On the Laws
De Legibus
Headnote
De Legibus is the companion to De Re Publica, and the two were conceived as a pair: where the earlier work asked what the best commonwealth is, this one sets out the laws by which such a commonwealth lives. As Cicero took Plato’s Republic for his model in the first, he takes Plato’s Laws for his model here — and, like Plato, he walks the ground while he talks. The dialogue is set at Cicero’s birthplace, Arpinum, on a summer’s day by the river Fibrenus where it joins the Liris; the speakers are Cicero himself (Marcus), his brother Quintus, and his lifelong friend Atticus, the Epicurean whose presence quietly sharpens every argument that law and justice are grounded in nature rather than in advantage.
The composition is hard to date precisely. Cicero seems to have begun the work around 52 BC, in the disordered years after the murder of Clodius, and to have returned to it afterwards; he never published it in his lifetime, and it may never have been finished. What survives is three books, the last breaking off in mid-conversation. Ancient citations show that at least a fourth and fifth book once existed, and probably more; all of that is lost. The Latin in this volume is taken from the IntraText edition, since the work is absent from the Perseus corpus.
Book 1 lays the philosophical foundation: law is not a human invention or a calculation of utility but is rooted in nature and right reason, shared by gods and men, so that justice exists by nature and not by opinion. This is the Stoic doctrine of natural law in its most influential Latin statement — the seed of a tradition that runs through Roman jurisprudence and the medieval and early-modern law of nature. Book 2 turns to the law of religion, and Cicero does something striking: he writes out, in deliberately archaic and lapidary Latin, a code of sacred law — on approaching the gods, the priesthoods, the rites, the dead — and then has Marcus expound it clause by clause. Book 3 does the same for the magistracies, setting down a statute on the powers and offices of the Roman constitution, the consuls and praetors and tribunes and censors, before the dialogue is cut short.
The mock-archaic statute blocks in books 2 and 3 are rendered here in a formal, set-off register distinct from the surrounding conversation, to keep the texture of Cicero’s two voices: the lawgiver drafting in the old style, and the philosopher discussing what he has drafted.
Atticus. That grove, surely, and this oak of the Arpinates are recognizable — often have I read of them in your Marius; for if that oak still stands, this is certainly it, since it is indeed very old. Quintus. It stands, our Atticus, and always will; for it was sown by genius. No farmer’s tending can plant a stock so long-lived as a poet’s verse can. Atticus. How so, Quintus? And what sort of thing is it that poets sow? It seems to me that, in praising your brother, you are voting for your own cause.
Lucus quidem ille et haec Arpinatium quercus agnoscitur, saepe a me lectus in Mario: si enim manet illa quercus, haec est profecto; etenim est sane uetus. Qvintvs: Manet uero, Attice noster, et semper manebit: sata est enim ingenio. Nullius autem agricolae cultu stirps tam diuturna quam poetae uersu seminari potest. Atticvs: Quo tandem modo, Quinte? Aut quale est istuc quod poetae serunt? Mihi enim uideris fratrem laudando suffragari tibi.
Quintus. Let it be so, then. Yet still, as long as Latin letters shall speak, an oak will not be wanting to this spot to be called the Marian oak; and it, as Scaevola says of my brother’s Marius, “will grow grey through the countless ages” — unless perhaps your Athens has been able to keep an everlasting olive on the citadel, or unless the place that men today point out is the same tall and slender palm which Homer’s Ulysses said he had seen at Delos. Many things in many places last longer in the telling than they could stand in nature. So let this now be that acorn-bearing oak from which once flew out the tawny messenger of Jupiter, a marvel to behold in its form. But when storm or age has worn it away, there will still be in these parts an oak which men shall call the Marian oak.
Qvintvs: Sit ita sane; uerum tamen dum Latinae loquentur litterae, quercus huic loco non deerit quae Mariana dicatur, eaque, ut ait Scaeuola de fratris mei Mario, canescet saeclis innumerabilibus, nisi forte Athenae tuae sempiternam in arce oleam tenere potuerunt, aut quam Homericus Vlixes Deli se proceram et teneram palmam uidisse dixit, hodie monstrant eandem, multaque alia multis locis diutius commemoratione manent quam natura stare potuerunt. Quare glandifera illa quercus, ex qua olim euolauit nuntia fulua Iouis miranda uisa figura, nunc sit haec. Sed cum eam tempestas uetustasue consumpserit, tamen erit his in locis quercus quam Marianam quercum uoca‹bu›nt.
Atticus. I do not doubt that. But this I now ask not of you, Quintus, but of the poet himself: did your verses sow this oak, or did you take it on report that the thing really happened to Marius, as you write it? Marcus. I will answer you, certainly — but not before you have first answered me, Atticus, whether it is sure that not far from your own house Romulus, walking about after his departure, told Proculus Julius that he was a god and was called Quirinus, and ordered a temple to be dedicated to him on that spot; and whether it is true that at Athens, likewise not far from that ancient home of yours, Aquilo carried off Orithyia — for so it has been handed down.
Atticvs: Non dubito id quidem. Sed hoc iam non ex te, Quinte, quaero, uerum ex ipso poeta, tuine uersus hanc quercum seuerint, an ita factum de Mario, ut scribis, acceperis. Marcvs: Respondebo tibi equidem, sed non ante quam mihi tu ipse responderis, Attice, certen ‹non› longe a tuis aedibus inambulans post excessum suum Romulus Proculo Iulio dixerit se deum esse et Quirinum uocari templumque sibi dedicari in eo loco iusserit, et uerumne sit ‹ut› Athenis non longe item a tua illa antiqua domo Orithyiam Aquilo sustulerit; sic enim est traditum.
Atticus. To what end, pray, or why do you ask these things? Marcus. For no reason at all, except that you should not inquire too scrupulously into things that have been preserved in memory after that fashion. Atticus. And yet many things in the Marius are questioned, whether they are invented or true; and from some, since the matter turns both on recent memory and on a man of Arpinum, the truth is demanded of you. Marcus. And by Hercules I myself do not wish to be thought a liar; but still, our Titus, certain of those people show a want of skill, who in such a matter exact the truth not as from a poet but as from a witness — nor do I doubt that the same men think Numa really conversed with Egeria and that the cap was set on Tarquin’s head by an eagle.
Atticvs: Quorsum tandem aut cur ista quaeris? Marcvs: Nihil sane, nisi ne nimis diligenter inquiras in ea quae isto modo memoriae sint prodita. Atticvs: Atqui multa quaeruntur in Mario fictane an uera sint, et a nonnullis quod et in recenti memoria et in Arpinati homine uers‹atur›, ueritas a te postulatur. Marcvs: Et mehercule ego me cupio non mendacem putari, sed tamen nonnulli isti, Tite noster, faciunt imperite, qui in isto periculo non ut a poeta sed ut a teste ueritatem exigant, nec dubito quin idem et cum Egeria conlocutum Numam et ab aquila Tarquinio apicem impositum putent.
Quintus. I understand you, brother: you hold that one set of laws is to be observed in history, another in poetry. Marcus. Just so, since in the one, Quintus, everything is referred to truth, in the other most things to delight — though both in Herodotus, the father of history, and in Theopompus there are countless tales. Atticus. I have the opening I was hoping for, and I will not let it slip. Marcus. What opening, Titus? Atticus. A history has long been asked of you — demanded, rather. For people think that, if you took it in hand, we might in this kind of writing too yield nothing to Greece. And, that you may hear what I myself feel: you seem to me to owe this service not only to the zeal of those who delight in your writings, but to your country as well — that she who has been kept safe through you should be adorned through you also. For history is wanting to our literature, as I myself recognize and very often hear from you. And you, certainly, can do it justice, since this is the most oratorical of all tasks, as you at any rate are wont to think it.
Qvintvs: Intellego te, frater, alias in historia leges obseruandas putare, alias in poemate. Marcvs: Quippe cum in illa ad ueritatem, Quinte, ‹quaeque› referantur, in hoc ad delectationem pleraque; quamquam et apud Herodotum patrem historiae et apud Theopompum sunt innumerabiles fabulae. Atticvs: Teneo quam optabam occasionem neque omittam. Marcvs: Quam tandem, Tite? Atticvs: Postulatur a te iam diu uel flagitatur potius historia. Sic enim putant, te illam tractante effici posse, ut in hoc etiam genere Graeciae nihil cedamus. Atque ut audias quid ego ipse sentiam, non solum mihi uideris eorum studiis qui [tuis] litteris delectantur, sed etiam patriae debere hoc munus, ut ea quae salua per te est, per te eundem sit ornata. Abest enim historia litteris nostris, ut et ipse intellego et ex te persaepe audio. Potes autem tu profecto satis facere in ea, quippe cum sit opus, ut tibi quidem uideri solet, unum hoc oratorium maxime.
So set your hand to it, we beg you, and take time for this thing, which by our countrymen has hitherto been either neglected or left aside. For after the annals of the chief pontiffs — than which nothing can be plainer — if you come to Fabius, or to that Cato who is always on your lips, or to Piso, or to Fannius, or to Vennonius — though of these one has more vigor than another — yet what is so meager as all those men? Antipater, joined in age to Fannius, blew a little more forcefully, and had vigor indeed, but a rough and rustic vigor, without polish or training; yet he could at least warn the rest to write more carefully. But see, there succeeded him Gellius, Clodius, Asellio — nothing next to Antipater, but rather a relapse into the languor and clumsiness of the ancients.
Quam ob rem adgredere, quaesumus, et sume ad hanc rem tempus, quae est a nostris hominibus adhuc aut ignorata aut relicta. Nam post annalis pontificum maximorum, quibus nihil potest esse iucundius, si aut ad Fabium aut ad eum qui tibi semper in ore est Catonem, aut ad Pisonem aut ad Fannium aut ad Vennonium uenias, quamquam ex his alius alio plus habet uirium, tamen quid tam exile quam isti omnes? Fannii autem aetati coniunctus ‹Coelius Anti›pater paulo inflauit uehementius, habuitque uires agrestis ille quidem atque horridas, sine nitore ac palaestra, sed tamen admonere reliquos potuit ut adcuratius scriberent. Ecce autem successere huic ‹G›elli‹us›, Clodius, Asellio, nihil ad Coelium, sed potius ad antiquorum languorem et inscitiam.
For why should I count Macer? His garrulity has some sharpness, yet that drawn not from the learned abundance of the Greeks but from our Latin scribblers; while in his speeches he displays much that is well suited to Latin diction. Sisenna, his friend, has so far easily surpassed all our writers — save perhaps for any who have not yet published, and of whom we cannot judge. Yet he was never reckoned an orator in your number, and in his history he chases after something childish, so that he seems to have read of the Greeks only Cleitarchus and no one else besides, and to wish merely to imitate even him; and if he could attain to him, he would still fall somewhat short of the best. So this task is yours; from you it is awaited — unless Quintus thinks otherwise.
Nam quid Macrum numerem? Cuius loquacitas habet aliquid argutiarum nec id tamen ex illa erudita Graecorum copia, sed ex librariolis Latinis: in orationibus autem multa s‹ane a›pt‹a L›ati‹n›o ‹ser›m‹oni› imp‹er›t‹iens›, Sisenna, eius amicus, omnis adhuc nostros scriptores—nisi qui forte nondum ediderunt, de quibus existimare non possumus—facile superauit. Is tamen neque orator in numero uestro umquam est habitus, et in historia puerile quiddam consectatur, ut unum Clitarchum neque praeterea quemquam de Graecis legisse uideatur, eum tamen uelle dumtaxat imitari: quem si adsequi posset, aliquantum ab optumo tamen abesset. Quare tuum est munus hoc, a te exspectatur; nisi quid Quinto uidetur secus.
Quintus. I, for my part, think nothing of the kind, and we have often talked about it; but there is a small disagreement between us. Atticus. What is it, pray? Quintus. From what period the beginning of the writing should be taken. I judge it should be from the earliest, since those events are so written that they are not even read; whereas he himself demands the record of his own age, so that he may take in those things in which he himself had a part. Atticus. I, indeed, rather agree with him. For there are very great matters in this memory and in our own time; and besides, he will throw light on the praises of Gnaeus Pompeius, his closest friend, and will fall too upon that famous and memorable year of his own — things which I would rather have proclaimed by him than, as they say, set among Remus and Romulus. Marcus. I understand, Atticus, that this labor has long been asked of me. I would not refuse it, if any free and empty time were granted me. For so great a work cannot be undertaken with the work occupied or the mind hindered: both are needed, freedom from care and freedom from business.
Qvintvs: Mihi uero nihil, et saepe de isto conlocuti sumus; sed est quaedam inter nos parua dissensio. Atticvs: Quae tandem? Qvintvs: A quibus temporibus scribendi capiatur exordium. Ego enim ab ultimis censeo, quoniam illa sic scripta sunt ut ne legantur quidem, ipse autem aequalem aetatis suae memoriam deposcit, ut ea conplectatur quibus ipse interfuit. Atticvs: Ego uero huic potius adsentior. Sunt enim maxumae res in hac memoria atque aetate nostra; tum autem hominis amicissimi Cn. Pompeii laudes inlustrabit, incurret etiam in ‹praeclarum› illum et memorabilem annum suum: quae ab isto malo praedicari quam, ut aiunt, de Remo et Romulo. Marcvs: Intellego equidem a me istum laborem iam diu postulari, Attice. Quem non recusarem, si mihi ullum tribueretur uacuum tempus et liberum. Neque enim occupata opera neque inpedito animo res tanta suscipi potest: utrumque opus est, et cura uacare et negotio.
Atticus. What? For the other things you have written, more than any of us, what free time, pray, was ever conceded to you? Marcus. Certain spare moments come along, which I do not let go to waste — so that if some days are given for the country, I fit to their number the things I write. But a history can neither be begun except with leisure prepared, nor finished in a short time; and I am wont to be in suspense of mind when, once I have begun something, I am drawn off to another matter, nor do I knit up so easily what has been broken off as I finish what has been begun without interruption.
Atticvs: Quid? Ad cetera quae scripsisti plura quam quisquam e nostris, quod tibi tandem tempus uacuum fuit concessum? Marcvs: Subsiciua quaedam tempora incurrunt, quae ego perire non patior, ut si qui dies ad rusticandum dati sint, ad eorum numerum adcommodentur quae scribimus. Historia uero nec institui potest nisi praeparato otio, nec exiguo tempore absolui, et ego animi pendere soleo, cum semel quid orsus, [si] traducor alio, neque tam facile interrupta contexo quam absoluo instituta.
Atticus. Such talk demands, no doubt, some embassy, or some such free and leisured leave of absence. Marcus. For my part, I was rather counting on the exemption that comes with age, especially since I would not refuse, after the fashion of our fathers, to sit on the chair and give responses to those who consult me, and to discharge the welcome and honorable duty of a not idle old age. For so it would be open to me to give as much labor as I wished both to that thing you desire and to far richer and greater works.
Atticvs: Legationem aliquam nimirum ista oratio postulat, aut eius modi quampiam cessationem liberam atque otiosam. Marcvs: Ego uero aetatis potius uacationi confidebam, cum praesertim non recusarem, quominus more patrio sedens in solio consulentibus responderem senectutisque non inertis grato atque honesto fungerer munere. Sic enim mihi liceret et isti rei quam desideras et multo uberioribus atque maioribus operae quantum uellem dare.
Atticus. And yet I fear that no one will recognize that excuse, and that you must always be pleading — all the more because you yourself have changed and taken up a different manner of speaking; so that, just as your friend Roscius in his old age sang his measures more gently and made the very flutes slower, so you, from those intense exertions you used to employ at full pitch, relax something every day, until now your speech is not far from the smoothness of the philosophers. And since even the extremest old age seems able to keep this up, I see no exemption from the courts being granted you.
Atticvs: Atqui uereor ne istam causam nemo noscat, tibique semper dicendum sit, et eo magis quod te ipse mutasti, et aliud dicendi instituisti genus, ut, quem ad modum Roscius familiaris tuus in senectute numeros in cantu ‹remissius› cecinerat ipsasque tardiores fecerat tibias, sic tu a con‹ten›tionibus quibus summis uti solebas, cotidie relaxes aliquid, ut iam oratio tua non multum a philosophorum lenitate absit. Quod sustinere cum uel summa senectus posse uideatur, nullam tibi a causis uacationem uideo dari.
Quintus. But by Hercules I used to think that it might win the approval of our people, if you gave yourself to answering points of law; for which reason, when it pleases you, I think you should make the trial. Marcus. If only, Quintus, there were no danger in the trying! But I fear that, while I wish to lessen my labor, I may increase it, and that to that work of the courts — to which I never come except prepared and rehearsed — this interpretation of the law may be joined, which would be troublesome to me not so much for its labor as because it would take away the rumination over speech, without which I have never dared to come to any greater case.
Qvintvs: At mehercule ego arbitrabar posse id populo nostro probari, si te ad ius respondendum dedisses; quam ob rem, cum placebit, experiendum tibi id censeo. Marcvs: Si quidem, Quinte, nullum esset in experiundo periculum. Sed uereor ne, dum minuere uelim laborem, augeam, atque ad illam causarum operam, ad quam ego numquam nisi paratus et meditatus accedo, adiungatur haec iuris interpretatio, quae non tam mihi molesta sit propter laborem, quam quod dicendi cogitationem auferat, sine qua ad nullam maiorem umquam causam sum ausus accedere.
Atticus. Why then do you not explain those very matters to us in these spare moments, as you call them, and write of the civil law more subtly than the rest? For I remember that you devoted yourself to the law from the first season of your life, when I too used to come to Scaevola, nor did you ever seem to me to have so given yourself to oratory as to despise the civil law. Marcus. You call me into a long discourse, Atticus; yet, unless Quintus would rather we do something else, I will take it up, and, since we are at leisure, I will speak. Quintus. I, for one, would gladly hear it. For what should I rather do, or in what could I better spend this day?
Atticvs: Quin igitur ista ipsa explicas nobis his subsiciuis, ut ais, temporibus, et conscribis de iure ciuili subtilius quam ceteri? Nam a primo tempore aetatis iuri studere te memini, quom ipse etiam ad Scaeuolam uentitarem, neque umquam mihi uisus es ita te ad dicendum dedisse, ut ius ciuile contemneres. Marcvs: In longum sermonem me uocas, Attice, quem tamen, nisi Quintus aliud quid nos agere mauult, suscipiam, et, quoniam uacui sumus, dicam. Qvintvs: Ego uero libenter audierim. Quid enim agam potius, aut in quo melius hunc consumam diem?
Marcus. Why then do we not make for those walks and seats of ours? There, when we have walked enough, we shall rest; and surely there will be no want of pleasure for us as we pursue one question out of another. Atticus. For our part, gladly — and this way to the Liris, if you please, along the bank and the shade. But now begin, I beg you, to set forth what you think about the civil law. Marcus. I? That there have been the greatest men in our state, who were wont to interpret it to the people and to give responses; but that they, having professed great things, busied themselves with small. For what is so great as the law of a state? And yet what is so slight as the duty of those who are consulted? — although it is necessary to the people. Nor indeed do I think that those who have presided over that duty have been wholly unversed in the universal law; but this civil law, as they call it, they practiced only so far as they were willing to be of service to the people; and that, in point of knowledge, is a slender thing, in point of use a necessary one. So to what do you call me, or to what do you urge me? That I compose pamphlets on the law of eaves-drip and of party walls? Or that I draw up the formulas of stipulations and judgments? These have both been carefully written by many, and they are humbler than the things I think are expected of us.
Marcvs: Quin igitur ad illa spatia nostra sedesque pergimus? Vbi, cum satis erit ambulatum, requiescemus, nec profecto nobis delectatio deerit, aliud ex alio quaerentibus. Atticvs: Nos uero, et hac quidem ad ‹L›irem, si placet, per ripam et umbram. Sed iam ordire explicare, quaeso, de iure ciuili quid sentias. Marcvs: Egone? Summos fuisse in ciuitate nostra uiros, qui id interpretari populo et responsitare soliti sint, sed eos magna professos in paruis esse uersatos. Quid enim est tantum quantum ius ciuitatis? Quid autem tam exiguum quam est munus hoc eorum qui consuluntur? Quam‹quam› est [populo] necessarium, nec uero eos, qui ei muneri praefuerunt, uniuersi iuris fuisse expertis existimo, sed hoc ciuile quod uocant eatenus exercuerunt, quoad populo praestare uoluerunt; id autem in cogniti‹one› tenue est, in usu necessarium. Quam ob rem quo me uocas, aut quid hortaris? ut libellos conficiam de stillicidiorum ac de parietum iure? An ut stipulationum et iudiciorum formulas conponam? Quae et conscripta a multis sunt diligenter, et sunt humiliora quam illa quae a nobis exspectari puto.
Atticus. And yet, if you ask what I expect, then since you have written about the best condition of the commonwealth, it seems to follow that you should likewise write about the laws. For so I see your beloved Plato did — whom you admire, whom you set before all others, whom you most love. Marcus. Do you wish, then, that — just as he, with the Cretan Clinias and the Spartan Megillus, on a summer’s day (as he describes it), in the cypress groves and forest walks of the Cnossians, often halting, sometimes resting, discoursed of the institutions of states and of the best laws — so we too, walking among these very tall poplars on the green and shady bank, and then sitting down, should ask about the same matters something more amply than the practice of the courts requires?
Atticvs: Atqui, si quaeris ego quid exspectem, quoniam scriptum est a te de optimo rei publicae statu, consequens esse uidetur ut scribas tu idem de legibus: sic enim fecisse uideo Platonem illum tuum, quem tu admiraris, quem omnibus anteponis, quem maxime diligis. Marcvs: Visne igitur, ut ille cum Crete Clinia et cum Lacedaemonio Megillo aestiuo, quem ad modum describit, die in cupressetis Gnosiorum et spatiis siluestribus, crebro insistens, interdum adquiescens, de institutis rerum publicarum ac de optimis legibus disputa‹ba›t, sic nos inter has procerissimas populos in uiridi opacaque ripa inambulantes, tum autem residentes, quaeramus isdem de rebus aliquid uberius quam forensis usus desiderat?
Atticus. For my part, I long to hear such things. Marcus. What does Quintus say? Quintus. About nothing more. Marcus. And rightly. For understand this: in no kind of discussion can it better be made plain what has been granted to man by nature, how great a force of the best things the human mind contains, for the cultivating and fulfilling of which office we have been born and brought into the light, what is the bond among men, what the natural fellowship between them. For when these things have been unfolded, the source of laws and of right can be found.
Atticvs: Ego uero ista audire cupio. Marcvs: Quid ait Quintus? Qvintvs: Nulla de re magis. Marcvs: Et recte quidem; nam sic habetote, nullo in genere disputandi ‹p›o‹t›est magis patefieri, quid sit homini a natura tributum, quantam uim rerum optimarum mens humana contineat, cuius muneris colendi efficiendique causa nati et in lucem editi simus, quae sit coniunctio hominum, quae naturalis societas inter ipsos. His enim explicatis, fons legum et iuris inueniri potest.
Atticus. You think, then, that the science of law is to be drawn not from the praetor’s edict, as most do now, nor from the Twelve Tables, as our forebears did, but from the very depths of philosophy? Marcus. For we are not inquiring in this discourse, Pomponius, how to safeguard ourselves in law, or what response to give to each point of consultation. Let that be a great matter, as indeed it is, which was once upheld by many famous men and now by one of the highest authority and learning; but in this discussion we must embrace the whole subject of universal right and law in such a way that what we call the civil law is confined to a small and narrow space. For the nature of right is to be unfolded by us, and it is to be sought from the nature of man; the laws by which states ought to be governed are to be considered; then those rights and ordinances of peoples that have been composed and set down are to be handled — among which not even the so-called civil rights of our own people will lie hidden.
Atticvs: Non ergo a praetoris edicto, ut plerique nunc, neque a duodecim tabulis, ut superiores, sed penitus ex intima philosophia hauriendam iuris disciplinam putas? Marcvs: Non enim id quaerimus hoc sermone, Pomponi, quem ad modum caueamus in iure, aut quid de quaque consultatione respondeamus. Sit ista res magna, sicut est, quae quondam a multis claris uiris, nunc ab uno summa auctoritate et scientia sustinetur, sed nobis ita complectenda in hac disputatione tota causa est uniuersi iuris ac legum, ut, hoc ciuile quod dicimus, in paruum quendam et angustum locum concludatur. Natura enim iuris explicanda nobis est, eaque ab hominis repetenda natura, considerandae leges quibus ciuitates regi debeant; tum haec tractanda, quae conposita sunt et descripta iura et iussa populorum, in quibus ne nostri quidem populi latebunt quae uocantur iura ciuilia.
Quintus. Deeply indeed, and, as is fitting, from the source, brother, do you trace back what we are seeking; and those who teach the civil law otherwise are teaching the ways not so much of justice as of litigation. Marcus. It is not so, Quintus; rather it is ignorance of the law that is litigious, not knowledge. But that later: now let us look at the first principles of law. The most learned men, then, have decided to begin from law — rightly, perhaps, if, as they themselves define it, law is the highest reason, implanted in nature, which commands the things that must be done and forbids their opposites. This same reason, when it has been confirmed and perfected in the human mind, is law.
Qvintvs: Alte uero et, ut oportet, a capite, frater, repetis quod quaerimus, et qui aliter ius ciuile tradunt, non tam iustitiae quam litigandi tradunt uias. Marcvs: Non ita est, Quinte, ac potius ignoratio iuris litigiosa est quam scientia. Sed hoc posterius: nunc iuris principia uideamus. Igitur doctissimis uiris proficisci placuit a lege, haud scio an recte, si modo, ut idem definiunt, lex est ratio summa, insita in natura, quae iubet ea quae facienda sunt, prohibetque contraria. Eadem ratio, cum est in hominis mente confirmata et ‹per›fecta, lex est.
And so they hold that prudence is law, whose power is to command right action and forbid wrongdoing; and they think this thing was named in Greek nomos from assigning to each his own, in our tongue lex from choosing. For as they put the force of fairness in law, so we put the force of choice; yet each is truly proper to law. And if this is rightly said, as it usually seems to me at least, then the origin of right is to be derived from law. For law is the force of nature, it is the mind and reason of the prudent man, it is the rule of right and wrong. But since our whole discourse turns on the popular understanding, we shall sometimes have to speak in the popular way, and to call that “law” which in writing sanctions what it wishes either by commanding or by forbidding, as the crowd is wont to call it. But for the establishing of right let us take our beginning from that highest law, which, common to all the ages, was born before any written law existed, or indeed before any state had been founded.
Itaque arbitrantur prudentiam esse legem, cuius ea uis sit, ut recte facere iubeat, uetet delinquere, eamque rem illi Graeco putant nomine nÒmon ‹a› suum cuique tribuendo appellatam, ego nostro a legendo. Nam ut illi aequitatis, sic nos delectus uim in lege ponimus, et proprium tamen utrumque legis est. Quod si ita recte dicitur, ut mihi quidem plerumque uideri solet, a lege ducendum est iuris exordium. Ea est enim naturae uis, ea mens ratioque prudentis, ea iuris atque iniuriae regula. Sed quoniam in populari ratione omnis nostra uersatur oratio, populariter interdum loqui necesse erit, et appellare eam legem, quae scripta sancit quod uult aut iubendo ‹aut prohibendo›, ut uulgus appellare ‹solet›. Constituendi uero iuris ab illa summa lege capiamus exordium, quae, saeclis ‹communis› omnibus, ante nata est quam scripta lex ulla aut quam omnino ciuitas constituta.
Quintus. More fitly indeed, and more wisely, to the plan of the discourse you have undertaken. Marcus. Do you wish, then, that we trace the rise of right itself from its fountainhead? Once that is found, there will be no doubt to what these things we are seeking are to be referred. Quintus. For my part, I judge it should be done so. Atticus. Set me down too for my brother’s opinion. Marcus. Since, then, we must hold and preserve the condition of that commonwealth which Scipio showed to be the best in those six books, and since all laws are to be fitted to that kind of state, and morals too are to be sown and not all things sanctioned by written rule, I will trace back the stock of right from nature, with whom as our guide all this discussion is to be unfolded. Atticus. Most rightly; and with that guide indeed there can be no straying.
Qvintvs: Commodius uero et ad rationem instituti sermonis sapientius. Marcvs: Visne ergo ipsius iuris ortum a fonte repetamus? Quo inuento non erit dubium, quo sint haec referenda quae quaerimus. Qvintvs: Ego uero ita esse faciendum censeo. Atticvs: Me quoque adscribe fratris sententiae. Marcvs: Quoniam igitur eius rei publicae, quam optumam esse docuit in illis sex libris Scipio, tenendus est nobis et seruandus status, omnesque leges adcommodandae ad illud ciuitatis genus, serendi etiam mores nec scriptis omnia sancienda, repetam stirpem iuris a natura, qua duce nobis omnis ‹haec› est disputatio explicanda. Atticvs: Rectissime, et quidem ista duce errari nullo pacto potest.
Marcus. Do you grant us this, then, Pomponius — for I know Quintus’s mind — that all nature is governed by the will, the reason, the power, the mind, the divinity (or whatever other word there be by which I may signify more plainly what I mean) of the immortal gods? For if you do not approve this, it is from there above all that our argument must begin. Atticus. I grant it indeed, since you ask; for thanks to this concert of birds and the murmur of the streams, I have no fear that any of my fellow students may overhear. Marcus. And yet you must take care; for they are wont (as is the way of good men) to grow quite angry, nor indeed will they bear it, if they hear that you have betrayed the first chapter of that excellent man, in which he wrote that god cares for nothing, neither his own affairs nor another’s.
Marcvs: Dasne igitur hoc nobis, Pomponi, (nam Quinti noui sententiam), deorum immortalium ‹n›ut‹u›, ratione, potestate, mente, numine (siue quod est aliud uerbum quo planius significem quod uolo) naturam omnem regi? Nam, si hoc ‹c›o‹m›probas, ab eo nobis causa ordienda est potissimum. Atticvs: Do sane, si postulas; etenim propter hunc concentum auium strepitumque fluminum non uereor condiscipulorum ne quis exaudiat. Marcvs: Atqui cauendum est; solent enim (id quod uirorum bonorum est) admodum irasci, nec uero ferent, si audierint, te primum caput ui‹ri› optimi prodidisse, in quo scripsit nihil curare deum nec sui nec alieni.
Atticus. Go on, I beg you. For I am waiting to see to what end the point I conceded to you is leading. Marcus. I will not draw it out longer. For it comes to this: that this living creature — foreseeing, shrewd, manifold, sharp, mindful, full of reason and counsel, which we call man — has been begotten by the supreme god under a certain glorious condition. For he alone, out of so many kinds and natures of living things, has a share in reason and reflection, while all the rest are without it. And what is there, I will not say in man, but in all heaven and earth, more divine than reason? Which, when it has grown up and been perfected, is rightly named wisdom.
Atticvs: Perge, quaeso. Nam id quod tibi concessi, quorsus pertineat, exspecto. Marcvs: Non faciam longius. Huc enim pertinet: animal hoc prouidum, sagax, multiplex, acutum, memor, plenum rationis et consilii, quem uocamus hominem, praeclara quadam condicione generatum esse a supremo deo. Solum est enim ex tot animantium generibus atque naturis particeps rationis et cogitationis, quom cetera sint omnia expertia. Quid est autem, non dicam in homine, sed in omni caelo atque terra, ratione diuinius? Quae quom adoleuit atque perfecta est, nominatur rite sapientia.
Since, then, nothing is better than reason, and it is both in man and in god, the first fellowship between man and god is one of reason. And those who have reason in common have also right reason in common; and since this is law, we must hold that men are united with the gods by law as well. Further, those between whom there is a sharing of law have also a sharing of right; and those who have these things in common must be reckoned as belonging to the same state. And if they obey the same authorities and powers, far more do they obey this celestial ordering and the divine mind and the all-powerful god — so that now this whole universe must be regarded as one common commonwealth of gods and men. And just as in states, by a certain reckoning (of which more will be said in a fitting place), ranks are distinguished by the kinships of families, so in the nature of things this is on so much grander and more glorious a scale, that men are held bound by kinship and lineage with the gods.
Est igitur, quoniam nihil est ratione melius, eaque ‹est› et in homine et in deo, prima homini cum deo rationis societas. Inter quos autem ratio, inter eosdem etiam recta ratio [et] communis est: quae cum sit lex, lege quoque consociati homines cum dis putandi sumus. Inter quos porro est communio legis, inter eos communio iuris est. Quibus autem haec sunt inter eos communia, ei ciuitatis eiusdem habendi sunt. Si uero isdem imperiis et potestatibus parent, multo iam magis parent [autem] huic caelesti discriptioni mentique diuinae et praepotenti deo, ut iam uniuersus ‹sit› hic mundus una ciuitas communis deorum atque hominum existimanda. Et quod in ciuitatibus ratione quadam, de qua dicetur idoneo loco, agnationibus familiarum distinguuntur status, id in rerum natura tanto est magnificentius tantoque praeclarius, ut homines deorum agnatione et gente teneantur.
For when we inquire into the nature of man, this is what is usually argued — and beyond doubt it is as is argued — that by the perpetual courses and revolutions of the heavens there came about a certain ripeness for sowing the human race, which, scattered over the lands and sown, was enriched by the divine gift of souls; and that, while men took the other things by which they hold together from their mortal stock — things frail and perishable — the soul was implanted in them by god. Whence we may truly call it our kinship, or our lineage, or our stock with the celestial beings. And so, out of so many kinds, there is no living creature except man that has any notion of god; and among men themselves there is no race so gentle or so savage that, even if it knows not what manner of god it ought to hold, yet does not know that one must be held.
Nam cum de natura hominis quaeritur, ‹haec› disputari sole‹n›t — ‹et› nimirum ita est, ut disputatur — perpetuis cursibus conuersionibus‹que› caelestibus exstitisse quandam maturitatem serendi generis humani, quod sparsum in terras atque satum diuino auctum sit animorum munere, cumque alia quibus cohaererent homines e mortali genere sumpserint, quae fragilia essent et caduca, animum esse ingeneratum a deo. Ex quo uere uel agnatio nobis cum caelestibus uel genus uel stirps appellari potest. Itaque ex tot generibus nullum est animal praeter hominem quod habeat notitiam aliquam dei, ipsisque in hominibus nulla gens est neque tam mansueta neque tam fera, quae non, etiamsi ignoret qualem haberi deum deceat, tamen habendum sciat.
From which it follows that the man recognizes god who, as it were, remembers and knows from where he sprang. Now virtue is one and the same in man and in god, and in no other kind besides. And virtue is nothing else than nature perfected and brought to its highest pitch: there is, therefore, a likeness between man and god. And since this is so, what kinship can there be nearer or surer? And so for the conveniences and uses of men nature has lavished such an abundance of things, that the things which are produced seem given to us by design, not born by chance — and not only those which the earth pours forth in its yield of grain and fruit, but also the beasts, since it is clear that most have been brought forth for the use of men, partly for profit, partly for food.
Ex quo efficitur illud, ut is agnoscat deum, qui, unde ortus sit, quasi recordetur ‹ac› cognoscat. Iam uero uirtus eadem in homine ac deo est, neque alio ullo in gen‹ere› praeterea. Est autem uirtus nihil aliud, nisi perfecta et ad summum perducta natura: est igitur homini cum deo similitudo. Quod cum ita sit, quae tandem esse potest proprior certiorue cognatio? Itaque ad hominum commoditates et usus tantam rerum ubertatem natura largita est, ut ea, quae gignuntur, donata consulto nobis, non fortuito nata uideantur, nec solum ea quae frugibus atque bacis terrae fetu profunduntur, sed etiam pecudes, qu‹om› perspicuum sit ‹plerasque› esse ad usum hominum, partim ad fructum, partim ad uescendum, procreatas.
And arts beyond number have been discovered, with nature teaching them, in imitation of whom reason has skillfully attained the things necessary to life. Man himself, too, that same nature not only adorned with swiftness of mind but also assigned him the senses as attendants and messengers, and unraveled the obscure and not sufficiently expressed apprehensions of very many things, as foundations, so to speak, of knowledge; and it gave him a bodily form suited and fitted to the human spirit. For while it had cast down the other animals to their feeding, man alone it raised upright and roused to the contemplation of the sky, as of his kinship and his ancient home; and then it so molded the cast of his face as to imprint in it his deeply hidden character.
Artes uero innumerabiles repertae sunt, docente natura, quam imitata ratio res ad uitam necessarias sollerter consecuta est. Ipsum autem hominem eadem natura non solum celeritate mentis ornauit sed ‹ei› et sensus tamquam satellites attribuit ac nuntios, et rerum plurimarum obscuras nec satis ‹expressas› intellegentias enodauit, quasi fundamenta quaedam scientiae, figuramque corporis habilem et aptam ingenio humano dedit. Nam cum ceteras animantes abiecisset ad pastum, solum hominem erexit et ad caeli quasi cognationis domiciliique pristini conspectum excitauit, tum speciem ita formauit oris, ut in ea penitus reconditos mores effingeret.
For the eyes too tell, all too keenly, how we are affected in mind; and what is called the countenance, which can exist in no living thing but man, betokens character — the force of which the Greeks know, though they have no name for it at all. I pass over the conveniences and aptitudes of the rest of the body, the modulation of the voice, the power of speech, which is the chief reconciler of human fellowship. For not all things belong to this discussion and this time, and this topic, as it seems to me, Scipio set forth well enough in those books you have read. Now, since god has so begotten and adorned man — whom he willed to be the beginning of the other things — this much becomes plain (that not everything be argued out): that nature herself advances further on her own, and even with no one teaching, setting out from those things whose kinds she came to know from her first and rudimentary apprehension, confirms and perfects reason by herself.
Nam et oculi nimis argute quem ad modum animo affecti simus, loquuntur et is qui appellatur uultus, qui nullo in animante esse praeter hominem potest, indicat mores, quoius uim Graeci norunt, nomen omnino non habent. Omitto opportunitates habilitatesque reliqui corporis, moderationem uocis, orationis uim, quae conciliatrix est humanae maxime societatis. Neque enim omnia sunt huius disputationis ac temporis, et hunc locum satis, ut mihi uidetur, in iis libris quos legistis, expressit Scipio. Nunc quoniam hominem, quod principium reliquarum rerum esse uoluit, ‹ita› generauit et ornauit deus, perspicuum ‹fi›t illud (ne omnia disserantur), ipsam per se naturam longius progredi, quae etiam nullo docente, profecta ab iis quorum ex prima et inchoata intellegentia genera cognouit, confirmat ipsa per se rationem et perficit.
Atticus. Immortal gods, how far back you trace the first principles of law! And so much so that I am in no hurry to reach those things I was expecting from you about the civil law, but would gladly suffer you to spend this whole day, if you like, on this discourse. For these matters are greater, which perhaps you take up for the sake of others, than those very things for whose sake these are being prepared. Marcus. These things are indeed great, which are now touched on briefly. But of all the matters that come up in the discussion of learned men, there is surely nothing more excellent than to understand plainly that we are born for justice, and that right is established not by opinion but by nature. That will already be clear, if you look closely at the fellowship and bond of men among themselves.
Atticvs: Di immortales, quam tu longe iuris principia repetis! atque ita ut ego non modo ad illa non properem, quae exspectabam a te de iure ciuili, sed facile patiar te hunc diem uel totum in isto sermone consumere. Sunt enim haec maiora, quae aliorum causa fortasse conplecteris, quam ipsa illa, quorum haec causa praeparantur. Marcvs: Sunt haec quidem magna, quae nunc breuiter attinguntur. Sed omnium quae in hominum doctorum disputatione uersantur, nihil est profecto praestabilius, quam plane intellegi, nos ad iustitiam esse natos, neque opinione sed natura constitutum esse ius. Id iam patebit, si hominum inter ipsos societatem coniunctionemque perspexeris.
For there is nothing so like one thing to another, so equal, as all of us are among ourselves. And if the depravity of habits and the variety of opinions did not twist and bend the weakness of our minds wherever it had begun, no one would be so like to himself as all are like to all. And so, whatever the definition of man is, the one definition holds for all.
Nihil est enim unum uni tam simile, tam par, quam omnes inter nosmet ipsos sumus. Quodsi deprauatio consuetudinum, si opinionum ua‹r›i‹e›tas non inbecillitatem animorum torqueret et flecteret, quocumque c‹u›pisset, sui nemo ipse tam similis esset quam omnes sunt omnium. Itaque quaecumque est hominis definitio, una in omnis ualet.
And this is sufficient proof that there is no unlikeness within the kind. For if there were, one definition would not embrace all. Indeed reason, by which alone we excel the beasts, through which we are strong in inference, argue, refute, discourse, and bring something to a conclusion, is certainly common to all men; differing in instruction, it is equal in the capacity for learning. For the same things are grasped by the senses of all; and the things that move the senses move the senses of all alike; and those rudimentary apprehensions that are imprinted in the mind, of which I spoke before, are imprinted alike in all; and speech, the interpreter of the mind, differs in words but agrees in meaning. Nor is there anyone of any nation who, taking nature as his guide, cannot arrive at virtue.
Quod argumenti satis est nullam dissimilitudinem esse in genere. Quae si esset, non una omnis definitio contineret. Etenim ratio, qua una praestamus beluis, per quam coniectura ualemus, argumentamur, refellimus, disserimus, conficimus aliquid, cun‹ctis hominib›us certe est communis, doctrina differens, discendi quidem facultate par. Nam et sensibus eadem omni‹um› conprehenduntur, et ea quae mouent sensus, itidem mouent omnium, quaeque in animis imprimuntur, de quibus ante dixi, inchoatae intellegentiae, similiter in omnibus imprimuntur, interpresque mentis oratio uerbis discrepat, sententiis congruens. Nec est quisquam gentis ullius, qui ducem naturam nactus ad uirtutem peruenire non possit.
And not only in right conduct, but also in depravities, the likeness of the human race is conspicuous. For all are caught by pleasure, which, even though it is an enticement to baseness, yet has something resembling natural good; for, delighting by an appearance of gentleness and sweetness, it is taken up, through an error of the mind, as if it were something wholesome. And by a like ignorance death is fled as if it were the dissolution of nature, and life is sought because it keeps us in that in which we were born; pain is counted among the greatest evils, both for its own harshness and because the destruction of nature seems to follow it;
Nec solum in rectis, sed etiam in prauitatibus insignis est humani generis similitudo. Nam et uoluptate capiuntur omnes, quae etsi est inlecebra turpitudinis, tamen habet quiddam simile naturalis boni; le‹n›itatis enim et suauitatis ‹specie› delectans, sic ab errore mentis tamquam salutare aliquid adsciscitur, similique inscitia mors fugitur quasi dissolutio naturae, uita expetitur, quia nos in quo nati sumus continet, dolor in maximis malis ducitur, cum sua asperitate, tum quod naturae interitus uidetur sequi;
and on account of the likeness between honor and glory, those who are honored seem blessed, while those who are without glory seem wretched. Troubles, joys, desires, fears range alike through the minds of all; and if opinions differ among different peoples, it does not follow that those who worship dog and cat as gods are not afflicted by the same superstition as the rest of the nations. But what nation does not love courtesy, kindliness, a grateful spirit mindful of a good turn? What nation does not spurn and hate the proud, the wicked, the cruel, the ungrateful? From all of which, since it is understood that the whole race of men is bound together in fellowship, the final conclusion is that the principle of right living makes men better. If you approve these things, let us go on to the rest; but if you have any questions, let us settle them first. Atticus. We have none — to answer for us both.
propterque honestatis et gloriae similitudinem beati, qui honorati sunt, uidentur, miseri autem, qui sunt inglorii. Molestiae, laetitiae, cupiditates, timores similiter omnium mentes peruagantur, nec si opiniones aliae sunt apud alios, idcirco qui canem et felem ut deos colunt, non eadem superstitione qua ceterae gentes conflictantur. Quae autem natio non comitatem, non benignitatem, non gratum animum et beneficii memorem diligit? Quae superbos, quae maleficos, quae crudeles, quae ingratos non aspernatur, non odit? Quibus ex rebus cum omne genus hominum sociatum inter se esse intellegatur, illud extremum est, [.... ] quod recte uiuendi ratio meliores efficit. Quae si adprobatis, pergam‹us› ad reliqua; sin quid requiritis, id explicemus prius. Atticvs: Nos uero nihil, ut pro utroque respondeam.
Marcus. It follows, then, that by nature we have been made to share right one with another and to hold it in common among all. And in this whole discussion I wish it to be understood, when I say “by nature,” that so great is the corruption of bad habit that the little fires given by nature are, as it were, quenched by it, and the contrary vices rise up and grow strong. But if men, just as they are by nature, were so also by judgment to think (as the poet says) “nothing human alien to themselves,” right would be cultivated equally by all. For those to whom reason has been given by nature have also been given right reason; and so law too, which is right reason in commanding and forbidding; and if law, then right also; and reason has been given to all. Right, therefore, has been given to all; and Socrates rightly used to curse the man who first separated utility from right — for he complained that this was the source of all ruin. Hence comes that Pythagorean saying, [the passage on friendship]: that one should be made out of many.
Marcvs: Sequitur igitur ad participandum alium ‹cum› alio communicandumque inter omnes ius ‹n›os natura esse factos. Atque hoc in omni hac disputatione sic intellegi uolo, quo‹m› dicam naturam [esse]; tantam autem esse corruptelam malae consuetudinis, ut ab ea tamquam igniculi exstinguantur a natura dati, exorianturque et confirmentur uitia contraria. Quodsi, quo modo s‹un›t natura, sic iudicio homines ’humani, ut ait poeta, nihil a se alienum putarent’, coleretur ius aeque ab omnibus. Quibus enim ratio ‹a› natura data est, isdem etiam recta ratio data est; ergo et lex, quae est recta ratio in iubendo et uetando; si lex, ius quoque; et omnibus ratio. Ius igitur datum est omnibus, recteque Socrates exsecrari eum solebat qui primus utilitatem a ‹iure› seiunxisset; id enim querebatur caput esse exitiorum omnium. Vnde enim illa Pythagorea uox, [de amicitia locus]: ‹ut unus fiat ex pluribus.›
... From which it is plain that, when the wise man has bestowed this goodwill, so broadly and so far diffused, upon someone endowed with equal virtue, then that comes about which to some may seem incredible but is nonetheless necessary — that he loves himself no more than the other; for what is there that should differ, when all things are equal? But if anything, however small, could differ in it, then the name of friendship would already have perished, whose force is such that, the instant either friend should prefer that something be his own, it is no friendship at all. All of which is laid as a foundation for the rest of our discourse and discussion, that it may the more easily be understood that right is placed in nature. And when I have said a very little about this, I will come to the civil law, from which this whole discourse was born. Quintus. Very little indeed now, of course. For from what you have said — though Atticus may judge otherwise — it certainly seems to me that right has arisen from nature.
... Ex quo perspicitur, quom hanc beniuolentiam tam late longeque diffusam uir sapiens in aliquem pari uirtute praeditum contulerit, tum illud effici (quod quibusdam incredibile uideatur, sit autem necessarium) ut ‹non› in ill‹o› sese plus quam alterum diligat: quid enim est quod differat, quom sint cuncta paria? Quod si interesse quippiam tantulum modo potuerit in ‹ea›, iam amicitiae nomen occiderit, cuius est ea uis ut simul atque sibi aliquid ‹esse› alter maluerit, nulla sit. Quae praemuniuntur omnia reliquo sermoni disputationique nostrae, quo facilius ius in natura esse positum intellegi possit. De quo quom perpauca dixero, tum ad ius ciuile ueniam, ex quo haec omnis est nata oratio. Qvintvs: Tu uero iam perpauca scilicet. Ex his enim quae dixisti, ‹etsi aliter› Attico, uidetur mihi quidem certe ex natura ortum esse ius.
Atticus. Could it seem otherwise to me, when these things have now been settled: first, that we have been equipped and adorned as if by gifts of the gods; second, that there is one and the same way of living, equal and shared, for men among themselves; and then, that all are bound together, both by a certain natural indulgence and goodwill, and also by a fellowship of right? When we have granted that these things are true — rightly, as I think — how can it now be permitted us to separate laws and rights from nature?
Atticvs: An mihi aliter uideri possit, cum haec iam perfecta sint, primum quasi muneribus deorum nos esse instructos et ornatos, secundo autem loco unam esse hominum inter ipsos uiuendi parem communemque rationem, deinde omnes inter se naturali quadam indulgentia et beniuolentia, tum etiam societate iuris contineri? quae quom uera esse, recte ut arbitror, concesserimus, qui iam licet nobis a natura leges et iura seiungere?
Marcus. You speak rightly, and so it stands. But in the manner of the philosophers — not of those ancient ones, but of those who have set up, as it were, workshops of wisdom — the things that were once argued at large and freely are now stated joint by joint, point by point. For they do not think justice is done to the topic now in hand unless they have argued separately this very thing, that right comes from nature. Atticus. And so, I suppose, your freedom of discourse is lost, or you are the sort of man who in arguing does not follow your own judgment but submits to the authority of others!
Marcvs: Recte dicis, et res se sic habet. Verum philosophorum more, non ueterum quidem illorum, sed eorum qui quasi officinas instruxerunt sapientiae, quae fuse olim disputabantur ac libere, ea nunc articulatim distincta dicuntur. Nec enim satis fieri censent huic loco qui nunc est in manibus, nisi separatim hoc ipsum, ‹a› natura esse ius, disputarint. Atticvs: Et scilicet tua libertas disserendi amissa est, aut tu is es qui in disputando non tuum iudicium sequaris, sed auctoritati aliorum pareas!
Marcus. Not always, Titus; but you see what the course of this discourse is: all our speech is bent toward strengthening commonwealths and toward making firm and healing the morals of peoples. For which reason I am afraid to commit the fault of laying down principles not well foreseen and carefully explored; nor yet do I hope that they will be approved by all — for that cannot be — but only by those who have judged everything right and honorable to be sought for its own sake, and have held that either nothing at all is to be counted among goods except what is praiseworthy in itself, or at any rate that nothing is to be reckoned a great good unless it can truly be praised of its own accord:
Marcvs: Non semper, Tite, sed iter huius sermonis quod sit, uides: ad res publicas firmandas et ad stabiliend‹o›s ‹mo›res sanandos‹que› populos omnis nostra pergit oratio. Quocirca uereor committere ut non bene prouisa et diligenter explorata principia ponantur, nec tamen ‹spero fore› ut omnibus probentur— nam id fieri non potest—, sed ut eis qui omnia recta atque honesta per se expetenda duxerunt, et aut nihil omnino in bonis numerandum nisi quod per se ipsum laudabile esset, aut certe nullum habendum magnum bonum, nisi quod uere laudari sua sponte posset:
by all such men — whether they have remained in the Old Academy with Speusippus, Xenocrates, and Polemo, or have followed Aristotle and Theophrastus, who agree with them in substance though differing a little in their manner of teaching; or, as Zeno thought best, changed the terms without changing the things; or even followed the harsh and arduous sect of Aristo, now broken and refuted, who, with the virtues and vices set apart, put everything else on a footing of complete equality — by all these the things I have said may be approved.
iis omnibus, siue in Academia uetere cum Speusippo, Xenocrate, Polemone manserunt, siue Aristotelem et Theophrastum, cum illis congruentes re, genere docendi paulum differentes, secuti sunt, siue, ut Zenoni uisum est, rebus non commutatis immutauerunt uocabula, siue etiam Aristonis difficilem atque arduam, sed iam tamen fractam et conuictam sectam secuti sunt, ut uirtutibus exceptis atque uitiis cetera in summa aequalitate ponerent: iis omnibus haec quae dixi prob‹e›ntur.
But those who are indulgent to themselves and slaves to the body, and who weigh everything they pursue and shun in life by pleasures and pains — even if they speak the truth (for there is no need of quarrels here) — let us bid them speak in their own little gardens, and let us ask them to withdraw a while from all part in the commonwealth, of which they neither know nor ever wished to know any share. And that Academy, the disturber of all these matters — this recent one, from Arcesilas and Carneades — let us beseech to keep silent. For if it breaks in upon these things, which seem to us tolerably well arranged and composed, it will work too great ruin. This Academy I indeed long to placate; I dare not drive it off....
Sibi autem indulgentes et corpori deseruientes atque omnia quae sequantur in uita quaeque fugiant uoluptatibus et doloribus ponderantes, etiam si uera dic‹a›nt — nihil enim opus est hoc loco litibus—, in hortulis suis iubeamus dicere, atque etiam ab omni societate rei publicae, cuius partem nec norunt ullam neque umquam nosse uoluerunt, paulisper facessant rogemus. Perturbatricem autem harum omnium rerum Academiam, hanc ab Arcesila et Carneade recentem, exoremus ut sileat. Nam si inuaserit in haec, quae satis scite nobis instructa et composita uidentur, nimias edet ruinas. Quam quidem ego placare cupio, submouere non audeo.......
For even without its fumigations we have been purified. But of crimes against men and impieties against the gods there is no expiation. And so they pay the penalty, not so much by trials — which once existed nowhere, today in many places do not exist, and where they do exist are very often false — but the furies harry and hound them, not with burning torches as in the tales, but with the anguish of conscience and the torment of their guilt. But if it were the penalty, and not nature, that ought to keep men from wrongdoing, what anxiety would vex the wicked, once the fear of punishment were taken away? Yet of these none was ever so bold as not either to deny that the deed was done by him, or to feign some cause for his just resentment, and to seek a defense of the deed in some right of nature. And if the wicked dare to invoke these names, with what zeal, pray, will they be cultivated by good men? But if the penalty, if the fear of punishment, and not baseness itself, deters from a wrongful and wicked life, then no one is unjust, and the wicked are rather to be reckoned merely incautious.
Nam etiam sine illius suffimentis expiati sumus. At uero scelerum in homines atque ‹in deos› inpietatum nulla expiatio est. Itaque poenas luunt, non tam iudiciis — quae quondam nusquam erant, hodie multifariam nulla sunt, ubi ‹sunt› tamen, persaepe falsa sunt — ‹a›t eos agitant insectanturque furiae, non ardentibus taedis sicut in fabulis, sed angore conscientiae fraudisque cruciatu. Quodsi homines ab iniuria poena, non natura arcere deberet, quaenam sollicitudo uexaret impios sublato suppliciorum metu? Quorum tamen nemo tam audax umquam fuit, quin aut abnuer‹e›t a se commissum esse facinus, aut iusti sui doloris causam aliquam fingeret, defensionemque facinoris a naturae iure aliquo quaereret. Quae si appellare audent impii, quo tandem studio colentur a bonis? Quodsi poena, si metus supplicii, non ipsa turpitudo deterret ab iniuriosa facinerosaque uita, nemo est iniustus, a‹t› incauti potius habendi sunt inprobi.
And then we, who are moved to be good men not by honorableness itself but by some advantage and profit, are cunning, not good. For what will the man do in the dark who fears nothing but a witness and a judge? What will he do in a deserted place, having come upon someone weak and alone whom he could rob of much gold? Our man here, just and good by nature, will even converse with him, help him, set him on his way. But the man who will do nothing for another’s sake and will measure all things by his own conveniences — you see, I think, what he will do! And if he says he will not take that man’s life and carry off his gold, he will never say it because he judges the thing base by nature, but because he fears it may leak out, that is, that he may suffer harm. O thing worthy to make not only the learned but even the rustics blush!
Tum autem qui non ipso honesto mouemur ut boni uiri simus, sed utilitate aliqua atque fructu, callidi sumus, non boni. Nam quid faciet is homo in tenebris qui nihil timet nisi testem et iudicem? Quid in deserto quo loco nactus, quem multo auro spoliare possit, imbecillum atque solum? Noster quidem hic natura iustus uir ac bonus etiam conloquetur, iuuabit, in uiam deducet. Is uero qui nihil alterius causa faciet et metietur suis commodis omnia, uidetis, credo, quid sit acturus! Quodsi negabit se illi uitam erepturum et aurum ablaturum, numquam ob eam causam negabit quod id natura turpe iudicet, sed quod metuat ne emanet, id est ne malum habeat. O rem dignam, in qua non modo docti, sed etiam agrestes erubescant!
And now that other notion, the most foolish of all: to think that everything is just which has been enacted in the institutions or laws of peoples. What, even if they are the laws of tyrants? If those Thirty at Athens had wished to impose laws, and if all the Athenians delighted in their tyrannical laws, would those laws on that account be held just? No more, I believe, than the law our interrex carried, that a dictator might with impunity put to death any citizen he wished, by name, and without a hearing. For there is one right by which the fellowship of men is bound together and which one law has established, which law is right reason in commanding and forbidding. Whoever is ignorant of it is unjust, whether that law is written anywhere or nowhere. But if justice is obedience to written laws and the institutions of peoples, and if, as those same men say, all things are to be measured by utility, then he will neglect and break through the laws, if he can, who thinks the thing will be profitable to himself. So it comes about that there is no justice at all, if it is not from nature, and if that which is established for the sake of utility is torn up by another utility.
Iam uero illud stultissimum, existimare omnia iusta esse quae s‹c›ita sint in populorum institutis aut legibus. Etiamne si quae leges sint tyrannorum? Si triginta illi Athenis leges inponere uoluissent, et si omnes Athenienses delectarentur tyrannicis legibus, num idcirco eae leges iustae haberentur? Nihilo credo magis illa quam interrex noster tulit, ut dictator quem uellet ciuium ‹nominatim› aut indicta causa inpune posset occidere. Est enim unum ius quo deuincta est hominum societas et quod lex constituit una, quae lex est recta ratio imperandi atque prohibendi. Quam qui ignorat, is est iniustus, siue est illa scripta uspiam siue nusquam. Quodsi iustitia est obtemperatio scriptis legibus institutisque populorum, et si, ut eidem dicunt, utilitate omnia metienda sunt, negleget leges easque perrumpet, si poterit, is qui sibi eam rem fructuosam putabit fore. Ita fit ut nulla sit omnino iustitia, si neque natura est ‹et› ea quae propter utilitatem constituitur utilitate ‹a›lia conuellitur.
And yet if nature is not going to confirm right, all the virtues are abolished. For where will generosity be, where love of country, where piety, where the will either to deserve well of another or to return a kindness? For these arise from the fact that we are by nature inclined to love men, which is the foundation of right. And not only will services toward men be abolished, but also ceremonies and observances toward the gods, which I think are to be preserved not out of fear but out of that bond which man has with god. But if rights were established by the commands of peoples, by the decrees of leading men, by the verdicts of judges, then it would be right to rob, right to commit adultery, right to forge wills, if these things were approved by the votes or decrees of the multitude.
Atqui si natura confirmatura ius non erit, uirtutes omnes tollantur. Vbi enim liberalitas, ubi patriae caritas, ubi pietas, ubi aut bene merendi de altero aut referendae gratiae uoluntas poterit existere? Nam haec nascuntur ex eo quod natura propensi sumus ad diligendos homines, quod fundamentum iuris est. Neque solum in homines obsequia, sed etiam in deos caerimoniae religionesque toll‹e›ntur, quas non metu, sed ea coniunctione quae est homini cum deo conseruandas puto. Quodsi populorum iussis, si principum decretis, si sententiis iudicum iura constituerentur, ius esset latrocinari, ius adulterare, ius testamenta falsa supponere, si haec suffragiis aut scitis multitudinis probarentur.
But if there is so great a power in the opinions and commands of fools that by their votes the nature of things should be overturned, why do they not enact that what is bad and pernicious be held for good and wholesome? Or why, since law can make right out of wrong, can it not make good out of bad? And yet we can divide a good law from a bad by no other standard than that of nature. Nor is it only right and wrong that are distinguished by nature, but absolutely all things honorable and base. For, just as common understanding has made things known to us and sketched them in our minds, so honorable things are placed in virtue, base things in vice.
Quodsi tanta potestas est stultorum sententiis atque iussis, ut eorum suffragiis rerum natura uertatur, cur non sanciunt ut quae mala perniciosaque sunt, habeantur pro bonis et salutaribus? Aut ‹cur› cum ius ex iniuria lex facere possit, bonum eadem facere non possit ex malo? Atqui nos legem bonam a mala nulla alia nisi natura‹e› norma diuidere possumus. Nec solum ius et ‹in›iuria natura diiudicatur, sed omnino omnia honesta et turpia. Nam, ‹ut› communis intellegentia nobis notas res eff‹e›cit easque in animis nostris inchoauit, honesta in uirtute ponuntur, in uitiis turpia.
But to reckon these things as set in opinion, not in nature, is the mark of a madman. For neither the virtue (so called) of a tree nor of a horse — where we misuse the word — is set in opinion, but in nature. And if that is so, then honorable and base things too must be distinguished by nature. For if virtue as a whole were a matter of opinion, its parts too would be approved by opinion. Who, then, would judge a prudent and (so to speak) shrewd man not from his own disposition but from some external thing? For virtue is the perfected reason of some good, which is certainly in nature: therefore all honorableness in the same way. For as true and false, as consistent and contradictory, are judged of themselves, not by anything outside, so too the constant and unbroken plan of life, which is virtue, and likewise inconstancy, which is vice, will be proved by their own nature; and shall we not judge characters in the same way?
Haec autem in opinione existimare, non in natura posita, dementis est. Nam nec arboris nec equi uirtus quae dicitur (in quo abutimur nomine) in opinione ‹po›sita est, sed in natura. Quod si ita est, honesta quoque et turpia natura diiudicanda sunt. Nam si opinione uniuersa uirtus, eadem eius etiam partes probarentur. Quis igitur prudentem et, ut ita dicam, catum non ex ipsius habitu sed ex aliqua re externa iudicet? Est enim uirtus ‹boni alicuius› perfecta ratio, quod certe in natura est: igitur omnis honestas eodem modo. Nam ut uera et falsa, ut consequentia et contraria sua sponte, non aliena iudicantur, sic constans et perpetua ratio uitae, quae uirtus est, itemque inconstantia, quod est uitium, sua natura proba‹b›i‹tur›; nos ingenia i‹udice›m‹us› non item?
Or shall characters be judged by nature, while the virtues and vices that arise from characters are judged otherwise? Or, if these are not judged otherwise, will it not be necessary that honorable and base things too be referred to nature? Whatever is good and praiseworthy must have in itself that for which it is to be praised; for the good itself is not a matter of opinions but of nature. For if it were not so, we should also be blessed by opinion — than which what can be said more foolish? Therefore, since both good and evil are judged by nature, and these are the first principles of nature, surely honorable and base things too must be distinguished by like reasoning and referred to nature.
An ingenia natura, uirtutes et uitia quae existunt ab ingeniis, aliter iudicabuntur? An ea ‹si› non aliter, honesta et turpia non ad naturam referri necesse erit? ‹Si› quod laudabile bonum est, in se habeat quod laudetur, necesse est; ipsum enim bonum non est opinionibus, sed natura. Nam ni ita esset, beati quoque opinione esse‹mus›, quo quid dici potest stultius? Quare quom et bonum et malum natura iudicetur, et ea sint principia naturae, certe honesta quoque et turpia simili ratione diiudicanda et ad naturam referenda sunt.
But we are confounded by the variety of opinions and the disagreement of men; and because the same does not hold true in the senses, we think these certain, while those things which appear so to some, otherwise to others, and not always in one way even to the same persons, we call fictions. But it is far otherwise. For our senses are not corrupted by parent, by nurse, by teacher, by poet, by stage, nor led astray by the consent of the multitude. But against our minds all snares are laid: either by those I have just enumerated, who, when they have received us tender and untaught, stain and bend us as they please; or by that imitator of the good which sits implanted deep in every sense — pleasure, the mother of all evils; corrupted by whose blandishments, we do not discern well enough the things that are good by nature, because they lack this sweetness and this itch.
Sed perturbat nos opinionum uarietas hominumque dissensio, et quia non idem contingit in sensibus, hos natura certos putamus; illa quae aliis sic, aliis secus, nec isdem semper uno modo uidentur, ficta esse dicimus. Quod est longe aliter. Nam sensus nostros non parens, non nutrix, non magister, non poeta, non scaena deprauat, non multitudinis consensus abducit. At uero animis omnes tenduntur insidiae, uel ab iis quos modo enumeraui qui teneros et rudes quom acceperunt, inficiunt et flectunt ut uolunt, uel ab ea quae penitus in omni sensu implicata insidet, imitatrix boni uoluptas, malorum autem mater omnium; quoius blanditiis corrupti, quae natura bona sunt, quia dulcedine hac et scabie carent, non cern‹imus› satis.
It follows — that this whole discourse may now be wound up by me — from what has been said and lies before our eyes, that both right and everything honorable are to be sought for their own sake. For all good men love fairness itself and right itself, nor is it the part of a good man to err and to love what is not to be loved for itself: therefore right is to be sought and cultivated for its own sake. And if right, then justice also; and if justice, then the rest of the virtues too are to be cultivated for their own sake. What of generosity? Is it freely given or hired? If a man is kind without reward, it is free; if for a fee, it is bought. And there is no doubt that the man who is called generous or kind pursues duty, not profit. So likewise justice seeks no reward, no price: therefore it is sought for its own sake, and the cause and meaning of all the virtues is the same.
Sequitur (ut conclusa mihi iam haec sit omnis oratio), id quod ante oculos ex iis est quae dicta sunt, et ius et omne honestum sua sponte esse expetendum. Etenim omnes uiri boni ipsam aequitatem et ius ipsum amant, nec est uiri boni errare et diligere quod per se non sit diligendum: per se igitur ius est expetendum et colendum. Quod si ius, etiam iustitia; sin ea, reliquae quoque uirtutes per se colendae sunt. Quid? Liberalitas gratuitane est an mercennaria? Si sine praemio benignus est, gratuita; si cum mercede, conducta. Nec est dubium quin is qui liberalis benignusue dicitur, officium non, fructum sequatur. Ergo item iustitia nihil expetit praemii, nihil pretii: per se igitur expetitur eademque omnium uirtutum causa atque sententia est.
And besides, if virtue is sought for its profits and not for its own sake, there will be but one virtue, which will most rightly be called malice. For just as each man refers whatever he does most to his own advantage, so he is least a good man; so those who measure virtue by reward count no virtue but malice. For where is the benefactor, if no one acts kindly for another’s sake? Where the grateful man, if those are not seen to be grateful at the very moment when they return a kindness? Where that sacred friendship, if the friend himself is not loved for his own sake with the whole heart, as the saying is? Why, he must even be deserted and cast off when there is no more hope of profit and gain — than which what can be called more monstrous? But if friendship is to be cultivated for its own sake, then the fellowship of men too, and equality, and justice, are to be sought for their own sake. And if it is not so, there is no justice at all. For this very thing is the most unjust of all: to seek a reward for justice.
Atque etiam si emolumentis, non ‹sua› sponte uirtus expetitur, una erit uirtus quae malitia rectissime dicetur. Vt enim quisque maxume ad suum commodum refert, quaecumque agit, ita minime est uir bonus, ‹sic› qui uirtutem praemio metiuntur, nullam uirtutem nisi malitiam put‹a›nt. Vbi enim beneficus, si nemo alterius causa benigne facit? Vbi gratus, si non ‹tu›m ipsi cernunt‹ur› grati, quo‹m› referunt gratiam? Vbi illa sancta amicitia, si non ipse amicus per se amatur toto pectore, ut dicitur? Qui etiam deserendus et abiciendus est, desperatis emolumentis et fructibus; quo quid potest dici immanius? Quodsi amicitia per se colenda est, societas quoque hominum et aequalitas et iustitia per se expetenda. Quod ni ita est, omnino iustitia nulla est. Id enim iniustissimum ipsum est, iustitiae mercedem quaerere.
What, then, shall we say of modesty, of temperance, of self-control, of decency, of shame and chastity? That men are not wanton through fear of disgrace, or through fear of the laws and the courts? They are innocent, then, and decent only to be well spoken of, and they blush to speak unchaste words only to gather a good repute. But I am ashamed of those philosophers who wish to escape the judgment passed on a vice, and yet do not think themselves branded by the vice itself.
Quid uero de modestia, quid de temperantia, quid de continentia, quid de uerecundia, pudore pudicitiaque dicemus? Infamiaene metu non esse petulantes, an legum et iudiciorum? Innocentes ergo et uerecundi sunt, ut bene audiant, et, ut rumorem bonum colligant, erubescent impudica loqui. At me istorum philosophorum pudet, qui ‹uitii› iudicium uitare ‹uolunt, nec se› uitio ipso ‹no›tat‹os› putant.
For what? Can we call those chaste who are kept from debauchery by fear of disgrace, when the very disgrace follows on account of the baseness of the thing? For what can be rightly praised or blamed, if you depart from the nature of the thing you think praiseworthy or blameworthy? Will deformities of body, if they are very marked, have something offensive in them, and will deformity of soul have none — whose baseness can most easily be seen from the vices themselves? For what can be named fouler than avarice, what more monstrous than lust, what more contemptible than cowardice, what more abject than dullness and folly? What, then? Do we call those who excel in single vices, or even in several, wretched on account of their losses or harms or some torments, or on account of the force and baseness of the vices? And the same may be said, with praise as the opposite, of virtue.
Quid enim? Possumus eos, qui a stupro arcentur infamiae metu, pudicos dicere, quom ipsa infamia propter rei ‹turp›itudinem consequatur? Nam quid aut laudari rite aut uituperari potest, si ab eius natura recesseris quod aut laudandum aut uituperandum putes? An corporis prauitates, si erunt perinsignes, habebunt aliquid offensionis, animi deformitas non habebit? Cuius turpitudo ex ipsis uitiis facillime perspici potest. Quid enim foedius auaritia, quid immanius libidine, quid contemptius timiditate, quid abiectius tarditate et stultitia dici potest? Quid ergo? Eos qui singulis uitiis excellunt aut etiam pluribus, propter damna aut detrimenta aut cruciatus aliquos miseros esse dicimus, an propter uim turpitudinemque uitiorum? Quod item ad contrariam laudem ‹de› uirtute dici potest.
For if virtue is sought for the sake of other things, something must be better than virtue. Money, then? Or honors? Or beauty? Or health? These, even when present, are of very small worth, and how long they will remain present can in no way be known for certain. Or is it that thing most shameful to name, pleasure? But it is in the very spurning and rejecting of pleasure that virtue is most clearly seen. But do you see what a chain of things and conclusions there is, and how one is linked to another out of another? Indeed I should slip on further, had I not held myself back. Quintus. To where, pray? For I would gladly slip on with you, brother, wherever this discourse of yours is tending. Marcus. To the end of goods, to which all things are referred and for the sake of attaining which everything is to be done — a matter contested and full of disagreement among the most learned men, but to be judged at some point all the same.
Nam si propter alias res uirtus expetitur, melius esse aliquid quam uirtutem necesse est: pecuniamne igitur an honores an formam an ualetudinem? Quae et quom adsunt perparua sunt, et quam diu adfutura sint, certum sciri nullo modo potest. An id quod turpissimum dictu est, uoluptatem? At in ea quidem spernenda et repudianda uirtus uel maxime cernitur. Sed uidetisne quanta series rerum sententiarumque sit, atque ut ex alio alia nectantur? Quin labebar longius, nisi me retinuissem. Qvintvs: Quo tandem? Libenter enim, frater, quo ista oratione ‹tendis› tecum prolab‹ar›. Marcvs: Ad finem bonorum, quo referuntur et quoius a‹pi›scendi causa sunt facienda omnia, controuersam rem et plenam dissensionis inter doctissimos sed aliquando tam‹en› iudicandam.
Atticus. How can that be done, now that Lucius Gellius is dead? Marcus. What, pray, has that to do with the matter? Atticus. Because I remember hearing at Athens from my friend Phaedrus that your friend Gellius, when he had come to Greece as proconsul after his praetorship and was at Athens, called together into one place the philosophers who then were there, and strongly urged them at last to set some limit to their controversies. And that, if they were of such a mind as to be unwilling to wear away their lives in disputes, the thing might be arranged; and at the same time he promised them his own help, if some agreement could be reached among them. Marcus. That is a joke indeed, Pomponius, and often laughed at by many. But I, for my part, should plainly wish to be appointed arbiter between the Old Academy and Zeno. Atticus. How so, pray? Marcus. Because they disagree about one thing only; on the rest they agree wonderfully. Atticus. Do you really say so? Is there disagreement about one thing only?
Atticvs: Qui istuc fieri potest L. Gellio mortuo? Marcvs: Quid tandem id ad rem? Atticvs: Quia me Athenis audire ex Phaedro meo memini, Gellium familiarem tuum, quom pro consule ex praetura in Graeciam uenisset ‹esset›que Athenis, philosophos, qui tum erant, in locum unum conuocasse ipsisque magno opere auctorem fuisse, ut aliquando controuersiarum aliquem facerent modum. Quodsi essent eo animo ut nollent aetatem in litibus conterere, posse rem conuenire, et simul operam suam illis esse pollicitum, si posset inter eos aliquid conuenire. Marcvs: Ioculare istuc quidem, Pomponi, et a multis saepe derisum. Sed ego plane uellem me arbitrum inter antiquam Academiam et Zenonem datum. Atticvs: Quo tandem istuc modo? Marcvs: Quia de re una solum dissident, de ceteris mirifice congruunt. Atticvs: Ain tandem? Vna de re est solum dissensio?
Marcus. About one thing, at least, that bears on the matter: for whereas the ancients decreed everything to be good which was according to nature and which helped us in life, this man thought nothing good but what was honorable. Atticus. A small controversy indeed you call it — yet not one that does not settle everything! Marcus. You would feel rightly, if they disagreed in substance and not in words. Atticus. So you agree with my friend Antiochus — for I do not dare to call him my teacher — with whom I lived and who all but tore me from our little gardens and led me into the Academy by a very few steps. Marcus. That man was indeed acute and prudent, and perfect in his kind, and, as you know, a friend of mine; but whether I agree with him in all things or not, I will see presently. This I say: that this whole controversy can be settled. Atticus. How do you see that, pray?
Marcvs: Quae quidem ad rem pertineat una: quippe quom antiqui omne quod secundum naturam esset, quo iuuaremur in uita, bonum esse decreuerint, hic nisi quod honestum esset ‹non› putarit bonum. Atticvs: Paruam uero controuersiam dicis, at non eam quae dirimat omnia! Marcvs: Probe quidem sentires, si re ac non uerbis dissiderent. Atticvs: Ergo adsentiris Antiocho familiari meo (magistro enim non audeo dicere), quocum uixi et qui me ex nostris paene conuellit hortulis, deduxitque in Academiam perpauculis passibus. Marcvs: Vir iste fuit ille ‹quidem› acutus et prudens, et in suo genere perfectus mihique, ut scis, familiaris, cui tamen ego adsentiar in omnibus necne, mox uidero. Hoc dico, controuersiam totam istam posse sedari. Atticvs: Qui istuc tandem uides?
Marcus. Because if, as Aristo of Chios said, he had declared only that to be good which is honorable and only that bad which is base, with all other things plainly equal, and that it made not the slightest difference whether they were present or absent, then he would differ widely from Xenocrates and Aristotle and that family of Plato, and there would be disagreement among them about the greatest matter and about the whole plan of living. But as it is, since he calls that the sole good which the ancients called the highest good, namely honor; and likewise calls that the sole evil which they called the highest evil, namely dishonor; and calls riches, health, beauty “advantageous things,” not goods; poverty, weakness, pain “disadvantageous things,” not evils — he feels the same as Xenocrates, the same as Aristotle, but speaks in another way. And out of this discord not of things but of words there has arisen a controversy about the ends of goods; in which, since the Twelve Tables refused to allow possession by use within five feet, we will not let this sharp fellow graze down the ancient holding of the Academy, nor will we, as single arbiters under the Mamilian law, but as three arbiters under the Twelve Tables, rule the boundaries.
Marcvs: Quia si, ut Chius Aristo dixit, solum bonum esse ‹dixisset› quod honestum esset malumque quod turpe, ceteras res omnis plane pares, ac ne minimum quidem utrum adessent an abessent interesse, ualde a Xenocrate et Aristotele et ab illa Platonis familia discreparet, esset‹que› inter eos de re maxima et de omni uiuendi ratione dissensio. Nunc uero cum decus, quod antiqui summum bonum esse dixerant, hic solum bonum dicat; itemque dedecus ‹quod› illi summum malum, hic solum; diuitias, ualetudinem, pulchritudinem, commodas res appellet, non bonas; paupertatem, debilitatem, dolorem incommodas, non malas; sentit idem quod Xenocrates, quod Aristoteles, loquitur alio modo. Ex hac autem non rerum sed uerborum discordia controuersia est nata de finibus, in qua, quoniam usus capionem duodecim tabulae intr‹a› quinque pedes esse ‹n›oluerunt, depasci ueterem possessionem Academiae ab hoc acuto homine non sinemus, nec Mamilia lege singuli, sed e XII tres arbitri fines regemus.
Quintus. What verdict, then, do we deliver? Marcus. That the boundary-stones which Socrates fixed be sought out, and that we abide by them. Quintus. Splendidly, brother — already now you are using the language of the civil law and of the statutes, on which kind I await your discussion. For that is indeed a great point of decision, as I have often learned from you yourself. But certainly the matter stands thus: that to live according to nature is the highest good, that is, to enjoy a life that is moderate and fitted to virtue; and yet to follow nature and to live by her law, as it were, is this — to omit nothing, so far as in one lies, that one may attain the things nature demands... by which she would have us live equally by virtue’s law, as it were. For which reason, whether this can ever be decided I do not know, but by this discourse certainly it cannot, if indeed we are to finish what we have undertaken.
Qvintvs: Quamnam igitur sententiam dicimus? Marcvs: Requiri placere terminos quos Socrates pepigerit, iisque parere. Qvintvs: Praeclare, frater, iam nunc a te uerba usurpantur ciuilis iuris et legum, quo de genere expecto disputationem tuam. Nam ista quidem magna diiudicatio est, ut ex te ipso saepe cognoui. Sed certe ita res se habet, ut ex natura uiuere summum bonum sit, id est uita modica et apta uirtu‹ti› perfrui; atqui naturam sequi et eius quasi lege uiuere, id est nihil, quantum in ipso sit praetermittere, quominus ea quae natura postulet consequatur... quo ‹par›iter haec uelit uirtut‹is› tamquam lege ‹nos› uiuere. Quapropter hoc diiudicari nescio an numquam, sed hoc sermone certe non potest, si quidem id quod suscepimus perfecturi sumus.
Atticus. But I was inclining this way, and not unwillingly. Quintus. It will be allowed another time. Now let us do what we began, especially since this disagreement about the highest evil and good has no bearing on it. Marcus. Most prudently you speak, Quintus. For what has so far been said by me... Quintus.... I desire neither the laws of Lycurgus nor of Solon nor of Charondas nor of Zaleucus, nor our Twelve Tables, nor the plebiscites, but I expect that you, in today’s discourse, will give laws of living and a discipline both to peoples and to individuals.
Atticvs: At ego huc declinabam nec inuitus. Qvintvs: Licebit alias. Nunc id agamus quod coepimus, quom praesertim ad id nihil pertineat haec de summo malo bonoque dissensio. Marcvs: Prudentissime, Quinte, dicis. Nam quae a me adhuc dicta sunt... Qvintvs:... nec Lycurgi leges neque Solonis neque Charondae neque Zaleuci, nec nostras duodecim tabulas nec plebiscita desidero, sed te existimo cum populis, tum etiam singulis, hodierno sermone leges uiuendi et disciplinam daturum.
Marcus. It is indeed proper to this discussion, Quintus, that which you expect — and would that it were also within my power! But surely the matter stands thus: since the law ought to be the corrector of vices and the commender of virtues, the teaching of how to live should be drawn from the same source. So it comes about that wisdom is the mother of all good things, from love of which philosophy took its name in Greek — than which nothing richer, nothing more flourishing, nothing more excellent has been given by the immortal gods to the life of men. For this one thing has taught us, among all else, that which is hardest of all: that we should know ourselves; the force and import of which precept is so great that it was ascribed not to any man but to the Delphic god.
Marcvs: Est huius uero disputationis, Quinte, proprium, id quod expectas, atque utinam esset etiam facultatis meae! Sed profecto ita se res habet, ut quoniam uitiorum emendatricem legem esse oportet commendatricemque uirtutum, ab ea‹dem› uiuendi doctrina ducatur. Ita fit ut mater omnium bonarum rerum ‹sit› sapientia, a quoius amore Graeco uerbo philosophia nomen inuenit, qua nihil a dis immortalibus uberius, nihil florentius, nihil praestabilius hominum uitae datum est. Haec enim una nos cum ceteras res omnes, tum, quod est difficillimum, docuit, ut nosmet ipsos nosceremus, cuius praecepti tanta uis et tanta sententia est, ut ea non homini quoipiam, sed Delphico deo tribueretur.
For he who knows himself will first perceive that he has something divine, and will think his own genius within him a kind of consecrated image; and he will always do and feel something worthy of so great a gift of the gods; and when he has examined and tested himself wholly, he will understand how he has come into life equipped by nature, and how great are the instruments he has for obtaining and attaining wisdom — since at the beginning of all things he conceived in his mind and soul, as it were, shadowed apprehensions, which, when they are illumined, with wisdom as his guide, he sees himself to be a good man and, for that very reason, blessed.
Nam qui se ipse norit, primum aliquid se habere sentiet diuinum ingeniumque in se suum sicut simulacrum aliquod dicatum putabit, tantoque munere deorum semper dignum aliquid et faciet et sentiet, et quom se ipse perspexerit totumque temptarit, intelleget quem ad modum a natura subornatus in uitam uenerit, quantaque instrumenta habeat ad obtinendam adipiscendamque sapientiam, quoniam principio rerum omnium quasi adumbratas intellegentias animo ac mente conceperit, quibus inlustratis sapientia duce bonum uirum et, ob eam ipsam causam, cernat se beatum fore.
For when the soul, with the virtues known and grasped, has departed from the indulgence and service of the body, and has crushed pleasure like some stain of dishonor, and has fled all fear of death and pain, and has united itself in a fellowship of love with its own, and has counted all those joined to it by nature as its own, and has taken up the worship of the gods and pure religion, and has sharpened, like the eyes’, so the mind’s edge, for choosing the good and rejecting its opposites (which virtue, from foreseeing, is called prudence) — what can be called or conceived more blessed than this?
Nam quom animus cognitis percep tisque uirtutibus a corporis obsequio indulgentiaque discesserit, uoluptatemque sicut labem aliquam dedecoris oppresserit, omnemque mortis dolorisque timorem effugerit, societateque caritatis co‹h›ae‹s›erit cum suis, omnesque natura coniunctos suos duxerit, cultumque deorum et puram religionem susceperit, et exacuerit illam, ut oculorum, sic ingenii aciem ad bona seligenda et reicienda contraria (quae uirtus ex prouidendo est appellata prudentia), quid eo dici aut cogitari poterit beatius?
And when the same soul has surveyed the sky, the lands, the seas, and the nature of all things, and has seen whence they were begotten, whither they will return, when, in what way they will perish, what in them is mortal and perishable, what divine and eternal, and has all but laid hold of the god himself who governs and rules these things, and has recognized itself to be no citizen hemmed in by the walls of one town, belonging to some fixed place, but a citizen of the whole world as of a single city — in this grandeur of things, in this view and knowledge of nature, immortal gods, how it will know itself! [as Pythian Apollo enjoined] How it will despise, how look down on, how count as nothing those things which are commonly called most magnificent!
Idemque quom caelum, terras, maria rerumque omnium naturam perspexerit, eaque unde generata quo recur‹sur›a, quando, quo modo obitura, quid in iis mortale et caducum, quid diuinum aeternumque sit uiderit, ipsumque ea moderantem et regentem ‹deum› paene prenderit, seseque non ‹oppidi› circumdatum moenibus popularem alicuius definiti loci, sed ciuem totius mundi quasi unius urbis agnouerit, in hac ille magnificentia rerum, atque in hoc conspectu et cognitione naturae, dii inmortales, qua‹le›m se ipse noscet! [quod Apollo praecepit Pythius] Quam contemnet, quam despiciet, quam pro nihilo putabit ea quae uolgo dicuntur amplissima!
And all these things it will fence about, as if with some enclosure, by the art of reasoning, by the science of judging true and false, and by a certain skill of understanding what follows from each thing and what is contrary to each. And when it has perceived itself to be born for civil fellowship, it will think it must use not only that subtle disputation but also speech poured out more broadly and continuously, by which it may govern peoples, may make laws firm, may chastise the wicked, may protect the good, may praise famous men, may issue precepts of safety and praise fittingly to persuade its fellow citizens, by which it may exhort to honor, recall from disgrace, console the afflicted, and hand down the deeds and counsels of the brave and wise, together with the infamy of the wicked, in everlasting monuments. When these things are so many and so great, which are perceived to be in man by those who wish to know themselves, the parent and nurse of them is wisdom.
Atque haec omnia quasi saepimento aliquo uallabit disserendi ratione, ueri et falsi iudicandi scientia, et arte quadam intellegendi quid quamque rem sequatur et quid sit quoique contrarium. Quomque se ad ciuilem societatem natum senserit, non solum illa subtili disputatione sibi utendum putabit sed etiam fusa latius perpetua oratione, qua regat populos, qua stabiliat leges, qua castiget improbos, qua tueatur bonos, qua laudet claros uiros, qua praecepta salutis et laudis apte ad persuadendum edat suis ciuibus, qua hortari ad decus, reuocare a flagitio, consolari possit adflictos, factaque et consulta fortium et sapientium cum improborum ignominia sempiternis monumentis prodere. Quae quom tot res tantaeque sint, quae inesse in homine perspiciantur ab iis qui se ipsi uelint nosse, earum parens est educatrixque sapientia.
Atticus. Praised gravely and truly indeed by you! But to what does this tend? Marcus. First, Pomponius, to those very things which we are now about to treat, which we wish to be so great. For they will not be great, unless those things from which they flow are themselves the most ample. And then I do it gladly and, I hope, rightly, because I cannot pass over in silence that thing by zeal for which I am held, and which has made me whatever I am. Atticus. Rightly indeed you do, and deservedly and dutifully, and it was, as you say, to be done in this discourse.
Atticvs: Laudata quidem a te grauiter et uere! Sed quorsus hoc pertinet? Marcvs: Primum ad ea, Pomponi, de quibus acturi iam sumus, quae tanta esse uolumus. Non enim erunt, nisi ea fuerint, unde illa manant, amplissima. Deinde facio et lubenter et, ut spero, recte, quod eam quoius studio teneor quaeque me eum, quicumque sum, effecit, non possum silentio praeterire. Atticvs: Re‹cte› uero facis et merito et pie, fuitque id, ut dicis, in hoc sermone faciundum. LIBER II
Atticus. But would you like, since we have walked enough by now and you have to make a fresh start to your discourse, that we change our place and go on with the rest of the conversation seated on the island that lies in the Fibrenus — for that, I think, is the name of this other river? Marcus. By all means. For I am very fond of using that spot, whether I am turning something over in my own mind, or writing, or reading.
Atticus: Sed visne, quoniam et satis iam ambulatum est, et tibi aliud dicendi initium sumendum est, locum mutemus et in insula quae est in Fibreno — nam opinor ‹id› illi alteri flumini nomen est — sermoni reliquo demus operam sedentes? Marcus: Sane quidem. Nam illo loco libentissime soleo uti, sive quid mecum ipse cogito, sive aliquid scribo aut lego.
Atticus. For my part, now that I have come here for the first time, I cannot get my fill of it, and I despise those grand villas with their marble pavements and panelled ceilings. And as for the water-channels they call their Niles and their Euripi — who would not laugh at them once he had seen this? And so, just as a little while ago, when you were discoursing on law and on right, you referred everything to nature, so in these very things that are sought for the rest and delight of the mind, nature is sovereign. That is why I used to wonder — for I thought there was nothing in these parts but rocks and mountains, and it was your accounts and your verses that led me to think so — I used to wonder, as I said, that you took such great delight in this place. But now, on the contrary, I wonder that you are anywhere else, whenever you are away from Rome.
Atticus: Equidem, qui nunc potissimum huc venerim, satiari non queo, magnificasque villas et pavimenta marmorea et laqueata tecta contemno. Ductus vero aquarum, quos isti Nilos et Euripos vocant, quis non cum haec videat inriserit? Itaque ut tu paulo ante de lege et de iure disserens ad naturam referebas omnia, sic in his ipsis rebus, quae ad requietem animi delectationemque quaeruntur, natura dominatur. Quare antea mirabar — nihil enim his in locis nisi saxa et montis cogitabam, itaque ut facerem et narrationibus inducebar tuis et versibus —, sed mirabar ut dixi, te tam valde hoc loco delectari. Nunc contra miror te cum Roma absis usquam potius esse.
Marcus. For my part, when I am allowed to be away for several days, especially at this time of year, I do go after this loveliness and this healthfulness; but I am rarely allowed. And no doubt there is another reason too that delights me, one that does not touch you, Titus. Atticus. What, then, is that reason? Marcus. Because, to tell the truth, this is the true native land of myself and of this brother of mine. For here we are sprung from a most ancient stock; here are our family rites, here our kin, here many traces of our forefathers. Need I say more? You see this villa, built — as it now stands — more handsomely, by the zeal of our father, who, being of weak health, spent nearly his whole life here among his books. But in this very place, while my grandfather was living and the villa, in the old fashion, was small, like that Curian one in the Sabine country, know that I was born. And so there is something — I know not what — that lurks deep in my mind and feeling, by which perhaps this place delights me the more; since indeed even that wisest of men is written to have refused immortality, that he might see Ithaca again.
Marcus: Ego veto, cum licet pluris dies abesse, praesertim hoc tempore anni, et amoenitatem et salubritatem hanc sequor; raro autem licet. Sed nimirum me alia quoque causa delectat, quae te non attingit Tite. Atticus: Quae tandem ista causa est? Marcus: Quia si verum dicimus, haec est mea et huius fratris mei germana patria. Hic enim orti stirpe antiquissima sumus, hic sacra, hic genus, hic maiorum multa vestigia. Quid plura? Hanc vides villam, ut nunc quidem est, lautius aedificatam patris nostri studio, qui cum esset infirma valetudine, hic fere aetatem egit in litteris. Sed hoc ipso in loco, cum avos viveret et antiquo more parva esset villa, ut illa Curiana in Sabinis, me scito esse natum. Qua re inest nescio quid et latet in animo ac sensu meo, quo me plus hic locus fortasse delectet, si quidem etiam ille sapientissimus vir Ithacam ut videret inmortalitatem scribitur repudiasse.
Atticus. I, for my part, think that a just reason of yours, why you should come here the more gladly and love this place. Indeed, to tell the truth, I myself have just now grown more of a friend to that villa, and to all this soil in which you were born and bred. For we are stirred, somehow, by the very places in which the traces of those we love or admire are present. Take our own Athens: it is not so much by the magnificent works and the exquisite arts of the ancients that it delights me, as by the recollection of its greatest men — where each of them used to live, where to sit, where to dispute; and I gaze, too, eagerly upon their very tombs. So I shall love henceforth all the more this place where you were born. Marcus. I am glad, then, that I have shown you what is almost my cradle.
Atticus: Ego vero tibi istam iustam causam puto, cur huc libentius venias atque hunc locum diligas. Quin ipse, vere dicam, sum illi villae amicior modo factus atque huic omni solo, in quo tu ortus et procreatus es. Movemur enim nescio quo pacto locis ipsis, in quibus eorum quos diligimus aut admiramur adsunt vestigia. Me quidem ipsae illae nostrae Athenae non tam operibus magnificis exquisitisque antiquorum artibus delectant, quam recordatione summorum virorum, ubi quisque habitare, ubi sedere, ubi disputare sit solitus, studioseque eorum etiam sepulcra contemplor. Quare istum ubi tu es natus plus amabo posthac locum. Marcus: Gaudeo igitur me incunabula paene mea tibi ostendisse.
Atticus. And I am very glad indeed to have come to know it. But still, what did you mean by what you said a little while ago — that this place (for I take you to mean Arpinum) is your true native land? Have you two native lands, then, or is that common one the only native land? Unless perhaps the native land of wise old Cato was not Rome but Tusculum. Marcus. I, by Hercules, hold that he, and all townsmen, have two native lands, one of nature and one of citizenship: just as that Cato, though he was born at Tusculum, was received into the citizenship of the Roman people, and so, being by birth a Tusculan but by citizenship a Roman, had one native land of place and another of right; just as your Attic forebears, before Theseus ordered them to leave the fields and gather all together into what is called the city, were both their own people and Athenians at once, so we call that our native land where we were born, and that also by which we were taken in. But of necessity that one must come first in our affection from which the name of commonwealth belongs to the whole body of citizens — for which we ought to die, to which we ought to give our whole selves, in which we ought to lay up and as it were consecrate all that is ours. Yet not much less sweet is the one that bore us than the one that took us in. And so I shall never deny outright that this is my native land, provided that the other is the greater and this is contained within it. * has two cities, but thinks of those as one city.
Atticus: Equidem me cognosse admodum gaudeo. Sed illud tamen quale est quod paulo ante dixisti, hunc locum — id enim ego te accipio dicere Arpinum — germanam patriam esse vestram? Numquid duas habetis patrias, an est una illa patria communis? Nisi forte sapienti illi Catoni fuit patria non Roma sed Tusculum. Marcus: Ego mehercule et illi et omnibus municipibus duas esse censeo patrias, unam naturae, alteram civitatis: ut ille Cato, quom esset Tusculi natus, in populi Romani civitatem susceptus est, ita‹que› quom ortu Tusculanus esset, civitate Romanus, habuit alteram loci patriam, alteram iuris; ut vestri Attici, priusquam Theseus eos demigrare ex agris et in astu quod appellatur omnis conferre se iussit, et sui erant idem et Attici, sic nos et eam patriam dicimus ubi nati, et illam ‹a› qua excepti sumus. Sed necesse est caritate eam praestare ‹e› qua rei publicae nomen universae civitati est, pro qua mori et cui nos totos dedere et in qua nostra omnia ponere et quasi consecrare debemus. Dulcis autem non multo secus est ea quae genuit quam illa quae excepit. Itaque ego hanc meam esse patriam prorsus numquam negabo, dum illa sit maior, haec in ea contineatur. * duas habet civitatis, sed unam illas civitatem putat.
Atticus. Then our friend Pompey the Great was right — I heard it myself — when in a trial, pleading together with you on behalf of Ampius, he laid it down that our commonwealth could give the justest thanks to this municipality, because from it two of its saviours had arisen; so that now I am brought to believe that this place too, which gave you birth, is your native land. But we have come to the island. And surely nothing is lovelier than this. For here the Fibrenus is split as if by a prow, and, divided equally into two parts, washes these flanks, and, swiftly running off, quickly flows together again into one, and embraces just enough ground to serve for a modest wrestling-court. And, this being done, as though that had been its work and office, to make us this seat for disputation, at once it plunges into the Liris, and, as if it had entered a patrician family, loses its more obscure name, and makes the Liris far colder. For I have touched no colder river than this, though I have come near to many, so that I can scarcely test it with my foot, as Socrates does in Plato’s Phaedrus.
Atticus: Recte igitur Magnus ille noster me audiente posuit in iudicio, quom pro Ampio tecum simul diceret, rem publicam nostram iustissimas huic municipio gratias agere posse, quod ex eo duo sui conservatores exstitissent, ut iam videar adduci, hanc quoque quae te procrearit esse patriam tuam. Sed ventum in insulam est. Hac vero nihil est amoenius. Etenim hoc quasi rostro finditur Fibrenus, et divisus aequaliter in duas partes latera haec adluit, rapideque dilapsus cito in unum confluit, et tantum conplectitur quod satis sit modicae palaestrae loci. Quo effecto, tamquam id habuerit operis ac muneris, ut hanc nobis efficeret sedem ad disputandum, statim praecipitat in Lirem, et quasi in familiam patriciam venerit, amittit nomen obscurius, Liremque multo gelidiorem facit. Nec enim ullum hoc frigidius flumen attigi, cum ad multa accesserim, ut vix pede temptare id possim, quod in Phaedro Platonis facit Socrates.
Marcus. It is indeed so. And yet, for loveliness, your famous Epirote Thyamis — of which I often hear from Quintus — has not, I think, yielded anything to this. Quintus. It is just as you say. For do not suppose that anything is more splendid than our friend Atticus’s Amalthea and those plane-trees of his. But if you think fit, let us sit down here in the shade, and return to that part of the discourse from which we set out. Marcus. Splendidly you press me, Quintus — and I had thought I had got away; nothing of this can be left owing to you. Quintus. Begin, then, for we are giving you this whole day. Marcus. “From Jove the beginnings of the Muses” — just as we began in the poem of Aratus. Quintus. To what end is that? Marcus. Because now, in the same way, from him and from the other immortal gods we must take the beginnings of what we do.
Marcus: Est vero ita. Sed tamen huic amoenitate, quem ex Quinto saepe audio, Thyamis Epirotes tuus ille nihil opinor concesserit. Quintus: Est ita ut dicis. Cave enim putes Attici nostri Amalthio platanisque illis quicquam esse praeclarius. Sed si videtur considamus hic in umbra, atque ad eam partem sermonis ex qua egressi sumus revertamur. Marcus: Praeclare exigis Quinte — at ego effugisse arbitrabar —, et tibi horum nihil deberi potest. Quintus: Ordire igitur, nam hunc tibi totum dicamus diem. Marcus: ’A Iove Musarum primordia’, sicut in Aratio carmine orsi sumus. Quintus: Quorsum istuc? Marcus: Quia nunc item ab eodem et a ceteris diis immortalibus sunt nobis agendi capienda primordia.
Quintus. Most excellent, brother, and so it is fitting to do. Marcus. Let us see, then, once again, before we come to the laws one by one, the force and nature of law, lest — since everything is to be referred by us to it — we slip from time to time into an error of language, and be ignorant of the force of that reasoning by which rights are to be defined for us. Quintus. Indeed, by Hercules, and that is the right way of teaching. Marcus. This, then, I see was the judgement of the wisest men: that law was neither thought up by the wits of men, nor was it any decree of peoples, but something eternal, which governs the whole world by the wisdom of commanding and forbidding. So they used to say that the first and final law was the mind of god, who compels or forbids all things by reason. And from this comes the deserved praise of that law which the gods gave to the human race: for it is the reason and mind of a wise being, fit to command and to deter.
Quintus: Optime vero frater, et fieri sic decet. Marcus: Videamus igitur rursus, priusquam adgrediamur ad leges singulas, vim naturamque legis, ne quom referenda sint ad eam nobis omnia, labamur interdum errore sermonis, ignoremusque vim rationis eius qua iura nobis definienda sint. Quintus: Sane quidem hercle, et est ista recta docendi via. Marcus: Hanc igitur video sapientissimorum fuisse sententiam, legem neque hominum ingeniis excogitatam, nec scitum aliquod esse populorum, sed aeternum quiddam, quod universum mundum regeret imperandi prohibendique sapientia. Ita principem legem illam et ultimam mentem esse dicebant omnia ratione aut cogentis aut vetantis dei. Ex quo illa lex, quam di humano generi dederunt, recte est laudata: est enim ratio mensque sapientis ad iubendum et ad deterrendum idonea.
Quintus. You have touched on that idea several times already. But before you come to the laws of the people, lay out, if you please, the force of that heavenly law, lest the tide of habit sweep us off and drag us into the customary manner of speaking. Marcus. For from childhood, Quintus, we have learned to call “if one summons another to court” and other things of that sort by the name of laws. But it ought truly to be understood thus: that both this and the other commands and prohibitions of peoples have the force of calling men to right action and calling them away from wrongs; and that this force is not only older than the age of peoples and cities, but is coeval with that god who watches over and rules the heavens and the earth.
Quintus: Aliquotiens iam iste iocus a te tactus est. Sed antequam ad populares leges venias, vim istius caelestis legis explana si placet, ne aestus nos consuetudinis absorbeat et ad sermonis morem usitati trahat. Marcus: A parvis enim Quinte didicimus, ’si in ius vocat’ atque alia eius modi leges ‹alias› nominare. Sed vero intellegi sic oportet, et hoc et alia iussa ac vetita populorum vim habere ad recte facta vocandi et a peccatis avocandi, quae vis non modo senior est quam aetas populorum et civitatium, sed aequalis illius caelum atque terras tuentis et regentis dei.
For the divine mind cannot exist without reason, nor can divine reason fail to have this force in sanctioning what is right and what is wrong. And though it was nowhere written that one man should stand against all the forces of the enemy upon a bridge and order the bridge to be cut down behind him, we shall not on that account think that the famous Cocles did so great a deed of valour without a law and a command; nor, if under the reign of Lucius Tarquinius there was no written law at Rome concerning rape, did Sextus Tarquinius therefore not offer violence to Lucretia, daughter of Tricipitinus, against that everlasting law. For there was a reason, proceeding from the nature of things, both impelling to right action and calling men away from wrong, which does not first begin to be law at the moment it is written down, but at the moment it arose. And it arose at the same time as the divine mind. Wherefore the true and first law, fit for commanding and forbidding, is the right reason of supreme Jove.
Neque enim esse mens divina sine ratione potest, nec ratio divina non hanc vim in rectis pravisque sanciendis habere, nec quia nusquam erat scriptum, ut contra omnis hostium copias in ponte unus adsisteret, a tergoque pontem interscindi iuberet, idcirco minus Coclitem illum rem gessisse tantam fortitudinis lege atque imperio putabimus, nec si regnante ‹L.› Tarquinio nulla erat Romae scripta lex de stupris, idcirco non contra illam legem sempiternam Sex. Tarquinius vim Lucretiae Tricipitini filiae attulit. Erat enim ratio, profecta a rerum natura, et ad recte faciendum inpellens et a delicto avocans, quae non tum denique incipit lex esse quom scripta est, sed tum quom orta est. Orta autem est simul cum mente divina. Quam ob rem lex vera atque princeps, apta ad iubendum et ad vetandum, ratio est recta summi Iovis.
Quintus. I agree, brother, that what is right and true is also eternal, and neither rises nor sets with the letters in which decrees are written. Marcus. Therefore, just as that divine mind is the supreme law, so it is the law also when, in man, it is perfected in the mind of a wise being. But those laws that have been variously and for the occasion drawn up for peoples hold the name of laws by favour rather than in reality. For that every law that can rightly be called a law is praiseworthy, they prove by some such arguments as these. It is surely agreed that laws were invented for the safety of citizens, for the security of cities, and for the quiet and happy life of men; and that those who first sanctioned decrees of this kind showed their peoples that they would write and pass such things as, once received and taken up, would let them live honourably and happily; and that what was so composed and sanctioned they would, of course, name laws. From which it is fair to understand that those who drew up ruinous and unjust commands for peoples, since they did the opposite of what they had promised and professed, passed anything you please rather than laws; so that it can be plain that in the very interpreting of the name of law there is bound up the force and meaning of choosing what is just and true.
Quintus: Adsentior frater, ut quod est rectum verumque, ‹aeternum quoque ratio, est› sit, neque cum litteris quibus scita scribuntur aut oriatur aut occidat. Marcus: Ergo ut illa divina mens summa lex est, item quom in homine est perfecta in mente sapientis. Quae sunt autem varie et ad tempus descriptae populis, favore magis quam re legum nomen tenent. Omnem enim legem, quae quidem recte lex appellari possit, esse laudabilem qui‹bus›dam talibus argumentis docent. Constare profecto ad salutem civium civitatumque incolumitatem vitamque hominum quietam et beatam inventas esse leges, eosque qui primum eiusmodi scita sanxerint, populis ostendisse ea se scripturos atque laturos, quibus illi adscitis susceptisque honeste beateque viverent, quaeque ita conposita sanctaque essent, eas leges videlicet nominarent. Ex quo intellegi par est, eos qui perniciosa et iniusta populis iussa descripserint, quom contra fecerint quam polliciti professique sint, quidvis potius tulisse quam leges, ut perspicuum esse possit, in ipso nomine legis interpretando inesse vim et sententiam iusti et veri legendi.
I ask you, then, Quintus, as those people are wont to do: if a state lacks something — and for that very reason, because it lacks it, is to be reckoned as nothing — is that to be numbered among goods? Quintus. Among the very greatest, indeed. Marcus. And a state that lacks law — is it, for that very reason, to be held of no account? Quintus. It cannot be said otherwise. Marcus. Of necessity, then, law must be reckoned among the best things. Quintus. I agree entirely.
Quaero igitur a te Quinte, sicut illi solent: quo si civitas careat ob eam ipsam causam quod eo careat pro nihilo habenda sit, id estne numerandum in bonis? Quintus: Ac maxumis quidem. Marcus: Lege autem carens civitas estne ob ipsum habenda nullo loco? Quintus: Dici aliter non potest. Marcus: Necesse est igitur legem haberi in rebus optimis. Quintus: Prorsus adsentior.
Marcus. And what of the fact that many ruinous, many pestilent things are decreed among peoples, which no more touch the name of law than if a band of robbers should sanction something by their own consent? For neither can the prescriptions of physicians truly be so called, if in their ignorance and inexperience they have prescribed deadly things in place of healthful ones; nor, among a people, can a thing be law, of whatever kind it be, even if the people has accepted something ruinous. Law, therefore, is the distinction between the just and the unjust, framed after that most ancient nature which is the first principle of all things, to which the laws of men are directed — laws that afflict the wicked with punishment, and defend and protect the good. Quintus. I understand you perfectly, and now I think there is no other law that should not only not be held, but not even be called, a law.
Marcus: Quid quod multa perniciose, multa pestifere sciscuntur in populis, quae non magis legis nomen adtingunt, quam si latrones aliqua consensu suo sanxerint? Nam neque medicorum praecepta dici vere possunt, si quae inscii inperitique pro salutaribus mortifera conscripserint, neque in populo lex, cuicuimodi fuerit illa, etiam si perniciosum aliquid populus acceperit. Ergo est lex iustorum iniustorumque distinctio, ad illam antiquissimam et rerum omnium principem expressa naturam, ad quam leges hominum diriguntur, quae supplicio inprobos adficiunt, defendunt ac tuentur bonos. Quintus: Praeclare intellego, nec vero iam aliam esse ullam legem puto non modo habendam sed ne appellandam quidem.
Marcus. Then you think the Titian and Apuleian laws no laws at all? Quintus. For my part, not even the Livian ones. Marcus. And rightly, especially since they were abolished by the Senate in a single short line, in an instant of time. But that law whose force I have laid out can neither be abolished nor repealed. Quintus. Then the laws you will propose, no doubt, are such as can never be repealed. Marcus. Certainly, provided only they are accepted by the two of you. But, as that most learned man Plato did — the weightiest, too, of all the philosophers, who was the first to write about the commonwealth, and separately about its laws — I think I must do the same: that before I read out the law itself, I should speak in praise of that law. I see that Zaleucus and Charondas did the same, when in fact they wrote laws for their cities not for the sake of study and pleasure, but for the sake of the commonwealth. And Plato, imitating them, plainly thought this too was part of a law: to persuade somewhat, and not to compel everything by force and threats.
Marcus: Igitur tu Titias et Apuleias leges nullas putas? Quintus: Ego vero ne Livias quidem. Marcus: Et recte, quae praesertim uno versiculo senatus puncto temporis sublatae sint. Lex autem illa, cuius vim explicavi, neque tolli neque abrogari potest. Quintus: Eas tu igitur leges rogabis videlicet quae numquam abrogentur. Marcus: Certe, si modo acceptae a duobus vobis erunt. Sed ut vir doctissimus fecit Plato atque idem gravissimus philosophorum omnium, qui princeps de re publica conscripsit idemque separatim de legibus ‹eius›, id‹em› mihi credo esse faciundum, ut priusquam ipsam legem recitem, de eius legis laude dicam. Quod idem et Zaleucum et Charondam fecisse video, quom quidem illi non studii et delectationis sed rei publicae causa leges civitatibus suis scripserint. Quos imitatus Plato videlicet hoc quoque legis putavit esse, persuadere aliquid, non omnia vi ac minis cogere.
Quintus. And what of the fact that Timaeus denies your Zaleucus ever existed? Marcus. But Theophrastus affirms it — in my judgement an authority no worse, and many call him better — and his own fellow citizens, the Locrians, our clients, attest it. But whether he existed or not is nothing to the matter: we speak of what has been handed down. Let this, then, be settled with the citizens from the very start: that the gods are the lords and governors of all things; that what is done is done by their judgement and divine power; that they deserve supremely well of the human race; and that they observe what kind of man each one is, what he does, what he takes upon himself, with what mind, with what piety he keeps the rites of religion — and that they take account of the pious and the impious...
Quintus: Quid quod Zaleucum istum negat ullum fuisse Timaeus? Marcus: At ‹ait› Theophrastus, auctor haud deterior mea quidem sententia — meliorem multi nominant —, commemorant vero ipsius cives, nostri clientes, Locri. Sed sive fuit sive non fuit, nihil ad rem: loquimur quod traditum est. Sit igitur hoc iam a principio persuasum civibus, dominos esse omnium rerum ac moderatores deos, eaque quae gerantur eorum geri iudicio ac numine, eosdemque optime de genere hominum mereri, et qualis quisque sit, quid agat, quid in se admittat, qua mente, qua pietate colat religiones, intueri, piorumque et impiorum habere rationem... ‹conprehendantur, ratione nulla›.
For minds steeped in these convictions will surely not shrink from any useful or true opinion. For what is truer than that no one ought to be so foolishly arrogant as to think there is reason and mind in himself, but not in the heavens and the world? Or that he should think those things, which can scarcely be grasped by the highest exercise of intelligence, are moved by no reason at all? But the man whom the ordered courses of the stars, whom the alternations of day and night, whom the tempering of the seasons, whom the things that are brought forth for our enjoyment do not compel to be grateful — how can such a man be counted a man at all? And since all things that have reason excel those that are without reason, and since it would be impious to say that anything excels the nature of all things, we must confess that reason resides within it. And who would deny that these opinions are useful, when he understands how many things are made firm by an oath; how greatly the religious sanctions of treaties make for safety; how many men the fear of divine punishment has called back from crime; and how holy is the fellowship of citizens among themselves, with the immortal gods interposed now as judges, now as witnesses? There you have the proem of the law; for so Plato calls it.
His enim rebus inbutae mentes haud sane abhorrebunt ab utili aut a vera sententia. Quid est enim verius quam neminem esse oportere tam stulte adrogantem, ut in se rationem et mentem putet inesse, in caelo mundoque non putet? Aut ut ea quae vix summa ingenii ratione moveri putet? Quem vero astrorum ordines, quem dierum noctiumque vicissitudines, quem mensum temperatio, quemque ea quae gignuntur nobis ad fruendum, non gratum esse cogunt, hunc hominem omnino numerari qui decet? Quomque omnia quae rationem habent praestent iis quae sint rationis expertia, nefasque sit dicere ullam rem praestare naturae omnium rerum, rationem inesse in ea confitendum est. Utilis esse autem has opiniones quis neget, quom intellegat quam multa firmentur iure iurando, quantae saluti sint foederum religiones, quam multos divini supplicii metus a scelere revocarit, quamque sancta sit societas civium inter ipsos, diis inmortalibus interpositis tum iudicibus ‹tum› testibus? Habes legis prooemium; sic enim haec appellat Plato.
Quintus. I have it indeed, brother, and I am much delighted in this, that you dwell on matters and on views other than his. For nothing is so unlike his as either what you said before, or this very opening about the gods. One thing alone you seem to me to imitate: the manner of speech. Marcus. To wish to, perhaps; for who can imitate that, or ever will be able to? For to render his thoughts is easy enough, which indeed I would do, were I not wholly determined to be myself. For what trouble is it to say the same things, translated into nearly the same words? Quintus. I agree entirely. Truly, as you yourself just said, I prefer that you should be your own man. But now, if you please, set forth those laws on religion.
Quintus: Habeo vero frater, et in hoc admodum delector quod in aliis rebus aliisque sententiis versaris atque ille. Nihil enim tam dissimile quam vel ea quae ante dixisti, vel hoc ipsum de deis exordium. Unum illud mihi videris imitari, orationis genus. Marcus: Velle fortasse: quis enim id potest aut umquam poterit imitari? Nam sententias interpretari perfacile est, quod quidem ego facerem, nisi plane esse vellem meus. Quid enim negotii est eadem prope verbis isdem conversa dicere? Quintus: Prorsus adsentior. Verum ut modo tute dixisti, te esse malo tuum. Sed iam exprome si placet istas leges de religione.
Marcus. I will set them forth as best I can; and since both the place and the conversation are by no means commonplace, I shall propose the laws of the laws aloud. Quintus. What, pray, is that? Marcus. There are certain set forms of words for laws, Quintus — not so archaic as those in the Twelve and in the sacred laws of old, and yet, that they may carry more authority, a little more ancient than this talk of ours is. That manner, then, I shall follow, with brevity if I can. The laws will be issued by me not in full — for that would be endless — but only the sum and substance of the matters. Quintus. It must indeed be so. Therefore let us hear them.
Marcus: Expromam equidem ut potero, et quoniam et locus et sermo ‹haudquaquam› familiaris est, legum leges voce proponam. Quintus: Quidnam id est? Marcus: Sunt certa legum verba Quinte, neque ita prisca ut in veteribus XII sacratisque legibus, et tamen, quo plus auctoritatis habeant, paulo antiquiora quam hic sermo ‹noster› est. Eum morem igitur cum brevitate si potuero consequar. Leges autem a me edentur non perfectae — nam esset infinitum —, sed ipsae summae rerum atque sententiae. Quintus: Ita vero necesse est. Quare audiamus.
Marcus. Let them approach the gods in purity; let them bring piety; let them lay aside wealth. Whoever does otherwise, the god himself shall be his avenger. Let no man have gods of his own, neither new ones nor foreign, save those publicly received; in private let them worship those whom they have rightly received as worshipped from their fathers. In the cities let them keep shrines. In the fields let them keep groves and the dwellings of the Lares. Let them observe the rites of family and of forefathers. Let them worship the gods, both those who have always been held celestial, and those whom their merits have placed in heaven — Hercules, Liber, Aesculapius, Castor, Pollux, Quirinus; and also those qualities by which a man is granted ascent into heaven — Mind, Virtue, Piety, Faith — and let there be shrines of these their praises, and let no rites be solemnly performed for the vices. Let them put away quarrels on the festival days, and let them keep those days, the labours of the household being completed; and let it be so set down in the yearly rounds that it falls thus. Let the priests publicly offer up certain fruits and certain berries, with fixed sacrifices and on fixed days;
Marcus: ’Ad divos adeunto caste, pietatem adhibento, opes amovento. Qui secus faxit, deus ipse vindex erit.’ ’Separatim nemo habessit deos neve novos neve advenas nisi publice adscitos; privatim colunto quos rite a patribus ‹cultos acceperint›.’ ’‹in urbibus› delubra habento. Lucos in agris habento et Larum sedes.’ ’Ritus familiae patrumque servanto.’ ’Divos et eos qui caelestes semper habiti sunt colunto et ollos quos endo caelo merita locaverint, Herculem, Liberum, Aesculapium, Castorem, Pollucem, Quirinum, ast olla propter quae datur homini ascensus in caelum, Mentem, Virtutem, Pietatem, Fidem, earumque laudum delubra sunto, nec ulla vitiorum sacra sollemnia obeunto.’ ’Feriis iurgia ‹a›movento, easque in famulis operibus patratis habento, idque ut ita cadat in annuis anfractibus descriptum esto.’ ’Certasque fruges certasque bacas sacerdotes publice libanto ‹hoc› certis sacrificiis ac diebus,
and likewise let them keep, against other days, the abundance of milk and of the young of the flocks; and, that this be not neglected, let the priests for that purpose fix the reckoning of the yearly courses; and let them provide what victims are seemly and pleasing to each god. For the several gods let there be several priests; for all of them, pontiffs; for each one, flamens. And let the Vestal Virgins guard in the city the everlasting fire of the public hearth. And in what manner these things are to be done in private and in public, and by what rite, let the ignorant learn from the public priests. Of these let there be three kinds: one to preside over ceremonies and sacrifices; another to interpret the unknown utterances of the soothsayers and prophets which the Senate and the people have accepted. And let the interpreters of Jove Most Good and Greatest, the public augurs, give heed to signs and auspices, and keep their discipline;
itemque alios ad dies ubertatem lactis feturaeque servanto, idque ne omitti possit, ad eam rem rationem cursus annuos sacerdotes finiunto, quaeque quoique divo decorae grataeque sint hostiae, providento.’ ’Divisque aliis ‹alii› sacerdotes, omnibus pontifices, singulis flamines sunto. Virginesque Vestales in urbe custodiunto ignem foci publici sempitemum.’ ’Quoque haec privatim et publice modo rituque fiant, discunto ignari a publicis sacerdotibus. Eorum autem genera sunto tria: unum quod praesit caerimoniis et sacris, alterum quod interpretetur fatidicorum et vatium ecfata incognita, quae eorum senatus populusque asciverit. Interpretes autem Iovis optumi maxumi, publici augures, signis et auspiciis operam danto, disciplinam tenento,
and let the priests take the auguries for the vineyards and the orchards and the safety of the people; and let those who shall conduct the business of war, and those who shall conduct that of the people, be forewarned of the auspice, and let them obey it. And let them foresee the wraths of the gods and give place to them, and temper the lightnings of the sky to its appointed regions; and let them keep the city and the fields and the templa free and consecrated. And whatsoever an augur shall declare unjust, unlawful, faulty, or accursed, let it be void and undone; and whoever shall not obey, let it be a capital matter. Let the fetial priests be the judges and messengers of treaties of peace, of war, and of ratified truces; let them decide questions of war. Let prodigies and portents, if the Senate has so ordered, be referred to the Etruscan haruspices, and let Etruria teach its discipline to the leading men. To whatsoever gods they shall determine, let them make atonement, and let them expiate the lightnings and the stricken places. Let there be no nocturnal sacrifices of women, save those that shall be duly performed on behalf of the people. Nor let them initiate anyone, save as is customary in the Greek rite of Ceres.
sacerdotesque vineta virgetaque et salutem populi auguranto, quique agent rem duelli quique popularem, auspicium praemonento ollique obtemperanto. Divorumque iras providento sisque apparento, caelique fulgura regionibus ratis temperanto, urbemque et agros et templa liberata et effata habento. Quaeque augur iniusta nefasta vitiosa dira deixerit, inrita infectaque sunto, quique non paruerit, capital esto.’ ’Foederum pacis belli indotiarum ratorum fetiales iudices non‹tii› sunto, bella disceptanto.’ ’Prodigia portenta ad Etruscos ‹et› haruspices si senatus iussit deferunto, Etruriaque principes disciplinam doceto. Quibus divis creverint, procuranto, idemque fulgura atque obstita pianto.’ ’Nocturna mulierum sacrificia ne sunto praeter olla quae pro populo rite fient. Neve quem initianto nisi ut adsolet Cereri Graeco sacro.’
A sacrilege committed that cannot be expiated, let it be held an impious deed; one that can be expiated, let the public priests expiate. At the public games, where they are held without a chariot-race and without contests of bodies, by song and lyre and flute, let them keep the people’s joy within bounds, and join it with honour to the gods. Of the ancestral rites let them keep the best. Save for the servants of the Idaean Mother, and they on the appointed days, let no man collect alms. Whoever shall have stolen or carried off a sacred thing, or a thing entrusted to what is sacred, let him be a parricide. For perjury the divine penalty is destruction, the human penalty disgrace. For incest let the pontiffs sanction the supreme punishment. Let no impious man dare to placate the wrath of the gods with gifts. Let them pay their vows scrupulously. Let there be a penalty for the violation of right. Let no man consecrate a field to the gods. Let there be a limit to the consecration of gold, silver, and ivory. Let private rites remain perpetual. Let the rights of the gods of the dead be held sacred. Let them hold as gods those good men who have been given over to death. Let them lessen the cost spent upon them, and the mourning.
’Sacrum commissum quod neque expiari poterit impie commissum esto; quod expiari poterit publici sacerdotes expianto.’ ’Loedis publicis quod sive curriculo et ‹sine› certatione corporum ‹sive› cantu et fidibus et tibiis fiat, popularem laetitiam moderanto eamque cum divum honore iungunto.’ ’Ex patriis ritibus optuma colunto.ë ’Praeter Idaeae Matris famulos eosque iustis diebus ne quis stipem cogito.’ ’Sacrum sacrove commendatum qui clepsit rapsitve, parricida esto.’ ’Periurii poena divina exitium, humana dedecus.’ ’Incestum pontifices supremo supplicio sanciunto.’ ’Impius ne audeto placare donis iram deorum.’ ’,Caute vota reddunto.’ ’Poena violati iuris esto.’ ’‹quocirca› Nequis agrum consecrato.’ ’Auri, argenti, eboris sacrandi modus esto.’ ’Sacra privata perpetua manento.’ ’Deorum Manium iura sancta sunto. ‹Bo›nos leto datos divos habento. Sumptum in ollos luctumque minuunto.’
Atticus. A great law indeed you have rounded off, and how briefly! But, at least as it seems to me, this constitution of the rites of religion does not differ much from the laws of Numa and from our own customs. Marcus. Do you think, then, that — since in those books on the commonwealth Africanus seems to prove that of all commonwealths our old one was the best — it is not necessary to give the best commonwealth laws to match it? Atticus. On the contrary, that is exactly what I think. Marcus. Then look for laws of such a kind as will hold together that best form of commonwealth; and if any are perhaps proposed by me today that do not exist, and have not existed, in our commonwealth, still they were almost all in the custom of our forefathers, which then had the force of law.
Atticus: Conclusa quidem est a te magna lex sane quam brevi! Sed ut mihi quidem videtur, non multum discrepat ista constitutio religionum a legibus Numae nostrisque moribus. Marcus: An censes, quom in illis de re publica libris persuadere videatur Africanus, omnium rerum publicarum nostram veterem illam fuisse optumam, non necesse esse optumae rei publicae leges dare consentaneas? Atticus: Immo prorsus ita censeo. Marcus: Ergo adeo expectate leges, quae genus illud optumum rei publicae contineant, et si quae forte a me hodie rogabuntur, quae non sint in nostra re publica nec fuerint, tamen ‹fu›erunt fere in more maiorum, qui tum ut lex valebat.
Atticus. Then advocate, if you please, that very law, so that I may be able to say, “As you propose.” Marcus. Do you really mean it, Atticus? Will you say nothing otherwise? Atticus. On no greater matter, certainly, will I vote otherwise; in lesser ones, if you wish, I shall yield this to you. Quintus. And my view, for that matter, is the same. Marcus. But take care it does not become long. Atticus. Would that it might! For what would we rather be doing? Marcus. The law bids us approach the gods in purity — of mind, that is, in which all things lie; it does not do away with purity of body, but this must be understood: that, since the mind far excels the body, and care is taken to approach with a pure body, much more is this to be observed in our minds. For bodily defilement is removed by a sprinkling of water or by the passing of a number of days; a stain of the mind can neither fade with length of time nor be washed away by any rivers.
Atticus: Suade igitur si placet istam ipsam legem, ut ego ’ut ei tu rogas’ possim dicere. Marcus: Ain tandem Attice? Non es dicturus aliter? Atticus: Prorsus maiorem quidem rem nullam sciscam aliter, in minoribus si voles remittam hoc tibi. Quintus: Atque mea quidem ‹eadem› sententia est. Marcus: At ne longum fiat videte. Atticus: Utinam quidem! Quid enim agere malimus? Marcus: Caste iubet lex adire ad deos, animo videlicet in quo sunt omnia; nec tollit castimoniam corporis, sed hoc oportet intellegi, quom multum animus corpori praestet, observeturque ut casto corpore adeatur, multo esse in animis id servandum magis. Nam illud vel aspersione aquae vel dierum numero tollitur, animi labes nec diuturnitate evanescere nec amnibus ullis elui potest.
As for its bidding piety be brought and wealth laid aside, it signifies that uprightness is pleasing to the god, and that lavish expense is to be removed. For since we wish poverty to stand even among men on an equal footing with riches, why should we bar it from the approach of the gods by adding expense to the rites? Especially since nothing will be less pleasing to the god himself than that the way to placating and worshipping him should not lie open to all. And as for its setting up not a judge but the god himself as avenger, religion seems thereby to be strengthened by the fear of a present penalty. And the worship of one’s own gods, whether new or foreign, brings a confusion of religious observances and ceremonies unknown to our priests.
Quod autem pietatem adhiberi, opes amoveri iubet, significat probitatem gratam esse deo, sumptum esse removendum. Quom enim paupertatem cum divitiis etiam inter homines esse aequalem velimus, cur eam sumptu ad sacra addito deorum aditu arceamus? Praesertim cum ipsi deo nihil minus gratum futurum sit, quam non omnibus patere ad se placandum et colendum viam. Quod autem non iudex sed deus ipse vindex constituitur, praesentis poenae metu religio confirmari videtur. Suosque deos aut novos aut alienigenas coli confusionem habet religionum et ignotas caerimonias nos‹tris› sacerdotibus.
For the gods received from our fathers should, it is agreed, be worshipped thus — provided the fathers themselves have obeyed this law. I hold that there should be shrines in the cities, and I do not follow the Magi of the Persians, on whose authority Xerxes is said to have burned the temples of Greece, on the ground that men shut up within walls those gods to whom all things ought to be open and free, and whose temple and home this whole world is. Better the Greeks and our own people, who, to increase piety toward the gods, willed that they should dwell in the same cities as ourselves. For this opinion brings a religion useful to states, since indeed it was well said by Pythagoras, that most learned man, that piety and religion are most of all astir in our minds when we are giving attention to divine matters; and what Thales, the wisest of the seven, said: that men ought to believe that all things they behold are full of the gods — for so all would be the purer, just as when they are in the most sacred sanctuaries. For there is in opinion a certain visible presence of the gods, not in our minds alone, but before our eyes.
Nam ‹a› patribus acceptos deos ita placet coli, si huic legi paruerint ipsi patres. Delubra esse in urbibus censeo, nec sequor magos Persarum quibus auctoribus Xerses inflammasse templa Graeciae dicitur, quod parietibus includerent deos, quibus omnia deberent esse patentia ac libera, quorumque hic mundus omnis templum esset et domus. XI Melius Graii atque nostri, qui ut augerent pietatem in deos, easdem illos urbis quas nos incolere voluerunt. Adfert enim haec opinio religionem utilem civitatibus, si quidem et illud bene dictum est a Pythagora doctissimo viro, tum maxume et pietatem et religionem versari in animis, cum rebus divinis operam daremus, et quod Thales qui sapientissimus in septem fuit, homines existimare oportere, omnia ‹quae› cernerent deorum esse plena; fore enim omnis castioris, veluti quom in fanis essent maxime religiosis. Est enim quaedam opinione species deorum in oculis, non solum in mentibus.
The groves in the fields hold the same principle; nor is the worship of the Lares, handed down from our forefathers to masters and servants alike, set in view of the farm and the house, to be rejected. As for keeping the rites of family and forefathers — that is, since antiquity comes nearest to the gods, to guard a religion handed down, as it were, by the gods themselves. And as for the law’s bidding that those consecrated from the race of men, such as Hercules and the rest, be worshipped, it shows that the souls of all men are indeed immortal, but that those of the brave and good are divine.
Eandemque rationem luci habent in agris, neque ea quae a maioribus prodita est cum dominis tum famulis, posita in fundi villaeque conspectu, religio Larum repudianda est. Iam ritus familiae patrumque servare, id est, quoniam antiquitas proxume accedit ad deos, a dis quasi traditam religionem tueri. Quod autem ex hominum genere consecratos, sicut Herculem et ceteros, coli lex iubet, indicat omnium quidem animos inmortalis esse, sed fortium bonorumque divinos.
It is well, too, that human Mind, Piety, Virtue, and Faith are consecrated, all of which have temples publicly dedicated at Rome, so that those who possess them — and all good men possess them — may think the gods themselves lodged in their own minds. For that was a fault at Athens, that, when the crime of Cylon had been expiated at the prompting of Epimenides of Crete, they made a shrine to Insolence and Shamelessness; for virtues, not vices, ought to be consecrated. And the ancient altar of Fever on the Palatine, and the other on the Esquiline to Evil Fortune, and all things of that kind, are to be detested and rejected. But if names must be coined, let them rather be such as Vica Pota, from conquering and getting the upper hand, and Stata, from standing firm, and the titles of Jove the Stayer and the Unconquered, and the names of things to be sought after — Safety, Honour, Plenty, Victory; and since the mind is uplifted by the expectation of good things, Hope too was rightly consecrated by Calatinus. And let there be a Fortune — whether of This Very Day, for she has power over all days; or the Looking-Back, for the bringing of aid; or Chance, in whom the uncertain hazards are rather signified; or the Firstborn, the companion in begetting.
Bene vero quod Mens, Pietas, Virtus, Fides consecrantur humanae, quarum ommum Romae dedicata publice templa sunt, ut illas qui habeant — habent autem omnes boni — deos ipsos in animis suis conlocatos putent. Nam illud vitiosum Athenis quod Cylonio scelere expiato, Epimenide Crete suadente, fecerunt Contumeliae fanum et Inpudentiae, ‹magnumque consecravit gymnasiis in simulacra Amorum et Cupidinum quod Graeciasuscepit consilium audax›. Virtutes enim, non vitia consecrari decet. Araque vetusta in Palatio Febris et altera Esquiliis Malae Fortunae detest‹anda›, atque omnia eius modi repudianda sunt. Quodsi fingenda nomina, Vicaepotae potius vincendi atque potiundi, Statae standi, cognominaque Statoris et Invicti Iovis, rerumque expetendarum nomina, Salutis, Honoris, Opis, Victoriae, quoniamque exspectatione rerum bonarum erigitur animus, recte etiam Spes a Calatino consecrata est. Fortunaque sit vel Huiusce diei — nam valet in omnis dies —, vel Respiciens ad opem ferendam, vel Fors in quo incerti casus significantur magis, vel Primigenia a gignendo comes. XII
Then the scheme of festival and feast-days brings to the free a rest from lawsuits and quarrels, to slaves a rest from works and labours; and the ordering of the year ought to make these fall in with the completion of the rustic tasks. As for the season at which the offerings of sacrifices and the births of the flocks, which are named in the law, are to be observed, the reckoning of intercalation must be carefully kept — an institution skilfully arranged by Numa, but undone by the negligence of later pontiffs. Again, this is not to be changed from the institutions of the pontiffs and the haruspices: with what victims sacrifice is to be made to each god, to which the larger ones, to which sucklings, to which males, to which females. And the priests of all the gods together, and the several priests of the several gods, supply the means both of answering on points of right and of carrying through the rites of religion. And since Vesta, as it were the hearth of the city — so called by a Greek name, which we keep nearly as the Greek, untranslated — has embraced it, let virgins preside over her worship, that watch may more easily be kept over the guarding of the fire, and that women may feel that the nature of their sex calls for entire chastity.
Tum feriarum festorumque dierum ratio in liberis requietem habet litium et iurgiorum, in servis operum et laborum; quas conpositio anni conferre debet ad perfectionem operum rusticorum. Quod ‹ad› tempus ut sacrificiorum libamenta serventur fetusque pecorum quae dicta in lege sunt, diligenter habenda ratio intercalandi est, quod institutum perite a Numa posteriorum pontificum neglegentia dissolutum est. Iam illud ex institutis pontificum et haruspicum non mutandum est, quibus hostiis immolandum quoique deo, cui maioribus, cui lactentibus, cui maribus, cui feminis. Plures autem deorum omnium, singuli singulorum sacerdotes et respondendi iuris et conficiendarum religionum facultatem adferunt. Quomque Vesta quasi focum urbis, ut Graeco nomine est appellata — quod nos prope idem ‹ac› Graecum, ‹non› interpretatum nomen tenemus —, conplexa sit, ei colendae ‹VI› virgines praesint, ut advigiletur facilius ad custodiam ignis, et sentiant mulieres ‹in› naturam feminarum omnem castitatem pati.
What follows pertains not only to religion but also to the condition of the state: namely, that without those who preside over the public rites, men cannot satisfy their private religion. For it holds the commonwealth together, that the people should always stand in need of the counsel and authority of its leading men; and the distribution of the priesthoods leaves out no kind of lawful religion. For some are appointed to placate the gods and to preside over the solemn rites; others to interpret the predictions of the prophets — and not those of many, lest it should be endless, nor in such a way that anyone outside the college should know the very things that were undertaken on behalf of the public.
Quod sequitur vero, non solum ad religionem pertinet sed etiam ad civitatis statum, ut sine iis, qui sacris publice praesint, religioni privatae satis facere non possint. Continet enim rem publicam, consilio et auctoritate optimatium semper populum indigere, discriptioque sacerdotum nullum iustae religionis genus praetermittit. Nam sunt ad placandos deos alii constituti, qui sacris praesint sollemnibus, ad interpretanda alii praedicta vatium, neque multorum ne esset infinitum, neque ut ea ipsa quae suscepta publice essent quisquam extra conlegium nosset.
But the greatest and most outstanding right in the commonwealth is that of the augurs, joined with their authority. Nor do I think this because I am myself an augur, but because it is necessary that we be so esteemed. For what is greater, if we ask about right, than to be able to dismiss assemblies and councils, even when convened by the highest commands and the highest powers, or to annul them once held? What is weightier than that an undertaking should be broken off, if a single augur has said, “On another day”? What is more magnificent than to be able to decree that the consuls lay down their office? What is more sacred than the granting or withholding of the right of dealing with the people, with the plebs? Than the abolishing of a law, if it has not been duly proposed — as the Titian law by decree of the college, as the Livian laws by the counsel of the consul and augur Philippus? That nothing done at home, nothing done in war by magistrates can be approved for anyone without their authority?
Maximum autem et praestantissimum in re publica ius est augurum cum auctoritate coniunctum, neque vero hoc quia sum ipse augur ita sentio, sed quia sic existimari nos est necesse. Quid enim maius est, si de iure quaerimus, quam posse a summis imperiis et summis potestatibus comitiatus et concilia vel instituta dimittere vel habita rescindere? Quid gravius quam rem susceptam dirimi, si unus augur ’alio ‹die›’ dixerit? Quid magnificentius quam posse decernere, ut magistratu se abdicent consules? Quid religiosius quam cum populo, cum plebe agendi ius aut dare aut non dare? Quid, legem si non iure rogata est tollere, ut Titiam decreto conlegi, ut Livias consilio Philippi consulis et auguris? Nihil domi, nihil militiae per magistratus gestum sine eorum auctoritate posse cuiquam probari? XIII
Atticus. Come now, I see these things and I confess they are great. But in your college there is a great disagreement between Marcellus and Appius, those excellent augurs — for I have come upon their books — since the one holds that those auspices were devised for the advantage of the commonwealth, while to the other it seems that by your discipline one can, as it were, divine. On this matter I ask you what you think. Marcus. I? I hold that divination — which the Greeks call mantike — exists, and that this very part of it which lies in birds and the other signs belongs to our discipline. For if we grant that the gods exist, and that the world is ruled by their mind, and that they take counsel for the race of men, and that they can show us signs of things to come, I do not see why I should deny that divination exists.
Atticus: Age iam ista video fateorque esse magna. Sed est in conlegio vestro inter Marcellum et Appium optimos augures magna dissensio — nam eorum ego in libros incidi —, cum alteri placeat auspicia ista ad utilitatem esse rei publicae composita, alteri disciplina vestra quasi divinari videatur posse. Hac tu de re quaero quid sentias. Marcus: Egone? Divinationem, quam Graeci mavtikev appellant, esse sentio, et huius hanc ipsam partem quae est in avibus ceterisque signis ‹quod› disciplinae nostrae. Si enim deos esse concedimus, eorumque mente mundum regi, et eosdem hominum consulere generi, et posse nobis signa rerum futurarum ostendere, non video cur esse divinationem negem.
And the things I have laid down are those from which what we wish is brought about and forced upon us. And our commonwealth is full of very many examples, and so are all kingdoms, all peoples, all nations — that from the predictions of augurs many things have incredibly turned out true. For neither would Polyidus, nor Melampus, nor Mopsus, nor Amphiaraus, nor Calchas, nor Helenus have had so great a name, nor would so many nations have kept the practice to this time — such as the Phrygians, the Lycaonians, the Cilicians, and most of all the Pisidians — had not antiquity taught them that it was sure. Nor truly would our Romulus have founded the city with auspices, nor would the name of Attus Navius flourish so long in memory, had not all these foretold many wonderful things in keeping with the truth. But there is no doubt that this discipline and art of the augurs has by now faded away, both through age and through neglect. So I neither agree with him who denies that this knowledge ever existed in our college, nor with him who thinks it exists even now. To me it seems to have been twofold among our forefathers: so that it pertained sometimes to the occasions of the commonwealth, but very often to the planning of action.
Sunt autem ea quae posui, ex quibus id quod volumus efficitur et cogitur. Iam vero permultorum exemplorum et nostra est plena res publica et omnia regna omnesque populi cunctaeque gentes, ‹ex› augurum praedictis multa incredibiliter vera cecidisse. Neque enim Polyidi neque Melampodis neque Mopsi neque Amphiarai neque Calchantis neque Heleni tantum nomen fuisset, neque tot nationes id ad hoc tempus retinuissent, ut Phrygum, Lycaonum, Cilicum maximeque Pisidarum, nisi vetustas ea certa esse docuisset. Nec vero Romulus noster auspicato urbem condidisset, neque Atti Navi nomen memoria floreret tam diu, nisi omnes hi multa ad veritatem admirabilia dixissent. Sed dubium non est quin haec disciplina et ars augurum evanuerit iam et vetustate et neglegentia. Ita neque illi adsentior qui hanc scientiam negat umquam in nostro collegio fuisse, neque illi qui esse etiam nunc putat. Quae mihi videtur apud maiores fuisse duplex, ut ad rei publicae tempus non numquam, ad agendi consilium saepissime pertineret.
Atticus. By Hercules, I believe it is so, and I agree most of all with that reasoning. But give us the rest. Marcus. I will give it indeed, and that briefly if I can. For there follows the law of war, in which we sanctioned by law that, both in undertaking and in waging and in laying it down, right and good faith should have the fullest force, and that there should be public interpreters of these. As for the religion of the haruspices, and the expiations and atonements, I think enough has been plainly said in the law itself. Atticus. I agree, since all this discourse turns upon religion. Marcus. But as for what follows, Titus, I really do wonder how either you can agree to it, or I can find fault with it. Atticus. What, pray, is it?
Atticus: Credo hercle ita esse, istique rationi potissimum adsentior. Sed redde cetera. XIV Marcus: Reddam vero, et id si potero brevi. Sequitur enim de iure belli, in quo et suscipiendo et gerendo et deponendo ius ut plurimum valeret et fides, eorumque ut publici interpretes essent, lege sanximus. Iam de haruspicum religione, de expiationibus et procurationibus satis esse plane in ipsa lege dictum puto. Atticus: Adsentior, quoniam omnis haec in religione versatur oratio. Marcus: At vero quod sequitur quo modo aut tu adsentiare ego reprehendam sane quaero Tite. Atticus: Quid tandem id est?
Marcus. The nocturnal sacrifices of women. Atticus. I agree indeed, especially since an exception is made in the law itself for the solemn and public sacrifice. Marcus. What, then, will become of your Iacchus and the Eumolpidae and those august mysteries, if indeed we abolish nocturnal rites? For we are giving laws not to the Roman people alone, but to all good and steadfast peoples.
Marcus: De nocturnis sacrificiis mulierum. Atticus: Ego vero adsentior, excepto praesertim in ipsa lege sollemni sacrificio ac publico. Marcus: Quid ergo aget Iacchus Eumolpidaeque vostri et augusta illa mysteria, si quidem sacra nocturna tollimus? Non enim populo Romano sed omnibus bonis firmisque populis leges damus.
Atticus. You make an exception, I suppose, for those into which we ourselves have been initiated. Marcus. I will indeed make an exception. For while many extraordinary and divine things seem to me to have been brought forth by your Athens and carried into the life of men, nothing is better than those mysteries, by which we have been refined out of a rough and savage life and softened toward humanity, and have come to know the rites called “beginnings” as in truth the first principles of life; and we have received from them not only a way of living with gladness, but also of dying with a better hope. But what displeases me in the nocturnal rites the comic poets reveal. Had such licence been granted at Rome, what would that man have done who brought into a sacrifice a lust deliberately conceived — where it was not lawful to admit even the unintended glance of the eyes? Atticus. Then propose that law of yours for Rome, but do not take ours from us.
Atticus: Excipis credo illa quibus ipsi initiati sumus. Marcus: Ego vero excipiam. Nam mihi cum multa eximia divinaque videntur Athenae tuae peperisse atque in vitam hominum attulisse, tum nihil meilus illis mysteriis, quibus ex agresti immanique vita exculti ad humanitatem et mitigati sumus, initiaque ut appellantur ita re vera principia vitae cognovimus, neque solum cum laetitia vivendi rationem accepimus, sed etiam cum spe meliore moriendi. Quid autem mihi displiceat in nocturnis, poetae indicant comici. Qua licentia Romae data quidnam egisset ille qui in saerificium cogitatam libidinem intulit, quo ne inprudentiam quidem oculorum adici fas fuit? Atticus: Tu vero istam Romae legem rogato, nobis nostras ne ademeris. XV
Marcus. I return, then, to ours. For these it must surely be most carefully sanctioned that the clear daylight, with the eyes of many, should guard the good name of women, and that they be initiated to Ceres by the rite in which they are initiated at Rome. In this matter the severity of our forefathers is shown by the old decree of the Senate concerning the Bacchanalia, and by the inquiry and punishment carried out with a consul’s army called in. And all nocturnal rites — lest perhaps we seem too harsh — were abolished in the very heart of Greece by a perpetual law of Pagondas the Theban. New gods, and the nocturnal vigils kept in worshipping them, Aristophanes, that wittiest poet of the old comedy, so harries that in his work Sabazius and certain other foreign gods are condemned and cast out of the state. But let the public priest free from fear an unwitting fault expiated by his counsel, and condemn the boldness of bringing foul lusts into the rites of religion, and judge it impious.
Marcus: Ad nostras igitur revertor. Quibus profecto diligentissime sanciendum est, ut mulierum famam multorum oculis lux clara custodiat, initienturque eo ritu Cereri quo Romae initiantur. Quo in genere severitatem maiorum senatus vetus auctoritas de Bacchanalibus et consulum exercitu adhibito quaestio animadversioque declarat. Atque omnia nocturna — ne nos duriores forte videamur — in media Graecia Pagondas Thebanus lege perpetua sustulit. Novos vero deos et in his colendis nocturnas pervigilationes sic Aristophanes facetissumus poeta veteris comoediae vexat, ut apud eum Sabatius et quidam alii dei peregrini iudicati e civitate eiciantur. Publicus autem sacerdos inprudentiam consilio expiatam metu liberet, audaciam ‹libid›ines inmittendi religionibus foedas damnet atque inpiam iudicet.
Now, since the public games are divided between the theatre and the circus, let there be contests of bodies — running, boxing, wrestling, and races of horses — up to a clear victory, established in the circus; and let the theatre be given over to song and lyre and flute, provided these be kept within bounds, as the law prescribes. For I agree with Plato that nothing flows so easily into tender and soft minds as the varied sounds of singing, whose force in either direction can scarcely be told how great it is. For it both rouses the languid and makes languid the roused, and now relaxes our minds and now draws them tight; and it was a matter of concern to many states in Greece that the old measure of their tunes be preserved; for their characters, slipping into softness, were altered together with their songs — either depraved by this sweetness and corruption, as some think, or, when severity of character had fallen away through other vices, then in their changed ears and minds there was room for this change too.
Iam ludi publici quoniam sunt cavea circoque divisi, sint corporum certationes cursu et pugillatu et luctatione curriculisque equorum usque ad certam victoriam ‹in› circo constitutae, cavea cantui vacet ac fidibus et tibiis, dummodo ea moderata sint ut lege praescribitur. Adsentior enim Platoni nihil tam facile in animos teneros atque mollis influere quam varios canendi sonos, quorum dici vix potest quanta sit vis in utramque partem. Namque et incitat languentis, et languefacit excitatos, et tum remittit animos tum contrahit, civitatumque hoc multarum in Graecia interfuit, antiquom vocum conservari modum; quarum mores lapsi ad mollitias pariter sunt inmutati cum cantibus, aut hac dulcedine corruptelaque depravati ut quidam putant, aut cum severitas morum ob alia vitia cecidisset, tum fuit in auribus animisque mutatis etiam huic mutationi locus.
For which reason that wisest and by far most learned man of Greece greatly fears this taint. For he denies that the laws of music can be changed without a change of the public laws. I, however, think it neither so greatly to be feared nor wholly to be despised. This indeed we see: that the theatre, which once used to be filled with the pleasant gravity of the measures of Livius and Naevius, now exults in such fashion that men twist their necks and their eyes in time with the turns of the tunes. That old Greece once punished such things gravely, foreseeing from far off how a ruin gliding gradually into the minds of citizens, through evil pursuits and evil teachings, would suddenly overturn whole states — since indeed that severe Lacedaemon ordered the strings on the lyre of Timotheus, more than the seven it should have, to be cut away.
Quam ob rem ille quidem sapientissimus Graeciae vir longeque doctissimus valde hanc labem veretur. Negat enim mutari posse musicas leges sine mutatione legum publicarum. Ego autem nec tam valde id timendum nec plane contemnendum puto. Illud quidem ‹videmus›, quae solebat quondam conpleri severitate iucunda Livianis et Naevianis modis, nunc ut eadem exultet ‹cavea› * cervices oculosque pariter cum modorum flexionibus torqueant. Graviter olim ista vindicabat vetus illa Graecia, longe providens quam sensim pernicies inlapsa civium [in] animos, malis studiis malisque doctrinis repente totas civitates everteret, si quidem illa severa Lacedaemo nervos iussit quos plures quam septem haberet in Timothei fidibus in‹ci›di. XVI,
Next in the law it is provided that, of the ancestral rites, the best be observed. When the Athenians consulted Pythian Apollo about almost everything, asking what religious observances they should keep, the oracle was given: “Those that are in the custom of the forefathers.” When they came again and said that the custom of the forefathers had often been changed, and asked which custom, among the various ones, they should follow, he answered: “The best.” And surely it is so, that what is best should be reckoned most ancient and nearest to god. We did away with the collecting of alms, save what we excepted, proper to the Idaean Mother, for a few days. For it fills the mind with superstition and drains the household. There is a penalty for the sacrilegious man, and not for him alone who has carried off a sacred thing, but also for him who has carried off a thing entrusted to what is sacred.
Deinceps in lege est ut de ritibus patriis colantur optuma. De quocum‹que› consulerent Athenienses Apollinem Pythium, quas potissimum religiones tenerent, oraclum editum est ’eas quae essent in more maiorum’. Quo cum iterum venissent maiorumque morem dixissent saepe esse mutatum, quaesissentque quem morem potissimum sequerentur e variis, respondit ’optumum’. Et profecto ita est ut id habendum sit antiquissimum et deo proximum, quod sit optumum. Stipem sustulimus nisi eam quam ad paucos dies propriam Idaeae Matris excepimus. Implet enim superstitione animos et exhaurit domus. Sacrilego poena est, neque ei soli qui sacrum abstulerit, sed etiam ei qui sacro commendatum.
This is done even now in many sanctuaries, and of old Alexander is said to have deposited money with the Solenses in their shrine in Cilicia, and Cleisthenes, the Athenian, an outstanding citizen, when he feared for his fortunes, to have entrusted his daughters’ dowries to Samian Juno. As for perjuries and incest, there is really nothing to be argued in this place. That the impious should not dare to placate the gods with gifts, let them hear Plato, who forbids us to doubt with what mind a god will be disposed, since no good man would wish to be given a gift by a wicked one. Of scrupulousness in vows enough has been said in the law, * and a vow is the pledge by which we are bound to god. But the penalty for violated religion admits of no just refusal. Why should I here use examples of criminals, of whom the tragedies are full? Rather will I touch on those that are before our eyes. And though I fear this recital may seem above the lot of a mortal, still, since I am speaking among you, I will keep nothing back, and would wish that what I say should seem to the immortal gods rather welcome than presumptuous.
Quod et nunc multis fit in fanis, ‹et olim› Alexander in Cilicia deposuisse apud Solensis in delubro pecuniam dicitur, et Atheniensis Clisthenes civis egregius, quom rebus timeret suis, Iunoni Samiae filiarum dotis credidisse. Iam de periuriis, de incesto nihil sane hoc quidem loco disputandum est. Donis impii ne placare audeant deos, Platonem audiant, qui vetat dubitare qua sit mente futurus deus, quom vir nemo bonus ab inprobo se donari velit. Diligentiam votorum satis in lege dictum est * ac votis sponsio qua obligamur deo. Poena vero violatae religionis iustam recusationem non habet. Quid ego hic sceleratorum utar exemplis, quorum plenae tragoediae? Quae ante oculos sunt, ea potius adtingam. Etsi haec commemoratio vereor ne supra hominis fortunam esse videatur, tamen quoniam sermo mihi est apud vos, nihil reticebo volamque hoc quod loquar diis inmortalibus gratum potius videri quam grave. XVII
At the time of my departure, by the crime of abandoned citizens, all the rights of religion were polluted; our household Lares were harried; on the site of their dwellings a temple to Licence was built up; he who had preserved those rites was driven from the shrines. Cast your minds quickly round — for it matters not that anyone be named — and see what ends befell them. We, who would not suffer that guardian of the city to be profaned by impious men, though all our possessions had been torn from us and ruined, and who carried her from our own house into the very house of her father, attained the judgements of the Senate, of Italy, in fine of all nations, that our country had been saved. What more glorious could befall a man? Of those by whose crime the rites of religion were then prostrated and afflicted, some lie torn apart and scattered; while those who, among them, had been the very leaders of these crimes and beyond the rest impious in all religion, not only lack any torment and disgrace in life, but lack even burial and the due rites of funeral.
Omnia tum perditorum civium scelere discessu meo religionum iura polluta sunt, vexati nostri Lares familiares, in eorum sedibus exaedificatum templum Licentiae, pulsus a delubris is qui illa servarat: circumspicite celeriter animo — nihil enim attinet quemquam nominari —, qui sint rerum exitus consecuti: nos, qui illam custodem urbis omnibus ereptis nostris rebus ac perditis violari ab impiis passi non sumus eamque ex nostra domo in ipsius patris domum detulimus, iudicia senatus, Italiac, gentium denique omnium conservatae patriae consecuti sumus. Quo quid accidere potuit homini praeclarius? Quorum scelere religiones tum prostratae adflictaeque sunt, partim ex illis distracti ac dissipati iacent; qui vero ex iis et horum scelerum principes fuerant et praeter ceteros in omni religione inpii, non solum ‹nullo in› vita cruciatu atque dedecore, verum etiam sepultura et iustis exsequiarum carent.
Quintus. For my part I recognize these things, brother, and give the gods deserved thanks. But all too often we see things turn out quite otherwise. Marcus. For we do not rightly judge, Quintus, what the divine penalty is, but are swept into error by the opinions of the crowd, and do not discern the truth. We weigh men’s miseries by death, or bodily pain, or grief of mind, or the adverse judgement of men — which I confess are human things and have befallen many good men. The penalty proper to crime itself is grim, and apart from those consequences that follow, in itself it is the greatest: we have seen men who, had they not hated their country, would never have been our enemies, burning now with desire, now with fear, now with the consciousness of whatever they were doing, now afraid, now in turn despising religion — judgements corrupted by the same men, corrupted by men, not by the gods.
Quintus: Equidem ista agnosco frater, et meritas dis gratias ago. Sed nimis saepe secus aliquanto videmus evadere. Marcus: Non enim Quinte recte existimamus quae poena divina sit, sed opinionibus vulgi rapimur in errorem, nec vera cernimus. Morte aut dolore corporis aut luctu animi aut offensione iudicii hominum miserias ponderamus, quae fateor humana esse et multis bonis viris accidisse. Sceleri ‹ipsi in›est poena tristis et praeter eos eventus qui secuntur per se ipsa maxima est: vidimus eos, qui nisi odissent patriam numquam inimici nobis fuissent, ardentis tum cupiditate, tum metu, tum conscientia quid‹quid› agerent, modo timentis, vicissim contemnentis religiones, iudicia corrupta ab isdem ‹corrupta› — hominum, non deorum.
I will restrain myself now, and not pursue it further, and the less so because I have more vengeance than I sought. This much only let me lay down briefly: that the divine penalty is twofold, since it consists both in the harrying of the minds of the living and in that repute of the dead by which their destruction is approved both by the judgement of the living and by their joy.
Reprimam iam me, non insequar longius, eoque minus quo plus poenarum habeo quam petivi. Tantum ponam brevi, duplicem poenam esse divinam, quod constat et ex vexandis vivorum animis et ea fama mortuorum, ut eorum exitium et iudicio vivorum et gaudio conprobetur. XVIII
As for fields not being consecrated, I agree entirely with Plato, who — if only I can interpret him — uses nearly these words: “The earth, then, as the hearth of our dwellings, is sacred to all the gods. Wherefore let no one consecrate the same thing a second time. But gold and silver in the cities, both in private hands and in the sanctuaries, is a thing that breeds envy. Ivory, too, drawn from a lifeless body, is no pure enough gift to god. Bronze, again, and iron are the instruments of war, not of the sanctuary. But let a man dedicate, of wood, whatever he will, of a single piece of wood, and likewise of stone, in the common shrines; of woven work, nothing more laborious than a woman’s month of toil. White, moreover, is the colour especially seemly to god, in all else and most of all in woven work; let dyed things be absent, save in the insignia of war. The most divine gifts are birds and figures finished by a single painter in a single day; and let the rest of this kind be such likewise.” These are his views. But I do not fix the rest so strictly, led either by men’s wealth or by the resources of the times: I suspect that the tilling of the earth would be the slacker, if any superstition were to attach to the using of it and the breaking of it with iron. Atticus. I have those points. Now there remains the matter of the perpetual rites and of the law of the dead. Marcus. What a wonderful memory is yours, Pomponius! But those things had slipped my mind.
Agri autem ne consecrentur, Platoni prorsus adsentior, qui si modo interpretari potuero, his fere verbis utitur: ’Terra igitur ut focus domiciliorum sacra deorum omnium est. Quocirca ne quis iterum idem consecrato. Aurum autem et argentum in urbibus et privatim et in fanis invidiosa res est. Tum ebur ex inani‹mi› corpore extractum haud satis castum donum deo. Iam aes atque ferrum duelli instrumenta, non fani. Ligneum autem quod ‹quis›que voluerit uno e ligno ‹di›cato, itemque lapideum, in delubris communibus, textile ne operosius quam mulieris opus menstruum. Color autem albus praecipue decorus deo est, cum in cetero tum maxime in textili; tincta vero absint nisi a bellicis insignibus. Divinissima autem dona aves et formae ab uno pictore uno absolutae die, itemque cetera huius exempli dona sunto.’ Haec illi placent. Sed ego cetera non tam restricte praefinio, vel hominum ‹di›vitiis vel subsidiis temporum inductus: terrae cultum segniorem suspicor fore, si ad eam utendam ferroque subigendam superstitionis aliquid accesscrit. Atticus: Habeo ista. Nunc de sacris perpetuis et de Manium iure restat. Marcus: O miram memoriam Pomponi tuam! At mihi ista exciderant.
Atticus. I believe it. But still I both remember and look out for these matters the more, because they pertain both to pontifical right and to civil right. Marcus. True, and there are many answers and writings on these matters by the most skilled men in them; and in this whole discourse of ours, to whatever kind of law our discussion shall lead me, I will handle, so far as I can, the part of our own civil law belonging to that very kind — but in such a way that the topic itself shall be made known, from which each part of the law is drawn; so that it is not difficult, for anyone who can be stirred by his own wit, to hold the right of whatever new case or consultation shall arise, when he knows from what head it is to be traced.
Atticus: Ita credo. Sed tamen hoc magis eas res et memini et specto, quod et ad pontificium ius et ad civile pertinent. Marcus: Vero, et a peritissimis sunt istis de rebus et responsa et scripta multa, et ego in hoc omni sermone nostro, quod ad cumque legis genus me disputatio nostra deduxerit, tractabo quoad potero eius ipsius generis ius civile nostrum, sed ita locus ut ipse notus sit, ex quo ducatur quaeque pars iuris, ut non difficile sit, qui modo ingenio possit moveri, quaecumque nova causa consultatiove acciderit, eius tenere ius, quom scias a quo sit capite repetendum. XIX
But the jurisconsults, whether for the sake of throwing up obstacles, that they may seem to know more and harder things, or — what is nearer the truth — through not knowing how to teach (for not only is the knowing of a thing an art, but there is also a certain art of teaching), often parcel out into infinity what is set in a single understanding. Take, for instance, in this very matter, how great a thing the two Scaevolas make of it — both of them pontiffs and both most skilled in the law! “Often,” says the son of Publius, “I have heard from my father that no one is a good pontiff unless he has learned the civil law.” All of it? Why so? For what has the pontiff to do with the law of walls or of waters or of lights, save that which is bound up with religion? And how little that is! Of sacred rites, I suppose, of vows, of festivals, and of tombs, and anything of that kind. Why, then, do we make so much of these things, when the rest is very small, but of sacred rites — where the field lies more open — this is the one rule: that they be preserved always and handed down from generation to generation in families, and, as I laid it down in the law, that the rites be perpetual?
Sed iuris consulti, sive erroris obiciundi causa, quo plura et difficiliora scire videantur, sive, quod similius veri est, ignoratione docendi — nam non solum scire aliquid artis est, sed quaedam ars [est] etiam docendi — saepe quod positum est in una cognitione, id in infinita dispertiuntur. Velut in hoc ipso genere, quam magnum illud Scaevolae faciunt, pontifices ambo et eidem iuris peritissimi! ’Sae‹pe›’ inquit Publi filius ’ex patre audivi, pontificem bonum neminem esse, nisi qui ius civile cognosset.’ Totumne? Quid ita? Quid enim ad pontificem de iure parietum aut aquarum aut luminum ‹ni›si eo quod cum religione coniunctum est? Id autem quantulum est! De sacris credo, de votis, de feriis et de sepulcris, et si quid eius modi est. Cur igitur haec tanta facimus, cum cetera perparva sint, de sacris autem, qui locus patet latius, haec sit una sententia, ut conserventur semper et deinceps familiis prodantur, et ut in lege posui perpetua sint sacra?
This being laid down, these rules followed, by the authority of the pontiffs: that, lest the memory of the rites should die with the death of the head of the family, they should be attached to those to whom the property came at that man’s death. This one thing being laid down — which suffices for an understanding of the system — countless questions arise, by which the books of the jurisconsults are filled. For inquiry is made, who are bound by the rites. The case of heirs is the most just; for there is no person who comes nearer in place of him who has departed from life. Next, he who by that man’s death or testament takes as much as all the heirs together: that too is in order, for it is suited to what is proposed. In the third place, if there is no heir, he who, of the goods that were the dead man’s when he died, has acquired the most by use through possession. Fourth, if there is no one who has taken any part of the property, he who keeps the most of the dead man’s creditors’ claims.
Hoc posito haec iura pontificum auctoritate consecuta sunt, ut, ne morte patris familias sacrorum memoria occideret, iis essent ea adiuncta ad quos eiusdem morte pecunia venerit. Hoc uno posito, quod est ad cognitionem disciplinae satis, innumerabilia nascuntur quibus implentur iuris consultorum libri. Quaeruntur enim qui adstringantur sacris. Heredum, causa iustissima est; nulla est enim persona quae ad vicem eius qui e vita emigrarit propius accedat. Deinde qui morte testamentove eius tantundem capiat quantum omnes heredes: id quoque ordine, est enim ad id quod propositum est adcommodatum. Tertio loco, si nemo sit heres, is qui de bonis quae eius fuerint quom moritur usu ceperit plurimum possidendo. Quarto qui, si nemo sit qui ullam rem ceperit, de creditoribus eius plurimum servet.
The last person is this: that if the man who owed money to the deceased has paid it to no one, he is held just as if he had taken that money. These things we learned from Scaevola; they were not so set down by the ancients. For they used to teach in these words: “In three ways one is bound by the rites: by inheritance; or if one takes the larger part of the property; or if the larger part of the property has been bequeathed, and one has taken anything from it.”
Extrema illa persona est, ut, si is, qui ei qui mortuus sit pecuniam debuerit, nemini ‹qui› eam solverit, proinde habeatur quasi eam pecuniam ceperit. XX Haec nos a Scaevola didicimus, non ita descripta ab antiquis. Nam illi quidem his verbis docebant: tribus modis sacris adstringitur: hereditate, aut si maiorem partem pecuniae capiat, aut si maior pars pecuniae legata est, si inde quippiam ceperit.
But let us follow the pontiff. You see, then, that everything hangs on that one point, that the pontiffs wish the rites to be joined with the property, and think that festivals and ceremonies are to be assigned to the same persons. And the Scaevolas teach this too: that when there is a division, if a deduction has not been written into the testament, and the heirs themselves have taken less than is left to all the heirs, they are not bound to the rites. In the case of a gift they interpret this same thing otherwise: what the head of a family has approved in the gift of one who is in his own power is ratified; what is done without his knowledge, if he does not approve it, is not ratified.
Sed pontificem sequamur. Videtis igitur omnia pendere ex uno illo, quod pontifi‹ces› cum pecunia sacra coniungi volunt, isdemque ferias et caerimonias adscribendas putant. Atque etiam hoc docent Scaevolae, quom est partitio, ut si in testamento deducta scripta non sit, ipsique minus ceperint quam omnibus heredibus relinquatur, sacris ne alligentur. In donatione hoc idem secus interpretantur: ‹et› quod pater familias in eius donatione qui in ipsius potestate est adprobavit, ratum est; quod eo insciente factum est, si id is non adprobat, ratum non est.
From these premises many little questions arise, which anyone who does not understand them, if he refers them to the head of the matter, will easily see through for himself. For instance: if someone had taken less, so as not to be bound to the rites, but afterwards one of his heirs had exacted, for his own share, what had been omitted by the man whose heir he was, and that money, with the later exaction, had become not less than was left to all the heirs, then the man who exacted that money is bound to the rites alone, without his co-heirs. Indeed, they even provide that he to whom more is bequeathed than he may take without religious obligation should free the heirs of the testament “by bronze and balance,” for the reason that in that case the matter is so discharged from the inheritance as if that money had not been bequeathed.
His propositis quaestiunculae multae nascuntur, quas qui non intellegat, si ad caput referat, per se ipse facile perspiciat. Veluti si minus quis cepisset ne sacris alligaretur, at post de eius heredibus aliquis exegisset pro sua parte id quod ab eo quoi ipse heres esset praetermissum fuisset, eaque pecunia non minor esset facta cum superiore exactione quam heredibus omnibus esset relicta, qui eam pecuniam exegisset, solum sine coheredibus sacris alligari. Quin etiam cavent ut, cui plus legatum sit quam sine religione capere liceat, is per aes et libram heredes testamenti solvat, propterea quod eo loco res est ita soluta hereditate, quasi ea pecunia legata non esset. XXI
On this point and on many others I ask of you Scaevolas — supreme pontiffs and, in my judgement at least, most acute men — what it is you seek from the pontifical right of the civil law; for by the knowledge of the civil law you in a manner do away with the pontifical. For rites are joined with property by the authority of the pontiffs, by no law. And so, if you were only pontiffs, the pontifical authority would remain; but because you are at the same time most skilled in the civil law, by this knowledge you make sport of the other. It pleased Publius Scaevola and Tiberius Coruncanius, supreme pontiffs, and the rest likewise, that those who took as much as all the heirs together should be bound to the rites. There I have the pontifical right.
Hoc ego loco multisque aliis quaero a vobis Scaevolae, pontifices maximi et homines meo quidem iudicio acutissimi, quid sit quod ad ius pontificium civile adpetatis; civilis enim iuris scientia pontificium quodam modo tollitis. Nam sacra cum pecunia pontificum auctoritate, nulla lege coniuncta sunt. Itaquc si vos tantummodo pontifices essetis, pontificalis maneret auctoritas; sed quod idem iuris civilis estis peritissimi, hac scientia illam eludistis. Placuit P. Scaevolae et Ti. Coruncanio pontificibus maximis itemque ceteris, eos qui tantundem caperent quantum omnes heredes sacris alligari. Habeo ius pontificium.
What has been added to it from the civil law? A clause of partition carefully written, that a hundred sesterces should be deducted: a way was found by which the property might be freed from the burden of the rites. But if the man making his testament had not chosen to provide for this, the jurisconsult — this very Mucius, the same who is pontiff — advises that he take less than is left to all the heirs. The earlier authorities used to say that whatever a man had taken bound him; again he is freed from the rites. But this has nothing to do with the pontifical right, and lies wholly within the civil law: that they should free the heir of the testament “by bronze and balance,” and the matter stand in the same case as if that money had not been bequeathed; and if he to whom the legacy was given has stipulated for the very thing that was bequeathed, so that the money is owed by virtue of the stipulation, and so is not bound to the rites...
Quid huc accessit ex iure civili? Partitionis caput scriptum caute, ut centum nummi deducerentur: inventa est ratio cur pecunia sacrorum molestia liberaretur. Quodsi hoc qui testamentum faciebat cavere noluisset, admonet iuris consultus hic quidem ipse Mucius, pontifex idem, ut minus capiat quam omnibus heredibus relinquatur. Super‹iores› dicebant, quicquid cepisset adstringi: rursus sacris liberatur. Hoc vero nihil ad pontificium ius, sed e medio est iure civili, ut per aes et libram heredem testamenti solvant et eodem loco res sit, quasi ea pecunia legata non esset, ‹et› si is cui legatum est stipulatus est id ipsum quod legatum est, ut ea pecunia ex stipulatione debeatur, sitque ea non ‹adligata sacris.› [*Plutarch. quaest. Rom. 34]:...
I come to the rights of the dead, which our forefathers both established most wisely and observed most religiously. In the month of February — which was then the last month of the year — they willed that offerings be made to the dead; though Decimus Brutus, as is written by Sisenna, used to do it in December. When I asked myself the reason for this, I found that Brutus had departed from the custom of the forefathers in this matter; for I see that Sisenna does not know the reason why he did not keep the old institution, but it does not seem to me likely that Brutus rashly neglected the institution of our forefathers — a learned man indeed, with whom Accius was on closest terms; but I believe he was following the last month of the year, December, as the old men followed February. He thought, too, that to make offering with the largest victim was a part of piety.
‹Venio ad Manium iura, quae maiores nostri et sapientissime instituerunt et religiosissime coluerent. Februario autem mense, qui tum extremus anni mensis erat, mortuis parentari voluerunt; quod tamen D. Brutus, ut scriptum a Sisenna est, Decembri facere solebat. Cuius ego rei causam cum mecum quaererem, Brutum reperiebam in hac re idcirco a more maiorum discessisse, nam Sisennam video causam, cur ille vetus institutum non servaret, ignorare, Brutum antem maiorum nostrorum institutum temere neglexisse non fit mihi veri simile›, doctum hominem sane, cuius fuit Accius perfamiliaris; sed mensem credo extremum anni ut veteres Februarium sic hic Decembrem sequebatur. Hostia autem maxima parentare pietatis esse adiunctum putabat. XXII
Now so great is the religion of tombs that men deny it is right to bury outside the family rites and the clan, and so Aulus Torquatus judged among our forefathers in the case of the Popillian clan. Nor would the denicales — which are named from death, because they are observed for the dead — be called festivals, like the days of rest of the other celestial beings, had not our forefathers wished those who had departed from this life to be in the number of the gods. The law is that these be set on those days when there is neither a private nor a public festival. And the whole composition of this pontifical right declares great religion and ceremony, nor is there need for us to expound what is the end of a family in mourning, what kind of sacrifice is made to the Lar with wethers, in what manner the cut bone is covered with earth, what rights are established by the sacrifice of a sow, and at what time the place begins to be a tomb and to be held by religion.
Iam tanta religio est sepulcrorum, ut extra sacra et gentem inferri fas negent esse, idque apud maiores nostros A. Torquatus in gente Popillia iudicavit. Nec vero tam denicales, quae a nece appellatae sunt quia residentur mortuis, quam ceterorum caelestium quieti dies feriae nominarentur, nisi maiores eos qui ex hac vita migrassent in deorum numero esse voluissent. Eas in eos dies conferre ius, ut nec ipsius neque publicae feriae sint. Totaque huius iuris conpositio pontificalis magnam religionem caerimoniamque declarat, neque necesse est edisseri a nobis, quae finis funestae familiae, quod genus sacrificii Lari vervecibus fiat, quem ad modum os resectum terra obtegatur, quaeque in porca contracta iura sint, quo tempore incipiat sepulcrum esse et religione teneatur.
But to me, at least, the most ancient kind of burial seems to have been that which Cyrus uses in Xenophon: for the body is given back to the earth, and so laid and set as though it were drawn over with the covering of its mother. And by the same rite we have received that our king Numa was buried in the tomb that is not far from the Altar of the Spring; and we know that the Cornelian clan used this manner of burial down to our own memory. Sulla the victor ordered the buried remains of Gaius Marius to be scattered by the Anio, driven on by a bitterer hatred than if he had been as wise as he was vehement.
At mihi quidem antiquissimum sepulturae genus illud fuisse videtur quo apud Xenophontem Cyrus utitur: redditur enim terrae corpus, et ita locatum ac situm quasi operimento matris obducitur. Eodemque ritu in eo sepulcro quod ‹haud› procul a Fontis ara est, regem nostrum Numam conditum accepimus, gentemque Corneliam usque ad memoriam nostram hac sepultura scimus esse usam. C. Mari sitas reliquias apud Anienem dissipari iussit Sylla victor, acerbiore odio incitatus, quam si tam sapiens fuisset quam fuit vehemens.
Fearing, I rather think, lest the same should befall his own body, he was the first of the patrician Cornelii to wish to be cremated by fire. For Ennius declares of Africanus, “Here is that man laid” — truly, for those are said to be “laid” who are buried. Nor yet is there a tomb of theirs before the due rites are performed and a pig has been slain. And what now commonly comes to pass with all the buried, that they are said to be “interred,” was then proper to those whom the cast-on earth had covered; and this custom the pontifical right confirms. For before a clod has been cast upon the bone, that place where the body has been burned has nothing of religion about it; once the clod is cast on, then the man is interred and it is called a tomb, and then at last it embraces many religious rights. And so, in the case of a man killed on shipboard and then thrown into the sea, Publius Mucius decreed the family pure, because no bone stood above the earth; that a sow was due from the heir, that a three-day festival was to be kept, and an expiation made with a sow that had farrowed. If he had died at sea, the same, save the expiation and the festival.
Quod haud scio an timens ‹ne› suo corpori posset accidere, primus e patriciis Corneliis igni voluit cremari. Dedarat enim Ennius de Africano: ’Hic est ille situs’, vere, nam siti dicuntur ii qui conditi sunt. Nec tamen eorum ante sepulcrum est quam iusta facta et porcus caesus est. Et quod nunc communiter in omnibus sepultis venit usu ‹ut› humati dicantur, id erat proprium tum in iis quos humus iniecta contexerat, eumque morem ius pontificale confirmat. Nam prius quam in os iniecta gleba est, locus ille ubi crematum est corpus nihil habet religionis; iniecta gleba tum et ille humatus est et sepulcrum vocatur, ac tum denique multa religiosa iura conplectitur. Itaque in eo qui in nave necatus, deinde in mare proiectus esset, decrevit P. Mucius familiam puram, quod os supra terram non extaret; porcam heredi esse contrac‹tam›, et habendas triduum ferias et porco femina piaculum faci‹undum›. Si in mari mortuus esset, eadem praeter piaculum et ferias. XXIII
Atticus. I see what is in the pontifical right; but I ask whether there is anything in the laws. Marcus. A few things indeed, Titus, and, as I think, not unknown to you. But they look not so much to religion as to the right of tombs. “A dead man,” says the law in the Twelve Tables, “you shall not bury nor burn within the city.” I believe it is for fear of fire. And as for its adding “nor burn,” it shows that the man buried is not the one who is burned, but the one who is interred. Atticus. What of the fact that after the Twelve Tables famous men have been buried within the city? Marcus. I believe, Titus, that there were either those to whom this was granted, before this law, for the sake of their virtue — as to the Publicolae, as to Tubertus — a right which their descendants held by law; or those who, like Gaius Fabricius, attained it for the sake of their virtue, being released from the laws. But just as the law forbids burial within the city, so it was decreed by the college of pontiffs that there is no right to make a tomb in a public place. You know the temple of Honour outside the Colline Gate. It has been handed down to memory that there was an altar in that place. When a tablet was found beside it, and on the tablet was written “Of Honour,” that was the reason this temple was dedicated. But since there had been many tombs in that place, they were ploughed up. For the college determined that a public place could not be bound by a private religion.
Atticus: Video quae sint in pontificio iure, sed quaero ecquidnam sit in legibus. Marcus: Pauca sane Tite, et ut arbitror non ignota vobis. Sed ea non tam ad religionem spectant quam ad ius sepulcrorum. ’Hominem mortuum’ inquit lex in XII ’ in urbe ne sepelito neve urito.’ Credo vel propter ignis periculum. Quod autem addit ’neve urito’, indicat non qui uratur sepelin, sed qui humetur. Atticus: Quid quod post XII in urbe sepulti sunt clari viri? Marcus: Credo Tite fuisse aut eos quibus hoc ante hanc legem virtutis causa tributum est, ut Poplicolae, ut Tuberto, quod eorum posteri iure tenuerunt, aut eos si qui hoc ut C. Fabricius virtutis causa soluti legibus consecuti sunt. Sed ‹ut› in urbe sepeliri lex vetat, sic decretum a pontificum collegio, non esse ius in loco publico fieri sepulcrum. Nostis extra portam Collinam aedem Honoris. Aram in eo loco fuisse memoriae proditum est. Ad eam cum lamina esset inventa, et in ea scriptum ‹lamina› ’Honoris’, ea causa fuit ‹ut› aedis haec dedicare‹tur›. Sed quom multa in eo loco sepulcra fuissent, exarata sunt. Statuit enim collegium locum publicum non potuisse privata religione obligari.
The rest in the Twelve Tables aims at lessening expense and funeral lamentation, transferred almost from the laws of Solon. “More than this,” it says, “you shall not do. You shall not smooth the pyre with an axe.” You know what follows. For we used to learn the Twelve Tables as boys, as a required song, which now no one learns. Expense being cut down, then, to three veils and a little purple tunic and ten flute-players, it does away also with excessive lamentation: “Women shall not tear their cheeks nor hold a wailing for the sake of a funeral.” This the old interpreters, Sextus Aelius and Lucius Acilius, said they did not well understand, but suspected it was some kind of funeral garment; Lucius Aelius took lessus to be a kind of mournful wailing, as the very word signifies. Which I judge to be the truer, the more so because the law of Solon forbids this very thing. These are praiseworthy rules, and shared by the rich, for the most part, with the common people. And this indeed is most in keeping with nature: that the distinction of fortune be done away with in death.
Iam cetera in XII minuendi sumptus sunt lamentationisque funebris, translata de Solonis fere legibus. ’Hoc plus’ inquit ’ne facito. Rogum ascea ne polito.’ Nostis quae sequuntur. Discebamus enim pueri XII ut carmen necessarium, quas iam nemo discit. Extenuato igitur sumptu tribus reciniis et tunicula purpurea et decem tibicinibus, tollit etiam ‹nimiam› lamentationem: ’Mulieres genas ne radunto neve lessum funeris ergo habento.’ Hoc veteres interpretes Sex. Aelius L. Acilius non satis se intellegere dixerunt, sed suspicari vestimenti aliquod genus funebris, L. Aelius lessum quasi lugubrem eiulationem, ut vox ipsa significat. Quod eo magis iudico verum esse quia lex Solonis id ipsum vetat. Haec laudabilia et locupletibus fere cum plebe communia. Quod quidem maxime e natura est, tolli fortunae discrimen in morte. XXIV
The other funeral observances by which grief is increased the Twelve Tables likewise abolished. “For a dead man,” it says, “you shall not gather the bones to make a funeral afterwards.” It makes an exception for death in war and abroad. These things, besides, are in the laws: concerning anointing — “the servile anointing and all passing-round of cups shall be done away with.” These too are rightly abolished, and would not be abolished had they not been in use. “Let there be no costly sprinkling, no long garlands, nor incense-boxes carried before.” This now is a signal that the ornaments of praise belong to the dead, in that the law commands that the crown won by virtue may be set upon the man who won it and upon his parent without fraud. And I believe that, because it had been the practice that several funerals be made for one man and several biers laid out, this too was sanctioned by law that it should not be done. And whereas in this law there stood “nor shall gold be added,” see how humanely another clause makes an exception: “But for him whose teeth shall be fastened with gold, if a man buries or burns him with it, let it be without fraud.” And note this too at the same time: that to bury and to burn were held different things.
Cetera item funebria quibus luctus augetur XII sustulerulit. ’Homini’ inquit ’mortuo ne ossa legito quoi pos funus faciat.’ Excipit bellicam peregrinamque mortem. Haec praeterea sunt in legibus: ‹De uncturaque› ’servilis unctura tollitor omnisque circumpotatio.’ Quae et recte tolluntur, neque tollerentur nisi ‹in usu› fuissent. ’Ne sumptuosa respersio, ne longae coronae nec acerrae praeferantur.’ Illa iam significatio est laudis ornamenta ad mortuos pertinere, quod coronam virtute partam et ei qui peperisset et eius parenti sine fraude esse lex impositam iubet. Credoque quod erat factitatum ut uni plura funera fierent lectique plures sternerentur, id quoque ne fieret lege sanctum est. Qua in lege quom esset ’neve aurum addito’, ‹videtote› quam humane excipiat altera lex ‹praecipit altera lege›: ’At cui auro dentes iuncti escunt, ast im cum ub sepeliet uretve, se fraude esto.’ Et simul illud videtote, aliud habitum esse sepelire et urere.
There are, besides, two laws concerning tombs, of which the one guards the buildings of private persons, the other the tombs themselves. For as to its forbidding “a pyre or a new burning-place to be brought nearer than sixty feet to another’s house against the owner’s will,” it seems to ward off fire. And as to its forbidding the “forecourt,” that is, the vestibule of a tomb, “or the burning-place to be acquired by use,” it protects the right of tombs. These things we have in the Twelve Tables, surely in accordance with nature, which is the standard of law. The rest is in custom: that the funeral be announced if there are to be any games; and that the master of the funeral use an attendant and lictors;
Duae sunt praeterea leges de sepulcris, quarum altera privatorum aedificiis, altera ipsis sepulcris cavet. Nam quod ’rogum bustumve novum’ vetat ’propius sexaginta pedes adigi aedes alienas invito domino’, incendium videtur arcere ‹vetat›. Quod autem ’forum’, id est vestibulum sepulcri, ’bustumve usu capi’ vetat, tuetur ius sepulcrorum. Haec habemus in XII, sane secundum naturam, quae norma legis est. Reliqua sunt in more: funus ut indicatur si quid ludorum, dominusque funeris utatur accenso atque lictoribus,
that the praises of honoured men be recounted in an assembly, and that a song to the flute, called the nenia, accompany them — by which word among the Greeks too mournful songs are named. Atticus. I am glad that our laws are accommodated to nature, and I am much delighted by the wisdom of our forefathers. But I look for a limit set to the expense of tombs, as to the rest of the expense. Marcus. You ask rightly. For to what an extent of expense this matter has now advanced, I believe you saw in the tomb of Gaius Figulus. That of old there was very little appetite for such things, many examples of the forefathers survive. As for the interpreters of our law, in the clause where they are bidden to remove expense and mourning from the right of the gods of the dead, let them understand this above all: that the magnificence of tombs is to be lessened.
honoratorum virorum laudes in contione memorentur, easque etiam ‹et› cantus ad tibicinem prosequatur, cui nomen neniae, quo vocabulo etiam ‹apud› Graecos cantus lugubres nominantur. XXV Atticus:: Gaudeo nostra iura ad naturam accommodari, maiorumque sapientia admodum delector. Sed requiro ut ceteri sumptus sic etiam sepulcrorum modum. Marcus: Recte requiris. Quos enim ad sumptus progressa iam ista res sit, in C. Figuli sepulcro vidisse [te] credo. Minimam olim istius rei fuisse cupiditatem multa extant exempla maiorum. Nostrae quidem legis interpretes, quo capite iubentur sumptum et luctum removere a deorum Manium iure, hoc intellegant in primis, sepulcrorum magnificentiam esse minuendam.
Nor were these things neglected by the wisest writers of laws. For among the Athenians this right of burial in the earth has lasted, as they say, from the time of Cecrops: when the nearest kin had performed the rites and the earth had been drawn over, it was sown with grain, that the bosom and lap, as it were, of a mother might be given to the dead, and the soil, purified by the grain, be given back to the living. There followed a banquet, which the kinsmen entered crowned, and among whom, when whatever was true had been proclaimed concerning the praise of the dead — for to lie was held an impiety — the due rites were completed.
Nec haec a sapientissimis legum scriptoribus neglecta sunt. Nam et Atheniensium in more a Cecrope ut aiunt permansit hoc ius terra humandi, quod quom proxumi fecerant obductaque terra erat, frugibus obserebatur, ut sinus et gremium quasi matris mortuo tribueretur, solum autem frugibus expiatum ut vivis redderetur. Sequebantur epulae quas inibant propinqui coronati, apud quos de mortui laude quom siquid veri erat praedicatum — nam mentiri nefas habebatur —, iusta confecta erant.
Later, when — as Demetrius of Phalerum writes — funerals had begun to grow costly and full of lamentation, they were abolished by a law of Solon, which law our Ten Men cast into the Tenth Table in almost the same words. For the clause about the three veils and most of those things are Solon’s. But as to the lamentations, they are rendered in his very words: “Women shall not tear their cheeks nor hold a wailing for the sake of a funeral.” Concerning tombs, however, there is nothing in Solon beyond “that no one destroy them nor bring another’s body in,” and there is a penalty, “if any man” — the burning-place, for that I think is called the tymbos — “or monument,” it says, “or column shall violate, throw down, or break.” But some while afterwards, on account of these vast tombs that we see in the Ceramicus, it was sanctioned by law “that no one make a tomb more laborious than what ten men could finish in three days”;
Postea quom, ut scribit Phalereus ‹Demetrius›, sumptuosa fieri funera et lamentabilia coepissent, Solonis lege sublata sunt, quam legem eisdem prope verbis nostri Xviri in decimam tabulam coniecerunt. Nam de tribus reciniis et pleraque illa Solonis sunt. De lamentis vero expressa verbis sunt: ’mulieres genas ne radunto neve lessum funeris ergo habento.’ XXVI De sepulcris autem nihil est apud Solonem amplius quam ’ne quis ea deleat neve alienum inferat’, poenaque est, ’si quis bustum’ — nam id puto appellari t... mbon— ’aut monimentum’ inquit ’aut columnam violarit deiecerit fregerit’. Sed post aliquanto propter has amplitudines sepulcrorum, quas in Ceramico videmus, lege sanctum est, ’ne quis sepulcrum faceret operosius quam quod decem homines effecerint triduo’;
nor was it allowed to adorn it with stucco-work, nor to set upon it those “herms,” as they call them, nor to speak of the praise of the dead save in public burials, nor by anyone save him who had been publicly appointed to that office. The thronging of men and women, too, was done away with, that the lamentation might be lessened; for a gathering of people increases grief.
neque id opere tectorio exornari nec hermas hos quos vocant licebat inponi, nec de mortui laude nisi in publieis sepulturis, nec ab alio nisi qui publice ad eam rem constitutus esset dici licebat. Sublata etiam erat celebritas virorum ac mulierum, quo lamentatio minueretur; auget enim luctum concursus hominum.
Wherefore Pittacus forbids anyone at all to attend the funeral of others. But the same Demetrius says, again, that this magnificence of funerals and tombs had grown rife — such as is now generally the case at Rome. This custom he himself lessened by law. For this man, as you know, was not only most learned, but also a great citizen in the commonwealth and most skilled in the safeguarding of the state. He therefore lessened expense, not only by penalty but also by the hour: for he ordered the body to be borne out before daylight. He set a limit, too, to new tombs; for above the mound of earth he wished nothing to be set up save a little column not more than three cubits high, or a table, or a basin, and he had put a particular magistrate in charge of this oversight.
Quocirca Pittacus omnino accedere quemquam vetat in funus aliorum. Sed ait rursus idem Demetrius increbruisse eam funerum sepulcrorumque magnificentiam quae nunc fere Romae est. Quam consuetudinem lege minuit ipse. Fuit enim hic vir ut scitis non solum eruditissimus, sed etiam civis in re publica maximus tuendaeque civitatis peritissimus. Is igitur sumptum minuit non solum poena sed etiam tempore: ante lucem enim iussit efferri. Sepulcris autem novis finivit modum; nam super terrae tumulum noluit quid‹quam› statui nisi columellam tribus cubitis ne altiorem aut mensam aut labellum, et huic procurationi certum magistratum praefecerat. XXVII
So much, then, for these Athenians of yours. But let us look at Plato, who refers the due rites of funerals to the interpreters of religion — a custom which we keep. Concerning tombs he says this: he forbids any part of cultivated land, or land that can be cultivated, to be taken for a tomb; but that land which by its nature can only serve to receive the bodies of the dead without loss to the living, that above all should be filled; while land that can bear fruit and, like a mother, supply us food, let no one diminish for us, neither for the living nor for the dead.
Haec igitur Athenienses tui. Sed videamus Platonem, qui iusta funerum reicit ad interpretes religionum; quem nos morem tenemus. De sepulcris autem dicit haec: vetat ex agro culto, eove qui coli possit, ullam partem sumi sepulcro; sed quae natura agri tantum modo efficere possit, ut mortuorum corpora sine detrimento vivorum recipiat, ea potissimum ut conpleatur; quae autem terra fruges ferre et ut mater cibos suppeditare possit, eam ne quis nobis minuat neve vivos neve mortuos.
He forbids, moreover, that a tomb be built higher than what five men could finish in five days, nor that more stone be raised or set upon it than will hold the praise of the dead, inscribed in not more than four heroic verses, which Ennius calls “long.” We have, then, the authority of this great man too concerning tombs; by whom likewise the expense of funerals is fixed beforehand according to property, from five minae down to one mina. Then he says the same things about the immortality of souls, and the tranquillity that remains for the good after death, and the punishments of the impious.
Extrui autem vetat sepulcrum altius, quam quod ‹quinque homines› quinque diebus absolverint, nec e lapide excitari plus nec inponi, quam quod capiat laudem mortui incisam ne plus quattuor herois versibus, quos longos appellat Ennius. Habemus igitur huius quoque auctoritatem de sepulcris summi viri, a quo item funerum sumptus praefinitur ex censibus a minis quinque usque ad minam. Deinceps dicit eadem illa de inmortalitate animorum et reliqua post mortem tranquillitate bonorum, poenis impiorum.
You have, then, the whole subject of the rites of religion set forth, as I think. Quintus. We have indeed, brother, and copiously too; but go on with the rest. Marcus. I will go on, and since it has pleased you to drive me to this, I will finish in today’s discourse, I hope, especially on this day; for I see that Plato did the same, and that his whole discourse on the laws was carried through in a single summer’s day. So, then, I shall do, and speak of the magistrates. For that, surely, is what most holds the commonwealth together, once religion is established. Atticus. Speak on, then, and keep to that method you have begun.
Habetis igitur explicatum omnem ut arbitror religionum locum. Quintus: Nos vero frater, et copiose quidem; sed perge cetera. Marcus: Pergam equidem, et quoniam libitum est vobis me ad haec inpellere, hodierno sermone conficiam, spero, hoc praesertim die; video enim Platonem idem fecisse, omnemque orationem eius de legibus peroratam esse uno aestivo die. Sic igitur faciam, et dicam de magistratibus. Id enim est profecto quod constituta religione rem publieam contineat maxime. Atticus: Tu vero dic et istam rationem quam coepisti tene. LIBER III I
Marcus. I shall go on, then, as I have begun, with that godlike man whom, stirred by a certain excessive admiration, I praise perhaps more often than I need to. Atticus. You mean Plato, of course. Marcus. The very man, Atticus. Atticus. You can never praise him too warmly or too often. For even those followers of mine, who would have no one praised but their own master, grant me this much: that I may love him as I please. Marcus. They do well, by Hercules. For what could be more worthy of your refinement? In him both life and discourse seem to me to have attained that most difficult union — gravity joined with humanity. Atticus. I am truly glad I interrupted you, since you have given me so splendid a testimony of your judgement. But go on as you had begun. Marcus. Shall we praise the law itself, then, first, with the true and proper praises of its own kind? Atticus. By all means — just as you did with the law on religion.
Marcus: Sequar igitur ut institui divinum illum virum quem ‹nimia› quadam admiratione commotus saepius fortasse laudo quam necesse est. Atticus: Platonem videlicet dicis. Marcus: Istum ipsum Attice. Atticus: Tu vero eum nec nimis valde umquam nec nimis saepe laudaveris. Nam hoc mihi etiam nostri illi, qui neminem nisi suum laudari volunt, concedunt, ut eum arbitratu meo diligam. Marcus: Bene hercle faciunt. Quid enim est elegantia tua dignius? Cuius et vita et oratio consecuta mihi videtur difficillimam illam societatem gravitatis cum humanitate. Atticus: Sane gaudeo quod te interpellavi, quoniam quidem tam praeclarum mihi dedisti iudicii tui testimonium. Sed perge ut coeperas. Marcus: Laudemus igitur prius legem ipsam veris et propriis generis sui laudibus? Atticus: Sane quidem, sicut de religionum lege fecisti.
Marcus. You see, then, that this is the force of a magistrate: that he should preside and prescribe what is right and useful and bound up with the laws. For as the laws preside over the magistrates, so the magistrates preside over the people; and it can truly be said that a magistrate is a speaking law, and the law a silent magistrate.
Marcus: Videtis igitur magistratus hanc esse vim ut praesit praescribatque recta et utilia et coniuncta cum legibus. Ut enim magistratibus leges, ita populo praesunt magistratus, vereque dici potest, magistratum esse legem loquentem, legem autem mutum magistratum.
Nothing, moreover, is so suited to the principle and condition of nature — and when I say this, I want it understood that I mean the law — as command, without which no household can stand, nor any city, nor nation, nor the whole race of mankind, nor the whole of nature, nor the universe itself. For the universe obeys God; the seas and lands obey the universe; and the life of man submits to the orders of the supreme law.
Nihil porro tam aptum est ad ius condicionemque naturae — quod quom dico, legem a me dici intellegi volo — quam imperium, sine quo nec domus ulla nec civitas nec gens nec hominum universum genus stare, nec rerum natura omnis nec ipse mundus potest. Nam et hic deo paret, et huic oboediunt maria terraeque, et hominum vita iussis supremae legis obtemperat. II
And to come to these nearer matters, more familiar to us: all the ancient nations once obeyed kings. This kind of command was at first conferred on the most just and wisest of men — and this prevailed most of all in our own commonwealth, so long as the royal power presided over it; afterward it was handed on in succession to their descendants, which custom even now remains among those who are ruled by kings. But those to whom the royal power was not pleasing wished to obey, not no one, but not always one man. We, however — since we are giving laws to free peoples, and since we have already, in six earlier books, set down what we judged to be the best commonwealth — shall now fit our laws to that condition of the state which we approve.
Atque ut ad haec citeriora veniam et notiora nobis: omnes antiquae gentes regibus quondam paruerunt. Quod genus imperii primum ad homines iustissimos et sapientissimos deferebatur — idque et in re publica nostra maxime valuit, quoad ei regalis potestas praefuit —, deinde etiam deinceps posteris prodebatur, quo ‹et› in iis qui etiam nunc regnant‹ur› manet. Quibus autem regia potestas non placuit, non ii nemini, sed non semper uni parere voluerunt. Nos autem quoniam leges damus liberis populis, quaeque de optima re publica sentiremus, in sex libris ante diximus, accommodabimus hoc tempore leges ad illum quem probamus civitatis statum.
There is need, then, of magistrates, without whose prudence and diligence a state cannot exist, and in whose distribution of office the whole ordering of the commonwealth is contained. And not only must the measure of commanding be prescribed to them, but also the measure of obeying to the citizens. For he who commands well must at some time have obeyed, and he who obeys with restraint seems worthy of one day commanding. And so it is fitting both that he who obeys should hope that he will at some time command, and that he who commands should reflect that before long he himself must obey. Nor do we prescribe only that men should submit to and obey the magistrates, but also that they should honour and love them — as Charondas does in his laws; while our own Plato held that those who oppose the magistrates, as the Titans opposed the gods of heaven, are of the Titans’ breed. Since this is so, let us now come to the laws themselves, if you please. Atticus. Indeed both that, and this whole order of subjects, pleases me.
Magistratibus igitur opus est, sine quorum prudentia ac diligentia esse civitas non potest, quorumque discriptione omnis rei publicae moderatio continetur. Neque solum iis praescribendus est imperandi, sed etiam civibus obtemperandi modus. Nam et qui bene imperat, paruerit aliquando necesse est, et qui modeste paret, videtur qui aliquando imperet dignus esse. Itaque oportet et eum qui paret sperare, se aliquo tempore imperaturum, et illum qui imperat cogitare, brevi tempore sibi esse parendum. Nec vero solum ut obtemperent oboediantque magistratibus, sed etiam ut eos colant diligantque praescribimus, ut Charondas in suis facit legibus, noster vero Plato Titanum e genere ‹esse› statuit eos qui ut illi caelestibus, sic hi adversentur magistratibus. Quae cum ita sint ad ipsas iam leges veniamus si placet. Atticus: Mihi vero et istud et ordo iste rerum placet. III
Marcus. Let commands be lawful; and let the citizens obey them with restraint and without refusal. Against a citizen who does not obey, and who is not harmful, let the magistrate restrain him by fine, by chains, or by stripes, unless an equal or greater power, or the people, forbid it; to whom let there be appeal. When a magistrate has given judgement or imposed a penalty, let there be a contest before the people over the fine and the penalty. On military service let there be no appeal from him who commands; and whatever he who wages the war has ordered, let it be lawful and binding. Of the lesser magistrates, who share their authority, let there be several over several things. On military service let them command those over whom they have been set, and let them be the tribunes of those men. At home let them guard the public money, keep the chains for the guilty, exact capital penalties, coin bronze, silver, and gold for the state, judge the suits brought before them, and do whatever the senate shall have decreed.
Marcus: ’Justa imperia sunto, isque cives modeste ac sine recusatione parento. Magistratus nec oboedientem et ‹in›noxium] civem multa vinculis verberibusve coherceto, ni par maiorve potestas populusve prohibessit, ad quos provocatio esto. Cum magistratus iudicassit inrogassitve, per populum multae poenae certatio esto. Militiae ab eo qui imperabit provocatio nec esto, quodque is qui bellum geret imperassit, ius ratumque esto.’ ’Minoris magistratus partiti iuris ploeres in ploera sunto. Militiae quibus iussi erunt imperanto eorumque tribuni sunto. Domi pecuniam publicam custodiunto, vincula sontium servanto, capitalia vindicanto, aes argentum aurumve publice signanto, litis contractas iudicanto, ‹quod› quodcumque senatus creverit agunto.’
Let there be aediles, overseers of the city, of the grain supply, and of the solemn games; and let this be for them the first step of ascent toward higher honour. Let the censors take the census of the people’s ages, offspring, households, and properties; let them guard the city’s temples, roads, waters, and treasury and revenues; let them distribute the parts of the people into tribes; then let them apportion the people by wealth, age, and rank; let them enrol the offspring of horsemen and footmen; let them forbid men to remain unwed; let them govern the morals of the people; let them leave no disgrace standing in the senate. Let there be two of them; let them hold the magistracy for five years; and let that power be perpetual. Let the rest of the magistrates be annual.
’Suntoque aediles curatores urbis annonae ludorumque sollemnium, ollisque ad honoris amplioris gradum is primus ascensus esto.’ ’Censoris populi aevitates suboles familias pecuniasque censento, urbis templa vias aquas aerarium vectigalia tuento, populique partis in tribus discribunto, exin pecunias aevitatis ordinis partiunto, equitum peditumque prolem discribunto, caelibes esse prohibento, mores populi regunto, probrum in senatu ne relinquonto. Bini sunto, magistratum quinquennium habento eaque potestas semper esto, reliqui magistratus annui sunto.’
Let there be a praetor, an arbiter of right, to judge private suits or to order them judged. Let him be the guardian of the civil law. Of equal power with him let there be as many as the senate shall have decreed or the people commanded. Let there be two with royal command; and from their going before, their judging, and their consulting, let them be called praetors, judges, consuls. On military service let them hold the supreme right; let them obey no one. Let the safety of the people be their highest law.
’Iuris disceptator, qui privata iudicet iudicarive iubeat, praetor esto. Is iuris civilis custos esto. Huic potestate pari quotcumque senatus creverit populusve iusserit, tot sunto.’ ’Regio imperio duo sunto, iique ‹a› praeeundo iudicando consulendo praetores iudices consules appellamino. Militiae summum ius habento, nemini parento. Ollis salus populi suprema lex esto.’
Let no one hold the same magistracy unless ten years have come between. Let them observe the limit of age by the law of years. But when a graver war or discord among the citizens shall arise, let one man, if the senate shall have so decreed, hold for no more than six months the same right as the two consuls; and, declared under favourable auspices, let him be the master of the people. And let him have one to command the cavalry, of equal right with him who shall be the arbiter of justice. Let the other magistrates not exist. But when there shall be neither consuls nor a master of the people, let the auspices belong to the fathers, and let them produce from their own number one who can duly create consuls in the assembly. Let commands, powers, and embassies, when the senate has decreed or the people commanded, go forth from the city; let them wage lawful wars justly; let them spare the allies; let them hold themselves and their men in check; let them increase the glory of their people; let them return home with praise. Let no one be a legate for the sake of his own affairs. Whom the people shall have created, ten of their own, against violence and for the sake of aid, let these be their tribunes; and what they shall forbid, and what they shall lay before the people, let it be binding; and let them be inviolable; and let them not leave the people bereft of tribunes.
’Eundem magistratum, ni interfuerint decem anni, ne quis capito. Aevitatem annali lege servanto.’ ’Ast quando duellum gravius discordiaeve civium escunt, oenus ne amplius sex menses, si senatus creverit, idem iuris quod duo consules teneto, isque ave sinistra dictus populi magister esto. Equitatumque qui regat habeto pari iure cum eo quicumque erit iuris disceptator. Reliqui magistratus ne sunto.’ ’Ast quando consules magisterve populi nec erunt, auspicia patrum sunto, ollique ec se produnto qui comitiatu creare consules rite possit.’ ’Imperia potestates legationes, cum senatus creverit populusve jusserit, ex urbe exeunto, duella iusta iuste gerunto, sociis parcunto, se et suos continento, populi ‹sui› gloriam augento, domum cum laude redeunto.’ ’Rei suae ergo ne quis legatus esto.’ ’Plebes quos pro se contra vim auxilii ergo decem creassit, ei tribuni eius sunto, quodque ei prohibessint quodque plebem rogassint, ratum esto; sanctique sunto; neve plebem orbam tribunis relinquunto.’
Let all magistrates hold the right of auspices and of judgement; and let the senate be formed of them. Let its decrees be binding. But if an equal or greater power forbid, let the decrees be kept on record. Let that order be free of fault, and a model to the rest. Let the creation of magistrates, the judgements of the people, the things commanded and forbidden, when they are voted on, be known to the best men by their votes, and free to the common people. But if there shall be anything that needs to be managed beyond the magistrates, let the people create one to manage it, and grant him the right of managing it. Let the right of dealing with the people and the fathers belong to the consul, the praetor, the master of the people and of the cavalry, and to him whom the fathers shall produce for the purpose of proposing consuls; and let the tribunes whom the common people shall have created for themselves have the right of dealing with the fathers; let these same men bring before the common people whatever shall be needful. Let whatever is dealt with before the people, and whatever among the fathers, be measured.
’Omnes magistratus auspicium iudiciumque habento, exque is senatus esto. Eius decreta rata sunto. At potestas par maiorve prohibessit, perscripta servanto.’ ’Is ordo vitio vacato, ceteris specimen esto.’ ’Creatio magistratuum, iudicia populi, iussa vetita cum cosciscentur, suffragia optumatibus nota, plebi libera sunto.’ IV ’Ast quid erit quod extra magistratus coerari oesus sit, qui coeret populus creato eique ius coerandi dato. ’Cum populo patribusque agendi ius esto consuli praetori magistro populi equitumque, eique quem patres prodent consulum rogandorum ergo; tribunisque quos sibi plebes creassit ius esto cum patribus agendi; idem ad plebem quod oesus erit ferunto.’ ’Quae cum populo quaeque in patribus agentur, modica sunto.’
For the senator who shall not be present, let there be either a reason or a fault. Let the senator speak in his place and in due measure; let him have a grasp of the people’s affairs. Let violence be absent from the people. Let the equal or greater power prevail. But if there shall be any disorder in the proceeding, let the fault be the mover’s. Let the man who intervenes against a bad measure be a citizen of public benefit. Let those who act observe the auspices, obey the public augur; let them, once their bills have been promulgated and posted in the treasury, conduct them when these are known; let them consult on no more than single matters at a time; let them instruct the people on the matter, and suffer themselves to be instructed by magistrates and by private men. Let them not impose privileges. Concerning a citizen’s life let them bring nothing except through the greatest assembly and through those whom the censors shall have placed in the divisions of the people. Let them neither take a gift nor give one, whether in seeking, in conducting, or in having conducted office. Whoever transgresses in any of these matters, let the penalty be equal to the offence. Let the censors keep the trust of the laws. Let private men refer their acts to them; nor on that account let them be the more free from the law. The law has been read out: I shall order you to withdraw, and the ballot to be given.
’Senatori qui nec aderit aut causa aut culpa esto. Loco senator et modo orato, causas populi teneto.’ ’Vis in populo abesto. Par maiorve potestas plus valeto. Ast quid turbassitur in agendo, fraus actoris esto. Intercessor rei malae salutaris civis esto.’ ’Qui agent auspicia servanto, auguri publico parento, promulgata proposita in aerario Ü cognita agunto; nec plus quam de singulis rebus semel consulunto; rem populum docento, doceri a magistratibus privatisque patiunto.’ ’Privilegia ne inroganto. De capite civis nisi per maximum comitiatum ollosque quos censores in partibus populi locassint ne ferunto.’ ’Donum ne capiunto neve danto neve petenda neve gerenda neve gesta potestate. Quod quis earum rerum migrassit, noxiae poena par esto.’ Cesoris fidem legum custodiunto. Privati ad eos acta referunto, nec eo magis lege liberi sunto.ë Lex recitata est: discedere et tabellam iubebo dari. V
Quintus. How briefly, brother, you have set before our eyes the whole distribution of the magistracies! But it is nearly that of our own state, even though you have brought in a little that is new. Marcus. You observe quite rightly, Quintus. For this is the very tempering of the commonwealth which Scipio praises in those books, and which he approves most of all — the balance that could not have been brought about save by such a distribution of the magistracies. For hold this to be true: that the commonwealth is contained in its magistrates and in those who preside over it, and that from their arrangement is understood what kind of commonwealth each one is. Since this had been most wisely and most temperately established by our ancestors, I found nothing at all, or not much, that I thought needed to be made new in the laws.
Quintus: Quam brevi frater in conspectu posita est a te omnium magistratuum discriptio, sed ea paene nostrae civitatis, etsi a te paulum adlatum est novi. Marcus: Rectissime Quinte animadvertis. Haec est enim quam Scipio laudat in ‹illis› libris et quam maxime probat temperationem rei publicae, quae effici non potuisset nisi tali discriptione magistratuum. Nam sic habetote, magistratibus iisque qui praesint contineri rem publicam, et ex eorum conpositione quod cuiusque rei publicae genus sit intellegi. Quae res cum sapientissime moderatissimeque constituta esset a maioribus nostris, nihil habui sane ‹aut› non multum quod putarem novandum in legibus.
Atticus. You will give us, then — as you did in the law on religion, at my prompting and request — so too on the magistracies, a discussion of the reasons why that distribution most pleases you. Marcus. I shall do as you wish, Atticus; and I shall unfold this whole topic, as it has been inquired into and debated by the most learned men of Greece, and, as I set out to do, I shall touch on our own institutions. Atticus. That is the kind of discussion I most look forward to. Marcus. And yet most of it has been said in those books, as had to be done when the question concerned the best commonwealth. But there are certain things proper to this topic of the magistracies, inquired into more subtly first by Theophrastus, then by Diogenes the Stoic.
Atticus: Reddes igitur nobis, ut in religionis lege fecisti admonitu et rogatu meo, sic de magistratibus, ut disputes, quibus de causis maxime placeat ista discriptio. Marcus: Faciam Attice ut vis, et locum istum totum, ut a doctissimis Graeciae quaesitum et disputatum est, explicabo, et ut institui nostra iura attingam. Atticus: Istud maxime exspecto disserendi genus. Marcus: Atqui pleraque sunt dicta in illis libris, quod faciendum fuit quom de optuma re publica quaereretur. Sed huius loci de magistratibus sunt propria quaedam, a Theophrasto primum, deinde a Dio‹ge›ne Stoico quaesita subtilius. VI
Atticus. Do you really say so? Have these matters been treated even by the Stoics? Marcus. Not at all, except by the one I have just named, and afterward by a great man, learned among the first, Panaetius. For the older Stoics discussed the commonwealth acutely enough, but only in words, not for this practical and civic use. These matters flowed rather from the Academy, with Plato as their head. Afterward Aristotle threw light on this whole civic field of debate, and so did Heraclides of Pontus, who set out from the same Plato. Theophrastus, trained by Aristotle, dwelt — as you know — on this kind of subject; and Dicaearchus, taught by the same Aristotle, did not fail this study and pursuit. After Theophrastus, that famous Demetrius of Phalerum, whom I mentioned above, marvellously drew learning out of the shaded retreats of scholars and their leisure, not only into the sun and the dust, but into the very crisis and battle-line. For we can name many men of middling learning who were great in the commonwealth, and many most learned men not much engaged in public affairs; but who excelled in both — so as to be foremost both in the pursuits of learning and in the governing of the state — who can easily be found besides this man? Atticus. I think one can be found — one, indeed, among the three of us. But go on as you had begun.
Atticus: Ain tandem? Etiam a Stoicis ista tractata sunt? Marcus: Non sane nisi ab eo quem modo nominavi, et postea a magno homine et in primis erudito Panaetio. Nam veteres verbo tenus acute illi quidem, sed non ad hunc usum popularem atque civilem, de re publica disserebant. Ab Academia magis ista manarunt Platone principe. Post Aristoteles inlustravit omnem hunc civilem in disputando locum, Heraclidesque Ponticus profectus ab eodem Platone. Theophrastus vero institutus ab Aristotele habitavit ut scitis in eo genere rerum, ab eodemque Aristotele doctus Dicaearchus huic rationi studioque non defuit. Post a Theophrasto Phalereus ille Demetrius, de quo feci supra mentionem, mirabiliter doctrinam ex umbraculis eruditorum otioque non modo in solem atque in pulverem, sed in ipsum discrimen aciemque produxit. Nam et mediocriter doctos magnos in re publica viros, et doctissimos homines non nimis in re publica versatos multos commemorare possumus: qui vero utraque re excelleret, ut et doctrinae studiis et regenda civitate princeps esset, quis facile praeter hunc inveniri potest? Atticus: Puto posse, et quidem aliquem de tribus nobis. Sed perge ut coeperas. VII
Marcus. The question, then, that they raised was this: whether it pleased them that there should be one magistrate in the state whom the rest would obey. This, I understand, pleased our ancestors after the kings were driven out. But since the royal form of the state, once approved, was afterward rejected — not so much for the faults of monarchy as for the faults of the monarch — only the name of king will seem to have been rejected; the thing will remain, if one man commands all the rest of the magistrates.
Marcus:: Quaesitum igitur ab illis est, placeretne unum in civitate esse magistratum cui reliqui parerent. Quod exactis regibus intellego placuisse nostris maioribus. Sed quoniam regale civitatis genus, probatum quondam, postea non tam regni quam regis vitiis repudiatum est, nomen tantum videbitur regis repudiatum, res manebit si unus omnibus reliquis magistratibus imperabit.
For this reason the ephors were not set against the kings at Sparta by Theopompus without cause, nor among us the tribunes against the consuls. For the consul has this very thing which is fixed in law: that all the other magistrates obey him, except the tribune, who arose afterward precisely so that what had been should not be. For this first diminished the consular right — that there arose one who was not bound by it; and next, that it brought aid to the rest, not only to the magistrates but even to private men who did not obey the consul.
Quare nec ephori Lacedaemone sine causa a Theopompo oppositi regibus, nec apud nos consulibus tribuni. Nam illud quidem ipsum quod in iure positum est habet consul, ut ei reliqui magistratus omnes pareant, excepto tribuno, qui post exstitit ne id quod fuerat esset. Hoc enim primum minuit consulare ius, quod exstitit ipse qui eo non teneretur, deinde quod attulit auxilium reliquis non modo magistratibus, sed etiam privatis consuli non parentibus.
Quintus. It is a great evil you speak of. For with that power once born, the gravity of the aristocracy fell, and the force of the multitude grew strong. Marcus. It is not so, Quintus. For that bare right of the consul had to seem not only too haughty for the people but too violent as well. After a moderate and wise tempering was added to it — [… a fragment preserved by Macrobius: “How will he be able to protect the allies, if he has no discrimination between useful things and useless?” … the law applies to all.]
Quintus: Magnum dicis malum. Nam ista potestate nata gravitas optimatium cecidit, convaluitque vis multitudinis. Marcus: Non est Quinte ita. Non ius enim illud solum superbius populo, ‹sed› et violentius videri necesse erat. Quo posteaquam modica et sapiens temperatio accessit* [Macrobius de differentiis et societatibus 17,6: Cicero de legibus tertio: Qui poterit socios tueri, si dilectum rerum utilium et inutilium non habebit? Ü convertem lex in omnis est.] VIII
“Let them return home with praise.” For good and blameless men should bring back nothing from enemies or from allies but praise. And surely this much is plain: that nothing is more shameful than for anyone to be sent out on an embassy except for the sake of the commonwealth. I pass over how those men behave, and have behaved, who use an embassy to chase down their own inheritances or debts. The fault is perhaps in the men. But I ask: what in fact is more shameful than a senator made legate without commission, without instructions, without any public charge of the commonwealth? This kind of embassy I, when consul, although it seemed to bear on the convenience of the senate, would still have abolished — with the senate, in fullest attendance, approving — had not a frivolous tribune of the people then interposed his veto. I did, however, cut down its term, and what was unlimited I made annual. So the disgrace remains, but its long duration is gone. But now, if you please, let us depart from the provinces and return to the city. Atticus. We are willing enough; but those who are in the provinces are by no means willing.
’Domum cum laude redeunto.’ Nihil enim praeter laudem bonis atque innocentibus neque ex hostibus neque a sociis reortandum. Iam illud apertum est profecto nihil esse turpius quam quemquam legari nisi rei publicae causa. Omitto quem ad modum isti se gerant atque gesserint, qui legatione hereditates aut syngraphas suas persecuntur. In hominibus est hoc fortasse vitium. Sed quaero quid reapse sit turpius, quam sine procuratione senator legatus, sine mandatis, sine ullo rei publicae munere? Quod quidem genus legationis ego consul, quamquam ad commodum senatus pertinere videbatur, tamen adprobante senatu frequentissimo, nisi mihi levis tribunus plebis tum intercessisset, sustulissem. Minui tamen tempus, et quod erat infinitum, annuum feci. Ita turpitudo manet, diutunitate sublata. Sed iam si placet de provinciis decedatur, in urbemque redeatur. Atticus: Nobis vero placet, sed iis qui in provinciis sunt minime placet.
Marcus. And yet, Titus, if they will obey these laws, nothing will be sweeter to them than the city and their own home, and nothing more toilsome and troublesome than a province. But there follows the law that sanctions the power of the tribunes of the people, which exists in our commonwealth. About this there is no need to argue. Quintus. But by Hercules, brother, I do ask what you think of that power. For to me it seems a thing of ruin, born as it was in sedition and for sedition. If we are willing to recall its first origin, we see it brought forth amid the arms of citizens, with the strong points of the city seized and besieged. Then, when it had been quickly killed off — like a child marked for deformity under the Twelve Tables — in a short time, by some means or other, it was revived, and was born again far more loathsome and foul. For what did that creature not bring forth? It first, as befitted an impious thing, stripped the fathers of all their honour, made all the lowest equal to the highest, threw everything into confusion, mingled all together. And when it had crushed the gravity of the leading men, still it never rested.
Marcus: At vero Tite si parebunt his legibus, nihil erit iis urbe, nihil domo sua dulcius, nec laboriosius molestiusque provincia. Sed sequitur lex quae sancit eam tribunorum plebis potestatem, quae est in re publica nostra. De qua disseri nihil necesse est. Quintus: At mehercule ego frater quaero, de ista potestate quid sentias. Nam mihi quidem pestifera videtur, quippe quae in seditione et ad seditionem nata sit. Cuius primum ortum si recordari volumus, inter arma civium et occupatis et obsessis urbis locis procreatum videmus. Deinde quom esset cito necatus tamquam ex XII tabulis insignis ad deformitatem puer, brevi tempore nescio IX quo pacto recreatus multoque taetrior et foedior natus est. Quae enim ille non edidit? Qui primum, ut inpio dignum fuit, patribus omnem honorem eripuit, omnia infima summis paria fecit, turbavit, miscuit. Cum adflixisset prineipum gravitatem, numquam tamen conquievit.
For — to leave aside Gaius Flaminius and those things which now seem ancient by their age — what right did the tribunate of Tiberius Gracchus leave to good men? And yet, five years before, Decimus Brutus and Publius Scipio — consuls, and what great men! — a man the lowest and basest of all, the tribune of the people Gaius Curiatius, threw into chains, which had not been done before. And the tribunate of Gaius Gracchus — with the daggers which he himself said he had flung into the Forum for the citizens to fight one another — did it not throw the whole order of the commonwealth into confusion? What now shall I say of Saturninus, of Sulpicius, of the rest? Whom the commonwealth could not even drive off from itself without the sword.
Namque ut C. Flaminium atque ea quae iam prisca videntur propter vetustatem relinquam, quid iuris bonis viris Tiberi Gracchi tribunatus reliquit? Etsi quinquennio ante D[ecim]um Brutum et P. Scipionem consules — quos et quantos viros! — homo omnium infimus et sordidissimus tribunus plebis C. Curiatius in vincula coniecit, quod ante factum non erat. C. vero Gracchi tribunatus sicis quas ipse se proiecisse in forum dixit, quibus digladiarentur inter se cives, nonne omnem rei publicae statum perturbavit? Quid iam de Saturnino, Sulpicio, reliquis dicam? Quos ne depellere quidem a se sine ferro potuit res publica.
But why should I bring forward old things or other men’s, rather than our own and recent ones? Who, I ask, would ever have been so bold, so hostile to us, as to think of overthrowing our standing, had he not first sharpened against us some tribune’s blade? And when wicked and abandoned men could find no such blade in any household, nor in any clan, they thought whole clans must be thrown into confusion for them in the darkness of the commonwealth. This indeed is for us a distinguished thing, and glorious to the immortality of memory: that no tribune could be found for any bribe to use against us, except one to whom it had not even been permitted to be a tribune.
Cur autem aut vetera aut aliena proferam potius quam et nostra et recentia? Quis, inquam, tam audax, tam nobis inimicus fuisset, ut cogitaret umquam de statu nostro labefactando, nisi mucronem aliquem tribunicium exacuisset in nos? Quem quom homines scelerati ac perditi non modo ulla in domo, sed nulla in gente reperirent, gentis sibi in tenebris rei publicae perturbandas putaverunt. Quod nobis quidem egregium et ad inmortalitatem memoriae gloriosum, neminem in nos mercede ulla tribunum potuisse reperiri, nisi cui ne esse quidem licuisset tribuno.
But what carnage that man wrought! Such, of course, as madness could work, without reason and without any good hope — the madness of a filthy beast, inflamed by the frenzies of many. For which reason, in that matter at least, I strongly approve of Sulla, who by his law took from the tribunes of the people the power of doing injury and left them the power of bringing aid; and while in all other matters I exalt our Pompey always with the fullest and highest praises, on the tribunician power I keep silent. For I have no wish to blame, and I cannot praise.
Sed ille quas strages edidit! Eas videlicet quas sine ratione ac sine ulla spe bona furor edere potuit inpurae beluae, multorum inflammatus furoribus. Quam ob rem in ista quidem re vehementer Sullam probo, qui tribunis plebis sua lege iniuriae faciendae potestatem ademerit, auxilii ferendi reliquerit, Pompeiumque nostrum ‹in› ceteris rebus omnibus semper amplissimis summisque ecfero laudibus, de tribunicia potestate taceo. Nec enim reprehendere libct, nec laudare possum. X
Marcus. You discern the faults of the tribunate splendidly, Quintus; but in censuring anything it is unfair to leave out the good and reckon up only the evils, picking out the faults. For in that way even the consulship can be reviled, if you collect the sins of the consuls — whom I do not care to enumerate. For my part, I admit there is something of evil in that very power; but the good that was sought in it we could not have without that evil. “The power of the tribunes of the people is excessive.” Who denies it? But the force of the people is far more savage and far more violent; and that force, when it has a leader, is sometimes gentler than if it had none. For the leader reflects that he advances at his own peril, while the people’s onset takes no account of its own danger.
Marcus: Vitia quidem tribunatus praeclare Quinte perspicis, sed est iniqua in omni re accusanda praetermissis bonis malorum enumeratio vitiorumque selectio. Nam isto quidem modo vel consulatus vitupe[rari po]test, si consulum quos enumerare nolo peccata collegeris. Ego enim fateor in ista ipsa potestate inesse quiddam mali, sed bonum, quod est quaesitum in ea, sine isto malo non haberemus. ’Nimia potestas est tribunorum plebis.’ Quis negat? Sed vis populi multo saevior multoque vehementior, quae ducem quom habet interdum lenior est, quam si nullum haberet. Dux enim suo se periculo progredi cogitat, populi impetus periculi rationem sui non habet.
“But at times it is inflamed.” And indeed it is often calmed. For what college is so desperate that, of ten men, no one is of sound mind? Why, Tiberius Gracchus himself was overthrown not only by the disregard but by the suppression of an intervening colleague. For what else struck him down, except that he stripped his colleague who interposed his veto of that power? But look at the wisdom of our ancestors in this: when that power had been granted to the common people by the fathers, the arms fell, the sedition was quenched, a tempering was found by which the lower orders could think themselves made equal with the leading men — and in this one thing lay the safety of the state. “But there were two Gracchi.” And besides them you may enumerate as many as you like; for since ten are created at a time, you will find in all of memory some ruinous tribunes — frivolous too, not good ones, perhaps the greater number; but the highest order is free of unpopularity, and the common people raise no dangerous contests over their own right.
’At aliquando incenditur.’ Et quidem saepe sedatur. Quod enim est tam desperatum collegium, in quo nemo e decem sana mente sit? Quin ipsum Ti. Gracchum non solum neglectus sed etiam sublatus intercessor evertit. Quid enim illum aliud perculit, nisi quod potestatem intercedenti collegae abrogavit? Sed tu sapientiam maiorum in illo vide: concessa plebei a patribus ista potestate arma ceciderunt, restincta seditio est, inventum est temperamentum, quo tenuiores cum principibus aequari se putarent, in quo uno fuit civitatis salus. ’At duo Gracchi fuerunt.’ Et praeter eos quamvis enumeres multos licet, cum deni creentur, ‹non›nullos in omni memoria reperies perniciosos tribunos, leves etiam, non bonos, fortasse plures: invidia quidem summus ordo caret, plebes de suo iure periculosas contentione nullas facit.
For which reason either the kings should not have been expelled, or liberty should have been given to the people in deed, not in word. Yet it was so given that the people were led, by many most distinguished institutions, to yield to the authority of the leading men. But our own case, my best and sweetest brother, which fell upon the tribunician power, had no contest with the tribunate. For it was not the people, stirred up, who envied our deeds; rather the chains were loosed and the slaves roused, with the added terror of arms as well. Nor was my struggle with that plague of the moment, but with a most grievous crisis of the commonwealth; and had I not yielded to it, my country would not have enjoyed for long the fruit of my service. And the outcome of events proved this: for who, not only of the free but even of the slaves who deserved liberty, did not hold our safety dear?
Quam ob rem aut exigendi reges non fuerunt, aut plebi re, non verbo, danda libertas. Quae tamen sic data est, ut multis ‹institutis› praeclarissimis adduceretur, ut auctoritati principum cederet. XI Nostra autem causa quae, optume et dulcissume frater, incidit in tribuniciam potestatem, nihil habuit contentionis cum tribunatu. Non enim plebes incitata nostris rebus invidit, sed vincula soluta sunt et servitia concitata, adiuncto terrore etiam militari. Neque nobis cum illa tum peste certamen fuit, sed cum gravissimo rei publicae tempore, cui si non cessissem, non diuturnum beneficii mei patria fructum tulisset. Atque haec rerum exitus indicavit: quis enim non modo liber, sed etiam servus libertate dignus fuit, cui nostra salus cara non esset?
But if the outcome of those things which we did for the safety of the commonwealth had been such that they pleased not everyone, and if the inflamed envy of a raging multitude had driven us out, and the tribunician force had stirred the people against me, as Gracchus did against Laenas, and Saturninus against Metellus — we should bear it, O Quintus my brother; and we should be consoled, not so much by the philosophers who were at Athens (who ought to have done this), as by those most illustrious men who, when driven from that city, preferred to do without an ungrateful state rather than remain in a wicked one. As for Pompey — since in this one matter you do not so greatly approve of him — you seem to me scarcely to notice enough that he had to see not only what was best, but also what was necessary. For he perceived that this power could not be denied to our state: a power which our people had sought so eagerly while it was unknown to them — how could they do without it once they knew it? But it was the part of a wise citizen not to leave a cause that was neither ruinous, and yet so popular that it could not be resisted, to some citizen who was ruinously popular. — You know, brother, that in conversation of this sort, so that one may pass on to something else, it is usual to say “quite so” or “exactly so.” Quintus. I do not at all agree. Still, I would have you go on to what remains. Marcus. You persist, then, and stand by your old opinion. Atticus. And by Hercules, I for one do not really disagree with our Quintus. But let us hear what remains.
Quodsi is casus fuisset rerum quas pro salute rei publicae gessimus, ut non omnibus gratus esset, et si nos multitudinis furentis inflammata invidia pepulisset, tribuniciaque vis in me populum, sicut Gracchus in Laenatem, Saturninus in Metellum incitasset, ferremus o Quinte frater, consolarenturque nos non tam philosophi qui Athenis fuerunt — qui hoc facere debebant —, quam clarissimi vin qui illa urbe pulsi carere ingrata civitate quam manere in ‹im›proba maluerunt. Pompeium vero quod una ista in re non ita valde probas, vix satis mihi illud videris attendere, non solum ei quid esset optimum videndum fuisse, sed etiam quid necessarium. Sensit enim deberi non posse huic civitati illam potestatem: quippe quam tanto opere populus noster ignotam expetisset, qui posset carere cognita? Sapientis autem civis fuit, causam nec perniciosam et ita popularem ut non posset obsisti, perniciose populari civi non relinquere. — Scis solere frater in huius modi sermone, ut transiri alio possit, dici ’admodum’ aut ’prorsus ita est.’ Quintus: Haud equidem adsentior. Tu tamen ad reliqua pergas velim. Marcus: Perseveras tu quidem et in tua vetere sententia permanes. Atticus: Nec mehercule ego sane a Quinto nostro dissentio. Sed ea quae restant audiamus. XII
Marcus. Next, then, auspices and powers of judgement are given to all the magistrates: powers of judgement, so that there should be a power in the people to which appeal might be made; auspices, so that well-judged delays might hold back many useless assemblies. For often the immortal gods have checked an unjust onset of the people by the auspices. And as for the senate’s being formed of those who have held a magistracy, it is altogether of the people’s kind that no one should come to the highest place except through the people, the censors’ power of co-optation being taken away. But a tempering of this fault is at hand, in that the authority of the senate is confirmed by our law.
Marcus: Deinceps igitur omnibus magistratibus auspicia et iudicia dantur: iudicia ‹ita› ut esset populi potestas ad quam provocaretur, auspicia ut multos inutiles comitiatus probabiles inpedirent morae. Saepe enim populi impetum iniustum auspiciis di immortales represserunt. Ex iis autem qui magistratum ceperunt quod senatus efficitur, populare ‹est› sane neminem in summum locum nisi per populum venire, sublata cooptatione censoria. Sed praesto est huius viti temperatio, quod senatus lege nostra confirmatur auctoritas.
For there follows: “Let its decrees be binding.” For the matter stands thus: if the senate is master of the public counsel, and all defend what it has decreed, and if the remaining orders are willing for the commonwealth to be governed by the counsel of the leading order, then it will be possible, by this tempering of the law — with the power in the people, the authority in the senate — to maintain that moderate and harmonious condition of the state; especially if the next law is obeyed; for next comes: “Let that order be free of fault, a model to the rest.” Quintus. A splendid law, indeed, brother; but it extends widely, that the order should be free of fault, and it requires a censor as its interpreter.
Sequitur enim: ’Eius decreta rata sunto.’ Nam ita se res habet, ut si senatus dominus sit publici consilii, quodque is creverit defendant omnes, et si ordines reliqui principis ordinis consilio rem publicam gubernari velint, possit ex temperatione iuris, cum potestas in populo, auctoritas in senatu sit, teneri ille moderatus et concors civitatis status, praesertim si proximae legi parebitur; nam proximum est: ’Is ordo vitio careto, ceteris specimen esto.’ Quintus: Praeclara vero frater ista lex, sed et late patet ut vitio careat ordo, et censorem quaerit interpretem.
Atticus. Now, although that whole order is yours, and keeps a most grateful memory of your consulship, by your leave I would say: it could wear out not only the censors, but all the judges as well. Marcus. Leave off, Atticus! For this discourse is held not about this senate, nor about these men who exist now, but about future men, if any should ever wish to obey these laws. For since the law commands that they be free of every fault, no one who shares in a fault will even come into that order. But this is difficult to bring about save by a certain upbringing and discipline; of which we shall perhaps say something, if there is any room or time.
Atticus: Ille vero etsi tuus est totus ordo, gratissimamque memoriam retinet consulatus tui, pace tua dixerim: non modo censores sed etiam iudices omnes potest defatigare. XIII Marcus: Omitte ista Attice! Non enim de hoc senatu nec his de hominibus qui nunc sunt, sed de futuris, si qui forte his legibus parere voluerint, haec habetur oratio. Nam cum omni vitio carere lex iubeat, ne veniet quidem in eum ordinem quisquam vitii particeps. Id autem difficile factu est nisi educatione quadam et disciplina; de qua dicemus aliquid fortasse, si quid fuerit loci aut temporis.
Atticus. Room there will certainly be, since you hold to the order of the laws; and as for time, the length of the day grants it freely. But I, even if you pass it over, will demand from you that topic on upbringing and discipline. Marcus. Demand it, Atticus — both that, and any other I pass over. “A model to the rest.” If we hold to this, we hold to everything. For as the whole state is wont to be infected by the desires and faults of the leading men, so it is amended and corrected by their self-restraint. That great man, and a friend to us all, Lucius Lucullus, was reported to have given a most convenient answer when the magnificence of his Tusculan villa was thrown up against him: that he had two neighbours, the one above a Roman knight, the one below a freedman; and since their villas were magnificent, it ought to be conceded to him to do what was permitted to men of a lower order. Do you not see, Lucullus, that this very thing arose from you — that they desired what would not have been permitted them if you had not done it?
Atticus: Locus certe non derit, quoniam tenes ordinem legum; tempus vero largitur longitudo diei. Ego autem, etiam si praeterieris, repetam a te istum de educatione et de disciplina locum. Marcus: Tu vero et istum Attice, et si quem alium praeteriero. ’Ceteris specimen esto.’ Quod si tenemus, ‹tenemus› omnia. Ut enim cupiditatibus principum et vitiis infici solet tota civitas, sic emendari et corrigi continentia. vir magnus et nobis omnibus amicus L. Lucullus ferebatur, quasi commodissime respondisset, cum esset obiecta magnificentia villae Tusculanae, duo se habere vicinos, superiorem equitem Romanum, inferiorem libertinum: quorum cum essent magnificae villae, concedi sibi oportere quod iis qui inferioris ordinis essent liceret. Non vides Luculle a te id ipsum natum ut illi cuperent quibus id si tu non faceres non liceret?
For who would put up with those men, when he saw their villas crammed with statues and paintings, some of them public property, some even sacred and consecrated — who would not break their lusts, unless those very men who ought to break them were held by the same desire? For it is not so great an evil that the leading men should sin — although this is in itself a great evil — as that very many imitators of the leading men arise. For one may see, if you will unroll the memory of the ages, that whatever the highest men of the state have been, such has the state been; and whatever change of morals has arisen in the leading men, the same has followed in the people.
Quis enim ferret istos, cum videret eorum villas signis et tabulis refertas, partim publicis, partim etiam sacris et religiosis, quis non frangeret eorum libidines, nisi illi ipsi qui eas frangere deberent cupiditatis eiusdem tenerentur? XIV Nec enim tantum mali est peccare principes, quamquam est magnum hoc per se ipsum malum, quantum illud quod permulti imitatores principum existunt. Nam licet videre, si velis replicare memoriam temporum, qualescumquc summi civitatis viri fuerint, talem civitatem fuisse; quaecumque mutatio morum in principibus extiterit, eandem in populo secutam.
And this is not a little truer than what pleases our Plato. He says that with the changing of the strains of music the conditions of states are changed; but I think that with the changing of the life and habits of the nobles the morals of states are changed. So much the more ruinously do faulty leading men deserve ill of the commonwealth, in that they not only conceive faults themselves, but pour them into the state; and they harm it not only because they are themselves corrupted, but because they corrupt others, and do more damage by example than by sin. And this law, though stretched over the whole order, can also be narrowed: for a few, and very few indeed, raised up by honour and glory, can either corrupt the morals of the state or correct them. But of this enough for now; and it has been treated more thoroughly in those books. So let us come to what remains.
Idque haud paulo est verius, quam quod Platoni nostro placet. Qui musicorum cantibus ait mutatis mutari civitatum status: ego autem nobilium vita victuque mutato mores mutari civitatum puto. Quo perniciosius de re publica merentur vitiosi principes, quod non solum vitia concipiunt ipsi, sed ea infundunt in civitatem, neque solum obsunt quod ipsi corrumpuntur, sed etiam quod corrumpunt, plusque exemplo quam peccato nocent. Atque haec lex, dilatata in ordinem cunctum, coangustari etiam potest: pauci enim atque admodum pauci honore et gloria amplificati vel corrumpere mores civitatis vel corrigere possunt. Sed haec et nunc satis, et in illis libris tractata sunt diligentius. Quare ad reliqua veniamus. XV
Next comes the matter of votes, which I direct should be known to the best men, free to the people. Atticus. By Hercules, I attended closely, and yet I did not fully grasp what the law, or those words, meant. Marcus. I shall tell you, Titus, and I shall be turning over a difficult matter, much and often inquired into: whether, in entrusting a magistracy and in judging an accused man and in voting on a law or a bill, it was better that the votes be cast secretly or openly. Quintus. Is even that in doubt? I am afraid I shall again disagree with you. Marcus. You will not, Quintus. For I hold the very opinion which I know you have always held: that nothing in voting was better than the open voice. But whether it can be maintained is what we must look into.
Proximum autem est de suifragiis, quae iubeo nota esse optimatibus, populo libera. Atticus: Ita mehereule attendi, nec satis intellexi quid sibi lex aut quid verba ista vellent. Marcus: Dicam Tite et versabor in re difficili ac multum et saepe quaesita, suffragia in magistratu mandando ac de reo iudicando ‹sciscenda›que in lege aut rogatione clam an palam ferri melius esset. Quintus: An etiam id dubium est? Vereor ne a te rursus dissentiam. Marcus: Non facies Quinte. Nam ego in ista sum sententia qua te fuisse semper scio, nihil ut fuerit in suffragiis voce melius; sed optineri an possit videndum est.
Quintus. And yet, brother — by your good leave I would say it — that opinion both deceives the inexperienced most of all, and most often harms the commonwealth, when something is said to be true and right, but it is denied that it can be maintained, that the people can be resisted. For, first, there is resistance when the matter is handled with severity; and next, it is better to be overborne by force in a good cause than to give way to a bad one. And who does not perceive that the ballot-law took away all the authority of the best men? A law which the people, while free, never longed for; the same people, when oppressed by the domination and power of the leading men, clamoured for it. And so heavier judgements upon the most powerful men stand on record from the voice than from the ballot. For which reason the excessive lust to vote, in bad causes, ought to have been taken from the powerful men, and no hiding-place given to the people, in which, with good men ignorant of what each thought, the ballot might conceal a vicious vote. And so for that scheme no proposer was ever found, and no good man to back it.
Quintus: Atqui frater bona tua venia dixerim, ista sententia maxime et fallit imperitos, et obest saepissime rei publicae, cum aliquid verum et rectum esse dicitur, sed optineri id est obsisti posse populo negatur. Primum enim obsistitur cum agitur severe, deinde vi opprimi in bona causa est melius quam malae cedere. Quis autem non sentit omnem auctoritatem optimatium tabellariam legem abstulisse? Quam populus liber numquam desideravit, idem oppressus dominatu ac potentia principum flagitavit. Itaque graviora iudicia de potentissimis hominibus extant vocis quam tabellae. Quam ob rem suffragandi nimia libido in non bonis causis eripienda fuit potentibus, non latebra danda populo, in qua bonis ignorantibus quid quisque sentiret, tabella vitiosum occultaret suffragium. Itaque isti rationi neque lator quisquam est inventus nec auctor umquam bonus. XVI
For there are four ballot-laws, of which the first is on entrusting magistracies: this is the Gabinian (a law of Aulus Gabinius), brought in by an unknown and base man. Two years after followed the Cassian, on the judgements of the people, brought in by a noble man, Lucius Cassius — but, by his family’s leave I would say it, one at variance with good men and angling, by popular contrivance, for every little breath of rumour. The third is the Carbonian (the law of Gaius Papirius Carbo), on commanding and forbidding laws, the work of a seditious and dishonest citizen, to whom not even his return to good men could bring safety from good men.
Sunt enim quattuor leges tabellariae, quarum prima de magistratibus mandandis: ea est Gabinia, lata ab homine ignoto et sordido. Secuta biennio post Cassia est de populi iudiciis, a nobili homine lata L. Cassio, sed, pace familiae dixerim, dissidente a bonis atque omnis rumusculos populari ratione aucupante. Carbonis est tertia de iubendis legibus ac vetandis, seditiosi atque inprobi civis, cui ne reditus quidem ad bonos salutem a bonis potuit adferre.
In one kind alone the open-voiced vote seemed to be left, which Cassius himself had excepted — that of treason. But to this judgement too Gaius Coelius gave the ballot; and he grieved as long as he lived that, to crush Gaius Popillius, he had harmed the commonwealth. And our own grandfather, with singular virtue, withstood throughout his life, in this town, Marcus Gratidius — in whose marriage was our grandmother’s sister — when Gratidius was bringing in a ballot-law. For Gratidius was stirring up waves in a ladle, as the saying goes — the very waves which his son Marius afterward stirred up in the Aegean sea. And when the matter had been brought before our grandfather, Marcus Scaurus, the consul, said: “Would, Marcus Cicero, that with that spirit and virtue you had chosen to be engaged with us in the highest affairs of state rather than in those of a town!”
Uno in genere relinqui videbatur vocis suffragium, quod ipse Cassius exceperat, perduellionis. Dedit huic quoque iudicio C. Coelius tabellam, doluitque quoad vixit se ut opprimeret C. Popillium nocuisse rei publicae. Et avus quidem noster singulari virtute in hoc municipio quoad vixit restitit M.Gratidio cuius in matrimonio sororem aviam nostram habebat, ferenti legem tabellariam. Excitabat enim fluctus in simpulo ut dicitur Gratidius, quos post filius eius Marius in Aegaeo excitavit mari. Ac nostro quidem avo, cum res esset ad se delata, M. Scaurus consul: ’Utinam’ inquit ’M. Cicero isto animo atque virtute in summa re publica nobiscum versari quam in municipali maluisses!’
For which reason, since we are not now revising the laws of the Roman people, but either reclaiming the laws torn from us or writing new ones, I think you must be told not what can be maintained with this people, but what is best. For the blame of the Cassian law your own Scipio bears, on whose authority it is said to have been brought in; but if you bring in a ballot-law, you will answer for it yourself. For it pleases neither me nor our Atticus, so far as I can read it from his face.
Quam ob rem, quoniam non recognoscimus nunc leges populi Romani, sed aut repetimus ereptas aut novas scribimus, non quid hoc populo optineri possit, sed quid optimum sit tibi dicendum puto. Nam Cassiae legis culpam Scipio tuus sustinet, quo auctore lata esse dicitur; tu si tabellariam tuleris, ipse praestabis. Nec enim mihi placet nec Attico nostro quantum e vultu eius intellego. XVII Atticus: Mihi vero nihil umquam populare placuit, eamque optimam rem publicam esse dico, quam hic consul constituerat, quae sit in potestate optimorum.
Atticus. For my part, nothing popular has ever pleased me, and I say that the best commonwealth is the one which this consul established, the one which is in the power of the best men. Marcus. You, I see, have rejected the law without a ballot. But for my part — although Scipio said enough for himself in those books — I grant the people that liberty of theirs in such a way that the good men may both have weight by their authority and use it. For the law on votes was read out by me thus: “Let them be known to the best men, free to the common people.” This law contains the intent of abolishing all the laws brought in afterward which screen the vote by every means, so that no one may look at the ballot, may question, may challenge. The Marian law (a law of Gaius Marius) even made the gangways narrow.
Marcus: Vos ‹qui›dem ut video legem antiquastis sine tabella. Sed ego, etsi satis dixit pro se in illis libris Scipio, tamen ita libertatem istam largior populo, ut auctoritate et valeant et utantur boni. Sic enim a me recitata lex est de suffragiis: ’Optimatibus nota, plebi libera sunto.’ Quae lex hanc sententiam continet, ut omnes leges tollat quae postea latae sunt quae tegunt omni ratione suffragium, ne quis inspiciat tabellam, ne roget, ne appellet. Pontes etiam lex Maria fecit angustos.
If these provisions are set against canvassers — as for the most part they are — I do not blame them; if, however, the laws have not availed to keep out bribery, then let the people indeed have their ballot as a kind of guardian of liberty, provided that this ballot be shown, and freely offered, to every best and gravest citizen, so that in that very thing may lie the liberty in which the people are given the power of honourably gratifying good men. And so now there comes about what you, Quintus, said a little while ago: that the ballot condemns fewer men than the voice used to, because for the people it is enough that it be permitted; once this is retained, the rest of their will is handed over to authority or to favour. And so — to leave aside votes corrupted by bribery — do you not see that, whenever canvassing is silent, men inquire in the voting what the best men think? For which reason, by our law the appearance of liberty is given, the authority of the good men is retained, and the cause of contention is taken away.
Quae si opposita sunt ambitiosis, ut sunt fere, non reprehendo; si non valuerint tamen leges ut ne sit ambitus, habeat sane populus tabellam quasi vindicem libertatis, dummodo haec optimo cuique et gravissimo civi ostendatur ultroque offeratur, ut in eo sit ipso libertas ‹in› quod populo potestas honeste bonis gratificandi datur. Eoque nunc fit illud quod a te modo Quinte dictum est, ut minus multos tabella condemnet, quam solebat vox, quia populo licere satis est: hoc retento reliqua voluntas auctoritati aut gratiae traditur. Itaque, ut omittam largitione corrupta suffragia, non vides, si quando ambitus sileat, quaeri in suifragiis quid optimi viri sentiant? Quam ob rem lege nostra libertatis species datur, auctoritas bonorum retinetur, contentionis causa tollitur. XVIII
Then there follows: to whom belongs the right of dealing with the people or with the senate. Then comes a weighty law, and, as I judge, a splendid one: “Let whatever is dealt with before the people, and whatever among the fathers, be measured” — that is, modest and calm. For the mover shapes and moulds not only the minds and wills, but almost the very faces, of those before whom he acts. In the senate this is not difficult; for the senator is a man whose mind is not directed toward a stage-manager, but who wishes to be looked at for himself. To him three commands are given: that he attend — for the matter has weight when the order is full; that he speak in his place — that is, when asked; and that he speak in measure — that he not be endless. For brevity is a great merit, not only in a senator but even in an orator, when giving an opinion; and a long speech is never to be used — which is most often done out of self-display — unless either, when the senate is sinning and no magistrate is helping, it is useful to talk out the day, or when the cause is so great that there is need of an orator’s abundance, whether for exhorting or for instructing. In both of these kinds our own Cato is great.
Deinde sequitur, quibus ius sit cum populo agendi aut cum senatu. ‹Tum› gravis et ut arbitror praeclara lex: ’Quae cum populo quaeque in patribus agentur, modica sunto’, id est modesta atque sedata. Actor enim moderatur et fingit non modo mentes ac voluntates, sed paene vultus eorum apud quos agit. Quod ‹ni›si in senatu non difficile; est enim ipse senator is cuius non ad actorem referatur animus, sed qui per se ipse spectari velit. Huic iussa tria sunt: ut adsit, nam gravitatem res habet, cum frequens ordo est; ut loco dicat, id est rogatus; ut modo, ne sit infinitus. Nam brevitas non modo senatoris sed etiam oratoris magna laus est in sententia, nec est umquam longa oratione utendum — quod fit ambitione saepissime —, nisi aut peccante senatu nullo magistratu adiuvante tolli diem utile est, aut cum tanta causa est ut opus sit oratoris copia vel ad hortandum vel ad docendum; quorum generum in utroque magnus noster Cato est.
And as for what it adds — “Let him have a grasp of the people’s affairs” — it is necessary for a senator to know the commonwealth; and this extends widely: how many soldiers it has, how strong it is in the treasury, what allies the commonwealth has, what friends, what tributaries, by what law, condition, or treaty each is bound; and to have a grasp of the custom of decreeing, to know the precedents of our ancestors. You see now this whole class of knowledge, diligence, and memory, without which a senator can in no way be prepared.
Quodque addit ’causas populi teneto, est senatori necessarium nosse rem publicam — idque late patet: quid habeat militum, quid valeat aerario, quos socios res publica habeat, quos amicos, quos stipendiarios, qua quisque sit lege, condicione, foedere —, tenere consuetudinem decernendi, nosse exempla maiorum. Videtis iam genus hoc omne scientiae, diligentiae, memoriae, sine quo paratus esse senator nullo pacto potest.
Next come the dealings with the people, in which the first and greatest thing is: “Let violence be absent.” For nothing is more destructive to states, nothing so contrary to right and to the laws, nothing less civil and more inhuman, than that anything be done by violence in an ordered and established commonwealth. The law commands obedience to the man who intervenes with his veto, than which nothing is more excellent: for it is better that a good measure be hindered than that a bad one be conceded. And as for my making the fault belong to the mover, I took this whole point from the opinion of that wisest of men, Crassus, whom the senate followed when, in the consulship of Gaius Claudius, on Gnaeus Carbo’s referring the matter of sedition, it decreed that sedition cannot occur against the will of the man who is dealing with the people, since it is open to him to dismiss the assembly the moment a veto is interposed and disorder begun. Whoever shall press on to act when nothing can be done seeks violence, the impunity of which he loses by this law.
Deinceps sunt cum populo actiones, in quibus primum et maximum, vis abesto’. Nihil est enim exitiosius civitatibus, nihil tam contrarium iuri ac legibus, nihil minus civile et inhumanius, quam composita et constituta re publica quicquam agi per vim. Parere iubet intercessori, quo nihil praest‹abil›ius: impediri enim bonam rem melius quam concedi malae. XIX Quod vero actoris iubeo esse fraudem, id totum dixi ex Crassi sapientissimi hominis sententia, quem est senatus secutus, cum decrevisset C. Claudio consule de Cn. Carbonis seditione referente, invito eo qui cum populo ageret seditionem non posse fieri, quippe cui liceat concilium, simul atque intercessum turbarique coeptum sit, dimittere. Quod qui ‹agere› perget cum agi nihil potest, vim quaerit, cuius inpunitatem amittit hac lege.
There follows: “Let the man who intervenes against a bad measure be a citizen of public benefit.” Who would not zealously come to the aid of the commonwealth, praised by so splendid a voice of the law? Then there are set down next those things which we have also in our public institutions and laws: “Let them observe the auspices, let them obey the public augur.” And it is the part of a good augur to remember that, in the greatest crises of the commonwealth, he ought to be ready at hand; that he has been given to Jupiter best and greatest as a counsellor and minister, so that those whom he has ordered to be present at the auspices are his to command, and that the regions of the sky have been assigned and handed over to him as his own, from which he can often bring aid to the commonwealth. Then come the matters of promulgation, of dealing with single matters, of hearing private men and magistrates.
Sequitur illud ’intecessor rei malae salutaris civis esto’. Quis non studiose rei publicae subvenerit hac tam praeclara legis voce laudatus? Sunt deinde posita deinceps quae habemus etiam in publicis institutis atque legibus: ’Auspicia servanto, auguri ‹publico› parento.’ est autem boni auguris meminisse ‹se› maximis rei publicae temporibus praesto esse debere, Iovique optimo maximo se consiliarium atque administrum datum, ut sibi eos quos in auspicio esse iusserit, caelique partes sibi definitas esse traditas, e quibus saepe opem rei publicae ferre possit. Deinde de promulgatione, de singulis rebus agendis, de privatis magistratibusve audiendis.
Then two most distinguished laws carried over from the Twelve Tables, of which one abolishes privileges, the other forbids that anything be proposed touching a citizen’s life except before the greatest assembly. And with seditious tribunes of the people not yet in existence — not even thought of — it is marvellous that our ancestors should have provided so much for the future. They were unwilling that laws be passed against private men — for that is what a privilege is; and what is more unjust than this, when the very force of a law is that it be an enactment and a command upon all? They were unwilling that anything be proposed touching individuals except in the centuriate assembly. For the people, distributed by census, by orders, by ages, brings more counsel to its vote than when convened loosely in the tribes.
Tum leges praeclarissimae de duodecim tabulis tralatae duae, quarum altera privilegia tollit, altera de capite civis rogari nisi maximo comitiatu vetat. Et nondum in‹ven›tis seditiosis tribunis plebis, ne cogitatis quidem, admirandum tantum maioris in posterum providisse. In privatos homines leges ferri noluerunt, id est enim privilegium: quo quid est iniustius, cum legis haec vis sit, ‹ut sit› scitum et iussum in omnis? Ferri de singulis ‹ni›si centuriatis comitiis noluerunt. Discriptus enim populus censu ordinibus aetatibus plus adhibet ad suffragium ‹con›silii quam fuse in tribus convocatus.
The truer, then, was the saying of that man of great talent and the highest prudence, Lucius Cotta, in our case: that nothing whatever had been enacted concerning us. For, besides that those assemblies had been conducted with the arms of slaves, moreover neither the tributary assemblies of the head could be valid, nor any concerning a privilege. For which reason we had no need of a law, since concerning us nothing whatever had been enacted by law. But it seemed better both to you and to those most illustrious men that, concerning a matter in which slaves and brigands might say they had passed some measure, all Italy should declare what it thought.
Quo verius in causa nostra vir magni ingenii summaque prudentia L. Cotta dicebat, nihil omnino actum esse de nobis. Praeter enim quam quod comitia illa essent armis gesta servilibus, praeterea neque tributa capitis comitia rata esse posse neque ulla privilegii. Quocirca nihil nobis opus esse lege, de quibus nihil omnino actum esset legibus. Sed visum est et vobis et clarissimis viris melius, de quo servi et latrones scivisse ‹se› aliquid dicerent, de hoc eodem cunctam Italiam quid sentiret ostendere. XX
There follows the matter of moneys taken and of bribery. Since these laws are to be sanctioned by judgements rather than by the words of laws, there is added: “Let the penalty be equal to the offence,” so that each may be punished in his own fault: violence by death, avarice by a fine, the lust for honour by disgrace. The last laws are not in use with us, but necessary for the commonwealth. We have no keeping of the laws, and so the laws are such as our clerks wish them to be: we seek them from the copyists, and we have no public record of public memory consigned to public documents. The Greeks did this more carefully, among whom were created guardians of the laws nomophylakes, who watched not only over the documents — for that indeed was so even among our ancestors — but also over the deeds of men, and called them back to the laws.
Sequitur de captis pecuniis et de ambitu. ‹Leges› quae cum magis iudiciis quam ‹legum› verbis sancienda sint, adiungitur ’noxiae poena par esto’, ut in suo vitio quisque plectatur, vis capite, avaritia multa, honoris cupiditas ignominia sanciatur. Extremae leges sunt nobis non usitatae, rei publicae necessariae. Legum custodiam nullam habemus, itaque eae leges sunt quas apparitores nostri volunt: a librariis petimus, publicis litteris consignatam memoriam publicam nullam habemus. Graeci hoc diligentius, apud quos nomofulakoi crea‹ba›ntur, nec ei solum litteras — nam id quidem etiam apud maiores nostros erat —, sed etiam facta hominum observabant ad legesque revocabant.
Let this care be given to the censors, since indeed we wish them always to exist in the commonwealth. Before these same censors let those who have laid down a magistracy declare and set forth what they have done in office, and let the censors give a preliminary judgement upon them. In Greece this is done by publicly appointed accusers, who indeed cannot be effective unless they are volunteers. For which reason it is better that the accounts be rendered and the case set forth before the censors, while still the matter is kept whole for the law, the accuser, and a trial. But enough has now been argued about the magistrates — unless perhaps you want something more. Atticus. What? If we are silent, does the place itself not remind you what you must say next? Marcus. I? About the courts, Pomponius, I suppose; for that is joined to the magistrates.
Haec detur cura censoribus, quando quidem eos in re publica semper volumus esse. Apud eosdem qui magistratu abierint edant et exponant, quid in magistratu gesserint, deque iis censores praeiudicent. Hoc in Graecia fit publice constitutis accusatoribus, qui quidem graves esse non possunt, nisi sunt voluntarii. Quocirca melius rationes referri causamque exponi censoribus, integram tamen legi accusatori iudicioque servari. Sed satis iam disputatum est de magistratibus, nisi forte quid desideratis. Atticus: Quid? Si nos tacemus, locus ipse te non admonet, quid tibi sit deinde dicendum? Marcus: Mihine? De iudiciis arbitror Pomponi; id est enim iunctum magistratibus.
Atticus. What? About the law of the Roman people, in the way you set out to do — do you think nothing need be said? Marcus. Why, what is there in this place that you would ask for? Atticus. I? What I think it most shameful for those engaged in public life to be ignorant of. For as you said just now, that the laws are sought from the copyists, so I observe that most men in the magistracies, through ignorance of their own law, know just as much as their attendants wish. For which reason, if you thought you must speak of the alienation of sacred things when you had set out the laws on religion, you must likewise, now that the magistracies are established by law, discuss the law of their powers.
Atticus: Quid? De iure populi Romani, quem ad modum instituisti, dicendum nihil putas? Marcus:: Quid tandem hoc loco est quod requiras? Atticus: Egone? Quod ignorari ab iis qui in re publica versantur turpissimum puto. Nam ut modo a te dictum est leges a librariis peti, sic animadverto ‹ple›rosque in magistratibus ignoratione iuris sui tantum sapere quantum apparitores velint. Quam ob rem si de sacrorum alienatione dicendum putasti, quom de religione leges proposueras, faciendum tibi est ut magistratibus lege constitutis de potestatum iure disputes.
Marcus. I shall do so briefly, if I can manage it. For Marcus Junius, our friend, wrote to your father at greater length — skilfully, in my judgement, and carefully. But we ought to think and speak, of our own resources, about the law of nature; about the law of the Roman people, only what has been left and handed down to us. Atticus. That is exactly my view, and that very thing you speak of is what I am waiting for. […]
Marcus: Faciam breviter si consequi potuero. Nam pluribus verbis scripsit ad patrem tuum M. Iunius sodalis, perite meo quidem iudicio et diligenter. Nos autem de iure nat‹ur›ae cogitare per nos atque dicere debemus, de iure populi Romani quae relicta sunt et tradita. Atticus: Sic prorsum censeo, et id ipsum quod dicis exspecto.*