reo pecuniam, cum iudex esset, clam atque extra ordinem accepisse confessus esset, salvum esse non posse, minus ei fidele consilium dedisse. in hoc si improbus Cethegus fuit, videtur mihi adversarium removere voluisse; sin erat eius modi causa ut Staienus nummos se accepisse negare non posset, nihil autem erat periculosius nec turpius quam ad quam rem accepisset confiteri, non est consilium Cethegi reprendendum.

But the cause of Staienus then was different, your case now, Attius, is different. He, when he was pressed by the matter, whatever he said would say more honourably than if he should confess what had been done. But that you have now brought back the same thing which then was hooted off and cast out, I wonder. For how could Cluentius then return into favour with Oppianicus, who could not with his mother? In the public records the defendant and accuser were stuck together; the Fabricii had been condemned. Albius could not slip away by another accuser; nor could Cluentius leave the prosecution without the ignominy of a false charge.

verum alia causa tum Staieni fuit, alia nunc, Atti, tua est. ille cum re premeretur, quodcumque diceret, honestius diceret quam si quod erat factum fateretur; te vero illud idem quod tum explosum et eiectum est nunc rettulisse demiror. qui enim poterat tum in gratiam redire cum Oppianico Cluentius, qui cum matre? haerebat in tabulis publicis reus et accusator; condemnati erant Fabricii; nec elabi alio accusatore poterat Albius nec sine ignominia calumniae relinquere accusationem Cluentius.

Or rather should he act as a false ally? For that too has to do with corrupting the trial. But what need was there for that of a judge as depository? And altogether why should that whole matter be conducted through Staienus, a man most foreign to each side, most filthy, most foul, rather than through some good man, friend and connection of both? But why do I dispute these things in many words, as if of an obscure matter, when the very money which was given to Staienus by its number and sum shows not only how great it was but even for what it was? I say sixteen judges had to be corrupted that Oppianicus should be acquitted; that to Staienus 640,000 sesterces had been brought. If, as you say, for the sake of winning favour, what does that addition of forty thousand mean? If, as we say, that 40,000 sesterces should be given to sixteen judges, Archimedes could not better have laid it out.

an vero praevaricaretur? nam id quoque ad corrumpendum iudicium pertinet. sed quid opus erat ad eam rem iudice sequestre? et omnino quam ob rem tota ista res per Staienum potius, hominem ab utroque alienissimum, sordidissimum, turpissimum, quam per bonum aliquem virum ageretur et amicum necessariumque communem? sed quid ego haec pluribus quasi de re obscura disputo, cum ipsa pecunia quae Staieno data est numero ac summa sua non modo quanta fuerit sed etiam ad quam rem fuerit ostendat? Sedecim dico iudices ut Oppianicus absolveretur corrumpendos fuisse; ad Staienum dcxl milia nummum esse delata. si, ut tu dicis, gratiae conciliandae causa, quadraginta istorum accessio milium quid valet? si, ut nos dicimus, ut quadragena milia nummum sedecim iudicibus darentur, non Archimedes melius potuit discribere.

But it is said that very many trials have been made by Cluentius that the trial was corrupted. Indeed, before this time that very thing in its own name has never been called into trial. So much agitated, so long tossed about is this matter, that on this day for the first time that case has been defended; on this day for the first time truth, trusting in these judges, has sent her voice against hatred. But yet what are these many trials? For I have prepared myself for all things and so set out that I should teach what trials made afterwards about that trial are spoken of: were partly more like a ruin or a storm than a trial and debate; partly weighed not at all against Habitus; partly even were for him; partly were of such a kind that they were neither ever called trials nor reckoned so.

at enim iudicia facta permulta sunt a Cluentio iudicium esse corruptum. immo vero ante hoc tempus omnino ista ipsa res suo nomine in iudicium numquam est vocata. ita multum agitata, ita diu iactata ista res est ut hodierno die primum causa illa defensa sit, hodierno die primum veritas vocem contra invidiam his iudicibus freta miserit. verum tamen ista multa iudicia quae sunt? ego enim me ad omnia confirmavi et sic paravi ut docerem quae facta postea iudicia de illo iudicio dicerentur, partim ruinae similiora aut tempestati quam iudicio et disceptationi fuisse, partim nihil contra habitum valere, partim etiam pro hoc esse, partim esse eius modi ut neque appellata umquam iudicia sint neque existimata.

Here, more that I should keep custom than because you do not of your own will do this, I shall ask of you, gentlemen, that you should attentively hear me while I dispute about each of these. Gaius Junius was condemned, who had been in charge of that trial. Add even this, if it pleases you: he was then condemned when he was the inquisitor of the trial. Not only to the case but not even to the law was any relaxation given through the tribune of the plebs. At the time when it was not lawful to take him from the trial to any other duty of the commonwealth, at that time he himself was snatched away to a trial. But to what trial? For your faces, gentlemen, invite me to say freely now what I had thought ought to be left silent.

hic ego magis ut consuetudinem servem quam quod vos non vestra hoc sponte faciatis, petam a vobis ut me, dum de his singulis disputo, iudices, attente audiatis. condemnatus est C. Gaius Iunius qui ei quaestioni praefuerat; adde etiam illud, si placet: tum est condemnatus cum esset iudex quaestionis. non modo causae sed ne legi quidem quicquam per tribunum plebis laxamenti datum est. quo tempore illum a quaestione ad nullum aliud rei publicae munus abduci licebat, eo tempore ad quaestionem ipse abreptus est. at quam quaestionem? voltus enim vestri, iudices, me invitant ut quae reticenda putaram libeat iam libere dicere.

What? That at last — was it an inquiry or a debate or a trial? I shall reckon it was. Let anyone who wishes today, of that stirred-up people whose wishes were then served, say on what matter Junius pleaded his case. Whomever you ask, this he will answer: because he had taken money, because he had circumvented an innocent man. This is the opinion. But, if it were so, he ought to have been accused on this law on which Habitus is being accused. But he himself was holding the inquiry by that law. Quinctius would have waited a few days. But he wished neither as a private man to accuse, nor with hatred now calmed. You see therefore that all the prosecutor’s hope was not in the case but in the time and the power.

quid? illa tandem quaestio aut disceptatio aut iudicium fuit? putabo fuisse. dicat qui volt hodie de illo populo concitato, cui tum populo mos gestus est, qua de re Iunius causam dixerit; quemcumque rogaveris, hoc respondebit, quod pecuniam acceperit, quod innocentem circumvenerit. est haec opinio. at, si ita esset, hac lege accusatum fuisse oportuit qua accusatur habitus. at ipse ea lege quaerebat. paucos dies exspectasset Quinctius. at neque privatus accusare nec sedata iam invidia volebat. videtis igitur non in causa sed in tempore ac potestate spem omnem accusatoris fuisse.

He sought a fine. By what law? Because he had not sworn into the law (which has never been a hurt to anyone), and because Gaius Verres, the city praetor (a sacred and diligent man), did not have the substitution of his lot in that codex which was then brought forth erased. For these causes Gaius Junius was condemned, gentlemen — most light and most weak ones, which ought not at all to have been brought into trial. So he was crushed not by the case but by the time.

multam petivit. qua lege? quod in legem non iurasset, quae res nemini umquam fraudi fuit, et quod C. Gaius Verres, praetor urbanus, homo sanctus et diligens, subsortitionem eius in eo codice non haberet qui tum interlitus proferebatur. his de causis C. Gaius Iunius condemnatus est, iudices, levissimis et infirmissimis, quas omnino in iudicium adferri non oportuit. itaque oppressus est non causa sed tempore.

Do you reckon that this trial ought to harm Cluentius? For what cause? If by the law Junius had not been substituted by lot, or if into some law he had at some time not sworn, was therefore by his condemnation anything being judged about Cluentius? "No," he says; "but he was condemned by those laws, because he had committed something against another law." Those who confess this — can they at the same time defend that that was a trial? "Therefore," he says, "the Roman people was hostile to Gaius Junius for this: because that trial was thought corrupted through him." Has the case then changed at this time? Is there now another matter, another reasoning of that trial, another nature of the whole business than there was then? I think no thing of those which were done could have been changed.

hoc vos Cluentio iudicium putatis obesse oportere? quam ob causam? si ex lege subsortitus non erat Iunius aut si in aliquam legem aliquando non iuraverat, idcirco illius damnatione aliquid de Cluentio iudicabatur? ’ non ’ inquit; ’sed ille idcirco illis legibus condemnatus est, quod contra aliam legem commiserat.’ qui hoc confitentur, possunt idem illud iudicium fuisse defendere? ’ ergo ’ inquit ’idcirco infestus tum populus Romanus fuit C. Gaio Iunio, quod illud iudicium corruptum per eum putabatur.’ num igitur hoc tempore causa mutata est? num alia res, alia ratio illius iudici, alia natura totius negoti nunc est ac tum fuit? non opinor ex eis rebus quae gestae sunt rem ullam potuisse mutari.

What then is the cause that now our defence is heard with such silence, while then to Junius the means of defending himself was snatched? Because then in the case there was nothing save hatred, error, suspicion, daily public meetings stirred up seditiously and popularly. The same tribune of the plebs was prosecuting in the meetings, the same at the benches; he was coming to the trial not only from a public meeting but even with the public meeting itself. Those Aurelian steps, then new, seemed built as if for the theatre of that trial; which when the prosecutor had filled with stirred-up men, there was for the defendant the means not only of speaking but not even of rising.

quid ergo est causae quod nunc nostra defensio audiatur tanto silentio, tum Iunio defendendi sui potestas erepta sit? quia tum in causa nihil erat praeter invidiam, errorem, suspicionem, contiones cotidianas seditiose ac populariter concitatas. accusabat tribunus plebis idem in contionibus, idem ad subsellia; ad iudicium non modo de contione sed etiam cum ipsa contione veniebat. gradus illi Aurelii tum novi quasi pro theatro illi iudicio aedificati videbantur; quos ubi accusator concitatis hominibus complerat, non modo dicendi ab reo sed ne surgendi quidem potestas erat.

Lately before Gaius Orchivius, my colleague, the place was not granted by the judges to Faustus Sulla on a matter of moneys remaining; not because they thought that Sulla was outside the law, or that the case of public money was contemned and cast aside, but because, with a tribune of the plebs prosecuting, they thought there could be no debate on equal terms. What shall I compare? Sulla with Junius? This tribune of the plebs with Quinctius? Or rather time with time? Sulla with the greatest resources, kinsmen, connections, friends, very many clients; while these for Junius were small and weak, sought and gathered by his own labour. Here a modest, modest tribune of the plebs, not only not seditious but even an adversary to the seditious; that one bitter, given to charges, a popular and turbulent man. This time calm and at peace; that one stirred up by all the storms of hatred. Although these things were so, in Faustus’s case yet those judges decided that the defendant was pleading on unfair terms, when to his adversary the highest force of power was added to the right of accusation.

nuper apud C. Gaium Orchivium, conlegam meum, locus ab iudicibus Fausto Sullae de pecuniis residuis non est constitutus, non quo illi aut exlegem esse Sullam aut causam pecuniae publicae contemptam atque abiectam putarent, sed quod accusante tribuno plebis condicione aequa disceptari posse non putaverunt. quid conferam? Sullamne cum Iunio, an hunc tribunum plebis cum Quinctio, an vero tempus cum tempore? Sulla maximis opibus, cognatis, adfinibus, necessariis, clientibus plurimis, haec autem apud Iunium parva et infirma et ipsius labore quaesita atque conlecta; hic tribunus plebis modestus, pudens, non modo non seditiosus sed etiam seditiosis adversarius, ille autem acerbus, criminosus, popularis homo ac turbulentus; tempus hoc tranquillum atque placatum, illud omnibus invidiae tempestatibus concitatum. quae cum ita essent, in Fausto tamen illi iudices statuerunt iniqua condicione reum causam dicere, cum adversario eius ad ius accusationis summa vis potestatis accederet.

Which reckoning, gentlemen, you ought diligently, by your wisdom and humanity, to consider and deeply to see through: what evil, what peril of how great force the tribunician force can bring upon each one of us, with hatred forged especially and with public meetings stirred up seditiously. In the best of times, by Hercules — when men kept themselves safe not by popular tossing but by dignity and innocence — yet neither Publius Popilius nor Quintus Metellus, most distinguished and most ample men, could withstand the tribunician force; much less in these times, with these morals, with these magistrates, can we be safe without your wisdom and the remedies of trials.

quam quidem rationem vos, iudices, diligenter pro vestra sapientia et humanitate cogitare et penitus perspicere debetis, quid mali, quantum periculi uni cuique nostrum inferre possit vis tribunicia, conflata praesertim invidia et contionibus seditiose concitatis. optimis hercule temporibus, tum cum homines se non iactatione populari sed dignitate atque innocentia tuebantur, tamen nec P. Publius Popilius neque Q. Quintus Metellus, clarissimi viri atque amplissimi, vim tribuniciam sustinere potuerunt, nedum his temporibus, his moribus, his magistratibus sine vestra sapientia ac sine iudiciorum remediis salvi esse possimus.

That, then, was not a trial like a trial, gentlemen, was not, in which no measure was used, no manner and custom kept, no case defended. It was that force, and (as I have often said) a kind of ruin and storm, and anything rather than a trial or debate or inquiry. But if there is anyone who thinks that was a trial and that one must abide by these matters judged, he yet ought to sunder this case from that. For from him — whether because he had not sworn into the law or because by the law he had not been substituted as judge — a fine, it is said, was sought. But Cluentius’s reasoning with those laws by which a fine was sought from Junius can in no part be joined.

non fuit illud igitur iudicium iudici simile, iudices, non fuit, in quo non modus ullus est adhibitus, non mos consuetudoque servata, non causa defensa; vis illa fuit et, ut saepe iam dixi, ruina quaedam atque tempestas et quidvis potius quam iudicium aut disceptatio aut quaestio. quod si quis est qui illud iudicium fuisse arbitretur et qui his rebus iudicatis standum putet, is tamen hanc causam ab illa debet seiungere. ab illo enim, sive quod in legem non iurasset sive quod ex lege subsortitus iudicem non esset, multa petita esse dicitur; Cluenti autem ratio cum illis legibus quibus a Iunio multa petita est nulla potest ex parte esse coniuncta.

But Bulbus too has been condemned. Add: "of treason," that you may understand that this trial is not joined with that. But this charge was thrown at him. I confess; but also that a legion was solicited by him in Illyricum has been made plain by the letters of Gaius Cosconius and by the testimonies of many — which charge was the proper one of that inquiry, and a thing held by the law of treason. But this most of all hurt him. That now is divination; if I may use it, see lest my conjecture be much truer. For I so think: that Bulbus, because he, a worthless, foul, dishonest man, polluted with many disgraces, was led into trial, was therefore the more easily condemned. You pick out for me from Bulbus’s whole case what is convenient for you, that you may say the judges followed it.

at enim etiam Bulbus est condemnatus. adde ’maiestatis,’ ut intellegas hoc iudicium cum illo non esse coniunctum. at est hoc illi crimen obiectum. fateor, sed etiam legionem esse ab eo sollicitatam in Illyrico C. Gaii Cosconi litteris et multorum testimoniis planum factum est, quod crimen erat proprium illius quaestionis et quae res lege maiestatis tenebatur. at hoc obfuit ei maxime. iam ista divinatio est; qua si uti licet, vide ne mea coniectura multo sit verior. ego enim sic arbitror, Bulbum, quod homo nequam, turpis, improbus, multis flagitiis contaminatus in iudicium sit adductus, idcirco facilius esse damnatum. tu mihi ex tota causa Bulbi quod tibi commodum est eligis ut id esse secutos iudices dicas.

Wherefore this trial of Bulbus’s ought no more to harm this case than those two trials recalled by the prosecutor — of Publius Popilius and Tiberius Gutta, who pleaded a case of canvassing, who were accused by those who themselves had been condemned of canvassing. Whom I think were not on this account restored as before because they made plain that those men had taken money for judging, but because they proved to the judges that, since they had reproached others in the same kind in which themselves had offended, they ought to come to the prizes of the law. Wherefore I think no one doubts that that condemnation of canvassing can in no part be joined with Cluentius’s case and your trial.

quapropter hoc Bulbi iudicium non plus huic obesse causae debet quam illa quae commemorata sunt ab accusatore duo iudicia P. Publii Popili et Ti. Tiberii Guttae, qui causam de ambitu dixerunt, qui accusati sunt ab eis qui erant ipsi ambitus condemnati; quos ego non idcirco esse arbitror in integrum restitutos quod planum fecerint illos ob rem iudicandam pecuniam accepisse sed quod iudicibus probarint, cum in eodem genere in quo ipsi offendissent alios reprendissent, se ad praemia legis venire oportere. quapropter neminem dubitare existimo quin illa damnatio ambitus nulla ex parte cum causa Cluenti vestroque iudicio coniuncta esse possit.

What of this — that Staienus has been condemned? I do not say at this time, gentlemen — which I do not know but ought to be said — that he was condemned of treason; I do not read out the testimonies of most honourable men which were said against Staienus by those who were under the most distinguished man Mamercus Aemilius as legates, prefects, and military tribunes; by whose testimonies it was made plain that, by his work most of all, when he was quaestor, a sedition was forged in the army. Nor do I read those testimonies which were spoken about the 600,000 sesterces which he, when he had taken them under the name of the Safinian trial (just as afterwards in Oppianicus’s), kept silent and held back.

quid quod Staienus est condemnatus? non dico hoc tempore, iudices, id quod nescio an dici oporteat, illum maiestatis esse condemnatum; non recito testimonia hominum honestissimorum quae in Staienum sunt dicta ab eis qui Mam. Aemilio, clarissimo viro, legati et praefecti et tribuni militares fuerunt; quorum testimoniis planum factum est maxime eius opera, cum quaestor esset, in exercitu seditionem esse conflatam; ne illa quidem testimonia recito quae dicta sunt de HS dc quae ille, cum accepisset nomine iudici Safiniani, sicut in Oppianici iudicio postea, reticuit atque suppressit.

I leave aside both these things and very many others which were said in that trial against Staienus. This I say: that there was then for Publius and Lucius Cominius, Roman knights, honourable and eloquent men, the same controversy with Staienus whom they were prosecuting which I now have with Attius. The Cominii said the same as I say: that Staienus had taken money from Oppianicus to corrupt the trial. Staienus said that he had taken it for the sake of winning favour.

omitto et haec et alia permulta quae illo iudicio in Staienum dicta sunt; hoc dico, eandem tum fuisse P. Publio et L. Lucio Cominiis, equitibus Romanis, honestis hominibus et disertis, controversiam cum Staieno quem accusabant quae nunc mihi est cum Attio. Cominii dicebant idem quod ego dico, Staienum ab Oppianico pecuniam accepisse ut iudicium corrumperet; Staienus conciliandae gratiae causa se accepisse dicebat.

This conciliation of his was laughed at, and the character of a good man taken on — as in those gilded statues which he set up at the temple of Juturna, on which he wrote that the kings had been brought back into favour by him. All his frauds and falsehoods were stirred up; his whole life, occupied in such reasoning, was opened. His domestic want, his forensic gain, was brought into the open. The money-taking interpreter of peace and concord was not approved. So Staienus then, while he defended the same as Attius now, was condemned.

inridebatur haec illius reconciliatio et persona viri boni suscepta, sicut in statuis inauratis quas posuit ad Iuturnae, quibus subscripsit reges ab se in gratiam esse reductos. exagitabantur omnes eius fraudes atque fallaciae, tota vita in eius modi ratione versata aperiebatur, egestas domestica, quaestus forensis in medium proferebatur, nummarius interpres pacis et concordiae non probabatur. itaque tum Staienus cum idem defenderet quod Attius condemnatus est;

The Cominii, when they handled this which we have handled in the whole case, proved it. Wherefore, if by Staienus’s condemnation it was judged that Oppianicus wished to corrupt the trial, that Oppianicus gave the money to a judge for buying votes; and since it has been laid down that in that fault either Cluentius or Oppianicus was; and no penny of Cluentius is found by any trace given to a judge, while Oppianicus’s money was taken away from a judge after the trial was made — can it be in doubt that that condemnation of Staienus is not only not against Cluentius but most of all confirms our case and defence?

Cominii cum hoc agerent quod nos in tota causa egimus probaverunt. quam ob rem, si Staieni damnatione Oppianicum iudicium corrumpere voluisse, Oppianicum iudici ad emendas sententias dedisse pecuniam iudicatum est, et, cum ita constitutum sit ut in illa culpa aut Cluentius sit aut Oppianicus, Cluenti nummus nullus iudici datus ullo vestigio reperitur, Oppianici pecunia post iudicium factum ab iudice ablata est: potest esse dubium quin illa damnatio Staieni non modo non sit contra Cluentium sed maxime nostram causam defensionemque confirmet?

So now I see that the trial of Junius is of such a kind that I think it must be called rather a sedition’s incursion, the force of a multitude, a tribunician onset, than a trial. But if anyone should call it a trial, yet he must necessarily confess this: that the fine which was sought from Junius can in no way be joined with Cluentius’s case. The Junian therefore was done by force; that of Bulbus and Popilius and Gutta is not against Cluentius; that of Staienus is even for Cluentius. Let us see if any other trial we can bring forth which is for Cluentius. Did Gaius Fidiculanius Falcula, who had condemned Oppianicus, plead a case — especially when (which was most odious in that trial) he had sat for a few days from substitution? He pleaded, and twice indeed pleaded. For Lucius Quinctius had brought him into the highest hatred by daily seditious and turbulent meetings. In one trial a fine was sought from him, just as from Junius, because he had not sat by the duty of his own decury or by the law. He was accused at a somewhat calmer time than Junius, but on almost the same law and charge. Because no sedition or force or tumult was at large in the trial, in the first hearing he was most easily acquitted. I do not count this acquittal. For nevertheless it can be that, although he had not committed that fine, yet he had taken for judging — as Staienus’s case of money taken for judging on that law was nowhere pleaded. The proper charge of that inquiry was not that.

ergo adhuc Iuni iudicium video esse eius modi ut incursionem potius seditionis, vim multitudinis, impetum tribunicium quam iudicium appellandum putem. quod si quis illud iudicium appellet, tamen hoc confiteatur necesse est, nullo modo illam multam quae ab Iunio petita sit cum Cluenti causa posse coniungi. illud igitur Iunianum per vim factum est, Bulbi et Popili et Guttae contra Cluentium non est, Staieni etiam pro Cluentio est. videamus ecquod aliud iudicium quod pro Cluentio sit proferre possimus. dixitne tandem causam C. Gaius Fidiculanius Falcula qui Oppianicum condemnarat, cum praesertim, id quod fuit in illo iudicio invidiosissimum, paucos dies ex subsortitione sedisset? dixit et bis quidem dixit. in summam enim L. Lucius Quinctius invidiam contionibus eum cotidianis seditiosis et turbulentis adduxerat. Vno iudicio multa est ab eo petita, sicut ab Iunio, quod non suae decuriae munere neque ex lege sedisset. Paulo sedatiore tempore est accusatus quam Iunius, sed eadem fere lege et crimine. quia nulla in iudicio seditio neque vis nec turba versata est, prima actione facillime est absolutus. non numero hanc absolutionem; nihilo minus enim potest, ut illam multam non commiserit, accepisse tamen ob rem iudicandam, sicut causam pecunia ob rem iudicandam capta nusquam Staienus ea quidem lege dixit. proprium crimen illud quaestionis eius non fuit.

What was Fidiculanius said to have done? To have taken from Cluentius 400,000 sesterces. Of what order was he? Senatorial. By the law on which an account is wont to be sought from a senator in that kind — of extortion — by that law accused, he was most honourably acquitted. For the case was conducted in the manner of our ancestors, without force, without fear, without peril. All things were said and set out and shown. The judges were brought to think that not only could he honestly be condemned by the man who had not sat throughout, but, even if that judge had known nothing else save what was agreed had been the prejudgements about him, he ought to have heard nothing besides.

Fidiculanius quid fecisse dicebatur? accepisse a Cluentio HS cccc. cuius erat ordinis? senatorii. qua lege in eo genere a senatore ratio repeti solet, de pecuniis repetundis, ea lege accusatus honestissime est absolutus. Acta est enim causa more maiorum sine vi, sine metu, sine periculo; dicta et exposita et demonstrata sunt omnia. adducti iudices sunt non modo potuisse honeste ab eo reum condemnari qui non perpetuo sedisset sed, aliud si is iudex nihil scisset, nisi quae praeiudicia de eo facta esse constaret, audire praeterea nihil debuisse.

Then those five too, who, hunting the little rumours of unskilled men, had then acquitted him, now did not greatly wish their clemency to be praised. From whom if anyone should ask whether they sat as judges over Gaius Fabricius, they would say they had sat. If they were asked whether he had been accused on any charge save of that poison which had been sought to be given to Habitus, they would deny it. If they were then asked what they judged, they would say they had condemned. For no one acquitted. In the same way, if it had been asked of Scamander, surely they would have answered the same. Although he was acquitted by one vote, but that one no one of those would then have wished it to be called his.

tum etiam illi quinque qui imperitorum hominum rumusculos aucupati tum illum absolverunt iam suam clementiam laudari magno opere nolebant; a quibus si qui quaereret sedissentne iudices in C. Gaium Fabricium, sedisse se dicerent; si interrogarentur num quo crimine is esset accusatus praeterquam veneni eius quod quaesitum habito diceretur, negarent; si deinde essent rogati quid iudicassent, condemnasse se dicerent; nemo enim absolvit. eodem modo quaesitum si esset de Scamandro, certe idem respondissent; tametsi ille una sententia est absolutus, sed illam unam nemo tum istorum suam dici vellet.

Which then would more easily render the reckoning of his vote? He who says he was consistent both with himself and with the matter judged, or he who answered that he was lenient toward the chief of the evil deed, most vehement against his helpers and accomplices? About whose vote I ought not to dispute. For I do not doubt that those such men, struck by some sudden suspicion, swerved from their position. Wherefore the pity of those who acquitted I do not reproach. The constancy of those who in judging followed the previous judgements of their own accord (not by Staienus’s fraud) I approve. The wisdom indeed of those who said that it was not clear to them I praise — who could in no way acquit the man whom they had known most guilty and whom they themselves had twice already before condemned, while to condemn him, with so great an infamy of council and the suspicion of so atrocious a thing thrown in, they preferred a little later, with the matter made plain.

Vter igitur facilius suae sententiae rationem redderet, isne qui se et sibi et rei iudicatae constitisse dicit, an ille qui se in principem malefici lenem, in adiutores eius et conscios vehementissimum esse respondit? quorum ego de sententia non debeo disputare; neque enim dubito quin ei tales viri suspicione aliqua perculsi repentina de statu suo declinarint. qua re eorum qui absolverunt misericordiam non reprendo, eorum qui in iudicando superiora iudicia secuti sunt sua sponte, non Staieni fraude, constantiam comprobo, eorum vero qui sibi non liquere dixerunt sapientiam laudo, qui absolvere eum quem nocentissimum cognorant et quem ipsi bis iam antea condemnarant nullo modo poterant, condemnare, cum tanta consili infamia et tam atrocis rei suspicio esset iniecta, paulo posterius patefacta re maluerunt.

And lest you should judge them wise only from the deed, but rather should approve that what these men did was done most rightly and most wisely from the men themselves, who can be recalled more prudent in talent than Publius Octavius Balbus, more experienced in law, more diligent or more pure in faith, religious obligation, duty? He did not acquit. Who more constant than Quintus Considius, who more experienced in trials and that dignity which ought to be at large in public trials, who more outstanding in virtue, counsel, authority? Not even he acquitted. It is long thus to speak of each one’s virtue, and the things which are now known to all do not seek the ornaments of words. What kind of man Marcus Iuventius Pedo was, of that old discipline of the trials; what kind Lucius Caulius Mergus, Marcus Basilus, Gaius Caudinus! All of whom in the public trials, with the commonwealth then flourishing, flourished. Of the same number Lucius Cassius, Gnaeus Heius of equal integrity and prudence; by the vote of none of whom was Oppianicus acquitted. And among all these the youngest in age, in talent and diligence and religion equal to those whom I have named before, Publius Saturius, was of the same opinion.

ac ne ex facto solum sapientes illos iudicetis, sed etiam ex hominibus ipsis quod hi fecerunt rectissime ac sapientissime factum probetis, quis P. Publio Octavio Balbo ingenio prudentior, iure peritior, fide, religione, officio diligentior aut sanctior commemorari potest? non absolvit. quis Q. Quinto Considio constantior, quis iudiciorum atque eius dignitatis quae in iudiciis publicis versari debet peritior, quis virtute, consilio, auctoritate praestantior? ne is quidem absolvit. longum est de singulorum virtute ita dicere, quaeque iam cognita sunt ab omnibus verborum ornamenta non quaerunt. qualis vir M. Marcus Iuventius Pedo fuit ex vetere illa iudiciorum disciplina, qualis L. Lucius Caulius mergus, M. Marcus Basilus, C. Gaius Caudinus! qui omnes in iudiciis publicis iam tum florente re publica floruerunt. ex eodem numero L. Lucius Cassius, Cn. Gnaeus Heius pari et integritate et prudentia; quorum nullius sententia est Oppianicus absolutus. atque in his omnibus natu minimus, ingenio et diligentia et religione par eis quos antea commemoravi, P. Publius Saturius, in eadem sententia fuit.

O singular innocence of Oppianicus! Toward which defendant who acquitted is reckoned canvassing, who delayed cautious, who condemned constant. These things, with Quinctius then acting, were shown neither in the public meeting nor in the trial. For neither he himself suffered them to be said, nor through the stirred-up multitude could anyone stand to speak. So he himself, after he overthrew Junius, abandoned the whole case. For in those few days he himself became a private man, and he understood that men’s zeal had cooled. But if, in those days through which he prosecuted Junius, he had wished to prosecute Fidiculanius, the means of answering would not have been given to Fidiculanius. And at first indeed he was threatening all those judges who had condemned Oppianicus.

O innocentiam Oppianici singularem! quo in reo qui absolvit ambitiosus, qui distulit cautus, qui condemnavit constans existimatur. haec tum agente Quinctio neque in contione neque in iudicio demonstrata sunt; neque enim ipse dici patiebatur nec per multitudinem concitatam consistere cuiquam in dicendo licebat. itaque ipse postquam Iunium pervertit, totam causam reliquit; paucis enim diebus illis et ipse privatus est factus et hominum studia defervisse intellegebat. quod si, per quos dies Iunium accusavit, Fidiculanium accusare voluisset, respondendi Fidiculanio potestas facta non esset. ac primo quidem omnibus illis iudicibus qui Oppianicum condemnarant minabatur.

You knew the man’s insolence; you knew his spirits and tribunician airs. What hatred was there, immortal gods! What pride, what ignorance of self, how grave and how unbearable arrogance! Who took even this very thing bitterly — from which all those things were born — that Oppianicus was not granted as a gift to him and to his defence; just as if it ought not have been sign enough that he was abandoned by all who had betaken himself to that patron. For at Rome there was the highest abundance of patrons, of most eloquent and most ample men, of whom surely some one would have defended a Roman knight, noble in his town, if he had thought such a case could honourably be defended.

iam insolentiam noratis hominis, noratis animos eius ac spiritus tribunicios. quod erat odium, di immortales! quae superbia, quanta ignoratio sui, quam gravis atque intolerabilis adrogantia! qui illud iam ipsum acerbe tulerit, ex quo illa nata sunt omnia, non sibi ac defensioni suae condonatum esse Oppianicum; proinde quasi non satis signi esse debuerit ab omnibus eum fuisse desertum qui se ad patronum illum contulisset. erat enim Romae summa copia patronorum, hominum eloquentissimorum atque amplissimorum, quorum certe aliquis defendisset equitem Romanum in municipio suo nobilem, si honeste putasset eius modi causam posse defendi.

For Quinctius indeed — when had he ever before pleaded a case, at almost fifty years of age? Who had ever seen him not only in the place of patron but of a more polished supporter? Who, because he had taken the rostra (long empty, that place since the coming of Lucius Sulla deserted from the tribunician voice), and had recalled the multitude (long unaccustomed to public meetings) to the likeness of the old custom, was therefore for a little while more pleasant to a certain kind of men. And the same one in how great hatred he was afterwards with those very men through whom he had ascended into a higher place!

nam Quinctius quidem quam causam umquam antea dixerat, cum annos ad quinquaginta natus esset? quis eum umquam non modo in patroni sed in lautioris advocati loco viderat? qui quod rostra iam diu vacua locumque illum post adventum L. Lucii Sullae a tribunicia voce desertum oppresserat multitudinemque desuefactam iam a contionibus ad veteris consuetudinis similitudinem revocarat, idcirco cuidam hominum generi paulisper iucundior fuit. atque idem quanto in odio postea fuit illis ipsis per quos in altiorem locum ascenderat!

Nor unjustly. For see to it that you recall not only his morals and arrogance but also his face and dress and even that purple cast down to his ankles. He, as if it were not in any way to be borne that he had departed conquered from a trial, brought the matter from the benches to the rostra. And do we already complain often that for new men there are not great enough rewards in this state? I deny that they were ever anywhere greater. Where, if anyone born in an ignoble place so lives that he seems able to keep the dignity of nobility by virtue, he comes thither, as long as industry with innocence has gone with him.

neque iniuria. facite enim ut non solum mores et adrogantiam eius sed etiam voltum atque amictum atque etiam illam usque ad talos demissam purpuram recordemini. is, quasi non esset ullo modo ferendum se ex iudicio discessisse victum, rem ab subselliis ad rostra detulit. et iam querimur saepe hominibus novis non satis magnos in hac civitate esse fructus? nego usquam umquam fuisse maiores; ubi si quis ignobili loco natus ita vivit ut nobilitatis dignitatem virtute tueri posse videatur, usque eo pervenit quoad eum industria cum innocentia prosecuta est.

But if anyone leans on this one thing — that he is ignoble — he often goes further than if the same man with the same vices were most noble. As Quinctius (for I shall say nothing about the rest), if he had been a noble man, who could have borne him with that pride and intolerance? Because he was in that place, they so bore him that, if he had something good from nature, they thought it ought to profit him; but his pride and arrogance they reckoned should rather be laughed at, on account of the lowness of the man, than feared. But that I may return thither: at the time when Fidiculanius was acquitted, you who recall trials made — what then do you reckon was judged? Surely that he had judged gratis.

si quis autem hoc uno nititur quod sit ignobilis, procedit saepe longius quam si idem ille esset cum isdem suis vitiis nobilissimus. Vt Quinctius — nihil enim dicam de ceteris — si fuisset homo nobilis, quis eum cum illa superbia atque intolerantia ferre potuisset? quod eo loco fuit, ita tulerunt ut, si quid haberet a natura boni, prodesse ei putarent oportere, superbiam autem atque adrogantiam eius deridendam magis arbitrarentur propter humilitatem hominis quam pertimescendam. sed ut illuc revertar, quo tempore Fidiculanius est absolutus, tu qui iudicia facta commemoras quid tum esse existimas iudicatum? certe gratiis iudicasse.

But he had condemned, but he had not heard the whole case, but in all the public meetings by Lucius Quinctius the tribune of the plebs he had been vehemently and often harassed. All those Quinctian things, then, the judges judged unjust, false, turbulent, popular, seditious. Be it so: Falcula could be innocent. Now therefore someone condemned Oppianicus gratis; now Junius did not substitute by lot those who would condemn with money taken; now someone can not have sat from the start and yet have condemned Oppianicus gratis. But if Falcula was innocent, I ask who is guilty. If he condemned gratis, who took? I deny that anything was thrown at any of those which was not thrown at Fidiculanius; that there was anything in Fidiculanius’s case which was not the same in the rest’s.

at condemnarat, at causam totam non audierat, at in contionibus omnibus a L. Lucio Quinctio, tribuno plebis, vehementer erat et saepe vexatus. illa igitur omnia Quinctiana iniqua, falsa, turbulenta, popularia, seditiosa iudices iudicaverunt. esto, potuit esse innocens Falcula. iam ergo aliquis Oppianicum gratiis condemnavit, iam non eos Iunius subsortitus est qui pecunia accepta condemnarent, iam potest aliquis ab initio non sedisse et tamen Oppianicum gratiis condemnasse. verum, si innocens Falcula, quaero quis sit nocens; si hic gratiis condemnavit, quis accepit? nego rem esse ullam cuiquam illorum obiectam quae Fidiculanio non obiecta sit, aliquid fuisse in Fidiculani causa quod idem non esset in ceterorum.

Either you must reproach this trial, whose prosecution leans on matters judged, or, if you grant this to be true, confess that Oppianicus was condemned gratis. Although it ought to be a great enough proof that out of so many judges, with Falcula acquitted, no other was made defendant. Why do you gather for me men condemned of canvassing on another law, on fixed charges, with very many witnesses? Since they themselves first ought to have been accused of extortion rather than of canvassing. For if in canvassing trials this hurt them, when they were pleading on another law, surely, if they had been brought on the proper law of this offence, it would have hurt much more.

aut hoc iudicium reprehendas tu cuius accusatio rebus iudicatis nitebatur necesse est aut, si hoc verum esse concedis, Oppianicum gratiis condemnatum esse fateare. quamquam satis magno argumento esse debet quod ex tam multis iudicibus absoluto Falcula nemo reus factus est. quid enim mihi damnatos ambitus conligitis alia lege, certis criminibus, plurimis testibus? cum primum illi ipsi debuerint potius accusari de pecuniis repetundis quam ambitus. nam si in ambitus iudiciis hoc eis obfuit, cum alia lege causam dicerent, certe, si propria lege huius peccati adducti essent, multo plus obfuisset.

Then if so great force was in this charge that, on whatever law each of those judges had been made defendant, he yet should perish by this blow, why, in such a multitude of accusers, with such great rewards, were the rest not made defendants? Here is brought forth what ought not to be called a trial: that against Publius Septimius Scaevola a fine was assessed under that name. What custom is in this matter, since I am speaking before most experienced men, I ought not to teach in many words. For never was that diligence which is wont to be brought to the rest of trials brought to the same defendant condemned.

deinde, si tanta vis fuit istius criminis ut, qua quisque lege ex illis iudicibus reus factus esset, tamen hac plaga periret, cur in tanta multitudine accusatorum, tantis praemiis, ceteri rei facti non sunt? hic profertur id quod iudicium appellari non oportet, P. Publio Septimio Scaevolae litem eo nomine esse aestimatam. cuius rei quae consuetudo sit, quoniam apud homines peritissimos dico, pluribus verbis docere non debeo. numquam enim ea diligentia quae solet adhiberi in ceteris iudiciis, eadem reo damnato adhibita est.

In assessing fines the judges generally either, because they think the man whom they have once condemned is hostile to them, if any capital suit has been brought against him, do not admit it; or, because they reckon they have already finished, when they have judged about the defendant, they attend more carelessly to the rest. So very many have been acquitted of treason for whom, condemned of extortion, fines on treason had been assessed. And we see this happen daily: that, with a defendant condemned of extortion, those to whom it has been laid down (in assessing fines) that the moneys had come, the same judges acquit. When this happens, trials are not rescinded; but it is laid down that the assessment of fines is not a trial. Scaevola was condemned on other charges, with very many witnesses from Apulia. With every contention it was fought that this fine should be assessed for capital. Which thing, if it had had the weight of a matter judged, he would afterwards, by the same or by other enemies, have been made defendant on this very law.

in litibus aestimandis fere iudices aut, quod sibi eum quem semel condemnarunt inimicum putant esse, si qua in eum lis capitis inlata est, non admittunt aut, quod se perfunctos iam esse arbitrantur cum de reo iudicarunt, neglegentius attendunt cetera. itaque et maiestatis absoluti sunt permulti quibus damnatis de pecuniis repetundis lites maiestatis essent aestimatae, et hoc cotidie fieri videmus ut reo damnato de pecuniis repetundis, ad quos pervenisse pecunias in litibus aestimandis statutum sit, eos idem iudices absolvant; quod cum fit, non iudicia rescinduntur sed hoc statuitur, aestimationem litium non esse iudicium. Scaevola condemnatus est aliis criminibus frequentissimis Apuliae testibus. omni contentione pugnatum est uti lis haec capitis aestimaretur. quae res si rei iudicatae pondus habuisset, ille postea vel isdem vel aliis inimicis reus hac lege ipsa factus esset.

What follows is what they call a trial, but our ancestors never named a trial nor regarded as much as a matter judged: the animadversion and authority of the censors. About which, before I begin to speak, I must say a very few words about my duty, that the reasoning both of this man’s peril and of the rest of duties and friendships may seem to be kept by me. For I have friendship with the brave men who were last censors, both. With the one indeed (as most of you know) there is great use, and the highest connection has been set up between the duties of each.

sequitur id quod illi iudicium appellant, maiores autem nostri numquam neque iudicium nominarunt neque proinde ut rem iudicatam observarunt, animadversio atque auctoritas censoria. qua de re ante quam dicere incipio, perpauca mihi de meo officio verba facienda sunt, ut a me cum huiusce periculi tum ceterorum quoque officiorum et amicitiarum ratio conservata esse videatur. nam mihi cum viris fortibus qui censores proxime fuerunt ambobus est amicitia; cum altero vero, sicuti plerique vestrum sciunt, magnus usus et summa utriusque officiis constituta necessitudo est.

Wherefore whatever I shall have to say of their entries, I shall say it with such mind that I would have all my speech reckoned not about their deed but about the censorial reasoning. From Lentulus, my familiar, who is named by me for honour’s sake on account of his outstanding virtue and the highest honours which he has obtained from the Roman people, I shall easily get this, gentlemen: that the faith and diligence, the force of mind and freedom of speaking which he himself is wont to bring to the perils of friends, of these he should grant me to take so much for myself as I cannot pass over without his peril. By me yet, as is fair, all things shall be said cautiously and step by step, that neither the faith of this defence may seem abandoned nor anyone’s dignity hurt or friendship violated.

qua re quicquid de subscriptionibus eorum mihi dicendum erit, eo dicam animo ut omnem orationem meam non de illorum facto sed de ratione censoria habitam existimari velim; a Lentulo autem, familiari meo, qui a me pro eximia sua virtute summisque honoribus quos a populo Romano adeptus est honoris causa nominatur, facile hoc, iudices, impetrabo ut, quam ipse adhibere consuevit in amicorum periculis cum fidem et diligentiam tum vim animi libertatemque dicendi, ex hac mihi concedat ut tantum mihi sumam quantum sine huius periculo praeterire non possim. A me tamen, ut aequum est, omnia caute pedetemptimque dicentur ut neque fides huius defensionis relicta neque cuiusquam aut dignitas laesa aut amicitia violata esse videatur.

I see therefore, gentlemen, that the censors animadverted on certain judges of that Junian council, when they entered this very cause. Here first I shall set forth this common point: that this state has never been so content with censorial animadversions as with matters judged. Nor shall I spend time on a known matter. As example I shall set down this one thing: that Gaius Geta, when he had been cast out of the senate by Lucius Metellus and Gnaeus Domitius the censors, was himself afterwards made censor; and that he, whose morals had been reproached by the censors, this same man was afterwards in charge of the morals both of the Roman people and of those who had animadverted on him. But if that were thought a trial, as the rest condemned by a foul trial are for ever deprived of all honour and dignity, so for men marked by ignominy there would be neither approach to honour nor return into the senate-house.

video igitur, iudices, animadvertisse censores in iudices quosdam illius consili Iuniani, cum istam ipsam causam subscriberent. hic illud primum commune proponam, numquam animadversionibus censoriis hanc civitatem ita contentam ut rebus iudicatis fuisse. neque in re nota consumam tempus; exempli causa ponam illud unum, C. Gaium Getam, cum a L. Lucio Metello et Cn. Gnaeo Domitio censoribus ex senatu eiectus esset, censorem esse ipsum postea factum et, cuius mores erant a censoribus reprehensi, hunc postea et populi Romani et eorum qui in ipsum animadverterant moribus praefuisse. quod si illud iudicium putaretur, ut ceteri turpi iudicio damnati in perpetuum omni honore ac dignitate privantur, sic hominibus ignominia notatis neque ad honorem aditus neque in curiam reditus esset.

Now if any freedman of Gnaeus Lentulus or Lucius Gellius shall be condemned of theft, he, with all ornaments lost, shall never recover any part of his honour. But those whom Lucius Gellius and Gnaeus Lentulus themselves — two censors, most distinguished men and wisest — marked under the name of theft and of moneys taken, these not only returned to the senate but were even acquitted in the trials of those very things. Our ancestors wished no man to be a judge — not only of any man’s standing, but not even of the smallest matter of money — save him on whom the parties had agreed. Wherefore in all laws in which it has been excepted on what causes either it shall not be lawful to take a magistracy, or to be chosen as judge, or to accuse another — this thing of ignominy has been passed over. For they wished the cause of fear, not the punishment of life, to be in that power. So I shall not only show what now you see,

nunc si quem Cn. Gnaei Lentuli aut L. Lucii Gelli libertus furti condemnarit, is omnibus ornamentis amissis numquam ullam honestatis suae partem reciperabit; quos autem ipse L. Lucius Gellius et Cn. Gnaeus Lentulus, duo censores, clarissimi viri sapientissimique homines, furti et captarum pecuniarum nomine notaverunt, ei non modo in senatum redierunt sed etiam illarum ipsarum rerum iudiciis absoluti sunt. neminem voluerunt maiores nostri non modo de existimatione cuiusquam sed ne pecuniaria quidem de re minima esse iudicem, nisi qui inter adversarios convenisset. quapropter in omnibus legibus quibus exceptum est de quibus causis aut magistratum capere non liceat aut iudicem legi aut alterum accusare, haec ignominiae causa praetermissa est. timoris enim causam, non vitae poenam in illa potestate esse voluerunt. itaque non solum illud ostendam quod iam videtis,

that very often the censorial entries have been taken away by the votes of the Roman people, but also by the trials of those who under oath were bound to determine with greater religious obligation and diligence. First the judges, the senators and Roman knights, in very many defendants now, against whom it has been entered that they took moneys against the laws, have obeyed their own religious obligation rather than the censors’ opinion. Then the city praetors, who under oath ought to enrol all the best as picked judges, have never reckoned that for that thing the censorial ignominy ought to be a hindrance to them.

populi Romani suffragiis saepenumero censorias subscriptiones esse sublatas, verum etiam iudiciis eorum qui iurati statuere maiore cum religione et diligentia debuerunt. primum iudices, senatores equitesque Romani, in compluribus iam reis quos contra leges pecunias accepisse subscriptum est suae potius religioni quam censorum opinioni paruerunt. deinde praetores urbani qui iurati debent optimum quemque in lectos iudices referre numquam sibi ad eam rem censoriam ignominiam impedimento esse oportere duxerunt.

The censors themselves often have not stood by the judgements of earlier censors — if you wish to call those judgements. And even the censors themselves among themselves so reckon their own judgements of such weight that the one not only reproaches the other’s judgement but even rescinds it: that the one wishes to remove from the senate, the other keeps in and reckons worthy of the most ample order; that the one orders some entered as aerarii or moved from a tribe, the other forbids it. Wherefore why does it come into your mind to call these things "trials," which you see rescinded by the Roman people, repudiated by sworn judges, neglected by magistrates, changed by those who have got the same power, differ between colleagues?

censores denique ipsi saepe numero superiorum censorum iudiciis, si ista iudicia appellare voltis, non steterunt. atque etiam ipsi inter se censores sua iudicia tanti esse arbitrantur ut alter alterius iudicium non modo reprehendat sed etiam rescindat, ut alter de senatu movere velit, alter retineat et ordine amplissimo dignum existimet, ut alter in aerarios referri aut tribu moveri iubeat, alter vetet. qua re qui vobis in mentem venit haec appellare iudicia quae a populo Romano rescindi, ab iuratis iudicibus repudiari, a magistratibus neglegi, ab eis qui eandem potestatem adepti sunt commutari, inter conlegas discrepare videatis?

Since these things are so, let us see what at last the censors are said to have judged about that corrupted trial. And first let us decide whether, because the censors have entered, it is so; or, because it was so, they have entered. If because they have entered, see what you do, lest into each one of us you grant in future a kingly power to censors; lest the censorial entry be able to bring no less of calamity to citizens than that most bitter proscription; lest we hereafter as much fear the censorial pen, whose point our ancestors have blunted by many remedies, as that dictatorial sword. But if what has been entered

quae cum ita sint, videamus quid tandem censores de illo iudicio corrupto iudicasse dicantur. ac primum illud statuamus utrum, quia censores subscripserint, ita sit, an, quia ita fuerit, illi subscripserint. si quia subscripserint, videte quid agatis ne in unum quemque nostrum censoribus in posterum potestatem regiam permittatis, ne subscriptio censoria non minus calamitatis civibus quam illa acerbissima proscriptio possit adferre, ne censorium stilum cuius mucronem multis remediis maiores nostri rettuderunt aeque posthac atque illum dictatorium gladium pertimescamus. sin autem quod subscriptum est,

ought to be grave because it is true, let us ask whether it is true or false. Let the censorial authorities be set aside; let what is not in the case be taken from the case. Show what money Cluentius gave, whence he gave, in what manner he gave; finally show one trace of money set out by Cluentius. Then convince that Oppianicus was a good man, an upright man; that nothing was ever thought otherwise of him, that nothing was prejudged. Then embrace the censorial authority; then defend that their judgement was joined to the matter.

quia verum est, idcirco grave debet esse, hoc quaeramus verum sit an falsum; removeantur auctoritates censoriae, tollatur id ex causa quod in causa non est; doce quam pecuniam Cluentius dederit, unde dederit, quem ad modum dederit; unum denique aliquod a Cluentio profectae pecuniae vestigium ostende. vince deinde bonum virum fuisse Oppianicum, hominem integrum, nihil de illo umquam secus esse existimatum, nihil denique praeiudicatum. tum auctoritatem censoriam amplexato, tum illorum iudicium cum re coniunctum esse defendito.

But while it shall stand fixed that Oppianicus was the man who was judged to have corrupted the public records of the town with his own hand, who erased a will, who saw to the sealing of a false will under a substituted person, who killed the man in whose name it was sealed, who killed the uncle of his own son in slavery and in chains, who saw to it that his townsmen were proscribed and killed, who took in marriage the wife of the man he had killed, who gave money for an abortion, who killed his mother-in-law, who killed his wives, who at one time killed his brother’s wife and the children hoped for and his brother himself, who finally killed his own children, who, when he wished to give poison to his stepson, was caught manifestly; with whose ministers and accomplices condemned, he himself, brought to trial, gave money to a judge for corrupting the votes of the judges — while these things, I say, shall stand fixed about Oppianicus, and the charge of Cluentian money shall be held by no proof, what is there that this censorial will or opinion (whatever it was) can seem to help you or to oppress this innocent man?

dum vero eum fuisse Oppianicum constabit qui tabulas publicas municipi manu sua corrupisse iudicatus sit, qui testamentum interleverit, qui supposita persona falsum testamentum obsignandum curaverit, qui eum cuius nomine id obsignatum est interfecerit, qui avunculum fili sui in servitute ac vinculis necaverit, qui municipes suos proscribendos occidendosque curaverit, qui eius uxorem quem occiderat in matrimonium duxerit, qui pecuniam pro abortione dederit, qui socrum, qui uxores, qui uno tempore fratris uxorem speratosque liberos fratremque ipsum, qui denique suos liberos interfecerit, qui, cum venenum privigno suo dare vellet, manifesto deprehensus sit, cuius ministris consciisque damnatis ipse adductus in iudicium pecuniam iudici dederit ad sententias iudicum corrumpendas, dum haec, inquam, de Oppianico constabunt neque ullo argumento Cluentianae pecuniae crimen tenebitur, quid est quod te ista censoria sive voluntas sive opinio fuit adiuvare aut hunc innocentem opprimere posse videatur?

What then did the censors follow? Not even themselves — to put it most gravely — will say anything else save talk and rumour. They will say that they learned nothing by witnesses, nothing by records, nothing by any grave proof; finally that they laid down nothing with the case learned. But if they had done so, yet it ought not to be so fixed that it could not be plucked out. I shall not use the supply of examples (which is the highest); I shall not bring forth an old matter, not some powerful or well-favoured man. Lately a slight man, a clerk to the aediles, Decimus Matrinius, when I had defended him before Marcus Junius and Quintus Publicius the praetors, and Marcus Plaetorius and Gaius Flaminius the curule aediles, I persuaded that they should under oath choose as clerk him whom these very same censors had left as aerarius. For when in the man no fault was found, they reckoned that what he had deserved (not what had been laid down about him) had to be asked.

quid igitur censores secuti sunt? ne ipsi quidem, ut gravissime dicam, quicquam aliud dicent praeter sermonem atque famam. nihil se testibus, nihil tabulis, nihil aliquo gravi argumento comperisse, nihil denique causa cognita statuisse dicent. quod si ita fecissent, tamen id non ita fixum esse deberet ut convelli non liceret. non utar exemplorum copia quae summa est, non rem veterem, non hominem potentem aliquem aut gratiosum proferam. nuper hominem tenuem, scribam aedilicium, D. Decimum Matrinium, cum defendissem apud M. Marcum Iunium Q. Quintum Publicium praetores et M. Marcum Plaetorium C. Gaium Flaminium aedilis curulis, persuasi ut scribam iurati legerent eum quem idem isti censores aerarium reliquissent. cum enim in homine nulla culpa inveniretur, quid ille meruisset, non quid de eo statutum esset, quaerendum esse duxerunt.

For these things which they have entered about the corrupted trial — who is there who reckons that they have been learned enough by them and judged diligently? Against Manius Aquilius and against Tiberius Gutta I see it has been entered. What is this? They judge that two alone were corrupted by money. The rest, of course, condemned gratis. Therefore he was not circumvented, not pressed down by money, not (as it was held in that Quinctian public meeting) all those who condemned Oppianicus must be set in fault and suspicion. Two alone I see by the authority of the censors are judged kin to that foulness. Or let them bring forth that they have learned about the rest something which they had learned about these two.

nam haec quidem quae de iudicio corrupto subscripserint quis est qui ab illis satis cognita et diligenter iudicata arbitretur? in M’. Manlium Aquilium et in Ti. Tiberium Guttam video esse subscriptum. quid est hoc? duos esse corruptos solos pecunia iudicant; ceteri videlicet gratiis condemnarunt. non est igitur circumventus, non oppressus pecunia, non, ut in illa Quinctiana contione habebatur, omnes qui Oppianicum condemnarunt in culpa sunt ac suspicione ponendi. duos solos video auctoritate censorum adfinis ei turpitudini iudicari. aut illud adferant, aliquid eos quod de his duobus habuerint compertum de ceteris comperisse.

For this is least to be approved: that they have transferred to the censorial entries and authority an example from the military custom. For our ancestors so laid it down: that, if a disgrace of military matter had been committed by many, by lot it should be animadverted upon some, that fear, of course, should reach all, but punishment a few. Why does the same fit the censors in choice of dignity and in the judgement of citizens and in the animadversion of vices? For a soldier who has not held his place, who has feared the onset and force of the enemy, can the same afterwards be both a better soldier and a good man and a useful citizen. Wherefore lest in war, on account of fear of the enemy, anyone should fall into fault, an ampler fear of death and punishment was set up by our ancestors. But lest too many should undergo capital punishment, therefore that drawing of lots was prepared.

nam illud quidem minime probandum est, ad notationes auctoritatemque censoriam exemplum illos e consuetudine militari transtulisse. statuerunt enim ita maiores nostri ut, si a multis esset flagitium rei militaris admissum, sortito in quosdam animadverteretur, ut metus videlicet ad omnis, poena ad paucos perveniret. quod idem facere censores in delectu dignitatis et in iudicio civium et in animadversione vitiorum qui convenit? nam miles qui locum non tenuit, qui hostium impetum vimque pertimuit, potest idem postea et miles esse melior et vir bonus et civis utilis. qua re ne quis in bello propter hostium metum delinqueret, amplior ei mortis et supplici metus est a maioribus constitutus; ne autem nimium multi poenam capitis subirent, idcirco illa sortitio comparata est.

Will you do the same as censor in choosing the senate? If there shall be more who took money for condemning an innocent man, will you not animadvert on all, but pluck off as you wish, and pick a few of many for ignominy by lot? Will the senate-house then have, with you knowing and seeing, as senator, the Roman people as judge, the commonwealth as citizen without ignominy any man who for the ruin of an innocent man has changed his faith and religious obligation for money? And shall he who, drawn on by a price, has snatched fatherland, fortunes, children from an innocent citizen, not be branded by the censorial mark of strictness? You are the prefect of morals; you the master of the old discipline and strictness, if either you keep anyone in the senate knowingly stained by such great crime, or lay down that he who is in the same fault need not be afflicted with the same punishment. Or what condition of punishment our ancestors wished to be set forth in war for the timidity of a soldier — shall you set up the same in peace for the wickedness of a senator? But if this example had to be transferred from the military matter to the censorial animadversion, that very thing ought to have been done by lot. But if to draw lots for punishment and to commit men’s offence to the judgement of fortune is least censorial, surely in the offence of many a few ought not to be plucked off for ignominy and foulness.

hoc tu idem facies censor in senatu legendo? si erunt plures qui ob innocentem condemnandum pecuniam acceperint, tu non animadvertes in omnis, sed carpes, ut velis, et paucos ex multis ad ignominiam sortiere? habebit igitur te sciente et vidente curia senatorem, populus Romanus iudicem, res publica civem sine ignominia quemquam qui ad perniciem innocentis fidem suam et religionem pecunia commutarit, et qui pretio adductus eripuerit patriam, fortunas, liberos civi innocenti, is censoriae severitatis nota non inuretur? tu es praefectus moribus, tu magister veteris disciplinae ac severitatis, si aut retines quemquam sciens in senatu scelere tanto contaminatum aut statuis qui in eadem culpa sit non eadem poena adfici convenire? aut quam condicionem supplici maiores in bello timiditati militis propositam esse voluerunt, eandem tu in pace constitues improbitati senatoris? quod si hoc exemplum ex re militari ad animadversionem censoriam transferendum fuit, sortito id ipsum factum esse oportuit. sin autem sortiri ad poenam et hominum delictum fortunae iudicio committere minime censorium est, certe in multorum peccato carpi paucos ad ignominiam et turpitudinem non oportet.

But we all understand that in those entries a kind of popular wind was being sought. The matter had been tossed about in a public meeting by a seditious tribune. The case unknown, that thing had been approved by the multitude. To no one was it lawful to speak against; finally no one laboured to defend the contrary part. Furthermore those trials had come into great hatred. For a few months afterwards another vehement hatred was at large in the trials, from the marking of the tablets. The censors did not seem to be able to be passed over and neglected as a stain on the trials. Men whom they saw infamous in the rest of vices and in every disgrace, them they wished to mark by this entry too; and so much the more because at that very time, in those censors’ time, the trials had been shared with the equestrian order, that they should seem by the ignominy of fit men to have reproached the matter by their authority.

verum omnes intellegimus in istis subscriptionibus ventum quendam popularem esse quaesitum. iactata res erat in contione a tribuno seditioso; incognita causa probatum erat illud multitudini; nemini licitum est contra dicere, nemo denique ut defenderet contrariam partem laborabat. in invidiam porro magnam illa iudicia venerant. etenim paucis postea mensibus alia vehemens erat in iudiciis ex notatione tabellarum invidia versata. praetermitti ab censoribus et neglegi macula iudiciorum posse non videbatur. homines, quos ceteris vitiis atque omni dedecore infamis videbant, eos hac quoque subscriptione notare voluerunt, et eo magis quod illo ipso tempore illis censoribus erant iudicia cum equestri ordine communicata, ut viderentur per hominum idoneorum ignominiam sua auctoritate rem reprendisse.

But if it had been allowed me to plead this case before those very censors (or to anyone else), to men endowed with such prudence I should surely have proved it. For the matter shows that they themselves had nothing learned, nothing ascertained; that out of all that entry a kind of rumour and popular applause was being sought. For against Publius Popilius (who had condemned Oppianicus) Lucius Gellius entered: that he had taken money for the condemning of an innocent man. Now of how great divination is this very thing — to know that the defendant whom he had perhaps never seen was innocent, when most wise men, gentlemen (to say nothing of those who condemned), with the case learned, said to themselves it was not clear!

quod si hanc apud eosdem ipsos censores mihi aut alii causam agere licuisset, hominibus tali prudentia praeditis certe probavissem; res enim indicat nihil ipsos habuisse cogniti, nihil comperti; ex tota ista subscriptione rumorem quendam et plausum popularem esse quaesitum. nam in P. Publium Popilium qui Oppianicum condemnarat subscripsit L. Lucius Gellius, quod is pecuniam accepisset quo innocentem condemnaret. iam id ipsum quantae divinationis est, scire innocentem fuisse reum quem fortasse numquam viderat, cum homines sapientissimi, iudices, ut nihil dicam de eis qui condemnarunt, causa cognita sibi dixerint non liquere!

But suppose so. Gellius condemns Popilius; he judges that he had taken money from Cluentius. Lentulus denies this. For Popilius, because he was the son of a freedman, he did not enrol in the senate, but he leaves him a senator’s place at the games and the rest of the ornaments and frees him from all ignominy. Which when he does, he judges by his own vote that Oppianicus was condemned gratis. And the same Popilius afterwards Lentulus, in a canvassing trial, in evidence most diligently praises. Wherefore, if Lentulus did not stand by Lucius Gellius’s judgement, nor was Gellius content with Lentulus’s standing — and if each censor thought that he must not abide by his colleague’s opinion — what is there why any of us should think all censorial entries fixed and ratified for ever?

verum esto; condemnat Popilium Gellius, iudicat eum accepisse a Cluentio pecuniam. negat hoc Lentulus; nam Popilium, quod erat libertini filius, in senatum non legit, locum quidem senatorium ludis et cetera ornamenta relinquit et eum omni ignominia liberat. quod cum facit, iudicat eius sententia gratiis esse Oppianicum condemnatum. et eundem Popilium postea Lentulus in ambitus iudicio pro testimonio diligentissime laudat. qua re si neque L. Lucii Gelli iudicio stetit Lentulus neque Lentuli existimatione contentus fuit Gellius, et si uterque censor censoris opinione standum non putavit, quid est quam ob rem quisquam nostrum censorias subscriptiones omnis fixas et in perpetuum ratas putet esse oportere?

But they animadverted on Habitus himself. For no foulness, indeed, for no — I shall not say vice, but error — of his whole life. For there can be no man more pure than this man, more honest, more diligent in keeping all duties; nor do they say otherwise, but they followed that same fame of the corrupted trial. Nor do they themselves think otherwise than we wish to be thought of his modesty, integrity, virtue. But they thought the prosecutor could not be passed over, when it had been animadverted upon the judges. About which whole matter, if I shall bring forth one deed from all antiquity, I shall say no more.

at in ipsum habitum animadverterunt. nullam quidem ob turpitudinem, nullum ob totius vitae non dicam vitium sed erratum. neque enim hoc homine sanctior neque probior neque in omnibus officiis retinendis diligentior esse quisquam potest; neque illi aliter dicunt, sed eandem illam famam iudici corrupti secuti sunt; neque ipsi secus existimant quam nos existimari volumus de huius pudore, integritate, virtute, sed putarunt praetermitti accusatorem non potuisse, cum animadversum esset in iudices. qua de re tota si unum factum ex omni antiquitate protulero, plura non dicam.

For the example of the highest and most distinguished man, Publius Africanus, does not seem to me must be passed over. Who, when he was censor and Gaius Licinius Sacerdos had come forward in the census of the knights, said with a clear voice (so that the whole assembly could hear) that he knew that man had perjured himself in set words; if anyone wished to speak against him, he would use his own testimony. Then, when no one spoke against, he ordered him to lead his horse across. So he, by whose discretion both the Roman people and foreign nations were wont to be content, himself by his own knowledge was not content for the ignominy of another. But if it had been allowed for him to do this in this man’s case, easily before those very judges he would have withstood both false suspicion and the popularly stirred-up hatred.

non enim mihi exemplum summi et clarissimi viri, P. Publii Africani, praetereundum videtur; qui cum esset censor et in equitum censu C. Gaius Licinius Sacerdos prodisset, clara voce ut omnis contio audire posset dixit se scire illum verbis conceptis peierasse; si qui contra vellet dicere, usurum esse eum suo testimonio. deinde cum nemo contra diceret, iussit equum traducere. ita is cuius arbitrio et populus Romanus et exterae gentes contentae esse consuerunt ipse sua scientia ad ignominiam alterius contentus non fuit. quod si hoc habito facere licuisset, facile illis ipsis iudicibus et falsae suspicioni et invidiae populariter excitatae restitisset.

One thing yet there is which most disturbs me, to which place I scarcely seem able to answer: that you read out a clause from the will of Gnaeus Egnatius the father — a most honourable and most wise man, of course — who had on this account disinherited his son: because he had taken money for the condemnation of Oppianicus. Of which man’s lightness and inconsistency I shall say no more. This very will which you read out is of such a kind that he, when he was disinheriting that son whom he hated, joined as co-heirs to the son whom he loved most foreign men. But you, Attius, see, I think, diligently whether you wish the censorial judgement to be grave, or Egnatius’s. If Egnatius’s, what the censors entered about the rest is light; for Gnaeus Egnatius himself, whom you wish to be grave, they cast out of the senate. But if the censorial: this Egnatius whom his father disinherited by a censorial entry, the censors — when they were casting out the father — kept in the senate.

Vnum etiam est quod me maxime perturbat, cui loco respondere vix videor posse, quod elogium recitasti de testamento Cn. Gnaei Egnati patris, hominis honestissimi videlicet et sapientissimi, idcirco se exheredasse filium quod is ob Oppianici condemnationem pecuniam accepisset. de cuius hominis levitate et inconstantia plura non dicam; hoc testamentum ipsum quod recitas eius modi est ut ille, cum eum filium exheredaret quem oderat, ei filio coheredes homines alienissimos adiungeret quem diligebat. sed tu, Atti, consideres censeo diligenter utrum censorium iudicium grave velis esse an Egnati. si Egnati, leve est quod censores de ceteris subscripserunt; ipsum enim Cn. Gnaeum Egnatium quem tu gravem esse vis ex senatu eiecerunt; sin autem censorium, hunc Egnatium quem pater censoria subscriptione exheredavit censores in senatu, cum patrem eicerent, retinuerunt.

But the whole senate judged that that trial was corrupted. In what way? It took up the matter. Or could it have repudiated a thing of such kind brought before it? When a tribune of the plebs, the rouser of the people, had almost called the matter to hands; when an excellent and most innocent man was being said to have been circumvented by money; when the senatorial order was blazing with hatred — could nothing be decreed; could that stirring-up of the multitude be repudiated without the highest peril of the commonwealth? But what was decreed? How justly, how wisely, how diligently! If there are any by whose work it has come about that a public trial should be corrupted. Does the senate seem to judge that it was so done, or, if it has been done, to bear it heavily and gravely? If Aulus Cluentius himself were asked his opinion about the trials, he would speak no other than they spoke whose opinions you say condemned Cluentius.

at enim senatus universus iudicavit illud corruptum esse iudicium. quo modo? suscepit causam. an potuit rem delatam eius modi repudiare? cum tribunus plebis, populi concitator, rem paene ad manus revocasset, cum vir optimus et homo innocentissimus pecunia circumventus diceretur, cum invidia flagraret ordo senatorius, potuit nihil decerni, potuit illa concitatio multitudinis sine summo periculo rei publicae repudiari? at quid est decretum? quam iuste, quam sapienter, quam diligenter! si qui sunt quorum opera factum sit ut iudicium publicum corrumperetur. Vtrum videtur id senatus factum iudicare an, si factum sit, moleste graviterque ferre? si ipse A. Aulus Cluentius sententiam de iudiciis rogaretur, aliam non diceret atque ei dixerunt quorum sententiis Cluentium condemnatum esse dicitis.

But I ask of you whether out of that senatorial decree Lucius Lucullus the consul, a most wise man, brought forward that law; whether a year afterwards Marcus Lucullus and Gaius Cassius, whom as consuls-designate the senate had then decreed the same. They did not bring it forward. And what you charge was done by Habitus’s money (and confirm by no slightest suspicion) was done first through the equity and wisdom of those consuls — so that what the senate had decreed for putting out that present fire of hatred, they thought ought not afterwards to be referred to the people. Then the Roman people itself, which (stirred before by Lucius Quinctius’s feigned complaints) had demanded that thing and that proposal, the same, moved by the tears of Gaius Junius’s son, a small boy, with the greatest cry and concourse repudiated the whole inquiry and law.

sed quaero a vobis num istam legem ex isto senatus consulto L. Lucius Lucullus consul, homo sapientissimus, tulerit, num anno post M. Marcus Lucullus et C. Gaius Cassius, in quos tum consules designatos idem illud senatus decreverat. non tulerunt; et quod tu habiti pecunia factum esse arguis neque id ulla tenuissima suspicione confirmas, factum est primum illorum aequitate et sapientia consulum, ut, quod senatus decreverat ad illud invidiae praesens incendium restinguendum, id postea referendum ad populum non arbitrarentur. ipse deinde populus Romanus qui L. Lucii Quincti fictis querimoniis antea concitatus rem illam et rogationem flagitarat, idem C. Gaii Iuni fili, pueri parvoli, lacrimis commotus maximo clamore et concursu totam quaestionem illam et legem repudiavit.

From which it could be understood (which has often been said): that, as the sea (which by its nature is calm) is stirred and troubled by the force of the winds, so the Roman people of itself is at peace; by the voices of seditious men it is stirred as by the most violent storms. There is also a remaining authority, very great, which I have shamefully almost passed over: it is said to be mine. Attius read from some speech, which he was saying was mine, a kind of urging of judges to honourable judging, and a recalling both of other trials which had not been approved and of that very Junian trial; just as if I had not from the start of this defence said that that trial was odious, or, when I was disputing about the infamy of trials, could have passed over what was so popular at that time.

ex quo intellegi potuit, id quod saepe dictum est, ut mare quod sua natura tranquillum sit ventorum vi agitari atque turbari, sic populum Romanum sua sponte esse placatum, hominum seditiosorum vocibus ut violentissimis tempestatibus concitari. est etiam reliqua permagna auctoritas quam ego turpiter paene praeterii; mea enim esse dicitur. recitavit ex oratione nescio qua Attius quam meam esse dicebat cohortationem quandam iudicum ad honeste iudicandum et commemorationem cum aliorum iudiciorum quae probata non essent tum illius ipsius iudici Iuniani; proinde quasi ego non ab initio huius defensionis dixerim invidiosum illud iudicium fuisse aut, cum de infamia iudiciorum disputarem, potuerim illud quod tam populare esset illo tempore praeterire.

For my part, if I said anything of that kind, I neither recalled it as known nor said it in evidence; and that speech was rather of my time than of judgement and authority. For when I was prosecuting and had set before me at the start that I should move the spirits both of the Roman people and of the judges, and was bringing forth all the offences of trials not from my own opinion but from men’s rumour, that thing which had been so popularly agitated I could not pass over. But he errs vehemently if anyone reckons that he has our authorities sealed in our speeches which we have made in trials. For all those are of cases and of times, not of the men themselves or of the patrons. For if the cases themselves could speak for themselves, no one would call in a speaker. Now we are called in that we should say those things which are not laid down by our authority, but are drawn from the matter itself and the case.

ego vero si quid eius modi dixi, neque cognitum commemoravi neque pro testimonio dixi, et illa oratio potius temporis mei quam iudici et auctoritatis fuit. cum enim accusarem et mihi initio proposuissem ut animos et populi Romani et iudicum commoverem, cumque omnis offensiones iudiciorum non ex mea opinione sed ex hominum rumore proferrem, istam rem quae tam populariter esset agitata praeterire non potui. sed errat vehementer, si quis in orationibus nostris quas in iudiciis habuimus auctoritates nostras consignatas se habere arbitratur. omnes enim illae causarum ac temporum sunt, non hominum ipsorum aut patronorum. nam si causae ipsae pro se loqui possent, nemo adhiberet oratorem. nunc adhibemur ut ea dicamus, non quae auctoritate nostra constituantur sed quae ex re ipsa causaque ducantur.

They say that that ingenious man, Marcus Antonius, was wont to say "for this cause he had never written any speech, that, if at any time anything had been said by him not necessary, he could deny that he had said it." Just as if, if anything has been said or done by us, it should not be taken in by the memory of men, unless we have entrusted it to writings. For my part in that kind I more willingly follow the authority of many, and especially of the most eloquent and most wise man Lucius Crassus. Who, when he was defending Gnaeus Plancus, with Marcus Brutus accusing (a vehement and crafty man in speaking), when Brutus had had two readers set up to read out from Crassus’s two speeches alternate chapters contrary to one another — because in the dissuasion of that proposal which was being brought against the Narbonensian colony he detracted as much as possible from the senate’s authority, while in the persuasion of the Servilian law he adorned the senate with the highest praises; and Brutus had read out many things said somewhat sharply against the Roman knights from that speech, that the spirits of those judges might be set on fire against Crassus — Crassus is said to have been somewhat moved.

hominem ingeniosum, M. Marcum Antonium, aiunt solitum esse dicere ’idcirco se nullam umquam orationem scripsisse ut, si quid aliquando non opus esset ab se esse dictum, posset negare dixisse’; proinde quasi, si quid a nobis dictum aut actum sit, id nisi litteris mandarimus, hominum memoria non comprehendatur. ego vero in isto genere libentius cum multorum tum hominis eloquentissimi et sapientissimi, L. Lucii Crassi, auctoritatem sequor qui, cum Cn. Gnaeum Plancum defenderet accusante M. Marco Bruto, homine in dicendo vehementi et callido, cum Brutus duobus recitatoribus constitutis ex duabus eius orationibus capita alterna inter se contraria recitanda curasset, quod in dissuasione rogationis eius quae contra coloniam Narbonensem ferebatur quantum potest de auctoritate senatus detrahit, in suasione legis Serviliae summis ornat senatum laudibus, et multa in equites Romanos cum ex ea oratione asperius dicta recitasset quo animi illorum iudicum in Crassum incenderentur, aliquantum esse commotus dicitur.

So in answering, first he set out the reasoning of each time, that the speech might seem to be made from the matter and from the case. Then, that Brutus might be able to understand what man and endowed not only with what eloquence but also with what charm and what wit he had provoked, he himself called up three readers with the little books which Marcus Brutus, the father of that prosecutor, left on the civil law. When their beginnings were being read out — those which I think are known to you: "It chanced that we were in the country, in the Privernate territory, I and Brutus my son" — he was demanding the Privernate estate. "We were at Albanum, I and Brutus my son" — he was demanding the Alban. "It chanced when we had sat down at Tiburtum, I and Brutus my son" — he was looking for the Tiburtine estate. He was saying that Brutus, a wise man, since he saw the worthlessness of his son, wished to attest by writing what estates he was leaving him. But that, if he had been able to write honourably that he had been with his son of that age in the baths, he would not have passed it over. Yet that he was looking for those baths from him not out of his father’s books but out of the records and the census. Crassus then so avenged himself on Brutus that the latter regretted his reading. For he had borne heavily that he was reproached in those speeches which he had made about the commonwealth, in which perhaps consistency is more demanded. But I do not bear it heavily that those things were read out.

itaque in respondendo primum exposuit utriusque rationem temporis ut oratio ex re et ex causa habita videretur, deinde ut intellegere posset Brutus quem hominem et non solum qua eloquentia verum etiam quo lepore et quibus facetiis praeditum lacessisset, tris ipse excitavit recitatores cum singulis libellis quos M. Brutus, pater illius accusatoris, de iure civili reliquit. Eorum initia cum recitarentur, ea quae vobis nota esse arbitror: ’ forte evenit ut ruri in Privernati essemus ego et Brutus filius,’ fundum Privernatem flagitabat; ’ in Albano eramus ego et Brutus filius,’ Albanum poscebat; ’ in Tiburti forte cum adsedissemus ego et Brutus filius, ’ Tiburtem fundum requirebat; Brutum autem, hominem sapientem, quod fili nequitiam videret, quae praedia ei relinqueret testificari voluisse dicebat. quod si potuisset honeste scribere se in balneis cum id aetatis filio fuisse, non praeterisset; eas se tamen ab eo balneas non ex libris patris sed ex tabulis et ex censu quaerere. Crassus tum ita Brutum ultus est ut illum recitationis suae paeniteret; moleste enim fortasse tulerat se in eis orationibus reprehensum quas de re publica habuisset, in quibus forsitan magis requiratur constantia. ego autem illa recitata esse non moleste fero.

For neither were they foreign from that time which then was, nor from that case which was then being conducted. Nor have I taken on myself any burden, when I so spoke, which would forbid me to defend this case honourably and freely. But if I should wish to confess that I have now learned the case of Aulus Cluentius, that before I had been in that popular opinion, who could reproach this? Especially, gentlemen, when from yourselves it is most just to obtain what I from the start asked and now ask: that, if you have brought hither some grave opinion about that trial, this — with the case seen through and the whole truth learned — you should set down.

neque enim ab illo tempore quod tum erat, neque ab ea causa quae tum agebatur aliena fuerunt; neque mihi quicquam oneris suscepi, cum ita dixi, quo minus honeste hanc causam et libere possem defendere. quod si velim confiteri me causam A. Auli Cluenti nunc cognosse, antea fuisse in ea opinione populari, quis tandem id possit reprehendere? praesertim, iudices, cum a vobis quoque ipsis hoc impetrari sit aequissimum quod ego et ab initio petivi et nunc peto ut, si quam huc graviorem de illo iudicio opinionem attulistis, hanc causa perspecta atque omni veritate cognita deponatis.

Now, since I have answered to all the things which were said by you, Titus Attius, about the condemnation of Oppianicus, you must necessarily confess that opinion has much deceived you, that you reckoned I would defend the case of Aulus Cluentius not by his own deed but by the law. For this you very often said: that it was so reported to you that I had in mind to defend this case by the protection of the law. Is that so? By friends, of course, we are imprudently betrayed; and there is some one of those whom we reckon as friends who carries our counsels to our adversaries. Who has reported this to you, who was so dishonest? To whom indeed have I told? No one (I think) is at fault. Surely the law itself reported it to you. But have I seemed to you so to defend that in the whole case I have made any mention of the law; have I seemed to defend this case otherwise than as if Habitus were held by the law? Surely (as a man ought to confirm) no place has been passed over by me of clearing him of that odious charge.

nunc, quoniam ad omnia quae abs te dicta sunt, T. Titi Atti, de Oppianici damnatione respondi, confiteare necesse est te opinionem multum fefellisse, quod existimaris me causam A. Auli Cluenti non facto eius sed lege defensurum. nam hoc persaepe dixisti tibi sic renuntiari, me habere in animo causam hanc praesidio legis defendere. itane est? ab amicis imprudentes videlicet prodimur, et est nescio quis de eis quos amicos nobis arbitramur qui nostra consilia ad adversarios deferat. quisnam hoc tibi renuntiavit, quis tam improbus fuit? cui ego autem narravi? nemo, ut opinor, in culpa est; nimirum tibi istud lex ipsa renuntiavit. sed num tibi ita defendisse videor ut tota in causa mentionem ullam legis fecerim, num secus hanc causam defendisse ac si lege habitus teneretur? certe, ut hominem confirmare oportet, nullus est locus a me purgandi istius invidiosi criminis praetermissus.

What then? Some will perhaps ask whether it displeases me to drive off a peril of life by the protection of the laws. To me indeed, gentlemen, it does not displease; but I use my own custom. In the trial of an honourable and prudent man, I am wont to use not only my own counsel but to obey much also the counsel and will of him whom I defend. For when this case was brought to me, who ought to know those laws to which we are called and in which we are at large, I said to Habitus at once: "Whoever has conspired that any one should be condemned — he is free, but our order is held." And he began to ask and beseech me that I should not defend him by law. When I said what seemed best to me, he led me over to his opinion. For he was confirming, weeping, that he was not more eager for the keeping of his citizenship than for his standing.

quid ergo est? quaeret fortasse quispiam displiceatne mihi legum praesidio capitis periculum propulsare. mihi vero, iudices, non displicet, sed utor instituto meo. in hominis honesti prudentisque iudicio non solum meo consilio uti consuevi sed multum etiam eius quem defendo et consilio et voluntati obtempero. nam ut haec ad me causa delata est, qui leges eas ad quas adhibemur et in quibus versamur nosse deberem, dixi habito statim eo: ’ Qui coisset quo quis condemnaretur ’ illum esse liberum, teneri autem nostrum ordinem. atque ille me orare atque obsecrare coepit ne sese lege defenderem. cum ego quae mihi videbantur dicerem, traduxit me ad suam sententiam; adfirmabat enim lacrimans non se cupidiorem esse civitatis retinendae quam existimationis.

I obeyed the man — yet I therefore did so (for we ought not always to do this), because I saw that the case could most copiously be defended by itself without the law. I saw in this defence which I have now used more dignity; in that, which he did not wish me to use, less labour would there be. But if nothing else were being attempted save that we should hold this case, I should have closed with the law read out. Nor does that speech of Attius’s move me, which says that it is an unworthy deed if a senator who has circumvented anyone in trial be held by the laws; if a Roman knight has done the same, that he be not held.

morem homini gessi et tamen idcirco feci — neque enim id semper facere debemus — quod videbam per se ipsam causam sine lege copiosissime posse defendi. videbam in hac defensione qua iam sum usus plus dignitatis, in illa qua me hic uti noluit minus laboris futurum. quod si nihil aliud esset actum nisi ut hanc causam obtineremus, lege recitata perorassem. neque me illa oratio commovet, quod ait Attius indignum esse facinus, si senator iudicio quempiam circumvenerit, legibus eum teneri; si eques Romanus hoc idem fecerit, non teneri.

Although I should grant you that this is unworthy (whose kind I shall already see), you must necessarily grant me that it is by far the more unworthy, in that state which is held by laws, to depart from the laws. For this is the bond of the dignity which we enjoy in the commonwealth, this the foundation of liberty, this the spring of equity. The mind and spirit and counsel and opinion of the state is set in the laws. As our bodies cannot, without mind, so the state cannot, without law, use its parts as sinews and blood and limbs. The ministers of laws are the magistrates; the interpreters of the laws are the judges; finally we are all servants of the laws, that we may be free.

Vt tibi concedam hoc indignum esse quod cuius modi sit iam videro, tu mihi concedas necesse est multo esse indignius in ea civitate quae legibus contineatur discedi ab legibus. hoc enim vinculum est huius dignitatis qua fruimur in re publica, hoc fundamentum libertatis, hic fons aequitatis; mens et animus et consilium et sententia civitatis posita est in legibus. Vt corpora nostra sine mente, sic civitas sine lege suis partibus ut nervis ac sanguine et membris uti non potest. legum ministri magistratus, legum interpretes iudices, legum denique idcirco omnes servi sumus ut liberi esse possimus.

What is it, Quintus Naso, why you sit in that place? What force is there by which these judges, endowed with such dignity, are held in by you? You, gentlemen, why out of so great a multitude of citizens are so few you casting your sentence on men’s fortunes? By what right has Attius said what he wished? Why has the means of speaking been given me so long? What do those clerks mean, what those lictors, what the rest whom I see attending this inquiry? I think all these things happen by law, and that this whole trial (as I said before) is ruled and administered as if by a kind of mind of the law. What then? Is this inquiry alone so governed? What of Marcus Plaetorius and Gaius Flaminius "for assassins"; what of Gaius Orchivius "of embezzlement"; what of mine "of extortion"; what of Gaius Aquilius’s, before whom now a case of canvassing is being pleaded; what of the rest of the inquiries? Look round all the parts of the commonwealth: you will see all things happen under the command and prescription of laws.

quid est, Q. Quinto Naso, cur tu in isto loco sedeas? quae vis est qua abs te hi iudices tali dignitate praediti coerceantur? vos autem, iudices, quam ob rem ex tanta multitudine civium tam pauci de hominum fortunis sententiam fertis? quo iure Attius quae voluit dixit? cur mihi tam diu potestas dicendi datur? quid sibi autem illi scribae, quid lictores, quid ceteri quos apparere huic quaestioni video volunt? opinor haec omnia lege fieri totumque hoc iudicium, ut ante dixi, quasi mente quadam regi legis et administrari. quid ergo? haec quaestio sola ita gubernatur? quid M. Marci Plaetori et C. Flamini inter sicarios, quid C. Gaii Orchivi peculatus, quid mea de pecuniis repetundis, quid C. Gaii Aquili apud quem nunc de ambitu causa dicitur, quid reliquae quaestiones? circumspicite omnis rei publicae partis; omnia legum imperio et praescripto fieri videbitis.

If anyone before me, Titus Attius, should wish to make you defendant, you would cry out that you were not held by the law of extortion. Nor would this refusal of yours be a confession of money taken, but a turning aside of toil and unlawful peril. Now what is being attempted and what right is being set up by you, see. The law (by which law this inquiry has been set up) bids the inquisitor of the trial — that is, Quintus Voconius — with those judges who shall have fallen to him by lot (he calls upon you, judges) inquire about poison. Inquire against whom? It is unbounded. Whoever has made, sold, bought, kept, given. What does the same law at once add? Read. And about his life let inquiry be made. Whose? Of him who has conspired, agreed? It is not so. What then is it? Tell. Of him who has been military tribune of the first four legions, or who quaestor, or tribune of the plebs — thereafter he named all the magistrates — or who has spoken his sentence in the senate, or shall have. What then? Who of them has conspired, conspires, agreed, agrees that any man should be condemned in a public trial. "Who of them"? Of whom? Of those, of course, who have been written above. What difference there is in the manner of writing — although it is plain, the law itself yet teaches us. For where it binds all mortals, it speaks thus: Who has made, shall have made bad poison. All men, women, children, slaves are called into court. If the same had been wished about conspiracy, it would have added: "Or who shall have conspired." Now it is so: And about his life let inquiry be made who has held a magistracy or who has spoken his sentence in the senate, who of them has conspired, conspires. Is Cluentius such?

si quis apud me, T. Titi Atti, te reum velit facere, clames te lege pecuniarum repetundarum non teneri; neque haec tua recusatio confessio sit captae pecuniae sed laboris et periculi non legitimi declinatio. nunc quid agatur et quid abs te iuris constituatur vide. iubet lex ea, qua lege haec quaestio constituta est, iudicem quaestionis, hoc est Q. Quintum Voconium, cum eis iudicibus qui ei obvenerint — vos appellat, iudices — quaerere de veneno. in quem quaerere? infinitum est. Quicumque fecerit, vendiderit, emerit, habuerit, dederit. quid eadem lex statim adiungit? recita. Deque eius capite quaerito. cuius? qui coierit, convenerit? non ita est. quid ergo est? dic. Qui tribunus militum legionibus quattuor primis, quive quaestor, tribunus plebis — deinceps omnis magistratus nominavit — quive in senatu sententiam dixit, dixerit. quid tum? Qui eorum coiit, coierit, convenit, convenerit quo quis iudicio publico condemnaretur. ’ qui eorum’? quorum? videlicet qui supra scripti sunt. quid intersit utro modo scriptum sit, etsi est apertum, ipsa tamen lex nos docet. Vbi enim omnis mortalis adligat, ita loquitur: ’ Qui venenum malum fecit, fecerit. ’ omnes viri, mulieres, liberi, servi in iudicium vocantur. si idem de coitione voluisset, adiunxisset: ’ Quive coierit. ’ nunc ita est: Deque eius capite quaerito qui magistratum habuerit quive in senatu sententiam dixerit, qui eorum coiit, coierit. num is est Cluentius?

Surely he is not. Who then is Cluentius? One who yet did not wish his case to be defended by the law. So I cast aside the law; I obey Cluentius. Yet to you, Attius, I shall answer a few things which are sundered from this man’s case. For there is something in this case which Cluentius reckons concerns himself; there is something which I reckon concerns me. He thinks it of his own interest that he should be defended by the matter itself and by the business done, not by the law. But I reckon it of my interest that I should not seem to have been overcome by Attius in any debate. For I have not this case alone to plead. To me this labour is set forth before all who can be content with this means of defence. I do not wish anyone of those who are present to think that I, by being silent, approve what has been said by Attius about the law. Wherefore, Cluentius, in your matter I obey you. I neither read out the law nor speak in this place for you; but those things which I think are looked for from me, I shall not abandon.

certe non est. quis ergo est Cluentius? qui tamen defendi causam suam lege noluit. itaque abicio legem, morem Cluentio gero. tibi tamen, Atti, pauca quae ab huius causa seiuncta sunt respondebo. est enim quiddam in hac causa quod Cluentius ad se, est aliquid quod ego ad me putem pertinere. hic sua putat interesse se re ipsa et gesto negotio, non lege defendi; ego autem mea existimo interesse me nulla in disputatione ab Attio videri esse superatum. non enim mihi haec causa sola dicenda est; omnibus hic labor meus propositus est quicumque hac facultate defensionis contenti esse possunt. nolo quemquam eorum qui adsunt existimare me quae de lege ab Attio dicta sunt, si reticuerim, comprobare. quam ob rem, Cluenti, de te tibi obsequor; neque ego legem recito neque hoc loco pro te dico, sed ea quae a me desiderari arbitror non relinquam.

It seems unfair to you, Attius, that not all should be held by the same laws. First, that I should confess this is most unfair, it is of such a kind that those laws should be changed — not that we should not obey those which are. Then what senator has ever refused this — that, when he had attained a higher step of dignity by the kindness of the Roman people, on this account he should think he ought to use harder conditions of the laws? How many advantages there are which we lack, how many troublesome and hard things which we undergo! And all these things are yet made up by the advantage of honour and amplitude. Turn now to the equestrian order and into the rest of the orders the same conditions of life: they will not bear them. For they think that fewer snares of laws and conditions and trials ought to be set forth for them, who could either not ascend to the highest place of the state, or did not seek it.

iniquum tibi videtur, Atti, esse non isdem legibus omnis teneri. primum, ut id iniquissimum esse confitear, eius modi est ut commutatis eis opus sit legibus, non ut his quae sunt non pareamus. deinde quis umquam hoc senator recusavit ne, cum altiorem gradum dignitatis beneficio populi Romani esset consecutus, eo se putaret durioribus legum condicionibus uti oportere? quam multa sunt commoda quibus caremus, quam multa molesta et difficilia quae subimus! atque haec omnia tamen honoris et amplitudinis commodo compensantur. converte nunc ad equestrem ordinem atque in ceteros ordines easdem vitae condiciones; non perferent. putant enim minus multos sibi laqueos legum et condicionum ac iudiciorum propositos esse oportere qui summum locum civitatis aut non potuerunt ascendere aut non petiverunt.

And to leave aside all the other laws by which we are held but the rest of the orders are freed, this very law: "lest anyone be circumvented in trial," Gaius Gracchus brought in. He brought in that law on behalf of the plebs, not against the plebs. Afterwards Lucius Sulla, a man most far from the people’s cause, when he was setting up the inquiry of that thing on this very law on which you now judge, did not yet dare to bind by a new kind of inquiry the Roman people, which he had received free from this kind. But if he had thought it could be done, on account of the hatred which he had against the equestrian order he would have done nothing more willingly than have brought all that bitterness of his proscription which he used against the old judges into this one inquiry.

atque ut omittam leges alias omnis quibus nos tenemur, ceteri autem sunt ordines liberati, hanc ipsam legem: ’ ne quis iudicio circumveniretur,’ C. Gaius Gracchus tulit; eam legem pro plebe, non in plebem tulit. postea L. Lucius Sulla, homo a populi causa remotissimus, tamen, cum eius rei quaestionem hac ipsa lege constitueret qua vos hoc tempore iudicatis, populum Romanum quem ab hoc genere liberum acceperat adligare novo quaestionis genere ausus non est. quod si fieri posse existimasset, pro illo odio quod habuit in equestrem ordinem nihil fecisset libentius quam omnem illam acerbitatem proscriptionis suae qua est usus in veteres iudices in hanc unam quaestionem contulisset.

Nor is anything now being attempted — believe me, gentlemen, and look forward to what is to be foreseen — save that Roman knights should be shut into the peril of this law. Nor is this attempted by all but by a few. For those senators who easily keep themselves safe by integrity and innocence (such as, to say truly, you are, and the rest who have lived without greed) wish the knights, the nearest to the senatorial order in dignity, to be most close-joined in concord. But those who wish themselves to be able to do all things, and that besides there should be nothing in any man or in any order, by this one fear think that they will reduce the Roman knights into their power: if it be set up that about those who have judged a matter trials of this kind can be made. For they see the authority of this order being confirmed; they see the trials being approved. With this fear set forth, they trust that they can pluck out the sting of your strictness.

nec nunc quicquam agitur — mihi credite, iudices, et prospicite id quod providendum est — nisi ut equites Romani in huiusce legis periculum concludantur; neque hoc agitur ab omnibus sed a paucis. nam ei senatores qui se facile tuentur integritate et innocentia, quales, ut vere dicam, vos estis et ceteri qui sine cupiditate vixerunt, equites ordini senatorio dignitate proximos, concordia coniunctissimos esse cupiunt; sed ei qui sese volunt posse omnia neque praeterea quicquam esse aut in homine ullo aut in ordine, hoc uno metu se putant equites Romanos in potestatem suam redacturos, si constitutum sit ut de eis qui rem iudicarint huiusce modi iudicia fieri possint. vident enim auctoritatem huius ordinis confirmari, vident iudicia comprobari; hoc metu proposito evellere se aculeum severitatis vestrae posse confidunt.

For who would dare to judge truly and bravely about a man endowed with somewhat greater resources, when he saw that he himself would have to plead his case for what he had conspired or agreed? O brave men, the Roman knights, who withstood that most distinguished and most powerful man, Marcus Drusus, the tribune of the plebs, when he was attempting nothing else with all that nobility which then was, save that those who had judged a matter should be called into court by inquiries of this kind! Then Gaius Flavius Pusio, Gnaeus Titinius, Gaius Maecenas, those oaks of the Roman people, and the rest of the same order did not do the same as Cluentius now (so that they should reckon they took on themselves any fault by refusing), but most openly fought back; when both they refused and openly, most bravely and most honourably, said that they could have come to the most ample place by the judgement of the Roman people, if they had wished to bring their pursuits to seeking honours. That they had seen what splendour was in that life, what great ornaments, what dignity. Which they had not despised, but had been content with their own and their fathers’ order, and had preferred to follow that calm and quiet life, removed from the storms of hatreds and trials of this kind.

quis enim de homine audeat paulo maioribus opibus praedito vere et fortiter iudicare, cum videat sibi de eo quod coierit aut consenserit causam esse dicendam? O viros fortis, equites Romanos, qui homini clarissimo ac potentissimo, M. Marco Druso, tribuno plebis, restiterunt, cum ille nihil aliud ageret cum illa cuncta quae tum erat nobilitate, nisi ut ei qui rem iudicassent huiusce modi quaestionibus in iudicium vocarentur! tum C. Gaius Flavius pusio, Cn. Gnaeus Titinius, C. Gaius Maecenas, illa robora populi Romani, ceterique eiusdem ordinis non fecerunt idem quod nunc Cluentius, ut aliquid culpae suscipere se putarent recusando, sed apertissime repugnarunt, cum et recusarent et palam fortissime atque honestissime dicerent, se potuisse iudicio populi Romani in amplissimum locum pervenire, si sua studia ad honores petendos conferre voluissent. sese vidisse in ea vita qualis splendor inesset, quanta ornamenta, quae dignitas; quae se non contempsisse sed ordine suo patrumque suorum contentos fuisse et vitam illam tranquillam et quietam, remotam a procellis invidiarum et huiusce modi iudiciorum sequi maluisse.

Either, they said, the whole of life ought to be restored to them for seeking honours; or, since that could not be, the condition of life which, having sought office, they had abandoned, ought to remain. That it was unfair that those who, on account of the multitude of perils, had passed over the ornaments of honours and were deprived of the people’s kindnesses, should yet not be without the perils of new trials. That a senator could not complain of this: because, with that condition set forth, he had begun to seek office; and because there were very many ornaments by which he could soften that trouble — place, authority, splendour at home, name and favour among foreign nations, the bordered toga, the curule chair, the marks of office, the fasces, armies, commands, provinces. In which things our ancestors wished both the highest rewards to be set forth for things rightly done, and more perils for sins. They were not refusing this — that they should be accused on the same law on which now Habitus is being accused, which then was the Sempronian, now is the Cornelian; for they understood that by that law the equestrian order was not held; but they were labouring lest by a new law they should be bound.

aut sibi ad honores petendos aetatem integram restitui oportere aut, quoniam id non posset, eam condicionem vitae quam secuti petitionem reliquissent manere. iniquum esse eos qui honorum ornamenta propter periculorum multitudinem praetermisissent populi beneficiis esse privatos, iudiciorum novorum periculis non carere. senatorem hoc queri non posse, propterea quod ea condicione proposita petere coepisset quodque permulta essent ornamenta quibus eam mitigare molestiam posset, locus, auctoritas, domi splendor, apud exteras nationes nomen et gratia, toga praetexta, sella curulis, insignia, fasces, exercitus, imperia, provinciae; quibus in rebus cum summa recte factis maiores nostri praemia tum plura peccatis pericula proposita esse voluerunt. illi non hoc recusabant ne ea lege accusarentur qua nunc habitus accusatur, quae tunc erat Sempronia, nunc est Cornelia — intellegebant enim ea lege equestrem ordinem non teneri — sed ne nova lege adligarentur laborabant.

Habitus has not even at this time refused this — that he should render the reckoning of his life on that law on which he is not held. Which condition if pleases you, let us all attempt that this inquiry should be carried as soon as possible into all orders. Meanwhile, by the immortal gods! since we hold all our advantages, our rights, our liberty, finally our safety from the laws, let us not depart from the laws. At the same time let us consider how unfair it is that the Roman people should now do something else — has entrusted to you the commonwealth and its own fortunes, is without care, does not fear lest by a law which it has never itself ordered, and by an inquiry from which it thinks itself loosed and free, it be bound through a few judges.

habitus ne hoc quidem umquam recusavit quo minus vel ea lege rationem vitae suae redderet qua non teneretur. quae si vobis condicio placet, omnes id agamus ut haec quam primum in omnis ordines quaestio perferatur. interea quidem, per deos immortalis! quoniam omnia commoda nostra, iura, libertatem, salutem denique legibus obtinemus, a legibus non recedamus, simul et illud quam sit iniquum cogitemus, populum Romanum aliud nunc agere, vobis rem publicam et fortunas suas commisisse, sine cura esse, non metuere ne lege ea quam numquam ipse iusserit et quaestione qua se solutum liberumque esse arbitretur per paucos iudices astringatur.

For Titus Attius, a good and eloquent young man, so pleads his case: that all citizens are held by all laws. You hear and attend in silence, as you ought. Aulus Cluentius, a Roman knight, pleads his case on a law on which only senators and those who have held a magistracy are held. To me through him it is not lawful to refuse and to set up the protections of my defence in the citadel of the law. If Cluentius shall hold the case (as, leaning on your equity, we trust), all will think (which it shall be) that he held it on account of his innocence, since he was so defended; that in the law which he had not wished to touch there had been no protection.

agit enim sic causam T. Titus Attius, adulescens bonus et disertus, omnis civis legibus teneri omnibus; vos auditis et attenditis silentio, sicut facere debetis. A. Aulus Cluentius, eques Romanus, causam dicit ea lege, qua lege senatores et ei qui magistratum habuerunt soli tenentur; mihi per eum recusare et in arce legis praesidia constituere defensionis meae non licet. si obtinuerit causam Cluentius, sicuti vestra aequitate nixi confidimus, omnes existimabunt, id quod erit, obtinuisse propter innocentiam, quoniam ita defensus sit; in lege autem quam attingere noluerit praesidi nil fuisse.

Here now is something which has to do with me, of which I spoke before, which I owe to the Roman people; since this is the standing of my life: that all my care and toil is set in defending men’s perils. I see how great and how perilous and how unbounded an inquiry is being attempted by the prosecutors, when they try to transfer to the Roman people that law which has been written into our order. In which law is: "Whoever has conspired" — which how widely it spreads you see. "Has agreed" — equally uncertain and unbounded. "Has consented" — that indeed is both unbounded and obscure and hidden. "Or has spoken false testimony" — who of the Roman commons has ever spoken testimony for whom this peril, with Titus Attius as author, is not seen prepared? For I confirm that surely no one will speak, if this trial is set forth before the Roman commons.

hic nunc est quiddam quod ad me pertineat, de quo ante dixi, quod ego populo Romano praestare debeam, quoniam is meae vitae status est ut omnis mihi cura et opera posita sit in hominum periculis defendendis. video quanta et quam periculosa et quam infinita quaestio temptetur ab accusatoribus, cum eam legem quae in nostrum ordinem scripta sit in populum Romanum transferre conentur. qua in lege est: ’ qui coierit,’ quod quam late pateat videtis. ’ convenerit ’; aeque incertum et infinitum est. ’ consenserit ’; hoc vero cum infinitum tum obscurum et occultum. ’ falsumve testimonium dixerit ’; quis de plebe Romana testimonium dixit umquam cui non hoc periculum T. Tito Attio auctore paratum esse videatis? nam dicturum quidem certe, si hoc iudicium plebi Romanae propositum sit, neminem umquam esse confirmo.

But this I promise to all: if to anyone perhaps trouble shall be stirred up by this law who is not held by the law, if he shall wish to use me as defender, I shall defend his case by the protection of the law and shall most easily prove it either before these judges or before such as these; and I shall use the whole defence of the law which now to use, by him to whose will I must obey, is not granted me. For I ought not to doubt, gentlemen, that, if any case of such kind be brought to you, of one who is not held by the law — even if he should seem odious or offensive to many, even if you should hate him, even if you should be unwilling to acquit him — yet you would acquit him and obey rather your religious obligation than your hatred.

sed hoc polliceor omnibus, si cui forte hac lege negotium facessetur qui lege non teneatur, si is uti me defensore voluerit, me eius causam legis praesidio defensurum et vel his iudicibus vel horum similibus facillime probaturum, et omni me defensione usurum esse legis, qua nunc ut utar ab eo cuius voluntati mihi obtemperandum est non conceditur. non enim debeo dubitare, iudices, quin, si qua ad vos causa eius modi delata sit eius qui lege non teneatur, etiam si is invidiosus aut multis offensus esse videatur, etiam si eum oderitis, etiam si inviti absoluturi sitis, tamen absolvatis et religioni potius vestrae quam odio pareatis.

For it is the part of a wise judge to consider that as much has been allowed him by the Roman people as has been entrusted and committed; and to remember that not only power has been given him, but faith has been placed in him. He can acquit whom he hates, condemn whom he does not hate; and always not what he himself wishes, but what the law and religious obligation compel, to consider; to mark on what law the defendant is summoned, about what defendant he learns, what matter is at issue in the inquiry. When these things are to be seen, then it is the part of a great man, gentlemen, and a wise one, when he has taken that tablet for judging, not to reckon himself alone or to think that whatever he has desired is lawful for him; but to have in council the law, religious obligation, equity, faith; lust however, hatred, envy, fear, and all desires to remove; and most to value the consciousness of his mind, which we have received from the immortal gods, which cannot be torn from us. Which, if it shall be the witness of the best counsels and deeds in our whole life, we shall live without any fear and with the highest honour.

est enim sapientis iudicis cogitare tantum sibi a populo Romano esse permissum quantum commissum sit et creditum, et non solum sibi potestatem datam verum etiam fidem habitam esse meminisse; posse quem oderit absolvere, quem non oderit condemnare, et semper non quid ipse velit sed quid lex et religio cogat cogitare; animadvertere qua lege reus citetur, de quo reo cognoscat, quae res in quaestione versetur. cum haec sunt videnda, tum vero illud est hominis magni, iudices, atque sapientis, cum illam iudicandi causa tabellam sumpserit, non se reputare solum esse nec sibi quodcumque concupierit licere, sed habere in consilio legem, religionem, aequitatem, fidem; libidinem autem, odium, invidiam, metum cupiditatesque omnis amovere maximique aestimare conscientiam mentis suae quam ab dis immortalibus accepimus, quae a nobis divelli non potest; quae si optimorum consiliorum atque factorum testis in omni vita nobis erit, sine ullo metu et summa cum honestate vivemus.

If Titus Attius had either learned or thought of these things, surely he would not even have tried to say — which he handled in many words — that the judge ought to lay down what seems good to him and not be bound by the laws. About which things I seem to have said for Cluentius’s will too much, for the dignity of the matter too little, for your prudence enough. The rest are very few; which, because they had to do with your inquiry, on this account they decided that they must be feigned by them and brought forth, lest they be found the foulest of all, if they had brought into court nothing save hatred. And that you may reckon I have necessarily handled in many words those things of which I have already spoken, attend the rest. Surely you will understand that those things which could be shown in few have most briefly been defended.

haec si T. Titus Attius aut cognovisset aut cogitasset, profecto ne conatus quidem esset dicere, id quod multis verbis egit, iudicem quod ei videatur statuere et non devinctum legibus esse oportere. quibus de rebus mihi pro Cluenti voluntate nimium, pro rei dignitate parum, pro vestra prudentia satis dixisse videor. reliqua perpauca sunt; quae quia vestrae quaestionis erant, idcirco illi statuerunt fingenda esse sibi et proferenda ne omnium turpissimi reperirentur, si in iudicium nihil praeter invidiam attulissent. atque ut existimetis me necessario de his rebus de quibus iam dixerim pluribus egisse verbis, attendite reliqua; profecto intellegetis ea quae paucis demonstrari potuerint brevissime esse defensa.

He said that to Gnaeus Decidius the Samnite (he who was proscribed) a wrong was done in his calamity by this man’s household. By no one was he more liberally treated than by Cluentius. The resources of this man relieved him in his most inconvenient affairs; and this both he himself and all his friends and connections knew. That this man’s bailiffs brought force and hand on the shepherds of Ancharius and of Pacenus. When some controversy of shepherds had arisen, as is wont, in the cattle-tracks, Habitus’s bailiffs defended the matter of their master and the private possession. When complaint was made, the cause shown to them, they parted without trial and controversy.

Cn. Gnaeo Decidio Samniti, ei qui proscriptus est, iniuriam in calamitate eius ab huius familia factam esse dixit. ab nullo ille liberalius quam a Cluentio tractatus est. huius illum opes in rebus eius incommodissimis sublevarunt, atque hoc cum ipse tum omnes eius amici necessariique cognorunt. Anchari et Paceni pastoribus huius vilicos vim et manus attulisse. cum quaedam in callibus, ut solet, controversia pastorum esset orta, habiti vilici rem domini et privatam possessionem defenderunt. cum esset expostulatio facta, causa illis demonstrata sine iudicio controversiaque discessum est.

When by the will of Publius Aelius a kinsman had been disinherited, this man — more foreign — was instituted heir. Publius Aelius did so on the deserving of Habitus; nor was he present at the making of the will, and that will was sealed by this man’s enemy Oppianicus. That he denied a legacy to Florus from a will. It is not so. But when 30,000 sesterces had been written for 40,000, and security did not seem enough to him, he wished him to enter something received to his liberality. At first he denied it was owed; afterwards without controversy he paid. That after the war the wife of a certain Ceius the Samnite was demanded back from him. When he had bought the woman from the slave-dealers, at the time when he first heard she was free, he gave her back to Ceius without trial.

P. Publii Aeli testamento propinquus exheredatus cum esset, heres hic alienior institutus est. P. Publius Aelius habiti merito fecit, neque hic in testamento faciendo interfuit, idque testamentum ab huius inimico Oppianico est obsignatum. Floro legatum ex testamento infitiatum esse. non est ita; sed cum HS xxx scripta essent pro HS xxxx neque ei cautum satis videretur, voluit eum aliquid acceptum referre liberalitati suae. primo deberi negavit, post sine controversia solvit. Cei cuiusdam Samnitis uxorem post bellum ab hoc esse repetitam. mulierem cum emisset a sectoribus, quo tempore eam primum liberam esse audivit, sine iudicio reddidit Ceio.

That there is a certain Ennius whose goods Habitus holds. This Ennius is some needy false accuser, the hireling of Oppianicus, who for very many years has been quiet. Then at some time he sued Habitus’s slaves of theft. Lately he began to demand from Habitus himself. He in that private trial, believe me, perhaps with you yourselves as patrons, will not escape a false-charge. And even (as is reported to us) you suborn a man of many guests, a certain Aulus Bivius, an innkeeper from the Latin road, to say that hands were brought against him by Cluentius and his slaves in his own shop. About which man it is not necessary to say anything yet now. If he shall invite us (as he is wont), we shall so receive the man that he shall bear it heavily that he turned aside from the road.

Ennium esse quendam cuius bona teneat habitus. est hic Ennius egens quidam calumniator, mercennarius Oppianici, qui permultos annos quievit; deinde aliquando cum servis habiti furti egit, nuper ab ipso habito petere coepit. hic illo privato iudicio, mihi credite, vobis isdem fortasse patronis calumniam non effugiet. atque etiam, ut nobis renuntiatur, hominem multorum hospitum, A. Aulum Bivium quendam, coponem de via Latina, subornatis qui sibi a Cluentio servisque eius in taberna sua manus adlatas esse dicat. quo de homine nihil etiam nunc dicere nobis est necesse. si invitaverit, id quod solet, sic hominem accipiemus ut moleste ferat se de via decessisse.

You have, gentlemen, what in the whole case the prosecutors have, after meditating eight years, gathered about the morals of Aulus Cluentius (whom they wish to be an odious defendant) — how light by their very kind, how false in matter, how short for answer! Learn now what has to do with your oath, what is of your trial, what burden has been laid on you by that law by which, compelled, you have come together hither: about the charges of poisoning. That all may understand in how few words this case could have been closed, and how many things have been said by me which had to do most with this man’s wish, least with your judgement.

habetis, iudices, quae in totam causam de moribus A. Auli Cluenti quem illi invidiosum esse reum volunt annos octo meditati accusatores conlegerint, quam levia genere ipso, quam falsa re, quam brevia responsu! cognoscite nunc id quod ad vestrum ius iurandum pertinet, quod vestri iudici est, quod vobis oneris imposuit ea lex qua coacti huc convenistis, de criminibus veneni, ut omnes intellegant quam paucis verbis haec causa perorari potuerit, et quam multa a me dicta sint quae ad huius voluntatem maxime, ad vestrum iudicium minime pertinerent.

It has been thrown that Gaius Vibius Capax was taken away by poison by this Aulus Cluentius. Conveniently the man is at hand, endowed with the highest faith and every virtue, Lucius Plaetorius, a senator, who was the guest-friend and familiar of that Vibius. At his house Vibius lived at Rome; at his he was sick; at his he died. But Cluentius is heir. I say that he died intestate, and that the possession of his goods was given by the praetor’s edict to this Numerius Cluentius (whom you see), the son of his sister, a most modest young man and among the chief honourable, a Roman knight.

obiectum est C. Gaium Vibium capacem ab hoc A. Aulo Cluentio veneno esse sublatum. opportune adest homo summa fide et omni virtute praeditus, L. Lucius Plaetorius, senator qui illius Vibi hospes fuit et familiaris. apud hunc ille Romae habitavit, apud hunc aegrotavit, huius domi est mortuus. at heres est Cluentius. intestatum dico esse mortuum possessionemque eius bonorum ex edicto praetoris huic illius sororis filio, adulescenti pudentissimo et in primis honesto, equiti Romano, datam, N. Numerio Cluentio quem videtis.

The other charge of poisoning is against this young man Oppianicus: that, when in his marriage according to the custom of the Larinates a multitude of men was lunching, poison was prepared by the counsel of Habitus; that, when it was being given in mead, a certain Balbutius, his familiar, intercepted it, drank it, and at once died. If I were so handling this as if a charge had to be cleared by me, I should say in many words those things which now my speech briefly runs through.

alterum venefici crimen Oppianico huic adulescenti, cum eius in nuptiis more Larinatium multitudo hominum pranderet, venenum habiti consilio paratum; id cum daretur in mulso, Balbutium quendam, eius familiarem, intercepisse, bibisse, statimque esse mortuum. hoc ego si sic agerem tamquam mihi crimen esset diluendum, haec pluribus verbis dicerem per quae nunc paucis percurrit oratio mea.

What has Habitus ever admitted into himself, that this great deed should not seem to shrink from him? But why did he greatly fear Oppianicus, when that man could not say any word at all in this very case, while accusers cannot fail this man as long as his mother lives? — which you will understand. Or that nothing might be lacking from the cause of his peril, that a new charge should be added to his case? But what was the time of giving the poison, on that day, in that throng? Through whom further was it given? Whence taken? What then is this intercepting of the cup? Why was it not given afresh? Many things there are which can be said. But I shall not allow myself to seem, by not speaking, to have wished to speak. The matter defends itself.

quid umquam habitus in se admisit ut hoc tantum ab eo facinus non abhorrere videatur? quid autem magno opere Oppianicum metuebat, cum ille verbum omnino in hac ipsa causa nullum facere potuerit, huic autem accusatores viva matre deesse non possint? id quod iam intellegetis. an ut de causa eius periculi nihil decederet, ad causam novum crimen accederet? quod autem tempus veneni dandi illo die, illa frequentia? per quem porro datum? unde sumptum? quae deinde interceptio poculi? cur non de integro autem datum? multa sunt quae dici possunt, sed non committam ut videar non dicendo voluisse dicere; res enim se ipsa defendit.

I deny that that young man, whom you have said died at once with the cup drained, died on that day at all. A great charge and a shameless lie! See through the rest. I say that he, since he had come to that lunch undigested and (as that age bears) had yet not spared himself, was sick for some days and so died. Who is the witness of this thing? The same who is the witness of his own mourning, his father; the father, I say, of that young man, whom on account of his grief of mind a very slight suspicion could have set up as witness from that place against Aulus Cluentius. He raises this man up by his testimony. Read it. But you, if it is not troublesome, rise for a little. Bear this grief of necessary recollection, in which I shall not longer dwell, since (which was the part of an excellent man) you have made it that your mourning should bring calamity and a false charge to no innocent man.

nego illum adulescentem quem statim epoto poculo mortuum esse dixistis omnino illo die esse mortuum. Magnum crimen et impudens mendacium! perspicite cetera. dico illum, cum ad illud prandium crudior venisset et, ut aetas illa fert, sibi tamen non pepercisset, aliquot dies aegrotasse et ita esse mortuum. quis huic rei testis est? idem qui sui luctus, pater; pater, inquam, illius adulescentis, quem propter animi dolorem pertenuis suspicio potuisset ex illo loco testem in A. Aulum Cluentium constituere, is hunc suo testimonio sublevat; quod recita. tu autem, nisi molestum est, paulisper exsurge; perfer hunc dolorem commemorationis necessariae, in qua ego diutius non morabor quoniam, quod fuit viri optimi, fecisti ut ne cui innocenti maeror tuus calamitatem et falsum crimen adferret.

One charge of this kind yet remains to me, gentlemen, from which you can see what was said by me at the start of my speech: that whatever ill Aulus Cluentius has seen through these years, whatever trouble and business he has at this time, all has been forged from his mother. That Oppianicus was killed by poison given to him in bread by a certain Marcus Asellius, his familiar; and that this was done by the counsel of Habitus, you say. In which first I ask what cause there was for Habitus that he should wish to kill Oppianicus. For I confess there were enmities; but men wish their enemies to be afflicted with death either because they fear them or because they hate them.

Vnum etiam mihi reliquum eius modi crimen est, iudices, ex quo illud perspicere possitis quod a me initio orationis meae dictum est, quicquid mali per hosce annos A. Aulus Cluentius viderit, quicquid hoc tempore habeat sollicitudinis ac negoti, id omne a matre esse conflatum. Oppianicum veneno necatum esse quod ei datum sit in pane per M. Marcum Asellium quendam, familiarem illius, idque habiti consilio factum esse dicitis. in quo primum illud quaero quae causa habito fuerit cur interficere Oppianicum vellet. inimicitias enim fuisse confiteor; sed homines inimicos suos morte adfici volunt aut quod eos metuunt aut quod oderunt.

For what fear was Habitus drawn on to try to undertake so great a deed against himself? What was there that anyone should now fear Oppianicus, afflicted with punishment for his evil deeds and cast out of the state? What did he fear? Lest he be assailed by a ruined man; or lest he be accused by a condemned man; or lest he be hurt by an exile’s testimony? But if Habitus, because he hated his enemy, on this account did not wish him to enjoy life, was he so stupid that he reckoned what then he was living was life — that of a condemned man, of an exile, of one abandoned by all, whom on account of the fierceness of his mind no one wished to receive under his roof, no one to approach, no one to address, no one to look upon?

quo tandem igitur habitus metu adductus tantum in se facinus suscipere conatus est? quid erat quod iam Oppianicum poena adfectum pro maleficiis et eiectum e civitate quisquam timeret? quid metuebat? ne oppugnaretur a perdito, an ne accusaretur a damnato, an ne exsulis testimonio laederetur? si autem quod oderat habitus inimicum, idcirco illum vita frui noluit, adeone erat stultus ut illam quam tum ille vivebat vitam esse arbitraretur, damnati, exsulis, deserti ab omnibus, quem propter animi importunitatem nemo recipere tecto, nemo adire, nemo adloqui, nemo aspicere vellet?

Did Habitus then envy this man’s life? If he hated him bitterly and deeply, ought he not to have wished him to live as long as possible? Did the enemy hasten his death, which alone was his refuge of calamity in his ills? Who, if he had had any spirit and virtue (as many brave men in such grief have often done), would himself have taken his life. For him why would the enemy wish to offer that which he himself ought to wish for himself? For now indeed what at last did death bring him of ill? Unless perhaps we are led by trifles and tales to think that he is bearing the punishments of the impious among the dead, and has met more enemies there than he has left here; that by the Avengers of his mother-in-law, of his wives, of his brother, of his children he has been driven headlong into the seat and region of the wicked. If these things are false (which all understand), what at last did death snatch from him save the sense of grief?

huius igitur habitus vitae invidebat? hunc si acerbe et penitus oderat, non eum quam diutissime vivere velle debebat? huic mortem maturabat inimicus, quod illi unum in malis erat perfugium calamitatis? qui si quid animi et virtutis habuisset, ut multi saepe fortes viri in eius modi dolore, mortem sibi ipse conscisset, huic quam ob rem id vellet inimicus offerre quod ipse sibi optare deberet? nam nunc quidem quid tandem illi mali mors attulit? nisi forte ineptiis ac fabulis ducimur ut existimemus illum ad inferos impiorum supplicia perferre ac pluris illic offendisse inimicos quam hic reliquisse, a socrus, ab uxorum, a fratris, a liberum Poenis actum esse praecipitem in sceleratorum sedem atque regionem. quae si falsa sunt, id quod omnes intellegunt, quid ei tandem aliud eripuit mors praeter sensum doloris?

Come now: through whom was the poison given? Through Marcus Asellius. What had this man with Habitus? Nothing. And, since he had used Oppianicus most familiarly, rather even there was a strife. Did he then most of all entrust both his crime and that man’s peril to him whom he knew was more offended with him, most familiar with Oppianicus? Why then have you, who have been roused by piety to accusing, suffered this Asellius to be unavenged for so long? Why have you not used Habitus’s example: that through him who had brought the poison there should be a prejudgement against this man?

age vero, per quem venenum datum? per M. Asellium. quid huic cum habito? nihil, atque adeo, quod ille Oppianico familiarissime est usus, potius etiam simultas. Eine igitur quem sibi offensiorem, Oppianico familiarissimum sciebat esse, potissimum et scelus suum et illius periculum committebat? cur igitur tu qui pietate ad accusandum excitatus es hunc Asellium esse inultum tam diu sinis? cur non habiti exemplo usus es ut per illum qui attulisset venenum de hoc praeiudicaretur?

Now indeed how improbable, how unfamiliar, gentlemen, how new — that the poison was given in bread! Could it more easily have been given in the cup? Could it have lain hidden more secretly in some part of bread than if the whole had been dissolved in the drink? Could it have spread more quickly when eaten than when drunk into the veins and into all parts of the body? Could it more easily escape notice in bread, if it had been observed, than in the cup, when it was so mixed that it could in no way be distinguished?

iam vero illud quam non probabile, quam inusitatum, iudices, quam novum, in pane datum venenum! faciliusne potuit quam in poculo, latentius potuit abditum aliqua in parte panis quam si totum conliquefactum in potione esset, celerius potuit comestum quam epotum in venas atque in omnis partis corporis permanare, facilius fallere in pane, si esset animadversum, quam in poculo, cum ita confusum esset ut secerni nullo modo posset?

But he died by sudden death. If it had been so done, that thing yet, on account of the like chance of many, would have least firm a suspicion of poison. If it were suspicious, yet it would have to do with others rather than with Habitus. But on this very point men lie most shamelessly. That you may understand it, learn both his death and how, after his death, the charge was sought against Habitus by his mother.

at repentina morte periit. quod si esset ita factum, tamen ea res propter multorum eius modi casum minime firmam veneni suspicionem haberet; si esset suspiciosum, tamen potius ad alios quam ad habitum pertineret. verum in eo ipso homines impudentissime mentiuntur. id ut intellegatis et mortem eius et quem ad modum post mortem in habitum sit crimen a matre quaesitum cognoscite.

When wandering and exiled and shut out from every quarter, Oppianicus had betaken himself to the Falernian estate to Lucius Quinctius, there first he fell into disease and was sick vehemently enough and long. When Sassia was with him, and was using a certain Sextus Albius, a settler, a strong man (who used to be with him), more familiarly than a most dissolute man could allow with his fortune unhurt, and was reckoning that the right of chaste and lawful marriage had been taken away by her husband’s condemnation, a certain Nicostratus, a faithful little slave of Oppianicus, very inquisitive and least lying, is said to have been wont to report many things to his master. Meanwhile Oppianicus, when he was now recovering and could no longer bear the wickedness of the settler in the Falernian estate, and had set out hither toward the city — for he was wont to keep something hired outside the gate — is said to have fallen from his horse, and the man (of weak health) to have struck his side vehemently. And after he came to the city with a fever, in a few days he died. The reasoning of his death, gentlemen, is such that either it has no suspicion or, if it has any, that turns within the walls of his domestic crime.

cum vagus et exsul erraret atque undique exclusus Oppianicus in Falernum se ad L. Lucium Quinctium contulisset, ibi primum in morbum incidit ac satis vehementer diuque aegrotavit. cum esset una Sassia eaque Sex. Albio quodam colono, homine valenti, qui simul esse solebat familiarius uteretur quam vir dissolutissimus incolumi fortuna pati posset, et ius illud matrimoni castum atque legitimum damnatione viri sublatum arbitraretur, Nicostratus quidam, fidelis Oppianici servolus, percuriosus et minime mendax, multa dicitur domino renuntiare solitus esse. interea Oppianicus cum iam convalesceret neque improbitatem coloni in Falerno diutius ferre posset et huc ad urbem profectus esset — solebat enim extra portam aliquid habere conducti — cecidisse de equo dicitur et homo infirma valetudine latus offendisse vehementer et, postea quam ad urbem cum febri venerit, paucis diebus esse mortuus. Mortis ratio, iudices, eius modi est ut aut nihil habeat suspicionis aut, si quid habet, id intra parietes in domestico scelere versetur.

After his death Sassia, the unspeakable woman, at once began to set snares against her son. She decided to hold an inquiry about her husband’s death. She bought from Aulus Rupilius (whom Oppianicus had used as doctor) a certain Strato, just as that Habitus might do the same as Habitus had done in buying Diogenes. She said she would inquire about this Strato and about a certain Asclas, her own slave. Besides, that slave Nicostratus, whom she reckoned had been too talkative and too faithful to his master, she demanded from this young man Oppianicus for the inquiry. He, since he was at that time a boy, and that inquiry was said to be set up about his father’s death — although he reckoned that slave both was well-disposed to himself and had been to his father — yet dared to refuse nothing. Friends and guest-friends of Oppianicus and of the woman herself, many honourable men adorned with all things, are called in. By all the most vehement tortures the inquiry is held. When the spirits of the slaves had been tried both with hope and with fear, that they should say something in the inquiry, yet (I think) led by the authority of the supporters, they remained in the truth and said they knew nothing.

post mortem eius Sassia moliri statim, nefaria mulier, coepit insidias filio; quaestionem habere de viri morte constituit. emit de A. Aulo Rupilio quo erat usus Oppianicus medico Stratonem quendam, quasi ut idem faceret quod habitus in emendo Diogene fecerat. de hoc Stratone et de Ascla quodam servo suo quaesituram esse dixit. praeterea servum illum Nicostratum quem nimium loquacem fuisse ac nimium domino fidelem arbitrabatur ab hoc adulescente Oppianico in quaestionem postulavit. hic cum esset illo tempore puer et illa quaestio de patris sui morte constitui diceretur, etsi illum servum et sibi benivolum esse et patri fuisse arbitrabatur, nihil tamen est ausus recusare. advocantur amici et hospites Oppianici et ipsius mulieris multi, homines honesti atque omnibus rebus ornati. tormentis omnibus vehementissimis quaeritur. cum essent animi servorum et spe et metu temptati ut aliquid in quaestione dicerent, tamen, ut arbitror, auctoritate advocatorum adducti in veritate manserunt neque se quicquam scire dixerunt.

The inquiry on that day, by the opinion of friends, was dismissed. After a long enough interval again they are called in. The inquiry is held afresh. No force of the most fierce tortures is passed over. The supporters turn aside and now scarcely can bear it. The cruel and harsh woman is in a fury that what she had thought was by no means coming forward as she had hoped. When now the torturer and the tortures themselves had been worn out, and yet she would not make an end, one of the supporters, a man both adorned with people’s honours and endowed with the highest virtue, said that he understood that this was being done not so that the truth should be found, but that they should be compelled to say something false. After the rest had approved this, by the opinion of all it was laid down that they seemed to have been inquired into enough.

quaestio illo die de amicorum sententia dimissa est. satis longo intervallo post iterum advocantur. habetur de integro quaestio; nulla vis tormentorum acerrimorum praetermittitur; aversari advocati et iam vix ferre posse, furere crudelis atque importuna mulier sibi nequaquam ut sperasset ea quae cogitasset procedere. cum iam tortor atque essent tormenta ipsa defessa neque tamen illa finem facere vellet, quidam ex advocatis, homo et honoribus populi ornatus et summa virtute praeditus, intellegere se dixit non id agi ut verum inveniretur sed ut aliquid falsi dicere cogerentur. hoc postquam ceteri comprobarunt, ex omnium sententia constitutum est satis videri esse quaesitum.

Nicostratus is given back to Oppianicus. She herself sets out for Larinum, mourning with her own people that now surely her son would be safe, to whom not only no true charge but not even a feigned suspicion would come; to whom not only the open assault of enemies, but not even the hidden snares of his mother could harm. After she came to Larinum, she who had pretended that she was persuaded that poison had been given before to her husband by that Strato, at once gave him a furnished and adorned shop at Larinum for practising medicine. One, a second, a third year Sassia was quiet, so that she seemed to wish and desire some calamity for her son rather than to plot and contrive it.

redditur Oppianico Nicostratus, Larinum ipsa proficiscitur cum suis maerens quod iam certe incolumem filium fore putabat, ad quem non modo verum crimen sed ne ficta quidem suspicio perveniret, et cui non modo aperta inimicorum oppugnatio sed ne occultae quidem matris insidiae nocere potuissent. Larinum postquam venit, quae a Stratone illo venenum antea viro suo datum sibi persuasum esse simulasset, instructam ei continuo et ornatam Larini medicinae exercendae causa tabernam dedit. Vnum, alterum, tertium annum Sassia quiescebat, ut velle atque optare aliquid calamitatis filio potius quam id struere et moliri videretur.

Then meanwhile, in the consulship of Quintus Hortensius and Quintus Metellus, that she might draw to this prosecution this Oppianicus (who was doing something else and thinking nothing of this kind) against his will, she promised her daughter to him — her whom she had taken up from her son-in-law — so that, with him bound by the marriage and at the same time tied by the hope of a will, she could have him in her power. At about this very time that doctor Strato did a theft in the house and a slaughter of this kind. When in the building there was a chest in which he knew there was some money and gold, by night he killed two fellow-slaves sleeping and threw them into the fish-pond. He himself cut out the bottom of the chest, and carried off ten thousand sesterces and five pounds of gold, with one of the slaves, a not large boy, knowing.

tum interim Q. Hortensio Q. Quinto Metello consulibus ut hunc Oppianicum aliud agentem ac nihil eius modi cogitantem ad hanc accusationem detraheret invito despondit ei filiam suam, illam quam ex genero susceperat, ut eum nuptiis adligatum simul et testamenti spe devinctum posset habere in potestate. hoc ipso fere tempore Strato ille medicus domi furtum fecit et caedem eius modi. cum esset in aedibus armarium in quo sciret esse nummorum aliquantum et auri, noctu duos conservos dormientis occidit in piscinamque deiecit; ipse armari fundum exsecuit et HS x et auri quinque pondo abstulit uno ex servis puero non grandi conscio.

The next day, with the theft known, all suspicion was being moved on those slaves who were not appearing. When that cutting-out of the bottom in the chest was being noticed, men were asking how it could possibly have been done. One of Sassia’s friends recalled that he had lately seen at some auction, among the small things, a hooked little saw with teeth on every side and twisted, by which that thing seemed possible to be so cut around. To be brief: it is sought out by the auctioneers; that little saw is found to have come to Strato. With this beginning of suspicion arisen and Strato openly charged, that knowing boy was struck with fear and reported the whole matter to his mistress. The men were found in the fish-pond. Strato was thrown into chains; and even in his shop the coins (by no means all) were found.

furto postridie cognito omnis suspicio in eos servos qui non comparebant commovebatur. cum exsectio illa fundi in armario animadverteretur, homines quonam modo fieri potuisset requirebant. quidam ex amicis Sassiae recordatus est se nuper in auctione quadam vidisse in rebus minutis aduncam ex omni parte dentatam et tortuosam venire serrulam qua illud potuisse ita circumsecari videretur. ne multa, perquiritur a coactoribus, invenitur ea serrula ad Stratonem pervenisse. hoc initio suspicionis orto et aperte insimulato Stratone puer ille conscius pertimuit, rem omnem dominae indicavit; homines in piscina inventi sunt, Strato in vincula coniectus est, atque etiam in taberna eius nummi, nequaquam omnes, reperiuntur.

An inquiry on the theft is set up. For what else could anyone suspect? Or do you say this: that, with the chest plundered, the money taken, not all recovered, the men killed, an inquiry was set up about Oppianicus’s death? Whom do you prove this to? What is there of less likeness to truth that you could bring forth? Then (to leave aside the rest), three years after Oppianicus’s death was inquiry being held about his death? And kindled by ancient hatred, she demanded that same Nicostratus then without cause in the inquiry. Oppianicus at first refused. Afterwards, when she threatened that she would lead the daughter away, that she would change her will, the most faithful slave to a most cruel woman not into the inquiry he handed but plainly to the punishment he gave over.

constituitur quaestio de furto. nam quid quisquam suspicari aliud potest? an hoc dicitis, armario expilato, pecunia ablata, non omni reciperata, occisis hominibus institutam esse quaestionem de morte Oppianici? cui probatis? quid est quod minus veri simile proferre potuistis? deinde, ut omittam cetera, triennio post mortem Oppianici de eius morte quaerebatur? atque etiam incensa odio pristino Nicostratum eundem illum tum sine causa in quaestionem postulavit. Oppianicus primo recusavit. postea cum illa abducturam se filiam, mutaturam esse testamentum minaretur, mulieri crudelissimae servum fidelissimum non in quaestionem detulit sed plane ad supplicium dedidit.

Three years afterwards then an inquiry on the husband’s death was being held afresh. But about what slaves? Some new thing, I trust, had been thrown forward; some new men had been called into suspicion. About Strato and about Nicostratus. What? Had inquiry not been made at Rome about these men? Indeed — woman now mad not by disease but by crime — when you had held an inquiry at Rome, when by the opinion of Titus Annius, Lucius Rutilius, Publius Saturius, and the rest of the most honourable men it had been laid down that they seemed to have been inquired into enough — did you about the same matter, three years afterwards, about the same men, with no man called in (I do not say "no man," lest you say a settler perhaps was at hand, but with no good man), against your son’s life try to hold an inquiry?

post triennium igitur agitata denuo quaestio de viri morte habebatur. at de quibus servis? nova, credo, res obiecta, novi quidam homines in suspicionem vocati sunt. de Stratone et de Nicostrato. quid? Romae quaesitum de istis hominibus non erat? itane tandem, mulier iam non morbo sed scelere furiosa, cum quaestionem habuisses Romae, cum de T. Titi Anni, L. Lucii Rutili, P. Publii Saturi, ceterorum honestissimorum virorum sententia constitutum esset satis quaesitum videri, eadem de re triennio post isdem de hominibus nullo adhibito non dicam viro, ne colonum forte adfuisse dicatis, sed bono viro, in fili caput quaestionem habere conata es?

Or do you say this — for it comes into my mind what could be said, although remember that this has not yet been said: that, while the inquiry was being held about the theft, Strato confessed something about poison? In this one way, gentlemen, often the truth, pressed down by the wickedness of many, comes up, and the defence of innocence, shut off, breathes again. Because either those who in fraud are cunning do not dare as much as they devise; or those whose audacity stands out and is thrown forth are abandoned by the counsels of malice. But if confident astuteness or cunning audacity were one, it could scarcely in any way be withstood. Was there no theft? But nothing was clearer at Larinum. Or did suspicion not have to do with Strato? But he was both charged from the saw and informed against by the knowing boy. Was not this being done in the inquiring? What other cause then was there of inquiring? Or what you must say, and what then Sassia kept saying: that, while inquiry was being made about the theft, then Strato in those same tortures spoke about poison?

an hoc dicitis — mihi enim venit in mentem quid dici possit, tametsi adhuc non esse hoc dictum mementote — cum haberetur de furto quaestio, Stratonem aliquid de veneno esse confessum? hoc uno modo, iudices, saepe multorum improbitate depressa veritas emergit et innocentiae defensio interclusa respirat, quod aut ei qui in fraude callidi sunt non tantum audent quantum excogitant, aut ei quorum eminet audacia atque proiecta est a consiliis malitiae deseruntur. quod si aut confidens astutia aut callida esset audacia, vix ullo obsisti modo posset. Vtrum furtum factum non est? at nihil clarius Larini. an ad Stratonem suspicio non pertinuit? at is et ex serrula insimulatus et a puero conscio est indicatus. an id actum non est in quaerendo? quae fuit igitur alia causa quaerendi? an id quod vobis dicendum est, et quod tum Sassia dictitavit: cum de furto quaereretur, tum Stratonem isdem in tormentis dixisse de veneno?

Lo, this is what I said before: the woman abounds in audacity, is wanting in counsel and reasoning. For several tablets of the inquiry are brought forth which have been read out and given to you — those very ones which she then said had been sealed; on which tablets no letter is found about the theft. Did it not come into mind first to write down Strato’s speech about the theft, then to add some saying about poison, which would seem to have been not sought by questioning but wrung out by pain? The inquiry is about the theft. The suspicion of poison was now removed by the previous inquiry; which very thing this same woman had judged, who, just as at Rome by the opinion of friends she had decided that they had been inquired into enough, afterwards through three years had loved that Strato most of all the slaves, had held him in honour, had favoured him with all advantages.

hem hoc illud est quod ante dixi: mulier abundat audacia, consilio et ratione deficitur. nam tabellae quaestionis plures proferuntur quae recitatae vobisque editae sunt, illae ipsae quas tum obsignatas esse dixit; in quibus tabellis de furto nulla littera invenitur. non venit in mentem primum orationem Stratonis conscribere de furto, post aliquod dictum adiungere de veneno quod non percontatione quaesitum sed per dolorem expressum videretur? quaestio de furto est, veneni iam suspicio superiore quaestione sublata; quod ipsum haec eadem mulier iudicarat quae, ut Romae de amicorum sententia statuerat satis esse quaesitum, postea per triennium maxime ex omnibus servis Stratonem illum dilexerat, in honore habuerat, commodis omnibus adfecerat.

When then inquiry was being made about the theft, and that theft which he without controversy had done, did he then make no word about what was being asked? About poison did he speak at once; about the theft, if not in the place where he ought, did he yet make no word at all in the very last or middle or any part finally of the inquiry? You see now that unspeakable woman, gentlemen, with the same hand by which (if the power were given) she would long to kill her son, has written this feigned inquiry. And of this very inquiry tell me one man by name who has sealed it. You will find no one, unless perhaps such a man whom I would prefer to be brought forth than that no one be named.

cum igitur de furto quaereretur, et eo furto quod ille sine controversia fecerat, tum ille de eo quod quaerebatur verbum nullum fecit? de veneno statim dixit, de furto si non eo loco quo debuit, ne in extrema quidem aut media aut aliqua denique parte quaestionis verbum fecit ullum? iam videtis illam nefariam mulierem, iudices, eadem manu qua, si detur potestas, interficere filium cupiat, hanc fictam quaestionem conscripsisse. atque istam ipsam quaestionem dicite qui obsignarit unum aliquem nominatim. neminem reperietis, nisi forte eius modi hominem quem ego proferri malim quam neminem nominari.

What say you, Titus Attius? Will you bring into court a peril of life, an information of crime, the fortunes of another, written in letters, and shall name no author of those letters, no sealer, no witness? And the pestilence which you have drawn for the most innocent son out of his mother’s bosom, shall such men as these approve? Be it so: in the tablets there is no authority. What? Why was that very inquiry not kept for these judges, why for the friends and guest-friends of Oppianicus whom she had previously called in, why finally for this very time? What has happened to those men, Strato and Nicostratus?

quid ais, T. Titi Atti? tu periculum capitis, tu indicium sceleris, tu fortunas alterius litteris conscriptas in iudicium adferes neque earum auctorem litterarum neque obsignatorem neque testem ullum nominabis? et quam tu pestem innocentissimo filio de matris sinu deprompseris, hanc hi tales viri comprobabunt? esto, in tabellis nihil est auctoritatis; quid? ipsa quaestio iudicibus, quid? amicis hospitibusque Oppianici quos adhibuerat antea, quid? huic tandem ipsi tempori cur non reservata est? quid istis hominibus factum est, Stratone et Nicostrato?

I ask of you, Oppianicus, what you say happened to your slave Nicostratus, whom (since you were soon going to accuse this man) you ought to have led to Rome, given the means of informing, finally to have kept safe for the inquiry, kept for these judges, kept for this time. For Strato, gentlemen, know that he was driven to the cross with his tongue cut out — which there is no Larinate who does not know. The senseless woman feared not her own conscience, not the hatred of the townsmen, not the fame of all; but, as if not all were going to be witnesses of that crime, so she feared lest she should be condemned by the last voice of the dying little slave.

quaero abs te, Oppianice, servo tuo Nicostrato quid factum esse dicas, quem tu, cum hunc brevi tempore accusaturus esses, Romam deducere, dare potestatem indicandi, incolumem denique servare quaestioni, servare his iudicibus, servare huic tempori debuisti. nam Stratonem quidem, iudices, in crucem esse actum exsecta scitote lingua; quod nemo Larinatium est qui nesciat. timuit mulier amens non suam conscientiam, non odium municipum, non famam omnium, sed, quasi non omnes eius sceleris testes essent futuri, sic metuit ne condemnaretur extrema servoli voce morientis.

What is this portent, immortal gods? What so great a monster in any places, what so hostile and monstrous a crime, or whence shall we say it has been born? Now indeed you see, gentlemen, that not without necessary and the greatest causes I spoke at the beginning of my speech about his mother. For there is no ill, no crime which she has not from the start wished, hoped, thought, brought about for her son. I leave aside that first wrong of lust; I leave aside the unspeakable marriage with her son-in-law; I leave aside the daughter cast out of marriage by her mother’s lust, which had to do not yet with the peril of this man’s life but with the common disgrace of the family. I make no complaint of the second marriage with Oppianicus, into which she — when she had received from him as hostages his sons dead — married into the mourning of the family and into the funeral of stepsons. I pass over that, when she knew that Aulus Aurius (whose she had once been mother-in-law, a little before wife) had been proscribed and killed by the work of Oppianicus, she chose for herself that house and seat in which daily she should see signs of the death of her former husband and the spoils of his fortunes.

quod hoc portentum, di immortales! quod tantum monstrum in ullis locis, quod tam infestum scelus et immane aut unde natum esse dicamus? iam enim videtis profecto, iudices, non sine necessariis me ac maximis causis principio orationis meae de matre dixisse. nihil est enim mali, nihil sceleris quod illa non ab initio filio voluerit, optaverit, cogitaverit, effecerit. Mitto illam primam libidinis iniuriam, mitto nefarias generi nuptias, mitto cupiditate matris expulsam ex matrimonio filiam, quae nondum ad huiusce vitae periculum sed ad commune familiae dedecus pertinebant. nihil de alteris Oppianici nuptiis queror, quarum illa cum obsides filios ab eo mortuos accepisset, tum denique in familiae luctum atque in privignorum funus nupsit. praetereo quod A. Aulum Aurium cuius illa quondam socrus, paulo ante uxor fuisset, cum Oppianici esse opera proscriptum occisumque cognosset, eam sibi domum sedemque delegit in qua cotidie superioris viri mortis indicia et spolia fortunarum videret.

I first complain of that crime which now at last has been made plain — of the Fabrician poison, which then recent was suspicious to the rest, incredible to this man, but now seems open and manifest to all. Surely the mother was not concealed from in that poison; nothing was thought up by Oppianicus without the woman’s counsel. But if it had been so, surely afterwards (the matter caught) she would not have departed from him as from a dishonest husband, but would have fled as from a most cruel enemy and left for ever that house overflowing with every crime.

illud primum queror de illo scelere quod nunc denique patefactum est, Fabriciani veneni, quod iam tum recens suspiciosum ceteris, huic incredibile, nunc vero apertum iam omnibus ac manifestum videtur. non est profecto de illo veneno celata mater; nihil est ab Oppianico sine consilio mulieris cogitatum; quod si esset, certe postea deprehensa re non illa ut a viro improbo discessisset sed ut a crudelissimo hoste fugisset domumque illam in perpetuum scelere omni adfluentem reliquisset.

Not only did she not do this, but from that time she has passed over no place in which she did not contrive some snares; and all days and nights with her whole mind she, the mother, has thought about her son’s ruin. She first — that she might confirm him as accuser of her son — bound him by gifts, presents, the placing of her daughter, the hope of inheritance. So what among others, with new enmities undertaken among kinsmen, we have often seen happen — divorces and the dissolutions of connections — this woman thought no man would be a firm enough accuser of her son save the man who had taken his sister in marriage. Others, drawn on by new connections, often lay aside old enmities; she thought the joining of connection would be a pledge for confirming enmities.

non modo id non fecit sed ab illo tempore nullum locum praetermisit in quo non strueret insidias aliquas ac dies omnis atque noctes tota mente mater de pernicie fili cogitaret. quae primum ut illum confirmaret accusatorem filio suo, donis, muneribus, conlocatione filiae, spe hereditatis obstrinxit. ita quod apud ceteros novis inter propinquos susceptis inimicitiis saepe fieri divortia atque adfinitatum discidia vidimus, haec mulier satis firmum accusatorem filio suo fore neminem putavit, nisi qui in matrimonium sororem eius ante duxisset. ceteri novis adfinitatibus adducti veteres inimicitias saepe deponunt; illa sibi ad confirmandas inimicitias adfinitatis coniunctionem pignori fore putavit.

Nor was she diligent in this alone — to procure an accuser for her son — but she also considered with what things she should arm him. Hence those solicitations of slaves, both with threats and with promises; hence those unbounded and most cruel inquiries about Oppianicus’s death, of which an end at last was made not by the woman’s measure but by the authority of friends. From the same crime were those inquiries held three years afterwards at Larinum; from the same frenzy the false writings of inquiries; from the same fury also that wicked cutting-out of the tongue. Finally the whole gathering-together of this charge was both devised and adorned by her.

neque in eo solum diligens fuit ut accusatorem filio suo compararet sed etiam cogitavit quibus eum rebus armaret. hinc enim illae sollicitationes servorum et minis et promissis, hinc illae infinitae crudelissimaeque de morte Oppianici quaestiones, quibus finem aliquando non mulieris modus sed amicorum auctoritas fecit. ab eodem scelere illae triennio post habitae Larini quaestiones, eiusdem amentiae falsae conscriptiones quaestionum; ex eodem furore etiam illa conscelerata exsectio linguae; totius denique huius ab illa est et inventa et adornata comparatio criminis.

And when, with these things equipped, she had sent the accuser to Rome against her son, she herself for a little tarried at Larinum for the sake of seeking out and hiring witnesses. Afterwards, when it was reported to her that this man’s trial was approaching, she at once flew hither, lest either diligence should fail her accusers or money her witnesses, or, lest perhaps the mother should lose this most longed-for spectacle of his squalor and mourning and so great filth. But what do you think this woman’s journey to Rome was? Which I, on account of the neighbourhood of the Aquinati and Fabraterni, have heard from many and learned. What gatherings in those towns, how great the groanings of both men and women have been? That a certain woman from Larinum was flying, was setting out for Rome from the upper sea, with great retinue and money, that the more easily she might circumvent in a capital trial and crush her son?

atque his rebus cum instructum accusatorem filio suo Romam misisset, ipsa paulisper conquirendorum et conducendorum testium causa Larini est commorata; postea autem quam appropinquare huius iudicium ei nuntiatum est, confestim huc advolavit ne aut accusatoribus diligentia aut pecunia testibus deesset, aut ne forte mater hoc sibi optatissimum spectaculum huius sordium atque luctus et tanti squaloris amitteret. iam vero quod iter Romam eius mulieris fuisse existimatis? quod ego propter vicinitatem Aquinatium et Fabraternorum ex multis audivi et comperi; quos concursus in his oppidis, quantos et virorum et mulierum gemitus esse factos? mulierem quandam Larino advolare, usque a mari supero Romam proficisci cum magno comitatu et pecunia quo facilius circumvenire iudicio capitis atque opprimere filium posset?

There was no man of those (I almost say) who did not think that that place must be expiated wherever she had made her journey; no one who did not think that the very earth (which is the mother of all) was being violated by the footprints of the wicked mother. So in no town was the means of stopping given her; no one out of so many guest-friends was found who did not flee the contagion of her sight; she committed herself rather to night and to solitude than to any city or any guest-friend.

nemo erat illorum, paene dicam, quin expiandum illum locum esse arbitraretur quacumque illa iter fecisset, nemo quin terram ipsam violari quae mater est omnium vestigiis consceleratae matris putaret. itaque nullo in oppido consistendi potestas ei fuit, nemo ex tot hospitibus inventus est qui non contagionem aspectus fugeret; nocti se potius ac solitudini quam ulli aut urbi aut hospiti committebat.

But now what she does, what she contrives, what at last she daily thinks — whom of us does she think ignorant? Whom she has addressed, to whom she has promised money, whose faith she has tried to shake by a price, we hold. Even her nightly sacrifices (which she thinks more hidden) and her wicked prayers and unspeakable vows we have learned. By which she even calls the immortal gods to witness her own crime; nor does she understand that the minds of the gods can be appeased by piety and religious obligation and just prayers, not by polluted superstition or by victims slain for the bringing about of crime. Whose frenzy and cruelty I trust the immortal gods have spurned from their own altars and temples.

nunc vero quid agat, quid moliatur, quid denique cotidie cogitet quem ignorare nostrum putat? quos appellarit, quibus pecuniam promiserit, quorum fidem pretio labefactare conata sit tenemus. quin etiam nocturna sacrificia quae putat occultiora esse sceleratasque eius preces et nefaria vota cognovimus; quibus illa etiam deos immortalis de suo scelere testatur neque intellegit pietate et religione et iustis precibus deorum mentis, non contaminata superstitione neque ad scelus perficiendum caesis hostiis posse placari. cuius ego furorem atque crudelitatem deos immortalis a suis aris atque templis aspernatos esse confido.

You, gentlemen, whom for this Aulus Cluentius fortune has wished to be as it were certain other gods for all the time of his life, drive off this fierceness of his mother from his life. Many in judging have often granted the sins of children to the pity of parents. We ask that you should not give over this man’s most honourably lived life to his mother’s cruelty, especially when on the other side you can see the whole town. Know all, gentlemen — it is incredible to say, but it shall be most truly said by me — that all the Larinates who have had the strength have come to Rome, that they should relieve him by their zeal and number, as far as they could, in so great a peril of his. Know that to children at this time and to women that town has been entrusted, and that for the present it is safe by the common peace of Italy, not by domestic resources. Whom, however, both equally and those whom you see present, the awaiting of this trial troubles day and night.

vos, iudices, quos huic A. Aulo Cluentio quosdam alios deos ad omne vitae tempus fortuna esse voluit, huius importunitatem matris a fili capite depellite. multi saepe in iudicando peccata liberum parentum misericordiae concesserunt; vos ne huius honestissime actam vitam matris crudelitati condonetis rogamus, praesertim cum ex altera parte totum municipium videre possitis. omnis scitote, iudices — incredibile dictu est, sed a me verissime dicetur — omnis Larinatis qui valuerunt venisse Romam ut hunc studio frequentiaque sua quantum possent in tanto eius periculo sublevarent. pueris illud hoc tempore et mulieribus oppidum scitote esse traditum, idque in praesentia communi Italiae pace, non domesticis copiis esse tutum. quos tamen ipsos aeque et eos quos praesentis videtis huius exspectatio iudici dies noctesque sollicitat.

They reckon that you are about to give votes not about one townsman’s fortunes but about the standing, dignity, and all the advantages of the whole town. For the highest is the man’s diligence in the common matter of the town, his kindness toward the single townsmen, his justice and faith toward all men. Besides, that nobility among his own and the place handed down by his ancestors he so keeps that he attains the gravity, constancy, favour, liberality of his ancestors. So with these words they praise him publicly, that they signify not only their testimony and judgement but also the care and grief of their mind. While this praise is being read out, you, please, who have brought it, rise.

non illi vos de unius municipis fortunis arbitrantur sed de totius municipi statu dignitate commodisque omnibus sententias esse laturos. summa est enim, iudices, hominis in communem municipi rem diligentia, in singulos municipes benignitas, in omnis homines iustitia et fides. praeterea nobilitatem illam inter suos locumque a maioribus traditum sic tuetur ut maiorum gravitatem, constantiam, gratiam, liberalitatem adsequatur. itaque eis eum verbis publice laudant ut non solum testimonium suum iudiciumque significent verum etiam curam animi ac dolorem. quae dum laudatio recitatur, vos, quaeso, qui eam detulistis adsurgite.

From the tears of these men, gentlemen, you can reckon that all these decurions decreed it weeping. Come now, of the neighbours how great the zeal, how incredible the goodwill, how great the care! They did not send a praise decreed in little books, but wished most honourable men, whom we all knew, to be at hand here in numbers, and present to praise him. The Ferentani are at hand, most noble men; the Marrucini likewise of equal dignity. From Teanum Apulum and Luceria you see Roman knights, most honourable men, as praisers; from Bovianum and from all Samnium, both most honourable praises have been sent and the most ample and most noble men have come.

ex lacrimis horum, iudices, existimare potestis omnis haec decuriones decrevisse lacrimantis. age vero, vicinorum quantum studium, quam incredibilis benivolentia, quanta cura est! non illi in libellis laudationem decretam miserunt, sed homines honestissimos, quos nossemus omnes, huc frequentis adesse et hunc praesentis laudare voluerunt. adsunt Ferentani, homines nobilissimi, Marrucini item pari dignitate; Teano Apulo atque Luceria equites Romanos, homines honestissimos, laudatores videtis; Boviano totoque ex Samnio cum laudationes honestissimae missae sunt, tum homines amplissimi nobilissimique venerunt.

Now those who have estates, business, cattle-trade in the Larinate field, honourable men endowed with the highest splendour, it is hard to say how anxious they are, how they labour. Few seem to me to be so loved by one as this man is by all these. How I grieve that Lucius Volusenus is absent from this trial — a man endowed with the highest splendour and virtue! I would I could name as present Publius Helvidius Rufus, of all the most adorned Roman knight. Who, when he was watching for this man’s sake day and night and was teaching me this case, fell into a grave and perilous disease, in which yet he labours no less for this man’s life than for his own. Of Gnaeus Tudicius the senator, an excellent and most honourable man, you will know the equal zeal from his testimony and praise. With the same hope but with greater modesty about you, Publius Volumnius, since you are a judge in Aulus Cluentius’s case, we speak. And lest it be long, we confirm that the highest goodwill of all the neighbours toward him exists. The zeal of all these,

iam qui in agro Larinati praedia, qui negotia, qui res pecuarias habent, honesti homines et summo splendore praediti, difficile dictu est quam sint solliciti, quam laborent. non multi mihi ab uno sic diligi videntur ut hic ab his universis. quam doleo abesse ab huius iudicio L. Lucium Volusenum, summo splendore hominem ac virtute praeditum! vellem praesentem possem P. Publium Helvidium Rufum, equitem Romanum omnium ornatissimum, nominare. qui cum huius causa dies noctesque vigilaret et cum me hanc causam doceret, in morbum gravem periculosumque incidit; in quo tamen non minus de capite huius quam de sua vita laborat. Cn. Tudici senatoris, viri optimi et honestissimi, par studium ex testimonio et laudatione cognoscetis. eadem spe sed maiore verecundia de te, P. Publi Volumni, quoniam iudex es in A. Aulum Cluentium, dicimus. et ne longum sit, omnium vicinorum summam esse in hunc benivolentiam confirmamus. Horum omnium studium,

the care, the diligence, and at the same time my labour (who in the old fashion alone have closed this whole case), and at the same time, gentlemen, your equity and gentleness, one mother assails. But what a mother! Whom you see borne blind by cruelty and crime; whose lust no foulness has ever slowed; who by the vices of her mind has turned all the rights of men to the worst part; whose stupidity is such that no one can call her a man, whose force such that no one can call her a woman, whose cruelty such that no one can call her a mother. And she has even changed the names of the connections, not only the name and rights of nature: a wife to her son-in-law, a stepmother to her son, a rival to her daughter — to that point now finally she has been brought, that to herself, save form, she has kept nothing for likeness to a human.

curam, diligentiam meumque una laborem, qui totam hanc causam vetere instituto solus peroravi, vestramque simul, iudices, aequitatem et mansuetudinem una mater oppugnat. at quae mater! quam caecam crudelitate et scelere ferri videtis, cuius cupiditatem nulla umquam turpitudo retardavit, quae vitiis animi in deterrimas partis iura hominum convertit omnia, cuius ea stultitia est ut eam nemo hominem, ea vis ut nemo feminam, ea crudelitas ut nemo matrem appellare possit. atque etiam nomina necessitudinum, non solum naturae nomen et iura mutavit, uxor generi, noverca fili, filiae paelex; eo iam denique adducta est uti sibi praeter formam nihil ad similitudinem hominis reservarit.

Wherefore, gentlemen, if you hate crime, forbid the approach of the mother from the son’s blood; give the parent this incredible grief from the safety, from the victory of her child; suffer the mother (lest, deprived of her son, she rejoice) to depart conquered rather by your equity. But if (which your nature demands) you love modesty, goodness, virtue, raise up at last this suppliant of yours, gentlemen, who for so many years has been at large in false hatred and perils; who now first, after that flame stirred up by the deed and greed of others, by the hope of your equity has begun to lift his spirit and to breathe a little from fear; who has all things placed in you; whom very many wish to be saved; you alone can save.

qua re, iudices, si scelus odistis, prohibete aditum matris a fili sanguine, date parenti hunc incredibilem dolorem ex salute, ex victoria liberum, patimini matrem, ne orbata filio laetetur, victam potius vestra aequitate discedere. sin autem, id quod vestra natura postulat, pudorem bonitatem virtutemque diligitis, levate hunc aliquando supplicem vestrum, iudices, tot annos in falsa invidia periculisque versatum, qui nunc primum post illam flammam aliorum facto et cupiditate excitatam spe vestrae aequitatis erigere animum et paulum respirare a metu coepit, cui posita sunt in vobis omnia, quem servatum esse plurimi cupiunt, servare soli vos potestis.

Habitus asks you, gentlemen, and weeping beseeches that you should not give him over to hatred (which ought not to have force in trials), to his mother (whose vows and prayers you ought to repudiate from your minds), to Oppianicus (an unspeakable man, now condemned and dead). But if some calamity shall afflict this innocent man in this trial, that wretched man, if (which is hard to do) he shall remain alive, will often and much complain that that Fabrician poison was caught in time. For if it had not then been informed against, it would have been to him — the most miserable man — not poison, but the medicine of many griefs; finally even his mother perhaps, having followed the funeral, would have pretended to mourn the death of her son. Now indeed what shall have been brought about, save that his life, kept safe out of the very midst of the snares of death, shall be seen kept for mourning, his death deprived of his father’s tomb? He has been long enough in misery,

orat vos habitus, iudices, et flens obsecrat ne se invidiae quae in iudiciis valere non debet, ne matri cuius vota et preces a vestris mentibus repudiare debetis, ne Oppianico, homini nefario, condemnato iam et mortuo condonetis. quod si qua calamitas hunc in hoc iudicio adflixerit innocentem, ne iste miser, si, id quod difficile factu est, in vita remanebit, saepe et multum queretur deprehensum esse illud quondam Fabricianum venenum. quod si tum indicatum non esset, non huic aerumnosissimo venenum illud fuisset sed multorum medicamentum maerorum; postremo etiam fortasse mater exsequias illius funeris prosecuta mortem se fili lugere simulasset. nunc vero quid erit profectum nisi ut huius ex mediis mortis insidiis vita ad luctum conservata, mors sepulcro patris privata esse videatur? satis diu fuit in miseriis,

gentlemen; he has long enough laboured under hatred. No one was so unfair to him save his parent, whose mind we should not now think filled. You who are fair to all, who, as each is most cruelly assailed, raise him up most gently — keep safe Aulus Cluentius; restore him whole to his town. Give him back to his friends, neighbours, guest-friends, whose zeal you see; bind him for ever to yourselves and to your children. This is yours, gentlemen, of your dignity, of your clemency. Rightly is it sought back from you that you should at last free the most excellent and most innocent man, dear and pleasant to very many mortals, from these calamities; that all may understand that in public meetings is the place of hatred, in trials of truth.

iudices, satis multos annos ex invidia laboravit. nemo huic tam iniquus praeter parentem fuit cuius animum non iam expletum putemus. vos qui aequi estis omnibus, qui ut quisque crudelissime oppugnatur eum lenissime sublevatis, conservate A. Aulum Cluentium, restituite incolumem municipio; amicis, vicinis, hospitibus quorum studia videtis reddite, vobis in perpetuum liberisque vestris obstringite. vestrum est hoc, iudices, vestrae dignitatis, vestrae clementiae; recte hoc repetitur a vobis ut virum optimum atque innocentissimum plurimisque mortalibus carum atque iucundum his aliquando calamitatibus liberetis, ut omnes intellegant in contionibus esse invidiae locum, in iudiciis veritati.

C icero by Claude

For Aulus Cluentius

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