Eleventh Philippic
Philippica XI
Headnote
Delivered in the Senate in the early spring of 43 BC, the Eleventh Philippic answers a single piece of dreadful news. Gaius Trebonius — one of Caesar’s assassins, now proconsul of Asia — had been surprised at night in Smyrna by Publius Cornelius Dolabella, who had marched east through the province with a legion; tortured for two days over the public money, killed, beheaded, and his body flung into the sea. The day before, on the motion of Quintus Fufius Calenus, the Senate had declared Dolabella a public enemy and ordered his goods confiscated. The present debate is the sequel: who is to be given the war against him. Cicero opens over the body of Trebonius — the cruelty of Dolabella made the measure of what Antony, the partner of his madness, would do in Italy if he could — and argues from the atrocity that the war for liberty and the war against Dolabella are one and the same.
Two motions are already before the house, and Cicero rejects both. The first, Lucius Caesar’s, would confer an extraordinary command on a distinguished private citizen, Publius Servilius Isauricus; Cicero opposes it on the old principle that extraordinary commands are “a popular, windy thing,” unworthy of the Senate’s gravity, and refuses to let the curia be turned into an electoral assembly where senators canvass and a friend’s defeat becomes a personal slight. (His own grant to the young Octavian, he answers the obvious objection, only ratified a command the facts had already created: “what was not snatched away is not to be reckoned as given.”) The second motion would send the consuls themselves, Pansa and Hirtius, to draw lots for Asia and Syria once Decimus Brutus is freed — which Cicero calls shameful and useless while a consul-elect is besieged at Mutina and the whole war turns on his rescue. From this comes the speech’s most quoted sentence (§28), the natural-law defence of Cassius’s having acted without orders: law is nothing else than right reason, drawn from the will of the gods; and a province seized to save the commonwealth is held, the written statutes once trampled down, “by the law of nature.”
Cicero’s own proposal, set out as a formal decree (§29–31), confirms Gaius Cassius — already in the East to keep Dolabella out of Syria — in command of that province “by the best right,” to take over the armies of Marcius Crispus, Staius Murcus, and Allienus, to requisition ships, men, and money across Syria, Asia, Bithynia, and Pontus, and to pursue Dolabella by land and sea, with the elder and younger Deiotarus and the other client kings invited to aid him. The case for Cassius is built from his proven army, his standing among the Tyrians and in Phoenicia, and his old victory over the Parthians — his greatest title to honour, the part in Caesar’s death, being pointedly left to the “testimony of memory rather than of speech.” Around the argument runs the familiar Philippic invective, a contemptuous muster of Antony’s creatures (his brother Lucius, the bankrupt Trebellius “turned into a new account-book himself,” Plancus, the land-commissioners Nucula and Lento, Annius Cimber, the squatters Saxa and Cafo), and the recurring retort to those who plead the veterans’ feelings: the Senate will not choose its commanders “at the veterans’ nod.” In the event the motion did not carry — the house preferred to leave the command to the consuls — but Cassius made the speech prophetic, taking Syria, raising the legions Cicero named, and driving Dolabella to suicide at Laodicea before the summer was out.